UCSB   LIBHAKY 


MODERN     GERMANY 


MODERN  GERMANY 

Her  Political  and  Economic  Problems, 

Her  Foreign  and  Domestic   Policy, 

Her  Ambitions,  and  the  Causes 

of  her  Successes  and  of  her 

Failures 


Fifth  and  very  greatly  enlarged  Edition,  completely 
revised  and  brought  up  to  January   1915 

BY 
J.   ELLIS   BARKER 


NEW   YORK 
E.   P.   DUTTON   &   COMPANY 

68 1    FIFTH   AVENUE 
1915 


Printed  by  BALLANTYNE,  HANSON  &  Co. 
at  the  Ballantyne  Press,  Edinburgh 


PREFACE    TO    THE    FIFTH 
EDITION 

THE  fifth  edition  of  Modern  Germany  is  practically  a 
new  book.  The  last  four  chapters,  containing  about 
a  hundred  pages,  have  been  added.  They  deal  with 
the  War,  its  causes  and  probable  consequences,  and  I 
venture  to  think  they  should  be  of  particular  interest  at 
the  present  moment.  In  Chapter  XXXII,  "  The 
Ultimate  Ruin  of  Germany,"  a  pessimistic  forecast  of 
that  country's  future  is  given,  while  Chapter  XXXIII, 
"  How  the  Military  Rules  Germany,"  sheds  a  great 
deal  of  light  upon  the  hidden  causes  of  the  War.  I 
would  draw  special  attention  to  Chapter  XXXIV, 
"The  German  Customs  of  War,"  and  Chapter  XXXV, 
"  Rules  of  the  Hague  Convention."  Their  perusal 
will  enable  every  reader  to  ascertain  for  himself 
whether  Germany  has  observed  the  international  laws 
of  war  and  her  own  war  regulations  or  whether  she 
has  violated  either. 

The  present  volume  contains  nearly  300,000  words, 
or  about  three  times  as  much  reading  matter  as  the 
average  six-shilling  novel.  While  the  present  edition 
runs  to  852  pages,  the  first  edition,  published  in  1905, 
comprised  only  346  pages.  Notwithstanding  its  very 
great  increase  in  size  the  price  of  the  book  has  now 
been  reduced  from  los.  6d.  to  75.  6d.  in  order  to  make 


vi  PREFACE 

it  as  widely  accessible  as  possible.  Unfortunately  the 
cost  of  producing  so  large  a  book  precluded  its  being 
sold  more  cheaply. 

Modern  Germany  in  its  present  form  is,  I  believe, 
the  most  exhaustive  book  on  the  subject  in  the  English 
language,  and  it  has  the  honour  of  being  generally 
considered  a  standard  work  which  has  even  penetrated 
to  Japan,  for  it  has  been  translated  into  the  Japanese 
language.  My  critics  have  very  kindly  declared  it  to 
be  "an  encyclopaedia  of  German  affairs,"  "  a  store- 
house of  information  which  cannot  be  found  else- 
where," "  an  indispensable  compendium,  invaluable 
as  a  book  of  reference  to  statesmen,  lecturers,  and 
publicists/'  &c. 

Ever  since  1900,  when  I  first  entered  the  literary 
field,  I  have  pointed  out  in  numerous  articles,  espe- 
cially in  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  After  and  in  the 
Fortnightly  Review,  that,  owing  to  the  mistaken  policy 
of  her  rulers,  Germany  was  creating  enemies  for  herself 
throughout  the  world  and  endangering  her  future. 
From  year  to  year  these  warnings  became  more  em- 
phatic. The  Preface  of  the  fourth  edition  of  Modern 
Germany,  published  in  autumn,  1912,  contains  the 
following  passage  : 

"  During  the  last  few  years  Germany's  failures,  to 
which  I  had  drawn  attention  in  previous  editions,  have 
become  more  salient  and  more  frequent.  During 
twenty  years  the  German  Foreign  Office  has  serenely 
marched  from  failure  to  failure.  The  Morocco  fiasco 
is  merely  the  last  of  a  large  number  of  mistaken  and 
unsuccessful  enterprises. 

"  By  her  policy  towards  Great  Britain,  Germany  has 
brought  into  being  the  Triple  Entente  and  that  isola- 
tion about  which  she  has  so  frequently  complained, 
and  she  is  accelerating  the  unification  of  the  British 


PREFACE  vii 

Empire,  which  she  wishes  to  prevent  and  has  tried  to 
prevent.  The  failure  of  her  domestic  policy  is  pro- 
claimed by  the  constant  increase  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party,  which  polled  more  than  4,250,000  votes 
at  the  election  of  1912.  Germany's  prosperity  is 
admittedly  phenomenal.  Still,  a  careful  observer 
cannot  help  noticing  that  her  economic  progress  is 
slackening.  Germany's  future  seems  no  longer  as 
bright  as  it  used  to  appear,  and  deep  pessimism  pre- 
vails in  leading  German  circles." 

I  foresaw  and  frequently  foretold  the  present  War, 
and  warned  not  only  British  statesmen  and  the  British 
public  of  the  coming  catastrophe,  but  also  the  leading 
German  statesmen,  as  may  be  seen  in  Chapter  XXXII. 
Unfortunately  these  warnings,  addressed  to  the  most 
eminent  official  German  personages,  produced  no 
effect. 

Most  of  the  chapters  of  this  book  have  appeared  in 
the  form  of  articles  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  and 
After,  the  Fortnightly  Review,  the  National  Review,  and 
the  Contemporary  Review,  and  I  herewith  cordially 
thank  their  editors  for  their  permission  to  reprint 
these. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  draw  attention  to  the 
Analytical  Index  at  the  end  of  this  book,  which 
should  greatly  increase  its  practical  utility. 


J.  ELLIS  BARKER. 


LONDON, 

January  25,  191 5. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION  v 

CHAP. 

I.  INTRODUCTION. — THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  STATE 

IN  ENGLAND  AND  IN  GERMANY          .         .         i 

II.  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMANY'S 

FOREIGN  POLICY         .  ...       12 

III.  THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE  PROB- 

LEM OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY        .         .         .38 

IV.  THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHER- 

LANDS           67 

V.  THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE  RUSSIAN 

PROBLEM 92 

VI.  GERMANY'S  WORLD  POLICY  AND  HER  ATTITUDE 

TOWARDS  ANGLO-SAXON  COUNTRIES  .     115 

VII.  GERMANY  AND  THE  BRITISH  DOMINIONS — HER 
ATTEMPTS  TO  DEFEAT  IMPERIAL  RECIPRO- 
CITY   148 

VIII.  ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC    .         .     174 

IX.  THE     RELATIONS     BETWEEN     GERMANY    AND 

FRANCE 198 

X.  THE  MOROCCO  CRISIS  OF  1911  ....     223 

XI,  ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES — GERMAN    EVI- 
DENCE ON  THE  SUBJECT     .         .         ,         .241 


x  CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

XII.  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE— CAN  GERMANY  RELY 

UPON  HER  PARTNERS  ?  270 

XIII.  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY     .        .     297 

XIV.  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  LEAGUE  AND  THE  NAVY     324 

XV.  THE  GERMAN   NAVY  AND  OPERATIONS  OVER 

SEA     .  .     345 

XVI.  THE    GERMAN    EMPEROR    AS    A    POLITICAL 

FACTOR 363 

XVII.  THE  SOCIAL  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  .         .         .     384 

XVIII.  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  IMPERIALISM  OVER  SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY — THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GERMAN 
ELECTION  OF  1907 412 

XIX.  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  LIBERALISM  OVER  RE- 
ACTION— THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GERMAN 
ELECTION  OF  1912 426 

XX.  EDUCATION  AND  MIS-EDUCATION  IN  GERMANY    453 

XXI.  THE  RURAL  INDUSTRIES  OF  GERMANY          .     485 

XXII.  WATERWAYS  AND  CANALS      ....     530 

XXIII.  THE   RAILWAYS  AND  THE   RAILWAY  POLICY 

OF  GERMANY 563 

XXIV.  THE  SHIPBUILDING  AND  SHIPPING  INDUSTRIES 

OF  GERMANY 600 

XXV.  THE  CHEMICAL  INDUSTRIES    ....     626 

XXVI.  THE  FISCAL  POLICY  OF  GERMANY    AND    ITS 

RESULT       .: 645 

XXVII.  WHY  AND  How  BISMARCK  INTRODUCED  PRO- 
TECTION        670 

XXVIII.  GERMANY'S  WEALTH  AND  FINANCES      .         .     690 
XXIX.  GERMAN  LABOUR  CONDITIONS        .        .        .     698 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAP.  PAGE 

XXX.  GERMAN  INDUSTRIAL  CONDITIONS  .         .         .  717 

XXXI.  THE  FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RELATIONS 

AND  BRITISH  TARIFF  REFORM    .         .         .  742 

XXXII.  THE  ULTIMATE  RUIN  OF  GERMANY         .         .  757 

XXXIII.  How  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY  .         .  798 

XXXIV.  THE  GERMAN  CUSTOMS  OF  WAR    .         .         .  830 
XXXV.  RULES  OF  THE  HAGUE  CONVENTION       .         .  842 

ANALYTICAL  INDEX        .....  845 


MODERN    GERMANY 


CHAPTER    I 

INTRODUCTION — THE   FUNCTIONS   OF  THE   STATE   IN 
ENGLAND   AND   IN   GERMANY 

SINCE  her  creation  in  1871,  Modern  Germany  (Prusso- 
Germany)  has  become  a  factor  of  constantly  increasing 
importance  in  the  world's  politics,  industry,  and 
commerce.  Formerly  Germany  was  a  humble  admirer 
and  modest  imitator  of  everything  English.  In 
political  and  economic  methods  she  was  England's 
follower.  Now,  Germany  has  become  a  formidable 
competitor  to  this  country,  and  her  importance  and 
strength  are  constantly  and  rapidly  increasing  from 
year  to  year. 

Two  or  three  decades  ago,  Great  Britain's  political 
position  in  the  world  was  unchallenged,  and  seemed  to 
be  unchallengeable,  by  Germany.  England  possessed 
almost  the  world's  monopoly  in  the  manufacturing 
industries,  in  engineering,  in  commerce,  in  banking, 
and  in  the  shipping  trade.  Now,  our  formerly  un- 
disputed, and  then  apparently  indisputable,  para- 
mountcy  in  manufacturing  and  in  the  various  branches 
of  trade  has  disappeared,  owing  to  the  stress  and 
success  of  Germany's  competition.  The  Germans, 
although  they  are  a  nation  and  a  race  of  landsmen, 
and  although  they  possess  practically  no  harbours 

A 


2         MODERN  GERMANY 

and  no  maritime  and  colonial  experience,  even  try  to 
wrest  from  this  country  its  patrimony,  its  paramount 
position  on  the  ocean  and  the  rule  of  the  sea,  which 
seems  to  be  the  peculiar  gift  of  Nature  to  these 
islands.  Germany  appears  to  threaten  even  our 
position  as  a  colonial  and  as  a  world  power,  and  has 
tried  to  oppose  the  unification  of  the  British  Empire. 
Will  Germany  be  as  successful  against  this  country 
in  matters  political  as  she  has  been  in  trade  and 
industry  ? 

The  fact  that  Great  Britain  has,  politically  and 
economically,  lost  much  ground  to  Germany  cannot 
be  denied,  and  Germany's  success  in  nearly  all  fields 
where  she  has  chosen  to  compete  with  this  country 
seems  all  the  more  astonishing  if  we  bear  in  mind 
that  her  natural  resources  in  men  and  matter  are 
much  inferior  to  those  possessed  by  this  country. 

Germany's  geographical  position  and  physical  con- 
figuration and  structure,  her  climate,  her  agricultural 
soil,  and  her  mineral  wealth  are  greatly  inferior  to 
those  possessed  by  Great  Britain.  Germany  is 
naturally  a  poor  country,  and  her  natural  poverty 
has  been  accentuated  by  numerous  wars  and  invasions 
which  have  frequently  devastated  her  territories. 
Until  lately,  she  had  but  little  accumulated  wealth, 
and  she  was  almost  exclusively  an  agricultural  State. 
She  has  only  inferior  coal,  she  does  not  possess  any 
colonies  worthy  of  the  name,  and  until  a  few  years 
ago  she  had  hardly  any  experience  in  manufacturing, 
commerce,  shipping,  and  finance. 

The  aristocratic  form  of  her  government  and  the 
survival  of  feudal  institutions,  feudal  privileges,  and 
of  many  mediaeval  prejudices  oppose  and  stifle,  to 
some  extent,  even  at  the  present  day,  personal  ambi- 
tion and  individual  effort  in  Germany. 


INTRODUCTION  3 

Germany  is  pre-eminently  a  military  nation.  She 
is  greatly  hampered  by  universal  and  compulsory 
military  service,  and  the  military  spirit  prevails  to 
such  an  extent  that,  until  a  few  years  ago,  trade 
and  every  form  of  making  money  was  looked  down 
upon  with  undisguised  contempt  by  her  upper  classes. 
Bankers  and  merchants  used  to  be  the  pariahs  of 
society,  and  they  are  even  now  not  treated  as  the 
equals  of  military  officers,  university  professors,  and 
professional  men. 

Evidently  Germany  is  very  heavily  handicapped 
by  nature  and  by  her  history,  by  traditions  and  by 
her  customs  ;  yet,  notwithstanding  all  these  natural 
and  artificial  disadvantages  and  obstacles,  which 
greatly  hamper  her  in  the  race  for  success,  and 
especially  in  the  race  for  economic  success,  Germany, 
who  but  three  decades  ago  was  a  poor  and  backward 
country,  has  become  Great  Britain's  greatest  and 
most  dangerous  rival  on  sea  and  land  the  world  over. 
Will  she  eventually  succeed  in  driving  Great  Britain 
to  the  wall  by  force  of  will  and  by  the  force  of  arms, 
or  by  patient  application,  industry,  and  study  ? 

Many  thoughtful  and  patriotic  Englishmen  view 
with  uneasiness,  if  not  with  alarm,  Germany's  rapid 
progress  and  her  equally  rapid  and  sometimes 
threatening  encroachments  upon  what  had  been, 
until  lately,  considered  to  be  Great  Britain's  political 
and  economic  preserves.  Will  Germany  eventually 
supplant  Great  Britain,  and  take  our  place  in  the 
world  ?  What  is  Germany's  policy  towards  this 
country,  towards  the  United  States,  Holland,  Austria- 
Hungary,  France,  and  Russia  ?  What  are  Germany's 
aims,  what  are  her  ambitions,  and,  above  all,  what 
are  the  causes  of  her  marvellous  success  ? 

These  are  questions  which  are  frequentty  heard, 


4          MODERN  GERMANY 

and  they  are,  perhaps,  the  most  urgent  questions  of 
the  time.  These  are  questions  which  should  occupy 
all  those  who  have  the  welfare,  the  greatness,  the 
happiness,  the  traditions,  and  the  prosperity  of  this 
country  truly  at  heart,  and  the  following  pages  have 
been  written  with  the  object  of  supplying  an  answer 
to  these  most  important  questions. 

If  we  look  for  the  ultimate  causes  of  Germany's 
marvellous  success,  it  will  become  clear  that  Germany 
is  no  longer  a  more  or  less  mechanical  imitator  of  this 
country.  On  the  contrary,  German  policy,  even  where 
it  imitates  this  country  in  matter,  differs  completely 
from  it  in  manner,  for  German  policy  is  guided  by  prin- 
ciples of  government  which  are  diametrically  opposed 
to  the  fundamental  principles  of  British  state-craft. 

The  conception  of  the  position  of  the  State  and 
of  its  duties  towards  the  citizens  is  totally  different 
in  the  two  countries.  Hence  it  comes  that  the 
authority  of  the  State  and  the  functions  of  the  State 
in  Germany  and  in  Great  Britain  are  quite  dissimilar, 
and  Germany's  different  conception  of  the  functions 
of  the  State  seems  to  be  one  of  the  chief  causes,  if 
not  the  principal  cause,  of  her  success. 

The  watchword  of  all  British  Governments  has 
been  Individualism,  Non-interference,  and  Free  Trade 
—that  is  to  say,  free  exchange.  The  governmental 
policy  of  Great  Britain  has  been  the  policy  of  laissez- 
faire.  Our  policy  of  laissez-faire  is  based  on  custom, 
and  it  has  been  recommended  as  the  best  policy  by  the 
most  distinguished  British  statesmen,  philosophers,  and 
political  economists  of  modern  times.  That  policy 
has  been  considered  the  natural  and  the  only  possible 
policy  for  this  country,  for  Englishmen  are  constitu- 
tionally impatient  of,  one  might  almost  say  hostile 


INTRODUCTION  5 

to,  governmental  interference,  and  even  to  the  justi- 
fied assertion  of  governmental  authority.  Bagehot 
truly  remarked  :  "  We  look  on  State  action  not  as 
our  own  action,  but  as  alien  action,  as  an  imposed 
tyranny  from  without,  not  as  the  consummated  result 
of  our  own  organised  wishes.  .  .  .  The  natural  im- 
pulse of  the  English  people  is  to  resist  authority." 

In  Great  Britain,  both  the  State  and  the  local 
authorities  are  meant  to  be,  and  are  made  to  be, 
subservient  to  society.  State  and  local  communities 
are,  on  the  whole,  deliberately  subordinated  to  the 
will  of  the  individual,  whose  rights  and  privileges 
are  jealously  guarded  against  every  form  of  official 
interference  and  coercion ;  and  if  private  rights  and 
national  rights  happen  to  come  into  collision,  private 
rights  are  apt  to  prove  the  stronger.  In  Great 
Britain  the  nation  has  to  give  way  before  the  indi- 
vidual, and  the  individual  can  tyrannise  the  nation 
if  he  is  strong  and  rich  enough  and  cares  to  do  so, 
as  may  be  seen  by  the  action  of  our  shipping  rings, 
railway  companies,  &c.,  whilst  the  nation  cannot 
treat  the  individual  unjustly.  Private  rights  are  well 
denned,  national  and  public  rights  are  not  so  defined. 

In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  the  will  of  the 
individual  is  deliberately  subordinated  td  the  will  of 
the  State  and  to  that  of  the  local  authorities,  which 
exercise  a  somewhat  absolutistic  rule.  The  nation  is 
disciplined  and  taught  obedience  as  its  first  duty, 
and  it  is  considered  the  first  duty  of  the  State  and 
of  the  local  authorities  to  maintain  order.  Con- 
scientious resistance,  active  resistance,  passive  resist- 
ance, open  resistance,  and  resistance  by  evasion,  by 
subterfuge,  or  by  the  skilful  abuse  of  the  law,  are 
practically  unknown  in  Germany.  In  Germany,  State 
and  nation  and  State  and  society  are  practically  one. 


6          MODERN  GERMANY 

Therefore,  the  State  and  the  nation  act  in  matters 
political  and  economical  like  one  man.  The  indi- 
vidual has  to  give  way  to  the  State,  which  represents 
all  individuals,  and,  in  the  absence  of  organised  and 
powerful  opposition  and  obstruction,  progress  in 
Germany  is  comparatively  easily  and  rapidly  achieved. 

In  Great  Britain,  national  and  local  authorities 
rule  and  legislate  with  a  show  of  power,  but  in  reality 
they  rule  and  legislate  merely  on  the  sufferance  of 
society.  National  and  local  authorities  have  to  obey 
the  will,  and  even  the  whim,  of  a  majority  of  voters 
or  supporters,  and  in  consequence  of  that  permanent 
dependence  on  that  volatile  factor,  Public  Opinion, 
they  do  not  lead,  but  are  led  by  society,  as  repre- 
sented or  misrepresented  by  public  opinion.  This  is 
the  reason  that  our  national  and  local  authorities 
possess  no  initiative,  that  they  always  wait  to  be 
pushed,  that  they  originate  little,  and  that  they  are 
satisfied  to  exist  to  maintain  order,  to  administer  in 
accordance  with  precedent,  to  perpetuate,  to  preserve. 

As  a  result  of  the  predominance  of  society  over 
the  State  in  this  country,  the  strongest  conservative 
influence  in  Great  Britain,  and  the  strongest  opposition 
to  progress  unfortunately  also,  lies  in  our  administra- 
tion, which  is  hostile  to  all  change,  and  therefore  to 
all  progress.  Owing  to  their  lack  of  authority, 
national  and  local  "  authorities "  in  this  country 
administer  mechanically,  soullessly,  impersonally,  but 
do  not  lead — they  reign,  but  do  not  govern.  After 
having  destroyed  the  power  of  the  Crown,  we  have 
crippled  the  power  of  the  national  executive  and 
administration  as  well;  and  we  have  substituted 
party  government,  caucus  government,  mass  govern- 
ment, carried  on  by  endless  unbeautiful  disputes  for 
power,  miscalled  discussion,  for  truly  national  govern- 


INTRODUCTION  7 

ment.  Great  Britain  has  many  heads  but  no  head, 
many  wills  but  no  will,  many  minds  but  no  mind. 
Great  Britain  is  a  nation  divided  against  itself.  Great 
Britain  is  a  kingdom  in  name,  but  it  is  in  reality  a 
republic  presided  over  and  directed  by  the  vague 
and  uncertain  moods  and  fancies  of  ill-informed 
masses,  personified  under  the  name  of  "  The  Man  in 
the  Street."  Even  republics  proper,  which  are  com- 
posed of  individual  and  very  independent  States, 
such  as  the  United  States  and  Switzerland,  possess  a 
more  national  government,  a  more  national  adminis- 
tration and  a  more  national  organisation,  than  does 
Great  Britain. 

In  Germany,  national  and  local  authorities  con- 
sider it  their  duty  to  lead,  to  initiate,  to  sow,  to 
plant,  to  foster,  to  support,  to  regulate,  to  instruct. 
The  governing  individuals  of  Germany  are  not  dis- 
tinguished and  irresponsible  amateurs,  without  ad- 
ministrative training,  supported  merely  by  a  section 
of  the  nation,  a  party ;  but  they  are,  as  a  rule,  dis- 
tinguished and  fully  responsible  experts  in  administra- 
tion, who,  owing  to  their  qualifications  for  the  office 
which  they  occupy,  are  supported  by  the  whole 
nation.  Therefore,  they  can  speak  and  act  in  the 
name  of  the  nation,  and  their  every  action  is  not 
condemned  on  principle  by  "  His  Majesty's  Opposi- 
tion," as  anti-national,  unconstitutional,  dangerous, 
foolish,  &c. 

The  German  nation  and  the  German  communities 
look  to  their  national  and  local  governors  and  ad- 
ministrators for  guidance,  for  enlightenment,  for 
initiative,  for  encouragement,  and  for  protection. 
Evidently  the  State  has  a  totally  different  position 
and  totally  different  functions  in  the  body  politic 
of  Germany  than  it  has  in  that  of  Great  Britain,  and 


8          MODERN  GERMANY 

the  conception  of  the  duties  of  the  State  towards 
the  citizens,  and  of  the  local  authorities  towards  the 
citizens,  is  quite  another  one  in  Germany  than  it  is 
in  this  country. 

In  Great  Britain,  nearly  all  progress  and  nearly 
all  great  reforms  have  been  initiated  by  far-sighted 
but  irresponsible  amateurs,  who  have  had  to  fight 
against  the  inertia,  the  indifference,  the  ill-will,  and 
the  opposition  of  the  governing  individuals,  official 
and  unofficial.  In  Germany,  nearly  all  progress  and 
nearly  all  great  reforms  are  due  to  the  initiative  of 
distinguished  and  enlightened  officials,  who  only  too 
often  had  to  fight  against  the  inertia,  the  indifference, 
the  ill-will,  and  the  opposition  of  almost  the  whole 
nation.  If  Germany  had  followed  the  policy  of 
laissez-faire,  if  the  German  Government  had  been 
subordinated  to  "  the  will  of  the  people,"  and  if  it 
had  always  waited  for  the  lead  of  "  The  Man  in  the 
Street,"  the  German  nation  would  still  be  a  medley 
of  peasants,  university  professors,  philosophers,  and 
soldiers.  Germany  would  not  have  become  a  nation, 
but  she  would  still  be  divided  against  herself  in 
hundreds  of  petty  principalities,  and  Voltaire's  word, 
"  England  rules  the  sea,  France  the  land,  Germany 
the  clouds,"  would  now  be  as  true  as  it  was  when  it 
was  coined. 

Unintelligent  Government  interference  by  in- 
capable or  selfish  administrators,  who  abused  or  ill- 
used  their  position,  to  which  they  were  not  entitled, 
and  for  which  they  were  not  qualified,  proved  so 
disastrous  to  this  country  at  the  time  when  Great 
Britain  was  cursed  with  class  rule,  that  nearly  all 
governmental  interference  is  now  opposed  and  con- 
demned in  advance  as  certain  to  prove  a  costly 
failure.  On  the  other  hand,  a  higher  conception  of 


INTRODUCTION  9 

the  duties  and  scope  of  the  State  and  intelligent 
governmentalism,  governmental  initiative,  State- 
organised  national  effort  and  State-organised  national 
co-operation,  which  sprang  from  that  higher  con- 
ception of  the  functions  of  the  State,  have  made 
Germany  united,  powerful,  wealthy,  and  successful, 
and  have  rapidly  converted  a  backward  and  con- 
servative military  peasant  State  into  a  progressive 
modern  industrial  nation. 

Individualism  is  the  strength,  but  it  is  at  the 
same  time  the  weakness,  of  this  country.  Indi- 
vidualism is  an  excellent  medicine,  but  it  is  no 
panacea,  and  it  must  be  taken  only  in  moderate 
doses.  Exaggerated  individualism  is  harmful.  Too 
much  liberty  and  too  much  individualism  have  de- 
stroyed the  greatness  of  the  Netherlands,  and  have 
completely  destroyed  the  ancient  republic  of  Poland. 
Individual  isolated  effort  has  made  this  country 
great  and  prosperous  in  the  past,  but  individualism 
may  not  prove  equally  effective  in  the  future.  Indi- 
vidualism has  made  Great  Britain  wonderfully  suc- 
cessful at  a  time  when  other  countries  were  greatly 
inferior  to  Great  Britain  in  organisation,  and  when, 
besides,  they  were  politically  disunited.  When  other 
States  had  not  yet  become  nations,  and  were  con- 
stantly at  war,  British  individualism  had  an  immense 
chance  and  an  immense  scope,  for  then  intelligent 
and  enterprising  British  individuals  were  pitted 
against  less  intelligent  foreign  individuals,  but  not 
against  foreign  States. 

At  the  present  time,  when  other  nations  are  no 
longer  divided  against  themselves,  as  was  Germany 
of  old,  but  have  become  homogeneous,  unified,  nations 
in  fact  and  nations  in  organisation,  and  when  the 
most  progressive  nations  have  become  gigantic  institu- 


io  MODERN    GERMANY 

tions  for  self-improvement  and  gigantic  business 
concerns  on  co-operative  principles,  the  spasmodic 
individual  efforts  of  patriotic  and  energetic  English- 
men and  their  unorganised  individual  action  prove 
less  effective  for  the  good  of  their  country  than  they 
were  formerly.  The  most  determined  and  even  the 
most  heroic  individual  efforts  of  the  ablest  and 
strongest  individual  Englishmen  are  altogether  futile, 
if  they  are  directed  against  the  serried  ranks  of  highly- 
organised  foreign  nations,  even  if  these  are  com- 
posed of  men  who,  individually,  are  in  every  respect 
greatly  inferior  to  Englishmen. 

Class  government  has  proved  a  failure  in  England, 
and  party  government,  as  at  present  carried  on,  is 
proving  a  failure,  because  the  enormous  forces  of 
opposition  and  of  obstruction  act  as  an  effective 
check  to  rapid  and  even  to  adequate  political  and 
economic  progress.  Chiefly  owing  to  indiscriminate, 
determined,  and  somewhat  unscrupulous  party  opposi- 
tion, progress  in  Great  Britain  is  so  slow  that  this 
country  is  every  year  falling  farther  behind  in  the 
race.  At  a  snail's  pace  we  try  to  catch  up  a  horse. 
Hence,  it  seems  that  both  class  government  and  party 
government,  as  at  present  constituted,  have  had 
their  day,  and  that  the  time  has  come  for  national 
government,  national  organisation,  national  co-opera- 
tion, and  for  the  management  of  national  and  local 
affairs  not  by  irresponsible  amateurs  and  party  men, 
who  represent  the  vague  instincts  of  the  likewise 
irresponsible  "  Man  in  the  Street,"  but  by  practical, 
experienced,  and  distinguished  business  men,  who  are 
willing  to  lead,  to  direct,  and  to  govern  in  a  manner 
worthy  of  this  country. 

Governmentalism  and  individualism  may  be  com- 
bined, and  that  nation  which  succeeds  best  in  com- 


INTRODUCTION  n 

billing  these  two  enormous  forces  will  prove  the  most 
successful  in  the  race.  Japan's  marvellous  success  in 
peace  and  in  war  is  chiefly,  if  not  entirely,  due  to  the 
successful  blending  of  a  highly-organised  govern- 
mentalism  and  of  an  equally  highly  developed  indi- 
vidualism; and  if  this  country  is  able  to  link  those 
mighty  forces  together,  Great  Britain  at  the  head  of 
the  British  Empire  will  again  obtain  the  leading 
position  in  the  world,  which,  by  her  geographical 
position,  her  latent  resources,  and  her  opportunities, 
is  her  due. 

Germany  has  been  successful,  but  she  is  not  so 
successful  as  she  might  have  been  because  indi- 
vidualism is  repressed.  The  individual  German  is  not 
given  enough  scope.  Besides,  Germany  is  in  some 
respects  not  well  governed,  and  the  ill  result  of 
partial  misgovernment  and  of  the  rash  repression  of 
individualism  may  be  seen  in  the  phenomenon  of  the 
Social  Democratic  Party  and  in  Germany's  failure  as 
a  colonising  power.  Est  modus  in  rebus. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES    OF   GERMANY'S 
FOREIGN   POLICY 

WE  cannot  fully  understand  the  foreign  policy  of 
Germany  unless  we  previously  cast  a  glance  into 
Germany's  past,  and  examine  the  genesis  and  the 
development  of  the  State  and  the  rise  of  its  policy 
and  of  its  political  traditions.  Germany,  as  known 
to  the  older  generation,  was  a  country  peopled  with 
philosophers,  poets,  composers,  slow  and  sleepy  officials, 
and  backward  peasants  ;  it  was  an  sesthetical,  senti- 
mental, day-dreaming  land.  Modern  Germany  is 
matter-of-fact,  hard-headed,  calculating,  cunning,  busi- 
ness-like, totally  devoid  of  sentimentality,  and  some- 
times even  of  sentiment,  and  very  up-to-date.  But 
modern  Germany  and  old  Germany  are  two  different 
countries.  New  Germany  is  an  enlarged  Prussia.  Old 
Germany  continues  to  vegetate  and  to  dream  dreams 
under  the  name  and  under  the  banner  of  Austria  ;  and 
it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  those  Germans  who  used 
to  be  considered  typical  representatives  of  Germany, 
such  as  Goethe,  Schiller,  Lessing,  Wieland,  Jean  Paul, 
Schlegel,  Uhland,  Lenau,  Hegel,  Fichte,  Beethoven, 
Mozart,  Haydn,  belonged  to  old  Germany  and  were 
non-Prussians. 

Six  hundred  years  ago  the  country  where  the  foun- 
dation of  Prussia  was  laid  was  a  wilderness,  which  was 
considered  to  lie  outside  the  then  German  Empire, 
and  it  was  inhabited  by  heathen  savages.  These  were 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  13 

ruthlessly  massacred  and  extirpated  by  the  knights  of 
the  Teutonic  Order,  who  were  sent  to  Prussia  to  con- 
quer and  to  colonise  that  country,  and  of  the  ancient 
Prussians  nothing  has  remained  excepting  the  name. 
The  Teutonic  knights  won  the  country  to  Christianity, 
and  replaced  the  massacred  population  with  emigrants 
from  all  parts  of  Germany,  but  they  created  at  the 
same  time  an  intolerable  feudal  anarchy  in  the  country. 
The  land  became  divided  among  powerful  robber- 
knights,  such  as  the  Quitzows,  the  Putlitzes,  the 
Rochows,  &c.,  and  as  these  denied  obedience  to  the 
Empire,  Prince  Frederick  of  Hohenzollern,  a  reduced 
but  warlike  Suabian  nobleman,  who  had  some  incon- 
siderable possessions  in  the  south  of  Germany,  was 
sent  by  the  Emperor  in  1415  to  Prussia  with  the 
mission  to  create  order  in  that  savage  and  rebellious 
country,  the  government  of  which  was  vested  in  him 
and  in  his  heirs  for  ever.  With  fire  and  sword  the 
Hohenzollerns  reduced  the  rebellious  knights  and  the 
independent  cities  of  Prussia  to  obedience,  and  created 
an  absolutely  centralised  State  ruled  by  the  sword, 
which  remained  military  in  character  partly  because 
the  population  was  composed  of  lawless  and  reckless 
adventurers  and  criminals  from  everywhere,  partly 
because  the  State  was  ever  threatened  by  hordes  of 
the  neighbouring  Slavs  and  by  the  armies  of  then 
powerful  Poland.  Thus,  up  to  a  comparatively  recent 
time,  savagery  and  arbitrary  rule  prevailed  in  Prussia, 
and  Prussia  occupied  a  position  in  Europe  not  unlike 
that  held  by  the  Balkan  States  at  the  present  day. 
In  1650  London  had  500,000  inhabitants,  Paris  had 
400,000  inhabitants,  Amsterdam  had  300,000  inhabi- 
tants, whilst  Berlin  was  a  village  of  10,000  inhabitants. 
Up  to  a  very  recent  time  Prussia  was  a  semi-barbarous 
State. 


I4  MODERN    GERMANY 

Prussia,  like  Rome,  was  founded  by  a  band  of  needy 
and  warlike  adventurers.  Both  States  were  artificial 
creations,  both  could  maintain  themselves  only  by 
force  of  arms  and  extend  their  frontiers  only  by  wars 
of  aggression,  and  the  character  of  both  States  may  be 
read  in  the  records  of  their  early  history.  By  the 
force  of  events  and  by  the  will  of  her  masterful  rulers 
Prussia  grew  up,  and  ever  since  has  been,  a  nation  in 
arms,  as  may  be  seen  at  a  glance  from  the  following 
figures,  which  more  clearly  illustrate  the  history  of 
Prussia  than  would  a  lengthy  account. 


Square  Kilo-     Inhabitants    sddstand-    Percentage  of 


1688  .  .  . 

113,000 

1,500,000 

38,000 

1740  .  .  . 

121,000 

2,250,000 

80,000 

1786  .  .  . 

199,000 

5,500,000 

195,000 

1865  .  .  . 

275.500 

18,800,000 

210,000 

1867  .  .  . 

347,500 

23,600,000 

260,000 

191  2  (Germany)  541,000 

66,000,000 

626,732 

2.5 

3-6 
3-6 
i.i 
i.i 
i.o 

During  the  last  two  hundred  and  twenty  years  the 
population  of  Great  Britain  has  grown  fivefold.  Dur- 
ing the  same  period  the  territory  ruled  by  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  has  grown  fivefold  in  size  and  the  population 
of  their  dominions  has  increased  no  less  than  forty- 
fold.  In  1688  Great  Britain  had  five  times  more  in- 
habitants than  had  Prussia,  but  at  present  Germany 
has  50  per  cent,  more  inhabitants  than  has  this 
country.  These  few  figures  prove  how  successful  has 
been  the  policy  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  in  view  of 
their  success  it  is  only  natural  that  modern  Germany 
closely  follows  Prussia's  political  methods  and  tradi- 
tions. The  foregoing  table  shows  also  that  the  mar- 
vellous rapidity  with  which  Prusso-Germany  has  grown 
was  due  to  the  strength  of  her  army.  Machtpolitik, 
the  policy  of  force,  the  policy  of  the  mailed  fist,  has 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  15 

always  been  Prussia's  favoured  policy  ;  it  has  hitherto 
been  exceedingly  effective,  and  it  has,  therefore,  not 
unnaturally,  become  Prusso-Germany's  policy  as  well. 

In  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  the 
little  State  of  Prussia  used  to  maintain  a  much  larger 
army  than  Austria,  France,  and  other  great,  densely 
populated,  and  wealthy  States.  Her  army  was,  as  a 
rule,  exceedingly  well  drilled  and  absolutely  ready  for 
war,  and  by  her  army  and  by  her  not  over-scrupulous 
diplomacy  Prussia  succeeded  in  aggrandising  herself 
at  the  cost  of  her  neighbours. 

Up  to  the  death  of  Frederick  William  I.  Prussia's 
diplomacy  was  simple,  crude,  artless,  and  clumsy, 
though  energetic.  Frederick  William's  successor, 
Frederick  the  Great,  opened  a  new  era  in  Prussia's 
foreign  policy,  for  that  monarch  gave  to  the  diplo- 
macy of  his  country  a  new  character.  The  main  prin- 
ciple of  Frederick  the  Great's  foreign  policy  was  to  act 
with  startling  rapidity  against  an  unprepared  and  un- 
suspecting opponent.  In  his  ExposS  du  Gouvernement 
Prussien,  des  Principes  sur  lesquels  il  route,  avec  quelques 
Reflexions  Politiques,  which  was  written  either  in  1775 
or  1776,  he  advises  his  successor  as  follows  :  "  Con- 
stant attention  must  be  paid  to  hiding,  as  far  as  possible, 
one's  plans  and  ambitions.  .  .  .  Secrecy  is  an  indis- 
pensable virtue  in  politics  as  well  as  in  the  art  of  war." 

During  the  year  before  he  came  to  the  throne, 
Frederick  the  Great  wrote  his  celebrated  book,  the 
Anti-Machiavel,  in  order  to  confute  Machiavelli's 
Prince,  a  book  which,  according  to  Frederick's  preface, 
was  one  of  the  most  monstrous  and  most  poisonous 
compositions  which  had  ever  been  penned.  According 
to  the  concluding  words  of  his  book,  Frederick  dedi- 
cated the  Anti-Machiavel  to  his  brother  sovereigns  ; 
at  the  end  of  chapter  vi.  Frederick  emphatically  pro- 


16  MODERN    GERMANY 

claims,  "  Let  Caesar  Borgia  be  the  ideal  of  Machiavel's 
admirers,  my  ideal  is  Marcus  Aurelius." 

The  Anti-Machiavel,  which  was  published  in  1740, 
the  year  in  which  Frederick  ascended  the  throne, 
seemed  to  be  a  political  pronunciamento  of  the  highest 
importance  and  the  political  programme  of  the  King, 
and  very  likely  it  was  meant  to  appear  as  such  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world  and  to  impress  foreign  rulers  with 
Frederick's  love  of  peace.  However,  in  December  of 
the  very  year  during  which  the  Anti-Machiavel  had 
appeared  and  had  proclaimed  that  Frederick  meant  to 
be  a  prince  of  peace,  the  King,  under  the  shallowest  of 
pretexts  and  without  a  declaration  of  war,  invaded 
Silesia  and  wrested  it  from  Austria,  "  because,"  as  he 
frankly  confesses  in  his  Memoirs,  "  that  act  brought 
prestige,  and  added  strength,  to  Prussia." 

Marcus  Aurelius  was  Frederick's  ideal  only  in  his 
Anti-Machiavel.  In  his  military  testament  Frederick 
the  Great  shows  himself  an  admirer  and  disciple  of 
Machiavel,  for  we  read  in  that  document :  "A  war  is 
a  good  war  when  it  is  undertaken  for  increasing  the 
prestige  of  the  State,  for  maintaining  its  security,  for 
assisting  one's  allies,  or  for  frustrating  the  ambitious 
plans  of  a  monarch  who  is  bent  on  conquests  which 
may  be  harmful  to  one's  interests."  In  other  words, 
every  advantageous  war  is  a  good  war. 

In  1741  Sweden  declared  war  against  Russia. 
Frederick  assured  Russia  on  his  word  of  honour  that 
he  had  not  instigated  that  war,  but  his  assurances  were 
unavailing,  and  Brakel,  the  Russian  Ambassador  in 
Berlin,  warned  his  Government  "  not  to  believe  the 
King,  who  was  consumed  with  ambitious  projects  and 
who  would  not  keep  the  peace  as  long  as  he  was  alive." 
It  should  be  noted  that  it  was  Frederick's  settled  policy 
to  foment  wars  among  his  powerful  neighbours.  This 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  17 

policy  was  formulated  in  the  following  words  by 
Frederick  the  Great  in  his  Expos/  du  Gouvernement 
Prussien,  which  was  written  for  the  guidance  of  his 
successors  :  "If  possible  the  Powers  of  Europe  should 
be  made  envious  against  one  another  in  order  to  give 
occasion  for  a  coup  when  opportunity  offers." 

Frederick  the  Great's  attitude  towards  Russia 
furnishes  us  with  the  key  to  Germany's  historic  and 
traditional  policy  towards  her  Eastern  neighbour. 
In  Frederick  the  Great's  Histoire  de  mon  Temps  we 
read :  "  Of  all  neighbours  of  Prussia  the  Russian 
Empire  is  the  most  dangerous,  both  by  its  power  and 
its  geographical  position,  and  those  who  will  rule 
Prussia  after  me  should  cultivate  the  friendship  of 
those  barbarians,  because  they  are  able  to  ruin  Prussia 
altogether  through  the  immense  number  of  their 
mounted  troops,  whilst  one  cannot  repay  them  for  the 
damage  which  they  may  do  because  of  the  poverty  of 
that  part  of  Russia  which  is  nearest  to  Prussia  and 
through  which  one  has  to  pass  in  order  to  get  into  the 
Ukraine."  Russia  was  dangerous  to  Prussia,  and  she 
possessed  nothing  worth  the  taking.  A  war  with 
Russia,  even  if  it  should  be  victorious,  was  therefore 
bound  to  be  very  unprofitable  to  Prussia.  Hence  it 
was  in  Prussia's  interest  to  make  Russia  harmless 
either  by  peaceful  means  or  by  involving  her  in  wars 
with  other  countries. 

The  easiest  way  to  neutralise  a  powerful  country 
and  a  possible  future  enemy  seemed  to  the  King  an 
alliance  with  that  very  State.  Therefore  we  read  in 
his  Expose  du  Gouvernement  Prussien  : — 

"  One  of  the  first  political  principles  is  to  endeavour  to 
become  an  ally  of  that  one  of  one's  neighbours  who  may 
become  most  dangerous  to  one's  State.  For  that  reason  we 
have  an  alliance  with  Russia,  and  thus  we  have  our  back 
free  as  long  as  the  alliance  lasts." 

B 


r8  MODERN    GERMANY 

In  another  part  of  his  writings  Frederick  advises  his 
successors  :  "  Before  engaging  in  a  war  to  the  south 
or  west  of  the  kingdom  every  Prussian  prince  should 
secure  at  any  cost  the  neutrality  of  Russia  if  he  be 
unable  to  obtain  her  active  support." 

According  to  Frederick's  advice,  alliances  were  to 
be  formed  by  Prussia,  not  so  much  for  the  defence  of 
Prussia's  possessions  as  for  their  extension.  Alliances 
were  to  be  considered  as  engagements  which  were  to 
serve  rather  for  Prussia's  benefit  than  for  the  mutual 
advantage  of  the  allies,  and  were  to  be  instruments 
which  were  to  serve  more  for  aggrandisement  than  for 
preservation  and  for  defence. 

Frederick's  views  as  to  the  sanctity  of  a  ruler's 
obligations  under  a  treaty  of  alliance  are  exceedingly 
interesting.  As  the  views  of  Frederick  the  Great  and 
of  Bismarck  with  regard  to  a  nation's  duties  under  a 
treaty  of  alliance  coincide,  and  as  these  views  con- 
siderably differ  from  the  English  conception  as  to  the 
sanctity  of  treaty  bonds,  it  is  worth  while  quoting 
Frederick's  views  as  to  the  binding  force  of  treaties 
which  he  expressed  in  his  Memoirs  as  follows  : — 

"  If  the  ruler  is  obliged  to  sacrifice  his  own  person  for  the 
welfare  of  his  subjects,  he  is  all  the  more  obliged  to  sacrifice 
engagements,  the  continuation  of  which  would  be  harmful  to 
his  country.  Examples  of  broken  treaties  are  frequent.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  clear  to  me  that  a  private  person  must  scrupulously 
keep  his  word  even  if  he  has  given  it  rashly.  If  he  fails  to  do 
so,  the  law  will  be  set  into  motion,  and  after  all  only  an  in- 
dividual suffers.  But  to  what  tribunal  can  a  sovereign  appeal 
if  another  ruler  breaks  his  engagements  ?  The  word  of  a 
private  man  involves  but  an  individual ;  that  of  a  sovereign 
involves,  and  may  mean  misery  for,  whole  nations.  There- 
fore the  problem  may  be  summed  up  thus  :  Is  it  better  that 
a  nation  should  perish  or  that  a  sovereign  should  break  his 
treaty  ?  Who  would  be  so  imbecile  as  to  hesitate  how  to 
decide  ?  " 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  19 

The  foregoing  explanation  reminds  of  Bismarck's 
cynical  remark  recorded  by  Busch :  "  What  are  alli- 
ances ?  Alliances  are  when  one  has  to." 

On  December  6th,  1772,  Frederick  the  Great  wrote 
to  Voltaire,  "  The  world  is  governed  only  by  skill 
and  trickery,"  and  one  is  amazed  at  the  skill  and 
trickery  with  which,  during  many  years  of  laborious, 
most  intricate  and  unceasing  diplomatic  negotiations, 
Frederick  the  Second  endeavoured  to  involve  Russia 
and  Austria,  his  strongest  neighbours,  in  war  with  one 
another.  Sometimes  Poland  was  the  object  which  was 
to  serve  Frederick's  policy,  sometimes  Turkey,  and 
Frederick  in  countless  letters  never  tired  pointing  out 
that  Russia's  advance  meant  a  frightful  danger  to 
Austria.  On  September  3rd,  1770,  Frederick  met 
Prince  Kaunitz,  the  Austrian  Prime  Minister,  at  Neu- 
stadt,  and  impressed  upon  him  that  "  Austria  can  on 
no  account  allow  Russia  to  cross  the  Danube.  ...  I 
am  aware  that,  if  the  Russians  cross  the  Danube,  you 
would  be  unable  passively  to  look  on.  ...  Could  you 
not  persuade  France  to  make  a  declaration  to  you  that, 
if  you  were  to  break  with  Russia  and  to  make  war 
against  her  if  the  Russians  should  cross  the  Danube, 
France  would  send  100,000  men  to  help  you  ?  You 
would  confide  the  news  to  me  and  I  would  make  use 
of  it." 

In  these  attempts  to  commit  Austria  against  Russia 
we  have  the  model  which  served  Bismarck  in  1866. 
At  the  time  of  the  Austro-Prussian  war  Napoleon  the 
Third  endeavoured  as  an  offset  to  Prussia's  conquests 
to  obtain  some  territorial  compensation  for  France  on 
the  left  border  of  the  Rhine.  Bismarck,  unwilling  to 
let  it  come  to  a  rupture  between  Prussia  and  France  at 
that  awkward  moment  when  hostilities  had  not  yet 
ceased,  proposed  to  Napoleon  that  he  should  take 


20  MODERN    GERMANY 

Belgium,  as  he,  Bismarck,  had  frequently  advised  the 
Emperor  in  former  years.  Napoleon  fell  into  Bismarck's 
trap,  and  Benedetti  handed  at  Bismarck's  request  a 
draft  agreement  to  Bismarck  which  was  to  be  placed 
before  the  King  of  Prussia.  As  soon  as  Benedetti  had 
given  to  Bismarck  that  compromising  document,  it 
was  sent  to  Russia  to  be  shown  to  the  Tsar,  and  Bis- 
marck explained  to  Benedetti  that  the  delay  in  de- 
ciding upon  it  was  caused  by  the  hesitation  of  the  King 
of  Prussia.  By  this  trick  Bismarck  succeeded  in  con- 
vincing the  Tsar  that  France  was  a  disturber  of  the 
peace,  and  in  securing  Russia's  support  in  the  sub- 
sequent war  against  France. 

Frederick's  skill  and  trickery  was  not  confined  to 
his  unceasing  attempts  to  create  war  among  his  neigh- 
bours. The  division  of  Poland  was  Frederick's  work, 
but  he  knew  how  to  put  the  odium  of  that  transaction 
on  the  shoulders  of  Russia,  who  apparently  took  the 
initiative.  Austria  had  intended  to  keep  aloof  from 
the  partition  of  Poland,  and  a  short-sighted  Prussian 
statesman  would  have  endeavoured  to  take  advantage 
of  Austria's  disinclination  to  participate  in  that  shame- 
ful transaction  in  order  to  secure  a  larger  portion  of 
Polish  territory  for  Prussia.  However,  Frederick 
looked  farther  ahead,  and  therefore  he  wished  to  induce 
Austria  to  assist  in  the  spoliation  of  Poland.  On 
February  i6th,  1772,  Frederick  wrote  to  Solms  :  "  If 
Austria  gets  no  part  of  Poland  all  the  hatred  of  the 
Poles  will  be  turned  against  us.  They  would  then 
regard  the  Austrians  as  their  sole  protectors,  and  the 
latter  would  gain  so  much  prestige  and  influence  with 
them  that  they  would  have  thousands  of  opportunities 
for  intrigues  of  all  kinds  in  that  country."  In  these 
words  we  find  the  reasons  which  caused  Frederick  to 
work  upon  Austria  for  years  until  he  at  last  succeeded 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  21 

in  persuading  her  against  her  will  that  it  would  be  in 
her  own  interest  if  she  took  part  in  the  division  of 
Poland.  By  giving  Austria  a  part  of  Poland  Frederick 
made  his  own  share  of  the  plunder  smaller  but  more 
secure.  At  the  same  time  he  weakened  Austria  by 
furnishing  her  with  a  disaffected  province  and  a  cause 
of  friction  with  Russia,  for  those  parts  of  Poland  which 
fell  to  Austria  were  coveted  by  the  Russians.  The 
partition  of  Poland  bound  the  three  confederates  in 
that  crime  to  one  another,  and  thus  Frederick  suc- 
ceeded in  creating  a  situation  which  allowed  Prussia 
to  aggrandise  herself  easily  at  the  cost  of  the  minor 
German  States  and  of  France.  Bismarck's  political 
successes  were  founded  on,  and  made  possible  by,  the 
partition  of  Poland  which  had  made  Russia  Prussia's 
traditional  friend  and  ally.  He  imitated  Frederick's 
policy  when,  in  1878,  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  he 
estranged  Italy  and  France  by  securing  for  France 
Tunis,  upon  which  Italy  had  the  strongest  claim,  and 
when  he  estranged  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  by 
giving  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to  Austria,  while  Russia 
returned  from  the  Congress  empty-handed.  Owing  to 
this  arrangement,  Austria  and  Russia  and  France  and 
Italy  were  set  against  one  another.  For  their  own 
safety  Austria  and  Italy  had  to  seek  Germany's  sup- 
port, and  thus  the  Triple  Alliance  was  made  a  necessity. 
Frederick  the  Great  had  said  in  his  Expost :  "All 
far-off  acquisitions  are  a  burden  to  the  State.  A  village 
on  the  frontier  is  worth  more  than  a  principality  two 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  away."  Bearing  in  mind  the 
wisdom  of  Frederick's  maxim,  Bismarck  refused  to 
embark  in  risky  but  dazzling  adventures  which  ap- 
pealed to  the  imagination,  and  which  were  suggested 
to  him  by  the  representatives  of  old  Germany,  South 
German  professors,  and  cosmopolitan  philanthropists 


22  MODERN    GERMANY 

who,  fifty  years  ago,  agitated  in  favour  of  making 
Germany  a  sea  Power.  Not  heeding  their  recommen- 
dations, Bismarck  kept  in  mind  "  the  village  on  the 
frontier."  Believing  that  he  ought  first  to  settle  the 
business  nearest  at  hand,  he  intended,  before  embark- 
ing on  the  sea,  to  make  Prussia  the  strongest  Power 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Nor  was  Bismarck  will- 
ing to  follow  the  policy  recommended  to  him  by  the 
German  Liberals,  who,  guided  by  the  declamation  and 
the  rhetoric  fireworks  of  Mr.  Cobden,  Mr.  Bright,  and 
other  distinguished  Englishmen,  preached  disarma- 
ment, the  weakening  of  the  executive  of  government, 
the  establishment  of  a  universal  brotherhood  among 
nations  in  a  universal  commonwealth  of  commerce  and 
the  universal  freedom  of  trade.  Believing  that  the 
Millennium  was  not  yet  at  hand,  Bismarck  refused  to 
be  guided  by  the  somewhat  hazy  sentiments  of  un- 
practical, though  large-hearted,  enthusiasts,  and  re- 
solved to  rely  in  his  policy  on  the  old  Prussian  political 
traditions  and  methods,  which  he  summed  up  in  the 
two  words  "  Blood  and  iron."  Therefore  he  meant  to 
raise  Prussia  to  further  greatness  not  by  a  sentimental 
policy  of  drift,  but  by  vigorous  action  and  by  the  sword. 
Immediately  on  coming  into  power  Bismarck 
doubled  the  Prussian  army,  and,  bearing  in  mind 
Frederick's  advice  to  ally  Prussia  with  her  most 
dangerous  neighbour,  her  future  antagonist,  he  in- 
duced Austria  in  1864  to  enter,  in  alliance  with  Prussia, 
upon  a  common  campaign  against  Denmark,  who  was 
deprived  of  Schleswig-Holstein  with  the  harbour  of 
Kiel,  and  of  more  than  1,000,000  inhabitants.  Thus 
Bismarck  brought  Prussia  back  to  her  traditional 
policy  of  conquest,  and  after  fifty  years  of  peace 
reopened  the  war-era  in  Europe.  Two  years  later, 
after  having  secured  Napoleon  the  Third's  benevolent 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY          23 

neutrality  in  return  for  vague  promises  that  France 
should  have  Belgium,  Bismarck  attacked  Austria, 
Prussia's  ally  in  the  Danish  campaign  of  1864,  being 
determined  to  humble  Austria  and  thus  to  secure  for 
Prussia  the  leading  place  among  the  German  States. 

Having  secured  Russia's  support  against  France 
largely  by  the  means  which  have  previously  been 
described  in  this  chapter,  Bismarck  turned  against 
France,  who,  by  her  benevolent  attitude  towards 
Prussia  during  the  Austro-Prussian  war,  had  assisted 
materially  in  Prussia's  aggrandisement  exactly  as 
Austria  had  done  in  1864.  Through  Bismarck's 
skilful  management  of  the  Spanish  question, — the  al- 
teration in  the  text  of  the  Ems  telegram  was  a  minor 
incident, — war  broke  out  between  France  and  Prussia 
in  1870,  and,  after  a  victorious  campaign,  in  which 
the  South  German  States  joined,  the  German  Empire 
was  erected  on  the  ruins  of  France,  and  the  South 
German  States  became  amalgamated  with  Prussia. 
Thus  Prussia  became  almost  synonymous  with  the 
German  Empire.  The  King  of  Prussia  became  Emperor 
of  Germany,  which,  as  William  the  First  somewhat 
contemptuously,  though  very  truly,  said,  was  merely 
"  an  enlarged  Prussia." 

Having  raised  Prussia  to  greatness,  Bismarck,  like 
Frederick  the  Great,  endeavoured  to  weaken  his  most 
powerful  neighbour,  Russia,  who,  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  Franco-German  war,  had  announced  that  she 
would  assist  Germany  if  another  Power  should  assist 
France.  Thus  Russia  had  kept  Austria,  Italy,  and 
Denmark  at  bay,  who  were  willing  to  help  France, 
and  had  enabled  Prussia  to  defeat  France  and  to  raise 
herself  to  further  greatness.  Encouraged,  incited, 
and  almost  pushed  by  Bismarck,  Russia  made  war 
upon  Turkey  in  1877.  This  war  utterly  crippled  her 


24  MODERN    GERMANY 

strength  and,  thanks  to  Bismarck's  manipulation  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  she  was  deprived  of  the  fruits  of 
her  victorj',  which  she  had  expected  Germany  would,  in 
gratitude  for  her  past  services,  assist  in  securing  for  her. 

When  Bismarck  had  established  Germany's  great- 
ness and  had  secured  her  paramountcy  on  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe  by  weakening  all  her  neighbours  by 
creating  discord  between  all  European  great  Powers, 
he  thought  that  now  the  time  had  come  for  Germany 
to  seek  further  expansion  in  other  continents,  and  he, 
not  William  the  Second,  originated  Germany's  world 
policy.  Already  in  1876  Bismarck  had  contemplated 
acquiring  a  large  part  of  South  Africa  with  the  help  of 
the  Boers.  According  to  the  very  reliable  Poschinger, 
Santa  Lucia  Bay  was  to  be  acquired  by  Germany,  and 
German  merchants  were  found  ready  to  build  a  railway 
from  that  harbour  to  Pretoria,  and  to  run  a  line  of  ships 
to  Santa  Lucia  Bay,  whereto,  by  specially  cheap  fares, 
a  great  stream  of  German  emigrants  was  to  be  directed. 
Thus  a  German  South  Africa  was  to  be  founded.  The 
sum  of  marks  100,000,000  (£5,000,000)  was  thought  to 
be  sufficient  for  financing  that  enterprise,  and  German 
business  men  were  willing  to  find  that  sum,  provided 
5  per  cent,  interest  on  that  sum  was  given  to  them  by 
the  State  during  ten  years.  At  that  time  Germany 
was  financially  exhausted  through  a  violent  Stock 
Exchange  crisis  and  through  the  consequences  of 
Free  Trade,  which  had  crippled  her  manufacturing 
industries.  Therefore  this  project  had  temporarily  to 
be  abandoned  for  lack  of  funds.  In  1884  Bismarck 
made  another  and  more  determined  attempt  at  ac- 
quiring Santa  Lucia  Bay,  but  this  second  attempt 
miscarried  through  the  incapacity  of  his  son,  to  whom 
the  negotiations  had  been  entrusted. 

Since  the  time  when  Prussia  and  Germany  were 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  25 

given  Parliaments,  Prusso-German  policy  is  no  longer 
exclusively  shaped  by  the  ruler  and  his  trusted  minister, 
but  it  is  influenced  to  some  considerable  extent  by  the 
will  and  by  the  wishes  of  the  people.  Consequently, 
if  we  wish  to  understand  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany, 
we  must  not  only  consider  the  attitude  of  the  actual 
political  leaders  of  the  nation  and  weigh  the  influence 
of  those  political  traditions  of  the  country  which  have 
become  the  leading  political  axioms  of  State,  but  we 
must  also  consider  the  views  of  the  very  influential 
German  professors. 

The  German  university  professors  play  a  very  im- 
portant part  in  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany.  There 
are  twenty-three  universities  in  Germany,  in  which 
more  than  three  thousand  professors  teach  more  than 
sixty  thousand  students.  These  three  thousand  univer- 
sity professors  not  only  form  the  minds  of  the  profes- 
sional men  and  of  the  future  high  and  low  officials,  and 
thus  influence  cultured  public  opinion  in  the  making, 
but  they  also  write  much  for  the  newspapers.  The 
views  of  the  German  professors  carry  very  great  weight 
with  the  newspapers,  and  thus  they  profoundly  influ- 
ence not  only  the  cultured  circles  but  the  whole  nation. 

None  of  the  German  university  professors  has 
exercised  a  greater  influence  upon  the  shaping  and  the 
development  of  Germany's  foreign  policy  than  Pro- 
fessor von  Treitschke,  the  great  historian,  who,  during 
about  thirty  years,  enjoyed  the  greatest  authority  in 
the  lecture  room  and  with  the  Press  in  matters  political. 
No  German  professor  of  his  time  had  a  greater  weight 
and  a  more  lasting  influence  with  the  German  patriots. 
Therefore  we  must  take  note  of  his  leading  views  and 
of  the  political  doctrines  which  he  inculcated. 

Treitschke  gazed  ahead  towards  the  time  when 
his  dream  of  a  Greater  Germany,  a  Germany  whose 


26  MODERN    GERMANY 

dominions  would  extend  beyond  the  seas,  would  be 
realised  ;  when  Germany  would  be  able  to  enter  upon 
a  world-embracing  policy,  and  when,  after  having  ac- 
quired the  harbours  of  Holland  and  built  an  enormous 
fleet,  she  would  be  able  to  measure  her  strength  with 
that  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries.  The  claim  of  the 
Pan-Germans  to  the  possession  of  the  whole  Rhine  is 
not  of  recent  origin.  It  is  based  on  Treitschke's  claim 
which  he  formulated  in  his  book,  Politik,  as  follows  :— 

"  Germany,  whom  Nature  has  treated  in  a  stepmotherly 
manner,  will  be  happy  when  she  has  received  her  due  and 
possesses  the  Rhine  in  its  entirety.  ...  It  is  a  resource  of 
the  utmost  value.  By  our  fault  its  most  valuable  part  has 
come  into  the  hands  of  strangers,  and  it  is  an  indispensable 
task  for  German  policy  to  regain  the  mouths  of  that  river. 
A  purely  political  union  with  Holland  is  unnecessary,  because 
the  Dutch  have  grown  into  an  independent  nation,  but  an 
economical  union  with  them  is  indispensable.  We  are  too 
modest  if  we  fear  to  state  that  the  entrance  of  Holland  into 
our  customs  system  is  as  necessary  for  us  as  is  our  daily 
bread,  but  apparently  we  are  afraid  to  pronounce  the  most 
natural  demands  which  a  nation  can  formulate." 

In  view  of  Germany's  dearth  of  harbours  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  Netherlands  was  considered  the  first 
step  towards  entering  upon  a  world-embracing  policy, 
and  acquiring  a  predominant  position  not  only  in 
Europe  but  in  the  world  across  the  ocean.  It  was 
clear  to  Treitschke  that  Germany  could  acquire  such 
a  position  only  after  England  had  been  crushed  and 
after  the  rule  of  the  sea  had  been  wrested  from  her. 
Then,  and  then  only,  would  Germany  find  a  free  field 
for  her  energy  in  every  quarter  of  the  world.  This 
was  his  view,  and  he  explained  the  nature  of  the  future 
relations  between  Germany  and  this  country  with  his 
usual  candour  at  every  occasion.  The  policy  which 
he  recommended  towards  this  country,  and  his  opinion 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  27 

of  this  country,  may  be  seen  from  the  following  charac- 
teristic extract  from  his  paper,  entitled  Die  Turkei  und 
die  Grossmachte,  which  was  published  on  June  20th, 
1876  :— 

"  Whatever  one  may  think  of  British  liberty,  England  of 
to-day  is  no  doubt  a  Power  for  action  in  the  society  of  nations, 
but  her  power  is  clearly  an  anachronism.  It  was  created  in 
the  olden  time  when  the  world's  wars  were  decided  by  naval 
battles  and  by  hired  mercenaries,  and  when  it  was  considered 
good  policy  to  rob  well-situated  fortresses  and  naval  ports 
without  any  regard  to  their  ownership  and  history.  In  this 
century  of  national  States  and  of  armed  nations  a  cosmo- 
politan trading  Power  such  as  England  can  no  longer  maintain 
itself  for  any  length  of  time.  The  day  will  come  and  must 
come  when  Gibraltar  will  belong  to  the  Spaniards,  Malta  to 
the  Italians,  Heligoland  to  the  Germans,  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  the  nations  who  live  on  the  Mediterranean.  .  .  . 
England  is  to-day  the  shameless  representative  of  barbarism 
in  International  Law.  Hers  is  the  blame,  if  naval  wars  still 
bear  the  character  of  privileged  piracy." 

Treitschke  detested  this  country,  wished  to  see  it 
crushed,  and  hoped  to  see  a  huge  German  World 
Empire  arise  on  the  ruins  of  Anglo-Saxondom.  De- 
cades would  have  to  pass  by  until  Germany  would 
be  strong  enough  to  crush  the  Anglo-Saxons.  Mean- 
while the  most  pressing  need  of  Germany  seemed  to 
Treitschke  the  acquisition  of  large  colonies  situated  in  a 
temperate  zone  whereto  a  stream  of  German  emigrants 
might  be  directed.  In  Deutsche  Kampfe  we  read  : — 

"  In  the  South  of  Africa  circumstances  are  decidedly  favour- 
ing us.  English  colonial  policy,  which  has  been  successful 
everywhere  else,  has  not  had  a  lucky  hand  at  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope.  The  civilisation  which  exists  there  is  Teutonic, 
is  Dutch.  The  policy  of  England  in  South  Africa,  which  vacil- 
lates between  weakness  and  brutality,  has  created  a  deadly 
and  unextinguishable  hatred  against  her  among  the  Dutch 
Boers.  ...  If  our  Empire  has  the  courage  to  follow  an  inde- 
pendent colonial  policy  with  determination,  a  collision  of  our 


28  MODERN    GERMANY 

interests  and  those  of  England  is  unavoidable.  It  was  natural 
and  logical  that  the  new  Great  Power  of  Central  Europe  had 
to  settle  affairs  with  all  Great  Powers.  We  have  settled  our 
accounts  with  Austria-Hungary,  with  France,  and  with  Russia. 
The  last  settlement,  the  settlement  with  England,  will  pro- 
bably be  the  lengthiest  and  the  most  difficult  one." 

Having  taken  note  of  the  world-embracing  political 
measures  which  Treitschke  advocated,  let  us  now  con- 
sider the  leading  maxims  of  his  political  philosophy. 
Treitschke  lectured  not  only  on  history  but  on  policy 
as  well,  and  the  political  theories  which  he  taught  have 
been  of  very  great  importance  in  developing  the 
political  mind,  and  in  creating  the  political  conscience, 
of  Germany.  It  would  lead  too  far  to  describe  here 
Treitschke's  system  of  policy.  It  must  suffice  to  say 
that  his  sj^stem  is  but  an  elaboration  of  the  political 
teaching  of  Machiavelli  and  the  glorification  of  the 
political  methods  which  have  been  adopted  with  such 
marvellous  success  by  Frederick  the  Great  and  by 
Bismarck.  Therefore  we  read  in  the  beginning  of  his 
book  Politik  : — 

"  It  will  always  redound  to  the  glory  of  Machiavelli  that 
he  has  placed  the  State  on  a  solid  foundation,  and  that  he 
has  freed  the  State  and  its  morality  from  the  moral  precepts 
taught  by  the  Church,  but  especially  because  he  has  been  the 
first  to  teach  :  '  The  State  is  Power.'  " 

Starting  from  his  fundamental  conception  that  "  The 
State  is  Power,"  that  it  is  not  a  moral  agent,  but 
merely  power,  Treitschke  logically  arrives  at  the  follow- 
ing conclusion  regarding  the  sacredness  of  treaties  : 
"  Every  State  reserves  to  itself  the  right  of  judging 
as  to  the  extent  of  its  treaty  obligations." 

If  we  bear  in  mind  Treitschke's  teaching,  can  we 
wonder  that  Treitschke's  pupils  gave  such  a  peculiar 
interpretation  to  that  Anglo-German  Treaty  regarding 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  29 

the  integrity  of  China  which  was  explained  away  by 
German  diplomacy  immediately  after  it  had  been 
signed,  which  since  has  become  known  as  the  Yangtse 
Agreement,  and  which  our  Foreign  Office  might  safely 
have  put  into  the  fire  ?  Seeing  in  the  State  not  a 
moral  representative  of  the  nation,  but  merely  power 
personified,  Treitschke  was  the  most  determined  op- 
ponent to  international  arbitration,  for  we  read  in  his 
book  Politik  :  "  The  institution  of  international  and 
permanent  courts  of  arbitration  is  incompatible  with 
the  very  nature  of  the  State.  Only  in  a  question  of 
secondary  or  tertiary  importance  would  it  be  possible 
to  obey  the  ruling  of  such  a  court.  For  vital  questions 
there  exists  no  impartial  foreign  power,  and  to  the  end  of 
history  arms  will  give  the  final  decision.  Herein  lies  the 
sacredness  of  war."  Taking  note  of  Treitschke's  politi- 
cal philosophy,  we  cannot  wonder  that  modern  Germany 
is  the  strongest  opponent  to  International  Arbitration, 
and  that  she  was  the  most  reluctant  participant  of  the 
first  International  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague. 

Treitschke  died  in  1896,  but  his  work  has  survived 
him.  The  seed  which  he  had  sown  broadcast  in  count- 
less lectures,  books,  pamphlets,  and  newspaper  articles 
has  borne  fruit.  Thus  Treitschke  has  helped  in  opening 
an  era  of  universal  political  unscrupulousness  in  Ger- 
many, and  he  has  created  a  mighty  popular  movement 
towards  expansion  over  sea,  with  the  object  of  de- 
stroying the  power  of  Anglo-Saxondom.  Germany's 
determination  to  diminish  the  greatness  of  this  country 
is  largely  due  to  Treitschke's  influence,  and  Germany's 
resolve  to  possess  herself  of  a  fleet  of  overwhelming 
strength,  regardless  of  cost,  is  perhaps  as  much  ascrib- 
able  to  the  activity  of  Treitschke  and  of  his  followers, 
as  to  the  activity  of  William  II.  and  his  Navy  League. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  the  professors  have 


3o  MODERN    GERMANY 

created  the  world  policy  of  Germany,  for  that  policy 
was  begun  by  Bismarck  who,  looking  further  ahead 
than  Treitschke  and  his  friends,  saw  rather  in  the 
United  States  than  in  England  Germany's  most  for- 
midable opponent.  Great  Britain  was  to  him  "  a 
country  which  had  seen  better  days."  Many  years 
ago  Bismarck  significantly  said  to  Bucher  : — 

"  Up  to  the  year  1866  we  pursued  a  Prusso-German  policy. 
From  1866  to  1870  we  pursued  a  German-European  policy. 
Since  then  we  have  pursued  a  world  policy.  In  discounting 
future  events  we  must  also  take  note  of  the  United  States, 
who  will  become  in  matters  economic,  and  perhaps  in  matters 
political  as  well,  a  much  greater  danger  than  most  people 
imagine.  The  war  of  the  future  will  be  the  economic  war, 
the  struggle  for  existence  on  the  largest  scale.  May  my 
successor  always  bear  this  in  mind  and  always  take  care  that 
Germany  will  be  prepared  when  this  battle  has  to  be  fought." 

Bismarck  left  the  preparation  for  that  battle  be- 
tween Germany  and  the  United  States  and  England 
not  merely  to  posterity,  but  he  prepared  his  country 
for  that  struggle,  and  especially  for  the  economic  part 
of  that  straggle,  by  his  economic  policy.  His  pro- 
tective tariff  of  1879  was  directed  against  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  though  principally  against  Great 
Britain,  and  we  see  the  outcome  of  his  policy  in  the  fact 
that  Bismarck's  policy  has  succeeded  in  crippling  our 
industries  and  in  transferring  industrial  success  and 
industrial  prosperity  from  Great  Britain  to  Germany, 
as  will  appear  in  the  course  of  this  book. 

Bismarck's  successors  have  continued  Bismarck's 
policy,  and  have  improved  upon  it.  Not  only  has 
Germany  more,  and  ever  more,  severely  penalised  our 
manufactures  by  protective  tariffs,  and  impoverished 
and  thrown  out  of  work  the  masses  employed  in 
our  factories,  but  she  has  besides  in  every  way 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY          31 

favoured  and  promoted  the  formation  of  gigantic 
trusts  (Syndikate,  Kartelle),  which  were  chiefly  de- 
signed to  destroy  our  industries  by  persistently  under- 
selling us  in  foreign  markets,  and  especially  in  our 
home  market.  Furthermore,  Germany  has,  by  the 
conclusion  of  commercial  treaties  with  many  Powers, 
secured  for  the  German  industries  an  immense  outlet, 
almost  the  monopoly,  in  many  countries  on  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe  to  the  disadvantage  of  our  own  in- 
dustries, and  she  is  now  assiduously  working  for  a 
Central  European  Customs  Union  of  States  to  which 
union  she  means  to  be  the  most  favoured,  and 
almost  the  sole,  purveyor  of  manufactured  articles. 
Thus  Germany  is  striving  to  recreate  in  time  of  peace 
Napoleon's  Continental  system  against  this  country 
whereby  English  goods  were  excluded  from  all  Con- 
tinental countries  under  his  sway.  Through  Germany's 
action  our  markets  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  have 
been  completely  spoiled,  and  before  long  they  may  be 
almost  closed  against  British  manufactures  unless 
Great  Britain  meets  force  with  force  and  violence 
with  violence  instead  of  meeting  it  with  polite  and 
perfectly  useless  remonstrations. 

Though  Bismarck  ostensibly  was  Russia's  friend,  he 
strengthened  Turkey  against  Russia  by  providing  her 
with  arms,  with  money,  with  railways,  and  with  officers. 
Bismarck's  successors  have  continued  that  policy  and 
have  extended  it  towards  this  country  as  well.  In 
Egypt  and  in  China  Germany's  agents  have  intrigued 
against  Great  Britain,  and  even  during  the  Tibet  settle- 
ment we  had  to  overcome  Germany's  opposition  at 
Pekin.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  South  African  war 
would  perhaps  never  have  broken  out  had  Germany 
not  deluded  the  Boers  into  the  belief  that,  as  the 
German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  declared 


32  MODERN    GERMANY 

to  us  in  writing,  "  the  independence  of  the  Transvaal 
Republic  is  a  German  interest,"  and  had  she  not  lavishly 
supplied  the  Boers  with  arms  and  ammunition. 

Some  years  ago  the  German  Emperor  painted  a 
symbolical  picture  of  the  "  Yellow  Peril,"  which  he 
sent  to  the  Tsar,  and  since  then  official  and  semi- 
official Germany  has  persistently  urged  Russia  that  it 
was  her  mission  to  civilise  the  Far  East  and  to  rule 
Asia.  Germany  hoped  that  Russia  in  civilising,  which 
means  conquering,  Asia  would  come  into  collision  with 
this  country,  but  Providence  willed  it  otherwise. 
Blindly  advancing  at  Germany's  bidding,  the  Russians 
rushed  upon  Japan's  bayonets,  and  Russia  was 
crippled  for  many  years.  Only  the  lesser  aim  of 
Germany's  foreign  policy  had  been  achieved.  Russia 
was  weakened,  but  Great  Britain's  force  is  unimpaired. 

It  should  here  be  remarked  that  it  is  an  axiom  of 
German  policy  that  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  in  Asia  are,  and  will  remain,  irreconcilable,  the 
wish  being  probably  father  to  the  thought.  Therefore, 
in  her  attitude  towards  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  it 
is  Germany's  constant  aim  in  every  quarter  of  the 
world,  and  at  every  opportunity,  to  accentuate  and 
to  increase  the  differences  between  Russia  and  this 
country.  Many  examples  of  Germany's  endeavours 
in  this  direction  could  be  quoted. 

Starting  from  the  premise  that  the  differences  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Russia  in  Asia  are,  and  will 
remain,  or  at  least  may  be  made  to  be,  irreconcilable, 
German  diplomacy  has  logically  arrived  at  the  follow- 
ing fundamental  rule  of  conduct  from  which  German 
foreign  policy  has  determined  not  to  swerve.  This  rule 
is  that  Germany  never  can,  and  never  will,  be  the  friend 
or  the  enemy  of  both  Great  Britain  and  Russia  at  the 
same  time,  because  Great  Britain  and  Russia  must  be 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  33 

made  to  act  constantly  as  a  counterpoise  against  one 
another  and  to  quarrel  with  one  another  to  Germany's 
benefit. 

If  we  now  abandon  for  a  moment  diplomatic  theory, 
and  look  at  Germany's  fundamental  rule  of  political 
conduct  towards  Russia  and  this  country  from  the 
point  of  view  of  political  and  military  practice,  it  will 
be  seen  that  Germany's  policy  is  an  exceedingly  wise 
one.  If  Germany  has  to  fight  Russia,  Great  Britain 
can  effect  a  powerful  diversion  in  the  Baltic  and  in  the 
Black  Sea,  especially  if,  as  until  lately  was  the  case, 
the  Russian  fleet  is  numerically  stronger  than  the 
German  Navy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Germany  should 
be  engaged  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  Russia's  help 
would  be  invaluable  to  Germany,  for  Germany  would 
endeavour  to  attack  Great  Britain  in  India  over  land, 
hand-in-hand  with  Russia.  The  happiest  result  of 
Germany's  policy  towards  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
would,  of  course,  be  if  Russia  and  Great  Britain  could 
be  made  to  fight  one  another  to  exhaustion.  By  such 
an  exhaustive  Anglo-Russian  war  Germany  would  be 
freed  of  all  restraint,  and  would,  with  her  strong  fleet 
and  immense  army,  be  able  to  act  on  land  and  sea 
according  to  her  pleasure. 

From  the  foregoing  it  follows  that  it  is  easy  for 
British  diplomats  to  understand  Germany's  real  atti- 
tude towards  this  country.  If  Germany  is  actively 
friendly  to  Russia,  she  -is  actually,  though  probably 
secretly,  hostile  to  Great  Britain  ;  if  she  is  on  terms 
approaching  hostility  with  Russia,  Germany  is  friendly 
to  this  country.  Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  all 
attempts  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  to 
settle  their  differences  and  to  arrive  at  an  under- 
standing are  viewed  with  the  most  serious  alarm  by 
Germany,  for  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain  Germany 

c 


34  MODERN    GERMANY 

could  harm  this  country  easiest  if  Russia  would 
enable  her  to  attack  India.  For  these  reasons  the 
conclusion  of  the  Anglo  -  Russian  understanding  is 
considered  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  calamities  by 
Germany,  and  it  is  hoped  that  it  will  not  last. 

During  the  last  twenty  years  Germany  has  felt 
confident  that  she  need  not  fear  a  Russian  attack. 
Consequently  she  has  constantly  supported  Russia 
against  this  country. 

Germany  has  always  tried  to  create  an  effective 
counterpoise  against  Great  Britain.  Bismarck  set 
France  and  England  against  one  another  over  Egypt, 
and  encouraged  France  in  her  anti-British  attitude, 
and  his  successors  continued  Bismarck's  policy.  There- 
fore Germany  tried  in  1905  and  in  1911  to  frighten 
France  away  from  Great  Britain  by  raising  the  Morocco 
question. 

Germany's  Venezuela  policy  also  aimed  at  creating 
a  counterpoise,  if  not  an  enemy,  against  this  country. 
When  the  United  States  took  umbrage  at  the  Anglo- 
German  Venezuela  expedition,  Great  Britain  wished 
to  withdraw,  but  Germany  insisted  that  the  Venezuela 
business  should  be  carried  through,  arguing  that  some 
show  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  strongest  naval  and 
of  the  strongest  military  Power  would  cause  the  United 
States  to  withdraw,  and  would  teach  them  to  be  modest 
for  at  least  thirty  years.  Happily  our  diplomacy  did 
not  stumble  into  the  trap,  and  saw  the  point  of  the 
argument,  which  was  similar  to  that  of  Frederick  the 
Great  when  he  told  the  Austrians  that  they  could  not 
allow  the  Russians  to  cross  the  Danube,  and  that  they 
should  oppose  their  crossing  in  alliance  with  France. 

A  few  years  ago  the  vague  and  groping  movement 
towards  the  unification  of  the  British  Empire  began 
to  take  a  more  tangible  shape.  Canada  offered  pre- 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  35 

ferential  fiscal  treatment  to  the  Mother  Country,  other 
colonies  were  inclined  to  follow,  and  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain cordially  responded  to  the  advances  made  by 
the  Colonies,  and  began  to  work  for  a  British  Im- 
perial Fiscal  Union.  Treitschke  and  his  followers  had 
frequently  declared  that  the  British  Empire  was  an 
empire  only  in  name,  that  it  would  gradually  fall  to 
pieces  ;  that  the  United  States  would  have  a  similar 
fate,  and  that  united  Germany  would  eventually  profit 
from  these  fatal  and  suicidal  disintegrating  tendencies 
among  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations.  Therefore  Germany 
resolved,  if  possible,  to  kill  the  movement  towards 
Imperial  Unification,  and  declared  commercial  war 
against  Canada.  As  the  penalising  of  Canada's  ex- 
ports failed  to  have  the  desired  effect,  further  measures 
to  prevent  the  unification  of  the  Empire  were  con- 
templated and  threatened  by  Germany,  and  on  June 
29th,  1903,  Lord  Lansdowne  made  the  following  ex- 
traordinary statement  in  the  House  of  Lords  : — 

"  The  position  between  Germany  and  Canada  with  which  we 
were  threatened  is  not  one  which  His  Majesty's  Government 
could  regard  as  other  than  a  serious  position.  It  is  not 
merely  that  we  found  that  Canada  was  liable  to  be  made 
to  suffer  in  consequence  of  the  preferential  treatment  which 
the  Canadian  Government  had  accorded  to  us,  but  it  was 
actually  adumbrated  in  an  official  document  that  if  other 
colonies  acted  in  the  same  manner  as  Canada,  the  result 
might  be  that  we,  the  mother  country,  would  find  ourselves 
deprived  of  most-favoured-nation  treatment." 

Not  satisfied  with  crippling  our  industries  and  our 
trade,  and  with  hampering  our  commercial  expansion, 
Germany  tried  to  oppose  the  political  unification  of 
the  Empire  by  threats.  Germany's  action  was  all  the 
more  astounding  as  she  could  not  seriously  expect  to 
be  consulted  in  the  arrangement  of  a  purely  internal 
affair  between  the  component  parts  of  the  British 


36  MODERN    GERMANY 

Empire,  for  it  is  clear  that  the  giving  of  fiscal  pre- 
ference between  Motherland  and  Colonies  is  a  purely 
domestic  affair,  and  a  right  which,  by  the  law  of  nature 
and  of  nations,  all  nations  exercise,  and  which  no  third 
nation  is  entitled  to  question. 

We  have  now  taken  note  of  the  three  main  factors 
of  German  policy  by  having  surveyed  Germany's 
genesis  and  political  history  ;  by  having  acquainted 
ourselves  with  her  political  traditions  and  methods, 
and  with  those  political  principles  of  hers  which  have 
become  the  leading  maxims  of  German  statesmanship  ; 
and  we  have  taken  account  of  the  political  aspirations 
of  the  masses  of  the  people.  These  three  factors 
form  the  triple  foundation  of  Germany's  foreign  policy, 
which  is  directed  by  the  Emperor. 

The  father  of  William  the  Second,  Frederick  the 
Third,  was  a  peaceful,  liberal-minded  man,  who, 
through  his  English  wife,  had  received  many  English 
ideas  and  many  English  ideals.  With  him  the  State 
was  not  merely  "  Power,"  but  a  power  for  good. 
With  him  generosity  and  humanity  were  not  merely 
empty  words  and  part  of  the  diplomat's  stock-in-trade 
of  political  counters.  It  was  not  his  idea  that  "  Might 
is  Right."  He  was  imbued  with  the  sense  of  political 
morality,  a  feeling  which,  it  is  true,  Machiavelli  treated 
almost  with  contempt.  The  views  of  the  Emperor 
and  the  Empress  Frederick  were  diametrically  opposed 
to  those  of  Prince  Bismarck,  who  proved  victorious  in 
the  lengthy  struggle  which  he  waged  against  what  he 
called  "  English  influences  "  and  "  petticoat  influences." 
In  these  struggles  Bismarck  was  energetically  supported 
by  the  present  Emperor,  then  Prince  William,  whom  old 
Prince  Bismarck  used  in  many  ways  to  liken  to  Fre- 
derick the  Great.  The  Emperor  William  II.,  indeed, 
resembles  in  many  ways  his  great  ancestor.  He  has 


GERMANY'S    FOREIGN    POLICY  37 

the  same  self-consciousness,  the  same  many-sidedness, 
the  same  passionate  desire  to  aggrandise  his  country, 
the  same  political  methods,  and  the  same  love  of  a 
powerful  army.  How  will  the  Emperor  make  use  of 
his  military  forces  and  of  his  opportunities  ? 

The  present  position  of  Germany  is  most  favourable. 
She  has  defeated  France  and  Austria.  Russia  lies  ex- 
hausted. Germany  has  her  elbows  free.  On  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe  she  is  not  only  the  strongest,  but  by 
far  the  strongest,  Power.  Now  or  never  is  her  oppor- 
tunity. Will  she  make  use  of  it  ?  Will  she  try  to 
take  Holland,  or  will  she  interfere  in  Austria-Hungary 
and  try  to  save  the  dissolving  German  element  in  that 
country  by  incorporating  with  Germany,  in  some  form 
or  other,  the  western  half  of  that  monarchy  ?  Or  will 
she  endeavour  to  take  another  slice  of  France  and  the 
French  colonies  ?  Or  will  Germany  at  present  abstain 
from  action,  notwithstanding  her  opportunities,  and 
continue  in  feverish  haste  to  increase  her  enormous 
navy  "  for  the  protection  of  commerce  "  until  an  oc- 
casion for  using  it  against  a  great  naval  and  colonial 
Power  arises  ? 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE  PROBLEM 
OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  l 

DURING  the  last  few  decades,  the  population  of 
Germany  has  been  increasing  with  marvellous  and 
unprecedented  rapidity.  From  1870  to  the  year  1912 
it  has  grown  from  40,818,000  people  to  more  than 
66,000,000  people,  and  has  therefore  increased  by 
exactly  65  per  cent.  During  the  same  period,  our 
own  population  has  increased  from  31,817,000  people 
to  45,500,000  people,  or  by  but  43  per  cent.  No 
nation  in  the  world,  excepting  those  oversea,  which 
yearly  receive  a  huge  number  of  immigrants  from 
abroad,  multiplies  more  rapidly  than  does  the  German 
nation,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures  : — 

AVERAGE  YEARLY  INCREASE  OF  POPULATION  BETWEEN  THE 
LAST  AND  THE  PREVIOUS  CENSUSES 

Germany    .     .  +13,600  inhabitants  per  million  of  inhabitants 

Europ.  Russia  +  11,100 

Holland       .     .  +13,700 

Switzerland     .  +12,400 

Belgium      .     .  +  9,800 

Great  Britain  .  +  9,000 

Austria  .     .     .  +  8,800 

Hungary     .     .  +   7,900 

Spain      .     .     .  +   4,700 

Italy       .     .     .  +  6,900 

France  +   1,500 

From  the  foregoing  table,  it  appears  that  not  only 
the  population  of  Germany,  but  that  of  all  the  chiefly 

1  In  this  chapter  the  figures  for  1900  are  frequently  given,  as 
the  Census  figures  of  1910  were  not  yet  available. 

38 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      39 

Germanic  nations  increases  very  much  faster  than 
that  of  other  nations,  Russia  excepted.  However, 
Russia  cannot  fairly  be  compared  with  Germany, 
partly  because  her  population  statistics  are  not 
reliable,  partly  because  the  conditions  prevailing  in 
large  parts  of  Russia  are  peculiar. 

Whilst  the  increase  of  the  population  per  million 
of  inhabitants  among  many  other  nations  is  rapidly 
becoming  smaller  and  smaller,  a  fact  which  is  so  well 
known  that  it  need  hardly  be  substantiated  by 
statistics,  the  population  of  Germany  has,  during  the 
last  few  decades,  been  growing  with  constantly  in- 
creasing rapidity.  Only  lately  this  increase  has  be- 
come less  rapid.  Between  1816  and  1855,  the  average 
yearly  increase  of  the  population  of  Germany  was 
only  9,600  per  million  of  inhabitants  ;  but  the  average 
increase  amounted  to  10,700  per  million  per  annum 
between  1885  and  1890,  to  11,200  per  million  per 
annum  between  1890  and  1895,  to  15,200  per  million 
per  annum  between  1900  and  1905,  and  to  13,600  per 
annum  between  1905  and  1910.  At  present,  when 
other  nations  are  comparatively  but  slowly  expanding, 
the  66,000,000  in  Germany  are  adding  yearly  approxi- 
mately 900,000  to  their  numbers,  whilst  Great  Britain 
adds  less  than  400,000  to  her  population.  As,  at  the 
same  time,  the  30,000,000  Germans  who  live  outside 
of  Germany  are  increasing  with  similar  rapidity,  the 
96,000,000  Germans  appear  to  be  multiplying  even 
faster  than  the  90,000,000  inhabitants  of  the  United 
States,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  these  receive, 
on  an  average,  more  than  800,000  emigrants  per 
annum. 

The  proud  boast  of  the  militant  Pan-Germans, 
that  it  is  the  destiny  of  the  Germans  in  Germany 
and  in  Greater  Germany  to  rule  the  world,  would 


40  MODERN    GERMANY 

appear  to  be  justified,  were  it  not  for  a  singular 
phenomenon  which,  so  far,  has  remained  almost 
unobserved.  Whilst  the  66,000,000  Germans  in 
Germany  are  increasing  with  astonishing  rapidity, 
the  30,000,000  Germans  who  live  in  Austria-Hungary 
and  in  other  countries  are  so  rapidly  losing  all  German 
characteristics  and  even  the  German  language,  that  it 
seems  possible  that  forty  or  fifty  years  hence  the 
Germans  outside  Germany  proper  will  be  a  negligible 
factor.  The  rapid  disappearance  of  the  30,000,000 
Germans  in  Greater  Germany  is  so  extraordinary  a 
process,  and  it  is  so  important  a  factor  in  Germany's 
foreign  policy,  that  it  is  worth  while  to  look  some- 
what closely  into  the  position  of  the  Germans  in  all 
countries  outside  Germany. 

Since  the  time  when  Tacitus  wrote,  the  Germans 
have  always  been  one  of  the  most  prolific  races,  if 
not  the  most  prolific  race,  in  Europe,  and  they  would, 
no  doubt,  have  obtained  the  dominion  of  the  world 
by  sheer  weight  of  numbers  had  it  not  been  for  two 
racial  peculiarities.  In  the  first  place,  the  German 
tribes  and  nations  have  never  been  unified,  but  have 
always  been  fighting  and  exterminating  one  another 
from  prehistoric  times  through  the  Middle  Ages  and 
the  Thirty  Years'  War  up  to  the  Austro-Prussian 
War  of  1866.  In  the  second  place,  the  Germans  who 
have  settled  among  foreign  nations  have,  even  if  they 
came  as  conquerors,  easily  given  up  their  national 
characteristics  and  their  language,  and  have  allowed 
themselves  to  be  submerged  and  assimilated  by  other 
races.  The  Franks,  who  went  to  Northern  France, 
became  French  ;  the  Longobardi,  who  conquered  Italy 
and  who  ruled  the  North  of  Italy  for  centuries,  became 
Italian,  and  only  a  few  names,  such  as  Lombardy, 
remind  one  of  the  ancient  rule  of  the  dreaded  "  Long- 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      41 

beards."  The  Goths  in  France  and  in  Spain,  and  the 
Varagi  and  Goths  in  Russia  have  similarly  disappeared, 
and  only  a  few  names  here  and  there  remind  one  of 
the  hosts  of  German  conquerors  who  were  swallowed 
up  by  those  countries  as  the  Pharaoh's  hosts  were 
swallowed  up  by  the  Red  Sea. 

It  seems  to  be  a  law  of  Nature,  and  may  be  con- 
sidered an  axiom,  that  the  Germans  increase  only  in 
countries  where  none  but  Germans  live.  If  Germans 
have  to  live  side  by  side  with  men  of  another  nation- 
ality, they  are  easily  absorbed  and  soon  lose  their 
language  unless  a  vigorous  German  Government 
upholds  Germanism  by  force  and  counteracts  the 
natural  tendency  of  Germans  to  sink  their  nationality 
by  forcibly  Germanising  those  who,  otherwise,  would 
denationalise  the  Germans. 

The  90,000,000  Germans  who  live  in  Germany  and 
in  Greater  Germany  are  distributed  as  follows,  over 
the  globe  : — 

Germany      ....          ...  66,ooo,.ooo 

Austria- Hu ngary  .     ......  11,550,000 

Switzerland 2,320,000 

Russia 2,000,000 

Various  European  countries      ....  i ,  1 30,000 


Total  in  Europe      .......          83,000,000 

United  States  and  Canada 11,500,000 

Central  and  South  America 600,000 

Asia,  Africa,  Australia 400,000 

Grand  Total 95,500,000 

In  Austria-Hungary  the  Germans  not  only  rapidly 
increased  in  numbers,  but  they  increased  proportion- 
ately more  rapidly  than  did  the  other  nations  which 
dwell  in  that  country  as  long  as  they  were  politically 


42  MODERN    GERMANY 

predominant,  and  were  able  to  Germanise  the  other 
races  with  which  they  share  the  land.  However, 
since  a  few  years,  the  Germans  have  lost  their  proud 
position  in  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Czechs,  Poles,  and 
Magyars  have  begun  to  assert  their  national  claims. 
They  have  rebelled  against  being  treated  as  an  inferior 
race  by  the  Germans,  and  since  then  the  Germans 
have  been  losing  ground  in  Austria-Hungary  with 
startling  rapidity. 

In  the  Austrian  half  of  the  monarchy,  where  four- 
fifths  of  the  Austrian-Germans  are  found,  there  lived 
8,461,580  Germans,  according  to  the  census  of  1890. 
At  the  census  of  1900,  9,170,939  Germans  were 
counted  in  that  country.  At  first  sight,  the  increase 
in  the  German  population  of  8,380  per  million  per 
annum,  which  compares  with  15,000  per  million  per 
annum  in  Germany,  may  appear  not  unsatisfactory; 
but  when  we  look  more  closely  into  the  population 
statistics  of  Austria  we  find  that  that  increase  is 
insufficient,  for  the  Austrians  of  non-German  nation- 
ality have  increased  much  faster  than  have  the 
Germans.  Between  1870  and  1900  the  Austrian  Poles 
increased  by  14,520  per  million,  the  Austrian 
Ruthenians  by  10,450  per  million,  the  Austrian  Czechs 
by  8,820  per  million,  whilst  the  Austrian  Germans 
increased  only  by  8,380  per  million,  or  slowest  of 
all.  Therefore  it  comes  that,  in  1880,  36.75  per  cent, 
of  the  Austrians  were  Germans,  that  in  1890  the  pro- 
portion of  Germans  had  shrunk  to  36.04  per  cent,  of 
the  total  population,  whilst  in  1900  the  proportion  of 
Germans  had  further  fallen  to  35.78  per  cent.  This 
decrease  is  perhaps  not  very  great,  but  it  is  only  the 
beginning  of  an  enormous  shrinkage  which  has  com- 
menced to  set  in,  as  will  readily  be  seen  if  we  examine 
the  position  of  the  6,000,000  Germans  who  live  in 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      43 

those  parts  of  Austria  where  they  come  into  contact 
with  other  nationalities. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  Bohemia  was  colonised  by 
Germans,  and  it  was  Germanised  by  force  ;  but  when 
the  Hussites  rose  in  rebellion,  more  from  political  and 
national  than  from  religious  motives,  the  progress  of 
Germanisation  was  interrupted,  but  in  course  of 
time  it  was  resumed.  At  present,  Bohemia  possesses 
a  prominently  German  and  a  prominently  Czech 
sphere.  About  37.27  per  cent,  of  the  whole  popula- 
tion are  Germans,  and  about  62.67  Per  cent,  are  Slav. 
The  Germans  live  chiefly  in  the  north  of  Bohemia, 
and  form  a  fringe  along  the  Austro-German  frontier. 
The  Czechs  sit  in  the  middle  and  in  the  east  of 
Bohemia. 

Prague,  the  capital  of  Bohemia,  which  is  situated 
in  the  central  part  of  the  country  and  in  the  Czech 
sphere,  used  to  be  a  German  town,  and  its  celebrated 
university  was,  until  1882,  a  purely  German  institu- 
tion. But  since  then,  and  especially  during  the  last 
ten  or  fifteen  years,  Prague  has  become  almost  com- 
pletely Czech.  In  1890  there  were  still  16  per  cent, 
of  German-speaking  people  in  Prague.  In  1900  only 
10  per  cent,  of  German-speaking  people  were  left 
in  that  town,  and  the  celebrated  German  university 
has  been  swamped  by  the  Czechs.  Although  the 
number  of  Czech  and  German  professors  and 
lecturers  is  equally  great,  there  are  about  3000 
Czech  students  as  compared  with  only  about  1000 
German  students,  and  the  number  of  the  Germans 
remains  stagnant,  whilst  that  of  the  Czech  students  is 
rapidly  increasing. 

The  Czechs,  who  have  seen  their  nationality  and 
their  language  suppressed  for  centuries,  and  who 
for  centuries  have  been  treated  as  an  inferior  race 


44  MODERN    GERMANY 

by  the  Germans,  and  have  been  treated  with  in- 
justice, work  with  passionate  energy  and  with  the 
zeal  of  revenge  to  reconquer  Bohemia  from  the 
Germans,  and  to  make  it  again  an  independent  nation, 
free  from  German  control.  The  Germans  offer  only 
a  feeble,  passive,  and  futile  resistance  to  the  deter- 
mined onslaught  of  their  opponents.  The  Czechs  in 
the  towns  of  mixed  nationality  not  only  refuse  to 
learn  German,  but  disdain  to  speak  it  even  if  they 
know  the  language.  In  fact,  it  is  dangerous  for  a 
German  to  enter  a  Czech  restaurant  and  to  speak 
German  in  it,  for  he  will  expose  himself  to  suffering 
bodily  violence  at  the  hands  of  the  fanatic  and  easily 
infuriated  Czechs,  to  whom  the  sight  of  a  German 
and  the  sound  of  the  German  language  appears  as 
an  insult. 

Whilst  the  Czechs  are  determined  to  remain  Czechs, 
and  refuse  to  learn  and  to  speak  German,  the  Germans 
in  Bohemia  are  sending  their  children  in  rapidly 
increasing  numbers  into  the  Czech  schools,  and  have 
thus  capitulated  to  the  Czechs.  Therefore  it  comes 
that,  although  37.3  per  cent,  of  the  total  population 
of  Bohemia  are  Germans,  only  33.8  per  cent,  of  the 
school  children  are  described  as  German-speaking; 
consequently,  it  seems  that,  at  present,  at  least  one- 
tenth  of  the  German  children  throughout  Bohemia 
are  being  converted  into  Czechs.  In  the  German 
school  district  of  Bohemia  332,118  children  were 
described  as  speaking  only  German,  30,320  children, 
or  as  much  as  one-ninth,  as  speaking  Czech  and 
German,  and  14,203,  or  one  twenty-fourth,  as  speak- 
ing only  Czech.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Czech 
school  districts,  597,149  children  were  described  as 
speaking  only  Czech,  10,743,  or  but  one-fiftieth,  as 
speaking  Czech  and  German,  and  2603,  or  only 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     45 

one  in  two  hundred  and  twenty-nine,  as  speaking 
only  German.  In  other  words,  of  the  children 
in  the  German  schools  about  one  out  of  eight 
speak  Czech,  whilst  of  the  children  in  the  Czech 
schools,  hardly  one  in  forty-five  children  speaks 
German. 

In  Prague  the  migration  of  the  German  children 
to  the  Czech  camp  is  still  more  pronounced  than  it 
is  for  the  whole  of  Bohemia.  In  the  German  schoo^ 
district  in  Prague  there  were,  according  to  the  last 
statistics,  but  1432  German-speaking  children,  whilst 
the  vast  majority,  namely  3480  children,  spoke  both 
languages,  and  323  children  spoke  Czech  only.  But 
in  the  Czech  school  district  of  the  capital  the  German 
language  is  almost  unknown,  for  there  16,644  children 
speak  Czech,  163,  or  less  than  one  child  in  a  hundred, 
speak  both  languages,  and  one  solitary  child  is  de- 
scribed as  speaking  German  only.  Here  we  have 
an  astonishing  contrast  between  the  Czech  and  the 
German  attitude.  Almost  three-quarters  of  the  chil- 
dren in  the  German  school  districts  speak  Czech, 
whilst  not  one  hundred  of  the  children  in  the  Czech 
school  district  speak  German.  The  German  language, 
after  having  been  the  medium  for  centuries,  is  rapidly 
and  completely  disappearing  in  Bohemia,  and  is 
being  replaced  by  Czech. 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears  that  the  Germans 
in  Bohemia,  and  especially  in  Prague,  lead  their 
children  by  the  thousand  into  the  camp  of  the  Czechs. 
In  a  few  years  Prague  will  have  become  completely 
Czech,  and  by  the  time  when  the  children  who  at 
present  go  to  school  have  grown  up,  German  will 
probably  be  as  little  spoken  in  Bohemia  as  it  is  now 
spoken  in  Hungary.  In  1900  there  were  2,337,013 
Germans  in  Bohemia,  and  their  number  has  increased 


46  MODERN    GERMANY 

by  8420  per  million  per  annum  since  1890,  largely 
owing  to  the  industrial  expansion  in  that  country. 
But  if  the  political  power  of  the  Czechs  should  be 
strengthened — and  all  indications  point  in  that 
direction — the  German  parts  of  Bohemia  would  as 
rapidly  lose  their  German  character  and  the  German 
language  as  Prague  has  lost  its  German  character  and 
language. 

In  Moravia,  where  27.1  per  cent,  of  the  population 
are  Germans,  and  71.36  per  cent,  of  the  people  are 
Slavs,  chiefly  Czech,  similar  conditions  prevail.  In 
Briinn,  the  largest  town  of  Moravia,  the  proportion 
of  Germans  has  shrunk  from  69  per  cent,  in  1890  to 
64  per  cent,  in  1900  ;  but  although  the  Germans  are 
still  in  a  great  majority  in  that  town,  only  4880 
children  are  described  as  speaking  German,  whilst 
no  less  than  8807  children,  or  almost  two-thirds  of 
the  total,  are  stated  to  be  speaking  Czech,  or  Czech 
and  German.  How  retrogressive  the  German  element 
is  in  Moravia  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the 
German  population  of  that  country  comprised  29.4 
per  cent,  of  the  population  in  1890,  but  only 
27.9  per  cent,  in  1900.  When  the  thousands  of 
German  children  who  now  learn  Czech  at  the 
schools  have  become  men  and  women,  Moravia  will 
probably  contain  only  traces  of  the  German  popu- 
lation. 

In  Austrian  Silesia  the  Germans  have  to  share  the 
land  with  both  Czechs  and  Poles,  and  numerically 
the  Germans  are  by  far  the  strongest  element.  Never- 
theless, they  have  rapidly  lost  ground  during  the 
last  decade.  In  1890,  47.8  per  cent,  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Austrian  Silesia  were  Germans,  30.2  per  cent,  were 
Poles,  and  22  per  cent,  were  Czechs.  In  1900  only 
44.7  per  cent,  of  the  population  were  Germans,  33.3 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     47 

per  cent,  were  Poles,  and  22  per  cent,  were  Czechs. 
The  ground  which  the  Germans  lost  in  Silesia  was 
gained  by  the  Poles,  and  here,  as  in  Bohemia  and 
Moravia,  the  German  children  are  sent  to  schools 
where  they  learn  Czech  or  Polish.  Therefore  we 
find  that,  although  44.7  per  cent,  of  the  total 
population  of  Austrian  Silesia  were  Germans,  only 
38  per  cent,  of  the  children  were  described  as  speak- 
ing German.  Apparently  one-sixth  of  the  German 
children  are  going  to  Czech  and  Polish  schools,  where 
they  are  rapidly  being  converted  into  Czechs  and 
Poles. 

In  Galicia  200,000  Germans  live  among  4,000,000 
Poles  and  3,000,000  Ruthenians,  and  the  Germans  are 
rapidly  disappearing.  The  German  population  of 
Galicia  has  declined  from  227,600  in  1890  to  211,752 
in  1900,  and  the  proportion  of  Germans  to  non- 
Germans  in  the  country  has,  during  the  same  time, 
fallen  from  3.46  per  cent,  to  but  2.91  per  cent. 

In  Tyrol  there  are  460,840  Germans  and  304,578 
Italians,  and  in  that  country  the  proportion  of 
Germans  to  non-Germans  has,  between  1890  and 
1900,  slightly  increased.  However,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  number  of  Germans  is  more  than 
50  per  cent,  larger  than  is  that  of  the  Italians,  we 
find  that  60,403  children  were  described  as  speaking 
German,  57,418  as  speaking  Italian,  and  3061  as 
speaking  both  German  and  Italian.  According  to  the 
numbers  of  Italians  and  Germans,  there  should  be 
80,000  German-speaking  children  and  40,000  Italian- 
speaking  children.  Consequently,  it  appears  that  in 
Tyrol  about  22,000  German  children  are  being 
Italianised,  and  it  seems  likely  that  the  Italian 
element  will,  eventually,  be  as  victorious  over  the 
German  element  in  the  south  of  the  monarchy  as 


48  MODERN    GERMANY 

are  the  Czechs  and  the  Poles  in  the  north  of 
Austria. 

The  foregoing  facts  and  figures  clearly  prove  that 
in  those  parts  of  Austria  where  Germans  live  side 
by  side  with  other  nationalities,  the  former  are  rapidly 
being  absorbed  by  the  latter.  The  Germans  who 
live  in  Austria-Hungary  are  likely  to  increase  only 
in  those  districts  where  exclusively,  or  nearly  exclu- 
sively, Germans  are  living.  These  districts  are 
Upper  Austria,  Lower  Austria,  Salzburg,  Styria,  and 
Carinthia. 

In  1890,  2,107,577  Germans  lived  in  Hungary. 
Ten  years  later,  2,114,423  Germans  were  counted  in 
that  country.  Therefore  it  appears  that,  whereas 
the  German  population  in  Germany  has  grown  by 
131,000  per  million  between  1890  and  1900,  the 
German  population  in  Hungary  has  grown  by  but 
3000  per  million  during  the  same  time,  or  at  about 
one-fortieth  the  rate  of  speed.  The  German  popula- 
tion of  Hungary  has  remained  practically  stationary 
during  the  last  decade,  although  the  whole  population 
of  Hungary  has  considerably  increased.  Consequently 
the  German  element,  although  it  is  unchanged  in 
numbers,  has  greatly  decreased  in  proportion  to  the 
total  population.  In  1890,  12.1  per  cent,  of  the 
population  of  Hungary  were  Germans.  In  1900  only 
ii  per  cent,  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  were 
Germans.  The  decrease  of  the  German  population 
has  been  particularly  striking  in  Hungary  proper, 
where  the  proportion  of  German  inhabitants  has 
shrunk  from  13.7  per  cent,  in  1890  to  only  12  per 
cent,  ten  years  later.  In  other  words,  in  1890  one 
German  was  to  be  found  for  every  six  Hungarians 
in  Hungary,  whilst  in  1900  there  was  only  one  German 
to  every  eight  Hungarians.  In  the  Hungarian  towns 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     49 

the  Germans  have  lost  ground  at  a  surprisingly  rapid 
rate,  as  the  following  figures  show  : — 


PROPORTION  OF  GERMANS  IN  IMPORTANT  HUNGARIAN  TOWNS 

1890  1900 

per  cent,  per  cent. 

Buda-Pesth. 24  14 

Pressburg 60  50 

Oedenburg      .......  64  54 

Temesvar 56  51 

Hermannstadt 61  55 

Arad "  .     .  53  10 

Kaschan 13  9 

Grosswardein 3  3 

Raab 5  4 

Klausenburg 4  4 

Agram 9  7 

Fiume 5  5 

A  glance  at  the  foregoing  table  shows  that  the 
Germans  have  diminished  in  all  the  big  towns  in 
Hungary,  and  most  rapidly  in  those  towns  which, 
only  ten  years  ago,  were  strongholds  of  Germanism  ; 
but  the  German  element  has  little  diminished,  or  has 
even  remained  stationary  in  those  towns  where  it  was 
insignificant. 

Buda-Pesth  was  founded  by  Germans  in  1241,  and 
it  was  pre-eminently  a  German  town  until  very 
recently.  Fifty  years  ago  more  than  half  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Hungarian  capital  were  Germans ; 
in  1888,  33  per  cent,  of  the  population  were  Germans  ; 
in  1890,  the  German  population  had  fallen  to  24  per 
cent. ;  in  1900  it  amounted  only  to  14  per  cent.  At 
the  present  date,  only  about  one-tenth  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Buda-Pesth  consists  of  Germans,  and  it  is 
quite  impossible  to  make  oneself  understood  only  with 
a  knowledge  of  German  in  the  Hungarian  capital. 


50  MODERN    GERMANY 

Whilst  in  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Austrian  Silesia, 
Galicia,  and  Tyrol  the  German  element  has  chiefly 
voluntarily  merged  itself  in  the  Czech,  Polish,  and 
Italian  element,  it  has  in  Hungary,  to  some  extent, 
been  denationalised  owing  to  the  application  of 
external  pressure.  Hungary,  like  Germany,  follows 
an  active,  and  to  some  extent  coercive,  national  policy, 
whilst  Austria  now  follows  the  policy  of  laissez-faire 
with  regard  to  the  different  nationalities  which  dwell 
in  the  country.  However,  the  Germans  in  Hungary 
do  not  seem  to  object -to  being  Magyarised.  On  the 
contrary,  they  like  to  be  taken  for  pure-blooded 
Magyars.  They  speak  Hungarian  among  themselves, 
and  affect  not  to  know  German  when  addressed  by  a 
stranger  in  their  mother-tongue.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  seems  likely  that,  in  a  few  decades,  hardly 
a  trace  will  be  left  of  the  2,000,000  Germans  who  now 
live  in  Hungary. 

In  1900  Austria-Hungary  had  a  total  population 
of  45,405,266  people,  of  whom  11,385,362,  or  about 
one  quarter,  were  Germans.  Of  these  Germans 
exactly  6,000,000,  or  somewhat  more  than  one  half, 
lived  in  a  precarious  position  in  Bohemia,  Moravia, 
Austrian  Silesia,  Tyrol,  Galicia,  and  Hungary,  dis- 
tricts where  their  position  is  threatened  by  Czechs, 
Poles,  Italians,  and  Magyars.  Consequently  the  out- 
look for  the  future  is  far  from  hopeful  for  the  Germans 
who  live  under  the  Double  Eagle. 

Hungary  absorbs  the  Germans  with  incredible 
rapidity,  but  the  Government  of  Austria  has  hitherto 
been  able  to  protect  the  German  element,  and  to 
rule  the  various  races  in  a  way  favourable  to  the 
preservation  of  the  German  nationality  and  of  the 
German  language.  But  the  Czechs  are  anxious  to 
follow  Hungary's  example,  and  to  pursue  a  vigorous 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     51 

national  policy,  which  would  necessarily  be  anti- 
German,  for  the  Germans  have  suppressed  the  Czechs 
in  the  past,  and  are  therefore  considered  by  them  as 
strangers  and  intruders.  If  the  Czechs  should  succeed 
in  getting  a  free  hand  in  Bohemia,  the  3,000,000 
Germans  who  live  in  that  country  would  rapidly  be 
absorbed  by  the  Czechs,  and  the  German  population 
of  Austria-Hungary  might  in  twenty  years  be  re- 
stricted to  about  seven  million  people,  who  would 
find  themselves  in  a  hopeless  minority  against  fifty 
million  non-Germans  living  with  them  in  the  monarchy. 
In  Bohemia,  Moravia,  and  Austrian  Silesia  the 
Germans  form  a  fringe  along  the  Austro-German 
frontier,  but  they  are  cut  off  from  the  German  Hinter- 
land of  Austria.  In  Hungary  the  Germans  occur  in 
patches,  here  and  there,  and  cannot  stand  together 
in  mutual  defence.  If  these  dispersed  great  German 
colonies  in  Austria  and  in  Hungary  should  disappear 
— and  their  isolation  makes  such  an  event  appear 
possible — the  Germans  in  Austria-Hungary  would  be 
confined  to  the  great  German  enclave  in  South-west 
Austria,  which  is  composed  of  Upper  and  Lower 
Austria,  Salzburg,  Styria,  Carinthia,  &c.,  where  about 
six  million  Germans  live,  who  form  nine-tenths  of  the 
population.  This  German  island  in  the  midst  of  a 
surging  and  roaring  sea  of  Slavonic  nations  would,  no 
doubt,  be  able  to  resist  the  more  or  less  forcible 
encroachments  of  Czechs,  Poles,  and  Hungarians  for 
some  considerable  time ;  but  the  German  element, 
with  its  hopeless  minority,  would  hardly  be  able  to 
act  any  longer  as  the  governing  element  hi  Austria, 
as  it  has  done  hitherto.  Vienna,  which  is  situated 
almost  on  the  eastern  border  of  the  German  enclave, 
and  dangerously  near  Bohemia,  is  already  being 
invaded  by  immense  numbers  of  Czechs,  and  if  the 


52  MODERN    GERMANY 

Czech  element  should  once  succeed  in  capturing  the 
Austrian  capital,  it  would  soon,  through  the  capital, 
dominate  the  whole  of  Austria. 

The  German  element  in  Austria  is  not  only 
threatened  from  without,  but  also  from  within.  It 
has  often  been  remarked  that  illegitimacy  is  nowhere 
in  Europe  more  frequent  than  in  Austria,  where, 
according  to  recent  official  statistics,  13.7  per  cent,  of 
the  children  were  illegitimate,  as  compared  with  only 
9  per  cent,  in  France,  9  per  cent,  in  Germany,  8.5  per 
cent,  in  Hungary,  7.4  per  cent,  in  Scotland,  4.2  per 
cent,  in  England  and  Wales,  &c.  The  high  pro- 
portion of  illegitimate  births  in  Austria  becomes 
particularly  startling  if  we  investigate  the  statistics 
of  births  in  the  different  parts  of  Austria,  for  then 
we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the  following  most 
extraordinary  phenomenon.  In  those  parts  of  Austria 
where  Czechs,  Poles,  Ruthenians,  and  Italians  prevail, 
such  as  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Silesia,  Galicia,  Tyrol, 
Carniola,  Bukovina,  Dalmatia,  only  about  7  per  cent, 
of  the  births  were  illegitimate.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  those  districts  where  the  Germans  form  about 
nine-tenths  of  the  population,  from  20  per  cent,  to 
40  per  cent,  of  the  children  were  illegitimate.  In 
Styria  24  per  cent.,  in  Lower  Austria  25.1  per  cent., 
in  Salzburg  26.9  per  cent.,  in  Vienna  32  per  cent.,  and 
in  Carinthia  even  42.6  per  cent,  of  the  children  were 
born  out  of  wedlock.  In  the  chiefly  German  parts 
of  Austria  130,000  children,  or  about  one  quarter  of 
all  the  children  born,  were  illegitimate.  This  startling 
and  almost  incredible  difference  in  the  percentage 
of  illegitimate  births  in  the  German  and  the  non- 
German  parts  of  Austria,  and  the  frightful  number 
of  fatherless  children  in  that  country,  bodes  ill  for  the 
future  of  the  Austrian  Germans,  for  such  figures  are  a 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      53 

sure  indication  of  moral  and  physical  decay,  and  they 
explain  why  the  Germans  in  Austria  are  everywhere 
losing  ground  to  Czechs,  Poles,  Italians,  and  Magyars.  . 

In  Austria  lived  in  1900,  in  round  numbers,  9,200,000 
Germans,  6,000,000  Czechs,  4,300,000  Poles,  and 
6,000,000  people  belonging  to  six  other  nationalities. 
Consequently,  if  the  German  element  should  lose  its 
supremacy  in  Austria,  the  Czechs,  or  the  Czechs  and 
the  Poles  combined,  might  claim,  and  probably  would 
obtain,  the  supremacy  in  and  the  rule  over  the  Austrian 
part  of  the  monarchy.  That  they  would  use  their 
power  for  their  own  ends,  and  retaliate  on  the  Germans 
for  the  centuries  of  persecution  which  they  have 
suffered,  by  gradually  extinguishing  the  German  ele- 
ment in  Austria  and  transforming  the  country  into  a 
Slavonic  State,  can  hardly  be  doubted. 

The  Slavonic  element  is  evidently  in  the  ascendant 
in  Austria,  where  60.2  per  cent,  of  the  population  are 
Slavs,  and  it  may  soon  be  triumphant.  Consequently, 
it  seems  very  likely  that  Austria  may,  in  course  of 
time,  be  turned  from  a  nominally  German  State  into 
a  purely  Slavonic  State,  supposing,  of  course,  that 
events  are  allowed  to  develop  peacefully  in  that 
direction  in  which  they  are  developing  at  present. 
Whether  Germany,  Austria's  neighbour,  will  allow 
such  a  change  to  take  place  is,  of  course,  another 
question.  That  Germany  will  placidly  look  on 
whilst  ten  million  Austrian  Germans  are  being  ab- 
sorbed by  those  Slavs  whom  Germans  and  Austrians 
have  colonised,  Germanised,  suppressed,  and  oppressed 
in  the  past,  and  who  therefore  detest  Germany  and 
Germanism,  may  well  be  doubted.  Therefore  Austria- 
Hungary  may,  in  course  of  time,  become  to  Germany 
and  Russia,  or  to  Germany,  Russia,  and  Italy,  a 
second  Poland. 


54  MODERN    GERMANY 

Switzerland  is  partly  German,  partly  French,  and 
partly  Italian.  In  1900  there  were  2,319,105  German- 
speaking  people,  733,220  French-speaking  people,  and 
222,247  Italian-speaking  people  in  Switzerland.  These 
three  nationalities  occupy  separate  parts  of  the 
country.  The  Italians  live  hi  the  south,  the  French 
in  the  west,  and  the  Germans  in  the  north  and  east 
of  the  country.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  more  than 
two-thirds  of  the  Swiss  are  Germans,  and  that  the 
French  and  Italians  in  Switzerland  do  not  endeavour 
to  Italianise  or  to  Gallicise  their  German  neighbours, 
it  might  be  thought  that  the  Germans  would,  owing 
to  their  great  fruitfulness,  increase  more  rapidly  than 
do  the  Italian  Swiss  and  the  French  Swiss.  But  this 
is  not  the  case.  Between  1888  and  1900,  the  French- 
speaking  population  of  Switzerland  increased  by  15.5 
per  cent.,  the  Italian  population,  largely  through  im- 
migration, increased  by  43.3  per  cent.,  whilst  the 
German-speaking  population  increased  by  only  11.4 
per  cent.  As  the  French  population  is  almost  com- 
pletely stationary  in  neighbouring  France,  it  cannot 
be  doubted  that  the  great  increase  in  the  French- 
speaking  population  of  Switzerland  is  largely  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  French-speaking  Swiss  are  absorbing 
the  Germans.  The  merging  of  the  German  element 
in  the  French  population  is  particularly  noticeable  in 
the  canton  Berne,  where  about  one-sixth  of  the  people 
are  French,  but  this  sixth  is  growing  fast  at  the 
expense  of  the  German  five-sixths. 

If  the  present  movement  of  nationalities  in  Switzer- 
land should  continue  for  a  few  decades,  the  Germans 
will  find  themselves  in  a  minority,  and  will  then,  in 
all  probability,  rapidly  become  Gallicised,  especially 
as  the  German  Swiss  are  republicans  to  a  man.  They 
are  passionately  opposed  to  monarchical  government, 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      55 

and  therefore  naturally  incline  rather  towards  France 
than  towards  Germany. 

It  is  estimated  that  two  million  Germans  live  in 
Russia,  but  no  exact  figures  exist  as  to  their  numbers. 
About  300,000  Germans  live  in  the  Baltic  provinces, 
principally  in  Riga,  Mitau,  Dorpat,  and  Reval.  In 
Poland  500,000  Germans  are  supposed  to  live.  They 
are  chiefly  occupied  in  factories,  and  in  Lodz  alone 
more  than  100,000  Germans  are  counted.  Spread 
through  South  Russia  and  along  the  Volga,  approxi- 
mately a  million  Germans  are  supposed  to  reside.  They 
are  the  descendants  of  the  German  peasant  colonies 
which  were  founded  by  Catherine  II.,  Alexander  I., 
and  other  monarchs,  who  wished  to  develop  their 
thinly  populated  country  by  attracting  many  thou- 
sands of  Germans. 

For  a  long  time  the  Germans  in  Russia  preserved 
their  national  characteristics  and  their  language ; 
they  had  in  their  colonies  their  own  laws,  their  own 
administration,  their  own  colleges,  schools,  &c. ;  but 
during  the  last  twenty-five  years  they  have  been 
Russianised  with  so  much  energy  and  so  much  success 
that  the  German  language  is  rapidly  becoming  ex- 
tinct in  Russia.  The  Poles  in  Russia  have  apparently 
preserved  their  nationality  and  their  language  much 
better,  notwithstanding  a  longer  and  more  energetic 
persecution  on  the  part  of  Russia.  Recently  there 
were  but  two  small  German  schools  in  Russia,  one 
in  Riga  and  one  in  Helsingfors. 

In  Belgium  and  Holland  about  150,000  Germans 
are  living,  and  in  both  countries  they  are  rapidly 
being  converted  into  Belgians  and  Dutch.  In  France 
there  are  at  least  100,000  Germans,  who  are  mostly 
in  comfortable  circumstances,  and  of  these  about 
15,000  live  in  Paris.  But  their  cohesion  and  their 


56  MODERN    GERMANY 

sense  of  nationality  is  so  small  that,  notwithstanding 
the  old  enmity  between  French  and  Germans,  they 
are  rapidly  becoming  French.  The  only  German  paper 
in  France  is  the  Pariser  Zeitung,  which  appears  weekly, 
and  which  has  to  work  hard  to  make  both  ends 
meet.  There  are  only  two  German  elementary  schools 
in  the  whole  of  France,  one  in  Paris  and  one  in  Mar- 
seilles. The  former  was  attended  by  113  German 
children  and  the  latter  by  but  seven  German  children. 

In  this  country  there  are  at  least  100,000  Germans 
permanently  domiciled,  who  are,  on  the  whole,  in  very 
good  circumstances,  and  of  whom  the  great  majority 
live  in  London.  There  are  some  German  churches 
in  London,  Liverpool,  and  other  provincial  towns. 
Two  German  weeklies  and  a  German  bi-weekly  paper 
appear  in  London,  but  their  circulation  is  quite  in- 
significant, and  there  are  four  or  five  German  schools 
in  the  whole  of  Great  Britain.  The  sons  and  daughters 
of  German  parents  living  in  this  country  in  many 
cases  know  no  German,  and  it  is  very  exceptional 
that  the  children  of  German  parents  are  sent  to 
school  in  Germany. 

In  Roumania,  Servia,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  about 
100,000  Germans  reside,  of  whom  about  30,000  live  in 
Bucharest  alone.  They  are  found  chiefly  in  the 
towns,  and  have  not  lost  their  nationality.  Hence, 
they  possess,  in  those  countries,  a  considerable  number 
of  schools,  which  are  largely  patronised  by  native 
children. 

In  the  United  States  there  were  in  1900  about 
11,200,000  German-speaking  people,  but  of  these 
only  2,666,990  were  born  in  Germany.  The  remain- 
ing 8,533,010  were  the  children  of  German  immigrants  ; 
but  of  these  many,  and  probably  the  majority,  grow 
up  with  hardly  any  knowledge  of  the  German  Ian- 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      57 

guage.  Throughout  the  United  States  there  are 
numerous  nominally  German  schools,  but  these  have 
gradually  become  Americanised,  and  have,  in  most 
cases,  lost  their  German  character  altogether.  The 
huge  number  of  flourishing  German  private  schools 
which  used  to  exist  in  North  America  has  almost 
completely  disappeared,  and  in  many  of  the  so-called 
German  schools  German  is  only  taught  as  a  foreign 
language,  side  by  side  with  French.  The  German 
element  remains  German  for  a  longer  time  only  in 
those  parts  of  the  United  States  where  the  Germans 
are  crowded  together  in  considerable  numbers — for 
instance,  in  New  York,  where  322,343  Germans  were 
counted  in  1900,  in  Chicago  with  170,738  Germans, 
in  Philadelphia  with  71,319  Germans,  in  St.  Louis 
with  58,781  Germans,  &c. 

Canada  is  estimated  to  have  about  340,000  Ger- 
mans among  her  population,  but  these  have  become 
Canadians. 

No  less  than  600,000  Germans  live  in  South 
America.  Brazil  has  about  400,000  German  citizens, 
of  whom  300,000  are  found  in  the  two  southern  dis- 
tricts of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  and  Santa  Catarina, 
where  they  form  about  one  quarter  of  the  population. 
Here  the  Germans  have  founded  substantial  towns 
and  villages,  and  they  have  preserved  their  char- 
acteristics and  their  language,  which  is  tinged  with 
numerous  Portuguese,  Spanish,  and  native  words ;  and 
in  those  parts  where  Germans  prevail  native  Brazilians 
and  negroes  may  be  heard  using  the  broadest  German 
dialects.  The  Germans  in  Brazil  possess  a  large 
number  of  German  schools,  there  being  six  hundred 
in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  alone,  and  there  are  numerous 
German  churches,  clubs,  newspapers,  &c.  Many  of 
the  German  schools  in  Brazil  are  subsidised  by 


58  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  German  Government.  The  Germans  in  South 
Brazil  feel  themselves  a  nation,  and  in  the  small 
morning  hours  after  festivities  they  may  be  heard 
discussing,  with  patriotic  enthusiasm,  the  possibility 
of  again  forming  a  part  of  the  old  Fatherland.  The 
Germans  in  Uruguay,  Argentina,  Chile,  Bolivia, 
Venezuela,  Ecuador,  &c.,  are  dispersed  all  over  these 
countries,  and  do  not  form  compact  colonies,  as  they 
do  in  the  south  of  Brazil. 

In  Australia  about  100,000  Germans  are  counted, 
who  have  completely  lost  their  nationality  and  lan- 
guage. In  Asia  there  are  a  few  thousand  Germans, 
who  chiefly  live  in  British  colonies  and  in  the  harbour 
towns  of  China.  Many  of  these  have  become  Angli- 
cised ;  they  are  members  of  English  clubs,  they  take 
in  the  English  papers,  and  they  speak  English  even 
among  themselves.  In  Africa  there  is  a  considerable 
number  of  Germans,  most  of  whom  are  found  hi  the 
Cape  Colony  and  in  the  Transvaal  Colony.  In  the 
former,  as  well  as  in  the  latter,  they  have  lost  their 
nationality  completely.  In  the  German  colonies  in 
Africa  so  few  Germans  are  living  that  they  are  not 
worth  mentioning. 

Whilst  the  66,000,000  Germans  in  Germany  are 
increasing  in  number  at  a  surprising  rate,  the 
30,000,000  Germans  outside  Germany  are  rapidly 
being  converted  into  Czechs,  Poles,  Italians,  Hun- 
garians, Frenchmen,  Russians,  Dutchmen,  Belgians, 
Englishmen,  Americans,  Canadians,  Boers,  &c.  This 
spectacle  fills  many  thoughtful  Germans  with  regret 
and  sadness,  especially  as  the  Germans  who  become 
incorporated  in  foreign  nations  are,  in  many  cases, 
men  of  promise  and  ability,  whose  services  would 
have  been  invaluable  to  the  mother  country.  Not 
a  few  of  the  most  prominent  statesmen,  generals, 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     59 

scientists,  and  business  men  in  many  countries,  Great 
Britain  included,  are  Germans  by  birth  or  by  descent. 
Germany  incurs  therefore  enormous  losses  not  only 
in  material,  but  also  in  intellectual  power,  by  the 
migratory  tendency  of  her  sons,  and  by  their  peculiarity 
of  easily  allowing  themselves  to  be  assimilated  by 
Germanic,  Latin,  or  Slavonic  nations. 

Men  of  other  nations  are  not  so  easily  denationalised 
as  are  the  Germans.  Wherever  the  Englishman  goes, 
he  takes  with  him  his  church,  his  Bible,  his  clubs, 
his  newspaper,  his  sports,  his  household  gods,  his 
national  virtues,  and  his  national  failings.  French- 
men also  who  live  abroad  will  remain  Frenchmen 
in  thought  and  language,  even  if  they  have  been 
separated  from  France  for  centuries,  as  may  be  seen 
by  the  habitants  of  Eastern  Canada.  Dutchmen, 
likewise,  preserve  their  language  and  their  national 
peculiarities  during  centuries  of  separation  from 
their  country,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  case  of  the 
Boers,  who  are  Dutch  to  the  marrow.  It  seems  that, 
among  European  nations,  the  Germans  alone  are 
truly  cosmopolitan,  for  they  make  the  world  their 
country. 

Fifty  years  ago,  when  cosmopolitanism  was  the 
fashion,  this  peculiar  adaptability  of  the  Germans  was 
considered  by  them  as  a  virtue ;  but  since  the  time 
of  Friedrich  List  and  Prince  Bismarck,  when  the 
Germans  began  to  call  Political  Economy  "  National " 
Economy  and  to  discard  their  policy  of  sentiment  for 
a  purely  national  and  deliberately  selfish  policy  of 
interest,  the  cosmopolitanism  of  the  Germans  has 
come  to  be  considered  as  a  vice,  and  it  is  now  loudly 
condemned  as  such  by  all  university  professors  and 
other  professional  moralists.  Therefore  the  Germans 
are  striving  hard  to  overcome  the  vice  of  cosmo- 


Co  MODERN    GERMANY 

politanism,  to  become  more  national  and  to  preserve 
the  German  element  abroad. 

With  this  object  in  view,  many  Societies  for  the 
Defence  of  Germanism  have  been  founded  both  in 
Germany  and  in  Austria  during  the  last  two  or  three 
decades.  In  1880  the  Vienna  School  Society  was 
founded  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  German 
language  in  those  parts  of  Austria  where  it  is 
threatened  by  other  nationalities.  That  society  has, 
since  its  creation,  spent  £400,000  and  has  opened 
forty-nine  schools,  but  of  these  only  fifteen  are  at 
present  in  existence.  The  enthusiasm  for  the  society 
which  prevailed  in  Austria  for  a  few  years  has  dis- 
appeared, and,  from  the  details  given  in  the  beginning 
of  this  article,  it  seems  that  its  activity  has  not  been 
able  to  stem  the  Slavonic  tide. 

In  1881  the  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Schulverein  zur 
Erhaltung  des  Deutschtums  im  Ausland  (the  German 
School  Society  for  the  Preservation  of  Germanism 
Abroad)  was  founded  in  Berlin  on  the  model  of  its 
Vienna  prototype.  In  1903  it  had  33,000  members, 
and  a  yearly  income  of  £6000.  It  has  confidential 
agents  in  all  countries,  and  has  altogether  spent 
about  £100,000  since  its  inception.  It  has  the  proud 
motto,  "  To  serve  Germanism  is  to  serve  mankind." 
The  moderate  figures  of  money  spent  by  that  society 
seem  to  show  that  its  practical  utility  can  hardly 
be  very  great,  and  it  is  not  apparent  that  it  has, 
during  its  twenty-five  years'  activity,  done  much  to 
counteract  the  process  of  denationalisation  among 
the  Germans  living  abroad.  The  German  Govern- 
ment sympathises  with  the  policy  of  the  Schulverein, 
and  it  grants  since  1900  a  subsidy  of  £15,000  to  German 
schools  in  foreign  countries  without  claiming  the  right 
of  control  or  supervision.  The  figures  given  in  this 
chapter  were  furnished  by  the  Schulverein. 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     61 

From  pre-Christian  times  up  to  the  present,  its 
migratory  instinct  has  been  one  of  the  leading  char- 
acteristics of  the  German  race.  The  Germans  have 
had  practically  no  settled  country,  excepting  the 
narrow  district  between  Rhine  and  Elbe,  which  has 
always  been  German.  That  district,  which  contains 
approximately  40,000,000  Germans,  is  almost  purely 
Germanic,  and  it  is  still  the  stronghold  of  the  race. 
The  remaining  parts  of  present  Germany  are  colonial 
land. 

In  the  course  of  centuries  the  Germans  have 
spasmodically  streamed  north  and  south  and  east 
and  west  in  enormous  numbers,  but  those  Germans 
who  were  left  behind  on  foreign  soil  were,  after  a 
short  period  of  supremacy,  swallowed  up  by  the 
original  inhabitants  of  the  countries  in  which  they 
had  settled.  Copenhagen  in  the  north,  and  Novgorod, 
near  St.  Petersburg,  far  away  in  the  east,  were  at 
one  time  German  towns,  and  German  used  to  be  the 
language  of  culture  and  the  language  of  commerce 
in  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Norway.  Holland  and 
Switzerland  were  at  one  time  loyal  German  States ; 
but,  having  been  left  to  fight  their  own  battles  single- 
handed,  they  cut  themselves  adrift  from  the  German 
nation  and  formed  independent  States.  In  this  way 
Germany  has  been  deprived  not  only  of  several 
millions  of  people  but  also  of  Switzerland  and  Holland, 
two  of  the  most  valuable  strategical  positions  in 
Europe,  the  possession  of  which  would  allow  Germany 
to  rule  the  Continent  of  Europe. 

Whilst  Germanism  has  lost  much  of  the  ground 
which  it  had  conquered  in  past  centuries,  it  has  pre- 
vailed in  other  not  originally  German  parts.  In 
East  Prussia,  for  instance,  the  native  heathen  in- 
habitants, the  Prussians,  of  whom  nothing  but  the 


62  MODERN    GERMANY 

name  has  been  preserved,  were  exterminated  in  the 
thirteenth  century  by  the  Teutonic  Order ;  and,  from 
all  parts  of  Germany,  peasants  and  townsmen  were 
settled  in  that  devastated  country,  which  thus  became 
thoroughly  German. 

Since  the  time  when  the  foundation  of  present 
Germany  was  laid  in  the  wilderness  of  Prussia  up  to 
the  present  day,  the  policy  of  vigorous,  and,  if  needs 
be,  brutal,  colonisation  has  always  been  a  guiding 
principle  of  Prussian  policy,  and  thus  Prussia  has 
Germanised  her  conquered  lands.  In  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  Prussian  Electors  attracted  to  their 
territories  the  Protestants  and  Dissenters  who  were 
expelled  from  other  German  States.  The  great 
Elector  and  the  first  Prussian  Kings,  Frederick  I.  and 
Frederick  William  I.,  pursued  the  same  policy  of 
colonisation  in  the  Slavonic  east  of  Germany,  and 
they  attracted  also  numerous  foreigners,  who  brought 
with  them  their  methods  of  agriculture,  of  canalisa- 
tion, and  of  irrigation,  their  sciences  and  their  manu- 
facturing industries. 

Frederick  the  Great  was  the  greatest,  the  most 
thorough,  and  the  most  systematic  of  all  Germanising 
rulers  of  Prussia,  although  he  spoke  only  French. 
He  created  along  the  Polish  frontier  in  Silesia  a  chain 
of  villages,  after  he  had  conquered  that  province 
from  Austria,  and  he  planted  a  large  German  popula- 
tion  among  the  Slavs  in  the  east  of  his  kingdom. 
He  converted  his  old  soldiers  into  peasants,  found 
them  wives,  cattle,  and  furniture,  and  he  attracted 
from  the  south  and  the  west  of  Germany  about 
43,000  families,  or,  approximately,  about  300,000 
people.  By  these  means  he  increased  the  slender 
population  of  his  kingdom  by  ten  per  cent.,  and  firmly 
established  German  supremacy  throughout  the  country. 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     63 

At  the  end  of  his  reign,  about  one-third  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Prussia  consisted  of  immigrant  colonists  and 
their  descendants. 

The  Empress  Maria  Theresa  and  the  Emperor 
Joseph  imitated  the  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great  in 
Austria-Hungary.  They  founded,  for  instance,  a 
great  German  colony  in  the  south  of  Hungary,  where 
25,000  colonists  were  settled,  and  where  at  present 
about  400,000  Germans  are  found.  However,  their 
labour  has  been  lost,  for  the  isolated  German  peasant 
colonies  in  the  north  and  the  south  of  Hungary 
will  soon  succumb  to  the  victorious  Magyars,  who 
are  rapidly  Magyarising  the  whole  of  Hungary. 

Through  the  deliberate,  forceful,  and  thorough 
Germanising  policy  of  Prussia,  Germany,  in  its  present 
form,  is  no  longer  a  conglomerate  of  individualistic 
and  mutually  hostile  States,  but  a  firmly  knit,  united, 
and  thoroughly  national  nation,  whilst  the  Germans 
in  other  countries,  and  even  in  nominally  German 
Austria,  are  not  unlike  wandering  tribes  of  nomads 
which  have  temporarily  settled  in  a  foreign  land, 
and  which  are  ready  to  abandon  their  own  nationality. 
Through  the  energetic  policy  of  the  Hohenzollerns 
the  historic  character  of  Germany  has  been  radically 
altered ;  the  Germans  in  Germany  have  with  fire  and 
iron  been  welded  into  a  nation,  and  will  remain  a 
nation  as  long  as  they  are  held  together  by  a  strong 
iron  band.  Whether  the  Germans  would  remain  a 
nation  if  they  are  left  to  themselves  and  if  the  firm 
band  of  national  discipline  be  loosened,  may  well  be 
doubted.  Not  by  national  inclination  and  by  natural 
growth,  but  by  force,  have  they  received  the  sense  of 
nationality,  and  by  force  they  have  Germanised  non- 
German  elements  in  the  country. 

The   traditional   policy   of    Germanisation   is   still 


64  MODERN    GERMANY 

pursued  by  the  Government  in  the  Eastern  Provinces 
of  Prussia,  where,  at  the  census  of  1900,  3,328,751 
Poles  were  counted,  whom  Prussia  has  so  far  been 
unable  to  assimilate  and  to  Germanise.  In  order  to 
convert  these  Poles  into  Germans,  the  use  of  the 
Polish  language  has  been  forbidden  to  the  Poles,  in 
public  and  private  education,  and  even  in  religious 
instruction.  Letters  addressed  in  Polish  are  not 
forwarded  by  the  German  Post-Office  ;  Polish  theatres, 
clubs,  societies,  &c.,  are  not  allowed  to  exist.  Be- 
sides, the  Prussian  Government  tries  to  Germanise 
the  districts  where  Poles  prevail  by  its  traditional 
policy  of  settling  German  peasants  among  them. 
This  policy  was  initiated  by  Bismarck  in  1886,  and 
for  this  purpose  a  settlements  fund  of  £5,000,000 
was  created,  which  was  increased  to  £10,000,000  in 
1898,  to  £22,500,000  in  1902,  and  to  £35,000,000  in 
1908.  With  this  fund  land  belonging  to  Polish  landed 
proprietors  and  Polish  peasants  is  bought,  and  the 
Poles  are  replaced  by  German  proprietors  and  German 
peasants.  This  measure  has  proved  a  godsend  to 
those  Polish  landed  proprietors  whose  estates  were 
heavily  encumbered,  for  they  were  enabled  to  sell 
them  on  very  favourable  terms. 

So  far,  about  fourteen  thousand  families,  or  about 
seventy  thousand  people,  have  thus  been  settled  by 
the  State  among  the  Poles,  but  in  spite  of  all  Govern- 
ment measures,  the  Poles  have  not  only  held  their 
ground  in  the  east  of  Germany,  but  they  have 
apparently  even  gained  ground,  partly  because  their 
national  instinct  is  strongly  developed  and  because 
they  cling  to  their  language,  partly  because  the  Poles 
are  even  more  prolific  than  are  the  Germans.  Con- 
sequently we  find  that,  in  the  province  of  Posen, 
where  about  1,000,000  Poles  and  about  900,000 


GERMANY    AND    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY     65 

Germans  are  living  side  by  side,  the  Germans  have 
increased  by  only  3f-  per  cent,  between  1890  and 
1900,  whilst  the  Poles  have  increased  by  about  io£ 
per  cent,  during  the  same  time. 

If  we  take  a  comprehensive  view  of  Germany  and 
of  Greater  Germany,  we  find  the  curious  spectacle 
that  Germany  proper  is  not  a  natural  but  an  artificial 
nation,  which  has  been  created  by  energetic  rulers, 
who  deliberately  set  themselves  the  task  to  counter- 
act the  natural  self-destructive  tendencies  which  are 
the  historical  characteristic  of  the  German  race. 

Modern  Germany  was  founded  about  five  hundred 
years  ago  by  conquerors  and  colonists,  and  the 
energetic  spirit  of  the  pioneers  who  founded  present 
Germany  among  the  heathen  Prussians  has  prevailed 
in  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Hohenzollerns  up  to 
the  present  date.  Present  Germany  is  but  a  magni- 
fied Prussia,  and  the  national  character  of  present 
Germany  is  no  longer  the  same  as  that  of  ancient 
Germany,  but  it  is  the  energetic  conquering  and 
fighting  character  of  the  Teutonic  Order,  who  laid  the 
foundation  of  the  present  Empire. 

It  is  clear  that  the  artificially  created  Germany 
of  to-day  has,  as  regards  national  character,  little  in 
common  with  the  natural  but  gradually  dissolving 
German  States  which  lie  outside  the  German  frontiers. 
Notwithstanding  their  unity  of  race  and  their  unity 
of  language,  the  Germans  inside  and  outside  of 
Germany  are  politically  totally  different  beings. 
Aristotle  taught,  twenty-three  centuries  ago,  that  men 
are,  after  all,  pre-eminently  political  animals,  and 
therefore  it  comes  that  the  Germans  inside  Germany 
and  those  outside  Germany  are  practically  two  different 
races. 

To   those  Germans  whose  ambition  is  a  German 


66  MODERN    GERMANY 

world-empire,  the  thought  that  30,000,000  of  their 
countrymen  in  Greater  Germany  are  disappearing  fast 
is  almost  unbearable.  Hence,  it  is  the  wish  of  many 
Germans  to  save  the  Germans  in  Greater  Germany 
by  drawing  them  into  the  iron  circle  which  surrounds, 
compresses,  and  at  the  same  time  upholds  and  elevates 
the  German  Empire.  Only  if  they  are  united  with 
the  German  Empire  will  the  outlying  German  tribes 
become  German  indeed,  and  will  be  made  to  Germanise 
other  nations. 

Whether  the  dream  of  a  German  Empire  from 
Hamburg  to  Trieste  which  would  include  the  German 
part  and  some  of  the  Slavonic  parts  of  Austria,  and 
which  might  include  Holland  and  Switzerland  as  well, 
will  remain  a  dream,  or  whether  it  will  materialise, 
should  soon  be  decided,  for  the  German  element  in 
Austria  seems  likely  to  disappear  almost  completely 
within  a  few  decades.  The  problem  of  the  Austrian 
Germans  may  therefore  become  soon  of  greater 
interest  to  German  diplomacy  than  the  future  of 
Asia  Minor  and  of  Shantung. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE 
NETHERLANDS 

GERMANY'S  relations  with  the  various  great  Powers 
have  carefully  been  scanned,  watched,  and  studied  by 
most  statesmen  and  political  writers,  but  Germany's 
relations  with  Holland  and  Germany's  policy  towards 
Holland  have  hitherto  escaped  attention,  although 
Holland  may,  and  probably  will,  some  day  play  a 
most  important  part  with  regard  to  the  political  and 
economic  development  of  Germany.  Holland  is  a 
small  and  weak  neutral  state,  and  it  is  usually  con- 
sidered to  be  politically  as  uninteresting  a  country  as 
is  Luxemburg  or  the  Republic,  of  San  Marino.  Yet 
it  may  become  a  factor  of  the  very  greatest  importance 
in  any  readjustment  of  international  relations  in  which 
Germany  is  concerned.  In  fact,  Holland  may,  and 
very  likely  will,  again  become  the  storm-centre  of 
European  politics,  as  it  was  in  the  times  of  Philip  the 
Second  and  of  Henry  the  Fourth,  of  Cromwell  and  of 
Louis  the  Fourteenth,  of  Marlborough  and  of  Napoleon 
the  First,  for  history  is  apt  to  run  in  circles.  During 
four  centuries  the  Netherlands  have  been  the  centre 
of  gravity  to  the  European  great  Powers.  The  sceptre 
of  Europe  lies  buried  not  on  the  banks  of  the  Bosphorus, 
but  at  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  and  the  Scheldt. 
Therefore  the  Netherlands  have  during  four  centuries 
been  the  battlefield  on  which  the  struggle  for  the 

67 


68  MODERN    GERMANY 

mastery  of  Europe  and  of  the  world  has  been  decided. 
In  the  Netherlands  the  mighty  armies  with  which 
Philip  the  Second,  Louis  the  Fourteenth,  Louis  the 
Fifteenth,  and  Napoleon  the  First  strove  to  subdue 
Europe  and  to  conquer  the  world  were  broken  to 
pieces,  and  in  the  Netherlands  Germany  may  find 
either  her  Gemblours,  her  Breda,  or  her  Waterloo. 

If  we  wish  clearly  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
political  relations  between  Holland  and  Germany,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  gauge  the  probable  development 
of  these  relations  in  the  future,  we  must  first  of  all 
consider  the  peculiar  and  most  important  position 
which  Holland  occupies  with  regard  to  Germany's 
manufacturing  industries  and  with  regard  to  Germany's 
commerce. 

The  kingdom  of  Holland  lies  right  across  the 
greatest  trade  route  of  Germany,  and  to  some  extent 
blocks  that  trade  route.  By  far  the  most  important 
coal  and  iron  mines,  and  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the 
more  important  manufacturing  industries  of  Germany, 
lies  on  or  near  the  Rhine,  and  its  tributaries,  the  Ruhr, 
the  Mosel,  the  Saar,  and  the  Main.  At  the  great 
industrial  exhibition  which  was  held  in  1902  in  Diissel- 
dorf,  it  was  triumphantly  announced  that  Rhenish 
Prussia  and  Westphalia,  the  two  Prussian  provinces 
on  the  Rhine,  which  possess  only  15  per  cent,  of  the 
territory  of  the  country,  consume  no  less  than  71  per 
cent,  of  the  coal  raised  and  produce  no  less  than 
8 1  per  cent,  of  the  iron  and  86  per  cent,  of  the  steel 
made  in  Prussia,  and  that  these  two  provinces  keep 
no  less  than  83  per  cent,  of  the  country's  spindles 
running.  Although  these  figures  show  that  the  Rhine 
valley  possesses  the  predominance  as  regards  manu- 
facturing, they  do  not  tell  the  whole  tale  of  its 
industrial  pre-eminence,  for  not  only  the  principal 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  69 

industrial  towns  of  Prussia  but  also  those  of  Baden, 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Hessia,  and  Bavaria,  lie  on  or  near 
the  Rhine.  In  fact,  if  we  allow  for  the  industrial 
centres  in  and  around  Saxony,  we  may  say  that 
practically  the  whole  of  the  German  manufacturing 
industry  is  concentrated  on  or  near  the  Rhine. 

As  the  German  manufacturing  industries  are  chiefly 
carried  on  in  the  valley  of  the  Rhine,  that  mighty  river 
has  not  unnaturally  become  the  main  artery  of  Ger- 
many's trade,  and  it  is  the  outlet  for  the  productions 
of  Dortmund,  Gelsenkirchen,  Ruhrort,  Barmen,  Elber- 
feld,  Essen,  Bochum,  Remscheid,  Solingen,  Gladbach, 
Duisburg,  Krefeld,  Diisseldorf,  Cologne,  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
Frankfort,  Offenburg,  Reutlingen,  Kaiserslautern,  Saar- 
briicken,  Mannheim,  Wiirzburg,  Karlsruhe,  Stuttgart, 
Strasburg,  Miilhausen,  Gebweiler,  Dornach,  Colmar,  &c. 
All  these  industrial  towns  and  many  more  send  their 
manufactures  along  the  valley  of  the  Rhine,  and  they 
receive  in  return  their  foreign  raw  materials,  food 
stuffs,  &c.,  also  largely  by  way  of  the  Rhine. 

While  the  English  coalfields  and  the  English  in- 
dustrial centres  enjoy  the  precious  advantage  of  being 
situated  either  on  the  seashore  itself  or  in  its  im- 
mediate proximity,  the  German  coalfields  and  all  the 
industrial  centres  on  and  near  the  Rhine  lie  in  a 
straight  line  from  150  to  350  miles  away  from  the 
sea.  The  great  Dortmund  coal  and  iron  centre,  for 
instance,  is  separated  by  150  miles  of  land,  the  Saar- 
briicken  coal  and  iron  centre  by  220  miles  of  land, 
and  the  Miilhausen  spinning  and  weaving  centre  by 
350  miles  of  land  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  sea 
border.  These  figures  make  it  absolutely  clear  that 
the  German  manufacturing  industries  labour  under 
the  very  greatest  difficulties  in  competing  in  foreign 
markets  with  other  countries,  and  especially  with  a 


70  MODERN    GERMANY 

country  which  is  as  happily  situated  as  is  England, 
which  manufactures  on  the  sea  border.  Indeed, 
Germany  would  be  quite  incapable  of  industrially 
competing  with  this  country  did  not  the  Rhine  and 
the  canals  built  in  connection  with  the  Rhine  afford 
to  the  German  industries  very  cheap  carriage  by 
water.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  under  equal  con- 
ditions the  competition  of  German  manufactured  goods 
with  British  manufactured  goods  should  be  impossible 
everywhere  outside  of  Germany,  owing  to  the  un- 
favourable geographical  position  of  the  German  coal- 
fields and  industrial  centres. 

Germany's  export  trade  is  principally  over-sea 
trade.  In  1898  the  Reichs  Marine  Amt,  the  Navy 
Board  of  Germany,  published  a  lengthy  memoir  on 
the  maritime  interests  of  Germany,  in  which  it  was 
estimated  that  "  certainly  three-fifths,  but  probably 
two-thirds  or  more  of  Germany's  foreign  trade  is  over- 
sea trade."  Since  1898  Germany's  foreign  trade  has 
increased  by  more  than  100  per  cent.,  and  at  present 
about  three-quarters  of  Germany's  foreign  trade,  per- 
haps more,  should  be  over-sea  trade.  The  preservation 
of  her  over-sea  trade  is  therefore  of  vital  importance 
to  Germany,  and  cheap  water  carriage  is  an  essential 
condition  for  its  maintenance  and  further  extension. 

Germany's  principal  industrial  centres  lie  in  the 
Rhine  Valley,  and  Germany's  enormous  export  trade 
flows  along  the  shores  of  the  Rhine,  through  Holland 
and  Belgium  towards  foreign  countries  over-sea, 
whilst  she  receives  on  the  same  route  her  most  valuable 
and  her  most  necessary  imports.  Hence  Antwerp  and 
Rotterdam  are  rightly  considered  by  far  the  most 
important  German  harbours,  and  compared  with  these 
Hamburg  appears  almost  insignificant,  especially  as 
Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  are  constantly  increasing 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  71 

the  lead  which  they  have  obtained  over  Hamburg. 
Formerly  Hamburg  was  Germany's  most  important 
harbour,  but  Hamburg  is  steadily  losing  ground 
through  the  marvellous  development  of  Antwerp  and 
Rotterdam.  At  present  the  shipping  trade  of  Antwerp 
and  Rotterdam  combined  is  almost  twice  as  large  as 
that  of  Hamburg,  and  the  time  seems  to  be  near  at 
hand  when  Hamburg  will  sink  from  the  first  to  the 
third  and  perhaps  even  the  fourth  place  among  Con- 
tinental harbours.  Antwerp,  which  fifty  years  ago 
handled  about  300,000  tons,  and  twenty  years  ago 
about  2,000,000  tons  of  shipping,  now  handles 
12,000,000  tons  of  shipping  every  year.  Rotterdam 
has  during  the  same  period  increased  its  shipping 
from  a  few  hundred  thousand  tons  to  about  10,000,000 
tons  at  the  present  time. 

The  enormous  increase  in  the  trade  of  Antwerp  and 
of  Rotterdam,  and  especially  of  Rotterdam — for  Ant- 
werp is  the  principal  port  not  only  to  Belgium  but  also 
to  the  industrial  north-east  of  France — is  due  to  the 
marvellous  prosperity  of  the  German  manufacturing 
industries,  and  to  the  surprising  expansion  of  traffic 
along  the  Rhine  and  across  the  Dutch-German  frontier 
which  is  still  growing  with  undiminished  rapidity,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures  : 

GOODS  EXCLUSIVE  OF  TIMBER  IN  RAFTS  CARRIED  BY  WATER 
PASSING  THE  GERMAN-DUTCH  FRONTIER  ON  THE  RHINE 
AT  EMMERICH 

Going  up  river.  Going  down  river. 

1894  •     •     •     .     4>?65,6oo  tons  3,142,000  tons 

1909  ....   14,881,299    „  9,964,662     „ 

The  Hamburg  trade  is  largely  Austrian  trade. 

From  these  figures,  which  show  that  the  freight 
carried  on  the  Rhine  across  the  German-Dutch  frontier 
has  considerably  more  than  trebled  in  the  short 


72  MODERN    GERMANY 

space  of  fifteen  years,  and  from  other  figures  supplied 
by  the  Statistical  Department  of  Germany,  it  appears 
that  by  far  the  greatest  and  the  most  valuable  part 
of  Germany's  over-sea  trade  is  not  carried  on  via 
Hamburg  and  Bremen  as  is  usually  believed,  but 
via  Rotterdam,  Amsterdam,  and  Antwerp,  and  that 
the  foreign  trade  carried  on  across  the  Dutch  frontier 
grows  proportionately  far  more  quickly  than  the 
general  foreign  trade  of  Germany.  Thus  Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam,  and  to  a  minor  extent  Antwerp,  have 
become  the  principal  harbours  of  industrial  Germany, 
and  industrial  Germany  is  in  the  same  position  in 
which  Lancashire  would  be  if  Liverpool  and  the 
Manchester  Ship  Canal  were  possessed  by  a  foreign 
country. 

Rotterdam,  Amsterdam,  and  to  a  lesser  degree 
Antwerp,  have  become  wealthy  through  the  immense 
stream  of  German  exports  and  imports  which  continu- 
ally flows  through  these  harbours,  and  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  great  prosperity  of  Holland  is  to  a 
very  large  extent  derived  from  the  German  through 
traffic.  The  Dutch,  the  Germans  exclaim,  have  become 
wealthy  at  the  cost  of  the  German  manufacturers  and 
traders.  It  is  true  that  the  trade  of  Rotterdam  and 
Antwerp  is  chiefly  carried  on  by  German  merchants 
living  in  those  towns,  for  the  merchant  always  follows 
his  wares  ;  but  these  German  merchants  enrich  Hol- 
land and  Belgium,  and  they  employ  Dutch  and  Bel- 
gian labour  to  whom  they  distribute  the  largest  part 
of  their  profits  in  the  shape  of  wages.  The  more 
industrial  Germany  works,  the  richer  will  Antwerp, 
Amsterdam,  and  especially  Rotterdam,  become,  for 
these  towns  possess,  so  to  say,  a  first  charge  on  the 
profits  made  by  the  foreign  trade  of  Germany.  In 
fact,  the  trade  of  Germany  is  in  perpetuity  mortgaged 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  73 

to  the  towns  of  the  Netherlands,  and  these  will  levy 
their  toll  in  good  and  in  bad  times. 

This  fact  is  exceedingly  galling  to  Germany,  and 
we  cannot  wonder  that  Professor  Treitschke,  the  enfant 
terrible  of  German  diplomacy,  proclaimed  in  his  book 
Politik,  with  his  usual  lack  of  reticence  and  discretion  : 

"  The  Rhine  is  the  king  of  rivers.  It  is  an  infinitely  precious 
natural  resource  to  Germany,  and,  owing  to  our  own  fault, 
the  very  part  of  the  Rhine  which  is  materially  most  valuable 
to  us  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  foreigners.  It  is  an  in- 
dispensable duty  of  German  policy  to  regain  the  mouths  of 
that  river.  A  purely  political  connection  with  Holland  is 
perhaps  not  necessary  ;  but  an  economic  union  of  Holland 
and  Germany  is  absolutely  required  ;  and  we  are  far  too 
modest  if  we  are  afraid  to  say  that  Holland's  entrance  into 
the  German  Customs  Union  is  as  necessary  to  us  as  is  our 
daily  bread." 

During  the  last  few  decades  the  people  in  Germany 
have  talked  much  about  a  purely  economic  and  about 
an  economic  and  political  union  with  Holland.  That 
agitation  received  for  a  long  time  no  official  counte- 
nance whatever  from  the  German  Government,  which 
refused  by  any  official  action  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  Dutch.  However,  during  the  reign  of  the 
Emperor  William  II.  the  policy  of  Germany  towards 
Holland  has  been  altered,  and  a  constantly  increasing 
economic  pressure  been  exercised  upon  the  Netherlands. 
An  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  divert  the  current  of 
German  trade  from  Holland  towards  the  German  coast, 
and  with  this  object  in  view  the  building  of  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal  was  begun  by  Germany  in  1892. 
This  canal,  which  was  completed  in  1899  and  opened 
in  1901,  connects  the  greatest  coal  and  iron  centre  of 
Germany  with  Emden,  a  little  German  coast  town 
which  almost  touches  the  German-Dutch  frontier  line. 
The  importance  of  the  Dortmund  district  in  respect  of 


74  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  Rhine  trade  may  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that 
its  coal  production  increased  from  12,219,432  tons  in 
1870  to  94,658,769  tons  in  1907,  that  it  produces  about 
three-fifths  of  the  hard  coal  raised  in  Germany,  and 
that  the  traffic  of  Hochfeld-Duisburg-Ruhrort,  the 
Rhine  harbour  serving  the  Dortmund  coal  and  iron 
centre,  increased  from  2,900,000  tons  in  1875  to  no  less 
than  17,000,000  tons  in  1909.  The  port  of  Hochfeld- 
Duisburg-Ruhrort  is  as  regards  extent  and  traffic  by 
far  the  greatest  inland  harbour  in  the  world,  and  Ger- 
many threatens  to  transfer  the  bulk  of  the  immense 
traffic  of  the  Dortmund  centre,  and  eventually  the  bulk 
of  the  whole  Rhine  traffic  as  well,  from  the  Netherlands 
to  Emden  by  means  of  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal. 

The  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  is  the  grandest  and  the 
most  generously  constructed  inland  waterway  of  Ger- 
many. It  is  a  Government  undertaking,  and  about 
£4,000,000,  or  no  less  than  £25,000  per  mile,  have  been 
spent  on  its  construction.  It  has  a  uniform  depth  of 
8£  feet,  a  depth  which  is  equal  to  that  of  the  Rhine 
at  Cologne,  and  it  can  be  used  by  ships  carrying  600 
tons  and  more.  How  large  such  ships  are  for  inland 
navigation  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  on  our 
English  canals  boats  carrying  only  from  30  to  50  tons, 
which  are  exceedingly  uneconomical,  may  daily  be  met 
with.  The  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  has  as  far  as  possible 
been  made  uniform  with  the  Rhine,  so  that  a  large, 
perhaps  the  larger,  part  of  the  50,000  ships  which  now 
yearly  cross  the  German-Dutch  frontier  should  in 
future  travel  to  Emden.  There  are  twenty-one  locks 
in  the  canal,  and  a  number  of  these  are  almost  600 
feet  long,  in  order  to  enable  whole  trains  of  boats  to 
get  through  the  locks  with  the  minimum  of  delay.  At 
Dortmund  almost  400  acres  of  land,  an  area  larger 
than  the  water  expanse  of  the  port  of  Hamburg,  have 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  75 

been  reserved  for  harbour  accommodation,  and  Emden, 
at  the  other  end  of  the  canal,  has  at  a  cost  of  £400,000 
been  fitted  out  with  the  most  modern  and  the  most 
expensive  appliances,  in  order  to  convert  that  sleepy 
little  coast  town  into  a  well-equipped  port. 

Although  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  has  been  in 
existence  only  during  a  few  years,  and  although  many 
serious  imperfections,  which  were  discovered  after  the 
completion  of  the  canal,  have  caused  delays  and  have 
impeded  the  rapid  development  of  traffic  on  the  canal, 
the  progress  shown  by  that  undertaking  is  certainly 
remarkable,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures  : 

TRAFFIC  ON  THE  DORTMUND-EMS  CANAL,  NEAR  EMDEN 

1899.  i908. 

Iron  ore      ....          512  tons  534,480  tons 
Iron  ware    ....       6,372     „  24,265      „ 

Grain,  &c 28,522     „  I42»535      „ 

Coal  and  coke      .     .     20,254     „  481,307     „ 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  bulk  of  the  German- 
Dutch  Rhine  trade  consists  of  the  imports  of  grain 
and  of  Swedish  iron  ore,  and  of  the  exports,  of  German 
coal  and  of  German  manufactured  goods,  chiefly  iron 
ware. 

During  the  nine  years  from  1899  to  1908  the  traffic 
on  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  in  the  most  important 
articles  carried  had  increased  twelvefold,  the  tonnage  of 
sea-shipping  entering  the  port  of  Emden  has  increased 
fivefold,  from  108,157  tons  in  1899  to  584,642  tons  in 
1908,  and  the  Emden  harbour  is  already  proving  too 
small  for  the  traffic. 

This  promising  beginning  has  caused  the  Govern- 
ment to  develop  the  new  inland  waterway  and  the 
new  sea  harbour  with  redoubled  energy.  A  million 
pounds  is  being  spent  on  the  enlargement  of  the  port 


76  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  Emden,  so  that  Emden  should  become  a  serious 
competitor  to  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp.  A  shallow 
of  750  acres  is  being  enclosed  by  high  dykes  and 
gradually,  according  to  requirements,  to  be  converted 
into  a  harbour,  which  hi  size  should  emulate  and 
perhaps  exceed  not  only  the  ports  of  Rotterdam  and 
Antwerp,  but  even  the  foremost  British  harbours. 

The  canal  itself  will  also  be  greatly  improved  and 
be  extended  further.  The  town  of  Dortmund,  where 
the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  at  present  ends,  lies  thirty- 
five  English  miles  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine,  and  in 
due  course  a  canal  connection  between  Dortmund  and 
the  Rhine  will  be  effected,  which  will  require  seven 
locks  and  which  will  cost  about  £2,500,000.  When 
these  works  are  accomplished,  and  they  can  be 
executed  probably  in  two  or  three  years,  Germany  will 
be  able  to  draw  not  only  the  traffic  furnished  by  the 
Dortmund  centre,  but  the  bulk  of  the  whole  Rhine 
traffic,  which  is  furnished  by  her  manufacturing 
industries,  away  from  the  Netherlands  towards  Emden. 

It  is  true  that  the  canal  route  to  Emden  compares 
unfavourably  with  the  route  along  the  Rhine  to 
Rotterdam,  Amsterdam,  and  Antwerp.  Whilst  the 
Rhine  follows  a  natural  course,  twenty-one  locks  and 
the  narrowness  of  the  artificial  channel  of  the  canal 
make  rapid  navigation  on  the  latter  impossible. 
Hence  goods  travel  along  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal 
in  five  days,  whilst  they  travel  hi  two  and  a  half  to 
three  and  a  half  days  along  the  Rhine.  This  dis- 
advantage would  be  crippling  in  a  country  where 
Government  interference  with  the  natural  develop- 
ment of  industry  is  considered  almost  a  crime,  but  it 
can  easily  be  rectified,  or  at  least  be  compensated  foi, 
in  a  country  which  deliberately  and  systematically 
fosters  its  home  trade.  By  low  tariffs,  which  will 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  77 

favourably  compare  with  the  minimum  costs  of  send- 
ing freight  via  the  Dutch  frontier  to  the  Dutch  and 
Belgian  harbours,  Germany  will  divert  her  exports 
and  imports  from  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  to  Emden, 
and  Germany  regulates  her  transport  charges  to  and 
from  Emden  with  that  object  in  view.  Since  the 
ist  of  April  1905,  for  instance,  the  charges  for  the 
export  of  coal  and  coke  via  Emden  have  been  con- 
siderably reduced  by  the  Government,  partly  in  order 
to  enable  the  coal  of  the  Dortmund  district  to  be 
sold  in  the  Mediterranean  (Port  Said)  and  in  South 
America,  and  partly  in  order  to  oust  English  coal 
from  the  north  of  Germany,  where  it  has  hitherto 
found  a  very  large  market. 

It  is  clear  at  first  sight  that  a  narrow,  artiilcial 
and  expensive  canal,  which  eventually  will  possess 
twenty-eight  locks,  which  follows  a  circuitous  route, 
and  which  takes  the  German  exports  to  a  seaport 
which  is  about  200  miles  further  distant  from  England 
and  from  other  Western  countries  whereto  these 
exports  are  sent,  than  are  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp, 
cannot  possibly  compete  as  regards  rapidity  and 
economy  of  transport  with  a  broad  natural  river 
which  carries  German  goods  to  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp. 
Nevertheless,  Germany  may,  by  offering  sufficient  in- 
ducement to  shippers,  succeed  in  diverting  the  whole 
of  her  over-sea  trade  from  Rotterdam,  Amsterdam,  and 
Antwerp  to  Emden,  but  she  may  have  to  work  the 
Dortmund-Ems  Canal  for  many  years,  perhaps  per- 
manently, at  a  loss,  in  order  to  achieve  her  aim. 
However,  it  seems  to  the  German  Government  a 
matter  of  very  minor  consideration  whether  the 
Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  with  its  eventual  extension  to 
the  Rhine,  will  be  a  profitable  or  an  unprofitable 
enterprise  to  the  State,  for  that  canal  is  not  a  necessity 


78  MODERN    GERMANY 

to  the  German  industries,  and  it  is  certainly  not  a 
purely  economic  enterprise  on  the  part  of  the  State, 
as  might  be  thought.  It  is  an  economic  undertaking 
serving  a  political  purpose,  or  rather  it  is  a  political 
enterprise  with  an  economic  label. 

When  the  canal  was  completed  the  Jahrbuch  fitr 
Deutschlands  Seeinteressen,  an  important  semi-official 
publication,  wrote  : 

"In  our  time  our  dependence  on  foreign  countries  has 
frequently  been  felt  by  the  circumstance  that  the  mouth  of 
the  Rhine  is  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign  country,  and  that  that 
country  in  consequence  draws  away  from  us  the  chief  profit 
of  our  export  industry.  This  state  of  dependence  will  be 
ended  by  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  which  gives  to  the  Rhine, 
at  least  for  the  province  of  Westphalia,  a  German  outlet  in 
Emden." 

In  July  and  August  1901,  the  year  when  the  new 
canal  was  opened,  a  series  of  anonymous  articles 
entitled  "  Holland  and  Germany,"  appeared  in  Die 
Grenzboten,  a  German  weekly  which  is  frequently 
officially  inspired,  and  the  style  of  those  articles  bears 
a  curious  resemblance  to  the  picturesque  diction  of 
Prince  Billow,  the  then  Chancellor.  The  gist  of  that 
important  series  of  articles  was  : 

"  Holland's  wealth  is  chiefly  derived  from  the  German 
transit  trade.  That  trade  can  be  diverted  by  the  new  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal,  which  will  give  to  the  Rhine  an  outlet  at 
Emden.  That  port,  which  lies  on  the  Dutch  frontier,  has  so 
far  been  neglected,  but  it  is  being  equipped  in  order  to  make 
it  an  efficient  competitor  of  Rotterdam.  If  she  chooses, 
Germany  can  cripple  Dutch  commerce  and  bring  Holland  on 
her  knees  by  diverting  the  Dutch  transit  trade  and  by  im- 
posing hostile  tariffs.  Consequently  Holland  is  economically 
dependent  upon  Germany,  and  Holland's  economic  incorpora- 
tion with  Germany  in  some  form  or  other  is  for  Holland  an 
unavoidable  necessity. 

"  Politically,  Holland  is  threatened  by  other  nations.    Her 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  79 

guaranteed  neutrality  is  no  more  than  a  shred  of  paper, 
which  would  prove  worthless  in  war.  Spain  has  been  brutally 
crushed  by  the  United  States  ;  Portugal  hangs  like  a  fly  in 
the  spider's  net  of  England,  a  prey  to  her  monopolistic  mer- 
cantile system.  The  Dutch  will  not  share  the  fate  of  the 
Boers,  but,  if  they  are  not  careful,  they  may  be  caught  in 
British  snares.  From  all  these  dangers  incorporation  with 
Germany  is  the  only  salvation.  The  movement  of  naval 
expansion  in  Germany  will  not  end  until  a  German  navy 
floats  on  the  sea  that  can  compete  with  the  fleet  of  Great 
Britain.  Equally  strong  on  sea  and  on  land,  the  world  may 
choose  our  friendship  or  our  enmity.  The  strong  may  make 
their  choice,  but  Holland  will  do  well  to  stand  by  us  in  friend- 
ship, not  so  much  for  our  sake  as  for  her  own  existence." 

The  foregoing  lines  were  written  during  the  Boer 
War,  "  the  fifth  Anglo-Dutch  War,"  as  it  was  called 
with  bitterness  by  many  Dutch  patriots,  who  re- 
membered that  Cromwell  and  Charles  the  Second  had 
destroyed  the  greatness  of  their  country.  At  that 
time  the  exasperation  of  Holland  against  Great  Britain 
was  indescribable,  and,  taking  advantage  of  the  pre- 
vailing spirit  among  the  Dutch,  the  semi-official  Press  of 
Germany  ventured  directly  and  vigorously  to  recom- 
mend the  incorporation  of  Holland  into  the  German 
Empire. 

At  first  sight,  the  idea  of  Holland  becoming  a  part 
of  the  German  Empire  seems  fantastic  and  absurd, 
but  it  is  much  less  extravagant  than  it  appears  at 
first  sight.  Germany  is  after  all  not  a  single  State, 
but  a  voluntary  union  of  a  number  of  independent 
States,  and  the  German  Emperor  is  not  the  monarch 
of  Germany,  but  merely  the  hereditary  President  of 
the  German  union  of  States.  He  is  only  the  primus 
inter  pares  among  the  German  rulers.  Such  is  the 
position  of  affairs — at  least  on  paper,  according  to 
the  German  constitution — although  it  might  be  a 
serious  matter  for  one  of  the  smaller  States  of  Germany 


8o  MODERN    GERMANY 

if  it  should  venture  to  insist  too  loudly  on  its  paper 
independence.  The  kingdoms  of  Bavaria,  Wurtem- 
berg,  and  Saxony,  and  all  the  other  political  units 
of  Germany,  large  and  small,  are  independent  States, 
which  hitherto  have  got  on  very  well  with  their 
mighty  President,  and  Holland  would  no  doubt  receive 
the  greatest  consideration  and  the  amplest  guarantees 
of  independence  at  the  hands  of  Germany  if  she 
should  be  inclined  to  join  the  union  of  German  States. 
It  is  conceivable  that  under  a  special  treaty  Holland 
would  be  given  special  privileges  by  Germany.  For 
instance,  Dutch  citizens  might  be  free  from  com- 
pulsory military  service  in  the  German  army  ;  the 
Dutch  army,  like  the  Bavarian  army,  might  form  a 
separate  contingent ;  Germany  might  guarantee  the 
integrity  of  Dutch  territory  without  requiring  more 
than  a  passive  assistance  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch  in 
case  of  a  foreign  war,  and  the  contributions  of  the 
Netherlands  to  the  imperial  German  exchequer  might 
be  fixed  at  a  very  low  rate.  In  short,  it  might  be 
made  worth  Holland's  while  to  join  the  German 
union  of  States. 

A  political  amalgamation  of  Holland  and  Germany 
is  no  doubt  the  beau  ideal  which  German  diplomacy 
keeps  in  view,  and  with  this  ultimate  aim  in  view, 
Germany's  policy  towards  Holland  is  shaped.  It  may 
be  summed  up  in  the  words,  "  Peaceful  penetration 
and  gradually  increasing  economic  pressure  from  with- 
out." German  merchants  following  their  wares 
steadily  filter  into  the  Netherlands.  On  the  exchanges 
of  Antwerp,  Rotterdam,  and  Amsterdam,  perhaps 
more  German  than  Dutch  and  French  is  heard  ;  the 
principal  banks,  shipping  companies,  mercantile  houses, 
factories,  &c.,  in  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  Netherlands 
are  in  German  hands  ;  and  as  the  commercial  classes 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  81 

exercise  a  great  influence  in  the  democratic  Low 
Countries,  German  political  influence  both  in  Holland 
and  in  Belgium  is  rapidly  growing,  although  it  is  little 
noticed  abroad.  Holland  and  Belgium  are  rapidly  be- 
coming Germanised.  Commercial  men  in  Belgium,  and 
especially  in  Holland,  begin  to  feel  greatly  hampered 
by  having  their  operations  restricted  to  the  narrow 
territory  of  their  country,  and  to  cast  longing  eyes 
towards  the  German  customs  walls,  which  so  effectively 
restrict  the  extension  of  their  operations.  Many 
Dutch  and  Belgian  business  men  are  of  opinion  that 
their  business  would  wonderfully  benefit  if  by  joining 
the  German  Customs  Union  they  would  receive 
66,000,000  new  customers,  and  they  view  with  serious 
apprehension  Germany's  determined  exertions  to  divert 
her  enormous  over-sea  trade  from  Rotterdam,  Antwerp, 
and  Amsterdam  to  Emden. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  wealthy  Holland 
is  by  nature  one  of  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world. 
Practically  no  coal,  no  iron,  no  timber,  and  no  stone 
exists  in  the  country,  which  is  merely  a  mud-flat,  and 
very  little  corn  can  be  grown  in  it.  Nevertheless, 
Holland  is  more  densely  populated  than  is  Great 
Britain.  Holland  is  more  dependent  on  foreign  food 
and  raw  material  than  is  this  country,  and  the  Dutch 
produce  for  export  chiefly  vegetables,  flower  bulbs, 
butter,  cheese,  margarine,  &c.  Manufacturing  has 
apparently  no  great  future  through  the  absence  of 
coal,  and  notwithstanding  all  these  hampering  circum- 
stances, the  Dutch  population  increases  much  faster 
than  does  the  population  of  this  country.  In  view 
of  the  lack  of  natural  resources,  it  is  quite  clear  that 
the  Dutch  owe  their  prosperity  chiefly  to  the  German 
transit  trade,  and  the  Netherlands  would  become 
utterly  impoverished  if  they  were  deprived  of  that 


82  MODERN    GERMANY 

trade,  for,  rightly  considered,  the  Dutch  harbours 
are  the  greatest  natural  resources  of  the  Dutch  people. 
Under  these  circumstances,  we  cannot  wonder  that 
Dutchmen  think  with  the  greatest  alarm  of  the  possi- 
bility that  Germany  might  succeed  in  diverting  her 
trade  from  the  Dutch  harbours  to  Emden,  and  they 
will  do  all  in  their  power  to  keep  the  precious  German 
transit  trade  in  the  Netherlands. 

It  is  worth  much  to  German  diplomacy  to  have 
created  that  feeling  of  alarm  and  consternation  in 
the  minds  of  the  Dutch,  and  Germany  is  probably 
prepared  to  spend  ten  or  twenty  million  pounds  a 
fonds  perdu  on  the  Emden  Canal,  not  so  much  in 
order  to  make  Emden  a  first-class  harbour,  to 
ruin  Rotterdam,  and  to  impoverish  the  Netherlands, 
but  in  order  to  force  Holland  into  a  political  union 
with  Germany,  towards  which  a  Customs  Union 
might  be  the  first  important  step.  If  Germany  should 
succeed  in  this  policy,  the  money  which  she  may  lose 
on  the  Emden  Canal  would  be  exceedingly  well  spent. 
The  possession  of  Holland  is  worth  to  Germany  ten 
or  twenty  million  pounds,  and  considerably  more. 

In  former  years,  when  the  Prussian  State  wished 
to  buy  cheaply  a  prosperous  private  railway,  it  regu- 
larly commenced  operations  by  building  a  well-planned 
competition  line,  which  deeply  cut  into  the  profits 
of  the  railway  which  the  Government  wished  to 
acquire.  After  some  years  of  severe  competition,  in 
which  the  private  enterprise  was,  of  course,  the  loser, 
it  could,  as  a  rule,  be  acquired  at  a  reasonable  figure, 
and  the  railway  was  glad  and  anxious  to  be  bought 
up  by  the  State.  Germany  seems  to  follow  a  similar 
policy  with  regard  to  Holland  in  building  the  canal 
connection  between  the  Rhine  and  Emden,  and  that 
policy  may  have  a  similar  success. 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  83 

The  mouths  of  the  Rhine,  together  with  the  mouths 
of  the  Meuse  and  the  Scheldt,  would  be  exceedingly 
precious  to  Germany,  not  only  for  economic  purposes, 
but  for  naval  and  military  purposes  as  well.  Germany 
is  determined  to  have  a  very  powerful  fleet,  and  she 
is  building  a  very  powerful  fleet,  but  she  has  practically 
no  harbours  which  are  suitable  for  her  mighty  navy. 
Germany  has  two  war  harbours,  Wilhelmshafen  on 
the  North  Sea,  and  Kiel  on  the  Baltic.  Wilhelms- 
hafen is  well  situated  for  striking  westward,  but  it 
is  an  artificially  dug  out,  small,  and  utterly  insufficient 
port.  Kiel,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  splendid  natural 
harbour  which  is  roomy  enough  to  contain  all  the 
ships  of  the  German  navy,  present  and  to  come.  Bat 
its  geographical  position  is  as  unfavourable  as  is  that 
of  the  German  coalfields.  Kiel  lies  on  the  wrong 
shore,  the  eastern  shore,  of  the  Danish  peninsula, 
and  it  is  suitable  only  for  observing  the  Danish  Sound, 
and  for  striking  at  Russia.  It  is  connected  with  the 
western  shore  of  the  Danish  peninsula  by  a  canal,  the 
Baltic-North  Sea  Canal,  and  thus  a  junction  of  the 
German  naval  forces  can,  at  least  in  theory,  quickly 
be  effected  in  the  North  Sea  in  case  of  war.  However, 
a  canal  sixty  miles  long  is  not  an  ideal  route  to  follow 
for  a  fleet  in  time  of  war.  At  the  critical  moment, 
when  minutes  may  decide  the  fate  of  the  German 
navy,  a  mishap,  blocking  the  Kiel  Canal  for  several 
days,  might  occur  either  by  chance  or  by  the  boldness 
or  bribery  of  Germany's  opponent,  and  the  German 
fleet  in  the  Baltic  would  be  forced  to  follow  the 
dangerous  and  narrow  route  round  the  north  of 
Denmark.  We  can  realise  the  difficulty  of  Germany's 
naval  position  with  the  principal  base  at  Kiel,  only 
by  comparing  her  situation  with  that  of  Great  Britain. 
In  doing  so,  we  discover  that  Germany  will  find  it 


84  MODERN    GERMANY 

as  difficult  to  defend  her  foreign  trade  off  the  Dutch 
coast  with  Kiel  as  principal  base,  as  Great  Britain 
would  find  it  to  defend  her  Channel  traffic  against  a 
superior  enemy,  if  her  only  important  naval  base  was 
situated  in  the  Hebrides  or  the  Orkney  Islands,  for 
the  distances  and  difficulties  in  both  cases  are  almost 
identical.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Baltic- 
North  Sea  Canal,  which,  at  present,  is  not  deep  enough 
for  the  new  warships  which  Germany  is  constructing, 
is  being  deepened  and  widened.  The  new  canal  will 
be  completed  about  1915,  and  will  greatly  alter  Ger- 
many's naval  strategical  position,  as  is  shown  in 
another  chapter.  As  Russia  will  hardly  become  a 
dangerous  naval  opponent  to  Germany  for  many 
decades  to  come,  the  German  fleet  is  meant  to  strike 
at  some  power  to  the  west  of  Germany.  Yet  Germany 
may  be  unable  to  act  in  the  way  she  may  wish  to  act, 
notwithstanding  her  strong  fleet,  unless  she  possesses 
an  adequate  naval  base  within  easy  reach  of  her 
probable  field  of  naval  operations.  If  the  German 
fleet  should  be  defeated  off  her  principal  trade  route 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhine,  it  would  probably  not  be 
able  to  reach  either  Wilhelmshafen  or  Kiel  for  re- 
fitting. Therefore,  a  naval  defeat  might  mean  anni- 
hilation to  the  German  fleet.  Germany,  as  at  present 
situated,  has  to  stake  her  all  on  the  first  naval  battle. 
If  Germany  possessed  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine, 
she  would  be  able  to  create  there  a  number  of  excellent 
naval  bases  which,  through  the  Dutch  islands  lying 
in  front  of  them,  would  be  safe  from  foreign  attack, 
and  these  bases  would  by  their  advantageous  position 
not  only  be  ideal  points  for  protecting  Germany's 
trade,  but  also  be  particularly  valuable  for  an  attack 
against  both  France  and  England.  Besides,  the 
amalgamation  of  Holland  and  Germany  would  give 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  85 

to  the  latter  Power  a  number  of  excellent  naval  bases 
and  coaling  stations  in  both  hemispheres. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  fact,  which  is 
ignored  by  many,  that  Holland  possesses  the  mouths 
of  the  Scheldt  and  the  islands  lying  in  front  of  Antwerp 
and  commanding  that  port.  Therefore,  if  Germany 
had  possessed  herself  of  Holland,  she  could  control 
Antwerp,  and  through  Antwerp  the  industries  of 
North-Eastern  France,  which  ship  their  raw  materials 
and  their  productions  through  Antwerp.  The  temp- 
tation to  join  the  possession  of  Antwerp  to  that  of 
Rotterdam  would  probably  prove  too  great  to  be 
resisted,  for  by  its  position  in  the  rear  of  the  Dutch 
shore  Antwerp  seems  destined  to  be  a  part  of  Holland. 

From  the  military  point  of  view  also  Holland 
would  be  extremely  valuable  to  Germany.  The 
provinces  of  North  and  South  Holland,  with  part 
of  Utrecht,  form  a  natural  fortress  of  the  greatest 
strength.  Within  twenty-four  hours  a  broad  belt  of 
country  stretching  from  Naarden  on  the  Zuyder  Zee, 
vid  Utrecht,  Culenborg,  and  Gorinchen  to  Geertruiden- 
berg,  on  the  mouth  of  the  Meuse,  can  be  inundated, 
and  the  places  where  a  passage  might  be  forced  across 
the  water  are  defended  by  strong  fortifications. 
Amsterdam  itself  is  a  huge  fortress  within  the  pro- 
vincial fortress  described,  which  is  defended  by  similar 
inundations  and  by  a  huge  circle  of  forts.  In  the 
possession  of  Holland,  Germany  would,  in  time  of 
war,  have  a  huge  impregnable  island  fortress  on  the 
flank  of  France  and  of  England,  a  fortress  which  could 
hardly  be  starved  into  surrender,  and  which  could 
hardly  be  attacked  if  vigorously  defended,  and  this 
fortress  would  furnish  the  most  convenient  sally-port 
for  a  naval  and  military  attack  on  either  country. 
As  long  as  Holland  is  neutral,  the  defence  of  the 


86  MODERN    GERMANY 

open  French  frontier  facing  Germany  is  comparatively 
easy.  If  Holland  should  fall  into  German  hands,  both 
the  Belgian  and  the  French  defences  could  be  turned 
from  Holland.  France  would  be  at  the  mercy  of 
Germany,  and  she  would  soon  occupy  as  unimportant 
a  political  position  in  the  world  as  is  that  held  by 
Belgium  at  the  present  day.  If  Germany  should  take 
Holland,  France  would  become  a  third-rate  Power. 
The  possession  of  Holland  would  not  only  enable 
Germany  to  become  a  naval  Power  of  the  first  rank, 
and  compel  England  to  keep  practically  her  whole 
fleet  permanently  tied  up  in  the  Channel,  but  it 
would  at  the  same  time  make  the  military  superiority 
of  Germany  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  absolutely  over- 
whelming. Holland  has  evidently  a  more  important 
strategical  position  than  Constantinople.  Therefore  I 
said  in  the  beginning  of  this 'chapter  that  the  sceptre 
of  Europe  lies  buried  not  on  the  banks  of  the  Bosphorus, 
but  at  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  and  the  Scheldt. 

Some  German  writers  have  argued  that  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Holland  would  be  of  in- 
estimable advantage  to  Germany  in  case  of  a  war 
with  a  superior  naval  Power  such  as  Great  Britain, 
inasmuch  as  the  over-sea  trade  of  Germany  would 
continue  to  flow  during  such  a  war  without  hindrance 
through  the  neutral  ports  of  the  Netherlands,  whilst 
the  enemy  would  blockade  Hamburg  and  some  minor 
German  ports.  Germany  could  stand  a  blockade  of 
Hamburg,  but  she  could  not  stand  the  cutting  off  of 
her  huge  over-sea  trade  vid  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp. 
Of  course,  it  is  possible  that  a  superior  naval  Power 
at  war  with  Germany  will,  at  the  bidding  of  some 
professors  of  international  law,  leave  Germany's  trade 
vid  Holland  and  Belgium  unmolested.  But  that 
seems  hardly  likely.  No  sane  German  statesman  wiD 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  87 

be  influenced  in  his  policy  towards  Holland  by  the 
argument  that  a  superior  sea  Power  will  leave  Ger- 
many's trade  through  the  Netherlands  undisturbed. 
Germany  trusts  for  her  security  in  war  to  her  right 
arm,  not  to  a  piece  of  paper  or  to  the  dicta  of  her 
professors. 

If  we  look  at  the  German-Dutch  relations  from  the 
German  point  of  view,  it  is  clear  that  the  acquisition 
of  Holland  in  some  form  or  other — the  form  is  very 
immaterial — would  be  of  inestimable  advantage  to 
Germany.  Germany,  like  every  young  and  vigorous 
Power,  and  every  young  and  vigorous  individual, 
wishes  to  acquire  and  to  increase,  and  not  merely 
to  preserve  and  to  maintain.  Only  old  nations  are 
contented  to  contemplate  and  to  philosophise,  leaving 
the  race  for  national  success  to  the  younger  and  the 
more  sturdy  nations  around  them.  Old  men  and 
old  nations  live  in  the  past,  and  political  Germany  is 
young,  very  young.  The  Germans  argue  :  Holland 
has  become  rich  by  shipping  our  goods,  Holland  is  a 
stumbling-block  in  Germany's  road  to  economic  success 
and  prevents  her  becoming  a  world-Power.  Holland 
has  excellent  harbours,  Holland  is  weak,  Holland  is 
dependent  upon  our  trade  for  her  very  existence. 
Therefore,  we  have  Holland  in  our  power.  Let  us 
make  Holland  feel  our  power,  let  us  make  Holland 
feel  that  she  is  dependent  on  Germany's  goodwill,  let 
us  drain  Holland  of  her  wealth  by  diverting  our  trade 
for  a  time  from  Holland,  and  she  will  ask  us  to  come 
to  terms  with  her.  When  she  is  in  the  required  mood 
of  humility,  let  us  propose  to  her,  "  Give  us  the  free 
use  of  your  harbours,  and  we  will  not  only  restore 
to  you  your  former  prosperity  by  leading  back  our 
foreign  trade  to  its  former  route  vid  Holland,  but  we 
will  besides  give  you  freedom  of  trade  throughout 


88  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany.  We  will  respect  your  independence  and  all 
your  peculiarities,  and  we  will  not  trouble  you  with 
militarism.  Do  what  you  like,  provided  you  give  to 
us  the  free  use  of  your  harbours." 

If  Germany  should  succeed  by  means  of  the  Emden 
Canal,  and  perhaps  by  the  additional  pressure  of  hostile 
tariffs,  in  impoverishing  Holland,  Holland  may  feel 
compelled  to  throw  herself  into  Germany's  arms  in  order 
to  escape  national  bankruptcy  ;  but  if  Germany  should 
not  succeed  in  drawing  her  trade  away  from  Holland 
through  the  insufficient  capacity  of  the  Emden  Canal 
or  some  other  reason,  Germany  may  feel  tempted  to 
create  some  dispute  with  her  Dutch  neighbours,  in 
order  to  acquire  Holland  in  a  more  direct  manner.  It 
is  true  that  in  twenty-four  hours  the  north-west  corner 
of  Holland  with  Amsterdam,  Rotterdam,  and  The 
Hague,  may  be  converted  into  an  impregnable  island 
fortress,  but  the  Dutch  may  not  be  given  the  time 
necessary  for  flooding  their  country.  Only  fifty  miles 
separate  Muiden,  where  the  most  important  sluices  for 
putting  the  country  round  Utrecht  under  water  are 
situated,  from  the  German  frontier,  and  German  mili- 
tary motor  cars  travel  at  an  astonishing  speed.  Be- 
sides, it  seems  not  at  all  certain  that  Holland  would 
vigorously  resist  an  energetic  German  attack.  In  1787, 
a  small  Prussian  force  overran  Holland,  and  took  Am- 
sterdam almost  without  bloodshed.  In  that  year  the 
dykes  were  pierced,  and  Amsterdam  seemed  to  be  im- 
pregnable, but  a  weak  spot  in  the  water  defences 
enabled  the  Prussians  to  get  through.  After  all,  the 
intensity  of  resistance  depends  not  so  much  upon  the 
defences  than  upon  the  defenders,  and  the  little  Dutch 
army  is  an  unknown  factor.  Therefore,  a  German 
general  of  daring  might  feel  tempted  to  recommend 
to  his  sovereign  to  take  Holland  by  a  rush,  and  in  view 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  89 

of  the  preparedness  of  the  German  army  such  a  rush 
would  very  likely  prove  successful. 

Germany's  acquisition  of  Holland,  in  whatever  form, 
would  directly  threaten  all  those  European  Powers 
which  do  not  desire  to  see  Germany  become  all-power- 
ful on  the  Continent.  Looked  at  from  the  British  point 
of  view,  Holland,  which  separates  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  occupies  the  identical  position  which  Corea 
occupied  in  relation  to  Japan  and  Russia  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  and  an  occupa- 
tion of  Holland  on  the  part  of  Germany  might,  to  that 
country,  have  consequences  similar  to  those  which  the 
attempted  occupation  of  Corea  had  to  Russia.  The 
absorption  of  Holland  by  Germany  would  permanently 
threaten  the  safety  of  England.  Therefore,  Germany 
will  hardly  be  able  to  acquire  Holland  forcibly  without 
a  great  struggle,  unless  some  vast  international  com- 
motion such  as  a  great  European  war  in  which  Germany 
is  neutral  may  give  to  her  an  opportunity  of  acquiring 
Holland  by  a  coup.  Unless  such  an  opportunity  should 
occur,  Germany  will  probably  endeavour  gradually  to 
strengthen  her  hold  upon  Holland  and  to  swallow  that 
country  by  degrees.  An  economic  arrangement  be- 
tween Germany  and  Holland  may  lead  to  a  customs 
union,  to  a  railway  union,  to  the  introduction  of  a, 
uniform  coinage  in  the  two  countries,  &c.,  and  Holland 
may  become  German  almost  unnoticed.  This  seems 
to  be  the  policy  which  is  at  present  being  pursued  by 
Germany. 

In  view  of  Germany's  record,  it  seems  natural 
to  conclude  that  she  will  continue  her  triumphant 
progress,  and  many  influential  Dutchmen  believe 
that  the  absorption  of  their  country  by  Germany  is 
inevitable,  that  this  consummation  is  merely  a  question 
of  time.  However,  a  few  years  may  altogether  change 


go  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  aspect  of  international  politics,  and  the  prospects 
of  Germany.  Germany's  military  and  naval  strength 
is  based  on  her  wealth.  During  the  last  twenty-five 
years  the  progress  of  her  industries  and  of  her  economic 
power  has  been  even  more  marvellous  than  has  been 
the  progress  of  her  political  power.  However,  Ger- 
many's prosperity  hangs  by  a  slender  thread.  Ger- 
many is  greatly  hampered  by  her  lack  of  harbours 
and  by  the  long  distances  which  separate  her  coalfields 
and  her  industrial  centres  from  the  sea-coast.  On  the 
other  hand,  Germany  has,  during  the  time  of  her 
marvellous  growth,  been  greatly  benefited  by  the  fact 
that  Great  Britain,  her  most  dangerous  competitor, 
if  natural  conditions  are  duly  considered,  has,  at  the 
bidding  of  unpractical  doctrinaires,  neglected  her 
matchless  resources  and  opportunities,  and  has 
foolishly  opened  to  Germany  her  world-wide  markets 
as  a  reward  for  seeing  her  manufactured  goods  ex- 
cluded from  Germany.  The  introduction  of  Protection 
in  Great  Britain  and  of  preferential  tariffs  throughout 
the  British  Empire  may  therefore  bring  about  the 
economic  and  the  political  decline  of  Germany,  and 
it  seems  not  impossible  that  Germany  is  building  her 
fleet  with  such  feverish  haste  in  order  to  oppose  if 
possible  the  conclusion  of  a  Pan-Britannic  Zollverein. 
Although  Holland  may  be  considered  the  mother  of 
Free  Trade — two  centuries  before  Adam  Smith  was 
born  the  Dutch  already  championed  that  policy — Hol- 
land may  owe  the  preservation  of  an  independent 
national  existence  to  the  introduction  of  Protection 
in  Great  Britain.  Owing  to  their  natural  burdens  and 
hindrances,  which  have  been  touched  upon  in  the  fore- 
going, the  German  industries  are  working  with  a  slender 
margin  of  profit,  and  if  Free  Trade  throughout  the 
British  Empire,  which  is  the  basis  on  which  the  vast 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS  91 

over-sea  trade  of  Germany  has  been  erected,  should 
cease  for  Germany,  Germany's  industries  may  decline, 
her  economic  prosperity  may  be  replaced  by  economic 
decay,  and  the  costly  canal  route  to  Emden  may  be- 
come abandoned  by  German  shipping  because  the  Ger- 
man Government  may  no  longer  be  able  to  subsidise 
that  undertaking.  The  introduction  of  Protection  in 
Great  Britain  may  conceivably  save  the  world  from  a 
very  great  war ;  it  may  save  Holland  from  political 
extinction  and  the  Continent  of  Europe  from  German 
domination. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  EXPANSION  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE 
RUSSIAN  PROBLEM 

THOSE  who  have  watched  Germany's  activity  in 
Samoa,  the  Philippines,  South- West  and  East  Africa, 
China,  Asia  Minor,  Polynesia,  and  Venezuela  believe 
that  it  is  Germany's  aim  to  acquire  colonies  and 
coaling  stations  wherever  they  can  be  obtained. 
Those  who  have  followed  her  policy  towards  Belgium, 
Holland,  and  Denmark  think  that  Germany  strives 
to  aggrandise  herself  at  the  cost  of  her  weak  neigh- 
bour States,  which  possess  excellent  harbours,  and 
which,  besides,  occupy  perhaps  the  most  valuable 
strategical  positions  in  Europe.  Those  who  have  been 
struck  by  the  menacing  attitude  towards  France 
which  Germany  took  up  in  connection  with  Morocco 
in  1905  and  1911  conclude  that  she  wishes  to  obtain 
by  a  victorious  war  another  slice  of  Eastern  France, 
and  perhaps  some  of  the  French  colonies  as  well. 
Lastly,  those  who  have  observed  Germany's  policy 
towards  Great  Britain,  the  rapid  growth  of  the  Ger- 
man navy  and  its  concentration  near  the  British 
shores,  and  who  remember  the  German  Emperor's 
declaration,  "  Germany's  future  lies  upon  the  water," 
and  the  statement,  "  Germany  requires  a  fleet  of  such 
strength  that  a  war  with  the  mightiest  naval  Power 
would  threaten  the  supremacy  of  that  Power,"  which 
was  contained  in  the  official  memorandum  introduc- 
tory to  the  great  German  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  believe 

92 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  93 

that  Germany  wishes  to  use  her  vast  naval  armaments 
for  the  overthrow  of  Great  Britain  and  the  dismem- 
berment of  the  British  Empire.  Germany  is  credited 
with  warlike  designs  against  nearly  all  civilised  and 
uncivilised  countries  of  the  world,  except  Russia. 
Yet  thinly-populated  and  semi-barbarous  Russia,  with 
her  immense  territory  and  her  unlimited,  varied,  and 
scarcely-touched  natural  resources,  would  be  an  ideal 
field  of  action  for  German  private  enterprise,  and  for 
the  genius  for  organisation  and  administration  pos- 
sessed by  the  German  officials. 

It  is  true  that  the  German  Emperor's  declaration, 
"Germany's  future  lies  upon  the  water,"  and  the 
preamble  of  the  German  Navy  Bill  referred  to,  have 
furnished  a  text  for  countless  speeches,  newspaper 
articles,  and  books  unfriendly  to  Great  Britain.  It 
is  true  that  the  German  Navy  Bill  was  promoted  by 
a  national  campaign  of  passionate  vituperation  and 
denunciation  of  Great  Britain,  a  campaign  which  was 
rather  encouraged  than  merely  tolerated  by  the 
German  Government.  It  is  also  true  that  since  the 
time  of  the  Kruger  telegram  German  diplomacy  has 
raised  difficulties  for  Great  Britain  in  various  parts 
of  the  world,  and  that  the  ciy,  Britanniam  esse  de- 
lendam,  is  periodically  raised  by  the  German  press. 
Still,  appearances  are  often  deceptive.  Diplomatic 
action  which  at  first  sight  seems  shallow  and  unin- 
telligent is  sometimes  deep.  Germany's  greatest  in- 
terests are  rather  continental  than  trans-oceanic  and 
maritime.  In  its  anti- British  campaign  German 
diplomacy  either  made  a  great  mistake  or  was  very 
profound.  If  the  German  diplomats  were  really  bent 
upon  acquiring  a  colonial  empire  at  the  risk  of  a 
collision  with  Great  Britain,  and  perhaps  with  the 
United  States  as  well,  if  they  had  really  been  pre- 


94  MODERN    GERMANY 

paring  themselves  for  war  with  "  the  mightiest  naval 
Power " — as  the  German  Navy  Bill  puts  it — their 
recklessness  in  endangering  Germany's  most  important 
interests  was  only  equalled  by  their  folly  in  proclaim- 
ing their  intentions  from  the  house-tops.  But  if  we 
assume  that  the  German  diplomats  understand  their 
business — and  secrecy  is  the  soul  of  statesmanship — 
then  we  may,  perhaps,  conclude  that  the  German  fleet 
is  neither  for  the  spoliation  of  Great  Britain  nor  for 
the  humiliation  of  the  United  States,  but  for  some 
other  purpose. 

Germany's  restlessness  springs,  in  the  first  place, 
from  her  need  of  expansion,  and,  in  the  second  place, 
from  a  vague  sense  of  future  danger.  Both  senti- 
ments are  justified.  Germany's  population  increases 
by  about  900,000  a  year.  The  country  is  rapidly 
becoming  too  small  for  its  inhabitants.  Per  square 
mile  Germany's  population  is  already  more  than  60 
per  cent,  greater  than  that  of  France,  and  is  almost 
as  great  as  that  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Germany 
wishes  neither  to  suffer  from  a  congestion  of  popula- 
tion destructive  to  the  national  physique  similar  to 
that  which  exists  in  the  British  manufacturing  dis- 
tricts and  in  the  West  of  Ireland,  nor  does  she  wish 
her  surplus  population  to  migrate  to  foreign  countries 
and  to  strengthen  her  national  competitors  to  Ger- 
many's hurt.  Germany's  greatest  need  is  sufficient 
territory  ;  she  requires  urgently  more  elbow-room. 

Germany's  territory  comprises  208,740  square 
miles.  Russia  in  Europe  has  2,052,490  square  miles, 
and  the  whole  of  Russia  extends  to  no  less  than 
8,379,044  square  miles.  All  Russia  is  forty  times, 
and  European  Russia  alone  is  ten  times,  as  large  as 
Germany.  In  the  imagination  of  many,  Russia  is  a 
gigantic  ice-bound  country  inhabited  by  shivering 


GERMANY   AND    RUSSIA  95 

moujiks  clothed  in  furs.  The  climate  of  Russia  is 
not  so  bad ;  it  has  extremes  of  heat  and  cold  similar 
to  Canada.  It  is  not  generally  known  that  Moscow 
and  Riga  in  the  north  of  Russia  lie  in  the  same  lati- 
tude as  Glasgow  and  Copenhagen,  that  Kieff  and 
Kharkoff  in  Russia's  centre  are  no  farther  north  than 
Frankfort-on-the-Main  and  the  Isle  of  Wight,  that 
Odessa  and  Rostoff  lie  as  far  south  as  Venice  and 
Milan,  and  that  Tiflis  and  Khiva  have  the  latitude 
and  the  climate  of  Naples  and  Constantinople.  The 
greater  part  of  European  Russia  lies  no  farther  to  the 
north  than  Germany ;  and  in  the  south  of  both 
European  and  Asiatic  Russia  peaches,  grapes,  tobacco, 
cotton,  and  many  other  tropical  and  sub-tropical  pro- 
ductions are  raised  in  abundance  under  a  climate 
which  resembles  that  of  Southern  Italy  and  of  Southern 
California.  Per  square  mile  European  Russia  has  65 
inhabitants,  and  Asiatic  Russia  has  only  3.7  inhabi- 
tants. Whilst  all  Russia  has  but  20  inhabitants  per 
square  mile,  Germany  has  no  less  than  310  inhabi- 
tants per  square  mile.  European  and  Asiatic  Russia 
possess  the  largest  cultivable  plains  in  the  world,  and 
as  the  soil  is  very  rich,  Russia  should,  and  undoubtedly 
will,  become  the  greatest  granary  and  ranch  in  the 
world.  Besides,  Russia  is  in  parts  very  highly  miner- 
alised, and  she  possesses  magnificent  forests  and 
inland  waterways.  Through  the  possession  of  all  these 
resources  Russia  has  room  for  a  very  large  population. 
If  we  now  assume  that  only  one-half  of  Russia  is 
susceptible  to  dense  settlement,  and  that  the  favoured 
half  of  Russia  can  support  only  half  as  many  people 
per  square  mile  as  Germany,  it  follows  that  all  Russia 
should  be  able  to  maintain  a  population  of  670,000,000 
people. 

Russia's    population    is    rapidly    increasing.     At 


96  MODERN    GERMANY 

present  she  has  more  than  160,000,000  inhabitants, 
and  if  the  present  rate  of  progress  should  be  main- 
tained, Russia  will  have  300,000,000  inhabitants  in 
about  thirty  years,  whilst  Germany  will  scarcely  be 
able  to  nourish  more  than  90,000,000  or  100,000,000 
people  on  her  present  territory.  A  military  state  of 
300,000,000  people,  able  to  raise  an  army  of  10,000,000 
or  20,000,000  men,  would  be  a  very  dangerous  neigh- 
bour to  Germany.  Germany's  future  lies  not  upon 
the  water,  but  upon  the  land,  because  her  future  is 
most  seriously  threatened  on  the  land,  and  she  can 
hope  to  remain  a  great  nation  only  by  acquiring 
sufficient  land  for  her  rapidly-increasing  population. 

Owing  to  the  great  prolificness  of  the  race,  the 
Russian  population  increases  very  rapidly.  The 
yearly  birth-rate  in  Russia  is  48.0  per  thousand,  com- 
pared with  only  31.0  per  thousand  in  Germany. 
Furthermore,  the  German  birth-rate  is  rapidly  de- 
clining, whilst  that  of  Russia  remains  stationary. 
The  death-rate  in  Russia  is  high ;  yet  the  excess  of 
births  over  deaths  is  18.5  per  thousand  in  Russia  as 
compared  with  only  13.8  per  thousand  in  Germany. 
The  natural  increase  of  the  population  is,  therefore, 
almost  50  per  cent,  greater  in  Russia  than  it  is  in 
Germany.  Since  the  Russian  census  of  1897,  the 
population  of  Russia  and  of  Germany  has  increased 
as  follows  : — 

Population  of  Russia.  Population  of  Germany. 

1897     .     .      129,209,000  53>569,ooo 

1909     .     .     160,095,000  63,695,000 

Increase       30,886,000  10,126,000 

During  the  twelve  years  under  review  the  popula- 
tion of  Russia  has  increased  a  little  more  than  three 
times  as  fast  as  that  of  Germany.  Germany  is  rapidly 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  97 

falling  behind.  To  Germany,  a  military  State  with 
160,000,000  inhabitants,  which  promises  to  have 
300,000,000  inhabitants  in  thirty  years,  is  a  great 
danger.  The  foregoing  makes  it  clear  that  Germany 
suffers  from  over-population  and  from  the  danger  of 
being  overwhelmed  by  Russia.  Her  greatest  needs 
are  elbow-room  and  territorial  security,  and  Germany 
can  simultaneously  obtain  both  by  a  successful  war 
with  Russia. 

Up  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War  Russia  was  almost 
everywhere,  and,  especially  by  the  Russians  them- 
selves, considered  invincible  in  war.  On  paper  she 
had  by  far  the  largest  and  the  most  powerful  army  in 
the  world.  The  Russian  soldiers  had  a  reputation  of 
fearless,  stubborn  stolidity,  and  of  an  absolute  con- 
tempt of  death,  which  had  given  them  victory  in 
countless  battles,  and  which  had  made  good  the 
defects  in  her  leadership  and  in  her  administration. 
It  was  assumed  that  Russia  could  not  be  conquered, 
because  people  believed  that  an  army  rash  enough 
to  invade  the  country  would  perish  as  miserably  in 
the  snow-fields  as  Napoleon's  army  in  1812.  Even 
before  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  Germans  had  no 
exaggerated  ideas  of  Russia's  military  strength.  The 
German  officers  had  learned  from  Clausewitz,  their 
classical  writer  on  strategy,  that  Napoleon  was  defeated 
in  Russia  not  by  the  Russian  armies,  and  by  "  general  " 
winter  and  "  general  "  hunger,  but  by  his  own  mis- 
takes, by  starting  too  late  on  his  campaign,  and  then 
exhausting  and  decimating  his  troops  by  marching 
too  rapidly  to  make  up  for  lost  time.  Besides,  they 
knew  that  with  the  advent  of  railways  Russia  was  no 
longer  an  inhospitable,  roadless  desert.  German  mili- 
tary men  stated  freely  that  Russia  was  a  thing  of 
lath  and  plaster  painted  to  look  like  iron.  The  German 

G 


98  MODERN    GERMANY 

general  staff  had  prepared  plans  for  an  advance  upon 
Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg  in  case  of  war.  No 
German  soldier  had  any  doubt  about  the  issue  of  a 
Russo-German  campaign.  Still,  German  diplomats 
followed  the  example  wisely  set  by  Bismarck  and 
William  I.,  and  made  to  the  Russians  flattering 
remarks  about  the  irresistible  might  of  their  army 
whenever  an  opportunity  offered. 

Napoleon's  invasion  of  Russia,  as  the  previous  one 
of  Charles  XII.  of  Sweden,  failed  through  an  ill-con- 
sidered plan  and  through  transport  difficulties.  Both 
had  to  feed  their  armies  with  supplies  carried  on  carts 
and  wagons  through  the  heart  of  the  wild,  poor,  and 
practically  roadless  country.  Conditions  have  changed 
since  1812.  The  country  separating  the  two  Russian 
capitals  from  the  German  frontier  has  become  densely 
settled,  and  has  been  provided  with  excellent  roads 
and  railways.  Besides,  an  invading  German  army 
need  not  necessarily  follow  the  footsteps  of  Napoleon 
the  First  and  advance  upon  Moscow.  St.  Petersburg 
is  now  by  far  the  more  important  of  the  two  capitals, 
and  it  lies  on  the  sea.  The  battle  of  Tsushima  has 
wiped  out  the  Russian  fleet,  and  an  enormous  German 
navy  has  been  built  up.  In  a  few  days  the  German 
battle-fleet  could  appear  before  St.  Petersburg,  and 
a  German  army  could  march  upon  St.  Petersburg 
via  Riga,  Dorpat,  and  Narva,  skirting  the  Baltic  Sea, 
drawing  the  necessary  supplies  either  over  the  rail- 
ways following  that  route  or  from  the  Baltic  Sea. 
It  is  undesirable  to  rely  on  a  railway  for  the  supply 
of  an  army.  Tunnels  and  bridges  can  be  blown  up, 
and  a  large  military  force  is  always  needed  for  the 
defence  of  the  line  of  communication.  If  Germany 
dominates  the  Baltic,  her  invading  armies  need  not 
rely  on  the  somewhat  precarious  connection  by  road 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  99 

and  railroad  with  their  own  country  and  its  arsenals. 
She  might  make  the  sea  her  base  of  supply,  and  she 
could  draw  all  the  food,  war  material,  and  reinforce- 
ments needed  through  the  excellent  harbours  of  Libau, 
Windau,  Riga,  Pernau,  Reval,  which  form  easy  and 
convenient  stages  on  the  road  from  Konigsberg  and 
Dantzig  to  St.  Petersburg.  Having  a  very  powerful 
fleet,  Germany  need  not  fear  molestation  from  Russian 
warships. 

Interruption  of  the  sea  communication  with  Ger- 
many might  be  fatal  to  her  army  if  it  relied  entirely 
on  the  sea.  But  such  interruption  could  only  come 
from  a  third  Power  strong  at  sea.  To  guard  against 
intervention  of  a  strong  naval  Power,  Germany  might 
seize  the  narrow  passages  through  the  Danish  Isles 
which  connect  the  Baltic  with  the  North  Sea.  Pre- 
parations for  such  a  step  have  probably  been  made. 
The  narrow  Little  Belt  could  be  closed  to  foreign 
warships  by  German  guns  placed  on  the  coast  of 
Schleswig ;  and  the  remaining  two  passages,  the 
Great  Belt  and  the  Sound,  might  be  closed  by  Ger- 
many's occupation  of  two  or  three  points  on  the 
Danish  Islands.  They  might  conceivably  be  closed 
by  the  Danes  themselves  in  the  interests  of  neutrality. 
As  soon  as  Germany  dominates  the  Baltic  with  her 
fleet,  no  transport  difficulties  and  no  serious  climatic 
difficulties  would  hamper  a  German  advance  upon 
St.  Petersburg.  The  distance  which  separates  St. 
Petersburg  from  the  German  frontier  is  only  a  little 
more  than  half  as  long  as  the  distance  which  sepa- 
rates Moscow  from  the  German  frontier.  The  German 
route  to  Russia's  capital  would,  therefore,  be  only  a 
little  more  than  half  as  long  as  that  taken  by  Napoleon 
in  1812,  and  it  would  be  far  more  secure  and  con- 
venient. Had  Great  Britain  been  friendly  or  neutral, 


ioo  MODERN    GERMANY 

Napoleon  might  in  1812  have  marched  upon  St.  Peters- 
burg, skirting  the  sea  and  receiving  provisions  and 
ammunition  from  the  French  fleet,  and  the  Franco- 
Russian  war  might  have  had  a  different  ending. 

The  occupation  of  St.  Petersburg — by  far  the  more 
important  of  the  two  capitals — a  town  which,  once 
captured,  could  be  held  indefinitely  by  a  Power  pos- 
sessing the  command  of  the  Baltic  Sea,  would  very 
likely  end  the  war.  However,  an  excellent  railway 
line  connects  Moscow  both  with  St.  Petersburg  and 
with  the  German  frontier.  If  the  occupation  of  St. 
Petersburg  and  the  very  important  Baltic  harbours 
should  not  suffice  to  bring  Russia  to  her  knees,  Ger- 
many would  have  the  choice  of  several  fairly  com- 
modious routes  for  an  advance  upon  the  older  capital. 
Russia  is  no  longer  invulnerable. 

A  nation  does  not  enter  upon  a  great  war  solely 
with  the  object  of  defeating  a  great  neighbour  State, 
the  continued  growth  of  which  might  become  dan- 
gerous. Wars  of  precaution  were  possible  when 
States  relied  upon  hired  armies.  With  the  advent  of 
national  armies  and  of  armed  nations  wars  must  be 
popular  even  in  non-democratic  countries.  They  must 
be  waged  not  only  for  a  practical  aim,  but  for  a  great 
national  ideal.  They  must  powerfully  appeal  to 
patriotism  and  the  national  imagination.  Wars  of 
precaution  and  prevention  are  never  popular. 

Official  Germany  has  in  the  past  not  only  frequently 
spoken  of  Russia's  irresistible  might,  but  has  equally 
frequently  stated  that  a  war  between  the  two  coun- 
tries was  senseless,  because  neither  country  has  any- 
thing which  the  other  country  desires.  The  latter 
assertion  is  as  incorrect  as  is  the  former.  A  glance  at 
the  map  shows  that  Russian  Poland  enters  like  a  solid 
wedge  between  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  From 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  101 

a  purely  theoretical  point  of  view  a  rounding  off  of 
the  German  frontier  by  detaching  Russian  Poland 
from  Russia  might  seem  desirable.  In  practice  such 
a  step  would  not  recommend  itself.  Germany  has 
enough  difficulties  with  her  Polish  subjects,  who 
number  more  than  3,000,000.  By  adding  several 
millions  to  these,  she  would  rather  weaken  than 
strengthen  herself,  and  she  would  not  weaken  Russia 
very  much.  She  could  also  not  weaken  Russia  by 
creating  an  independent  Poland  as  a  buffer  State 
between  Germany  and  Russia,  for  the  3,000,000  German 
Poles,  who  wish  Poland  to  become  again  an  inde- 
pendent State,  would  involve  Germany  in  serious 
difficulties  by  conspiring  with  the  independent  Polish 
State  across  the  border.  Germany  will  scarcely  try 
to  find  in  Russian  Poland  compensation  for  a  war 
with  Russia.  Besides,  the  acquisition  of  Russian 
Poland  would  not  be  an  object  with  which  a  Russo- 
German  war  might  be  justified  and  the  patriotism  of 
the  German  nation  be  aroused. 

To  the  north  of  Russian  Poland  and  along  the 
shore  of  the  Baltic  lie  the  three  Baltic  provinces, 
Courland,  Livonia,  and  Esthonia.  These  three  pro- 
vinces are  German  colonies  of  great  antiquity.  In 
the  eleventh  century  the  enterprising  merchants  of 
Lubeck  traded  with  the  natives  on  the  shores  of  the 
Russian  Baltic.  They  settled  in  1160  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Duna  River,  where  now  Riga  stands,  and  in 
1185  the  monk  Meinhard  of  Segenberg  built  a  church 
and  castle  at  Uxkull,  twenty  miles  up  the  river.  The 
Archbishop  of  Bremen  made  the  monk  Bishop  of 
Livonia.  Christianity  and  German  civilisation  were 
introduced  in  the  lands  on  the  Baltic.  In  those  days 
Church  and  State  went  hand  in  hand.  The  princes 
of  the  Church  wielded  sword  and  sceptre ;  they  were 


102  MODERN    GERMANY 

statesmen  and  soldiers.  In  1202  the  bishop  created 
the  Order  of  the  Knights  of  Christ,  called  the  Brethren 
of  the  Sword,  a  military  German  order  for  the  con- 
quest and  defence  of  the  Baltic  provinces.  In  1207 
Philipp,  King  of  Germany,  declared  Livonia  to  be 
part  of  the  German  Empire.  The  power  of  the 
Brethren  of  the  Sword  was  increased,  and  their  civilis- 
ing activity  and  that  of  the  Church  Militant  was 
supported  by  the  powerful  Hanseatic  League.  Trade 
became  very  active,  and  Riga,  Dorpat,  and  Reval 
became  prosperous  German  towns.  The  story  of  the 
Baltic  provinces  is  a  story  of  self-sacrifice  and  of 
heroism  on  the  part  of  a  handful  of  German  pioneers, 
who  struggled  successfully  against  the  overwhelming 
numbers  of  uncivilised  tribes  surrounding  them. 
They  defeated  the  Russians  in  many  battles. 

The  German  Reformation  spread  to  the  Baltic 
provinces.  The  great  religious  wars  broke  out  and 
devastated  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Germany  was 
rent  by  internecine  wars,  and  was  no  longer  able  to 
succour  her  sons  in  the  outlying  provinces.  Profiting 
by  her  weakness,  Alsace  and  Lorraine  in  the  west 
were  seized  by  France,  and  the  Baltic  provinces, 
having  to  rely  on  their  own  unaided  force,  were 
attacked  by  their  neighbours.  Russia,  Sweden,  and 
Poland  fought  for  their  possession.  To  obtain  peace 
Livonia  joined  Russia  in  1710  ;  and  in  1721,  at  the 
Peace  of  Neustadt,  Peter  the  Great  solemnly  bound 
himself  to  maintain  for  all  time  the  autonomy  and 
the  German  local  government  of  Livonia,  the  German 
law  and  law-courts  established  in  it,  the  German 
schools,  the  German  churches,  and  the  German  Pro- 
testant religion.  The  successors  of  Peter  the  Great 
solemnly  confirmed  the  Treaty  of  Neustadt,  but  in 
the  forties  of  last  century  the  Russian  Government 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  103 

induced  many  peasants  to  join  the  Russian  Church. 
In  the  seventies  the  Pan-Slavonic  movement  arose, 
and  in  1881  the  Baltic  provinces  were  deprived  of 
their  ancient  privileges.  The  German  schools  and  the 
German  university  were  ruthlessly  Russianised,  and 
were  degraded  in  the  process.  Russian  was  made  the 
official  language.  In  the  law-courts  the  use  of  the 
German  language  was  forbidden.  German  officials 
and  teachers  were  replaced  by  Russians.  The  Pro- 
testant clergy  were  persecuted,  and  many  were  im- 
prisoned or  sent  into  exile.  Even  the  names  of  Ger- 
man towns  were  Russianised.  Dorpat  was  re-chris- 
tened Yuriev.  A  cry  of  sorrow  and  of  rage  arose 
all  over  Germany.  The  Baltic  provinces  were  rather 
German  than  Russian,  and  many  patriotic  Germans 
had  hoped  that  some  day  the  Baits  and  the  Germans, 
being  united  by  a  common  language,  a  common 
civilisation,  and  a  common  religion,  might  again  be 
politically  united. 

Names  are  the  oldest  monuments  of  history.  A 
glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  the  three  Baltic 
provinces  are  essentially  German.  The  province  of 
Courland  is  divided  into  the  "  Circles  "  of  Bauske, 
Friedrichstadt,  Goldingen,  Grobin,  Hasenpoth,  Illuxt, 
Mitau,  Talsen,  Tuckum,  Windau. 

The  province  of  Livonia  is  divided  into  the 
"  Circles  "  of  Dorpat,  Fellin,  Oesel,  Pernau,  Riga,  Walk, 
Wenden,  Werro,  Wolmar.  The  province  of  Esthonia 
is  divided  into  the  "  Circles "  of  Harrien,  Jerwen, 
Wiek,  Wierland.  Among  the  larger  towns  in  the 
Baltic  provinces  are  Frauenburg,  Prinzenhof,  Neu- 
hausen,  Jacobstadt,  Marienburg,  Seswegen,  Lemburg, 
Muhlgraben,  Sennen,  Kiirbis,  Weissenstein,  Wasen- 
berg,  Grossenhof,  Gogenkreitz,  St.  Annen,  Pungern, 
&c.,  names  which  are  as  German  as  Berlin,  Hamburg, 


104  MODERN    GERMANY 

Wiesbaden,  and  Frankfurt.  Sentimentally  the  Baltic 
provinces  now  occupy  a  position  in  the  German  mind 
similar  to  that  which  Alsace  and  Lorraine  occupied 
before  the  Franco-German  War.  They  are  old  German 
provinces  which  were  torn  away  from  Germany  at 
the  day  of  her  humiliation.  They  contain  still  a 
considerable  proportion  of  German-speaking  people, 
and  they  remind  the  Germans  in  Germany  of  the 
ancient  glorious  times  of  strife  and  triumph  by  the 
German  names  of  the  towns.  From  the  German  point 
of  view  the  acquisition  of  the  Baltic  provinces  would 
be  a  cause  worth  fighting  for.  It  would  be  a  cause 
for  which  the  enthusiasm  of  the  German  nation  might 
easily  be  aroused.  A  war  for  the  conquest  of  the 
Baltic  provinces  might  be  as  popular  as  was  the 
war  for  the  defence  of  the  Rhine  and  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

According  to  the  Handbuch  des  Deutschtums  im 
Ausland,  the  population  of  the  Baltic  provinces  is 
composed  as  follows  :- 

Livonia.  Esthonia.  Courland. 

Germans  .     .     .     113,373=     9-74%  21,856=     S-8i%  49-953=     8-68% 

Russians  .  .  .  53-872  =  4-63%  17,465=  4-64%  10,900=  1.89% 
Esthonians,  Letts 

and  Jews    .     .     996,239=  85.63%  337,016=  89.55%  514,634=  89.43% 

Total          1,163,484=100.00%  376,337=100.00%  575,487=100.00% 

According  to  the  same  source,  the  population  of 
the  principal  towns  in  the  Baltic  provinces  is  as 
follows : — 

Number  of  Germans.  Percentage  of  Total  Population. 
Riga.    .    .     110,000  35% 

Mitau    .    .       16,000  50% 

Pernau  .     .         3,500  25% 

Dorpat  .     .       15,000  35% 

Reval    .     .       13,000  25% 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  105 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  Germans  in  the  Baltic 
provinces  form  only  a  minority  of  the  population. 
Still,  they  are  far  more  numerous  than  are  the  Russians. 
The  great  majority  of  the  inhabitants  are  Letts, 
Esthonians,  and  Jews.  In  the  large  towns  the  pro- 
portion of  the  Germans  is  very  considerable,  being 
irom  25  to  50  per  cent.  The  Germans  are,  as  they 
were  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  aristocracy  of  the  Baltic 
provinces.  Practically  all  the  large  estate  owners, 
bankers,  merchants,  lawyers,  doctors,  teachers,  clergy- 
men, &c.,  are  Germans.  In  Riga  alone  are  published 
twenty  German  newspapers  and  periodicals.  The 
German  element  represents  wealth  and  culture  in  the 
upper  and  middle  classes,  whilst  the  Russians,  Estho- 
nians, and  Letts  represent  manual  labour.  The 
Russians  are  largely  town  labourers,  and  many  of 
them  are  dissenters  who  have  fled  from  the  persecu- 
tion of  the  Russian  Church  into  the  Baltic  provinces. 
The  Letts  and  Esthonians  are  peasants  and  agri- 
cultural labourers,  and  the  Jews  are  petty  traders. 
Among  primitive  people  religion  is  a  stronger  bond 
than  racial  identity.  Most  of  the  Letts  and  Esthonians 
belong  to  the  German  Protestant  Church,  and  only 
about  10  per  cent,  of  the  Baits  belong  to  the  Russian 
Church.  In  their  common  religion  there  is  a  strong 
bond  of  union  between  the  German  estate  owners, 
merchants,  and  professional  men  in  the  Baltic  pro- 
vinces and  the  non-German  peasants  and  agricultural 
labourers  on  the  one  hand,  and  between  the  Baltic 
Protestants  and  the  Protestants  of  Germany  on  the 
other  hand.  The  German  Protestant  Churches  could 
easily  undertake  a  campaign  in  favour  of  freeing  the 
Baltic  Protestants  from  the  yoke  of  Russian  Ortho- 
doxy, Russian  intolerance,  and  Russian  persecution. 

Among   the   landless   agriculturists   in   the   Baltic 


io6  MODERN    GERMANY 

provinces  there  is  much  dissatisfaction.  A  few  years 
ago  they  attacked  the  landed  proprietors  and  burnt 
and  plundered  their  houses.  If  Germany  should 
acquire  the  Baltic  provinces,  she  would  no  doubt 
introduce  the  traditional  German  land  policy,  and 
convert  the  landless  cultivators  into  small  landowners 
with  the  assistance  of  the  State,  buying  out  many  of 
the  large  proprietors.  Such  a  step  would  make  the 
Letts  and  Esthonians  happy  and  contented,  and 
reconcile  them  with  their  change  of  rulers,  especially 
as  there  is  not  much  love  lost  between  Letts  and 
Russians,  Esthonians  and  Russians,  and  Jews  and 
Russians. 

Owing  to  the  absence  of  small  freeholds  and  the 
insufficient  development  of  agriculture  on  the  large 
estates,  the  Baltic  provinces  are  far  more  thinly 
populated  than  the  adjoining  provinces  of  Germany. 
This  is  apparent  from  the  following  figures  : — 

Population  per 
Square  miles.  Population.       square  mile. 

Courland  ....  I0,435  727,3°°             70 

Livonia     ....  17,5  74  1,431,900              80 

Esthonia  ....  7,605  459,700              60 

East  Prussia     .     .  14,786  2,030,176  137.3 

West  Prussia     .     .  9,861  1,641,746  166.5 

Pomerania    .    .     .  11,631  1,684,326  144.8 

Posen 11,190  1,986,637  177-5 

Germany  ....  208,780  67,000,000  320.00 

Whilst  the  population  in  the  Baltic  provinces  is 
from  60  to  80  people  per  square  mile,  the  population 
in  the  adjoining  German  provinces  of  East  Prussia, 
West  Prussia,  Pomerania,  and  Posen,  which  also 
suffer  from  the  evil  of  large  estates,  is  from  137.3  to 
T77-5  per  square  mile,  and  the  population  of  all  Ger- 
many comes  to  320  people  per  square  mile.  As  the 
soil  and  climate  of  the  Baltic  provinces  are  similar 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  107 

to  the  soil  and  climate  of  the  adjoining  German  pro- 
vinces, it  is  clear  that  the  Baltic  provinces,  which  at 
present  have  only  about  2,600,000  inhabitants,  should 
be  able  to  maintain  150  people  per  square  mile,  or 
about  6,000,000  inhabitants.  There  is,  therefore,  a 
good  chance  of  settling  a  very  considerable  part  of 
the  German  surplus  population  among  the  Baltic 
Letts  and  Esthonians,  who  would  welcome  a  German 
Government,  especially  if  it  should  enable  them  to 
acquire  on  easy  and  equitable  terms  farms  of  their 
own.  They  could  be  quickly  Germanised  by  planting 
Protestant  German  peasants  among  them.  If  suffi- 
cient inducements  were  offered  to  them,  German 
peasant  boys  would  migrate  to  Baltic  farms  instead 
of  to  German  factories.  The  German  Government 
has  successfully  followed  a  similar  policy  of  settle- 
ment in  the  districts  inhabited  by  the  German  Poles. 

A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  the  Baltic  pro- 
vinces touch  Eastern  Germany  only  with  a  small  and 
pointed  corner.  In  order  to  create  an  organic  con- 
nection, Germany  would  have  to  acquire  part,  or  the 
whole,  of  the  Russian  province  of  Kovno,  which 
extends  to  15,518  miles,  and  which  has  1,720,500 
inhabitants.  The  acquisition  of  the  three  Baltic 
provinces  alone  would  give  to  Germany  additional 
territory  equal  in  size  to  that  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtem- 
berg  combined.  The  acquisition  of  Kovno  would  give 
to  Germany  additional  territory  equal  in  size  to  that 
of  Baden,  Saxony,  and  Hesse  combined.  The  in- 
corporation of  the  Baltic  provinces  would  increase 
Germany's  territory  by  one-sixth,  and  the  incorpora- 
tion of  the  Baltic  provinces  and  of  Kovno  would 
increase  it  by  one-quarter.  The  Baltic  provinces 
would  give  Germany  some  elbow-room. 

The  possession  of  the  Baltic  provinces  would  give, 


io8  MODERN    GERMANY 

at  the  same  time,  Germany  some  security  from  a 
Russian  attack.  At  present  the  distance  separating 
St.  Petersburg  from  the  German  frontier  is  450  miles. 
The  acquisition  of  the  Baltic  provinces  would  reduce 
that  distance  to  80  miles,  or  four  days'  march.  The 
Baltic  provinces  form  a  kind  of  natural  fortress.  They 
contain  an  immense  number  of  small  lakes,  which 
make  the  use  of  large  bodies  of  troops  very  difficult, 
and  extensive  swamps  and  forests  provide  an  addi- 
tional protection  to  them  against  a  Russian  attack. 
The  natural  protection  of  the  Baltic  provinces  is 
particularly  strong  in  that  portion  which  is  nearest 
to  St.  Petersburg,  for  there  Lake  Peipus  and  Lake 
Pskoff  form  a  barrier  90  miles  wide  against  Russia. 
A  strong  German  garrison  in  Northern  Esthonia  could 
cover  the  80  miles  separating  it  from  St.  Petersburg 
in  a  few  days,  and  German  cruisers  stationed  at  Reval 
could  steam  to  St.  Petersburg  in  from  eight  to  ten 
hours.  St.  Petersburg  would  be  within  easy  striking 
distance  of  Berlin.  Russia  would  have  her  capital 
close  to  the  German  frontier.  She  would  be  one  of 
the  most  vulnerable  States  in  the  world. 

St.  Petersburg  lies  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  Gulf 
of  Finland,  an  arm  of  the  Baltic  which  is  250  miles 
long  and  from  30  to  50  miles  wide.  Finland  forms 
the  northern  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  and  of  the 
southern  shore  170  miles  belong  to  Esthonia.  The 
shipping  of  St.  Petersburg  would  have  to  pass  170 
miles  of  German  coast.  St.  Petersburg  would  be 
approximately  in  the  same  position  in  which  London 
would  find  itself  if  Germany  had  a  strong  military 
and  naval  base  at  Sheerness,  or  in  which  New  York 
would  be  if  a  first-class  Power  were  in  possession  of 
Long  Island.  St.  Petersburg  would  be  a  hostage  for 
Russia's  good  behaviour  in  Germany's  hands. 


GERMANY   AND    RUSSIA  109 

Finland  has  3,000,000  inhabitants,  of  whom  400,000 
are  Swedes  and  only  6000  are  Russians.  Of  the 
Finnish  population  98.14  per  cent,  are  Lutherans. 
The  remaining  1.86  per  cent,  belong  to  the  Russian 
and  Roman  Catholic  Churches.  Racially,  religiously, 
intellectually,  and  socially  Russians  and  Finns  have 
scarcely  anything  in  common.  Finland  is  nominally 
an  independent  Grand  Duchy,  the  Czar  of  Russia 
being  at  the  same  time  Grand  Duke  of  Finland,  but 
Russia  has  taken  away  from  Finland  her  solemnly 
guaranteed  rights  and  her  ancient  constitution. 
Russia  has  treated  Finland  like  a  conquered  country, 
and  the  Finns  resent  it,  but  they  are  too  weak  for 
active  opposition.  If  Germany  should  defeat  Russia, 
she  might  conceivably  restitute  to  Finland  her  freedom 
and  guarantee  her  continued  independence.  By  such 
a  step  Finland  would  become  virtually  a  German 
Protectorate.  As  St.  Petersburg  lies  only  ten  miles 
from  the  Finnish- Russian  frontier,  the  Russian  capital 
would  become  a  Finnish  frontier  town,  and  the  Finnish 
harbours  in  sight  of  St.  Petersburg  could  become  at 
any  moment  a  base  of  the  German  torpedo-boat 
flotillas.  Russia's  military  men  have  become  keenly 
aware  of  this  danger.  General  Borodkin  wrote : — 

"  The  Baltic  Sea  is  undoubtedly  the  scene  of  any  future 
conflicts  with  our  foes ;  it  is  here  that  they  will  endeavour  to 
inflict  injury  upon  Russia  by  attacking  her  fleet  and  towns, 
blocading  the  sea  border  and  making  attempts  to  land  forces. 
Of  all  the  territories  washed  by  the  Baltic,  Finland,  thanks  to 
its  proximity  to  the  capital,  will  always  attract  the  attention 
of  the  enemy.  From  the  moment  when  Peter  the  Great 
'  planted  a  firm  foot  beside  the  sea '  an  enemy  will  constantly 
have  Finland  for  a  very  serious  objective  for  operations  of 
war." 

Germany's  occupation  of  the  Baltic  provinces 
would  greatly  reduce  Russia's  naval  and  military 


no  MODERN   GERMANY 

power.  It  would  give  the  keys  to  Russia's  citadel 
into  Germany's  hands.  It  would,  besides,  greatly 
reduce  Russia's  economic  power  to  Germany's  benefit. 
Fully  one-third  of  Russia's  maritime  trade  is  carried 
on  by  the  ports  in  the  Baltic  provinces.  Riga  holds 
the  same  position  in  the  North  of  Russia  which  Odessa 
occupies  in  the  south.  Riga  is  the  Russian  Ham- 
burg. The  trade  handled  by  the  ports  in  the  Baltic 
provinces  —  Riga,  Reval,  Libau,  Windau,  Pernau  — 
amounted  in  1909  to  £53,500,000,  and  that  of  Riga 
alone  came  to  £29,000,000.  Russia's  Baltic  trade  is 
rapidly  growing,  and  is  becoming  more  and  more 
necessary  to  the  empire.  At  present  Riga  has  350,000 
inhabitants,  and  is  the  sixth  largest  town  in  the 
Russian  Empire.  In  1867  Riga  had  only  77,468 
inhabitants.  Reval  and  Libau  also  have  been  grow- 
ing at  a  very  rapid  rate. 

Russia's  manufacturing  industries  are  centred 
about  Lodz  in  Russian  Poland.  A  glance  at  the  map 
shows  that  the  harbours  of  the  Baltic  provinces  are 
nearest  to  Poland.  The  prosperity  of  the  Polish 
manufacturing  industries  depends  largely  on  the  un- 
impeded flow  of  trade  through  the  Baltic  ports. 
Hence  the  Baltic  harbours  are  very  important  to 
Russia  not  only  for  the  exportation  of  timber  and 
woodwork  and  of  Russian  agricultural  produce,  espe- 
cially wheat,  oats,  eggs  and  butter,  flax,  skins  and 
hides,  &c.,  but  also  for  the  importation  of  coal,  cotton, 
wool,  indiarubber,  copper,  tin,  lead,  machinery,  &c., 
used  in  manufacturing.  Through  their  excellent  ports 
the  Baltic  provinces  necessarily  control  a  large  part 
of  Russia's  export  and  import  trade,  and  as  alternative 
outlets  cannot  easily  be  provided,  it  is  evident  that 
a  foreign  Power  possessing  Riga,  Reval,  Libau,  Windau, 
and  Pernau  can  levy  tribute  on  Russia's  trade.  It 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  in 

can  bring  strong  pressure  to  bear  upon  Russia's  in- 
dustries, and  it  can  compel  the  manufacturers  at 
Lodz  to  transfer  a  large  part  of  their  industries  from 
Russian  to  German  territory. 

The  fact  that  Russia  is  no  longer  invulnerable  has 
lately  dawned  upon  the  Russians  themselves.  For- 
merly they  thought  that  in  case  of  war  their  armies 
would  overrun  Germany,  and  that  their  navy  would 
drive  the  German  fleet  into  Kiel  and  Wilhelmshaven. 
Therefore  they  had  stationed  large  bodies  of  cavalry 
close  to  the  Russo-German  frontier,  and  had  spent 
no  less  than  £18,000,000  in  converting  Libau,  the 
Russian  port  nearest  to  the  German  frontier,  into  a 
naval  base.  Libau  would  indeed  have  been  an  ex- 
cellent naval  harbour  for  an  attack  upon  Germany 
by  a  Russian  fleet  of  superior  strength.  Before  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  the  Russian  fleet  was  on  paper 
considerably  stronger  than  the  German  fleet.  After 
the  destruction  of  the  Russian  fleet  and  the  defeat 
of  the  Russian  army  by  Japan  there  came  an  awaken- 
ing. The  highest  military  authorities  in  Russia  began 
to  realise  the  insecurity  of  Russia's  position  and  the 
possibility  of  a  sudden  German  attack  upon  St. 
Petersburg  from  the  sea.  Notwithstanding  the  enor- 
mous expenditure  incurred,  the  port  of  Libau  was 
hurriedly  abandoned  as  a  naval  base,  and  the  pro- 
jected works  were  not  completed.  Instead  the  Russian 
authorities  resolved  to  concentrate  their  efforts  upon 
the  defence  of  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Gulf  of  Finland 
leading  to  it.  The  sum  of  £22,000,000  was  voted  for 
the  construction  of  defensive  works  around  the  capital 
and  for  transforming  the  port  of  Reval,  which  lies  at 
the  entrance  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  into  a  naval 
harbour.  Russia  is  building  battleships  of  the  Dread- 
nought type,  of  23,370  tons,  not  for  a  war  of  revenge 


H2  MODERN    GERMANY 

with  Japan,  but  for  the  defence  of  St.  Petersburg. 
She  has  revised  her  somewhat  exaggerated  ideas  of 
her  military  and  naval  strength. 

The  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  has  lately  adopted 
an  ambitious  naval  programme,  and  that  she  is  build- 
ing four  battleships  of  22,000  tons  each,  has  attracted 
universal  attention.  It  has  been  surmised  that  her 
new  fleet  of  Dreadnoughts  is  intended  to  help  her 
German  ally  in  defeating  Great  Britain  and  despoiling 
the  British  Empire.  However,  every  one  who  knows 
Austria-Hungary  is  aware  that  that  country  has  no 
need  and  no  use  for  colonies  over-sea,  and  that  it 
would  scarcely  be  in  her  interest  to  see  Great  Britain 
weakened.  Moreover,  those  who  have  watched  her 
policy  know  that  her  greatest  interests  lie  in  the  Near 
East,  especially  in  Salonica  and  Constantinople,  and 
that  it  has  been  her  traditional  policy  to  promote  those 
interests.  In  1878  she  prepared  for  war  with  Russia 
in  defence  of  Constantinople.  Austria-Hungary's 
recent  action  in  incorporating  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, and  her  menacing  attitude  towards  Russia 
in  connection  with  that  coup,  shows  that  she  has 
not  changed  her  policy.  The  Austrian  Dreadnoughts 
may  become  exceedingly  useful  in  promoting  Austria's 
policy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula — and  the  lands  beyond. 
After  all,  the  future  of  Austria-Hungary  is  quite  as 
much  threatened  by  the  Russian  colossus  as  is  that 
of  Germany.  Therefore  it  is  within  the  region  of 
possibility,  to  say  the  least,  that  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  have  formed  a  plan  of  meeting  the  danger 
which  threatens  them  from  the  East  by  combined 
action,  by  pushing  the  Russians  back  towards  the 
steppes  of  Asia  whence  they  have  come. 

Russia's  most  valuable  and  most  densely-populated 
provinces  are  the  Baltic  provinces,  industrial  Poland 


GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA  113 

with  Warsaw  and  Lodz,  and  the  very  rich  agricultural 
provinces  of  Volhynia,  Podolia,  Bessarabia,  Kieff,  and 
Kherson  with  the  towns  of  Kieff  and  Odessa.  All 
these  provinces  lie  along  her  western  frontier,  in 
tempting  proximity  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
The  wealth  and  power  of  Russia  are  as  much  concen- 
trated upon  her  western  border  as  the  wealth  and 
power  of  the  United  States  are  centred  in  the  Eastern 
States  of  the  Union.  The  joint  Austro-German  Ulti- 
matum of  1909,  despatched  in  connection  with  the 
discussion  of  the  problem  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
awakened  Russia  to  a  sense  of  her  danger.  As  her 
navy  had  been  destroyed  and  her  army  been  greatly 
weakened,  she  was  compelled  to  retire  in  ignominious 
haste  before  the  Austrian  and  German  threats.  At 
that  moment  her  statesmen  must  have  bitterly  re- 
gretted having  frittered  away  the  wealth  and  strength 
of  their  country  in  barren  adventures  in  Eastern  Asia. 

It  has  often  been  stated  that  Russia  is  politically 
unreliable,  that  the  Franco- Russian  Alliance  is  a  sham, 
that  Russia  concluded  it  only  in  order  to  be  able  to 
float  her  loans  in  Paris,  that  she  would  forsake  France 
in  her  hour  of  need,  that  the  Russo-British  entente  like- 
wise is  due  only  to  Russia's  wish  to  avail  herself  of  the 
London  money  market,  and  that  she  would  give  no 
assistance  to  Great  Britain  in  time  of  danger.  These 
ideas  are  erroneous.  Russia  has  become  aware  that 
a  strong  France  and  a  strong  Great  Britain  are  ab- 
solutely necessary  for  her  own  security,  that  the 
defeat  of  France  or  Great  Britain  by  Germany  might 
mean  her  own  downfall.  Russia  is  certainly  not 
anxious  to  have  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe 
altered  in  Germany's  favour. 

Germany's  colonial  and  anti-British  policy  has 
either  been  very  wise  or  very  foolish.  Secrecy  is  the 

n 


n4  MODERN    GERMANY 

soul  of  statesmanship.  If  Germany  has  been  build- 
ing her  great  fleet  with  the  intention  of  humiliating 
Russia  and  conquering  the  Baltic  provinces  from  the 
sea,  she  has  acted  very  wisely  in  proclaiming  at  the 
outset  that  she  wished  to  have  a  fleet  strong  enough 
to  meet  "  the  mightiest  naval  Power,"  and  that  she 
strengthened  the  impression  of  her  ostensible  aim  by 
an  active  anti-British  policy.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  German  fleet  is  really  intended  for  use  against 
Great  Britain,  Germany  will  waste  her  strength  hi 
barren  adventures  exactly  as  Russia  did  in  Eastern 
Asia.  Germany  will  scarcely  be  able  to  create  a  fleet 
strong  enough  to  defeat  or  to  overawe  Great  Britain. 
Besides,  if  she  makes  war  upon  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Russia  would  undoubtedly  come  to  Great  Britain's 
aid,  actuated  not  by  friendship  or  treaty  fidelity,  but 
by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation.  Neither  France 
nor  Russia  can  afford  to  see  Germany  greatly  streng- 
thened. War  with  Great  Britain  would  probably  be 
for  Germany  a  war  on  three  fronts.  Germany's  posi- 
tion in  Europe  is  too  insecure  to  allow  her  to  embark 
upon  a  venturesome  colonial  policy.  She  may  threaten 
Great  Britain,  but  she  will  find  it  dangerous  to  act. 
A  bold  colonial  policy  can  be  safely  pursued  only  by 
a  nation  which  lives  securely  on  an  island,  such  as 
Great  Britain  and  Japan,  or  which  need  not  fear 
continental  neighbours,  such  as  the  United  States. 
As  long  as  the  armies  of  France  and  Russia  hover  on 
Germany's  flanks,  Germany  cannot  afford  to  pursue 
a  policy  which  may  bring  her  into  collision  with  Great 
Britain  or  the  United  States.  For  many  years  Ger- 
many's future  will  continue  to  lie  not  on  the  water, 
but  on  the  land,  and  she  will  endanger  her  future  by 
disregarding  that  fact. 


CHAPTER    VI 

GERMANY'S  WORLD  POLICY  AND  HER  ATTITUDE 
TOWARDS  ANGLO-SAXON  COUNTRIES 

UP  to  1870  the  ambitions  of  the  Germans  were  for 
national  unity  and  for  a  leading  r61e  among  the 
Continental  nations.  Since  this  object  has  been 
achieved  by  Bismarck's  genius,  and  since  the  fabric 
of  the  German  Empire  has  been  consolidated  and 
strengthened,  the  German  horizon  has  rapidly  been 
enlarged.  Though  not  unmindful  of  her  exposed 
Continental  position  and  of  the  possibility  of  seeing 
her  empire  expanding  east,  south,  and  west,  by  the 
absorption  of  the  German  population  in  the  Baltic 
Provinces  of  Russia,  in  Austria,  and  Switzerland,  and 
of  the  "  Low  Germans "  of  Holland,  her  ambition 
has  grown,  and  is  still  growing,  to  become  a  great 
colonial  power. 

Many  decades  back  some  of  the  greatest  German 
thinkers,  including  Treitschke,  Schliemann,  Roscher, 
List,  Droysen,  and  many  others,  pointed  out  that  the 
problem  of  disposing  of  Germany's  surplus  population 
in  a  temperate  zone  was  an  urgent  one,  but  at  the 
time  when  these  men  wrote  and  spoke  Germany  was 
still  divided  against  herself  and  was  powerless  and 
poor.  She  then  possessed  neither  a  navy  nor  a 
merchant  marine  worthy  the  name,  nor  manufacturing 
industries,  nor  foreign  commerce,  and  for  some  thirty 
years  the  agitation  for  colonies  was  restricted  to  the 
Universities,  being  ignored  or  even  discountenanced 


n6  MODERN   GERMANY 

in  official  and  in  commercial  circles.  Nothing  illus- 
trates the  attitude  of  the  German  people  and  Govern- 
ment in  those  times  better  than  the  acquisition,  in 
1848,  of  a  small  fleet  paid  for  largely  by  the  voluntary 
contributions  of  colonial  enthusiasts,  and  its  subse- 
quent sale  by  auction,  in  1852,  by  the  Government. 

During  the  last  sixty  years,  but  especially  since 
Germany's  consolidation  in  1871,  the  population  of 
the  empire  has  increased  with  wonderful  rapidity. 
The  population  of  Germany  within  her  present  limits 
has  risen  as  follows  : — 

Average  increase 
German  population  per  annum 

1840  32,800,000 

1850  35,400,000  26o,OOO 

i860  37,700,000  230,000 

1870  40,800,000  310,000 

I88O  45,200,000  440,000 

1890  49,400,000  420,000 

I9OO  56,300,000  690,000 

1912  66,000,000  850,000 

At  present  the  German  population  is  estimated  to 
increase  by  no  less  than  900,000  per  annum.  German 
emigration,  which  accounted  for  the  loss  of  220,000 
citizens  in  1881,  has  sunk  to  only  24,921  in  1909,  but 
as  a  matter-of-fact  this  slight  loss  in  population  has 
been  more  than  counterbalanced  during  the  last  few 
years  by  immigration  into  Germany  from  Austria, 
Russia,  and  Italy.  Professor  Schmoller  estimates 
that  the  German  population  will  amount  to  104,000,000 
in  1965,  Hiibbe-Schleiden  prophesies  that  it  will  rise 
to  150,000,000  in  1980,  and  Leroy-Beaulieu,  the  first 
French  authority  on  these  things,  has  estimated  that 
it  will  be  200,000,000  within  a  century.  With  so 
rapid  an  increase  of  the  population  in  view,  it  be- 
comes clear  that  the  question  of  over-population,  and 
of  eventual  emigration,  may  soon  become  a  pressing 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  117 

one  for  Germany.  But  Germany  is  loth  to  strengthen 
foreign  nations,  her  present  and  future  competitors, 
with  her  emigration,  which  earlier  or  later  must  set 
in  in  a  powerful  stream.  Hence  it  comes  that  the 
necessity  to  provide  in  advance  for  future  emigration 
is  clearly  recognised  by  the  German  Emperor  and 
his  advisers,  by  German  business  men,  and  by  the 
people.  The  existing  German  colonies  do  not  offer 
an  outlet  for  the  emigration  of  white  men.  Conse- 
quently the  resolution  has  arisen  to  acquire  colonies 
in  a  temperate  zone  whenever  and  wherever  possible. 

The  rooted  conviction  that  Germany  must  possess 
colonies  almost  at  any  price,  which  sixty  years  ago 
emanated  from  professorial  circles,  gradually  per- 
vaded the  whole  nation  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest. 

The  German  politicians  and  bureaucrats,  who  had 
no  experience  in  colonial  policy,  who  often  lacked 
sympathy,  understanding,  enterprise,  and  imagination 
regarding  colonial  matters,  and  who  viewed  the  turbu- 
lent clamour  for  colonies  of  the  professor-led  multi- 
tude with  the  hearty  dislike  with  which  the  initiative 
of  the  people  is  frequently  viewed  by  official  Germany, 
quickly  became  the  most  enthusiastic  and  the  most 
uncompromising  of  colonial  fanatics  when  the  Emperor 
lent  the  unreserved  support  of  his  powerful  personality 
to  the  colonial  movement,  and  gave  to  it  its  anti- 
Anglo-Saxon  character. 

Astonishment  has  been  frequently  expressed  in 
this  country  at  the  peculiar  and  forceful  means  by 
which  Germany  tries  to  acquire  colonies,  but  those 
who  are  well  acquainted  with  the  character  of  official 
and  unofficial  Germany  cannot  wonder  at  those  means. 
Present-day  Germany  owes  her  greatness  to  the  sword, 
and  her  national  character  has  nothing  in  common 
with  the  better-known  character  of  the  Germany  of 


n8  MODERN    GERMANY 

former  years,   which  is  wrongly  imputed  by   many 
to  the  present  Empire. 

In  old  Germany  the  centre  of  gravity  lay  in  the 
more  easy-going  south,  and  her  character  resembled 
that  of  present-day  Austria.  New  Germany  has  been 
conquered  by  the  East  Prussian  nobility,  the  de- 
scendants of  those  hardy  knights  of  the  Teutonic 
Order,  who,  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries, 
wrested  East  Prussia  from  the  Slavs  in  countless 
battles,  and  converted  the  independent  heathen  in- 
habitants into  obedient  Christian  serfs.  The  East 
Prussian  nobility  ruled  the  aboriginal  inhabitants  of 
Prussia  with  the  greatest  harshness,  and  various  medi- 
aeval institutions — for  example,  serfdom — prevailed 
in  Prussia  even  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Though 
serfdom  in  Prussia  was  nominally  abolished  in  1807, 
its  last  remnants  continued  to  exist  until  a  short 
time  ago,  and  even  now  the  downtrodden  peasant  in 
East  Prussia  calls  his  master  "  Herr  Wohlthater " 
(Mr.  Benefactor),  humbly  kisses  the  hands  of  the 
squire  and  of  his  children,  and  the  hem  of  his  wife's 
garment,  and  submits  to  correction  by  the  whip. 
East  Prussia,  with  her  arrogant  nobility  and  sub- 
missive peasantry,  strongly  resembles  her  neighbour 
Russia,  in  which  country  also  the  nobility  and  the 
Government  established  themselves  by  force.  In 
East  Prussia,  as  in  Russia,  the  nobility  are  wasteful, 
their  estates  are  encumbered  with  mortgages,  the 
peasantry  are  ignorant,  poor,  and  hard-worked,  manu- 
facturing industries  are  practically  non-existent,  and 
the  only  way  to  acquire  money  known  to  noblemen 
is  by  force  or  by  craft,  not  by  industry.  The  de- 
scendants of  the  valorous  Teutonic  knights  do  not 
introduce  industries  on  their  estates,  or  up-to-date 
methods  into  agriculture,  as  will  be  shown  in  another 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  ng 

chapter,  but  try  to  obtain  from  the  Government  high 
protective  tariffs  and  other  favours  through  their 
representatives  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Agrarians. 

The  best  example  of  the  new  German  spirit  is 
afforded  by  Bismarck,  who  was  a  typical  East  Prussian 
in  his  policy  and  in  his  methods.  His  appearance 
and  his  personality  suggest  that  he  had  a  considerable 
amount  of  Slav  blood  in  him  ;  at  all  events,  Slavs 
and  Slav  methods  were  most  sympathetic  to  him, 
and  nowhere  did  he  feel  more  at  home  than  amongst 
the  Russians  in  Russia.  Bismarck's  political  methods, 
which  at  first  shocked  German  sentimentalism,  have 
made  her  great,  and,  owing  to  the  assiduous  and 
somewhat  uncritical  Bismarck  cult  which  is  carried 
on  in  that  country,  these  methods  have  become  in 
German  eyes  the  natural  and  classical  methods  of 
German  statecraft  and  diplomacy. 

The  East  Prussian  squires  have  always  been  con- 
sidered to  be  the  chief  pillars  of  the  throne,  and 
they  occupy  the  most  important  official  positions  in 
Prussia  and  in  Germany.  Consequently,  it  is  only 
natural  that,  when  the  question  of  acquiring  colonial 
possessions  came  to  the  front,  through  the  action  of 
the  present  Emperor,  Prusso-German  officialdom  turned 
instinctively  to  those  means  which  had  proved  so 
eminently  successful  in  the  past  under  Bismarck.  It 
did  so  the  more  readily  as  to  the  Prusso-German 
official,  who  has  grown  up  in  feudalistic  ideas,  the 
liberal  Anglo-Saxon  institutions  are  as  hateful  as  they 
are  to  the  Russian  official,  for  the  spreading  of  the 
Democratic  idea  threatens  to  subvert  the  reign  by 
caste  and  to  destroy  the  privileged  position  of  bureau- 
cracy. To  the  German  or  Russian  patriot,  who  looks 
back  upon  the  glorious  history  of  his  country  by 
conquest  from  the  small  beginnings  made  by  the 


120  MODERN   GERMANY 

Hohenzollerns  and  the  Ruriks,  the  continued  ex- 
pansion of  his  country  by  conquest  seems  as  natural 
and  as  legitimate  as  does  expansion  by  peaceful  means 
to  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  to  him  the  sword  is  not 
the  ultima  ratio  Regis,  but  the  usual  and  natural 
means  of  expansion  and  nationalisation. 

It  is,  unfortunately,  only  too  true  that  the  late 
anti-British,  as  well  as  the  late  anti-American,  move- 
ment in  Germany  was  not  a  spontaneous  outburst 
of  irresponsible  popular  opinion,  as  it  has  been  de- 
scribed by  the  inspired  part  of  the  German  press  and 
by  the  Germanophil  part  of  the  British  press,  but  an 
agitation  which  was  kindled,  fanned,  and  infuriated, 
so  that  at  last  it  got  quite  beyond  control,  by  those 
who  now  explain  it  as  having  been  an  irresponsible 
and  spontaneous  outburst  of  popular  passion.  The 
anti-British,  as  well  as  the  anti-American,  movement 
directly  emanated  from  the  Government  and  those 
near  it,  and  was  assisted  by  the  intellectual  leaders 
of  the  nation  at  the  Universities.  It  was  not  caused 
by  sympathy  with  the  Boers  or  the  Spaniards,  but 
solely  by  the  appetites  and  ambitions  of  the  German 
colonial  enthusiasts. 

In  considering  the  opinions  expressed  by  leading 
Germans  on  German  colonial  expansion  and  on  Anglo- 
Saxon  countries,  the  fact  that  those  opinions  are  by 
no  means  merely  the  private  opinions  of  irresponsible 
private  citizens  should  never  be  lost  sight  of.  The 
rigorous  discipline  which  Germany  enforces  on  her 
citizens  is  doubly  rigorous  in  respect  of  officials  and 
officers  both  on  active  service  and  on  the  retired 
list.  An  opinion  unfavourable  to  the  Government  or 
to  a  measure  taken  by  the  Government,  even  though 
it  be  privately  expressed  by  an  official  or  an  officer, 
will,  if  reported  to  his  superior,  bring  on  him  severe 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  121 

"  disciplinary  "  punishment,  or  even  dismissal.  The 
Government  can  also  bring  considerable  pressure  to 
bear  upon  the  nominally  independent  University  pro- 
fessors, who  all  thirst  after  preferment  by  the  State, 
titles,  and  decorations.  Consequently,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  publicly  expressed  opinions  of  acting  and 
retired  officials  and  officers,  and  of  the  University 
professors,  with  regard  to  German  colonial  policy  and 
Anglo-Saxon  nations  were  on  the  whole  approved  of 
and  endorsed  by  the  Government. 

The  anti-Anglo-Saxon  agitation  by  German  pro- 
fessors should  not  be  taken  too  lightly,  for  German 
professors  have  in  the  past  played  a  great  part  in 
German  history.  The  renascence  of  Prussia  after  her 
collapse  in  1806-1807  was  largely  due  to  the  patriotic 
activity  of  the  German  professors,  among  whom  pro- 
fessors Arndt,  Fichte,  and  Niebuhr  were  most  promi- 
nent, and  the  unification  of  the  German  Empire  was 
their  ideal  and  constant  thought  long  before  the 
advent  of  Bismarck,  though  they  intended  to  attain 
it  by  methods  less  vigorous  than  those  of  blood  and 
iron.  The  old  national  Parliament  of  Frankfort  and 
the  German  fleet  of  1848  are  witnesses  to  their  aims. 
Therefore  professorial  utterances  on  matters  of  policy 
should  not  be  dismissed  as  being  only  "  irresponsible 
professors'  talk."  The  professors  are  a  great  power 
in  Germany. 

German  politicians  and  German  colonial  enthusiasts 
think  very  highly  of  the  value  of  tropical  colonies, 
but  the  acquisition  of  settlement  colonies  in  a  tem- 
perate zone  is  their  principal  aim  and  ambition, 
because  these  would  afford  an  outlet  to  the  rapidly 
increasing  German  population.  Seeing  that  most 
habitable  and  thinly-populated  lands  over  sea  are  in 
Anglo-Saxon  hands,  official  and  unofficial  Germany 


122  MODERN    GERMANY 

have  been  seriously  considering  the  question  whether 
it  would  be  possible  to  wrest  suitable  territories  from 
Great  Britain  or  America.  In  making  their  plans 
for  colonial  expansion  and  surveying  their  chances 
against  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  the  Germans  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  Great  Britain  is  a  senile 
nation  which  is  declining,  and  that  the  United  States 
are  a  young  and  vigorous  nation,  whose  political 
future  and  military  potentialities  seem  unlimited 
unless,  indeed,  their  progress  be  arrested  by  force. 
The  plans  of  the  colonial  enthusiasts,  and  probably 
of  official  Germany  as  well,  are  shaped  in  accordance 
with  these  views. 

The  official  and  semi-official  publications  of  Ger- 
many are  of  course  very  careful  not  to  reveal  Ger- 
many's ultimate  aims  as  a  world  power,  which  can 
only  be  gauged  from  the  opinions  and  hopes  ex- 
pressed by  persons  who  move  in  well-informed  circles. 
Those  ultimate  aims  which  are  in  everybody's  mouth 
in  Germany  are  expressed  with  delightful  candour  in 
a  pamphlet,  "  Die  Abrechnung  mit  England,"  by  C. 
Eisenhart,  Munich,  1900.  In  this  book  we  are  shown 
how  Germany,  with  the  help  of  her  new  fleet,  first 
destroys  the  navy  of  Japan  and  gains  a  footing  in 
the  East;  how  afterwards,  whilst  Great  Britain  is 
crippling  Russia  in  Asia  for  the  convenience  of  Ger- 
many, she  destroys  the  British  fleet ;  and,  lastly,  how 
the  "  insolence "  of  the  United  States  is  punished 
by  their  complete  defeat,  Germany's  victories  re- 
sulting in  the  acquisition  of  the  best  Anglo-Saxon 
colonies,  including  Australia,  and  in  Germany's  para- 
mountcy  over  Anglo-Saxondom  the  world  over.  To 
this  writer,  as  to  many  others,  German  world  policy 
is  synonymous  with  German  world  supremacy  and 
German  domination  over  the  entire  globe.  Another 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  123 

candid  writer,  who,  however,  either  does  not  see  as 
far  as  Mr.  Eisenhart,  or  who  does  not  care  to  make 
known  to  the  world  the  whole  of  his  views,  from 
political  considerations,  says  in  his  book,  "  Deutsch- 
land  beim  Beginn  des  Zwanzigsten  Jahrhunderts," 
Berlin,  1900  : — 

"  We  consider  a  great  war  with  England  in  the  twentieth 
century  as  quite  inevitable,  and  must  strain  every  fibre  in 
order  to  be  prepared  to  fight  that  war  single-handed.  The 
experience  of  all  time  shows  that  colonial  empires  are  more 
fragile  and  less  enduring  than  continental  empires.  We  do 
not  require  a  fleet  against  France  or  Russia,  let  them  even 
ravage  our  coasts  in  case  of  a  war.  We  require  a  fleet  only 
against  England." 

In  a  similar  strain  the  Koloniale  Zeitschrift  writes 
on  the  1 8th  January  1900  : — 

"  The  old  century  saw  a  German  Europe  ;  the  new  one 
shall  see  a  German  world.  To  attain  that  consummation  two 
duties  are  required  from  the  present  German  generation ;  to 
keep  its  own  counsel  and  to  create  a  strong  naval  force." 

Again,  on  the  28th  March  1900,  the  same  journal 
says : — 

"  The  nineteenth  century  was  not  the  German  century ; 
it  was  the  Prussian  century.  In  the  history  of  the  world  the 
twentieth  century  will  be  called  the  German  century." 

In  a  leading  article  entitled  "  German  World 
Policy,"  the  Deutsches  Wochenblatt  writes  on  Februarv 
ist,  1899  : — 

"  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
next  great  war  Russia  will  take  Constantinople.  ...  It  is 
possible  that  a  general  war  against  England  will  come  before 
the  breakdown  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  ...  If  Russia 
attracts  to  herself  the  Slavonic  peoples  round  the  Danube, 
our  way  via  Salonika  towards  Asia  Minor  and  Suez  will  be 
lost  for  all  time.  .  .  .  Our  motto  should  be  :  With  the  whole 
Continent  against  England  ;  with  Austria  against  Russia  when 
the  time  comes." 


124  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  Teutonicus "  writes  in  the  same  journal  on 
August  igth,  1899  : — 

"  Our  adversaries  in  a  naval  war  would  probably  be  our 
Samoa  partners  (the  United  States  and  Great  Britain).  .  .  . 
Now,  as  ever,  the  existence  of  our  fleet  depends  upon  the 
good  will  of  England.  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  North 
Sea  will  be  the  theatre  of  war  where  our  fate  will  be  decided, 
whether  we  fight  for  our  interest  in  the  China  Seas  or  on  the 
eastern  coast  of  America.  Consequently,  in  a  future  naval 
war,  our  North  Sea  fleet  and  our  army  of  embarkation  would 
be  mobilised  at  the  moment  when  the  English  Mediterranean 
fleet  should  effect  a  suspicious  movement." 

These  utterances  are  more  than  the  bombastic 
rodomontades  of  fantastical  sensation-mongers,  for 
the  authors  of  them  have  palpably  taken  their  cue 
from  the  no  less  unmistakable  though  slightly  more 
diplomatically  expressed  utterances  of  the  Emperor, 
who  set  the  ball  rolling  and  gave  to  the  colonial 
movement  its  aggressive  character  by  pointing  out 
that  German  colonial  ambitions  could  only  be  satis- 
fied after  Germany  had  secured  the  supremacy  on  the 
ocean — that  is,  at  the  cost  of  Anglo-Saxon  countries. 
As  far  back  as  the  24th  April  1897,  William  II.  said 
in  Cologne  at  a  banquet :  "  Neptune  with  the  trident 
is  a  symbol  for  us  that  we  have  new  tasks  to  fulfil 
since  the  empire  has  been  welded  together.  Every- 
where we  have  to  protect  German  citizens,  every- 
where we  have  to  maintain  German  honour :  that 
trident  must  be  in  our  fist !  "  On  other  occasions 
his  Majesty  coined  the  winged  words,  "  Our  future 
lies  upon  the  water."  "  Without  the  consent  of 
Germany's  ruler  nothing  must  happen  in  any  part 
of  the  world."  "  May  our  Fatherland  be  as  powerful, 
as  closely  united,  and  as  authoritative,  as  was  the 
Roman  Empire  of  old,  in  order  that  the  old  '  Civis 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  125 

Romanus  sum '  be  replaced  by  '  I  am  a  German 
citizen  '  !  " 

On  the  i8th  of  October  1899,  his  Majesty  made 
a  speech  in  which  he  said,  "  We  are  in  bitter  need 
of  a  strong  German  navy.  ...  If  the  increase  de- 
manded during  the  first  years  of  my  reign  had  not 
been  continually  refused  to  me  in  spite  of  my  pressing 
entreaties  and  warnings,  for  which  I  have  even  ex- 
perienced derision  and  ridicule,  how  differently  should 
we  be  able  to  further  our  flourishing  commerce,  and 
our  interests  over  sea."  It  can  hardly  be  doubted 
that  the  Emperor's  bitterness  at  his  inability  to 
"  further  our  interests  over  sea  "  was  caused  by  the 
political  situation  in  South  Africa.  At  the  time  when 
he  was  speaking  the  Boer  ultimatum  had  been  de- 
spatched only  nine  days,  and  a  strong  German  fleet, 
had  it  then  existed,  might  no  doubt  have  been  able 
to  further  "  the  German  interest  in  the  Transvaal  as 
an  independent  State."  On  the  ist  of  January  1900, 
the  Emperor  William  announced  in  a  speech  his 
determination  to  possess  an  overwhelmingly  strong 
navy,  in  the  following  words  :  "As  my  grandfather 
reorganised  the  army,  so  I  shall  reorganise  my  navy, 
without  flinching  and  in  the  same  way,  so  that  it 
will  stand  on  the  same  level  as  my  army,  and  that, 
with  its  help,  the  German  Empire  shall  reach  the 
place  which  it  has  not  yet  attained." 

It  may  be  objected  that  these  and  similar  utter- 
ances of  his  Majesty  were  the  spontaneous  and  ill- 
considered  private  opinions  of  a  private  man  who 
happens  to  be  the  head  of  the  State,  not  pronuncia- 
mientos  deliberately  launched  by  the  head  of  the 
Empire  ;  that  they  were  in  fact  not  sanctioned  by 
the  official  representatives  of  German  policy,  and, 
therefore,  devoid  of  political  significance.  People 


126  MODERN   GERMANY 

who  express  such  views  are  evidently  ignorant  of 
the  far-reaching,  hay,  almost  unlimited,  political 
power  vested  in  the  German  Emperor  under  the 
German  Constitution,  and  are  not  aware  that 
William  II.  is  virtually  his  own  Chancellor. 

Similar  views  to  those  pronounced  by  the  German 
Emperor  were  also  uttered  by  his  responsible  ministers. 
For  instance,  on  the  day  of  the  disaster  at  Magers- 
fontein,  the   nth  of  December  1899,  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Prince  Biilow,  said  in  the 
Reichstag  in  support  of  an  immensely  increased  naval 
programme  :    "  The  necessity  to  strengthen  our  fleet 
arises  out  of  the  present  state  of  the  world,  and  out 
of  the  circumstances  of  our  over-sea  policy.     Only 
two  years  ago,  no  one  would  have  been  able  to  foresee 
in  which  way  things  would  start  moving.     It  is  urgent 
to  define  the  attitude  which  we  have  to  take  up  in 
view  of  what  is  happening.  .  .  .  We  must  create  a 
fleet    strong    enough    to    exclude    attack    from    any 
Power."     Again,    a   fortnight    after   the    disaster    of 
Spion  Kop,  Admiral  Tirpitz,  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  Imperial  Navy,  spoke  thus  :    "  We  do  not 
know  what  adversary  we  may  have  to  face.     We  must 
therefore  arm  ourselves,  with  a  view  to  meeting  the 
most  dangerous  naval  conflict  possible"     Prince  Biilow 
said  on  the  I2th  of  June  1900,  "  It  is  necessary  that 
Germany  should  be  strong  enough  at  sea  to  maintain 
German   peace,  German  honour,  and   German  pros- 
perity,  all  the   world   over."       In   all   these   official 
speeches  a  distinct  hint  was  conveyed  as  to  the  pro- 
bability of  a  conflict  with  Great  Britain,  from  whom 
the  supremacy  at  sea  was  to  be  wrested,  and    the 
regret  was  guardedly  expressed  that  Germany  could 
not  turn  the  British  difficulties  and  disasters  in  South 
Africa  to  account,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  her  fleet. 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  127 

That  the  German  Emperor's  phrase,  "  That  trident 
must  be  in  our  fist,"  was  not  merely  a  metaphor 
spontaneously  born  from  banquet-heated  enthusiasm, 
but  the  deliberate  statement  of  a  well-considered 
policy,  may  be  seen  from  the  dry,  matter-of-fact 
preamble  to  the  German  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  which 
says  :  "  Germany  must  have  a  fleet  of  such  strength 
that  a  war  against  the  mightiest  Power  would  involve 
risks  threatening  the  supremacy  of  that  Power."  Some 
time  ago  Mr.  Bassermann,  the  leader  of  the  Liberal 
Party  in  the  German  Reichstag,  thought  it  necessary 
to  endorse  also,  on  behalf  of  his  party,  the  official 
utterances  quoted  in  the  foregoing,  and  said  at  the 
Liberal  Party  Congress  on  the  I3th  October  1903  : 
"  In  our  attitude  towards  England  we  must  keep 
cool,  and,  until  we  have  a  strong  fleet,  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  let  ourselves  be  drawn  into  a  hostile 
policy  towards  her.  .  .  .  The  development  of  the 
United  States  of  North  America  and  their  desire  for 
expansion  is  likewise  a  lesson  for  us  not  to  be  for- 
getful of  our  armaments,  especially  at  sea." 

Bearing  in  mind  the  dependence  of  German  public 
opinion  upon  the  views  of  the  Emperor  and  his 
Government,  it  need  hardly  be  asserted  that  the 
official  and  authoritative  utterances  cited  above  were 
carefully  weighed  and  well-considered,  and  that  official 
statements  such  as  these  were  responsible  for  the 
less  veiled,  but  more  forcible,  views  expressed  in 
"  Die  Abrechnung  mit  England,"  "  Deutschland  beim 
Beginn  des  Zwanzigsten  Jahrhunderts,"  the  Koloniale 
Zeitschrift,  the  Deutsches  Wochenblatt,  and  hosts  of 
others,  and  that  the  violent  anti-British  campaign 
had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  German  sympathy 
with  the  Boers. 

Some  years  ago,  M.  E.  Lockroy,  a  man  of  great 


128  MODERN   GERMANY 

ability  and  of  sound  judgment,  who  has  been  three 
times  Minister  of  Marine  in  France,  visited  Germany 
and  was  allowed  to  inspect  the  German  fleet  and 
dockyards,  even  to  the  smallest  details.  That  this 
permission  was  granted  to  Germany's  "  hereditary 
enemy  "  seems  astonishing,  unless  we  bear  in  mind 
that  the  numerous  advances  to  France,  latterly  made 
by  the  Emperor  William  II.  and  his  Government,  are 
less  aimed  at  insuring  the  peace  of  Europe,  or  at 
breaking  up  the  Dual  Alliance,  than  at  securing  the 
assistance  of  the  French  fleet  for  the  overthrow  of 
Great  Britain.  This  view  has  repeatedly  been  ex- 
pressed in  Die  Grenzboten,  by  far  the  most  influential 
political  weekly  in  Germany,  which  has  very  fre- 
quently spoken  with  the  authority  of  the  German 
Foreign  Office.  In  view  of  the  close  relations  existing 
between  that  journal  and  the  German  Foreign  Office, 
the  views  expressed  in  it  are  of  exceptional  weight 
and  interest,  and  they  will  consequently  be  occasionally 
cited  hereafter.  On  the  5th  October  1899,  an  article 
appeared  in  Die  Grenzboten,  which  said  : — 

"  All  differences  between  France  and  Germany  benefit 
only  the  nearly  all-powerful  enemy  of  the  world.  As  long 
as  the  French  keep  one  eye  fixed  on  Alsace-Lorraine,  it  is 
no  good  that  they  occasionally  look  at  England  with  the  other 
eye.  Only  when  the  German  fleet  has  a  strength  commen- 
surate with  her  sea  interests,  will  the  French  seek  our  friend- 
ship instead  of  being  humiliated  by  their  hereditary  enemy." 

M.  Lockroy,  who  might  have  become  an  important 
factor  in  favour  of  a  Franco-German  alliance,  in  the 
event  that  he  should  have  returned  to  the  Cabinet, 
seems  not  to  have  been  left  in  the  dark  about  Ger- 
many's ambitions  by  his  official  German  hosts,  for 
in  his  "  Lettres  sur  la  Marine  Allemande,"  which 
appeared  in  1901,  he  sums  up  his  impressions  about 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  129 

the  purpose  of  the  German  navy  in   the   following 
way  : — 

"  Germany  will  be  a  great  naval  power  in  spite  of  her 
geographical  position  and  history.  Her  claim  to  rule  the 
waves  will  bring  on  a  war  with  Great  Britain  earlier  or  later. 
That  war  will  be  one  of  the  most  terrible  conflicts  of  the 
twentieth  century.  What  its  result  will  be  no  one  can  foretell, 
but  so  much  is  sure,  that  Germany  does  everything  that 
human  forethought  and  the  patience  and  energy  of  a  nation 
can  suggest." 

His  words  evidently  confirm  the  existence  of  the 
wish  of  German  diplomacy  to  form  an  anti-British 
alliance  with  France,  a  wish  which  was  hinted  at 
in  1899  hi  Die  Grenzboten,  and  in  many  other  in- 
spired journals.  This  wish  dictated  also  the  numerous 
personal  advances  made  by  William  II.  to  individual 
Frenchmen,  and  the  political  advances  made  by 
German  diplomacy.  These  personal  and  diplomatic 
advances  deserve  the  greater  notice  as  German  states- 
men were  well  aware  that  France  would  have  been 
found  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  had  the  outcome 
of  the  famous  Kruger  telegram  been  a  war  between 
this  country  and  Germany,  and  therefore  Germany's 
assiduous  advances  to  France  are  most  remarkable 
and  very  portentous. 

The  views  of  the  most  distinguished  and  most 
respected  German  professors  with  regard  to  Germany's 
policy  of  colonial  expansion  at  Anglo-Saxon  cost 
coincide  with  those  expressed  in  "  Die  Abrechnung 
mit  England  "  and  similar  publications,  and  breathe 
the  fiercest  hatred  against  Anglo-Saxon  countries, 
especially  against  Great  Britain,  the  more  immediate 
object  of  Germany's  attention. 

Count  Du  Moulin-Eckart,  professor  of  history  at 
Munich,  wrote  in  his  book,  "  Englische  Politik  und 
die  Machte  "  :— 

I 


130  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  Our  present  relations  with  England  are  similar  to  our 
former  relations  with  Austria.  To  both  nations  we  are 
related  by  race,  by  both  we  have  been  hampered  in  our  progress, 
and  by  both  we  have  been  deceived  times  without  number. 
Time  will  show  whether  co-operation  with  England  is 
possible.  If  it  be  impossible,  a  war  will  become  necessary, 
and  then :  Hail  thee,  Germany  !  May  the  genius  of  a  Bis- 
marck grant  us  then  a  second  Koniggratz  !  " 

Professor  Schmoller,  a  most  prominent  lecturer  on 
political  economy  at  the  Berlin  University,  a  member 
of  the  Prussian  Privy  Council  and  of  the  Prussian 
Upper  Chamber,  gave  a  lecture  in  Berlin,  Strasburg, 
and  Hanover,  which  has  been  largely  circulated  in 
print,  in  which  he  said  ; — 

"  In  various  States,  arrogant,  reckless,  cold-blooded  daring 
bullies  (Gewaltmenschen),  men  who  possess  the  morals  of  a 
captain  of  pirates,  as  Professor  Brentano  called  them  so 
justly  the  other  day,  push  themselves  more  and  more  forward 
and  into  the  Government.  .  .  .  We  must  not  forget  that  it 
is  in  the  freest  States,  England  and  North  America,  where  the 
tendencies  of  conquest,  Imperial  schemes,  and  hatred  against 
new  economic  competitors  are  growing  up  amongst  the 
masses.  The  leaders  of  these  agitations  are  great  speculators, 
who  have  the  morals  of  a  pirate,  and  who  are  at  the  same 
time  party  leaders  and  Ministers  of  State.  .  .  .  The  conquest 
of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  by  the  United  States  alters  their 
political  and  economical  basis.  Their  tendency  to  exclude 
Europe  from  the  North  and  South  American  markets  must 
needs  lead  to  new  great  conflicts.  It  must  also  not  be  forgotten 
how  England  tried  to  wreck  our  Zollverein,  how  she  tried  to 
prevent  us  from  conquering  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  how 
anti-German  she  was  in  1870.  .  .  .  These  bullies  (Gewalt- 
menschen), these  pirates  and  speculators  d  la  Cecil  Rhodes, 
act  like  poison  within  their  State.  They  buy  the  press, 
corrupt  ministers  and  the  aristocracy,  and  bring  on  wars  for 
the  benefit  of  a  bankrupt  company,  or  for  the  gain  of  filthy 
lucre.  Where  they  govern  modesty  and  decency  disappear, 
as  do  honesty  and  respect  for  justice.  Legitimate  business 
cannot  maintain  itself,  and  all  classes  of  society  are  exploited 
and  ill-used  by  a  small  circle  of  capitalistic  magnates,  stock- 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  131 

jobbers,  and  speculators.  .  .  .  We  mean  to  extend  our  trade 
and  industries  far  enough  to  enable  us  to  live  and  sustain 
a  growing  population.  We  mean  to  defend  our  colonies, 
and,  if  possible,  to  acquire  somewhere  agricultural  colonies. 
We  mean  to  prevent  extravagant  mercantilism  everywhere, 
and  to  prevent  the  division  of  the  earth  among  the  three 
world  powers,  which  would  exclude  all  other  countries,  and 
destroy  their  trade.  In  order  to  attain  this  modest  aim  we 
require  to-day  so  badly  a  large  fleet.  The  German  Empire 
must  become  the  centre  of  a  coalition  of  States,  chiefly  in 
order  to  be  able  to  hold  the  balance  in  the  death-struggle 
between  Russia  and  England,  but  that  is  only  possible  if 
we  possess  a  stronger  fleet  than  that  of  to-day.  .  .  .  We  must 
wish  that  at  any  price  a  German  country,  peopled  by  twenty 
to  thirty  million  Germans,  should  grow  up  in  Southern  Brazil. 
Without  the  possibility  of  energetic  proceedings  on  the  part 
of  Germany  our  future  over  there  is  threatened.  .  .  .  We 
do  not  mean  to  press  for  an  economic  alliance  with  Holland, 
but  if  the  Dutch  are  wise,  if  they  do  not  want  to  lose  their 
colonies  some  day,  as  Spain  did,  they  will  hasten  to  seek  our 
alliance." 

Another  distinguished  professor  of  political  eco- 
nomy, Professor  Dr.  von  Schaffle,  wrote  in  the 
Munchener  Allgemeine  Zeitung  on  the  4th  of  Feb- 
ruary 1898  : — 

"  The  progress  of  our  sea  commerce  has  become  so  immense 
that  Germany  must  be  prepared  for  anything  on  the  part  of 
her  rivals.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  The  English,  if 
they  can  summon  up  the  necessary  courage,  will  try  at  the 
first  opportunity  to  give  the  deathblow  to  our  commerce 
over  sea,  and  to  our  export  industries.  The  Transvaal  quarrel 
has  made  evident  what  we  have  to  expect.  Cecil  Rhodes, 
Chamberlain,  and  their  accomplices,  are,  in  this  respect,  only 
types  of  the  thought  and  intentions  of  present-day  England 
towards  new  Germany.  Great  Britain  will  move  heaven 
and  hell  against  the  sea  commerce  of  the  new  German  Empire 
as  soon  as  she  can." 

Another  eminent  scientist,  the  professor  of  political 
economy,  Von  Schulze-Gaevernitz,  wrote  in  the  Nation, 
the  5th  of  March  1898  :— 


T32  MODERN   GERMANY 

"  In  order  to  strengthen  the  sensible  and  peaceable  elements 
in  England,  and  to  confine  commercial  envy  within  harmless 
bounds,  we  require  the  defence  of  a  fleet.  .  .  .  The  British 
Cape  to  Cairo  idea  is  opposed  to  French  and  German  interests, 
but  German  vital  interests  would  be  affected  by  British 
control  of  the  still  undivided  portion  of  the  world  especially 
of  China  and  of  Turkey. 

Then,  referring  to  the  rapid  colonial  expansion  of 
Great  Britain  during  the  last  decade,  he  significantly 
adds  :  "  But  should  in  future  the  day  of  liquidation 
arrive,  Germany  must  have  the  power  to  participate 
in  it." 

Professor  Mommsen,  probably  the  greatest  his- 
torian of  modern  tunes,  wrote  regarding  England  in 
the  North  American  Review  for  February  1900  : — 

"  The  repetition  of  Jameson's  Raid  by  the  English  Govern- 
ment (I  won't  say  the  English  nation),  dictated  by  banking 
and  mining  speculations,  is  the  revelation  of  your  moral 
and  political  corruption." 

The  former  Under-Secretary  of  State,  professor  of 
political  economy,  Von  Mayr-Strasburg,  wrote  in  the 

Miinchener  Attgemeine  Zeitung  : — 

"  Our  national  policy  requires  the  firm  backbone  of  a 
strong  fleet  in  order  to  oppose  with  energy  the  brutal  in- 
stincts of  exporting  countries,  especially  of  those  which 
export  agricultural  produce.  Our  commercial  policy  requires 
it  in  order  to  give  to  our  home  industries  the  certainty  of  the 
continued  supply  of  raw  material  and  of  open  markets  for 
their  exports." 

Hans  Delbriick,  the  distinguished  professor  of 
history  at  Berlin,  and  former  tutor  to  Prince  Walde- 
mar  of  Prussia,  wrote  in  the  North  American  Review 
of  January  1900  : — 

"  England  insists  upon  being  the  only  great  commercial 
and  colonial  power  in  the  world,  and  is  only  willing  to  allow 
other  nations  the  favour  of  owning  small  fragments  as 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  133 

enclaves  wedged  in  helplessly  between  her  possessions.  This 
it  is  which  we  neither  can  nor  intend  to  tolerate.  .  .  .  The 
good  things  of  this  world  belong  to  all  civilised  nations  in 
common.  As  England  is  not  expected  to  give  way  peace- 
ably, and  as  her  great  naval  power  cannot  be  overwhelmed 
by  a  single  State,  the  best  remedy  would  be  the  alliance 
against  her  of  all  her  rivals  together,  especially  of  Russia, 
France,  and  Germany.  .  .  .  Such  is  the  state  of  public 
opinion  in  Germany.  There  is  only  one  person  in  the  whole 
country  who  thinks  otherwise,  and  that  is  the  Kaiser." 

From  the  foregoing  small  but  representative 
selection  of  professorial  opinions  expressed  by  the 
dite  of  the  German  professors,  which  might  easily 
be  increased  sufficiently  to  fill  a  volume,  the  nature 
of  Germany's  colonial  ambitions  and  the  cause  of  her 
fanatical  hatred  against  Anglo-Saxondom,  which  found 
expression  in  the  late  anti-British  movement,  should 
be  sufficiently  clear. 

The  last  phrase  of  Professor  Delbriick,  "  There 
is  only  one  person  in  the  country  who  thinks  other- 
wise, and  that  is  the  Kaiser,"  was  literally  true  at 
the  time  when  it  was  written,  for  the  combined 
agitation  by  the  official  classes,  the  Universities,  the 
entire  German  press,  and  the  Protestant  clergy,  had 
roused  Germany  to  a  frenzy  of  hatred;  and  though 
the  "  poor  Boers  "  were  constantly  in  the  mouth  of 
the  multitude,  the  utterances  of  the  leaders,  like  those 
cited,  make  it  clear  that  the  clashing  of  German 
colonial  ambitions  and  Anglo-Saxon  interests,  not 
German  sympathy  with  the  Boers,  was  at  the  bottom 
of  the  anti-British  propaganda. 

For  the  practical  politician  it  is  not  only  of  the 
greatest  interest  to  be  aware  of  the  existence  of  an 
aggressive,  powerful,  and  therefore  dangerous  current 
of  political  sentiment  that  pervades  a  neighbouring 
nation,  such  as  the  colonial  movement  in  Germany, 


134  MODERN    GERMANY 

with  its  aggressive  anti-Anglo-Saxon  tendency,  but 
it  is  important  also  to  be  acquainted  with  the  ways 
and  means  by  which  such  a  sentiment  is  likely  to 
be  translated  into  action.  In  attempting  to  make 
a  forecast  of  what  Germany  is  likely  to  do  in  order 
to  acquire  colonies,  we  must  learn  from  her  past, 
and  we  must,  before  all,  take  note  of  the  fundamental 
differences  between  German  and  Anglo-Saxon  policy. 

Owing  to  the  rule  of  democracy,  Anglo-Saxon 
diplomacy  works  in  the  full  glare  of  publicity,  and 
cannot  pursue  a  far-seeing,  secret,  or  unscrupulous 
policy,  but  is  forced  to  take  short  views  and  to  act 
honestly ;  whilst  German  as  well  as  Russian  Cabinet 
policy  is  enabled  to  work  with  infinite  patience  and 
foresight,  and  in  absolute  secrecy,  because  it  is  un- 
hampered by  popular  control.  An  example  will 
illustrate  this  point.  Between  1860  and  1863  an 
expedition,  sent  out  by  the  Prussian  Government, 
and  accompanied  by  the  celebrated  geographer, 
Freiherr  von  Richthofen,  explored  China,  Japan, 
and  Siam.  After  the  most  painstaking  investigation 
of  the  Chinese  coast  and  mainland,  Freiherr  von 
Richthofen  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Kiau-chow 
was  in  every  respect  by  far  the  most  valuable  harbour 
of  China,  and  when,  in  1897,  more  than  thirty  years 
after  his  survey,  two  German  missionaries  were 
murdered  in  China,  Germany  immediately  occupied 
Kiau-chow,  which  port  was  certainly  not  selected  by 
coincidence. 

Besides  remembering  the  powerful  and  aggressive 
colonial  ambitions  of  Germany,  and  the  foresight, 
tenacity,  patience,  and  secrecy  of  German  diplomacy, 
we  should  also  bear  in  mind  the  boldness  and  the 
startling  rapidity  of  her  military  action  as  shown 
in  1866  and  1870.  Furthermore,  in  order  to  under- 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  135 

stand  in  what  way  German  colonial  ambitions  may 
affect  her  policy  in  the  future,  we  should  study  the 
effect  of  Germany's  colonial  ambitions  upon  her  foreign 
policy  during  the  last  few  years. 

On  the  5th  May  1898,  a  few  days  after  the  out- 
break of  the  Spanish-American  War,  Die  Grenzboten, 
the  most  influential  political  weekly,  which  is  fre- 
quently inspired  by  the  Government,  wrote,  probably 
not  without  official  sanction  : — 

"  The  number  of  Germans  in  the  United  States  amounts 
to  nearly  twenty  millions,  but  many  of  them  have  lost  their 
native  language  or  their  German  names.  Nevertheless, 
German  blood  flows  in  their  veins,  and  it  is  only  required 
to  gather  them  together  under  their  former  nationality  in 
order  to  bring  them  back  into  the  lap  of  their  mother 
Germania.  The  German  volunteers  will,  of  course,  have  to 
pay  the  heaviest  blood  tax  in  the  war,  as  they  alone  form 
the  warlike  element  of  the  army.  The  promiscuous  mob  of 
Englishmen,  half-breeds,  Irish,  and  negroes,  is  too  incoherent 
and  too  unmilitary  to  show  any  soldierly  qualities.  Neverthe- 
less, Germanism  has  to  take  a  back  seat  in  the  army,  and 
generals'  positions  are  almost  exclusively  in  the  hands  of 
Englishmen. 

"  We  have  to  consider  that  more  than  three  million 
Germans  live  as  foreigners  in  the  United  States,  who  are  not 
personally  interested  in  that  country.  A  skilful  German 
national  policy  should  be  able  to  manipulate  that  German 
multitude  against  the  shameless  war  speculators." 

Had  the  issue  of  the  Spanish-American  War  been 
unfavourable  to  the  United  States,  or  had  the  attempt 
at  forming  an  anti-American  coalition  succeeded,  the 
"  skilful  manipulation  "  from  Berlin  of  the  German 
vote  "  against  the  shameless  war  speculators,"  might 
have  been  possible,  and  might  have  borne  much  fruit 
to  German  diplomacy.  Germany's  miscalculation  as 
to  the  issue  of  the  war,  and  as  to  the  strength  and 
leanings  of  the  German-Americans,  seems  to  have 


136  MODERN    GERMANY 

caused  great  disappointment  in  Berlin.  This  dis- 
appointment appears  to  have  been  responsible  for 
the  reckless  provocation  which  Admiral  Dewey  re- 
ceived from  Admiral  Diedrichs  before  Manila,  and 
which  very  likely  would  have  resulted  in  hostilities 
between  the  American  and  German  fleets,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  timely  presence  of  the  British  squadron 
and  the  determined  attitude  of  its  admiral. 

During  the  South  African  War  the  clashing  of 
German  colonial  ambitions  and  Anglo-Saxon  interests 
became  particularly  marked,  because  in  Africa  German 
colonial  ambitions  were  clearly  defined,  and  had  be- 
come the  ambitions  of  the  nation  and  of  the  popu- 
lace ;  in  the  Spanish-American  War  they  were  vague 
and  hazy,  and  exclusively  the  ambitions  of  German 
diplomacy,  for  to  the  German  masses  the  Spanish- 
American  War  had  little  significance.  Already  in 
1884,  at  the  beginning  of  her  colonial  career,  Ger- 
many attempted  to  gain  a  footing  in  Santa  Lucia 
Bay  with  an  eye  to  the  possibility  of  joining  hands 
with  the  Boer  republics  close  by,  and  of  gaining, 
with  their  help,  supremacy  in  Africa,  but  Bismarck's 
attempt  failed  through  the  incapacity  of  his  son,  who 
conducted  the  negotiations  in  London. 

Undaunted  by  her  first  failure,  Germany  continued 
to  believe  that  her  best  chance  of  acquiring  settle- 
ment colonies  lay  in  South  Africa,  and  worked 
patiently  and  in  silence  for  the  attainment  of  her 
ambition.  The  Jameson  Raid  gave  her  a  rude  awaken- 
ing ;  she  feared  the  absorption  of  the  Boer  republics 
by  Great  Britain  before  either  Germany  or  the  Boers 
were  ready  to  co-operate.  In  his  anxiety  to  maintain 
his  hold  upon  South  Africa,  the  German  Emperor 
sent  his  celebrated  telegram  to  Mr.  Kruger,  thus 
prematurely  revealing  Germany's  innermost  ambitions 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  137 

with  regard  to  South  Africa.  The  existence  of  these 
ambitions  was  still  further  proved  by  Baron  Marschall 
von  Bieberstein's  official  declaration  that  "  the  con- 
tinued independence  of  the  Boer  republics  was  a 
German  interest." 

By  the  Emperor's  impetuousness,  Germany's  ulti- 
mate aims  regarding  South  Africa  were  clearly  dis- 
closed to  Great  Britain,  a  mistake  which  Bismarck 
would  never  have  committed,  and  the  Kruger  telegram 
and  the  attitude  of  the  semi-official  press  left  the 
German  nation  with  the  erroneous  impression  that 
the  British  Government  had  been  behind  Jameson, 
and  that  the  Emperor's  veto  had,  once  and  for  all, 
put  an  end  to  the  aggressive  plans  of  Great  Britain. 
Thus  misled,  it  was  not  unnatural  that  the  Germans 
believed  themselves  to  be  the  masters  of  the  situation 
in  South  Africa,  and  that  the  German  press  constantly 
advocated  the  expulsion  of  Great  Britain  from  that 
country.  For  instance,  on  the  4th  July  1895,  a 
few  months  after  the  Jameson  Raid,  Die  Grenzboten 
wrote : — 

"  For  us  the  Boer  States,  with  the  coasts  that  are  their 
due,  signify  a  great  possibility.  Their  absorption  into  the 
British  Empire  would  mean  the  blocking  up  of  our  last  road 
towards  an  independent  agricultural  colony  in  a  temperate 
clime.  Will  England  obstruct  our  path  ?  If  Germany  shows 
determination,  Never  !  " 

After  surveying  the  globe,  official  Germany  had 
evidently  come  to  the  conclusion  that  South  Africa 
would  be  an  ideal  colony  for  her,  more  desirable  even 
than  South  Brazil,  and  that  the  most  natural  way 
to  acquire  it  would  be  to  wrest  it  out  of  British  hands 
with  the  help  of  the  Boers.  Die  Grenzboten  wrote 
on  the  I5th  April  1897  : — 


£38  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  The  possession  of  South  Africa  offers  greater  advantages 
in  every  respect  than  the  possession  of  Southern  Brazil.  If 
we  look  at  the  map  our  German  colonies  look  very  good 
positions  for  attack." 

In  a  similar  strain  the  Koloniales  Jahrbuch  for 
1897  wrote  : — 

"  The  importance  of  South  Africa  as  a  land  which  can 
receive  an  unlimited  number  of  white  immigrants  must  rouse 
us  to  the  greatest  exertions,  in  order  to  secure  there  supremacy 
to  the  Teuton  race.  The  greater  part  of  the  population  of 
South  Africa  is  of  Low  German  descent.  We  must  constantly 
lay  stress  upon  the  Low  German  origin  of  the  Boers,  and  we 
must,  before  all,  stimulate  their  hatred  against  Anglo- 
Saxondom.  .  .  .  No  doubt  the  Boers  will,  with  characteristi- 
cally German  tenacity,  retake  their  former  possessions  from 
the  English  by  combining  slimness  with  force.  In  this 
attempt  they  can  count  upon  the  assistance  of  the  German 
brother  nation." 

These  quotations  contain  an  unmistakable  pro 
gramme  and  a  very  interesting  forecast. 

As  the  idea  that  Germany  was  the  heir-presump- 
tive to  South  Africa  was  constantly  discussed  in  the 
German  press,  that  idea  sank  deeper  and  deeper  into 
the  German  mind,  and  the  succession  to  her  in- 
heritance soon  became,  with  the  masses,  an  impending 
event  to  be  looked  forward  to.  It  was  only  a  question 
of  time  when  that  event  would  come  to  pass.  In 
German  eyes  South  Africa  had  become  indispensable 
to  Germany,  it  was  already  half-way  reckoned  as  a 
national  asset  by  the  masses,  and  in  innumerable 
lectures,  books,  and  articles,  its  resources  and  possi- 
bilities were  discussed. 

Whilst  despatches  regarding  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Transvaal  were  being  exchanged  between  Great  Britain 
and  that  country,  the  leading  organs  of  the  German 
press  continued  preaching  the  expulsion  of  the  British 
from  South  Africa,  an  action  calculated  to  strengthen 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  139 

the  resistance  of  the  Boers  against  British  demands, 
and  to  make  them  look  to  Germany  for  protection. 
On  the  i6th  June  1898,  when  war  between  the  Trans- 
vaal and  Great  Britain  seemed  unavoidable,  Die 
Grenzboten  wrote  : — 

"  The  existence  of  the  Boer  States  makes  it,  perhaps, 
possible  to  regain  the  lost  colony,  including  Delagoa  Bay. 
Here  in  the  north  of  Cape  Colony  a  well-considered  German 
policy  must  be  pursued,  and  the  Emperor's  telegram  to 
Kruger  has  already  demonstrated  our  firm  will  to  return  the 
Gladstonian  '  hands  off '  to  the  English.  The  possession  of 
the  natural  harbour  of  Delagoa  Bay  is  a  vital  condition  for  the 
Low  German  States  in  South  Africa.  Without  Low  Ger- 
manism in  South  Africa  our  colonies  are  worth  nothing  as 
settlements.  Our  future  is  founded  upon  the  victory  of 
Low  Germanism,  and  upon  the  expulsion  of  the  English 
from  South  Africa,  where,  even  in  Cape  Colony,  they  are 
still  in  the  minority.  The  prosperity  of  our  South  African 
colonies,  which  singly  are  worth  as  little  as  Cameroon  and 
Togo,  depends  upon  the  possibility  of  connecting  those  two 
colonies,  whereby  England  will  be  confined  to  the  south, 
and  the  dream  of  a  great  British  colonial  empire  from  the 
Cape  to  Cairo  will  vanish." 

If  we  look  at  the  South  African  question  from 
the  German  point  of  view,  and  remember  how  German 
diplomacy  had  plotted  and  laboured  for  the  acquisition 
of  South  Africa  for  fifteen  years  and  more,  how  the 
telegram  and  the  speeches  of  William  II.  and  the  atti- 
tude and  propaganda  of  the  German  press  had  created 
the  universal  belief  in  Germany  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  move  in  South  Africa  without  Germany's 
consent,  and  that  Germany's  influence  there  was  be- 
coming paramount,  we  can  understand  with  what 
dismay  and  exasperation  the  outbreak  of  the  South 
African  War  and  the  prospect  of  seeing  the  Boer 
States  absorbed  by  Great  Britain  was  greeted  by  the 
Geiman  people. 


140  MODERN   GERMANY 

The  disappointment  felt  in  German  official  circles 
was  no  less  keen,  and,  not  unnaturally,  the  question 
suggested  itself  whether  Great  Britain's  progress  in 
South  Africa  might  not  be  stopped  by  force.  Re- 
membering her  failure  to  form  a  coalition  against 
Great  Britain  in  1895,  and  against  the  United  States 
in  1898,  Germany  found  herself  isolated  and  unable 
to  save  South  Africa  for  herself.  The  large  naval 
programme  of  1898,  providing  for  seventeen  battle- 
ships, &c.,  coincided  with  the  Spanish- American  War. 
Similarly,  the  outbreak  of  the  South  African  War 
coincided  with  the  German  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  pro- 
viding for  a  further  huge  increase.  Smarting  under 
the  sense  of  her  impotence  to  act  single-handed  against 
Great  Britain,  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  was  brought 
forward,  which  was  to  provide  a  fleet  of  such  strength 
that,  according  to  the  preamble  of  the  Bill,  "  a  war 
against  the  mightiest  naval  power  would  involve 
risks  threatening  the  supremacy  of  that  power." 
That  fleet  was  to  cost  about  £100,000,000.  In 
spite  of  that  staggering  amount,  the  Navy  Bill  was 
rapidly  passed,  for  its  object  to  destroy  the  power 
of  Great  Britain  was  greeted  with  delight  by 
the  nation,  and  with  hysterical  jubilation  by  the 
masses.  At  last  Great  Britain  was  to  be  brought  to 
her  knees. 

It  has  been  asserted  in  this  country  that  the 
powerful  Social  Democratic  Party  might  prove  an 
effective  obstacle  to  the  execution  of  Germany's 
colonial  ambitions,  because  that  party  disapproved 
of  the  Navy  Bill  and  voted  against  it.  However, 
though  the  representatives  of  Labour  objected  to  the 
Navy  Bill,  they  objected  neither  to  the  prospective 
humiliation  of  Great  Britain  nor  to  the  acquisition 
of  foreign  markets  by  conquest.  The  following  lines 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  141 

from  the  Sozialistische  Monatshefte  for  December  1899 
faithfully  depict  the  opinion  of  the  German  Labour 
Party  :— 

"  That  Germany  be  armed  to  the  teeth,  possessing  a 
strong  fleet,  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  working  men. 
What  damages  our  exports  damages  them  also,  and  working 
men  have  the  most  pressing  interest  in  securing  prosperity 
for  our  export  trade,  be  it  even  by  force  of  arms.  Owing  to 
her  development,  Germany  may  perhaps  be  obliged  to  main- 
tain her  position  sword  in  hand.  Only  he  who  is  under  the 
protection  of  his  guns  can  dominate  the  markets,  and  in  the 
fight  for  markets  German  working  men  may  come  before 
the  alternative  either  of  perishing  or  of  forcing  their  entrance 
into  markets  sword  in  hand." 

From  this  and  many  similar  manifestations  it  is 
clear  that  no  effective  opposition  against  Germany's 
colonial  ambitions  can  be  expected  to  come  from  the 
ranks  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party. 

In  due  course  the  German  Government  discovered 
the  danger  of  its  somewhat  too  openly  anti-British 
policy,  and,  too  late  in  the  day,  appeared  official 
declarations  that  that  huge  new  fleet  was  required 
for  the  defence  of  the  German  coast  against  Conti- 
nental Powers.  However,  some  of  the  foremost 
German  soldiers  and  sailors  had  already  laid  down 
the  maxim  that  Germany  does  not  require  a  strong 
fleet  for  a  Continental  war,  and  had  given  proof  for 
that  assertion.  Consequently,  the  argument  of  the 
Government,  that  the  huge  new  fleet  was  to  be  for 
the  defence  of  the  coast,  does  not  stand  examination. 
Field-Marshal  von  Moltke,  for  instance,  wrote  in  his 
memorandum  of  1884  :  "  Naval  battles  alone  rarely 
decide  the  fate  of  States,  and,  as  far  as  can  be  fore- 
seen, the  decision  of  every  war  in  which  Germany 
may  be  engaged  lies  with  her  army." 


142  MODERN    GERMANY 

Owing  to  the  peculiar  formation  of  the  German 
coast  her  harbours  are  hardly  assailable.  The  formei 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  navy,  Admiral  von  Stosch, 
wrote  in  his  memorandum  of  1888  :  "  The  North  Sea 
harbours  defend  themselves.  If  the  buoys  are  re- 
moved from  the  endless  sandbanks,  which  change 
their  shape  from  year  to  year,  even  the  most  expert 
pilots  would  not  dare  to  take  a  ship  through  the 
tortuous  channels  "  ;  and  Secretary  of  State  Admiral 
Hollmann  said,  as  late  as  March  1897,  before  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  :  "  We  require  no 
navy  for  coast  defence ;  our  coasts  defend  them- 
selves." It  seems  hardly  likely  that,  in  the  three 
years  elapsing  between  Admiral  Hollmann's  state- 
ment and  the  appearance  of  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900, 
Germany's  military  position  towards  her  neighbours 
or  the  formation  of  her  coasts  should  have  so  materi- 
ally altered  as  to  controvert  the  well-considered  views 
of  her  foremost  military  and  naval  advisers. 

From  the  foregoing  it  should  be  sufficiently  clear 
that  Germany's  new  fleet  has  been  created  for  the 
purpose  of  fighting  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States, 
or  both  nations,  in  the  pursuit  of  colonies  and  of  com- 
merce. It  remains  now  to  consider  her  plans  of 
attack  on  this  country. 

The  German  Generalstab  as  well  as  the  Admiral- 
stab  keep  their  secrets  well,  and  it  would  be  idle 
to  retail  officers'  gossip  with  regard  to  the  aggressive 
plans  of  official  Germany.  However,  a  fair  indication 
of  the  spirit  and  the  intentions  existing  among  the 
highest  German  officers  may  be  found  in  a  remarkable 
article  contributed  to  the  Deutsche  Rundschau  of 
March  1900,  by  General  C.  von  der  Goltz,  an  article 
which  is  all  the  more  remarkable  when  we  consider 
that  General  von  der  Goltz  is  on  active  service.  It 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  143 

should  be  added  that  General  von  der  Goltz  is  the 
reorganiser  of  the  Turkish  Army,  and  one  of  the  most 
talented  of  German  officers,  who  is  to  act  as  general- 
issimo in  case  of  war.  He  says  : — 

" .  .  .  .  We  must  contradict  the  opinion,  which  has  so 
frequently  been  expressed,  that  a  war  between  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  is  impossible.  Great  Britain  is  forced  to  dis- 
tribute her  fleets  over  many  seas  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war, 
and  her  home  squadron  is  surprisingly  weak  in  comparison 
with  her  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  India,  the  Far 
East,  Australia,  the  Red  Sea,  South  Africa,  the  West  Indies, 
and  the  Pacific.  In  that  necessary  distribution  of  her 
strength  lies  Great  Britain's  weakness.  Germany  is  in  a 
better  position.  Her  navy  is  small,  but  it  can  be  kept 
together  in  Europe.  Our  colonies  want  no  protection,  for  a 
victory  in  Europe  would  give  us  our  colonies  back  at  the 
conclusion  of  peace.  With  Great  Britain  matters  are  different. 
If  India,  Australia,  or  Canada  should  be  lost  in  a  war,  they 
would  remain  lost  for  ever.  .  .  . 

"...  For  the  moment  our  fleet  has  only  one-fifth  the 
fighting  value  of  the  British  fleet,  and  Great  Britain's  supe- 
riority over  us  is  striking,  but  when  the  projected  increase  of 
our  fleet  has  been  effected,  the  outlook  for  us  will  be  bright. 
The  British  home  squadron,  with  which  we  should  have  to 
deal,  amounts  to  43  battleships  and  35  large  cruisers.  Even 
if  that  fleet  should  be  increased  in  the  future,  it  would  no 
longer  be  an  irresistible  opponent  to  us.  Numbers  decide  as 
little  on  the  sea  as  they  do  on  land  ;  numerical  inferiority 
can  be  compensated  for  by  greater  efficiency.  .  .  . 

"  As  places  are  not  wanting  where  England's  defences  are 
weak,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  consider  a  landing  in  England 
as  a  chimera.  The  distance  is  short  enough  if  an  admiral 
of  daring  succeeds  in  securing  supremacy  on  the  sea  for  a 
short  time  .... 

"  The  material  basis  of  our  power  is  large  enough  to  make 
it  possible  for  us  to  destroy  the  present  superiority  of  Great 
Britain,  but  Germany  must  prepare  beforehand  for  what  is 
to  come,  and  must  arm  in  time.  Germany  has  arrived  at 
one  of  the  most  critical  moments  in  her  history,  and  her 
fleet  is  too  weak  to  fulfil  the  task  for  which  it  is  intended. 
We  must  arm  ourselves  in  time,  with  all  our  might,  and  pre- 


144  MODERN    GERMANY 

pare  ourselves  for  what  is  to  come,  without  losing  a  day, 
for  it  is  not  possible  to  improvise  victories  on  the  sea,  where 
the  excellence  of  the  material  and  the  greatest  skill  in  handling 
it  are  of  supreme  importance." 

The  existence  of  views  identical  with  those  of 
General  von  der  Goltz  in  the  highest  military  circles 
in  Germany  may  also  have  dictated  the  visits  of  the 
German  fleet  to  the  Irish  Channel  and  the  appear- 
ance of  a  "  Handbook  of  the  South  Coast  of  Ireland 
and  the  British  Channel,"  published  in  1901  by  the 
Imperial  Seewarte,  and  of  a  short  "  English  Military 
Interpreter "  published  in  the  same  year  by  the 
School  of  Artillery  and  Engineering. 

Germany's  policy  is  far-sighted,  and  German 
statesmen  are  as  well  aware  of  Germany's  lack  of 
naval  harbours  as  are  her  admirals.  Germany 
possesses  practically  only  two  naval  bases,  Kiel  on 
the  Baltic,  and  Wilhelmshafen  on  the  North  Sea. 
The  harbour  of  Kiel  is  an  immense  natural  basin 
which  could  receive  all  the  fleets  of  the  world ; 
Wilhelmshafen  is  a  very  small  harbour  which  has 
been  dug  out  of  the  mainland  with  infinite  trouble 
and  expense.  Notwithstanding  recent  enlargements  it 
is  far  too  small,  and  it  suffers  under  the  additional 
disadvantage  that,  at  low  tide,  entrance  for  large 
ships  is  difficult.  However,  in  spite  of  all  these 
grave  defects  of  Wilhelmshafen,  not  Kiel  but  Wil- 
helmshafen is  the  chief  naval  base  of  Germany, 
because  of  its  more  favourable  position  for  striking 
westward. 

In  commencing  the  construction  of  her  enormous 
new  fleet,  the  problem  of  finding  a  harbour  advan- 
tageously situated  for  an  attack  upon  Great  Britain 
became  an  urgent  one  for  Germany,  and,  lacking  an 
adequate  natural  harbour  in  the  North  Sea,  she 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  145 

turned  her  attention  to  Holland,  which  abounds  in 
excellent  harbours,  well  situated  for  Germany's  stra- 
tegical purposes.  From  Wilhelmshafen  a  German 
squadron  would  take  about  thirty  hours'  steaming 
to  cross  to  England  ;  from  the  Dutch  harbours  it 
could  cross  in  about  eight  hours,  and  the  danger  of 
failure  in  a  raid  upon  England,  arising  from  delay 
caused  by  a  fog  in  the  Channel,  or  by  insufficient 
accommodation  at  the  base  for  ships,  would  be  re- 
duced to  a  minimum. 

When  it  was  recognised  of  what  enormous  value 
Holland  might  be  to  Germany  in  a  war  with  Great 
Britain,  official  and  semi-official  attempts  without 
number  were  made  in  order  to  entice  or  to  coerce 
her  into  a  closer  union  with  Germany.  Although 
details  of  these  attempts  are  given  in  another  chapter, 
an  abstract  from  a  series  of  unsigned  articles,  which 
appeared  in  Die  Grenzboten  during  July  and  August 
1901,  entitled  "Holland  and  Germany,"  whose  care- 
fully thought-out  and  picturesque  diction  bears  a  strik- 
ing resemblance  to  the  well-known  style  of  the  then 
German  Chancellor  von  Billow,  might  perhaps  here 
be  repeated.  The  writer  speaks  with  the  authority 
of  one  who  possesses  an  inside  view  in  politics,  and 
it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  that  series  directly 
emanated  from  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  The  contents 
of  these  interesting  articles  may  be  summed  up  in 
the  following  way  : — 

"  Holland's  wealth  is  chiefly  derived  from  the  German 
transit  trade.  That  trade  can  be  diverted  by  the  new 
Dortmund-Ems  canal,  which  will  give  to  the  Rhine  an  outlet 
at  Emden.  That  port,  which  lies  on  the  Dutch  frontier,  has 
so  far  been  neglected,  but  is  being  equipped  in  order  to  make 
it  an  efficient  competitor  of  Rotterdam.  If  she  chooses, 
Germany  can  cripple  Dutch  commerce  and  bring  Holland 
on  her  knees  by  diverting  the  Dutch  transit  trade  and  by 

K 


146  MODERN   GERMANY 

imposing  hostile  tariffs.  Consequently  Holland  is  economi- 
cally dependent  upon  Germany,  and  Holland's  economic 
incorporation  with  Germany  in  one  form  or  the  other  is  for 
Holland  an  unavoidable  necessity. 

"  Politically,  Holland  is  threatened  by  other  nations. 
Her  guaranteed  neutrality  is  no  more  than  a  shred  of  paper, 
which  would  prove  worthless  in  war.  Spain  has  been  brutally 
crushed  by  the  United  States ;  Portugal  hangs  like  a  fly 
in  the  spider's  net  of  England,  a  prey  to  her  monopolistic 
mercantile  system.  The  Dutch  will  not  share  the  fate  of 
the  Boers,  but,  if  they  are  not  careful,  they  may  be  caught 
in  British  snares.  '  From  all  these  dangers  incorporation 
with  Germany  is  the  only  salvation.  The  movement  of  naval 
expansion  in  Germany  will  not  end  until  a  German  navy 
floats  on  the  sea  that  can  compete  with  the  fleet  of  Great 
Britain.  Equally  strong  on  sea  and  on  land,  the  world  may 
choose  our  friendship  or  our  enmity.  The  strong  may  take 
their  choice,  but  Holland  will  do  well  to  stand  by  us  in  friend- 
ship, not  so  much  for  our  sake  as  for  her  own  existence.'  " 

When  we  consider  the  spirit  of  irreconcilable 
hostility  against  Anglo-Saxondom  that  pervades  the 
countless  expansionist  manifestations  in  Germany, 
emanating  from  official  and  semi-official  quarters, 
from  professorial  and  mercantile  circles,  from  the 
clergy  and  the  proletariat,  we  cannot  help  being 
struck  by  the  unanimity  of  hatred  and  by  the  un- 
flinching determination  of  Germany  to  erect  a  German 
world  empire  upon  the  rums  of  Anglo-Saxondom. 
Nowhere  is  the  celebrated  word  of  Sir  Walter  Raleigh, 
"  Whosoever  commands  the  sea  commands  the  trade  ; 
whosoever  commands  the  trade  commands  the  riches 
of  the  world,  and  consequently  the  world  itself," 
more  frequently  quoted  and  more  thoroughly  appreci- 
ated than  in  Germany,  and  something  of  Sir  Walter 
Raleigh's  daring  spirit  of  conquest  seems  to  stir  the 
German  masses  and  animate  their  rulers.  History 
alone  will  show  whether  the  parallel  will  end  here,  or 
whether  Germany  is  destined  to  take  the  place  which 


GERMANY'S    WORLD    POLICY  147 

England  took  in  Sir  Walter  Raleigh's  time,  and  to 
succeed  by  force  of  arms  in  becoming  a  world  Power 
at  the  cost  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in 
the  same  way  in  which,  three  centuries  ago,  England, 
by  her  naval  superiority,  succeeded  in  building  up 
her  greatness  on  the  ruins  of  the  then  leading  com- 
mercial and  colonial  Powers,  Spain  and  Holland. 

Germany  has  become  great  by  the  sword,  but 
present-day  Germany,  though  she  would  like  to  walk 
in  the  steps  of  her  greatest  rulers,  Frederick  II.  and 
Bismarck,  disdains  the  advice  of  those  most  successful 
expansionists.  Frederick  the  Great's  counsel,  "  Secrecy 
is  the  soul  of  foreign  politics,"  is  as  little  heeded  by 
Germany's  present  rulers  as  Bismarck's  recommenda- 
tion, "  Not  to  meddle  in  the  affairs  of  foreign  States 
unless  one  has  also  the  power  to  accomplish  one's 
intentions."  By  the  impetuousness  of  her  present 
rulers  Germany's  plans  have  been  prematurely  and 
unmistakably  revealed  to  the  world,  and  if  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations  should  be  so  blind  as  not  to  take  the 
measures  necessary  to  frustrate  those  plans,  of  which 
they  have  received  such  ample  and  such  long-dated 
warning,  they  will  have  fully  deserved  the  fate  of 
Spain  and  Holland. 


CHAPTER   VII 

GERMANY  AND   THE   BRITISH   DOMINIONS — HER 
ATTEMPTS  TO   DEFEAT   IMPERIAL  RECIPROCITY 

GERMANY  strives,  not  unnaturally,  to  weaken  in  every 
way  her  rivals  and  her  possible  opponents.  With  this 
object  in  view  she  induced  France  to  waste  her  strength 
in  Africa,  and  urged  Russia  to  waste  hers  in  Asiatic 
adventures.  Besides,  by  encouraging  their  colonial 
and  expansionist  policy,  Germany  produced  dangerous 
friction  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  and  between 
France  and  Great  Britain — friction  which  brought 
these  nations  repeatedly  to  the  brink  of  war. 

To  Germany  a  firmly  united  British  Empire  is  no 
doubt  undesirable.  Nothing  could  be  more  un- 
welcome to  Germany  than  the  realisation  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain's  policy.  A  pan-Britannic  Customs 
Union,  a  system  of  fiscal  protection  in  Great  Britain 
and  of  mutual  preferences  throughout  the  British 
Empire,  would  seriously  curtail  Germany's  industrial 
exports  to  Great  Britain  and  to  her  daughter  states. 
It  would  injure  and  weaken  the  German  manufacturing 
industries  very  materially,  and  thus  undermine  Ger- 
many's prosperity.  Besides,  the  fiscal  union  of  the 
British  Empire  would  inevitably  lead  to  a  further,  a 
political,  union  of  motherland  and  colonies.  It  would 
bring  about  imperial  federation  ;  it  would  make  the 
British  Empire  an  empire  indeed ;  it  would  make  it 
a  unit  for  defence. 

Germany  aims  at  challenging  Great  Britain's  naval 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     149 

supremacy.  That  intention  was  clearly  expressed  in 
the  introduction  to  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900.  Germany 
is  so  rich  that  she  can,  perhaps,  hope  to  outbuild  the 
cramped  and  over-taxed  islands  of  Great  Britain ; 
but  she  can  never  hope  to  outbuild  the  British  Empire 
with  its  boundless  resources.  The  unification  of  the 
British  Empire  would  destroy  Germany's  naval  am- 
bition. 

Most  Germans  believe  that  they  can  acquire  ex- 
tensive colonies  suitable  for  the  settlement  of  white 
men  only  if  their  fleet  is  so  strong  as  to  be  able  to 
defeat,  or  at  least  to  overawe,  the  fleet  of  Great 
Britain.  Many  Germans  believe  that  the  break-up 
of  the  British  Empire  is  inevitable,  that  the  great 
British  dominions  are  bound  to  follow  the  example 
set  by  the  American  colonies  and  to  secede,  and  they 
believe,  as  I  have  shown  in  another  part  of  this  book, 
that  Germany  ought  to  be  Great  Britain's  heir.  The 
unification  of  the  British  Empire  would  destroy 
Germany's  colonial  ambitions  as  well. 

The  foregoing  considerations  have  shaped  Ger- 
many's policy  towards  Great  Britain  and  the  great 
dominions.  As  Germany  fears  the  unification  of  the 
British  Empire,  she  tries  to  prevent  it.  That  policy 
has  found  its  strongest  expression  in  her  attempts  to 
prevent  the  dominions,  and  especially  Canada,  giving 
a  fiscal  preference  to  the  motherland.  Hence  it  is 
worth  while  to  study  Germany's  attitude  towards  the 
British  imperialist  movement  and  her  policy  towards 
the  British  dominions  by  means  of  the  original  dip- 
lomatic documents  relating  to  her  differences  with 
Canada,  for  these  reveal  most  clearly  Germany's 
policy. 

On  May  i4th,  1897,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  who  at  the 
time  was  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  reported 


150  MODERN   GERMANY 

to  Lord  Salisbury,  who  then  was  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary : — 

"  In  the  course  of  conversation  this  afternoon, 
Baron  von  Marschall  informed  me  that  he  had  tele- 
graphed to  Count  Hatzfeldt  to  make  a  representation 
to  your  Lordship  on  the  subject  of  the  resolutions 
recently  submitted  to  the  Canadian  legislature  to 
grant  preferential  treatment  to  the  products  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  His  Excellency  said  that  Article 
VII.  of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce,  which  he  read  to 
me,  was  so  explicit  that  he  did  not  understand  how 
any  question  could  arise  as  to  the  right  of  Germany 
to  claim  any  preferential  treatment  which  (by  Canada) 
might  be  accorded  to  Great  Britain.  ...  He  would 
be  grateful  to  me  if  I  would  draw  your  Lordship's 
attention  to  the  great  importance  which  the  German 
Government  attached  to  the  question.  .  .  .  Baron 
von  Marschall  said  that  the  (Commercial)  Treaty  of 
1865  had  been  concluded  with  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, and  it  was  to  them  that  Germany  must  look 
for  its  due  execution,  and,  moreover,  Her  Majesty's 
Government  had  the  right  of  over-ruling  Canadian 
legislation." 

The  foregoing  extract  makes  it  clear  that,  when 
Canada  offered  a  fiscal  preference  to  Great  Britain, 
the  German  Government  opposed  the  granting  of  that 
preference,  and  urged  the  British  Government  to 
"  over-rule  "  Canada,  a  step  which  would  not  have 
failed  to  bring  about  a  conflict  between  Great  Britain 
and  that  great  Dominion. 

On  the  same  day,  the  I4th  of  May  1897,  when 
Baron  von  Marschall  spoke  to  the  British  Ambassador 
about  Canada,  the  German  Ambassador  in  London 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     151 

sent,  on  behalf  of  his  Government,  a  letter  to  Lord 
Salisbury,  which  was  very  peremptory  in  tone,  and 
which  was  worded  as  follows  : — 

"  It  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Imperial 
Government  that  the  Canadian  Government  have 
decided  that  from  the  25th  of  last  month  German 
goods  were  to  be  treated  differentially  as  against 
British  goods  on  entering  Canadian  territory,  a  de- 
duction of  duty  of  one-eighth  being  granted  in  the 
case  of  British  goods,  while  this  advantage  is  denied 
to  importers  of  German  goods. 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency,  in 
accordance  with  instructions  received,  that,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Imperial  Government,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  this  measure  is  a  contravention  of  the 
clear  terms  of  Article  VII.  of  the  Treaty  between  the 
Zollverein  and  Great  Britain  of  the  30th  May  1865, 
by  which  we  are  expressly  granted  in  the  British 
Colonies  a  footing  of  equality  for  our  products  with 
those  of  the  mother  country. 

"  Under  these  circumstances  I  have  to  request 
your  Excellency,  in  the  name  of  my  Government,  to 
be  so  good  as  to  cause  steps  to  be  taken  by  Her  Majesty's 
Government  to  put  an  end  to  the  violation  of  the 
Treaty  involved  in  the  action  of  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment. 

"  Trusting  that  your  Excellency  will  inform  me  of 
the  decision  taken  by  Her  Majesty's  Government  in 
the  matter,  I  have,  &c., 

"(Signed)  P.  HATZFELDT." 

In  consequence  of  Germany's  representations  Great 
Britain  decided  to  terminate  the  Treaty  of  Commerce 
of  1865,  which,  according  to  the  official  German  view, 


152  MODERN    GERMANY 

prevented  Canada  giving  a  preference  to  the  mother 
country.  Therefore,  on  July  28th,  1897,  Lord  Salis- 
bury wrote  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  : — 

"  With  reference  to  my  preceding  despatch,  I  have 
to  request  you  to  address  a  note  to  the  German 
Government  informing  them,  in  the  sense  of  the 
present  despatch,  of  the  reasons  which  have  decided 
Her  Majesty's  Government  to  give  notice  of  termina- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce  of  the  30th  May  1865." 

In  explanation  Lord  Salisbury  added  : — 

"  The  German  Government  are  aware  that  for 
many  years  past  the  British  self-governing  colonies 
have  enjoyed  complete  tariff  autonomy,  and  that  in 
all  recent  Commercial  Treaties  concluded  by  Great 
Britain  it  has  been  customary  to  insert  an  Article 
empowering  the  self-governing  colonies  to  adhere,  or 
not,  at  will.  No  such  Article  is  contained  in  the  Treaty 
of  1865  between  Great  Britain  and  the  (German) 
Zollverein,  and  the  consequence  is  that  certain  of 
the  British  colonies,  which  are  all  comprised  within 
its  operation,  find  themselves  committed  by  Treaty 
to  a  commercial  policy  which  is  not  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  the  responsible  colonial  Ministers, 
nor  adequate  to  the  requirements  of  the  people. 

"  Beyond  this,  the  provisions  of  Article  VII.  of  the 
Treaty  of  1865  constitute  a  barrier  against  the  internal 
fiscal  arrangements  of  the  British  Empire,  which  is 
inconsistent  with  the  close  ties  of  commercial  inter- 
course which  subsist  and  should  be  consolidated 
between  the  mother  country  and  the  colonies. 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     153 

ment  find  themselves  compelled  to  terminate  a  Treaty 
which  is  no  longer  compatible  with  the  general  interests 
of  the  British  Empire." 

Negotiations  were  opened  with  the  German  Govern- 
ment, and  on  April  ist,  1898,  Lord  Salisbury  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  : — 

"  With  reference  to  the  negotiations  for  a  new 
Commercial  Treaty,  I  request  that  you  will  inform 
the  German  Government  that  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment regret  their  inability,  under  any  circumstances, 
to  renew  the  provisions  of  Article  VII.  of  the  Treaty 
of  1865,  which  grant  to  Germany  the  same  treatment 
in  respect  of  import  and  export  duties  in  the  British 
colonies  as  is  accorded  to  the  United  Kingdom." 

On  April  4th,  1898,  Lord  Salisbury  received  a  letter 
from  Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  which  was  written  on  March 
the  3ist,  in  which  we  read  : — 

"In  an  interview  which  I  had  with  M.  de  Bulow 
yesterday,  I  asked  his  Excellency  whether  he  could 
now  inform  me  of  the  conditions  under  which  it  was 
proposed  to  temporarily  extend  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  after  the 
existing  Commercial  Treaty  should  have  terminated. 

"  M.  de  Biilow  replied  :  A  provisional  arrangement 
to  continue  most-favoured-nation  treatment  to  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  would  give  rise  to  discussion 
and  might  be  rejected.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  avoid  the  application  of  the 
Autonomous  Tariff  to  English  goods,  which  would 
cause  great  disturbance  to  trade.  The  present  Treaty 
had  existed  for  upwards  of  thirty  years,  and  he  hoped 


154  MODERN    GERMANY 

that,  under  the  circumstances,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment might  consent  to  its  continuance  for  one  year 
more." 

In  May  1897  the  German  Government  had  rather 
peremptorily  suggested  that  Great  Britain  should 
"  over-rule "  Canada  and  disallow  her  granting  a 
preference  to  the  motherland.  In  March  1898  the 
German  Government  went  further,  and  threatened  to 
withdraw  most-favoured-nation  treatment  from  Great 
Britain  and  to  penalise  the  entire  British  trade  with 
Germany  in  the  event  that  the  British  Government 
should  refuse  to  "  over-rule  "  Canada  in  Germany's 
interest.  German  diplomacy  said  plainly  to  Great 
Britain  :  "  You  must  disallow  the  Canadian  prefer- 
ence. If  you  accept  the  preference,  we  shall  penalise 
your  entire  trade.  You  can  keep  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  in  the  important  German  market  only  by 
refusing  to  accept  the  Canadian  preference." 

Happily  Lord  Salisbury  could  not  be  bluffed  and 
browbeaten.  In  reply  to  Germany's  extraordinary 
demand  he  wrote  on  April  gth,  1898,  to  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles : — 

"FOREIGN  OFFICE,  April 9,  1898. 

"SiR, — I  instructed  your  Excellency  by  telegram 
on  the  ist  instant  to  inform  the  German  Government 
that  Her  Majesty's  Government  could  not  in  any 
circumstances  agree  to  the  renewal  of  Article  VII.  of 
the  Treaty  at  present  in  force  between  the  two 
countries. 

"  The  reasons  which  led  Her  Majesty's  Government 
to  denounce  this  Treaty  were  fully  explained  in  my 
despatch  of  the  28th  July  1897.  .  .  . 

"It  is  the  fixed  policy  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment not  to  conclude  in  the  future  any  Treaty  engage- 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     155 

ments  which  would  interfere  in  any  way  with  such 
fiscal  or  tariff  arrangements  as  may  be  determined 
on  between  the  different  parts  of  the  British  Empire. 

"  Your  Excellency  should  explain  to  the  German 
Government  that  it  would  be  incompatible  with  this 
determination  to  renew  even  for  a  time  the  provisions 
of  Article  VII.  of  the  existing  Treaty,  which  would 
limit  and  restrain  the  freedom  of  the  colonies  in  this 
respect." 

The  German  Government  continued  threatening 
Great  Britain  with  penalising  her  trade  in  the  event 
that  the  British  Government  should  accept  Canada's 
proffered  preference.  On  June  3rd,  1898,  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles  wrote  to  Lord  Salisbury  : — 

"  BERLIN,  June  3,  1898. 

"  MY  LORD, — I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  I 
took  an  opportunity  of  speaking  to  Baron  von  Richt- 
hofen  this  morning  on  the  subject  of  the  proposal  as 
to  a  provisional  commercial  arrangement. 

"  Baron  von  Richthofen  said  that  the  German 
Government  were  not  prepared  to  make  any  further 
proposals  with  regard  to  a  provisional  commercial 
arrangement.  The  German  Government  had  pro- 
posed the  prolongation  of  the  existing  Treaty  for  a 
year,  but  Her  Majesty's  Government  had  declined 
this  proposal,  and  his  Excellency  did  not  see  what 
further  proposals  the  German  Government  could  make. 

"  I  replied  that,  in  that  case,  it  would  be  very 
important  if  his  Excellency  could  inform  me  whether 
the  Federal  Council  would  make  use  of  the  power 
which  they  had  obtained  from  the  Reichstag  to  extend 
most-favoured-nation  treatment  to  British  merchan- 
dise after  the  expiration  of  the  Treaty  on  the  3oth 


156  MODERN    GERMANY 

July.  I  explained  that  many  complaints  had  been 
received  at  your  Lordship's  Office  of  the  uncertainty 
which  prevailed  on  this  point,  and  which  was  causing 
considerable  injury  to  trade. 

"  Baron  von  Richthofen  replied  that  he  was  un- 
able to  give  me  an  official  answer  on  this  subject. 
Many  similar  complaints  had  been  received  at  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  from  German  merchants, 
but  the  Federal  Council  had  not  yet  come  to  any 
decision  on  the  subject,  and  it  was,  therefore,  not 
possible  to  give  an  official  answer.  His  personal 
opinion  was  that  no  change  would  be  made  with  the 
United  Kingdom  or  those  parts  of  the  British  Empire 
in  which  the  system,  which  had  hitherto  prevailed, 
continued,  but  that  a  difference  would  probably  be 
made  as  regards  those  parts  of  the  Empire  which  should 
affect  any  change  in  the  system.  As  far  as  he  knew, 
Canada  was  the  only  colony  which  intended  to  alter 
the  system,  and  it  was  his  opinion  that  it  would  be 
in  regard  to  Canada  alone  that  any  change  would 
be  made  by  the  German  Customs  authority." 

Ten  days  later,  on  June  the  i4th,  1898,  Germany 
gave  formal  notice  that  she  would  withdraw  from 
Canada  "  until  further  notice "  the  most-favoured- 
nation  treatment  in  the  German  market  which  she  had 
hitherto  enjoyed.  Canada  was  to  be  punished  because 
she  had  refused  to  grant  on  compulsion  to  Germany 
the  same  terms  which  she  had  voluntarily  granted  to 
the  mother  country.  Viscount  Gough,  the  British 
Charge  d' Affaires,  telegraphed  on  that  day  from 
Berlin : — 

"  The  following  Notification,  dated  the  nth  instant, 
was  published  last  night  in  the  Reichsanzeiger  : — 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     157 

"  '  The  Federal  Council  have  decided,  by  virtue  of 
the  Law  of  the  nth  May  last  relative  to  commercial 
relations  with  the  British  Empire,  that  on  and  after 
the  3ist  July  next,  and  until  further  notice,  all  the 
advantages  which  are  granted  by  the  German  Empire 
to  the  subjects  and  products  of  the  most  favoured 
nation  shall  be  granted  to  the  subjects  and  products 
of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
as  also  to  those  of  the  British  colonies  and  possessions, 
with  the  exception  of  Canada.' ' 

On  June  the  I5th,  the  day  following  this  Notifica- 
tion, Lord  Gough  wrote  to  Lord  Salisbury  : — 

"  I  venture  to  call  your  Lordship's  attention  to 
the  fact  that  this  decision,  being  given  '  until  further 
notice  '  only,  may  at  any  time  be  altered  so  as  to 
exclude  British  colonies  who  may,  before  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  new  Treaty,  grant  preferential  treatment  to 
the  United  Kingdom." 

Notwithstanding  the  formal  declarations  of  Lord 
Salisbury  that  he  would  not  fulfil  Germany's  unreason- 
able demands,  the  German  Government  thought  that, 
at  the  eleventh  hour,  the  British  Government  might 
still  change  its  mind  if  it  were  sufficiently  pressed, 
for  on  June  the  22nd  the  German  Ambassador  in 
London,  Count  Hatzfeldt,  wrote  to  Lord  Salisbury  on 
behalf  of  his  Government : — 

"  As  your  Excellency  will  see  from  the  annexed 
copy  of  No.  27  of  the  German  Reichs  Gesetzblatt,  p. 
909,  the  Bundesrath  determined,  on  the  nth  instant, 
in  accordance  with  the  Law  of  the  nth  May  last 
relative  to  commercial  relations  with  the  British 


158  MODERN   GERMANY 

Empire,  to  continue  to  allow  most  favoured  treatment 
to  the  nationals  and  to  the  products  of  Great  Britain 
and  British  colonies  and  foreign  possessions,  with  the 
exception  of  Canada,  from  the  3ist  July  until  further 
notice. 

"  In  explanation  of  this  resolution  I  venture  to 
add,  by  direction  of  my  Government,  that  they  would 
gladly  have  granted  most  favoured  treatment  to 
Canada  also,  but  in  the  meantime  they  are,  to  their 
regret,  not  in  a  position  to  do  so,  as,  from  information 
which  has  reached  them,  it  must  be  considered  as  cer- 
tain that  in  Canada,  after  the  3oth  July  next,  Germany 
will  not  be  left  in  enjoyment  of  her  present  position, 
but  will  be  treated  differentially  as  regards  the  British 
mother  country.  Should  Canada,  however,  determine 
to  continue,  after  the  term  in  question,  to  accord  Germany 
an  equal  position  with  Great  Britain,  the  Imperial 
Government  would  not  hesitate  to  have  the  decision  of 
the  Bundesrath  subsequently  extended  to  that  colony.  I 
have,  &c.  (Signed)  P.  HATZFELDT." 

Germany's  refusal  to  grant  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  to  Canada  because  Canada  had  given  a 
preference  to  Great  Britain  was  inconsistent,  inasmuch 
as  Germany  had  not  denied  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  to  the  colonies  of  other  countries  which 
had  given  a  preference  to  their  motherland.  There- 
fore Lord  Salisbury  wrote,  on  August  the  I2th,  to 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles  : — 

"...  I  have  received  from  the  Colonial  Office  a 
letter  from  the  High  Commissioner  for  Canada,  in  which 
he  expresses  the  regret  of  the  Dominion  Government 
at  the  decision  of  the  German  Government  to  dis- 
continue most-favoured-nation  treatment  of  imports 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     159 

from  Canada  on  the  expiry  of  the  Zollverein  Treaty 
of  1865,  and  requests  that  representations  may  be 
made  to  the  German  Government  with  a  view  to 
inducing  them  to  reconsider  their  decision. 

"  The  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  observes 
that,  if,  as  stated  by  Lord  Strathcona,  it  is  the  case 
that  Germany  extends  most-favoured-nation  treatment  to 
the  colonies  of  other  countries  which  grant  preferential 
treatment  to  the  products  of  the  metropolitan  country,  it 
is  not  apparent  on  what  grounds  they  refuse  most- 
favoured-nation  treatment  to  the  products  of  the  Dominion. 

"  I  request  that  you  will  ascertain  and  report  the 
practice  of  the  German  Government  in  this  respect, 
in  order  that  I  muy  be  in  a  position  to  decide  whether 
any  useful  object  would  be  attained  by  making  a 
representation  to  the  German  Government  on  the 
subject." 

On  June  24th,  1899,  Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  Viscount 
Gough,  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Berlin  : — 

"...  I  have  to  instruct  your  Lordship  to  request 
the  German  Government  to  furnish  you  with  a  distinct 
statement  of  the  grounds  upon  which  they  claim  to 
distinguish  the  case  of  Canada  from  that  of  the  French 
colonies,  and  also  from  that  formerly  occupied  by  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  colonies  under  the  Treaties 
of  1883  and  1872. 

"  The  fact  that  Canada  has  a  larger  measure  of 
independence  than  the  French,  Spanish,  or  Portuguese 
colonies  does  not  appear  to  Her  Majesty's  Government 
to  have  any  necessary  bearing  on  the  matter.  These 
colonies  have,  in  most  instances,  like  Canada,  inde- 
pendent fiscal  systems,  and  the  grant  by  them  of 
preferential  treatment  to  their  metropolitan  country 


160  MODERN    GERMANY 

appears  not  to  have  excluded  them  from  most-favoured- 
nation  treatment  in  Germany." 

In  consequence  of  the  foregoing  instructions,  Lord 
Gough  made  the  necessary  inquiries,  and  in  reply  to 
these  inquiries  Baron  von  Richthofen  wrote  to  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Berlin  on  August  the  5th, 
1899  :— 

"  The  Federal  Council  of  the  German  Empire  did 
not  extend  to  Canada  the  most-favoured-nation  treat- 
ment granted  autonomously  and  as  an  act  of  exception 
to  Great  Britain  and  the  British  colonies  and  posses- 
sions." 

In  plain  and  non-diplomatic  language  Great  Britain 
was  told  that  she  was  given  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  not  by  right,  not  by  treaty,  not  because 
she  charged  no  duties  on  Germany's  imports,  but 
that  she  was  given  most-favoured-nation  treatment 
"  as  an  act  of  exception,"  one  might  almost  say  as 
an  act  of  favour,  as  an  act  of  grace.  The  threat  of 
penalising  the  trade  of  Great  Britain,  if  Great  Britain 
should  accept  the  preference  freely  granted  to  her 
by  Canada,  was  employed  once  more,  for  in  conclu- 
sion Baron  von  Richthofen  stated  : — 

"  It  cannot  be  expected  of  Germany  that  upon  a 
change  being  made  by  one  party  in  the  state  of  affairs 
which  has  hitherto  prevailed,  she  should  accept  the 
change  without  more  ado  ;  it  is  the  less  to  be  ex- 
pected, as  it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  development  of 
the  commerce  of  the  world,  and  of  the  mutual  relations 
of  trade  and  navigation  between  Germany  and  the 
British  mother  country,  that,  in  the  British  colonies, 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     161 

equal  treatment  should  be  given  to  the  products  of  Ger- 
many and  of  Great  Britain." 

Germany  demanded  that  "  in  the  British  colonies 
equal  treatment  should  be  given  to  the  products  of 
Germany  and  Great  Britain,"  as  if  Germany,  not 
Great  Britain,  was  their  motherland,  and  she  threat- 
ened Great  Britain  with  commercial  war  unless  her 
demands  were  granted.  Great  Britain's  difficulties  were 
Germany's  opportunity.  The  foregoing  extraordinary 
and  unjustifiable  demands  would,  perhaps,  not  have 
been  made  had  not  Great  Britain  at  the  time  been  in 
a  difficult  and  embarrassed  position  owing  to  the  Boer 
War.  It  was  not  merely  by  coincidence  that,  about 
the  same  time,  Germany  repudiated  the  so-called 
"  Yangtse  Agreement,"  which  she  had  concluded  with 
Great  Britain. 

In  further  explanation  of  Germany's  high-handed 
and  overbearing  attitude,  Count  von  Posadowsky 
stated  on  behalf  of  the  German  Government  in  the 
Reichstag  on  May  the  26th,  1900  : — 

"It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  there  should 
be  no  disturbance  of  the  favourable  international 
commercial  relations  now  existing  between  Germany 
and  England.  .  .  .  When  single  British  colonies  deviate 
from  the  present  arrangement  and  refuse  most-fav- 
oured-nation treatment  (to  Germany),  there  are  only 
two  courses  open  :  either  to  apply  the  '  autonomous  ' 
tariff  to  these  single  colonies,  or,  should  a  consider- 
able portion  of  the  British  colonial  empire  differentiate 
against  Germany  as  regards  other  States,  to  utilise 
the  power  granted  by  applying  the  '  autonomous  ' 
tariff  to  the  whole  of  the  British  dominions  in  the 
world  "  (Weltreich). 


162  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany  refused  to  recognise  the  existence  of  the 
British  Empire,  she  refused  to  recognise  that  the 
arrangement  of  inter-imperial  preferences  was  a  purely 
domestic  matter  in  which  she  had  no  right  to  inter- 
fere, and  she  threatened  Great  Britain  once  more  with 
a  customs  war  if  the  colonies  should  be  allowed  by 
Great  Britain  to  give  better  fiscal  treatment  to  the 
motherland  than  to  Germany. 

In  1903  Germany  still  relied  in  her  treatment  of 
the  imperial  preference  question  on  threats,  for  on 
April  the  i6th,  1903,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  wrote  to 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  meanwhile  had  succeeded  Lord 
Salisbury  : — 

"  I  asked  Baron  von  Richthofen  how  matters 
stood  with  regard  to  the  conclusion  of  a  new  Com- 
mercial Treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
His  Excellency  replied  that,  as  regards  Great  Britain, 
he  was  convinced  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty 
in  coming  to  a  satisfactory  arrangement.  The  most- 
favoured-nation  treatment  would,  he  thought,  cer- 
tainly be  prolonged,  but  as  the  South  African  colonies 
had  decided  to  give  preferential  treatment  to  English 
goods,  it  was  now  to  be  considered  whether  they  as 
well  as  Canada  should  not  be  excepted  from  such 
treatment,  and  if  the  Australian  colonies  should  also 
decide  to  give  the  mother  country  preferential  treat- 
ment, a  situation  would  be  created  which  would 
increase  the  difficulty  for  the  German  Government  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag  to  the  conclusion 
of  a  Commercial  Treaty  between  our  two  countries." 

Germany's  threat  to  penalise  Great  Britain's  trade 
unless  she  was  given  the  same  privileges  in  the  colonial 
market  which  Great  Britain  was  voluntarily  offered 
was  not  merely  a  verbal  one,  for  on  the  previous  day, 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     163 

on  April  the  I5th,  1903,  Baron  von  Richthofen  had 
sent  to  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  the  following  most  extra- 
ordinary letter  : — 

"  BERLIN,  April  15,  1903. 

"  The  undersigned  has  the  honour  to  reply  to  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  communication  of  the  2$th  March, 
that  the  Imperial  Government  on  their  part  intend  to 
bring  about  at  the  proper  time  a  prolongation  of  the  Law 
by  which  the  Bundesrath  is  empowered  to  grant  most- 
favoured-nation  treatment  to  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
as  well  as  to  the  British  colonies  and  possessions. 

"  The  Imperial  Government  think,  however,  that  they 
should  not  conceal  the  fact  that  it  appears  doubtful, 
especially  having  regard  to  the  opposition  to  be  expected 
in  the  Reichstag,  whether  this  intention  can  be  realised 
if  Germany  is  differentiated  against  in  important  parts 
of  the  British  Empire,  and  if,  in  particular,  the  report 
is  confirmed  that  German  goods  will  in  the  future  be 
less  favourably  treated  than  British  not  only  in  Canada, 
but  also  in  British  South  Africa. 

"  The  undersigned  avails  himself,  &c. 

"  (Signed)  RICHTHOFEN." 

On  April  the  23rd,  1903,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  wrote, 
with  regard  to  the  foregoing  threatening  note  : — 

"In  an  interview  with  Baron  von  Richthofen  .  .  . 
Baron  von  Richthofen  said  that  it  was  the  action  of 
Canada  in  giving  preferential  treatment  to  Great 
Britain  that  had  brought  about  the  denunciation  of 
the  Treaty  of  Commerce,  and  if  other  British  colonies 
followed  her  example,  and  large  portions  of  the  British 
Empire  were  to  give  preferential  treatment  to  Great 
Britain,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  obtain  the  consent 
of  the  Reichstag  to  the  prolongation  of  most- favoured- 


164  MODERN    GERMANY 

nation  treatment  to  Great  Britain  herself.  His  Excel- 
lency added  that  the  competent  authorities  were  now 
considering  what  measures  should  be  taken  in  conse- 
quence of  the  action  of  the  Canadian  Government. 

"  I  said  that  the  commercial  relations  of  our  two 
countries  were  so  large  that  anything  in  the  nature 
of  a  customs  war  would  do  incalculable  harm  to  both, 
an  opinion  fully  shared  by  his  Excellency,  but  that  I 
fully  believed  that  if  any  serious  damage  were  done 
to  British  trade  by  the  non-prolongation  of  most- 
favoured-nation  treatment,  the  outcry  in  England 
would  be  so  great  that  His  Majesty's  Government 
would  be  forced,  however  unwillingly,  to  take  re- 
taliatory measures." 

The  position  had  become  an  intolerable  one.  From 
May  1897  to  April  1903,  during  six  whole  years,  Ger- 
many had  been  threatening  Great  Britain  to  penalise 
her  trade  if  she  should  accept  the  preference  volun- 
tarily offered  by  her  own  citizens  residing  across  the 
ocean.  Not  daring  to  strike  at  Great  Britain,  Ger- 
many had  actually  penalised  Canada's  trade  with 
Germany.  Her  threats  became  louder  and  louder,  and 
culminated  in  the  extraordinary  note  of  Baron  von 
Richthofen,  quoted  in  the  foregoing,  which  was  sent 
to  the  British  Ambassador  on  April  the  I5th.  At  last 
Lord  Lansdowne's  patience  became  exhausted,  and 
he  sent,  on  June  the  20th,  1903,  the  following  instruc- 
tions to  Mr.  Buchanan,  who,  at  the  time,  acted  as 
Charge  d' Affaires  in  Berlin  : — 

"  FOREIGN  OFFICE,  June  20,  1903. 
"  SIR, — His  Majesty's  Government  have  had  under 
their  careful  consideration  Sir  F.  Lascelles'  despatches 
of  the  i8th  and  23rd  April  last  relating  to  commercial 


GERMANY   AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     165 

relations  with  the  German  Government,  and  more 
especially  to  commercial  relations  between  the  German 
Empire  and  Canada.  .  .  . 

"  It  was  pointed  out  that  Canada  was  extending 
to  Germany  the  same  privileges  as  those  accorded  by 
the  Dominion  to  other  foreign  Powers,  and  would  on 
her  part  be  gratified  to  continue  this  policy.  In  these 
circumstances,  the  Dominion  Government  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  German  Government  would  find  it 
possible  to  alter  their  decision. 

"  After  having  patiently  waited  for  five  years  in  the 
hope  of  coming  to  an  arrangement  with  Germany,  the 
Canadian  Government  decided,  in  April  1903,  that 
they  could  no  longer  allow  the  matter  to  remain  on 
a  footing  so  detrimental  to  Canadian  interests.  A 
clause  was  accordingly  inserted  in  the  Canadian  Tariff 
to  the  effect  that  when  any  foreign  country  treated 
imports  from  Canada  on  less  favourable  terms  than 
imports  from  other  countries,  a  sur-tax  amounting  to 
one-third  of  the  duty  according  to  the  general  tariff 
might  be  imposed.  This  clause  was  general  in  its 
terms,  and  applicable  to  the  goods  of  any  country 
which  might  treat  Canadian  products  unfavourably. 
It  was  applied  immediately  in  the  case  of  Germany, 
and  took  effect  on  the  i6th  of  that  month,  except  as 
regards  goods  purchased  before  the  iyth  April.  In 
the  case  of  such  goods  it  is  to  apply  from  the  ist 
October  next. 

"  During  Sir  F.  Lascelles'  conversation  with  Baron 
von  Richthofen  of  the  2ist  April  last,  his  Excellency 
stated  that  if  the  example  of  Canada  in  giving  a  tariff 
preference  to  the  United  Kingdom  were  followed  by 
other  British  colonies  so  as  to  cover  large  portions  of 
the  British  Empire,  there  would  be  great  difficulty  in 
obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag  to  a  continua- 


166  MODERN   GERMANY 

tion  of  most-favoured-nation  treatment  for  this 
country ;  and  he  further  informed  His  Majesty's 
Ambassador  that  the  competent  authorities  were 
considering  what  measures  should  be  taken  in  conse- 
quence of  the  recent  action  of  Canada,  to  which  I 
have  referred. 

"  This  communication  has  greatly  increased  the 
difficulty  of  the  situation,  and  I  have  now  to  give 
you  the  following  instructions  as  to  the  language  which 
you  should  hold  with  regard  to  this  most  important 
question.  You  should,  in  the  first  place,  remind  the 
German  Government  that  the  Treaty  of  1865  between 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Germany  was  terminated 
by  His  Majesty's  Government,  in  order  that  this 
country  and  her  colonies  might  be  at  liberty  to  make 
such  arrangements  as  might  be  considered  desirable 
in  respect  of  their  mutual  trade.  To  this  policy  His 
Majesty's  Government  adhere. 

"  As  regards  Canada,  the  action  of  the  Dominion 
was  taken  only  after  every  effort  had  been  made  to  secure 
fair  treatment  for  Canadian  produce  in  Germany.  It 
was  only  after  these  efforts  had  failed,  and  Germany 
had  persistently  refused  to  accord  to  Canadian  produce 
the  same  most-favoured-nation  treatment  that  Canada 
accorded  to  German  produce,  that  Canada  was  driven 
in  self-defence  to  measures  of  retaliation.  If  Germany 
will  restore  Canadian  produce  to  the  most-Javoured- 
nation  terms,  His  Majesty's  Government  have  not  the 
least  doubt  that  the  increased  duties  which  have  just 
been  imposed  on  German  goods  will  be  at  once  removed. 

"  Should  the  German  Government,  however,  persist 
in  the  attitude  which  they  have  taken  up  on  this  matter, 
and,  further,  extend  to  the  products  of  other  British 
colonies,  and  even  to  those  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
whose  tariff  is  at  the  present  moment  based  upon  the 


GERMANY   AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     167 

most  liberal  principles,  the  discrimination  which  they 
have  enforced  against  Canada,  a  very  wide  and  serious 
issue  must  inevitably  be  raised  involving  the  fiscal 
relations  of  this  country  and  the  German  Empire." 

Mr.  Buchanan  handed  a  copy  of  the  foregoing 
instructions  to  Baron  von  Richthofen. 

Lord  Lansdowne's  energetic  language  and  Canada's 
determination  to  retaliate  upon  Germany  by  putting 
a  sur-tax  upon  Germany's  imports  into  Canada  proved 
more  effective  than  all  the  arguments  which  had  been 
exchanged  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  in  the 
course  of  six  years.  Germany's  loud  threats  ended 
abruptly,  and  her  diplomats  tried  to  explain  their 
attitude.  Baron  von  Richthofen  stated  in  a  long  and 
involved  despatch  that  Germany  had  been  obliged 
on  technical  grounds  to  act  as  she  had  acted,  and  he 
disclaimed  all  intention  of  interfering  in  the  relations 
between  the  British  motherland  and  the  dominions. 
He  wrote  on  June  the  2yth  to  the  German  Ambassador 
in  London  : — 

"  In  Germany  there  are,  as  is  well  known,  two 
tariffs — the  General  Customs  Tariff,  which,  by  law, 
is  applied  to  all  those  countries  with  which  no  Agree- 
ments to  the  contrary  are  in  force  ;  and  the  so-called 
Conventional  Tariff,  which  comes  into  force  when 
Treaty  arrangements  on  the  subject  are  made,  and 
which  is  purchased  by  concessions  on  the  part  of  the 
various  Treaty  States,  consisting  especially  in  the 
modification  of  numerous  items  in  their  own  autono- 
mous tariffs.  Consequently,  after  the  Anglo-German 
Commercial  Treaty  had  ceased  to  be  valid,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  autonomous  German  Customs  Tariff 
had  to  be  applied  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies. 


168  MODERN   GERMANY 

It  required  a  special  Act  of  the  German  Legislature 
to  make  an  exception  to  the  rule  in  question.  .  .  . 
This  procedure  shows  a  special  desire  on  the  part  of 
Germany  to  meet  the  wishes  of  Great  Britain,  for 
which  there  is  no  example  in  German  legislation  either 
before  or  since.  It  was  caused  by  the  wish  of  the 
Imperial  Government  to  make  their  commercial  rela- 
tions with  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies  as  friendly 
as  possible.  .  .  . 

"  Moreover,  there  is  in  the  German  procedure  —  for 
we  wish  also  to  correct  this  supposition,  which  has 
been  often  repeated  —  no  interference  in  the  relations 
between  mother  country  and  colony.  After  the  expiry 
of  the  Anglo-German  Commercial  Treaty,  Germany 
could  only  choose  whether  she  would  apply  her  General 
Tariff  to  Great  Britain  and  all  her  colonies,  as  accord- 
ing to  German  law  would  have  been  necessary  in  the 
ordinary  course,  or  whether  she  would  limit  the 
application  of  the  General  Tariff  to  those  parts  of  the 
British  Empire  in  which  there  had  been  an  alteration 
of  the  status  quo  affecting  imports  from  Germany.  .  .  . 

"  If  the  English  colonies  are  to  be  in  a  position  to 
follow  out  their  own  customs  policy,  other  countries 
must  be  allowed  to  treat  them  as  separate  customs 
territories." 

In  a  despatch  of  admirable  lucidity  of  July  the 
8th,  1903,  Lord  Lansdowne  replied  as  follows  in  a 
letter  addressed  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  of  which  a  copy 
was  to  be  handed  to  the  German  Government  :  — 


"FOREIGN  OFFICE,  /a/y  8,  1903. 

"  SIR,  —  The  German  Ambassador  left  with  me  on 
the  ist  instant  a  copy  of  the  note  addressed  to  him 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     169 

on  the  27th  ultimo  by  Baron  von  Richthofen  respect- 
ing the  commercial  relations  between  Canada  and 
Germany. 

"  His  Majesty's  Government  fully  appreciate  the 
friendly  tone  in  which  the  note  is  couched,  as  well  as 
the  desire  expressed  in  it  to  arrive  at  a  practical 
solution  of  the  question  at  issue  between  the  two 
countries. 

"  That  desire  is  shared  by  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, and  it  is  only  with  the  object  of  removing  mis- 
apprehensions that  they  offer  the  following  comments 
upon  Baron  von  Richthofen's  statements  :— 

"  They  observe  that  the  exclusion  of  Canada  from 
most-favoured-nation  treatment  in  Germany  is  repre- 
sented as  the  natural  and  inevitable  consequence  of 
the  denunciation  of  the  Commercial  Treaty  of  1865, 
and  complaint  is  apparently  made  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  for  having  suggested  that  this  exclusion 
was  to  be  regarded  as  a  punitive  measure,  or  as  an 
undue  attempt  by  Germany  to  interfere  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  mother  country  with  her  colonies. 

"  His  Majesty's  Government  desire  that  it  should 
be  clearly  understood  that  they  have  no  intention  to 
call  in  question  the  motives  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment. His  Majesty's  Government  are,  indeed,  in  no 
wise  concerned  with  those  motives,  but  only  with  the 
action  of  Germany  and  its  consequences  to  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  British  Empire. 

"  That  action  has  incontestably  had  the  effect  of 
bringing  about  the  loss  by  Canada  of  the  relatively 
advantageous  position  which  she  occupied  prior  to 
1897,  a  loss  which  she  has  sustained  not  because  she 
had  imposed  upon  German  imports  customs  duties 
exceeding  those  to  which  they  were  previously  sub- 


170  MODERN    GERMANY 

ject,  nor  because  she  had  treated  Germany  differently 
from  other  foreign  countries  with  which  she  had 
commercial  relations,  but  because  Canada  had  refused 
to  extend  to  Germany  a  special  concession  made  by 
her  to  the  mother  country,  in  pursuance  of  a  policy 
deliberately  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the 
national  trade  of  the  British  Empire.  It  is  not  dis- 
puted that  Germany  has  the  right  to  regard  this  ques- 
tion from  her  own  point  of  view,  and  to  deal  with  it 
in  whatever  manner  may  best  suit  her  interests. 
There  remains,  however,  the  fact  that  in  the  result 
a  British  colony  has  been  made  to  suffer  not  for  dis- 
criminating against  Germany  in  favour  of  other  foreign 
countries,  but  for  according  preferential  treatment  to  the 
imports  of  the  mother  country.  It  was  in  reply  to  this 
action  on  the  part  of  Germany  that,  in  April  1903, 
the  Canadian  Government  imposed  upon  German 
imports  the  additional  taxation  to  which  reference  is 
made  in  the  German  note.  .  .  . 

"  The  importance  of  the  question,  already  one  of 
the  utmost  moment  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies, 
was  greatly  increased  by  the  intimation  contained  in 
Baron  von  Richthofen's  note  of  the  i$th  April  last, 
enclosed  in  Sir  F.  Lascelles'  despatch  of  the  i8th  April. 

"  Baron  von  Richthofen  apparently  desires  to 
treat  this  intimation,  which  he  describes  as  having 
been  confidentially  made  to  Sir  F.  Lascelles,  as  an 
obiter  dictum  of  no  great  importance.  It  was,  how- 
ever, impossible  for  His  Majesty's  Government  so  to 
regard  it. 

"  The  announcement  made  in  Baron  von  Richt- 
hofen's note,  which  was  not  marked  Confidential,  and 
was  of  the  most  authoritative  character,  seemed  to  them 
at  the  time,  and  still  seems  to  them,  capable  of  no  other 


GERMANY    AND    BRITISH    DOMINIONS     171 

interpretation  than  this  :  that  if  other  British  self- 
governing  colonies  should  follow  the  example  of  Canada 
and  accord  national  treatment  to  British  imports,  the 
German  Government  might  find  themselves  compelled  to 
refuse  not  only  to  those  colonies  but  to  Great  Britain  her- 
self the  treatment  which,  in  view  of  the  liberal  terms 
upon  which  German  imports  are  admitted  to  this  country, 
we  are  entitled  to  expect  upon  the  most  ordinary  grounds 
of  reciprocity. 

"  Whether  such  a  refusal  were  to  be  the  result  of  a 
policy  recommended  to  the  Reichstag  by  the  German 
Government,  or  were  to  be  imposed  upon  the  German 
Government  by  the  Reichstag,  would,  so  far  as  British 
interests  are  concerned,  be  immaterial.  Baron  von 
Richthofen's  intimation  was  regarded  by  His  Majesty's 
Government  as  not  lightly  given  and  not  to  be  lightly 
received. 

"  Such  retaliation  on  the  part  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment would,  in  our  opinion,  not  be  justifiable  in  itself, 
and  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  attitude  which,  as 
we  understand  Baron  von  Richthofen's  argument,  the 
German  Government  desire  to  assume  towards  the  British 
self-governing  colonies.  If  it  be  true,  as  stated  in  the 
note,  that  those  colonies  are  regarded  by  the  German 
Government  as  '  independent  customs  districts  '  which 
foreign  Powers  are  at  liberty  to  treat  as  such,  it  would 
follow  that  no  responsibility  would  attach  to  the 
mother  country  for  their  external  tariff  arrangements, 
and  that  it  would  be  wholly  inequitable  and  illogical 
to  retaliate  upon  the  mother  country  in  consequence 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  colonies  had  made  use  of 
their  opportunities.  This  argument,  however,  although 
it  appears  to  His  Majesty's  Government  a  legitimate 
rejoinder  to  that  of  Baron  von  Richthofen,  is  not  one 


172  MODERN   GERMANY 

on  which  they  desire  to  lay  stress,  for,  so  far  as  the 
present  controversy  is  concerned,  they  have  no  in- 
tention of  drawing  a  distinction  between  their  own 
interests  and  those  of  the  self-governing  colonies.  .  .  . 

"  You  are  authorised  to  make  a  communication  in 
the  sense  of  this  despatch  to  the  German  Government, 
and  to  leave  a  copy  with  Baron  von  Richthofen.  I 
am,  &c.  (Signed)  LANSDOWNE." 

That  despatch  put  an  end  to  the  Anglo-German 
controversy  regarding  imperial  preference  and  to 
Germany's  claim  to  be  treated  by  the  British  colonies 
on  the  same  footing  as  Great  Britain.  Thus  Ger- 
many's attempt  to  step  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  great  dominions  and  to  defeat  imperial  reciprocity 
ended  in  failure. 

I  think  it  was  worth  while  to  rescue  the  Anglo- 
German  correspondence  relating  to  imperial  reci- 
procity from  obscurity.  The  important  documentary 
evidence  given  in  the  foregoing  pages  shows  that  it 
was  Germany's  intention  to  prevent  the  federation  of 
the  British  Empire  on  the  basis  of  preferential  trade 
throughout  the  Empire,  and  that  she  pursued  that 
policy  doggedly  and  determinedly  during  six  years. 
Incidentally  the  correspondence  throws  a  vivid  light 
upon  Germany's  diplomatic  methods,  and  explains  in 
part  Germany's  numerous  failures  in  the  realm  of 
foreign  politics.  Germany's  policy  towards  the  British 
dominions  suffered  from  two  defects  :  it  was  unin- 
telligent, and  at  the  same  time  overbearing.  After 
six  years  of  bluster  the  German  Government  effected 
a  precipitate  and  undignified  retreat  as  soon  as  it 
encountered  that  energetic  resistance  which  it  was 
bound  to  encounter,  and  which,  had  her  diplomats 


GERMANY   AND    BRITISH   DOMINIONS    173 

used  ordinary  foresight,   they  should  have  expected 
to  encounter. 

As  the  unity  of  the  British  Empire  is  not  in  Ger- 
many's interests,  we  must  expect  to  see  Germany 
trying  again  to  prevent  its  unification  should  there 
arise  a  situation  more  favourable  to  Germany's  aims. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

ENGLAND,    GERMANY,   AND   THE   BALTIC 

DURING  many  decades  the  Baltic  was  to  the  average 
Briton  not  much  better  known  than  the  Kara  Sea  or 
the  Sea  of  Okhotsk  is  known  to  him  at  the  present 
moment.  Ignored  in  official  despatches  and  Parlia- 
mentary speeches  and  unvisited  by  British  warships, 
the  Baltic  Sea  seemed  to  be  of  no  interest  to  our 
politicians,  to  the  Government  and  to  the  Admiralty. 
In  fact,  the  Baltic  had  come  to  be  generally  con- 
sidered to  be  a  sea  in  which  Great  Britain  had  no 
political  interest.  Lately  the  Baltic  has  attracted 
some  attention.  In  July  1905,  it  became  known  that 
a  powerful  squadron  of  British  warships  would  visit 
the  Baltic  and  manoeuvre  in  it.  This  news  created 
considerable  excitement  throughout  Germany.  Most 
German  journals  saw  in  that  cruise  a  political  demon- 
stration of  serious  portent,  and  the  most  indiscreet  of 
these  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  the  Baltic  was  by 
nature  not  a  sea  open  to  all  nations,  but  a  closed  sea, 
that  British  warships  had  no  business  in  the  Baltic, 
and  that  it  ought  to  be  converted  into  what  is  tech- 
nically termed  a  'mare  clausum.  Numerous  German 
writers  urged  that  the  States  bordering  on  the  Baltic, 
namely,  Germany,  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark, 
should  agree  that  the  Baltic  was  to  be  given  the 
status  of  an  inland  lake,  that  it  was  to  be  open  to 
the  warships  of  none  but  the  four  Baltic  Powers. 

This  recommendation  appeared  in  some  papers  which 

174 


CHART  OF  THE  ACCESSES  TO  THE  BALTIC  SEA. 

Scale 


176  MODERN    GERMANY 

apparently  were  inspired  by  the  Government,  and  it 
was  undoubtedly  levelled  at  this  country. — The  follow- 
ing pages  will  show  that  Germany's  excitement  at  the 
news  of  the  British  naval  visit  to  the  Baltic  was  not 
without  cause,  and  they  will  likewise  show  that  the 
British  Government  and  public  were  wrong  in  neglect- 
ing that  sea  in  the  past,  for  they  will  make  it  clear 
that  the  Baltic  seems  bound  to  become  a  place  of 
very  considerable  interest  and  importance  in  any 
great  war  in  which  Germany  may  be  engaged,  and 
especially  in  a  war  in  which  she  has  to  rely  largely  on 
her  fleet.  Therefore  it  behoves  us  carefully  to  consider 
the  position  of  the  Baltic  from  the  strategical,  political, 
and  economic  points  of  view,  and  especially  to  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  the  British  interests  in  that  sea. 

The  northern  frontier  of  Germany  is  formed  by 
the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic.  These  two  seas  are 
separated  from  one  another  by  the  Danish  Peninsula, 
which  stretches  out  northward  towards  Sweden  and 
Norway.  The  connection  between  the  North  Sea  and 
the  Baltic  is  formed  by  the  Skager  Rack  and  the 
Kattegat,  which  separate  the  Danish  Peninsula  from 
the  mainland  of  Sweden  and  Norway.  The  Skager 
Rack,  to  the  north-west  of  the  Danish  Peninsula,  is 
the  continuation  of  the  North  Sea,  and  is  about  seventy 
miles  wide.  The  continuation  of  the  Skager  Rack, 
the  Kattegat,  on  the  east  of  the  Danish  Peninsula, 
affords  a  passage  about  fifty  miles  wide  down  to  the 
56th  degree.  To  the  south  of  the  56th  degree  between 
sixty  and  seventy  islands,  with  shoals  and  sandbanks 
innumerable,  suddenly  occur,  almost  block  up  the 
Kattegat,  and  convert  the  broad  open  passage  into 
a  labyrinth  full  of  dange-rous  narrows,  shallows,  and 
treacherous  cross  currents.  There  is  probably  no  sea 
in  the  world  to  which  access  is  more  difficult,  more 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     177 

intricate,    and    more    dangerous   than   it    is   to    the 
Baltic. 

Through  the  cluster  of  the  Danish  Islands  and 
sandbanks  which  almost  close  the  Kattegat,  three 
narrow  and  tortuous  passages  lead  to  the  Baltic. 
These  are  the  Great  Belt,  the  Little  Belt,  and  the 
Sound,  and  these  passages — especially  the  Little  Belt, 
which  in  parts  is  less  than  a  thousand  yards  wide — 
have  rather  the  appearance  of  meandering  rivers  or 
canals  than  of  sea  straits  such  as  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar. 
So  tightly  is  the  Kattegat  closed  by  the  Danish  Islands, 
that  the  Baltic  is  rather  a  fresh-water  lake  filled  by 
the  rivers  of  north-eastern  Europe  and  fortuitously 
connected  with  the  sea  than  a  part  of  the  sea  itself. 
Therefore  the  Baltic  has  practically  no  tides,  and  the 
percentage  of  salt  contained  in  the  water  is  infini- 
tesimal and  in  parts  nil. 

As  both  the  Great  Belt  and  the  Little  Belt  are 
very  difficult  to  navigate,  the  third  passage,  the 
Sound,  on  which  Copenhagen  is  situated,  has  always 
been  the  favourite  route  chosen  by  the  world's  shipping. 
However,  the  Sound,  though  it  is  the  easiest,  is  not 
the  deepest  passage  to  the  Baltic.  South  of  Copen- 
hagen the  Sound  is  not  sufficiently  deep  for  the  largest 
warships.  Therefore  these  have  to  pass  through  the 
more  tortuous,  awkward,  and  dangerous  Belts,  whilst 
ships  of  medium  draft  prefer  going  through  the  Sound 
passing  Copenhagen.  Copenhagen  is  a  fortress,  which 
dominates  the  Sound  through  its  strong  land  forti- 
fications and  island  batteries.  At  Copenhagen  the 
Sound  is  about  ten  miles  wide,  but  it  gradually  narrows 
towards  the  north,  and  twenty  miles  north  of  Copen- 
hagen, at  Elsinore,  it  is  but  four  thousand  yards  wide. 
An  ordinary  field  gun  carries  easily  from  Elsinore  in 
Denmark  across  the  Sound  to  the  Swedish  town  of 

M 


178  MODERN    GERMANY 

Helsingborg  opposite,  and  no  squadron  can  approach 
Copenhagen  from  the  north  if  the  narrows  of  Elsinore- 
Helsingborg  are  adequately  fortified,  for  at  that  short 
distance  every  shot  fired  from  the  land  batteries  at 
passing  ships  should  hit  the  mark  aimed  at. 

The  foregoing  imperfect  sketch  shows  that  the 
passage  into  the  Baltic  by  way  of  the  Skager  Rack 
and  the  Kattegat  is  a  very  difficult  one,  and  that 
Denmark  possesses  the  very  greatest  strategical  import- 
ance in  any  war  in  which  Germany  may  be  engaged, 
because  she  holds  the  keys  to  the  Baltic.  With  a 
few  forts  armed  with  heavy  guns  and  a  number  of 
torpedo  boats  and  of  floating  and  of  fixed  sea  mines, 
she  can  close  absolutely  the  Sound  and  the  two  Belts 
against  a  purely  naval  attack,  but  she  cannot  close 
the  Baltic  against  a  combined  naval  and  military 
attack,  as  will  be  shown  in  due  course.  A  Power 
which  desires  to  control  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic 
must  seize  one  or  several  of  the  Danish  Islands  in 
order  to  be  able  to  dominate  the  passages  leading 
through  them. 

In  a  great  war  Denmark  may  make  use  of  her 
commanding  position,  and  may  thus  influence  the 
decision,  or  she  may  observe  an  attitude  of  strict 
neutrality.  At  any  rate,  whether  she  adopts  the  one 
course  or  the  other,  so  much  is  certain,  that  no  ship 
can  pass  into  or  out  of  the  Baltic  unobserved  by 
Denmark,  and  the  transmission  or  non-transmission  of 
her  observations  of  naval  movements  to  one  or  the  other 
of  the  belligerents  may  decide  battles  and  perhaps  the 
issue  of  a  great  war.  Hence  Denmark  is  a  very  im- 
portant factor  in  any  war  which  has  the  Baltic  for  its 
scene,  and  it  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  that 
she  is  bound  to  exercise  a  very  powerful,  and  perhaps  a 
decisive,  influence  in  the  next  great  European  war. 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     179 

Germany  has  two  naval  harbours,  Kiel  and  Wil- 
helmshaven.  Kiel  Harbour,  or  rather  Kiel  Fiord,  on 
the  Baltic,  is  a  deep  and  well-sheltered  natural  inlet 
of  the  sea  which  affords  ample  room  to  all  warships 
of  Germany  present  and  to  come.  Wilhelmshaven, 
on  the  North  Sea,  is  a  small  port  laboriously  dug  out 
of  the  mainland.  It  is  quite  insufficient  for  Germany's 
naval  requirements  as  regards  size,  and  the  narrow 
entrance  has  to  be  kept  at  a  proper  depth  by  constant 
dredging.  Thus  Nature  has  placed  the  chief  German 
war  harbour  in  the  inaccessible  Baltic. 

Kiel  is  Germany's  principal  naval  base.  Germany's 
naval  battles  might  have  to  be  fought  in  the  North 
Sea.  Under  these  circumstances  the  precariousness  of 
the  connection  between  the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea 
by  way  of  the  Skager  Rack  and  Kattegat  and  through 
the  Danish  Archipelago,  the  length  of  the  roundabout 
journey,  and  the  fact  that  in  war  time  the  German 
fleets  would  constantly  have  to  pass  to  and  fro  under 
the  eyes  and  under  the  guns  of  Denmark,  were  exceed- 
ingly irksome  to  Germany,  especially  as,  until  lately, 
Denmark  was  not  friendly  to  her  mighty  neighbour, 
remembering  her  spoliation  of  1864.  Germany  had 
to  be  prepared  to  fight  either  France  or  Russia,  and 
perhaps  both  Powers  simultaneously.  Therefore,  she 
had  to  maintain  strong  fleets  in  both  the  Baltic  and 
the  North  Sea,  and  she  had  to  be  able  to  fight  with  her 
whole  naval  strength  in  either  sea  and  at  short  notice. 

To  effect  rapidly  and  unnoticed  a  junction  of  her 
fleets  either  in  the  North  Sea  or  in  the  Baltic,  Germany 
created  an  artificial  link  connecting  the  North  Sea 
and  the  Baltic  by  the  construction  of  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  Canal.  The  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal 
has  been  planned  with  great  wisdom,  and  has  been 
built  without  regard  to  expense.  It  leads  from  the 


180  MODERN    GERMANY 

interior  of  Kiel  Harbour  to  Brunsbiittel,  a  town  which 
lies  on  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Elbe  twenty-five  miles 
above  the  mouth  of  that  river,  and  the  shallows  sur- 
rounding it.  Therefore  the  North  Sea  opening  of  the 
canal  is  exceedingly  well  sheltered.  It  is  neither 
easily  accessible  to  a  hostile  fleet  of  warships  and  of 
transports  carrying  landing  parties,  nor  can  it  easily 
be  observed  by  hostile  sea-keeping  cruisers  and  naval 
balloons,  because  the  distance  which  separates  the 
canal  opening  from  the  open  sea  is  too  great. 

The  distance  which  separated  Kiel  and  the  mouth 
of  the  Elbe  before  the  construction  of  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  Canal  was  650  miles.  The  cutting  of  the 
canal  has  reduced  that  distance  to  but  fifty-five  miles. 
As  the  canal  has  no  gradients  to  be  overcome  by 
locks,  as  its  banks  are  so  very  solidly  built  that  the 
wash  of  ships  passing  through  at  speed  will  not  damage 
them,  as  all  along  the  route  numerous  commodious 
basins  have  been  built  where  ships  going  in  different 
directions  may  pass  one  another,  and  whereto  disabled 
ships  may  be  dragged  in  order  not  to  block  the  passage, 
and  as  the  fixed  bridges  leading  across  the  canal  are  so 
high  above  the  water  level  as  to  allow  high-masted 
ships  to  pass  easily  underneath,  warships  are  able  to 
traverse  the  canal  with  great  rapidity.  The  passage 
from  Kiel  to  Brunsbiittel  can,  under  favourable  circum- 
stances, be  made  in  five  hours  or  less.  Therefore  Kiel 
protects  Hamburg  very  effectively,  and  it  may  be  said 
that,  thanks  to  the  canal,  Kiel  has  become  a  harbour 
on  the  North  Sea  as  well  as  on  the  Baltic. 

If  we  now  look  at  the  peculiar  configuration  of 
the  German  coasts,  it  will  become  apparent  that 
Germany's  position  for  naval  defence  is  by  nature  one 
of  very  considerable  strength,  and  that  her  naturally 
so  very  favourable  position  has  been  greatly  improved 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     181 

since,  through  the  construction  of  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  Canal,  she  has  been  enabled  to  make  Kiel, 
in  the  inaccessible  Baltic,  her  principal  naval  base  for 
the  defence  of  the  North  Sea. 

The  North  Sea  lies  within  easy  reach  of  all  those 
nations  with  which  Germany  will  conceivably  fight  a 
naval  war,  for  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Norway  have 
practically  no  fleets,  whilst  Russia  has  a  fleet  mainly 
on  paper,  and  will  for  many  decades  hardly  be  able 
to  fight  Germany  on  the  sea.  On  the  North  Sea,  or, 
rather,  near  the  North  Sea,  are  situated  the  two  most 
valuable  commercial  harbours  of  Germany,  Hamburg 
and  Bremen,  for  these  ports  lie  not  on  the  sea-shore 
but  on  rivers  about  fifty  miles  inland.  Therefore, 
Hamburg  and  Bremen  are  quite  out  of  the  reach  of 
a  hostile  fleet,  as  are  all  the  other  harbour  towns 
of  Germany.  It  would  not  be  easy  for  an  enemy  to 
approach  the  northern  coast  of  Germany  at  any  point 
in  the  North  Sea,  or  to  effect  a  landing  on  the  west 
coast  of  Schleswig-Holstein  in  order  to  seize  the  Baltic 
and  North  Sea  Canal,  because  a  belt  of  shallows  which 
is  from  ten  to  twenty  miles  wide  surrounds  these 
coasts.  After  the  removal  of  the  buoys  and  other 
signs  of  navigation,  it  would  be  almost  impossible  for 
hostile  ships  to  thread  their  way  through  the  narrow 
channels  which  lead  through  the  shifting  sandbanks 
round  the  German  North  Sea  coast,  and  which  con- 
stantly alter  their  course.  In  consequence  of  these 
difficulties  a  landing  in  force  on  the  shores  of  the 
North  Sea  would  require  so  much  time  that  Germany, 
with  her  excellent  railway  system,  which  has  been 
specially  designed  with  an  eye  to  facilitate  the  rapid 
concentration  of  troops  in  case  of  war,  should  easily 
be  able  to  collect  in  time  a  force  superior  to  that 
landed  by  the  invader. 


182  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  points  of  the  greatest  strategical  importance 
in  the  North  Sea  are  three  in  number  :  the  mouth  of 
the  Elbe,  which  gives  access  to  Hamburg  and  to  the 
western  entrance  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal ; 
the  naval  harbour  of  Wilhelmshaven  ;  and  the  mouth 
of  the  Weser  with  Bremen.  These  three  points  are 
admirably  defended  by  permanent  land  fortifications 
of  great  strength,  and  by  the  sea  fortress  of  Heligoland, 
which  is  likely  to  play  a  very  important  part  in  any 
naval  war  of  defence  in  which  Germany  may  be 
engaged. 

Heligoland  is  a  rock  some  hundred  and  fifty  feet 
high,  and  not  much  larger  than  a  park  of  moderate 
size,  such  as  Hyde  Park.  It  is  almost  exactly  equi- 
distant from  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  with  Hamburg 
and  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal, 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Weser  with  Bremen,  and  from 
Wilhelmshaven.  Therefore  Heligoland  provides  a  most 
excellent  advanced  point  of  observation.  It  is  amply 
provided  with  signal  stations  and  with  appliances  for 
wireless  telegraphy,  and  it  is  connected  by  cable  with 
Cuxhaven  and  Wilhelmshaven.  Besides,  Heligoland 
will  serve  in  war  as  a  base  for  torpedo  boats,  which 
can  lie  in  its  shallow  harbour  whilst  larger  ships  will 
be  able  to  anchor  close  to  Heligoland  sheltered  by  the 
"  Dune,"  and  there  to  take  in  ammunition  and  coal. 
Heligoland  is  so  strongly  fortified  that  it  is  not  only 
secure  against  a  coup  de  main  but  that  it  would  be  a 
very  awkward  antagonist  to  all  ships  within  reach  of 
its  heavy  guns  and  howitzers,  and  it  will  no  doubt 
take  a  very  active  part  in  any  naval  battle  which 
may  be  fought  in  its  vicinity.  Heligoland  lies  about 
forty  miles  in  front  of  the  German  coasts,  but,  owing 
to  the  extensive  shallows  already  referred  to,  it  lies 
only  about  fifteen  miles  in  front  of  the  open  sea  zone 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC      183 

of  Germany.  Consequently  its  guns  are  able  to  cut 
very  effectively  into  the  manoeuvring  field  of  a  hostile 
fleet,  whilst  they  would  give  an  invaluable  support 
to  a  German  fleet  issuing  from  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe 
or  from  Wilhelmshaven  or  retiring  to  one  of  these 
points.  Lastly,  all  merchantmen  going  to  or  coming 
from  Hamburg  must  pass  close  to  Heligoland.  Con- 
sequently Heligoland  makes  the  blockade  of  Hamburg 
difficult,  and  facilitates  the  protection  of  merchant 
shipping  going  to,  or  issuing  from,  that  point.  Thus 
Heligoland  serves  at  the  same  time  as  an  advanced 
point  of  observation,  and  as  a  powerful  floating  battery 
which  admirably  covers  the  most  vulnerable  spots  of 
Germany  in  the  North  Sea.  The  foregoing  makes  it 
clear  that  Heligoland  is  a  strategical  point  of  con- 
siderable importance,  and  that  those  British  statesmen 
who  light-heartedly  handed  it  over  to  Germany  in 
exchange  for  some  concessions  in  East  Africa,  believing 
it  to  be  of  no  value,  made  a  very  bad  bargain. 

To  a  strong  Power  at  war  with  Germany  the 
Baltic  should  be  more  attractive  as  a  field  of  action 
than  the  North  Sea,  for  the  following  reasons  :  firstly, 
from  the  Baltic  the  harbour  of  Kiel  may  be  watched, 
and  the  warships  contained  in  it  be  attacked  and 
destroyed.  Secondly,  a  landing  can  be  far  more  easily 
undertaken  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic  than  on  those 
of  the  North  Sea,  partly  because  the  Baltic  coast  can 
be  approached  more  easily,  partly  because  it  is  about 
three  times  longer  than  the  coast  of  the  North  Sea, 
and  can  therefore  less  easily  be  defended  against  an 
invader.  Thirdly,  a  landing  demonstration  or  a  landing 
in  force  would  be  more  effective  on  the  shores  of  the 
Baltic  than  on  the  shores  of  the  North  Sea,  because 
Berlin  lies  less  than  a  hundred  miles  from  the  nearest 
point  on  the  Baltic,  whilst  it  lies  more  than  two  hundred 


184  MODERN    GERMANY 

miles  from  the  nearest  point  on  the  North  Sea.  A 
landing  is  most  effective  when  it  threatens  directly 
the  centre  of  national  vitality.  In  case  of  a  great 
European  land  war,  a  telling  diversion  could  be  made, 
and  the  German  armies  invading  France  or  Russia  or 
Austria  might  be  turned  back,  by  landing  a  large 
army  in  Mecklenburg  or  Pomerania  within  easy  reach 
of  Berlin. 

Germany's  position  in  the  Baltic  strongly  resembles 
Russia's  position  in  the  Black  Sea.  Russia's  best 
naval  harbour  is  in  the  Black  Sea,  Germany's  best 
naval  harbour  is  in  the  Baltic.  Germany  is  practically 
as  much  master  of  the  Baltic  as  Russia  is  of  the  Black 
Sea,  because  the  Russian  North  Sea  squadron  and  the 
fleets  of  Sweden  and  Denmark  are  so  weak  that  they 
cannot  possibly  face  the  German  navy.  Both  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic  are  land-locked.  Both  can 
be  entered  by  an  enemy  only  by  a  narrow  opening 
which  is  in  the  hands  of  a  third  Power.  Both  seas 
are  practically  inland  lakes  which  are  almost  un- 
approachable to  a  hostile  fleet  except  by  permission 
of  the  Power  holding  the  straits  which  lead  to  it. 
Germany  is  almost  as  vulnerable  in  the  Baltic  as 
Russia  is  in  the  Black  Sea,  provided  the  entrance  to 
that  sea  can  be  seized.  Both  the  Baltic  and  the 
Black  Sea  can  easily  be  defended  by  the  State  which 
controls  it,  and  both  provide  ideal  conditions  for 
preparing  and  effecting  a  surprise  attack  on  the  largest 
scale.  These  facts  show  that  Germany's  position  in 
the  Baltic  is  similar  to  Russia's  position  in  the  Black 
Sea,  but  a  closer  investigation  will  prove  that  Germany's 
position  in  the  Baltic  is  comparatively  far  stronger 
than  is  Russia's  position  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  that 
Germany's  control  of  the  Baltic  is  a  far  greater  danger 
to  this  country  in  case  of  an  Anglo-German  war  than 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     185 

is  Russia's  control  of  the  Black  Sea  in  case  of  an 
Anglo-Russian  war. 

Germany's  position  in  the  Baltic  is  far  stronger 
than  Russia's  position  in  the  Black  Sea,  for  the  following 
reasons.  The  Black  Sea  has  but  one  opening  formed 
by  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  and  these 
cannot  easily  be  seized  by  Russia,  because  the  Russian 
army,  being  distributed  over  vast  districts,  can  only 
very  slowly  be  concentrated  and  carried  either  by 
land  or  sea  towards  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles. 
Besides,  Turkey  has  a  large  and  excellent  army,  and 
the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  can  easily  be 
defended  even  by  small  numbers  against  an  attack 
of  a  great  host.  Therefore  Russia  would  find  it  very 
difficult  to  seize  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles. 
Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  can  issue  far  more  easily 
from  the  Baltic  than  Russia  can  from  the  Black  Sea. 
The  German  fleet  can  sail  out  of  the  Baltic  either 
through  the  Kattegat  or  through  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  Canal,  two  alternative  openings  which  lie 
several  hundred  miles  apart  from  one  another.  The 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  lies  entirely  in  German 
territory,  and  cannot  easily  be  seized  by  a  nation 
with  which  Germany  is  at  war,  whilst  the  three  straits 
leading  through  the  Danish  Archipelago  cannot  easily 
be  defended  by  Denmark  against  a  determined  German 
attack  by  sea  and  land.  Whilst  the  Bosphorus  and 
the  Dardanelles  possess  a  frontage  of  only  a  few  miles, 
the  principal  Danish  Islands  in  the  Kattegat  have  a 
circumference  of  several  hundred  miles,  a  distance 
which  the  weak  Danish  army  cannot  possibly  hold 
against  an  energetic  German  attack.  Besides,  the 
Danish  mainland  north  of  Schleswig  Holstein  cannot 
possibly  be  defended  against  a  German  invasion,  and 
from  the  shores  of  the  Danish  mainland,  which  is 


186  MODERN    GERMANY 

not  defendable  by  Denmark  alone,  the  Little  Belt  can 
be  dominated.  In  a  few  hours  Germany  could  throw 
a  very  large  number  of  troops  from  Kiel  and  other 
Baltic  harbours  into  the  Island  of  Fiinen  or  Zealand, 
and  in  a  few  days  the  whole  of  the  Danish  Peninsula 
might  be  occupied.  Thus  Germany  may  at  the  critical 
moment  acquire  the  mastery  over  all  the  openings  of 
the  Baltic  without  much  difficulty,  and  close  these 
to  all  but  German  warships,  unless  Denmark  is  imme- 
diately and  most  energetically  supported  by  a  third 
Power  which  is  strong  on  land  and  sea. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  would  be  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  Germany  to  be  able  to  dominate  all 
the  entrances  to  the  Baltic,  it  seems  by  no  means 
unlikely  that  in  a  war  in  which  the  decision  depends 
largely  on  the  navy  Germany  will  take  such  a  step 
either  before  or  immediately  on  the  declaration  of 
war,  pleading  necessity,  and  acting  in  the  same  manner 
in  which  Prussia  acted  in  1866  towards  Hanover  and 
Hesse.  Perhaps  the  extensive  landing  manoeuvres 
which  Germany  has  carried  on  in  the  Baltic  were 
undertaken  in  preparation  for  such  a  contingency. 

If  the  German  fleet  is  able  to  pass  from  Kiel  out 
of  the  Baltic  either  vid  the  Kattegat  or  through  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal,  Germany's  naval  opponent 
would  have  to  watch  at  the  same  time  the  mouth 
of  the  Elbe,  and  the  three  passages  described  in  the 
foregoing  which  lead  from  the  Baltic  through  the 
Danish  Archipelago.  Germany's  naval  opponent 
would  find  it  difficult  to  watch  the  mouth  of  the 
Elbe,  because  of  the  extensive  shallows  surrounding 
it  and  of  the  commanding  position  of  Heligoland.  It 
would  be  at  least  equally  difficult  to  blockade  the 
Kattegat,  because  of  the  peculiar  configuration  of  the 
Danish  Islands  and  of  the  intricacy  of  the  passages 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC    187 

leading  through  them.  Besides,  the  weather  in  the 
Kattegat  is  often  very  rough.  If  Germany  is  able  to 
issue  with  her  fleet  from  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea 
Canal,  or  through  the  Kattegat,  Germany's  opponent 
would  have  to  divide  his  fleet  into  two  squadrons  of 
equal  strength,  which  would  be  separated  from  each 
other  by  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles.  At  that 
distance,  which  could  be  covered  only  in  about  thirty 
hours,  mutual  support  of  the  two  blockading  squadrons 
would  hardly  be  possible.  Hence  the  German  fleet, 
working  on  what  is  technically  called  interior  lines, 
could  in  combined  strength  fall  in  a  few  hours  upon 
one  or  the  other  blockading  squadron.  In  other  words 
a  blockade  of  the  Elbe  and  of  the  Kattegat  could  be 
maintained  only  if  each  of  the  blockading  squadrons 
were  strong  enough  to  meet  the  whole  German  fleet. 
Hence  for  every  German  ship  lying  at  Kiel  one  ship 
would  have  to  be  maintained  in  the  Kattegat  and 
another  one  near  Hamburg.  In  other  words,  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  doubles  the  strength  of 
the  German  navy,  or  reduces  to  one-half  the  strength 
of  the  fleet  attacking  Germany. 

Most  wars  have  been  caused  by  the  stress  of 
competition,  not  by  national  vanity.  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  are  competitors  for  trade  and  colonies. 
Therefore  the  possibility  of  a  collision  between  these 
two  countries  cannot  safely  be  disregarded,  and  if  we 
contemplate  the  possibility  of  an  Anglo-German  war, 
it  will  be  clear  that  Germany's  position  in  the  Baltic 
is  more  dangerous  to  Great  Britain  than  Russia's 
position  in  the  Black  Sea  has  been,  or  ever  can  be, 
to  this  country.  The  Russian  danger  consists  mainly 
in  this,  that  a  large  Russian  fleet  issuing  suddenly 
from  the  Black  Sea  could  destroy  the  British  trade 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  cut  in  two  our  road  to  India 


i88  MODERN    GERMANY 

and  the  East  via  the  Suez  Canal.  That  danger  is 
after  all  not  one  of  the  first  magnitude.  The  tem- 
porary, or  even  the  permanent,  loss  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean trade  would  be  comparatively  a  small  matter, 
and,  if  the  route  through  the  Suez  Canal  was  no 
longer  practicable,  English  ships  would  again  sail  to 
the  East  via  St.  Helena  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
as  they  did  before  the  Suez  Canal  was  opened.  The 
damage  which  Russia  could  do  to  Great  Britain  by 
attacking  us  from  the  Black  Sea  would  be  very  small, 
even  if  Russia  should  absolutely  control  the  Bosphorus 
and  the  Dardanelles.  Therefore  England  need  not  be 
afraid  of  Russia's  seizing  Constantinople  and  making 
herself  the  absolute  mistress  of  the  Black  Sea  and  of 
the  straits  leading  to  it. 

Whilst  Russia  controlling  the  Black  Sea  could 
threaten  only  a  secondary  interest  of  the  British  Em- 
pire, Germany  controlling  the  Baltic  could  threaten, 
and  would  be  able  to  strike  directly  at,  the  British 
shores.  Russia  in  the  possession  of  Constantinople 
might  at  the  worst  attack  Malta,  which  lies  a  thou- 
sand miles  from  that  town.  Germany  controlling  the 
Baltic  might  attack  London,  which  lies  but  five 
hundred  miles  from  Kiel. 

Many  English  people  who  merely  compare  the 
number  of  warships  possessed  by  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  believe  that  Germany  is  not  able  to  meet 
this  country  at  sea,  and  they  are  ready  to  conclude 
that  Germany  will  never  be  able  to  dispute  with  this 
country  for  the  rule  of  the  sea  and  the  possession  of 
colonies,  the  wish  being  father  to  the  thought.  The 
importance  of  facts  and  figures  is  affected  by  circum- 
stances, and  it  cannot  be  too  widely  known  and  too 
often  asserted  in  this  country  that  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  Canal  doubles  the  strength  of  the  German 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     189 

navy,  for  this  fact  is  ignored  by  most  Englishmen, 
naval  officers  included. 

The  foregoing  description  of  Germany's  maritime 
position  makes  it  clear  that,  if  that  country  should 
be  engaged  in  war  with  a  naval  Power  of  the  first 
rank  such  as  England,  the  decisive  battle  would 
possibly  be  fought  near  the  principal  naval  base  of 
Germany,  that  is  not  in  the  North  Sea  but  in  the 
Baltic.  Foreseeing  this  possibility,  the  German  navy 
has,  by  constant  manoeuvring,  made  itself  familiar 
with  all  the  intricacies  and  difficulties  of  that  sea, 
and  of  the  entrances  leading  to  it.  Naturally  it 
suited  Germany  admirably  that  Great  Britain  was 
short-sighted  enough  to  believe  that  she  had  no 
interests  in  that  sea,  and  that  British  naval  officers 
were  as  unacquainted  with  the  Baltic  as  British 
military  officers  were  with  the  Transvaal  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  South  African  war.  As  British 
naval  officers  were  quite  unfamiliar  with  navigation 
in  the  Baltic,  the  naval  officers  of  Germany  could 
contemplate  with  some  confidence  the  possibility  of  a 
struggle  with  Great  Britain,  notwithstanding  the  great 
superiority  of  the  British  fleet.  It  is  therefore  easy 
to  understand  that  a  feeling  approaching  dismay  and 
consternation  was  created  in  Germany  when,  in  July 
1905,  it  became  known  that  the  British  Channel 
Squadron  would  cruise  in  the  Baltic.  Thinking 
Germans  could  not  disguise  to  themselves  the  fact 
that  British  statesmen  had  at  last  discovered  the  great 
strategical  importance  of  the  Baltic,  and  that  the 
British  Admiralty  had  determined  to  make  the  British 
fleet  familiar  with  that  sea.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  was  only  natural  that  Germany  would  have 
liked  to  exclude  the  British  warships  from  the  Baltic 
by  some  diplomatic  arrangement  which,  though  osten- 


MODERN  GERMANY 

sibly  beneficial  to  all  the  Baltic  Powers,  would  only 
have  served  to  make  Germany  all-powerful  in  the 
Baltic — to  make  the  Baltic  Sea  a  German  lake. 

During  the  next  few  years  Germany's  naval  position 
will  be  one  of  considerable  difficulty,  and  may  become 
one  of  very  great  anxiety  in  time  of  war.  Germany 
is  building  at  vast  expense  a  fleet  of  some  twenty 
ships,  each  of  which  is  to  be  larger  and  stronger  than 
our  own  Dreadnought.  None  of  these  monster  ships 
will  be  able  to  pass  through  the  Baltic  and  North 
Sea  Canal,  which  is  too  small  for  them.  Therefore 
Germany  has  resolved  to  widen  and  deepen  that  canal, 
which  doubles  the  strength  of  her  fleet.  After  having 
spent  £8,000,000  on  the  original  construction  of  the 
canal,  she  is  spending  an  additional  £11,000,000,  or  no 
less  than  £19,000,000  in  all,  a  sum  much  larger  than 
that  expended  on  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  and 
sufficient  to  build  ten  Dreadnoughts,  in  order  to  make 
it  practicable  for  the  largest  ships  which  she  is  planning. 
It  is  expected  that  three  years  will  be  required  to  finish 
the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal.  Therefore  during  the 
next  three  years  Germany  will  be  unable  to  avail  her- 
self of  the  great  advantages  furnished  by  the  Baltic 
and  North  Sea  Canal  except  for  her  smaller  and  older 
ships.  Her  magnificent  new  ships  will  for  about  three 
years  be  restricted  to  one  of  the  German  seas.  Conse- 
quently Germany  will,  during  the  next  three  years,  do 
all  in  her  power  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  a  first-class 
naval  Power.  During  the  next  three  years  Germany 
has  every  reason  to  keep  the  peace.  Only  when  the 
enlargement  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  has 
been  accomplished  will  she  be  ready  for  a  great  naval 
war,  and  then  her  maritime  position  will  be  a  very 
formidable  one.  In  three  years  her  naval  opponents 
may  require  one  fleet  of  more  than  twenty  Dread- 


ENGLAND,   GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     191 

noughts  to  watch  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser 
and  a  second  fleet  of  more  than  twenty  Dreadnoughts 
to  watch  the  Kattegat.  In  the  near  future  the  British 
naval  budget  should  have  to  be  vastly  increased. 

It  may  be  argued  by  the  advocates  of  a  cheap 
navy  that  Great  Britain  does  not  require  a  navy  of 
overwhelming  strength  ;  that  in  case  of  an  Anglo- 
German  war  the  British  fleet  should  abandon  its 
traditional  policy  ;  that  our  fleets  need  not  search 
out  the  German  navy  at  its  bases,  an  undertaking 
which  would  clearly  require  that  Great  Britain  should 
lay  down  at  least  two  ships  for  every  ship  laid  down 
by  Germany ;  that  Germany,  which  had  become 
dependent  upon  her  foreign  trade  for  her  existence, 
could,  in  case  of  need,  be  fought  more  cheaply  by  a 
vigorous  blockade  carried  on  at  a  safe  distance,  where 
a  surprise  attack  from  either  opening  of  the  Baltic 
on  a  part  of  the  British  fleet  would  be  impossible. 
These  arguments  seem  plausible,  but  they  are  mis- 
leading, for  it  will  not  be  easy  to  stop  Germany's 
foreign  trade  by  means  of  a  blockade.  Germany's 
principal  trading  ports  are  not  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
but  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam,  which  lie  in  neutral 
territory,  and  which  serve  as  outlets  to  the  Rhine,  by 
far  the  most  important  trade  route  of  Germany  for 
her  exports  as  well  as  for  her  imports.  As  soon  as 
the  great  German  Canal  system  which  is  to  connect 
the  Rhine  with  Dortmund,  with  the  Elbe  and  with 
the  Danube — the  German  inland  canal  system,  like 
the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal,  will  serve  both 
strategical  and  commercial  purposes  —  is  finished 
Germany's  foreign  trade  may  in  war  time  be  made 
independent  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  The  trade 
going  now  via  Hamburg  and  Bremen  may  then  be 
diverted  to  neutral  ports.  Saxony,  for  instance,  will 


192  MODERN    GERMANY 

be  able  to  ship  her  manufactures  and  to  receive  her 
raw  cotton,  corn,  &c.,  via  Belgium  and  Holland  and 
the  Rhine  instead  of  via  Hamburg  and  the  Elbe,  and 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  neutral  Powers  which 
provide  Germany  with  cotton,  corn,  &c.,  will  allow 
the  British  fleet  to  interfere  with  a  large  and  profit- 
able trade  which  ostensibly  is  neutral.  Great  Britain 
might  conceivably  blockade  not  only  Hamburg  and 
Bremen,  but  Antwerp,  Rotterdam,  Amsterdam, 
Trieste,  and  other  neutral  ports  in  easy  reach  of 
Germany  as  well,  and  search  the  shipping  there  for 
German  goods,  but  it  seems  likely  that  the  vigorous 
protests  of  the  nations  interested  in  the  continuance 
of  that  trade,  such  as  the  United  States,  would  soon 
lead  to  the  raising  of  that  blockade. 

The  foregoing  details  show  that  Germany's  mari- 
time position  is  already  an  exceedingly  strong  one,  and 
that  it  seems  likely  that  it  will  become  increasingly 
strong,  one  might  almost  say  dangerously  strong,  in 
the  near  future.  Therefore  the  question  arises  :  How 
can  the  vast  advantages  which  Germany  enjoys  owing 
to  her  strong  position  for  defence  and  attack  be 
neutralised  ?  Where  is  the  weak  spot  in  Germany's 
armour  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  will  promptly 
suggest  itself  if  we  remember  the  resemblance  which 
Germany's  position  in  the  Baltic  bears  to  Russia's 
position  in  the  Black  Sea,  to  which  attention  has 
been  drawn  in  these  pages.  Exactly  as  Russia  cannot 
be  attacked  in  the  Black  Sea,  except  by  permission 
of  Turkey,  Germany  cannot  be  attacked  in  the  Baltic 
except  by  permission  of  Denmark.  It  is  therefore 
clear  that  both  Germany  and  Great  Britain  have  the 
very  greatest  interest  in  securing  Denmark's  goodwill. 
Little  Denmark  may,  in  an  Anglo-German  war,  be  at 
least  as  valuable  an  ally  as  any  one  of  the  great  Powers. 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     193 

Therefore  it  is  clear  that  both  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  are  bound  to  do  all  in  their  power  to  secure 
Denmark's  support  in  case  of  war  if  possible  by  a 
treaty  of  alliance.  Perhaps  it  has  been  with  this 
object  in  view  that  the  German  Emperor  has,  during 
the  last  few  years,  made  the  most  assiduous  advances 
to  both  the  Royal  House  of  Denmark  and  to  the 
Danish  people,  and  that,  by  his  command,  in  every 
year  a  German  naval  demonstration  of  the  greatest 
magnitude  and  of  unmistakable  meaning  takes  place 
in  the  Baltic. 

What  will  Denmark  do  ?  Will  she  throw  in  her 
lot  with  Great  Britain  or  with  Germany,  or  will  she 
reject  the  advances  of  either,  preferring  to  observe  an 
attitude  of  strict  neutrality  in  case  of  an  Anglo-German 
war  ?  Denmark  may  wish  to  step  outside  the  ring 
in  case  an  Anglo-German  conflict  should  take  place, 
but  she  will  hardly  be  able  to  act  the  part  of  a  mere 
spectator.  The  mastery  of  the  Kattegat  may  decide 
the  issue  of  an  Anglo-German  war — and  more.  The 
possession  of  the  Danish  Straits  would  be  of  vital 
importance  to  both  belligerents.  Consequently  Den- 
mark can  hope  to  observe  a  strict  neutrality  only  ii 
she  is  strong  enough  to  keep  her  territories  neutral 
and  to  defend  them  against  all  comers.  This  she 
cannot  do,  for  she  is  too  weak. 

The  attitude  which  Denmark  should  adopt  with 
regard  to  the  contingency  of  an  Anglo-German  conflict 
may  be  outlined  in  three  proverbs  which  are  daily 
used  in  Denmark  :  "  Naar  Naboes  Vaeg  braender, 
maa  hver  raedes  sin  egen,"  Look  to  your  own  house 
when  your  neighbour's  house  is  on  fire  ;  "  Ingen  kan 
tjene  to  Herrer,"  Nobody  can  serve  two  masters  ; 
"  Vorsigtighed  er  en  Borgemesterdyd,"  Wise  foresight 
is  a  Burgomaster  virtue.  It  may  be  too  late  for  the 

N 


194  MODERN    GERMANY 

Danes  to  make  up  their  minds  what  to  do  in  case  of 
an  Anglo-German  war  if  they  wait  until  such  a  war, 
which  may  possibly  end  Denmark's  existence  as  an 
independent  State,  has  actually  broken  out.  Den- 
mark should  decide  in  good  time  whether  she  will 
side  with  Germany  or  with  this  country,  for  at  the 
critical  moment  she  will  probably  not  have  time  for 
reflection. 

The  German  people  may  be  a  peace-loving  people, 
and  the  German  Emperor  and  his  ministers  may 
entertain  feelings  of  most  cordial  friendship  and 
esteem  for  this  country.  Nevertheless,  it  is  only 
reasonable  to  expect  that  the  rulers  of  Germany  and 
the  German  people  will  pursue  rather  a  policy  beneficial 
to  their  country  than  one  advantageous  to  Great 
Britain.  Since  Russia's  defeat  by  Japan,  Germany 
has  become  pre-eminent  on  the  continent  of  Europe. 
Her  three  land  frontiers  are  fairly  safe  against  in- 
vasion. She  is  vulnerable  only  on  the  sea.  Her 
North  Sea  coast  being  practically  inaccessible,  the 
coast  of  the  Baltic  is  the  only  frontier  which  need 
cause  anxiety  to  Germany  in  case  of  war,  and  the 
Baltic  coast  would  become  unapproachable  to  an 
enemy,  if  Germany  should  acquire  the  mastery  of  the 
Sound  and  of  the  two  Belts.  Therefore  it  is  only 
logical  that  even  the  most  peaceful  German  citizens 
will  desire  most  ardently  that  Germany  should  acquire 
the  Danish  Islands  which  dominate  the  entrances  to 
the  Baltic,  and  that  every  patriotic  German  states- 
man will  strive  unceasingly  and  with  all  his  power  to 
fulfil  that  wish.  From  the  German  point  of  view 
the  possession  of  the  entrances  to  the  Baltic  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  peace,  safety,  and  greatness 
of  the  country. 

If  Denmark  values  her  independence,  she  should 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     195 

side  with  this  country,  which  has  every  interest  in 
seeing  Denmark  independent  and  strong.  If  Denmark 
does  not  value  her  independence,  she  may  side  with 
Germany,  which  has  every  interest  in  acquiring,  or 
at  least  in  dominating,  the  territories  of  Denmark 
in  order  to  possess  herself  of  the  command  of  the 
Baltic  and  of  the  excellent  Danish  harbours.  It  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  Denmark,  if  she  knows  where 
her  interests  lie,  will  place  herself  at  the  side  of  Great 
Britain,  though  she  may  not  do  so  unreservedly. 

In  order  to  understand  the  attitude  of  the  Danes 
and  the  policy  which  Denmark  is  likely  to  follow,  we 
must  look  at  the  possibility  of  an  Anglo-German 
conflict  not  so  much  from  the  British  as  from  the 
Danish  point  of  view.  Denmark  is  a  small  and  weak 
State.  Both  her  army  and  her  navy  are  insignificant, 
and  the  country  is  not  rich.  Denmark  has  conse- 
quently every  reason  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a 
great  European  war.  Therefore  many  Danes  will 
argue  that  their  country  should  not  unnecessarily 
commit  itself  either  with  Great  Britain  or  with  Ger- 
many. Those  Danes,  on  the  other  hand,  who  see 
clearly  that  their  country  cannot  possibly  remain 
neutral  in  case  of  an  Anglo-German  struggle,  who 
value  the  independence  of  their  Fatherland,  and  who 
would  rather  support  Great  Britain  than  Germany, 
will  nevertheless  hesitate  to  conclude  a  formal  alliance 
with  this  country,  and  the  reason  of  their  hesitation 
is  obvious.  From  the  Danish  point  of  view,  Great 
Britain  is  far  away,  Germany  is  near  at  hand.  The 
Danish  mainland  can  easily  be  entered  from  the 
German  province  of  Schleswig-Holstein  which  adjoins 
it.  Besides,  the  Danes  will  remember  that  there  has 
been  much  muddle  in  the  South  African  war,  and 
they  may  fear  that  the  Danish  mainland  and  the 


196  MODERN    GERMANY 

principal  islands  may  be  occupied  from  end  to  end  by 
the  ever-ready  German  army  before  the  first  ship  of 
the  British  ally  has  started  for  the  Kattegat.  There- 
fore the  Danes  may  hesitate  to  enter  upon  any  diplo- 
matic arrangements  with  this  country  for  mutual 
support  unless  they  are  assured  by  their  own  military 
and  naval  experts  that  Great  Britain  will  take  the 
necessary  measures  for  the  defence  of  the  independence 
of  Denmark,  and  that  those  measures  are  well  devised 
and  will  promptly  be  carried  out.  The  British  and 
Danish  military  and  naval  authorities  should  there- 
fore jointly  settle  a  plan  for  the  military  and  naval 
defence  of  Denmark. 

Denmark  should  welcome  co-operation  with  Great 
Britain  not  only  from  political  but  also  from  economic 
reasons.  Denmark  is  a  purely  agricultural  and  pas- 
toral country.  As  she  possesses  neither  coal  nor  ore, 
her  manufacturing  industries  are  insignificant,  but 
her  rural  industries  are  very  highly  developed.  Per 
head  of  population  Denmark  has  three  times  more 
cattle,  four  times  more  horses,  and  six  times  more 
pigs  than  has  this  country.  The  quantity  of  rye, 
barley,  oats,  butter,  cheese,  &c.,  which  she  produces 
is  enormous.  Denmark  has  to  buy  from  foreign 
countries  vast  quantities  of  coal  and  of  manufactured 
articles,  and  she  pays  for  these  with  the  surplus 
produce  of  her  rural  industries  which  she  exports. 
Owing  to  her  lack  of  coal  and  manufacturing  industries, 
the  Danes  are  more  dependent  upon  their  foreign 
trade  for  their  sustenance  than  is  Great  Britain  herself. 
This  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  Danish 
foreign  trade  per  head  of  population  is  no  less  than 
20  per  cent,  larger  than  is  the  British  foreign  trade 
per  head  of  population.  As  Denmark  is  dependent 
for  her  existence  upon  her  foreign  markets,  it  is  of 


ENGLAND,  GERMANY,  AND  THE  BALTIC     197 

vital  importance  for  her  that  her  foreign  trade  should 
not  be  interrupted  by  war,  for  the  interruption  of  her 
foreign  trade  would  mean  acute  distress  to  the  people. 
Great  Britain  is  their  best  market,  whilst  Germany 
has  closed  her  frontiers  to  the  agricultural  products  of 
Denmark.  The  United  Kingdom  takes  no  less  than 
three-fifths  of  the  Danish  exports,  and  she  is  able  to 
take  much  more  than  she  is  taking  at  present.  Great 
Britain  is  by  far  the  best  open  market  to  the  Danish 
farmers,  and  this  country  may  remain  an  open  market 
to  them,  even  if  Protection  is  introduced  in  this 
country,  for  politics  and  trade  go  hand  in  hand. 

The  foregoing  shows  that  from  the  strategical, 
political,  and  economic  points  of  view  co-operation 
between  Great  Britain  and  Denmark  is  most  desirable. 
For  the  sake  both  of  Great  Britain  and  of  Denmark 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  diplomatic  arrangements  of  a 
permanent  kind,  securing  their  mutual  support  in  case 
of  need,  will  be  entered  upon  between  the  two  States. 
They  will  be  beneficial  to  both,  and  they  will  tend 
to  preserve  peace  in  Europe. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

ON  September  ist  and  2nd,  1870,  more  than  four 
decades  ago,  the  great  tragedy  of  Sedan  was  enacted, 
and,  after  a  series  of  defeats,  which  stand  unparalleled 
in  the  world's  history,  France  emerged  from  the  ordeal 
of  the  "  Terrible  Year,"  crushed,  humiliated,  reduced 
and  impoverished — the  very  shadow  of  her  former 
self.  Since  then,  France  has  played  a  very  incon- 
spicuous rdle  on  the  stage  of  Europe,  and  from  the 
very  reserve  which,  in  matters  political,  France  has 
imposed  on  herself  since  then,  it  has  been  assumed 
that  she  has  almost  forgotten  her  defeat,  that  she 
has  become  reconciled  to  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
that  she  has  definitely  abdicated  her  historic  position 
in  Europe,  that  she  is  willing  to  play  henceforth  a 
secondary  part  in  the  world,  and  that  all  her  energy 
and  all  her  genius  are  now  exclusively  bent  upon 
developing  the  material  well-being  of  the  nation  and 
the  Republican  institutions  of  the  country.  France 
has  come  to  be  considered  as  a  parochial  concern. 

So  strongly  was  it  assumed  that  le  feu  sacre  de 
la  revanche  had  died  down  that  official  and  semi- 
official Germany  thought  the  time  had  come  for 
Franco-German  co-operation.  Guided  by  the  German 
Emperor,  official  and  semi-official  Germany  bestowed 
graceful  compliments  upon  distinguished  Frenchmen 

at  every  opportunity.     French  and  German  ships  were 

198 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  199 

seen  side  by  side  in  Kiel  harbour  at  the  occasion  of 
the  opening  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal ;  in 
the  Far  East,  Russian,  French,  and  German  ships 
conjointly  demonstrated  the  Japanese  out  of  Port 
Arthur,  and  M.  E.  Lockroy,  France's  ablest  Minister 
of  Marine,  was  allowed  to  minutely  inspect  the  German 
Navy  and  the  German  Navy  yards.  France  had, 
apparently,  forgotten  her  defeats,  the  time  for  recon- 
ciliation seemed  to  have  arrived,  and  German  writers 
began  strongly  to  advocate  a  Franco-German  political 
alliance,  and  a  Central-European  Customs  Union. 

Lately,  however,  Franco-German  relations  have 
become  somewhat  overclouded.  When,  through  the 
instrumentality  of  M.  Delcasse,  France  settled  her 
differences  with  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Spain,  and 
made  a  somewhat  hesitating  attempt  to  have  again 
a  policy  of  her  own,  the  German  Emperor  intervened 
and  forbade  the  execution  of  the  Morocco  bargain, 
which  had  already  been  concluded  between  France 
and  those  Powers  which,  through  their  geographical 
position,  may  claim  a  special  interest  in  Moroccan 
affairs.  How  serious  and  threatening  the  Morocco 
incident  of  1905  was  is  apparent  from  the  steps  to- 
wards the  mobilisation  of  her  Army  which  were  taken 
by  Germany  at  the  time.  As  the  German  exports  to 
Morocco  amounted  then,  on  an  average,  to  a  paltry 
£90,000  per  annum,  it  is  clear  that  the  defence  of 
Germany's  commercial  interests  was  merely  a  pretext 
for  Germany's  action  in  supporting  Morocco  against 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain.  Her  aim  in  creating 
the  Moroccan  crisis  was  not  to  foster  Germany's  ex- 
ports to  Morocco,  but  to  detach  France  from  Great 
Britain,  and  to  attach  her  to  Germany. 

Hitherto,  German  policy  has  been  marvellously 
successful.  Will  German  diplomacy  also  succeed  in 


200  MODERN    GERMANY 

reconciling  France  and  in  making  her  Germany's  ally  ? 
If  a  Franco-German  alliance  or  a  Franco-Russo- 
German  alliance  should  eventually  be  concluded, 
against  which  Power  would  such  an  alliance  be  directed  ? 
These  are  questions  which,  at  the  present  moment, 
are  of  supreme  interest  to  all  nations,  for  the  future 
of  France  depends  on  France's  decision. 

In  order  to  gauge  how  the  relations  between 
France  and  Germany  are  likely  to  develop,  we  must 
investigate  the  position,  the  political  aims,  the  interests 
and  the  traditional  policy  of  the  two  countries.  Let 
us  first  look  at  Franco-German  relations,  from  the 
French  point  of  view. 

French  policy,  although  apparently  most  erratic 
and  unstable  of  puq^ose,  has,  through  centuries, 
constantly  pursued  the  same  aim.  During  centuries, 
France  has  fought  for  the  preservation  of  the  Balance 
of  Power  in  Europe  and  for  the  possession  of  the 
Rhine  frontier.  To  obtain  these  ends,  France  has 
successively  made  war  against  the  strongest  Con- 
tinental States  which  threatened  to  enslave  the  Con- 
tinent and  ultimately  to  engulf  France.  From  the 
time,  four  centuries  ago,  when  she  opposed  Charles  V., 
the  mightiest  monarch  of  Christendom,  who  ruled 
over  Austria,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Spain, 
down  to  the  present  time,  France  has  been  the  cham- 
pion of  liberty  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  When 
Charles  V.  ruled  almost  the  whole  Continent,  Christian 
France  allied  herself  with  Turkey,  the  abhorred 
Infidel  Power,  who  was  considered  to  stand  outside 
the  pale  of  the  comitas  gentium,  rightly  thinking  self- 
preservation  the  first  law  of  political  ethics  and  the 
first  duty  to  herself.  History  repeats  itself.  When 
Germany  had  crushed  France  and  when  Bismarck 
had  succeeded  in  raising  all  the  Powers  of  Western 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  201 

Europe  against  France  and  in  isolating  her,  France 
turned  to  Russia  for  support,  notwithstanding  the 
incompatible  differences  existing  between  the  Western 
Republic  and  the  Eastern  autocracy,  differences  which 
make  truly  cordial  relations  impossible  between  them. 

During  four  centuries,  France  and  Germany  have 
fought  one  another  for  supremacy  in  Europe,  and  as 
long  as  Austria  was  the  strongest  State  in  Germany, 
France  supported  Austria's  German  enemies  against 
her.  Thus  it  was  that  France,  up  to  1866,  encouraged 
Prussia  to  aggrandise  herself  at  Austria's  cost,  and 
that  Bismarck,  in  crushing  Austria,  received  Napoleon's 
sympathy  and  support. 

Since  Bismarck's  advent  to  power,  or  during  about 
half  a  century,  France  has  been  the  dupe  of  Prusso- 
Germany's  policy.  Napoleon  III.  received  no  grati- 
tude for  supporting  Prussia  against  Austria.  On  the 
contrary,  even  at  the  time  when  Napoleon  was  doing 
a  priceless  service  to  Bismarck  by  supporting  Prussia 
against  Austria,  Bismarck  contemplated  ruining 
France,  and  building  up  Germany's  unity  on  the 
ruins  of  France.  A  fortnight  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  Austro-Prussian  War  of  1866,  when  Austro- 
Prussian  relations  were  already  strained  to  breaking- 
point,  Bismarck  sent  General  Von  Gabelenz,  who  then 
was  in  Berlin,  to  the  Austrian  Emperor  in  Vienna, 
and  proposed,  through  the  General,  to  the  Emperor 
that  even  at  the  eleventh  hour  peace  might  be  pre- 
served among  the  Germanic  nations  by  making  a 
common  onslaught  on  France,  conquering  Alsace,  and 
creating  a  Greater  Germany  at  the  end  of  a  victorious 
campaign.  Thus,  the  Prusso- Austrian  differences  were 
to  be  settled  at  the  cost  of  France  at  the  very  moment 
when  France  was  lending  Bismarck  her  support  in  his 
anti-Austrian  policy.  Only  through  Austria's  hesita- 


202  MODERN    GERMANY 

tion  to  follow  Bismarck's  lead  was  France  saved  from 
destruction  in  1866,  but  she  became  the  victim  of 
Bismarck's  machinations  four  years  later. 

In  order  to  keep  France  in  good  humour  during 
the  Austro-Prussian  War,  Bismarck  verbally  promised 
France  the  Rhine  as  a  reward  for  her  support,  but 
when  France  wished  to  have  this  promise  given  in 
writing,  Bismarck  skilfully  drew  out  negotiations  and 
delayed  and  procrastinated  during  the  critical  period 
of  the  war,  until  the  decisive  victory  gained  by  the 
Prussians  at  Koniggratz  had  made  France's  support 
against  Austria  superfluous  and  had  brought  peace 
in  sight.  Before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  France, 
who  began  to  fear  that  Bismarck  was  playing  false  to 
her,  pressed  for  the  territorial  compensation  which 
Bismarck  had  held  in  view  before  the  war,  but  her 
demands  were  met  with  derision,  and  the  intimation 
that,  in  case  of  need,  Bismarck  would  not  hesitate  to 
make  peace  at  any  price  with  Austria,  and  induce 
her  to  march  together  with  Prussia  against  France. 
In  that  case  Austria  and  Prussia  would  aggrandise 
themselves  at  the  expense  of  France.  As  a  consider- 
able part  of  the  French  army  was  fighting  in  Mexico 
at  that  time,  Napoleon  was  unable  to  prevent  the 
undue  strengthening  of  Prussia,  and  it  became  clear 
that  the  historic  struggle  for  supremacy  between 
France  and  Germany  would  soon  have  to  be  renewed. 
Since  1866  Bismarck  skilfully  increased  the  bitter- 
ness which  France,  after  having  been  deceived  by 
Bismarck,  naturally  felt  for  Prussia,  partly  by  inflicting 
a  number  of  humiliations  upon  French  diplomacy  in 
the  Luxemburg  question,  the  Belgian  question,  &c., 
partly  by  rousing  the  discontent  of  the  excitable 
French  masses  against  Prussia.  The  convenience  of 
Bismarck's  policy  required  a  Franco-German  war, 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  203 

for  only  the  enthusiasm  created  by  such  a  war,  which 
was  likely  to  be  immensely  popular  in  Germany, 
where  the  remembrance  of  the  first  Napoleon  was 
still  kept  green,  could  make  the  unification  of  Germany 
possible.  Since  1866,  a  Franco-Prussian  war  had 
become  unavoidable,  but  French  diplomacy  was  un- 
skilful enough  to  walk  into  the  Spanish  trap  which 
Bismarck  skilfully  had  baited,  and  declared  war 
against  Prussia  upon  a  pretext  which,  in  the  eyes  of 
the  world,  put  France  in  the  wrong.  The  mistake  of 
France's  diplomacy  was  Bismarck's  opportunity.  On 
the  ruins  of  France  and  in  accordance  with  Bismarck's 
programme  a  united  Germany  was  founded,  whose 
main  object  it  was  proclaimed  to  be  to  resist  for  all 
time  the  wanton  aggression  of  Germany's  hereditary 
enemy.  Thus  the  unity  of  Germany  was  cemented 
with  French  blood,  and  Thiers  spoke  truly  when  he 
said  to  Bismarck  at  Versailles,  "  C'est  nous  qui  avons 
fait  1'union  de  1'Allemagne." 

It  is  often  said  that  the  war  of  1870-71  has  been 
forgotten,  and  that  France  no  longer  bears  Germany 
any  ill-will ;  but  it  seems  doubtful  whether  this  is 
the  case,  for  the  ill-effect  of  that  war  has  been  much 
greater  to  France  than  is  generally  known.  It  appears 
that  almost  700,000  lives  were  lost  to  France,  partly 
through  the  war,  partly  through  the  subsequent  out- 
break of  the  Commune,  and  the  loss  of  French  capital 
occasioned  by  the  war  must  be  estimated  at  about 
£800,000,000.  In  Alsace-Lorraine  France  lost  a  stretch 
of  territory  which  is  about  three  times  as  large  as 
the  county  of  Lancashire,  and  which,  by  its  highly- 
developed  industries,  might  have  been  called  the 
Lancashire  of  France.  If  we  look  at  the  population 
returns  of  France  for  1866  and  1872,  we  find  that 
during  that  period  the  population  of  France  decreased 


204  MODERN    GERMANY 

by  1,964,173,  and  if  we  add  to  that  figure  the  average 
yearly  increase  of  the  French  population  during  the 
six  years  between  1866  and  1872,  we  arrive  at  the 
result  that  the  war  and  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
combined  must  have  caused  the  loss  of  about  2,800,000 
people  to  France. 

By  now  France  has,  no  doubt,  recovered  from  the 
enormous  monetary  losses  which  the  war  caused. 
Nevertheless,  the  war  has  left  indelible  traces  upon 
the  country.  The  enormous  wastage  of  national 
capital  and  the  enormously  increased  National  Debt 
of  the  country,  together  with  the  necessity  for  France 
to  recreate  her  army  on  the  largest  scale,  and  to 
maintain  it,  notwithstanding  her  shrunken  resources 
in  men  and  money,  has  made  necessary  a  most  oppres- 
sive taxation,  which  can  be  met  only  by  the  exercise 
of  the  most  rigid  economy  on  the  part  of  all  individual 
tax-payers.  Hence  the  Franco-German  War  seems 
to  have  led  to  a  falling-off  in  the  birth-rate  of  France, 
which  was  much  smaller  after  the  war  than  it  had 
been  before,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  station- 
ariness  of  the  population  of  France  is  greatly,  and 
perhaps  chiefly,  caused  by  the  after-effects  of  that 
unfortunate  war. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Franco-German  War 
has  inflicted  four  decades  of  suffering  upon  all  French 
families,  it  can  hardly  be  expected  that  the  masses 
of  the  French  nation  have  become  the  friends  and 
well-wishers  of  Germany.  The  small  rentiers  of 
France  and  the  thrifty  peasants,  with  all  their  love 
of  peace  and  quiet,  know  quite  well  that  taxation  in 
France  will  remain  high  as  long  as  France  is  compelled 
to  maintain  her  enormous  army.  Nevertheless,  they 
are  determined  not  to  expose  themselves  to  the  possi- 
bility of  another  disastrous  defeat.  Hence  the  high 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  205 

taxation  is  borne  without  grumbling  in  the  silent 
hope  that  a  time  may  arrive  when,  in  consequence  of 
the  weakening  of  France's  eastern  neighbour,  France 
may  again  be  able  to  lighten  her  oppressive  armour. 

The  German  newspapers  speak  the  truth  when 
they  assert  that  the  old  spirit  of  revanche  has  died 
out  in  France.  Revanche  is  not  a  policy  but  a  sen- 
timent, and  France  has  learned,  to  her  cost,  how 
dangerous  it  is  to  be  led  by  sentiment  in  matters 
political.  It  is,  therefore,  not  so  much  the  aim  of 
French  policy  to  endeavour  to  weaken  Germany  as 
it  is  to  strengthen  France.  France  wishes  to  live  in 
peace  and  security  with  all  her  neighbours,  Germany 
included,  but  at  the  same  time  she  wishes  to  be  strong 
enough  to  be  able  to  hold  her  own  in  the  world.  AT 
policy  is,  after  all,  based  on  force,  and  no  policy  can 
be  successful  which  is  not  backed  by  sufficient  military 
and  naval  strength.  Therefore,  France  has  endea- 
voured to  create  and  to  maintain  an  army  sufficiently 
strong  to  meet  that  of  Germany,  but  she  finds  her 
task  from  year  to  year  more  difficult,  owing  to  the 
increasing  discrepancy  between  the  population  of 
France  and  that  of  Germany,  which  is  apparent  from 
the  following  table  : — 

Population  of  Population  of 

Germany.  France. 

1872 41,230,000  36,103,000 

1876 43,059,000  36,906,000 

1881 45,428,000  37,672,000 

1886 47,134,000  38,219,000 

1891 49,762,000  38,343,000 

1896 52,753,000  38,518,000 

I9OI 56,862,000  38,962,000 

1912  (estimated)     .  66,000,000  39,600,000 

From  the  foregoing  figures  it  appears  that,  in  1870, 
France  and  Germany  were  about  equally  populous, 


206  MODERN    GERMANY 

but  that  now  the  population  of  Germany  is  more 
than  fifty  per  cent,  larger  than  is  that  of  France. 
Notwithstanding  her  great  numerical  inferiority, 
France  has,  until  now,  succeeded  in  maintaining  an 
army  as  large  as  is  that  of  Germany,  bat  if  the  German 
population  continues  to  increase  at  the  present  rate, 
the  time  will  not  be  far  distant  when  France  will  no 
longer  be  able  to  rival  Germany  in  the  number  of  her 
soldiers,  and  then  France  will  automatically  sink  to  a 
secondary  rank  among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 
Time  is  fighting  on  Germany's  side,  and  therefore  it 
is  to  the  interest  of  Germany  to  maintain  peace  with 
France  as  long  as  possible,  whilst  it  is  to  the  interest 
of  France  to  utilise  the  earliest  opportunity  that  may 
offer  for  crushing  Germany.  Even  the  most  peaceful 
Frenchmen  who  have,  personally,  the  best  disposi- 
tions towards  Germany  are  bound  to  work  for  Ger- 
many's downfall. 

If  France  should  succeed  in  defeating  Germany, 
she  will  certainly  claim  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  she  would 
probably  demand  all  German  territory  up  to  the 
Rhine,  for  reasons  which  will  be  shown  later  on.  On 
the  territory  between  the  present  Franco-German 
frontier  and  the  Rhine  7,000,000  inhabitants  are  living, 
who  would  be  greatly  welcome  in  France,  and  who 
would,  to  some  extent,  improve  her  unfavourable 
population  figures. 

France  has  fought  for  centuries  for  the  possession 
of  the  Rhine,  which  the  French  consider  the  natural 
political  frontier  of  their  country ;  and  it  must  be 
admitted  that,  from  the  French  point  of  view,  the 
possession  of  the  Rhine  is  indispensable  for  the 
security  of  the  country. 

Every  nation  strives  to  secure  itself  against  inva- 
sion by  obtaining  strong  natural  defensive  boundaries. 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  207 

The  sea,  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Alps  protect  France 
nearly  from  all  sides.  In  the  sea-shores  and  the  high 
mountain  chains  surrounding  her,  France  has  found 
her  natural  frontiers  long  ago.  Only  her  north-east 
frontier  is  an  open  one,  and  has  been  an  open  one 
for  centuries,  and,  consequently,  France  has  always 
striven,  and  will  continue  to  strive  to  make  the  Rhine 
her  protection  against  Germany.  Besides,  France 
has  a  historical  claim  to  the  Rhine.  We  read  already 
in  Tacitus,  "  Germania  a  Gallis  Rheno  separatur," 
and  Csesar  also  mentions  that  Gaul  extends  from  the 
Rhine  to  the  ocean. 

A  glance  at  the  map  shows  why  the  possession  of 
the  Rhine  is  now  more  than  ever  an  absolute  necessity 
to  France.  In  Continental  warfare,  the  main  object 
of  an  invading  army  is  the  capital,  which,  owing  to  the 
great  centralisation  of  the  political  and  economic  ad- 
ministration, is  at  the  same  time  the  heart  and  the 
head  of  the  body  politic.  By  the  exposed  and  insecure 
position  of  her  capital,  France  is  most  unfortunately 
situated  compared  with  Germany.  Whilst  Berlin 
lies  400  miles  from  the  Franco-German  frontier,  only 
170  miles  separate  Paris  from  Metz.  Besides,  Berlin 
is  protected  against  an  invasion  from  the  west  by 
a  triple  line  of  exceedingly  strong  natural  defences. 
A  French  army  advancing  upon  Berlin  would  have 
to  cross  three  huge,  swift-flowing  rivers,  the  Rhine, 
the  Weser,  and  the  Elbe,  which  lie  at  right  angles  with 
its  line  of  march,  and  between  these  three  broad  and 
deep  streams  numerous  large  mountain  chains,  which 
afford  splendid  opportunities  for  defence,  are  found. 
Germany's  main  defensive  frontier  towards  France  is 
not  formed  by  her  fortresses  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  but 
by  the  Rhine  and  by  a  dozen  powerful  fortresses 
on  that  river,  which  extend  from  the  Isteiner  Klotz 


208  MODERN    GERMANY 

opposite  Basle  down  to  Wesel  on  the  Dutch  frontier, 
and  the  towns  on  the  Rhine  are  so  strongly  fortified 
that  it  seems  almost  impossible  for  an  army  to  cross 
it  in  the  face  of  a  determined  opposition. 

Whilst  Berlin  lies  far  away  from  the  French  frontier 
and  is  splendidly  protected  against  an  invasion  from 
the  west,  Paris  lies  but  eight  days'  march  from  an 
open  frontier  which  is  almost  completely  devoid  of 
natural  obstacles.  The  small,  easily-fordable  Me  use 
is  the  only  stream  between  Metz  and  Paris,  and  no 
great  mountain  chains,  which  could  stop  an  invader, 
are  found  between  Paris  and  the  German  frontier. 
Paris  is,  indeed,  within  easy  reach  of  the  German  army. 

Not  satisfied  with  her  triple  line  of  defences  against 
France,  Germany  has  made  Alsace-Lorraine  enormously 
strong  for  defence,  and  has  converted  it  into  an  ad- 
vanced work  in  front  of  the  Rhine  frontier.  At  the 
same  time,  Alsace-Lorraine  has  been  turned  into  an 
ideal  starting-point  for  an  attack  against  France. 
Germany  has  prepared,  throughout  Alsace-Lorraine, 
permanent  defensive  positions  of  the  greatest  strength 
at  all  points  where  a  battle  is  likely  to  occur.  Be- 
sides, the  fortresses  of  Alsace-Lorraine  have  lately 
been  enormously  strengthened.  Metz,  for  instance, 
has  been  surrounded  with  forts  which  lie  eight  miles 
from  the  town,  and  these  defences  have  been  joined 
with  the  fortifications  on  the  Gentringer  Hohe,  near 
Diedenhofen,  through  the  inclusion  of  which  the 
fortress  of  Metz  now  practically  extends  over  twenty- 
five  miles  of  country,  and  is,  therefore,  almost  un- 
besiegable. 

The  offensive  strength  of  Alsace-Lorraine  lies  in 
its  excellent  railway  net.  Whilst  seven  railway  lines 
run  from  Alsace-Lorraine  into  France,  eight  or  nine 
purely  strategical  lines  run  towards  France  and 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  209 

end  abruptly  near  the  French  frontier.  Furthermore, 
enormous  sidings  and  huge  open-air  stations,  which 
are  solely  meant  for  use  in  time  of  war,  have  been 
constructed,  and  thus  Germany  is  able  to  unload  in 
the  minimum  of  time  a  huge  army  in  any  part  of  the 
country  close  to  the  French  boundaries.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  Germany  is  able  to  detrain  150,000  to 
200,000  men  per  day  between  Metz  and  Strasburg. 

France,  being  deprived  of  a  natural  frontier  facing 
Germany,  and  even  of  natural  obstacles  between  her 
north-eastern  frontier  and  Paris,  has  constructed  a 
line  of  forts  along  the  200  miles  of  her  frontier.  These 
forts  lie,  on  an  average,  about  five  miles  apart  and 
form  a  continuous  line.  Only  two  gaps,  the  Trouee 
de  la  Meuse,  between  the  Belgian  frontier  and  Verdun, 
which  is  twenty  miles  wide,  and  the  Trouee  de  la 
Moselle,  between  Toul  and  Epinal,  which  is  thirty 
miles  wide,  are  left  open,  and  in  these  openings  the 
French  armies  are  to  be  assembled  at  the  outbreak 
of  war. 

The  weak  artificial  screen  of  forts  facing  Germany 
is  the  sole  obstacle  which  an  invader  meets  in  ad- 
vancing upon  Paris.  As  soon  as  he  has  passed  the 
line  of  forts,  Paris  is  in  his  grasp.  It  is  therefore 
clear  that  the  north-eastern  frontier  of  France  is  a 
most  unsatisfactory  one,  and  all  French  patriots  must 
desire  to  obtain  again  a  strong  natural  defensive 
frontier,  further  away  from  Paris.  Even  the  most 
peaceful  boulevardiers  in  Paris  must  have  that  desire. 
From  the  foregoing  it  is  clear  that  the  wish  of  all 
thoughtful  Frenchmen  to  obtain  again  the  Rhine 
frontier  is  not  a  sentimental,  but  a  purely  logical  one, 
and  the  weaker  France  is  as  compared  with  Germany, 
the  greater  is  her  need  for  a  strong  frontier  such  as 
that  which  is  formed  by  the  Rhine. 


210  MODERN    GERMANY 

It  is  therefore  only  natural  that  all  patriotic 
Frenchmen  must  strive  to  regain  Alsace-Lorraine, 
and,  if  possible,  the  Rhine.  To  acquiesce  in  France's 
present  mutilation,  to  make  peace  with  Germany 
and  to  allow  France  gradually  to  become  a  Power 
of  secondary  rank,  would  mean  national  extinction. 
Great  Britain,  Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  Spain  possess 
powerful  natural  defensive  frontiers,  which  protect 
them  against  their  mightiest  neighbours.  France, 
if  she  accepts  her  present  position  as  final,  will  sink 
to  the  level  of  Spain  without,  however,  possessing  a 
strong  frontier  such  as  Spain  possesses,  and  in  course 
of  time  she  will  become  a  second  Belgium. 

Whilst  patriotic  Frenchmen  cannot  possibly  con- 
template with  satisfaction  the  present  position  of 
France,  Germany  has  every  reason  to  be  gratified 
with  the  status  quo,  and  to  wish  that,  by  the  natural 
development  of  things,  France  should  gradually  and 
peacefully  sink  to  the  second,  or  even  to  the  third, 
rank  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

No  nation  desires  to  have  a  strong  neighbour,  least 
of  all  a  nation  which  wishes  to  expand  at  the  cost 
of  other  nations.  Between  1870  and  1912  the  popu- 
lation of  Germany  has  grown  from  40,000,000  to 
66,000,000.  Professor  Schmoller  estimates  that  the 
German  population  will  amount  to  104,000,000  in 
1965,  Professor  Hiibbe-Schleiden  is  of  opinion  that 
it  will  come  to  150,000,000  in  1980,  and  M.  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  thinks  that  the  Germans  will  number  more 
than  200,000,000  within  a  century. 

Germany  will  hardly  be  able  to  feed  and  clothe 
her  rapidly  growing  population  much  longer  within 
her  present  boundaries,  and,  as  she  is  loth  to  strengthen 
foreign  nations  with  her  surplus  population,  she 
wishes  to  have  her  elbows  free  in  order  to  be  able 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  211 

to  expand.  Expansion  by  peaceful  means,  whether 
it  be  within  or  without  Europe,  seems  out  of  the 
question.  Hence,  it  is  Germany's  interest  to  weaken 
beforehand  her  potential  enemies ;  and  France  is 
considered  by  Germany  as  a  potential  enemy,  who 
waits  only  for  a  favourable  opportunity  to  attack 
Germany.  On  this  point,  Bismarck  said  in  the 
Reichstag,  on  the  nth  of  January  1887  : 

"  Has  there  ever  been  a  French  minority  which 
could  venture  publicly  and  unconditionally  to  say, 
We  renounce  regaining  Alsace-Lorraine.  We  shall 
not  make  war  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  we  accept  the 
Peace  of  Frankfort  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  we 
accepted  the  Peace  of  Paris  in  1815  ?  Is  there  a 
ministry  in  Paris  which  would  have  the  courage  to 
make  such  a  declaration  ?  Why  is  there  no  such 
ministry  ?  For  the  French  have  hitherto  not  lacked 
courage.  No  such  ministry  exists,  because  such  a 
policy  is  opposed  to  public  sentiment  in  France. 
France  is  like  an  engine  which  is  filled  with  steam 
up  to  the  point  of  explosion,  and  a  spark,  a  clumsy 
movement  of  the  hand,  may  suffice  to  cause  an  ex- 
plosion, to  bring  on  war.  However,  the  fire  is  so 
carefully  tended  and  nursed  that  it  seems  at  first 
sight  not  likely  that  it  will  ever  be  used  for  causing  a 
conflagration  in  the  neighbouring  country. 

"If  you  study  French  history,  you  will  find  that 
the  most  important  decisions  have  been  taken  in 
France  not  by  the  will  of  the  people  but  by  the  will 
of  an  energetic  minority.  Those  people  in  France 
who  contemplate  war  with  Germany,  at  present  only 
prepare  everything  in  order  to  be  able  to  commence 
such  a  war  with  the  maximum  of  force.  Their  task 
is  to  keep  alive  le  feu  sacrt  de  la  revanche,  a  task  which 
Gambetta  defined  in  the  motto:  'Ne  parlez  jamais 


212  MODERN    GERMANY 

de  la  guerre,  mais  pensez-y  toujours,'  and  that  is  to- 
day still  the  attitude  of  France.  French  people  do  not 
speak  of  the  possibility  of  an  aggressive  war  against 
Germany,  but  only  of  the  fear  of  being  attacked  by 
Germany. 

"  France  will  probably  attack  us  as  soon  as  she 
has  reason  to  think  that  she  is  stronger  than  we  are. 
As  soon  as  France  believes  that  she  can  defeat  Ger- 
many, war  with  Germany  is,  I  think,  a  certainty. 
The  conviction  that  France  is  stronger  than  Germany 
may  arise  from  the  alliances  which  France  may  be 
able  to  conclude.  I  do  not  believe  that  such  alliances 
will  be  concluded  by  France,  and  it  is  the  task  of 
German  diplomacy  either  to  prevent  the  conclusion 
of  such  alliances,  or  to  counterbalance  such  alliances 
with  counter-alliances." 

It  was  Bismarck's  conviction  that  France  would 
seek  revenge  for  her  defeat,  and  therefore  he  en- 
deavoured to  ruin  France  by  the  severe  conditions 
of  peace.  Although  the  Franco-German  War  had 
cost  Germany  only  about  £60,000,000,  he  exacted 
almost  £250,000,000  from  France,  and  was  greatly 
disappointed  that  France  so  easily  paid  that  sum  and 
recovered  so  rapidly.  Fearing  France's  revenge,  Ger- 
many contemplated  already,  in  1875,  an  attack  upon 
France,  and  in  February  of  that  year  Herr  von  Rado- 
witz  was  sent  to  Russia  to  sound  the  Czar  and  to 
find  out  whether  Russia  would  remain  neutral  in  the 
event  of  the  struggle  between  France  and  Germany 
being  renewed.  Happily  for  France,  Germany's  de- 
sign miscarried  owing  to  the  energetic  opposition  of 
Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

Finding  himself  foiled  in  his  design  to  ruin  France 
before  she  had  recovered  from  her  defeat,  Bismarck 
strove  to  isolate  France,  being  of  opinion,  as  he  said 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  213 

in  his  Memoirs,  that  France  would  certainly  aid  Russia 
if  a  collision  should  take  place  between  Russia  and 
Germany.  Therefore  he  wrote,  on  the  2oth  December 
1872,  to  Count  Arnim,  the  German  Ambassador  in 
Paris  :  "  We  do  not  want  to  be  disturbed  by  France, 
but  if  France  does  not  intend  to  keep  the  peace  we 
must  prevent  her  finding  allies."  With  this  object 
in  view,  Bismarck  skilfully  isolated  France  by  bringing 
her  into  collision  with  Italy,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain  ; 
and  as  long  as  Bismarck  was  in  power  the  foreign 
policy  of  France  was  directed  from  Berlin,  and  France 
had  not  a  friend,  not  a  champion  in  the  wide  world. 
France  was  an  outcast  among  nations. 

Bismarck  most  carefully  watched  France's  relations 
with  foreign  countries,  and  as  soon  as  he  thought  that 
France  was  trying  to  pursue  a  policy  of  her  own  with- 
out consulting  Berlin,  and  was  endeavouring  to 
improve  her  relations  with  a  foreign  country,  he  at 
once  raised  the  spectre  of  war.  In  1887,  for  instance, 
the  Goblet  Ministry  was  trying  to  settle  the  Egyptian 
Question,  and  thus  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with 
Great  Britain.  However,  before  France  was  able  to 
come  to  the  desired  arrangement,  Bismarck  used  the 
ridiculous  Schnabele  incident  on  the  Franco-German 
frontier  for  a  violent  war-agitation,  compared  with 
which  the  recent  Morocco  incident  was  merely  child's- 
play.  France  was  almost  frightened  out  of  her  wits. 
The  contemplated  arrangement  with  Great  Britain 
was  dropped,  and  on  May  7th,  1887,  M.  Goblet  said 
at  Havre  :  "  For  fifteen  years  we  have  been  asking 
the  country  each  year  for  £40,000,000,  and  now,  when 
the  country  has  been  smitten  on  the  one  cheek,  we 
can  only  advise  her  to  turn  the  other  cheek  to  the 
smiter." 

Soon  after  Bismarck  had  been  dismissed  by  the 


214  MODERN    GERMANY 

Emperor  William,  France  succeeded  in  coming  to 
some  arrangement  with  Russia,  the  character  and 
scope  of  which  have  remained  secret ;  but  although 
both  Frenchmen  and  Russians  have  frequently  been 
speaking  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance,  there  is  very 
good  reason  for  believing  that  there  exists  no  Franco- 
Russian  alliance,  but  at  the  best  a  Franco-Russian 
military  convention.  Bismarck  sceptically  remarked, 
shortly  before  his  death,  "  '  Nations  alliees  '  need  by 
no  means  signify  that  there  is  an  alliance,  and  words 
like  these  are  sometimes  only  used  for  the  sake  of 
politeness."  From  what  has  since  leaked  out,  it 
appears  that  Bismarck  was  right,  and  that  there  never 
was  a  Franco-Russian  alliance,  notwithstanding  the 
numerous  solemn  assertions  to  the  contrary. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  "  alliance  " 
was  taken  very  philosophically  at  Berlin,  for  such  an 
event  was  considered  to  be  inevitable  in  view  of  the 
friction  which  had  taken  place  between  Russia  and 
Germany  after  the  present  Emperor  had  come  to  the 
throne.  Therefore,  German  diplomacy  concentrated 
its  efforts  upon  keeping  the  Anglo-French  differ- 
ences alive,  and  tried  to  forestall  France  by  previously 
coming  to  an  understanding  with  this  country. 

At  that  time  Germany's  most  valuable  colonies, 
including  Zanzibar,  were  exchanged  against  the  then 
valueless  rock  of  Heligoland,  an  exchange  which  was 
greeted  with  dismay  by  all  Germans,  for  it  was  clearly 
recognised  by  them  that  that  bargain  was  a  very  one- 
sided and  a  most  unsatisfactory  one  for  Germany. 
Even  in  Great  Britain  people  shook  their  heads  at  this 
exchange,  the  advantage  of  which  to  Germany  could 
not  be  seen.  Nevertheless,  from  the  German  point  of 
view  this  exchange  was  a  most  excellent  bargain, 
for  France  had  been  forestalled  by  it.  Von  Capri vi, 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  215 

the  then  Chancellor,  did  not  even  try  to  explain  that 
Germany  had  received  an  adequate  quid  pro  quo  in 
giving  up  her  best  colonies,  but  he  simply  stated  in 
the  Reichstag,  in  defending  the  exchange  :  "  We  meant, 
before  all,  to  maintain  our  good  understanding  with 
Great  Britain." 

It  was  Bismarck's  policy  not  only  to  isolate  France 
by  embroiling  her  with  all  her  neighbours  and  by  dis- 
crediting her  everywhere,  but  also  to  weaken  her 
financial  and  military  power  by  encouraging  her  to 
waste  her  military  and  financial  strength  in  unprofit- 
able colonial  adventures  in  every  quarter  of  the  world. 
France  went  to  West  Africa  and  to  Tonkin  at  Bis- 
marck's bidding,  and,  imagining  to  create  colonies, 
she  founded  vast  military  settlements  which  sap  her 
strength.  How  greatly  France  is  weakened  by  her 
possessions  abroad  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
she  has  to  keep  about  70,000  white  soldiers  in  her 
colonies,  and  she  can  ill  spare  them. 

If  we  review  the  policy  which  Germany  has  con- 
tinually pursued  towards  France  from  1871  down  to 
the  present  day,  we  find  that  Germany  has  consistently 
and  persistently  endeavoured  to  weaken  France  in 
every  possible  way,  and  that  she  has  succeeded  in 
turning  all  her  neighbours  into  enemies  to  her.  Foreign 
ministers  came  and  foreign  ministers  went  in  France  in 
rapid  succession,  but,  whether  they  liked  it  or  not,  all 
had  to  play  Germany's  game  to  the  harm  of  their 
country.  France  was  the  abject  tool  of  Germany  and 
the  laughing-stock  of  the  world,  until  at  last,  in  the 
year  1898,  M.  Delcasse  entered  the  French  Foreign 
Office. 

When  M.  Delcasse  became  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  he  found,  with  amazement,  that  the 
foreign  policy  of  France  was  directed  by  Germany, 


216  MODERN    GERMANY 

and  that,  at  the  bidding  of  German  statesmen,  France 
had  obediently  embroiled  herself  with  Italy  over 
Tunis,  with  Spain  over  various  questions,  and  with 
Great  Britain  over  Egypt.  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  it  was  his  first  task  to  settle  the  thankless  Fashoda 
problem,  M.  Delcasse  entered  upon  his  duties  with 
the  firm  determination  to  reconcile  France  with  Italy 
and  Spain,  and  especially  with  Great  Britain,  and  no 
longer  to  oppose  Great  Britain  in  Germany's  interests. 
In  the  beginning  of  November  1898,  a  few  days  after 
Colonel  Marchand  had  been  ordered  back  from 
Fashoda,  M.  Delcasse  said  in  his  study  to  a  friend  of 
mine  :  "I  mean  not  to  leave  this  fauteuil  without 
having  re-established  good  relations  with  Great 
Britain."  Such  a  declaration  required  considerable 
moral  courage  at  a  time  when  Great  Britain  and 
France  stood  on  the  brink  of  war. 

When  Germany  saw  that  France  was  slipping  away 
from  German  control,  that  France  was  trying  to  pursue 
a  national  policy,  and  that  she  succeeded  in  making 
friends  with  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Spain,  she  tried 
for  a  long  time  to  regain  control  over  the  foreign 
policy  of  France  by  personal  advances  to  individual 
Frenchmen,  by  flattering  the  vanity  of  France,  by 
urging  that  the  interests  of  France  and  Germany  were 
identical,  and  by  persistently  extolling  the  benefits 
and  the  necessity  of  a  Franco-German  alliance  as  the 
best  guarantee  for  maintaining  peace  in  Europe. 
However,  notwithstanding  Germany's  advances,  M. 
Delcasse  remained  passive  and  almost  indifferent, 
and  observed  a  cautious  reserve  towards  Germany. 
Nevertheless,  Germany  continued  her  advances  until 
the  battle  of  Mukden  had  shown  that  the  Russian 
army  was  no  longer  a  factor  upon  the  support  of  which 
France  could  reckon  in  case  she  should  be  attacked  by 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  217 

Germany.  Then,  and  then  only,  came  the  Morocco 
crisis  and  Germany's  threat  of  war. 

M.  Delcasse  has  made  many  mistakes  during  his 
seven  years'  tenure  of  office.  Still,  he  has  deserved 
well  of  France,  for  he  has  led  her  into  the  path  of 
independence  after  twenty-seven  years  of  political 
dependence  upon  Germany. 

As  the  German  Press  still  recommends  the  con- 
clusion of  a  Franco-German  alliance  for  preserving 
peace  in  Europe,  we  may  cast  a  glance  at  the  true 
inwardness  of  that  proposal.  Germany  is  surrounded 
by  weaker  nations  on  every  side,  and  she  is  threatened 
by  none.  So  strong  is  Germany  considered  to  be  by 
her  foremost  military  men,  that  the  late  Count  Wal- 
dersee  stated,  a  few  years  ago,  at  the  officers'  casino 
at  Kaiserslautern,  that  Germany  alone  was  strong 
enough  to  defeat,  single-handed,  France  and  Russia 
combined.  Therefore  Germany,  who  is  backed  by 
Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  need  not  seek  a  defensive 
alliance  with  France  against  any  Continental  nation 
or  any  Continental  nations.  The  only  nations  against 
which  a  Franco-German  alliance  could  possibly  be 
directed  would  be  England  or  the  United  States,  and 
as  neither  England  nor  the  United  States  is  an  aggres- 
sive nation,  a  Franco-German  alliance  could  hardly 
bear  a  defensive  character. 

Recent  history  supplies  the  proof  that  a  Franco- 
German  alliance  would  not  be  a  defensive  alliance. 
At  no  time  were  Germany's  advances  to  France  more 
assiduous  than  when  Germany  was  trying  to  raise  a 
coalition  against  this  country.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  Boer  War  the  whole  German  Press  entreated 
France  to  join  hands  with  Germany  and  to  assist  in 
humbling  Great  Britain  to  the  dust.  On  October  5th, 
1899,  three  days  after  the  mobilisation  of  the  Boer 


2i8  MODERN   GERMANY 

troops,  an  article  appeared  in  Die  Grenzboten,  the 
leading  journal  of  the  semi-official  press  of  Germany, 
in  which  it  was  said  : 

"  All  differences  between  France  and  Germany  benefit  only 
the  nearly  all-powerful  Enemy  of  the  World.  As  long  as 
the  French  keep  one  eye  fixed  on  Alsace-Lorraine,  it  is  no 
good  that  they  occasionally  look  at  England  with  the  other 
eye.  Only  when  the  strength  of  the  German  fleet  is  com- 
mensurate with  her  sea  interest  will  the  French  seek  our 
friendship,  instead  of  being  humiliated  by  their  hereditary 
enemy." 

In  this  and  numerous  other  articles  France  was 
entreated  to  crush  England,  her  hereditary  enemy, 
joining  a  coalition  of  Continental  Powers. 

I  was  in  Paris  during  the  Morocco  crisis  of  1905, 
when  extreme  nervousness  had  taken  hold  of  many 
French  politicians,  journalists,  and  Stock  Exchange 
operators.  In  the  highest  military  circles,  however, 
the  possibility  of  an  outbreak  of  war  with  Germany 
was  contemplated  with  perfect  confidence  in  the 
strength  and  excellence  of  the  French  army. 

Clausewitz,  the  greatest  military  writer  of  modern 
times,  has  justly  said  :  "  He  must  be  a  good  engineer 
who  is  able  to  gauge  the  value  of  a  very  complicated 
machine  whilst  it  is  at  rest,  for  he  must  not  only  see  that 
all  parts  are  there,  but  he  must  also  be  able  to  analyse 
the  state  of  each  individual  part  when  it  will  be  in 
action.  But  which  machine  resembles  in  its  many- 
sidedness  and  intricacy  of  construction  the  military 
power  ?  "  It  is,  of  course,  a  difficult  matter  to  form 
an  opinion  of  an  army  in  time  of  peace.  Still,  the 
confidence  of  the  French  generals  in  their  army  seems 
by  no  means  to  be  misplaced.  In  case  of  war,  France 
can  mobilise  three  million  men  and  more.  And  the 
men  are  alert  and  willing ;  they  are  well  disciplined 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  219 

and  well  trained,  and  their  training  is  a  thoroughly 
practical  one.  The  first  article  of  the  Reglement  sur 
les  Manoeuvres  de  rinfanterie  says  :  "  La  preparation 
a  la  euerre  est  le  but  unique  de  1'instruction  des 
troupes,"  and  that  principle  governs  the  training  of 
the  whole  French  army. 

The  equipment  of  the  French  army  is,  on  the 
whole,  very  superior  to  that  of  the  German  army. 
The  boots,  clothes,  knapsacks,  cooking  utensils,  &c., 
of  the  men  appear  to  be  more  practical  and  more 
serviceable  than  those  of  the  German  army ;  the 
French  horses  are  distinctly  superior  to  the  average 
of  the  German  horses  ;  the  rifles  of  both  armies  are 
about  equally  good ;  the  French  artillery  is  supposed 
to  be  superior  to  the  German  artillery. 

In  1870,  France  did  not  possess  a  national  army. 
Her  troops  were  a  rabble,  they  fought  without  en- 
thusiasm for  a  cause  which,  at  least  at  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign,  was  not  understood  by  them,  and 
they  were  pitted  against  a  national  army  which  fought 
for  the  greatest  of  causes.  To-day  every  Frenchman 
knows  that,  in  a  war  with  Germany,  he  will  fight  for 
all  that  is  dear  to  him,  that  he  will  fight  for  his  hearth 
and  home.  The  French  would  enter  upon  a  war 
with  Germany  conscious  that  such  a  war  would  be 
a  struggle  for  life  or  death  to  France,  whilst  the 
German  army  would  hardly  in  a  similar  spirit  enter 
upon  a  war  of  wanton  aggression  over  the  Morocco 
Question  or  some  similar  shallow  pretext  for  war. 
For  these  reasons,  the  best-informed  French  soldiers 
did  not  fear  an  encounter  with  Germany  at  the  time 
of  the  first  Morocco  crisis.  French  nervousness  was 
restricted  to  the  civilian  element  of  the  population, 
but  even  civilian  France  is  becoming  conscious  of  her 


220  MODERN   GERMANY 

strength.     That  consciousness  is  bound  to  affect  the 
nature  of  Franco-German  relations. 

Formerly  France  tried  to  emulate  the  navy  of  this 
country  ;  now  she  is  a  third-rate  naval  Power  which 
is  no  longer  able  to  meet  Germany  on  the  seas.  Ac- 
cording to  the  German  Naval  Year  Book  Nauticus  of 
1911,  the  French  and  the  German  fleets  will  compare 
as  follows  in  May  1913  : — 

BATTLESHIPS  OF  MORE  THAN   10,000  TONS  AND  ARMOURED 

CRUISERS  OF  MORE  THAN  5000  TONS  LAUNCHED  SINCE 
1894 

France.  Germany. 

Number      Tonnage  Number     Tonnage 

Battleships      ....     19         282,210  30         459,000 

Armoured  Cruisers  .     .     19         200,320  12          160,590 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  tonnage  of  the  German 
battleships  is  exactly  60  per  cent,  larger  than  that 
of  France,  and  that  supremacy  should  soon  be  very 
much  larger  than  50  per  cent.  At  the  moment  Ger- 
many is  building  more  super-Dreadnoughts  than 
France,  and  Germany  builds  much  faster  than  France 
can  build.  Besides,  the  organisation  and  discipline 
in  the  French  navy  and  in  the  French  dockyards 
leave  much  to  be  desired.  They  are  honeycombed 
with  Socialism,  and  have  suffered  much  from  the 
misrule  of  political  demagogues. 

In  comparing  the  French  and  German  naval  forces, 
we  must  remember  that  France  has  many  vulnerable 
spots  on  her  coast  to  defend,  for  all  her  great  harbours 
can  be  shelled  from  the  sea,  whilst  the  German  coasts, 
with  their  extensive  sandbanks,  which  every  year 
change  their  shape,  need  no  mobile  defence  whatever. 
Then  again,  half  of  the  French  fleet  is  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, far  away  from  the  northern  coast  of  France, 


GERMANY    AND    FRANCE  221 

whilst  the  whole  of  the  German  fleet  can  be  concen- 
trated within  a  few  hours  in  the  North  Sea.  Lastly, 
the  German  ships  possess  a  far  greater  homogeneity 
than  the  French  ships,  and  the  former  can  therefore 
be  more  easily  manoeuvred  than  the  latter.  From 
all  these  facts  it  would  appear  that  the  German  fleet 
possesses  a  marked,  one  might  almost  say  an  over- 
whelming, superiority  over  the  French  fleet. 

A  few  years  hence  the  German  fleet  should  possess 
a  positively  crushing  superiority  over  the  French 
fleet,  unless  France  soon  bestirs  herself  and  increases 
her  navy.  France  will  be  well  advised  if  she  strengthens 
her  naval  forces  as  soon  as  possible.  If,  in  a  war 
with  Germany,  the  French  fleet  should  be  defeated, 
Germany  would  be  able  to  turn  the  defences  on  the 
north-east  frontier  of  France  by  landing  large  bodies 
of  troops  on  the  northern  coast  of  France,  and  this 
possibility  has  been  very  seriously  considered  by  both 
French  and  German  officers.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
France  should  succeed  in  defeating  the  German  fleet, 
she  would  be  able  to  greatly  damage  Germany  by 
destroying  her  export  trade,  of  which  between  two- 
thirds  and  three-quarters  are  carried  on  over-sea. 

The  foregoing  short  sketch  shows  the  real  character 
of  the  relations  existing  between  France  and  Germany. 
The  Franco-German  relations  were  truly,  but  very 
indiscreetly,  described  by  the  great  German  historian, 
Professor  Treitschke,  in  his  book  Politik,  as  "  a  latent 
state  of  war."  Whatever  compliments  may  be  ex- 
changed between  the  two  countries,  the  aims  and 
ambitions  of  France  and  Germany  are  incompatible, 
and  they  will  remain  incompatible  as  long  as  Germans 
are  Germans  and  Frenchmen  are  Frenchmen.  Hence 
the  latent  state  of  war  existing  between  France  and 
Germany  seems  likely  to  continue  until  France  has 


222  MODERN    GERMANY 

either  regained  her  natural  frontier  or  until  she  has 
become  a  third-class  Power,  a  second  Belgium.  Only 
then  can  France  and  Germany  become  friends. 

France  is  under  no  illusion  as  to  Germany's  feelings 
towards  her.  Silently  she  has  borne  the  latent  state 
of  war  for  forty-one  years,  and  the  patriotism  of  the 
French  citizens  in  giving  their  services  and  their  money 
without  stint  and  without  grumbling  to  their  country 
is  worthy  of  the  greatest  admiration.  But  the  French 
may  some  day  be  rewarded  for  their  patient  patriotism. 
Already  the  forty-one  years  of  a  latent  state  of  war 
have  worked  wonders  in  the  national  character  of 
France,  and  have  created  a  race  of  strong  and  earnest 
men  in  that  country.  Besides,  forty-one  years  of 
concentrated  military  endeavour  have  given  France 
an  army  which  need  not  fear  any  foe.  Perhaps  that 
army  will  some  day  be  the  instrument  for  re-creating 
France  and  gaining  back  for  her  what  she  has  lost. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   MOROCCO   CRISIS   OF 

ON  July  2nd,  1911,  the  German  papers  published  the 
following  official  announcement  : — 

"  The  German  firms  interested  in  the  south  of 
Morocco  have  requested  the  Imperial  Government, 
having  regard  to  the  dangers  which  threaten  the  im- 
portant German  interests  in  these  parts  in  view  of  the 
possible  spread  of  the  disorders  prevailing  in  other 
parts  of  Morocco,  to  take  measures  to  protect  the 
lives  and  property  of  Germans  and  German  proteges 
in  this  region.  The  Imperial  Government,  with  this 
object  in  view,  thereupon  decided  to  send  His  Majesty's 
ship  Panther,  which  happened  to  be  in  the  neighbour- 
hood, to  the  harbour  of  Agadir,  and  apprised  the 
Powers  of  the  fact.  The  influential  Moors  of  the 
district  have  been  simultaneously  informed  that  no 
sort  of  unfriendly  intention  towards  Morocco  or  its 
inhabitants  is  associated  with  the  appearance  of  the 
German  warship  in  the  harbour." 

Thus  ran  the  translation  published  in  The  Times 
of  July  3rd  of  that  year.  Ostensibly  the  German 
Government  sent  the  Panther  to  Agadir  in  the  south 
of  Morocco  "  to  protect  important  German  interests 
in  these  parts  "  and  "  to  protect  the  life  and  property 
of  Germans  and  German  proteges  in  this  region."  Yet 
it  was  known  to  all  who  had  studied  Moroccan  affairs 
that  Germany  had  no  important  commercial  interests 
in  that  country,  and  that  no  German  lives  were 


233 


224  MODERN    GERMANY 

endangered  in  or  near  Agadir,  which  happens  to  be 
the  best  harbour  on  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Morocco. 
However,  the  official  communication  carefully  ex- 
plained in  its  opening  words  that  the  warship  was 
sent  at  the  request  of  "  the  German  firms  interested 
in  the  south  of  Morocco."  The  onus  of  proof  that 
German  interests  and  German  lives  were  actually 
threatened  was  therefore  laid  with  skilful  vagueness 
on  unnamed,  unenumerated,  and  unspecified  German 
firms,  which,  for  all  we  know,  had  their  seat  in  Ger- 
many, and  which  conceivably  were  previously  asked 
by  the  Government  to  make  a  request  for  protection. 
By  the  wording  of  the  communique  the  German  Govern- 
ment had  left  open  a  loophole  for  escape.  In  case  of 
need  it  could  explain  that  "  the  German  firms  "  had 
called  for  protection  without  sufficient  cause,  and  that 
the  ship  would  be  withdrawn  because,  upon  inquiry 
on  the  spot,  it  had  been  found  that  neither  the  pro- 
perty nor  the  lives  of  Germans  and  of  German  proteges 
in  the  south  of  Morocco  were  endangered. 

In  Bismarck's  time  German  diplomacy  was  dra- 
matic and  vigorous.  Now  it  is  dramatic  and  futile. 
For  a  second  time,  within  a  few  years  it  interfered 
with  menacing  suddenness  in  Morocco,  but  once  more 
the  stage  managing  seems  to  have  been  defective, 
and  the  dispatch  of  the  Panther  was  to  prove  as  un- 
profitable, and  as  little  creditable,  to  German  diplo- 
macy as  was  the  Emperor's  personal  demonstration 
at  Tangier  on  March  3ist,  1905,  when  he  promised  his 
support  to  the  Sultan. 

The  Morocco  crisis  of  1905  almost  led  to  war 
between  France  and  Germany.  Germany  had  actu- 
ally begun  mobilising  her  army  when  France  bowed 
to  the  demonstration  of  force,  giving  Germany  what 
is  usually  called  a  diplomatic  victory.  However,  she 


THE   MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        225 

lost  nothing  substantial  by  giving  way,  but  Germany 
received  in  the  following  year  a  diplomatic  defeat  at 
Algeciras,  whence  she  returned  empty-handed,  and 
she  quietly  withdrew  for  a  time  her  loudly  advertised 
claims  upon  Moroccan  territory. 

At  the  time  of  the  Morocco  crisis  of  1905  the 
German  Emperor,  Prince  Biilow,  and  the  semi-official 
German  Press  had  asserted  that  Germany  had  im- 
portant economic  interests  in  that  country,  and  in 
the  official  communique  printed  at  the  beginning  of 
this  chapter  stress  was  laid  on  the  important  interests 
of  German  firms  in  Morocco.  The  economic  interests 
of  Germany  in  that  country  may  best  be  gauged  by 
the  extent  and  development  of  Germany's  trade. 
According  to  the  British  Consular  Report  on  Morocco 
(Cd.  5465-17),  published  in  March  1911,  the  total 
foreign  trade  of  Morocco,  both  export  and  import 
trade,  was  during  the  three  preceding  years  as  fol- 
lows : — 

VALUE  OF  ALL  ARTICLES  IMPORTED  INTO  AND  EXPORTED 
FROM  MOROCCO  BY  SEA  AND  LAND 


United  Kingdom     .     . 

France i,  633,823 

Germany 

Spain 263,658 

Belgium 

Austria-Hungary      .     . 

Italy  

United  States 


Netherlands       ~\ 
Portugal    .     . 
Other  Countries) 


1907. 

1908. 

1909. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1,713,969 

2,448,977 

2,204,771 

1,633,823 

2,260,416 

2,195,109 

651,956 

676,413 

564,147 

263,658 

327,891 

523,715 

125,395 

190,746 

92,926 

30,821 

63,397 

91,889 

33,655 

67,786 

83,928 

67,651 

52,403 

62,347 

87,258 

39,769 

24,917 

|  13,771 

30,165 

52,150 

10,946 

I  46,130 

4,638,351       6,179,948       5,914,569 


226 


MODERN  GERMANY 


It  will  be  noticed  that  Germany's  trade  was  in- 
significant. Both  France  and  Great  Britain  had  a 
trade  with  Morocco  which  is  four  times  as  large  as 
that  of  Germany.  Moreover,  the  proportion  of  Ger- 
many's trade  in  Morocco  was  not  increasing,  but 
decreasing.  In  1904-1905  Germany  asserted  for  the 
first  time  that  she  had  important  economic  interests 
in  that  country.  Yet  notwithstanding  all  her  efforts 
to  increase  her  trade  among  the  Moors,  her  position 
in  the  Moroccan  market  has  since  then  steadily  de- 
teriorated, for  Germany's  proportion  did,  according  to 
the  Consular  Report  mentioned,  change  as  follows  : — 

PROPORTION  OF  GERMANY'S  TRADE  WITH  MOROCCO. 


German  Exports 

German  Imports 

HPrttal 

to  Morocco. 

from  Morocco. 

1  OltU. 

1904                     7.4  per  cent. 

20.4  per  cent. 

12.5  per  cent. 

1905 

7-1 

19-3        ii 

11.8         , 

1906 

7.2 

18.6        „ 

11.4     • 

i 

1907 

6.0        , 

25.0        „ 

14.1 

> 

1908 

6.0        , 

1  8.2           „ 

10.9 

> 

1909 

5-9 

15-9          » 

9-5 

i 

Both  in  exports  and  imports  Germany  had  been 
steadily  losing  ground  in  Morocco.  However,  as 
German  statesmen  and  publicists  have  frequently 
asserted  that  the  statistics  given  by  the  British  Consul, 
which  are  collected  at  the  ports  and  the  land  frontiers, 
are  untrustworthy,  let  us  measure  the  importance  of 
the  Moroccan  market  to  Germany  by  means  of  the 
official  German  statistics  : — 


1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 


German  Exports 

to  Morocco. 
Marks.  £ 

2,500,000=  125,000 
1,700,000  85,000 
1,800,000  90,000 
1,200,000  60,000 
1,800,000  90,000 
3,500,000  175,000 


German  Imports 

from  Morocco. 

Marks.  £ 

5,500,000  =  275,000 
5,900,000  295,000 
5,500,000  275,000 
8,500,000  425,000 


9,500,000 
7,8oo,OOO 


475,000 
390,000 


THE    MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        227 

Germany  imports  from  Morocco  small  quantities 
of  food  and  raw  produce,  such  as  barley,  almonds, 
beans,  gums,  bees-wax,  wheat,  goat-skins,  linseed, 
and  sheep-skins,  and  she  exports  to  Morocco  insig- 
nificant quantities  of  sugar  and  of  manufactured 
goods.  Her  exports  to  Morocco  are  admittedly  over- 
stated by  the  inclusion  of  Austrian  sugar  and  manu- 
factures, which  go  largely  via  Hamburg,  and  which 
figure  as  German  exports  in  the  German  Customs 
statistics.  However,  if  we  credit  Germany  with  the 
whole  of  the  trade  which  stands  in  her  name,  it  will 
be  found  that  Germany's  entire  yearly  trade  with 
Morocco  is  about  as  large  as  the  yearly  turnover  of 
a  moderate-sized  shop  in  a  provincial  town.  The 
importance  of  the  Moroccan  trade  to  Germany  may 
be  summarised  in  two  lines  as  follows  : — 

Marks. 

Total  Foreign  Trade  of  Germany  in  1909  .     .     16,945,700,000 
Total  German  Trade  with  Morocco  in  1909    .  11,300,000 

Germany's  trade  with  Morocco  was,  in  1909,  when 
that  trade  was  particularly  brisk,  exactly  equal  to 
y-g3^,  or  one-fifteenth  of  one  single  per  cent.,  of  her 
whole  foreign  trade.  No  one  envied  Germany  for 
her  microscopic  trade  in  Morocco,  and  no  one  wished 
to  diminish  it  or  take  it  away  from  her.  It  was  not 
worth  mentioning,  and  not  worth  taking. 

The  Germans  could  not  deny  that  their  participa- 
tion in  the  trade  of  Morocco  was  merely  an  insignificant 
portion  of  an  insignificant  total,  but  then  they  alleged 
that  their  shipping  interests  in  that  country  were 
very  important.  It  is  true  that  of  the  tonnage  which 
entered  the  Moroccan  ports  in  1907  21.9  per  cent, 
was  German,  in  1908  20.6  per  cent,  was  German, 
and  in  1909  16.6  per  cent,  was  German.  Apparently 


228  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany's  merchant  marine  was  proportionately  far 
more  interested  in  Morocco  than  Germany's  trade. 
However,  the  proportion  of  Germany's  shipping  was 
shrinking  as  rapidly  as  was  the  proportion  of  Ger- 
many's trade.  Besides,  the  proportion  of  Germany's 
shipping  was  comparatively  high  because  the  German 
ships  called  at  Moroccan  ports,  not  in  order  to  do 
business,  but  in  order  to  put  in  an  appearance  and 
to  swell  artificially  the  Moroccan  shipping  statistics 
in  Germany's  favour.  The  German  lines  were  able 
to  make  these  unprofitable,  and  chiefly  political,  calls 
owing  to  the  Government  subsidies  which  they  receive. 
The  artificial  character  of  the  German  shipping  figures 
will  be  seen  as  soon  as  we  compare  them  with  the 
corresponding  figures  relating  to  British  shipping. 
Let  us  make  such  a  comparison. 

TONNAGE  OF  SHIPPING  WHICH  ENTERED  THE  PORT 
OF  TANGIERS 

German.  British. 

With  Cargo.         In  Ballast.  With  Cargo.        In  Ballast. 

Tons.                 Tons.  Tons.                  Tons. 

1907  .     .     .     40,504              104,537  195^45              21,835 

1908  .     .     .     25,375              147,176  191,606              25,387 

1909  .     .     .     42,896              I35,670  193,230              34,636 

Of  the  British  shipping  entering  Tangiers  between 
1907  and  1910  almost  nine-tenths  was  with  cargo. 
Of  the  German  shipping  entering  that  port  during 
the  same  years  only  one-fifth  was  with  cargo.  We 
cannot  wonder  that  the  British  Consul  wrote  :  "  Sev- 
eral of  the  foreign  lines  of  steamers  receive  consider- 
able subsidy  from  their  Government,  or  they  would 
not  be  able  to  maintain  their  services  to  this  coast." 
That  remark  applies  particularly  to  the  German  ships 
and  the  fictitious  showing  which  they  make. 

German  merchants  were  interested  not  only  in  the 


THE   MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        229 

foreign  trade  of  Morocco,  but  also  in  the  exploitation 
of  its  lands  and  minerals.  The  mineral  concessions 
of  a  certain  German  firm  were  frequently  paraded  in 
the  papers,  but  their  validity  was  strongly  doubted 
in  the  best  informed  German  circles.  They  could  be 
described  as  concessions  rather  in  posse  than  in  esse. 
Hence  the  concessionnaires  were  more  in  need  of 
valid  documents  than  of  German  ships  and  guns  for 
the  protection  of  their  interests. 

The  foregoing  facts  and  figures  suffice  to  show 
that  Germany's  important  economic  interests  in 
Morocco  were  merely  a  diplomatic  fiction. 

The  second  reason  given  in  the  official  communique 
for  sending  the  Panther  to  Agadir  was  the  necessity 
to  protect  the  lives  of  Germans  and  of  German  proteges. 
Agadir  is  a  village  of  300  or  400  inhabitants,  and, 
according  to  the  well-informed  French  authorities,  it 
contained  at  the  time  not  a  single  German.  The  1909 
edition  of  the  semi-official — one  might  just  as  well 
say  the  official — German  Naval  Year  Book,  edited 
by  Nauticus,  contained  a  long  and  very  interesting 
paper,  entitled  "  Morocco  and  its  Relations  to  the 
German  National  Economy,"  in  which  we  read : 
"  In  1901  there  were  in  Morocco  193  Germans,  of 
whom  150  belong  to  the  German  Empire,  the  remain- 
ing 43  being  Austrians  and  Swiss.  Of  these  about 
100  were  in  Tangiers,  30  in  Casa  Blanca,  22  in  Mogador, 
12  in  Safi,  ii  in  Mazagan,  6  in  Rabat,  5  in  Larache, 
4  in  Fez,  3  in  Marakesh."  Although  Austrians  and 
Swiss  were,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  and  for  swelling 
the  total,  counted  as  Germans,  no  Germans  were 
mentioned  in  Agadir.  In  Mogador  there  were  22 
Germans,  including  Austrians  and  Swiss.  Yet  the 
Panther  did  not  go  to  Mogador  "  to  protect  the  threa- 
tened lives  of  German  citizens."  Apparently,  the 


230  MODERN    GERMANY 

explanation  that  the  Panther  was  sent  to  Agadir  to 
protect  the  threatened  lives  of  Germans  and  German 
proteges  was  another  diplomatic  fiction.  According 
to  the  latest  Consular  Report,  there  are  16,485  Euro- 
peans in  Morocco.  Therefore  the  Germans  are  ap- 
parently less  than  one  single  per  cent,  of  the  European 
population.  The  Germans  padded  the  Customs  re- 
turns, they  padded  their  shipping  statistics,  and  they 
padded  their  statistics  of  Germans  living  in  Morocco. 
Yet  notwithstanding  this  most  industrious  padding, 
Germany's  tangible  interests  in  Morocco  were  almost 
nil.  Germany's  policy  in  Morocco  was  not  entirely 
sincere. 

It  must  be  clear  even  to  the  most  credulous,  the 
most  unsuspecting,  and  the  most  uncritical  that  in 
1905  the  German  Emperor  did  not  go  to  Tangier  and 
almost  make  war  upon  France  for  the  love  of  the 
Sultan  of  Morocco,  and  that  in  July  1911  Germany 
did  not  send  the  Panther  to  Agadir  to  protect  German 
lives  and  property.  German  diplomacy  has  asserted 
from  1905  to  1911  that  it  was  anxious  to  preserve  the 
independence  and  the  integrity  of  Morocco,  and  the 
open  door  for  all  nations,  because  of  her  important 
economic  interests  in  that  country.  That  was  merely 
a  diplomatic  pretext,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  Germany  desired  to  acquire  Morocco,  or  at  least 
the  south  of  that  country,  and  that  she  wished  to 
defend  its  integrity  and  independence  until  she  was 
ready  and  able  to  make  it  a  colony  of  her  own. 

On  the  i  gth  January  1912,  in  the  course  of  a  law- 
suit for  libel  which  the  Rheinisch-W estfdlische  Zeitung 
brought  against  the  Grenzboten,  the  editor  of  the  former 
stated  :  "  I  demand  that  Mr.  Class,  the  president  of 
the  Pan-Germanic  League,  be  called.  At  my  wish 
he  put  himself  in  contact  with  the  Foreign  Secretary, 


THE    MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        231 

Herr  von  Kiderlen-Wachter.  The  Foreign  Secretary 
invited  Mr.  Class  to  meet  him  at  the  Hotel  Pfalzer  Hof 
in  Mannheim,  and  there  they  have  conferred  for 
hours.  The  Foreign  Secretary  stated  to  Herr  Class  : 
'  I  support  the  policy  of  partitioning  Morocco.  The 
Pan-Germanic  demand  is  absolutely  justified.  You 
can  rely  upon  it  that  we  shall  stick  to  Morocco,  and 
that  you  will  be  greatly  pleased  with  the  German 
Morocco  policy.  I  am  as  much  a  Pan-German  as  you 
are.'  Some  time  afterwards  Mr.  Class  called  upon  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  but,  failing  to  find  him  in,  met  Mr. 
Zimmermann,  the  Under-Secretary.  It  was  the  day 
of  the  despatch  of  the  Panther  to  Agadir.  Herr 
Zimmermann  told  Herr  Class  that  he  could  give  him 
some  cheering  news  :  '  You  come  just  in  time.  At 
this  moment  the  Panther  appears  before  Agadir.  We 
shall  retain  Agadir,  and  we  intend  to  seize  the  whole 
district  and  not  to  give  up  anything.  After  all,  we 
absolutely  require  settlement  colonies  for  our  excess 
of  births.  Take  care  that  no  claims  for  compensation 
are  raised  in  the  Press.  We  do  not  want  compensa- 
tions. We  want  Morocco.  France  wishes  to  offer  us 
the  Congo.'  '  The  foregoing  extract,  which  is  a 
careful  translation,  and  which  is  taken  from  the 
report  of  the  law-court  proceedings  published  in  the 
Tdgliche  Rundschau  of  January  20,  1912,  shows  that, 
notwithstanding  all  official  statements  that  Germany 
had  never  intended  to  seize  Moroccan  territory,  state- 
ments which  were  made  by  the  German  Chancellor 
and  the  Foreign  Secretary  in  December  1911,  the 
German  Government  had  actually  intended  to  take 
a  part  of  Morocco. 

Germany's  interests  in  Morocco,  as  her  interests 
in  Asia  Minor,  South  Africa,  and  Southern  Brazil,  are 
not  of  yesterday.  Many  decades  ago  the  most  far- 


232  MODERN    GERMANY 

seeing  and  patriotic  Germans  recognised  that  colonies 
in  a  moderate  zone,  able  to  receive  the  German  surplus 
population,  were  the  greatest  need  of  their  country. 
Animated  by  this  conviction,  many  professors  and  other 
leaders  of  public  opinion  agitated  for  the  creation  of 
a  large  German  fleet — the  first  ships  of  the  German 
navy  were  built  in  the  'forties  of  the  last  century  with 
moneys  raised  by  voluntary  private  subscriptions ; 
others  created  important  and  purely  German  settle- 
ments in  Santa  Catherina,  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  in 
the  Cape  Colony,  and  in  Natal ;  others  explored,  with 
or  without  Government  assistance,  uncivilised  coun- 
tries which  they  believed  to  be  suitable  for  German 
colonisation  and  which  had  not  yet  been  appropriated 
by  the  European  Powers.  Morocco  was  one  of  these, 
and  it  was  explored  in  the  'sixties  of  last  century  by 
the  Germans,  Gerhard  Rohlfs  and  von  Maltzan,  in 
the  'seventies  by  Noll,  von  Fritsch,  Rein,  and  Koch, 
in  the  'eighties  by  Lenz  and  Quedenfeld,  and  Pro- 
fessor Theobald  Fischer  travelled  through  that  country 
in  1888, 1899,  and  1901.  Professor  Fischer  is  considered 
to  be  the  greatest  German  authority  on  that  country. 

Prusso-Germany  was  the  first  country  which  intro- 
duced a  system  of  compulsory  and  national  education 
directed  by  the  State.  The  education  of  the  German 
citizen  by  the  State  does  not  end  with  the  time  when 
the  child  leaves  school.  It  is  continued  during  the  rest 
of  his  or  her  life.  Prominent  among  fhe  great  German 
State  institutions  for  the  education  of  the  adult  are  the 
semi-official  Press  and  the  semi-official  literature  in 
the  form  of  books,  the  teachings  of  which  are  rein- 
forced by  the  activity  of  a  host  of  Government  inspired 
professorial  and  non-professorial  lecturers,  writers,  and 
clergymen,  who  are  let  loose  whenever  their  assistance 
is  required.  The  larger  half  of  the  German  Press  of 


THE    MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        233 

all  parties,  the  Socialist  papers  excepted,  is  constantly 
inspired  by  the  Government.  Thus  public  opinion  is 
created  and  constantly  educated,  and  the  more  serious 
and  thoughtful  minds  are  provided  with  information 
by  weighty  semi-official  books  crammed  with  facts 
and  arguments  which  are  written,  or  inspired,  by  the 
Government  departments.  They  serve  the  same  pur- 
pose as  the  "  handbooks  for  speakers  "  and  "  cam- 
paign books  "  which  are  issued  by  the  British  party 
organisations  at  election  time.  In  1904-1905  a  large 
portion  of  the  semi-official  Press  preached,  in  conse- 
quence of  direct  inspiration  from  the  chief  of  the 
German  Foreign  Office,  the  doctrine  that  Germany 
required  the  south  of  Morocco,  and  in  1911  we  read 
again  in  papers  which  stand  under  Government  influ- 
ence demands  for  territorial  "  compensation "  in 
Morocco.  The  prevailing  official  view  of  the  value  of 
Morocco  to  Germany  may  best  be  gauged  from  the 
very  lengthy  paper,  "  Morocco  and  its  Relations  to 
the  German  National  Economy,"  published  in  the 
semi-official  German  Naval  Year  Book  for  1909,  and 
I  would  quote  from  it  the  following  important  pas- 
sages in  their  proper  sequence  : — 

"  Morocco  is  a  kind  of  African  peninsula,  being  isolated  by 
the  sea  and  separated  from  the  African  continent  by  vast 
mountains.  The  most  important  trade  routes  along  the 
West  Coast  of  Africa,  from  Europe  to  South  America,  and 
towards  the  future  Panama  Canal,  pass  its  coast.  The 
country  occupies  the  corner  of  Africa,  and  the  corner  position 
of  a  continent  is  always  a  favourable  world-strategical  factor. 
By  its  geographical  and  world-strategical  position  Morocco 
is  exceedingly  favoured  for  commerce  and  war.  Only  lately, 
when  the  traffic  on  the  trade  routes  through  the  Mediterranean 
along  the  northern  shore,  and  through  the  Atlantic  along  the 
western  shore,  of  Morocco  has  become  so  active,  the  country 
has  become  important.  It  lies  to-day  in  the  centre  of  the 
world's  traffic. 


234  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  Morocco  is  separated  from  the  African  continent  by  high 
mountains,  which  separate  it  at  the  same  time  from  the 
desert.  These  give  it  a  favourable  climate  by  catching  the 
moisture  which  the  wind  brings  from  the  Atlantic.  Morocco 
slopes  from  the  mountain  ranges  in  the  interior  towards  the 
Atlantic.  Therefore  the  mountains  act  as  an  enormous 
reservoir  to  the  lower-lying  lands.  The  province  of  Sus 
is  perhaps  the  most  richly  endowed  part  of  Morocco.  One 
can  scarcely  form  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  fruitfulness  of  a 
large  part  of  the  plains  near  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  rainfall  is 
small,  but  owing  to  the  abundance  of  water  in  the  sub-soil,  only 
a  few  feet  below  the  ground,  irrigation  can  easily  and  cheaply 
be  provided  which  would  make  cotton  growing  possible. 

"  Marakesh,  like  Milan  and  Munich,  is,  owing  to  its  position, 
a  natural  railway  centre.  Although  animals  are  raised  in 
the  most  primitive  fashion,  and  although  the  prohibition  to 
export  them  kills  all  enterprise,  Morocco  possesses,  according 
to  a  French  official  expert,  40,000,000  sheep,  11,000,000  goats, 
from  5,000,000  to  6,000,000  cattle,  4,000,000  donkeys  and 
mules,  and  600,000  horses.  However,  these  estimates  are 
probably  too  large.  Morocco  is  rich  in  minerals,  especially  in 
iron,  copper,  antimony,  and  salt.  Mining  used  to  flourish 
especially  in  the  province  of  Sus.  Morocco  has  about  8,000,000 
inhabitants,  and  is  able  to  maintain  perhaps  40,000,000 
people.  In  that  healthy  country,  which  is  nearly  quite  free 
from  malaria,  the  living  conditions  for  European  emigrants 
are  far  more  favourable  than  in  Algeria.  Morocco,  situated 
within  sight  of  Europe  and  occupying  an  exceedingly  im- 
portant world-strategical  position,  possesses  vast  natural 
resources  which  have  not  yet  been  touched.  Its  conditions 
are  mediaeval,  but  in  view  of  the  proximity  of  the  over- 
populated  States  of  Europe  which  require  expansion,  its 
exclusiveness  cannot  be  preserved  much  longer.  Morocco 
may  become  the  granary  and  the  ranch  of  Europe,  and  may 
provide  it  with  fruit,  oil,  cotton,  and  ore.  At  present  it  has 
not  a  single  mile  of  road  or  of  railroad,  and  not  a  single  bridge. 
Its  waterfalls  will  provide  power.  Morocco  is  an  important 
field  for  industrial  activity." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  semi-official  year  book 
considered   in   the   first    place    the    great    strategical 


THE    MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        235 

value  of  Morocco,  and  only  in  the  second  place  its 
great  economic  possibilities.  It  is  also  very  interest- 
ing that  it  described  the  province  of  Sus  as  the  richest 
part  of  Morocco  for  both  agriculture  and  mining,  and 
recognised  in  Marakesh  its  natural  railway  centre. 
Now,  Agadir  is  not  only  the  best  harbour  on  the  west 
coast,  with  47  feet  of  water  within  30  yards  of  the 
shore,  but  it  is  also  not  far  from  Marakesh,  and  is 
by  far  the  best  entrance  gate  to  the  province  of  Sus 
and  to  the  Soudan.  Owing  to  the  depth  and  shel- 
tered position  of  its  harbour  and  to  its  geographical 
situation,  Agadir  is  far  more  important  that  Mogador, 
which  has  24,000  inhabitants.  The  latter  has  become 
a  large  port  only  because  the  Moroccan  Government 
closed  the  port  of  Agadir  in  order  to  punish  its  citizens 
for  a  revolt.  Monsieur  de  Segonzac,  a  leading  French 
authority  on  Morocco,  wrote  in  his  book,  Voyage  au 
Maroc,  published  in  1903,  the  year  before  the  German 
Government  had  taken  an  active  interest  in  Morocco  : — 

"  Agadir  is  believed  to  be  the  best  harbour  on  the  Moroccan 
coast.  It  is  an  open  roadstead  without  obstacles,  which  is 
sheltered  against  the  breakers  and  the  wind  from  the  open 
sea.  I  have  been  told  that  thirty  metres  from  the  coast  the 
water  is  fifteen  metres  deep.  On  the  day  when  the  harbour  of 
Agadir  will  be  opened  to  European  commerce  Mogador  will 
cease  to  exist." 

The  greatest  German  authority  on  Morocco,  Pro- 
fessor Fischer,  who  has  devoted  more  than  thirty 
years  to  the  study  of  that  country,  and  who  has  ex- 
plored it  on  three  journeys,  saw,  like  the  semi-official 
German  Naval  Year  Book,  in  the  land  of  the  Moors 
a  world-strategical  position  of  the  very  greatest  im- 
portance. He  was  naturally  less  reserved  in  his 
utterances  than  the  Year  Book,  which  is  written 
throughout  in  the  ponderous,  stodgy,  and  impersonal 


236  MODERN    GERMANY 

style  of  official  Germany,  and  I  would  quote  from 
some  of  his  writings  the  following  most  interesting 
opinions  :— 

"  Morocco  occupies  to-day  a  position  of  the  very  greatest 
importance.  The  most  important  trade  routes  pass  by  its 
coast :  through  the  Mediterranean,  to  the  rapidly  developing 
West  Coast  of  Africa,  to  Central  America  with  the  Panama 
Canal,  towards  South  America,  which  is  rapidly  becoming 
settled  and  which  already  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for 
the  food  supply  of  Europe.  The  importance  of  the  Moroccan 
harbours  lies  in  their  position,  for  thence  many  a  vital  nerve 
of  the  nations  of  Europe  may  be  cut  through. — (Die  Seehafen 
von  Marokko.) 

"  Morocco  lies  on  the  most  important  route  of  the  world's 
trade.  It  takes  part  in  commanding  that  route,  and  its  ports 
on  the  Atlantic  can  become  important  bases  for  peaceful  and 
warlike  enterprises  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  and  towards 
Central  and  South  America. — (Geog.  Zeitschrift,  1907.) 

"  In  the  hands  of  a  European  Power  able  to  develop  its  rich 
resources,  Morocco  may  become  a  source  of  strength  of  the 
first  importance,  able  to  cause  a  change  in  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe.  It  is  strange  that  Germany  has  no  political 
interests  in  Morocco.  Our  position  as  a  world  Power  and  a 
commercial  Power  would  be  endangered  should  Morocco  fall 
into  the  hands  of  France.  It  is  Germany's  task  to  maintain 
Morocco's  independence.  But  should  an  alteration  of  the 
map  become  inevitable,  Germany  must  have  its  part :  El 
Haus  and  Sus.  Our  interests  at  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  are 
guarded  by  the  jealousies  of  France  and  Great  Britain. — 
(Geog.  Zeitschrift,  1903.) 

"  After  thirty  years'  occupation  with  Moroccan  affairs,  and 
after  three  journeys  through  that  country,  I  have  arrived  at  the 
conviction  that  the  world-political  position  of  Morocco  is  so  great 
that  that  State  which  succeeds  in  taking  it  will,  through  its 
possession,  receive  such  an  enormous  increase  in  power  that  all 
other  States,  especially  Great  Britain,  Spain,  and  Germany, 
will  feel  it  as  an  unbearable  hardship.  —  (Die  Seehafen  von 
Marokko.)" 

The  italics  are  in  the  original. 


THE    MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        237 

Morocco  looks  small  on  the  map,  but  it  is,  as  the 
following  figures  show,  a  large  country  : — 

Morocco          .....  219,000  square  miles. 

Algeria  (limits  of  1901)  .         .         .  184,474  »» 

Tunis      .  .       45,779 

Germany         .....  208,780  ,, 

United  Kingdom    ....  121,391  ,, 

Morocco  is  almost  as  large  as  Algeria  and  Tunis 
combined,  and  is  larger  than  Germany.  Its  superior 
size  and  climate,  its  vast  agricultural  and  mineral 
resources,  and  its  superior  geographical  and  strategical 
position  make  it  infinitely  more  valuable  than  Algeria. 
Besides,  it  is  a  natural  fortress.  Its  fruitful  plains 
and  uplands  along  the  Atlantic,  which  evoked  the 
enthusiasm  of  Pomponius  Mela  1900  years  ago,  are 
sheltered  towards  the  north  and  west  by  the  sea, 
and  towards  the  east  and  south  by  the  enormous 
ranges  of  the  Atlas  Mountains,  the  peaks  of  which 
rise  up  to  13,000  feet,  and  by  the  Sahara.  Thus 
thinly-populated  Morocco  is  an  ideal  country  both 
for  European  settlement  and  for  defence.  Its  world- 
strategical  position,  upon  which  the  German  Navy 
Year  Book  and  Professor  Fischer  have  rightly  dwelt, 
is  very  great,  and  its  possession  would  have  been  of 
particular  value  to  Germany,  especially  if  she  should 
wish  to  strike  at  France,  Great  Britain,  or  the  United 
States.  At  present  the  German  fleet  is  tied  to  the 
North  Sea  through  the  lack  of  coaling  stations. 
Agadir,  or  some  other  port  on  the  west  coast  of 
Morocco,  which  could  be  reached  in  about  a  week 
by  ships  steaming  from  Wilhelmshaven  round  the 
north  of  Scotland,  would  have  been  a  very  convenient 
half-way  house  on  the  way  to  the  West  Indies  and 
Panama  in  case  of  a  German- American  war ;  it  would 


238  MODERN    GERMANY 

have  been  the  best  possible  base  for  cruisers,  or  liners 
converted  into  cruisers,  told  off  to  prey  on  British 
shipping,  in  case  of  an  Anglo-German  war ;  it  would 
have  been  an  ideal  position  in  case  of  a  Franco-German 
war,  or  of  Franco-German  friction,  by  enabling  Ger- 
many to  cause  serious  trouble  in  Algeria.  Algeria  has 
an  army  of  occupation  of  75,000  men,  of  whom  43,000 
are  Europeans.  France  intends  in  case  of  a  great 
European  war  to  bring  over  from  Africa  her  European 
troops  and  some  coloured  troops  as  well,  replacing  the 
Algerian  garrison  with  West  African  soldiers.  The 
spirit  of  revolt  is  not  yet  dead  in  Algeria.  The  Ger- 
mans in  Morocco  could  have  caused  countless  risings 
in  the  neighbouring  Algeria  in  peace  time  by  encouraging 
the  disaffected,  and  could  have  overthrown  the  French 
mobilisation  scheme  in  Africa  at  the  moment  of  the 
outbreak  of  war  by  bringing  about  a  revolt.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  German  settlement  in  Morocco  would 
have  made  Algeria  untenable  for  France.  The  assi- 
duous advances  which  Germany  made  to  the  Moors 
after  the  Franco-German  war  were  probably  inspired 
by  the  wish  of  causing  trouble  to  France  in  Algeria 
if  the  war  should  be  renewed. 

Spain's  encroachment  upon  Morocco  and  her  pro- 
vocative attitude  towards  the  French  in  that  country 
coincided  with  that  of  Germany,  and  it  seems  probable 
that  Germany  and  Spain  were  working  in  unison. 
Spain  has  only  a  small  army,  but  her  support  would 
be  of  great  value  to  Germany  in  a  war  with  Great 
Britain  or  with  France,  or  with  both  combined.  A 
Spanish  demonstration  on  the  Franco-Spanish  frontier 
would  compel  France  to  divide  her  armies  of  defence, 
and  a  Spanish  demonstration  near  Gibraltar  would 
create  a  useful  diversion  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain. 
Did  Germany  try  to  secure  Spanish  co-operation 


THE   MOROCCO    CRISIS    OF    1911        239 

against  France  and  Great  Britain  by  arranging  with 
her  the  division  of  Morocco  ? 

Germany's  occupation  of  the  Moroccan  west  coast 
would  have  threatened  France  and  Great  Britain  in 
the  first,  and  the  United  States  in  the  second,  in- 
stance, but  the  danger,  at  least  to  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  would  not  have  been  an  immediate 
one.  Naval  bases  do  not  spring  up  overnight.  More- 
over, the  immediate  creation  of  a  naval  base  would 
have  been  difficult,  and  would  scarcely  have  been 
tolerated  by  the  Powers  chiefly  concerned.  Germany 
would  have  begun  by  creating  a  good,  but  purely 
commercial,  harbour  on  the  Atlantic,  and  would  have 
created  coaling  facilities  and  built  docks,  repairing- 
shops,  &c.  Against  a  possible  attack  by  the  Moors 
light  temporary  fortifications,  armed  with  a  few  field- 
guns  and  quick-firers,  would,  of  course,  have  been 
thrown  up,  and  these  might  gradually  have  been 
improved  into  strong  permanent  forts  armed  with 
heavy  artillery  without  attracting  much  attention. 

After  all,  a  Great  Power  can  do  what  it  likes  on  its 
own  soil.  By  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  Russia  bound 
herself  not  to  fortify  her  Black  Sea  ports,  but  she 
fortified  them  all  the  same,  and  laughed  at  England's 
protests.  Germany  would  not  have  bound  herself  to 
leave  the  harbours  on  the  Moroccan  west  coast  un- 
fortified, although  she  might,  of  course,  have  declared 
that  she  had  no  intention  of  fortifying  them.  Such 
declarations  of  intentions,  however,  are  not  binding. 

Some  Englishmen  argued  at  the  time  that  it  would 
be  in  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  see  Germany 
installed  on  the  west  coast  of  Morocco.  That  would 
divide  the  German  fleet.  This  argument  is  fallacious. 
A  German  war  harbour  at  Agadir  would  have  enabled 
a  few  German  ships  to  do  incalculable  damage  to  the 


240  MODERN    GERMANY 

British  carrying  trade,  and  to  restrict  very  seriously 
Great  Britain's  supply  of  food  and  raw  material. 
Great  Britain  would  therefore,  in  case  of  war,  have 
been  compelled  to  detach  a  very  large  number  of 
ships  to  protect  her  merchant  marine  against  German 
depredations,  and  to  blockade  the  German  port  or 
ports  in  Morocco.  Thus  a  German  settlement  in 
Morocco  would  have  weakened  the  German  fleet  very 
little  and  the  British  fleet  very  seriously. 

The  world  policy  lately  pursued  by  Germany  in 
Morocco  and  elsewhere  has  not  been  a  happy  one. 
It  has  caused  friction  and  annoyance  in  many  quarters. 
All  the  Powers  of  Europe,  Germany  excepted,  are 
satisfied  with  their  possessions  and  wish  to  be  left  in 
peace.  But  Germany  is  setting  the  pace  in  arma- 
ments by  land  and  sea,  and  she  is  compelling  all  the 
Powers  against  their  will  to  increase  their  armaments 
unceasingly.  The  armies  and  navies  of  Europe  and 
of  America  would  be  much  smaller  than  they  are  were 
it  not  for  Germany's  armaments  and  the  activity  of 
Germany's  diplomacy.  Germany's  ambitions  are  very 
expensive  to  the  Powers  of  the  world,  her  allies  in- 
cluded, and  they  may  lose  patience  with  Germany. 
There  is  always  a  Power  which  threatens  the  peace 
of  the  world.  Up  to  1870  France  was  the  mischief- 
maker  of  the  world,  then  it  was  Russia's  turn,  and 
now  Germany  is  apparently  qualifying  for  that  thank- 
less and  dangerous  part.  If  the  Powers  of  the  world 
should  arrive  at  the  firm  conviction  that  Germany  is 
a  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world,  she  may  share  the 
fate  which  overtakes  earlier  or  later  those  who  are 
considered  to  be  the  disturbers  of  the  world's  peace. 


CHAPTER   XI 

ANGLO-GERMAN   DIFFERENCES — GERMAN   EVIDENCE 
ON  THE   SUBJECT 

ANGLO-GERMAN  relations,  which  used  to  be  satis- 
factory and  cordial  in  the  past,  have  during  the  last 
few  years  become  more  and  more  strained  and  em- 
bittered. During  the  Morocco  crisis  of  1911  the 
tension  increased  to  the  breaking-point.  The  two 
countries  prepared  for  war  and  their  fleets  for  instant 
action.  Every  British  and  every  German  sailor 
waited  impatiently  for  the  signal.  Had  a  British 
and  a  German  warship  unexpectedly  encountered  one 
another,  mutual  distrust  might  have  led  to  the  charging 
and  training  of  guns  ;  and  if,  through  the  loss  of 
nerve  on  the  part  of  an  officer,  through  the  misunder- 
standing of  an  order,  or  through  an  accident,  a  gun 
had  gone  off — and  at  such  a  moment  of  supreme 
tension  guns  are  apt  to  go  off  in  an  unaccountable 
manner — a  war  to  the  death  between  England  and 
Germany  might  have  ensued.  That  is  an  intolerable 
situation,  a  situation  which  urgently  requires  to  be 
dealt  with,  and  Germans  and  Englishmen  ought  to 
ask  themselves :  Why  have  Anglo-German  rela- 
tions become  lately  so  strained  and  embittered  ? 
Is  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  blame  ?  Can  Anglo-German 
relations  be  improved  ?  What  can  be  done  to  improve 
them  ? 

Let  us  first  of  all  consider  the  situation  from  the 
241  o 


242  MODERN    GERMANY 

German  point  of  view,  relying  exclusively  upon  Ger- 
man evidence. 

We  have  been  told  officially  and  semi-officially  by 
German  statesmen,  writers,  and  lecturers  that  Ger- 
many is  a  peaceful  nation,  which  ever  since  the  Franco- 
German  War  of  1870-1871  has  kept  the  peace,  that 
she  cannot  in  any  way  be  blamed  for  the  Anglo- 
German  tension,  that  all  is  England's  fault.  Countless 
German  Government  officials,  professors,  and  jour- 
nalists have  asserted  that  Great  Britain  envies  Germany 
for  her  economic  success,  and  that  she  works  un- 
ceasingly, both  openly  and  secretly,  for  Germany's 
downfall,  in  order  to  rid  herself  of  an  inconvenient 
competitor.  They  have  asserted  that  Great  Britain 
pursues  towards  Germany  that  traditional  policy  of 
envy  and  plunder  which  caused  her  to  attack  and 
despoil  one  by  one  all  the  great  industrial,  commercial, 
and  colonial  nations  of  the  past.  In  hundreds  of 
books  and  newspapers  and  from  thousands  of  plat- 
forms the  Germans  have  been  informed  that  the 
leading  principle  of  British  statesmanship  is  the 
promotion  of  British  trade  by  the  destruction  of 
Great  Britain's  commercial  rivals,  that  Great  Britain 
grudges  Germany  her  "  place  in  the  sun,"  that  she 
envies  Germany  her  commerce  and  her  shipping,  that 
British  diplomats  have  cribbed  and  confined  Germany 
with  a  network  of  hostile  alliances,  and  that  they 
perfidiously  hamper  and  oppose  Germany's  progress 
in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

The  current  German  description  of  British  policy 
is  a  calumny  and  a  fantastic  distortion  of  history. 
Every  one  who  is  acquainted  with  British  history  is 
aware  that  during  the  last  two  centuries  the  principal 
aim  of  British  policy  has  not  been  the  pursuit  of 
commercial  aggrandisement  and  colonial  expansion, 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        243 

but  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe.  Great  Britain  has  fought  all 
her  greatest  wars  not  for  trade  and  colonies — for 
"  plunder,"  as  the  Germans  say — but  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  For  that 
great  principle  she  has  fought  the  Spaniards  under 
Philip  II.,  the  French  under  Louis  XIV.,  Louis  XV., 
Napoleon  I.,  and  the  Russians  in  the  Crimea  ;  and 
the  eventual  conquest  of  the  Spanish  and  French 
colonies  was,  as  Professor  Seeley  has  shown,  merely 
the  accidental  consequence,  but  not  the  cause,  of  our 
great  wars  against  Spain  and  France.  The  great 
majority  of  England's  wars  were  not  wars  of  aggres- 
sion, but  wars  of  defence. 

The  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  is  one  of  the  greatest  of  British 
interests.  It  is  clear  that  only  a  nation  which  has 
destroyed  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent,  and 
which  has  become  supreme  on  the  Continent,  can 
hope  successfully  to  attack  Great  Britain.  It  is 
equally  clear  that  no  nation  can  maintain  the  mastery 
of  the  Continent  of  Europe  as  long  as  a  strong  and 
independent  England  exists  on  its  flank.  Hence  a 
nation  which  strives  for  supremacy  in  Europe  feels 
impelled  to  attack  Great  Britain  earlier  or  later. 
History  confirms  this  argument.  All  the  rulers  from 
Julius  Caesar  to  Napoleon  I.  who  have  striven  to 
become  supreme  in  Europe  have  made  war  upon 
Great  Britain.  National  security  is  more  important 
than  a  profitable  commerce  and  extensive  colonies. 
A  little  consideration  shows  that  Great  Britain's  island 
position  is  secure  only  as  long  as  the  balance  of  power 
on  the  Continent  is  maintained  intact ;  and  the  more 
evenly  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent  is 
adjusted,  the  greater  is  Great  Britain's  security  from 


244  MODERN    GERMANY 

continental  attack.  Consequently  the  greatest  and 
the  most  important  task  of  British  statesmanship  has 
been  in  the  past  not  the  promotion  of  trade  and  the 
acquisition  of  colonies,  but  the  maintenance  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  Great  Britain  has  been 
actuated  in  her  foreign  policy  not  by  greed,  but  by 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 

In  the  course  of  the  last  few  decades  British  states- 
manship has  been  given  another  task,  which  has  become 
even  more  important  than  the  maintenance  of  the 
balance  of  power  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  A 
century  ago,  when  Great  Britain  fought  Napoleon  I., 
the  British  islands  were  practically  self-supporting. 
In  the  'fifties  of  last  century  Great  Britain  raised  at 
home  nine-tenths  of  the  bread  and  meat  which  her 
people  required.  Now  nine-tenths  of  the  bread-corn 
and  one-half  of  the  meat  which  the  British  people 
require  come  from  abroad.  Philip  II.,  Louis  XIV., 
Louis  XV.,  Napoleon  I.  could  hope  to  subdue  England 
only  by  the  slow  process  of  invasion  and  conquest ; 
now  Great  Britain  can  more  easily  and  more  rapidly 
be  subdued  by  starvation.  Occasionally  the  supply 
of  wheat  stored  in  Great  Britain  suffices  for  less  than 
a  month.  Even  a  short  interruption  of  the  grain 
imports  would  bring  about  a  famine.  No  nation  in 
the  world  possesses  a  more  precarious  food  supply 
than  Great  Britain,  and  none  is  more  vitally  de- 
pendent upon  the  free  and  unhampered  entrance  of 
food-ships  into  her  ports.  As  Great  Britain  has  only 
sea  frontiers,  we  can  protect  ourselves  against  the 
danger  of  being  starved  into  surrender  only  if  our 
fleet  is  strong  enough  to  defend  the  freedom  of  the 
sea  against  any  Power  and  against  any  possible  com- 
bination of  Powers.  Hence  the  possession  of  an  un- 
challengeable supremacy  of  our  navy  is  now  more 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES         245 

important  to  Great  Britain  than  it  has  been  at  any 
time  of  her  history,  and  the  maintenance  of  British 
naval  supremacy  has  become  even  more  important  a 
principle  of  British  statesmanship  than  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  The  Germans 
themselves  are  aware  'that  he  who  threatens  Great 
Britain's  naval  supremacy  threatens  not  only  her 
trade  and  her  colonies  but  her  very  life.  In  1909  a 
little  book  for  the  use  in  schools,  entitled  Die  Flotte 
als  notwendige  Erganzung  unserer  nationalen  Wehr- 
macht,  written  by  Adolf  Schroeder,  was  published  in 
Germany.  In  it  we  read  : — 

"  Were  it  possible  to  cut  off  Great  Britain's  supply  of  food, 
in  less  than  six  weeks  would  the  inhabitants  die  of  starvation. 
Britons  are  fully  aware  of  the  danger,  and  all,  from  the  noble 
lord  to  the  labourer,  are  convinced  that  it  is  the  most  important 
duty  of  the  State  to  keep  open  and  secure  the  broad  highway  of 
the  ocean  on  which  British  merchantmen  import  food  and 
raw  material  and  export  British  manufactures.  However, 
the  security  of  the  import  and  export  trade  in  the  case  of 
a  country  which  is  entirely  surrounded  by  the  sea  can  be 
guaranteed  only  by  a  navy  which  is  stronger  than  that  of 
any  other  State.  But  the  Briton  requires  more.  He  demands 
a  fleet  ivhich,  both  ship  /or  ship  and  by  their  combined  number, 
should  be  superior  to  the  combined  fleets  of  the  two  most  powerful 
nations  which  conceivably  might  make  war  upon  his  country. 
That  conviction  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  minds  of  all  Britons, 
and  all  Parties  agree  in  this  principle  which  is  a  question  of 
the  national  existence." 

The  italics  are  in  the  original.  The  Conservative 
Kreuz  Zeitung  wrote  on  the  28th  January  1911  : — 

"  England  must  protect  her  enormous  and  indispensable 
imports  of  food  against  every  disturbance,  especially  in  case 
of  war.  Therefore  the  English  Government  is  compelled  to 
maintain  a  Navy  strong  enough  to  open  all  trade  routes  and, 
if  possible,  to  blockade  all  hostile  squadrons  in  their  ports  in 
order  to  protect  the  British  Isles  against  the  danger  of  star- 
vation and  of  a  panic  affecting  the  prices  of  foodstuffs." 


246  MODERN   GERMANY 

i  Captain  Hart  wig  Schubert  wrote  in  his  pamphlet, 
Die  Deutsche  Schlachtflotte  eine  Gefahr  fur  Deutsch- 
land's  Machtstellung,  published  in  1911  :— 

"  Great  Britain  imports  approximately  five  times  as  much 
bread,  corn,  and  flour  as  Germany.  Whilst  England  can 
receive  food  only  by  sea,  Germany  can  obtain  it  by  land 
across  the  frontiers  of  Denmark,  Russia,  Austria,  Switzerland, 
France,  Luxemburg  and  Holland.  It  follows  that  Germany 
requires  no  navy  for  the  protection  of  her  food  supply,  whilst 
Great  Britain  can  secure  a  sufficiency  of  foodstuffs  only  as 
long  as  she  possesses  a  fleet  which  is  strong  enough  to  face  any 
hostile  combination  of  Powers." 

No  British  statesman  could  have  given  clearer  and 
fairer  statements  proving  Great  Britain's  need  of  the 
possession  of  a  paramount  navy  than  the  three  given 
in  the  foregoing.  Most  thinking  Germans  agree  that 
Great  Britain  requires  a  fleet  of  unchallengeable  power 
for  the  protection  of  her  food  supply.  Therefore  it 
must  also  be  clear  to  all  Germans  that  a  nation  which 
challenges  British  naval  supremacy  threatens  Great 
Britain's  very  existence.  Captain  Schubert  (late  of 
the  German  army)  wrote  : — 

"  In  the  Franco-German  War  France  had  a  superior  fleet. 
Germany's  victories  on  land  compelled  the  French  to  land 
their  sailors  and  to  employ  them  for  the  defence  of  their 
country  on  land.  In  a  future  war  with  France  and  Russia 
we  must  strive  to  bring  about  the  same  result.  A  German 
naval  victory  in  a  war  against  France  and  Russia  would  be 
unnecessary  to  us  in  case  we  are  victorious  on  land.  It  would 
be  worthless  to  us  should  we  be  defeated  on  land  because  our 
land  armies  would  be  weakened  by  the  men  on  board  our  ships. 
Besides,  if  defeated  on  land,  we  could  not  follow  up  a  naval 
victory  by  the  landing  of  armies  in  the  enemy's  country,  for  we 
should  then  have  no  land  troops  to  spare.  It  is  therefore 
clear  that  the  German  navy  is  built  only  for  use  against 
England." 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        247 

Captain  Schubert's  arguments  are  faultless  and 
unanswerable.  His  statement  that  the  German  navy 
is  built  only  for  use  against  England  cannot  be  dis- 
proved. 

In  an  interview  which  Professor  Hans  Delbriick, 
one  of  the  leading  German  professors,  gave  in  De- 
cember 1911  to  the  Daily  Mail,  he  spoke  of  "  Britain's 
long-standing  and  traditional  political  hostility  to 
Germany."  Germans  are  fond  of  asserting  that  Great 
Britain  has  "  always "  been  hostile  to  Germany. 
This  is  one  of  their  greatest  grievances.  However, 
that  complaint  also  can  be  disproved  out  of  German 
mouths.  Herr  Eduard  Bernstein,  one  of  the  leading 
Socialist  writers  and  a  man  of  widely  recognised 
eminence,  fairness,  and  honesty  of  purpose,  published 
at  the  end  of  1911  a  pamphlet  entitled  Die  Englische 
Gefahr  und  das  Deutsche  Volk,  in  which  we  read  : — 

"  All  that  has  been  written  as  to  England's  hostility  towards 
Germany  before  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire  in  1870 
is  merely  idle  and  mischievous  talk  and  invention.  England 
and  Prussia  and  England  and  Austria  were  sometimes  friends 
and  sometimes  opposed  to  each  other,  but  in  their  relations 
there  was  no  fixed  tendency  and  there  could  be  none,  because 
no  important  clashing  interests  existed  between  the  British 
Empire  and  the  two  great  German  States.  Even  during  the 
first  years  of  the  German  Empire  there  was  no  friction  worth 
mentioning  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 

"  During  the  struggle  for  Protection  (in  1879  and  afterwards) 
German  Free  Traders  were  pilloried  as  '  English  agents.' 
The  Protectionist  literature  of  the  period  abounds  with 
attacks  upon  England.  ...  In  consequence  of  the  Protec- 
tionist movement  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  impelled 
England  to  secure  markets  for  the  future,  and  when  in  1883 
Germany  began  acquiring  colonies  she  met  with  British  re- 
sistance. However,  one  must  recognise  that  that  resistance 
was  not  the  result  of  British  illwill  towards  the  German 
nation,  for  that  resistance  was  caused,  or  at  least  greatly 
increased,  by  Germany's  introducing  in  economic  matters  the 


248  MODERN    GERMANY 

policy  of  the  closed  door.  It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  in  many 
cases  British  resistance  did  not  emanate  from  the  British 
Government  itself,  but  from  the  British  colonies  or  from 
individual  British  colonists  whose  claims  for  protection  the 
Government  in  London  was  bound  at  least  formally  to 
support.  In  several  cases  Germany  recognised  the  existence 
of  old  and  valid  British  claims.  .  .  .  When  in  1888  the 
Emperor  Frederick  III.  came  to  the  throne  the  nationalist 
German  press  began  a  violent  anti-British  campaign,  attack- 
ing the  Empress  Victoria,  '  the  Englishwoman.' 

"  On  the  yth  February  1896  (shortly  after  the  Jameson  Raid) 
the  Foreign  Secretary,  Freiherr  von  Marschall,  declared  in  the 
Reichstag  that  the  continued  independence  of  the  Boer 
Republics  was  a  German  interest.  Now  the  publication  of 
the  correspondence  of  several  of  the  Boer  leaders  has  shown 
that  the  leading  Boers  aimed  not  only  at  the  shaking  off  of 
England's  paramountcy  over  the  Boer  States,  but  that  they 
intended  to  drive  England  out  of  South  Africa,  and  that  they 
relied  in  this  policy  upon  Germany's  support.  Meanwhile 
Germany  had  begun  to  increase  her  fleet  in  feverish  haste.  In 
1898  a  Navy  Bill  was  passed  providing  for  nineteen  battle- 
ships, eight  armourclads  for  coast  defence,  and  forty-two 
cruisers  at  a  a  cost  of  ^20,000,000,  and  William  II.  declared 
in  Hamburg :  '  We  are  in  bitter  need  of  a  strong  German 
fleet.'  Two  years  later,  in  1900,  came  another  Navy  Bill 
which  doubled  the  battle  fleet  provided  by  the  Bill  of  1898, 
and  which  increased  the  sum  required  for  shipbuilding  to 
£40,000,000.  Can  one  wonder  that  the  English  were  startled 
by  our  action  ?  Whilst  Secretary  of  State  Admiral  Hollmann 
had  declared  in  the  Reichstag  '  The  German  coasts  require  no 
protection,  they  protect  themselves,'  the  Emperor  had  loudly 
proclaimed  :  '  The  trident  must  be  in  our  fist.'  " 

By  the  Navy  Bill  of  1898,  the  provisions  of  which 
were  doubled  by  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  the  building 
programme  of  the  German  navy  was  firmly  laid  down 
up  to  the  year  1917.  However,  the  year  1905  brought 
a  second,  and  the  year  1908  a  third,  and  the  year 
1912  a  fourth  enlargement,  and  the  monies  voted 
in  respect  of  these  five  Navy  Bills  greatly  exceeded 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES         249 

in  the  aggregate  the  sum  of  £250,000,000.  The  intro- 
duction to  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  stated  :  "  Germany 
requires  a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  a  war  with  the 
mightiest  naval  Power  would  involve  risks  threaten- 
ing the  supremacy  of  that  Power."  Germany  de- 
liberately set  to  work  to  challenge  Great  Britain's 
naval  supremacy,  and  she  proclaimed  in  1900  that 
intention  officially  from  the  housetops.  The  original 
Navy  Bills  of  1898  and  1900,  and  their  amendments 
of  1905,  1908  and  1912,  were  carried  after  a  passionate 
anti-British  campaign  which  was  undoubtedly  en- 
couraged by  the  Government.  It  has  been  shown  in 
the  foregoing  that  the  possession  of  an  unchallengeable 
naval  supremacy  is  a  matter  of  life  or  death  for  Great 
Britain,  and  that  most  Germans  who  have  given  the 
matter  a  moment's  thought  agree  that  Great  Britain 
must  have  a  navy  which  is  stronger  than  that  of  any 
other  Power  or  of  any  probable  combination  of  Powers. 
Consequently  it  is  clear  that  by  the  naval  policy  which 
Germany  inaugurated  in  1900  she  deliberately  chal- 
lenged not  only  Great  Britain's  position  in  the  world, 
but  her  very  existence  as  an  independent  nation. 

Most  Germans  who  complain  about  British  "  in- 
trigues "  assert  that  King  Edward  VII.  was  Germany's 
greatest  enemy,  and  that  he  was  responsible  for  hedging 
Germany  about  with  a  network  of  alliances  and  under- 
standings. Yet  a  well-known  and  eminent  German 
writer  on  foreign  politics,  the  Councillor  of  Legation, 
Herr  von  Rath,  wrote  on  November  3,  1911,  in 
Der  Tag  : — 

"  To-day  it  cannot  be  denied  that  England  strove  in  the 
first  instance  for  a  political  rapprochement  with  Germany, 
and  that  King  Edward  VII.  pursued  this  plan  as  soon  as  he 
had  come  to  the  throne.  The  strongest  sea  Power  gravitated 
towards  the  strongest  land  Power,  and  nobody  can  deny 


250  MODERN   GERMANY 

nowadays  that  Germany  rejected  at  that  time  the  repeated 
advances  of  British  Conservative  statesman,  such  as  Mr. 
Chamberlain,  Lord  Lansdowne  and  the  Duke  of  Devonshire." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Great  Britain's  attempts  to 
be  on  the  best  and  the  most  intimate  terms  with 
Germany  began  long  before  King  Edward  VII.  had 
come  to  the  throne.  Formerly  Great  Britain  had 
followed  the  policy  of  "  splendid  isolation."  In  the 
'eighties  of  last  century,  when  Bismarck's  policy  of 
alliances  divided  Europe  into  two  camps,  British 
statesmen  began  to  recognise  the  desirability  of 
entering  upon  more  intimate  relations  with  one  of  the 
two  groups  of  nations.  Englishmen  and  Germans  are 
far  more  closely  akin  by  race,  national  character,  and 
religion  than  are  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen  or 
Englishmen  and  Russians.  Most  Englishmen  in- 
stinctively desired  to  march  side  by  side  with  their 
German  cousins.  Besides,  at  that  time  there  was 
constant  friction  in  the  colonial  sphere  between  France 
and  Great  Britain  and  between  Russia  and  Great 
Britain.  Desiring  to  enter  upon  more  intimate  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  British  diplomacy  began  to 
settle  all  outstanding  differences  between  the  two 
countries  so  as  to  abolish  all  causes  of  friction  and  of 
dispute.  With  this  object  in  view  it  concluded  the 
Anglo-German  Agreement  of  1890,  which  denned  the 
British  and  the  German  spheres  of  influence  in  East, 
West,  and  South- West  Africa.  This  Agreement  was 
followed  by  the  Anglo-Congolese  Agreement  of  1894, 
and  later  by  an  Anglo-German  understanding  regard- 
ing the  Portuguese  colonies  in  the  event  of  their 
coming  into  the  market.  When  in  1897  Germany 
occupied  Kiaochow,  Great  Britain  supported  her,  and 
renounced  all  intentions  of  connecting  Wei-hai-wei  by 
railway  with  the  Shantung  hinterland,  thus  giving  to 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES         251 

Germany  the  monopoly  in  the  exploitation  of  that 
important  and  wealthy  province.  In  1899  Great 
Britain  concluded  with  Germany  the  Samoa  Agree- 
ment, according  to  which  Great  Britain  retired  alto- 
gether from  Samoa,  whilst  Germany  received  the  two 
most  important  islands  of  that  group.  In  1900  Great 
Britain  concluded  with  Germany  an  agreement  de- 
nning Anglo-German  interests  in  China,  the  so-called 
Yangtse  Agreement.  The  mere  enumeration  of  these 
various  agreements  shows  that  during  the  decade 
1890-1900  British  diplomacy  consistently  strove  to 
abolish  all  differences  with  Germany  in  all  parts  of 
the  world,  with  the  object  of  bringing  about  an  Anglo- 
German  rapprochement.  Unfortunately  all  attempts 
of  British  diplomacy  to  win  Germany's  goodwill  and 
all  the  advances  made  by  British  statesmen  were 
rejected  by  Germany  with  scorn.  Great  Britain,  her 
statesmen,  and  even  her  rulers  were  treated  by  prac- 
tically the  whole  semi-official  press  of  Germany  with 
contempt,  insults,  and  ridicule,  and  complaints  arose 
in  responsible  quarters  that  German  statesmen  were 
taking  unfair  advantage  of  Great  Britain  by  the 
employment  of  questionable  diplomatic  methods. 

When  British  statesmen  discovered  that  they  had 
wasted  ten  years  in  fruitless  attempts  at  reconciling 
Germany,  and  that  Germany  had  treated  every 
British  advance  as  a  sign  of  cowardice  on  the  part  of 
a  hateful  enemy,  and  especially  when  they  saw  that, 
almost  within  sight  of  the  British  coast,  an  enormous 
fleet  was  being  constructed  which,  it  was  officially 
proclaimed,  was  intended  to  challenge  the  supremacy 
of  "  the  mightiest  naval  Power,"  they  recognised  that 
it  was  vain  to  hope  any  longer  for  Germany's  political 
friendship,  and  they  turned  elsewhere.  The  Anglo- 
French  and  the  Anglo- Russian  ententes  were  brought 


252  MODERN    GERMANY 

about  not  by  King  Edward,  but  by  Germany  herself, 
by  her  anti-British  policy.  Germany  forced  Great 
Britain  to  enter  into  arrangements  with  Germany's 
opponents.  If  Germany  is  now  hedged  around  by  a 
network  of  ententes  and  alliances,  she  should  accuse 
not  the  late  King  Edward,  but  her  own  leaders. 

Many  years  ago  the  Emperor  William  II.  pro- 
claimed, "  Germany's  future  lies  upon  the  sea." 
During  more  than  twenty  years  Germany  has  striven 
to  acquire  colonies  for  her  surplus  population.  The 
expansion  of  States  is  a  natural  movement.  Conti- 
nental States  such  as  Germany  can  expand  on  the 
land.  Insular  ones  are  compelled  by  nature  to  expand 
over-sea.  Over-sea  colonies  are  a  necessity  to  an 
over-populated  State  such  as  Great  Britain,  but  they 
are  not  so  much  a  necessity  to  Germany.  During  a 
considerable  number  of  years  immigration  into  Ger- 
many has  been  far  greater  than  emigration  from 
Germany.  At  the  census  of  1907  it  was  found  that 
no  less  than  1,342,292  foreigners  were  living  in  Ger- 
many. German  agriculturists,  mine-owners,  and  manu- 
facturers complain  constantly  about  a  shortage  of 
labour.  Germany  does  not  yet  suffer  from  over- 
population. A  nation  can  in  safety  embark  upon  a 
great  transmaritime  policy  only  if  the  motherland  is 
secure,  if  it  occupies  an  island  like  Great  Britain  or 
Japan,  or  if  it  possesses  practically  an  insular  posi- 
tion such  as  the  United  States.  At  the  time  when 
the  Triple  Alliance  was  a  reliable  entity,  and  when 
France,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain  were  all  isolated, 
Germany's  position  on  the  Continent  was  so  strong 
that  she  could  safely  devote  a  very  large  part  of  her 
means  to  her  navy  and  her  over-sea  interests  ;  but 
matters  have  changed  since  then.  The  Triple  Alliance 
exists  merely  on  paper.  That  alliance  was  based  on 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES         253 

Italy's  fear  of  France  and  on  Austria's  fear  of  Russia. 
Italy  and  France,  and  Austria  and  Russia,  have  be- 
come friends.  The  raison  d'etre  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
has  gone.  It  is  generally  recognised  in  Germany  that 
Germany  cannot  count  upon  Italy's  support  in  the 
hour  of  danger,  and  Austria's  support  may  possibly 
be  doubtful.  Germany,  as  Bismarck  foretold  in  one 
of  the  most  impressive  passages  of  his  Gedanken  und 
Erinnerungen,  may  be  faced  by  a  Pan-European 
coalition  including  Austria-Hungary.  Bismarck 
wrote :  "If  Russian  policy  succeeds  in  winning 
Austria,  then  the  coalition  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
against  us  is  complete,  for  France  can  always  be 
induced  to  act  against  us,  her  interests  on  the  Rhine 
being  more  important  than  those  in  the  East  and 
on  the  Bosphorus." 

The  greater  part  of  the  German  colonies  was 
acquired  by  Bismarck.  However,  although  in  Bis- 
marck's time  Germany's  position  in  Europe  was  in- 
finitely stronger  than  it  is  now,  Bismarck's  principal 
care  was  to  ensure  Germany's  security  on  the  Conti- 
nent of  Europe,  and  he  attached  the  greatest  value 
to  Great  Britain's  goodwill  and  support  in  view  of 
the  possibility  of  continental  complications.  Con- 
sidering Germany's  continental  interests  infinitely 
more  important  than  her  transoceanic  ones,  he  ab- 
solutely refused  to  pursue  a  transmaritime  and  colonial 
policy  in  opposition  to  England,  fearing  that  an 
anti-British  policy  would  drive  England  into  the  arms 
of  France  and  Russia.  Even  when  diplomatic  dif- 
ferences had  arisen  between  the  two  countries,  Bis- 
marck wished  to  remain  on  cordial  terms  with  Great 
Britain.  On  the  2nd  March  1884,  for  instance,  he 
stated  in  the  Reichstag  with  reference  to  an  Anglo- 
German  dispute  : — • 


254  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power  in  order  sine  ira  et 
studio,  and  in  the  most  conciliatory  manner,  to  settle  this 
matter  in  accordance  with  that  quiet  and  friendly  intercourse 
which  has  at  all  times  existed  between  England  and  Germany, 
a  quiet  and  friendly  intercourse  which  is  most  natural  because 
neither  Power  possesses  vital  interests  which  conflict  with 
the  vital  interests  of  the  other  Power.  I  can  see  only  an 
error  in  the  opinion  that  England  envies  us  our  modest 
attempts  at  colonising." 

He  laid  down  at  greater  length  his  guiding  prin- 
ciples in  his  intercourse  with  Great  Britain  on  the 
loth  January  1885,  when  he  stated  in  the  Reichtag  :— 

"  The  last  speaker  has  told  us  that  we  must  either  abandon 
our  colonial  policy  or  increase  our  naval  strength  to  such  an 
extent  that  we  need  not  fear  any  naval  Power,  or,  to  speak  more 
clearly,  that  our  navy  should  rival  that  of  England  herself. 
However,  even  if  we  should  succeed  in  building  up  a  navy  as 
strong  as  that  of  England,  we  should  still  have  to  fear  an 
alliance  of  England  and  France.  Those  Powers  are  stronger 
than  any  single  Power  in  Europe  is  or  ever  can  be.  It  follows 
that  the  policy  indicated  by  the  last  speaker  is  one  which  can 
never  be  striven  after. 

"  I  would  also  ask  the  last  speaker  not  to  make  any  attempts 
either  to  disturb  the  peace  between  England  and  Germany  or 
to  diminish  the  confidence  that  peace  between  these  two 
Powers  will  be  maintained  by  hinting  that  some  day  we  may 
find  ourselves  in  an  armed  conflict  with  England.  I  ab- 
solutely deny  that  possibility.  Such  a  possibility  does  not 
exist,  and  all  the  questions  which  are  at  present  being  dis- 
cussed between  England  and  Germany  are  not  of  sufficient 
importance  to  justify  a  breach  of  the  peace  on  either  side  of 
the  North  Sea.  Besides,  I  really  do  not  know  what  disputes 
might  arise  between  England  and  Germany.  There  never 
have  been  disputes  between  the  two  countries.  From  my 
diplomatic  experience  I  cannot  see  any  reasons  which  can 
make  hostilities  possible  between  them  unless  a  Cabinet  of 
inconceivable  character  should  be  in  power  in  England,  a 
Cabinet  which  neither  exists  nor  which  is  ever  likely  to  exist, 
and  which  criminally  attacks  us." 

Four  years  later,  on  the  26th  January  1889,  only 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        255 

a  short  time  before  his  dismissal,  he  stated  with 
reference  to  the  Anglo-German  Zanzibar  dispute  in 
the  Reichstag  : — 

"  I  absolutely  refuse  to  act  towards  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar 
in  opposition  to  England.  As  soon  as  we  have  arrived  at  an 
understanding  with  England,  we  shall  take  the  necessary 
measures  in  Zanzibar  in  agreement  with  England.  I  do  not 
intend  either  actively  to  oppose  England  or  even  to  take  note 
of  those  steps  which  subordinate  British  individuals  have 
taken  against  us.  In  Zanzibar  and  in  Samoa  we  act  in 
perfect  harmony  with  the  British  Government.  We  are 
marching  hand  in  hand,  and  I  am  firmly  resolved  that  our 
relations  shall  preserve  their  present  character.  English 
colonial  interests  compete  with  ours  in  numerous  places,  and 
subordinate  colonial  officials  are  occasionally  hostile  to 
German  interests.  Nevertheless  we  are  acting  in  perfect 
unison  with  the  British  Government,  we  are  absolutely  united, 
and  I  am  firmly  resolved  to  preserve  Anglo-German  harmony 
and  to  continue  working  in  co-operation  with  that  country. 

"The  preservation  of  Anglo-German  goodwill  is,  after  all, 
the  most  important  thing.  I  see  in  England  an  old  and 
traditional  ally.  No  differences  exist  between  England  and 
Germany.  If  I  speak  of  England  as  our  ally,  I  am  not  using 
a  diplomatic  term.  We  have  no  alliance  with  England. 
However,  I  wish  to  remain  in  close  contact  with  England 
also  in  colonial  questions.  The  two  nations  have  marched 
side  by  side  during  at  least  150  years,  and  if  I  should  dis- 
cover that  we  might  lose  touch  with  England,  I  should  act 
cautiously  and  endeavour  to  avoid  losing  England's  goodwill." 

Modern  Germany  has  erected  to  Bismarck  count- 
less statues.  Bismarck's  speeches,  Bismarck's  letters, 
and  Bismarck's  memoirs  have  been  printed  in  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  copies,  and  they  are  found  on 
the  bookshelves  of  the  people  by  the  side  of  Schiller 
and  Goethe.  But  modern  Germany  has  forgotten,  or 
she  deliberately  disregards,  Bismarck's  policy  and 
Bismarck's  warnings.  Through  the  shortsightedness 
of  Bismarck's  successors  the  bonds  of  the  Triple 


256  MODERN    GERMANY 

Alliance  have  been  so  much  loosened  that  Germans 
themselves  raise  periodically  the  cry  that  they  are 
isolated  in  a  hostile  world.  Yet  modern  Germany 
has  needlessly  increased  the  danger  which  threatens 
her  on  the  Continent  still  further  by  throwing  Bis- 
marck's warnings  to  the  winds  and  antagonising  Great 
Britain,  which  might  prove  Germany's  best  and  most 
valuable  friend  in  her  hour  of  need. 

The  reason  that  Great  Britain  is  no  longer  Ger- 
many's "  old  and  traditional  ally,"  as  Bismarck  called 
her,  must  be  sought  not  in  Great  Britain's  envy  but 
in  the  culpable  mistakes  of  Germany's  diplomacy. 
The  Germans  Ihemselves  have  begun  to  find  out  that 
the  policy  and  the  peculiar  diplomatic  methods  of 
their  statesmen  are  responsible  for  the  numerous  dis- 
comfitures which  they  have  experienced  in  the  domain 
of  foreign  policy.  Among  the  independent  German 
newspapers  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  occupies  the 
leading  place.  It  is  conducted,  as  regards  the  treat- 
ment of  foreign  questions,  with  remarkable  fairness, 
fearlessness,  and  ability.  On  the  8th  November,  1911, 
that  journal  published  in  the  most  prominent  place  an 
article  from  its  London  correspondent  in  which  the 
causes  of  the  Anglo-German  differences  in  connection 
with  the  Morocco  question  were  unsparingly  exposed 
in  the  following  words  : — 

"  On  the  1 5th  May  the  German  Emperor  came  to  England 
in  order  to  attend  the  unveiling  of  the  national  memorial  to 
the  late  Queen.  He  was  received  by  the  people  of  London 
with  the  greatest  cordiality.  Five  weeks  later  the  German 
Crown  Prince  arrived  in  London  to  attend  the  Coronation, 
and  he  was  greeted  with  the  same  universal  goodwill.  A 
week  after  King  George's  Coronation  came  the  bomb  of 
Agadir.  Of  course  one  may  say  :  The  fact  that  the  Em- 
peror was  cordially  received  by  the  English  people  has  nothing 
to  do  with  diplomatic  relations.  Germany  cannot  regulate 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        257 

her  political  action  by  the  visits  of  her  Sovereign.  Such 
arguments  show  a  complete  lack  of  understanding  of  the 
spirit  of  western  democracy.  A  foreign  monarch  comes  to 
England.  He  drives  during  a  week  through  London.  He 
constantly  takes  off  his  grey  top  hat  to  cheering  crowds,  and 
the  man  in  the  street  says  smilingly  :  '  Jolly  fellow,  isn't 
he  ?  '  Now  the  man  in  the  street  makes  public  opinion,  and, 
after  all,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself  is  a  man  in  the  street  who 
has  become  a  minister. 

"  When  the  German  Emperor  arrived  in  London,  the  im- 
pression became  general  in  England  that  Germany  would 
remain  quiet.  If,  at  that  time,  the  German  Morocco  policy 
was  already  mapped  out,  then  the  Imperial  visits  to  England 
were  a  mistake.  They  brought  us  with  the  English  people 
the  regrettable  reputation  of  perfidiousness  (Untreite).  Now 
the  reproach  of  perfidiousness  has  adhered  to  German  policy 
for  some  time.  That  is  known  to  everybody  who  is  in  contact 
with  international  diplomacy.  It  is  the  irony  of  fate  that 
the  German  diplomatic  apparatus,  which  is  exclusively  served 
by  men  belonging  to  the  best  families  of  the  aristocracy,  does 
not  at  all  enjoy  the  credit  which  is  owed  to  gentlemen." 

Editorially  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  wrote  on  the 
2gth  December  1911  : — 

''  The  German  navy  alone  cannot  have  been  the  cause  of  the 
acute  differences  which  exist  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany.  If  we  Germans  strive  for  once  to  place  ourselves 
without  prejudice  in  the  position  of  the  British,  we  must 
confess  that  the  distrust  of  Germany  which  prevails  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Channel  is  not  without  cause.  If  we  Germans 
had  had  to  hear  certain  utterances  from  the  mouth  of  a  foreign 
sovereign,  we  also  would  have  been  startled  and  would  have 
thought  it  necessary  to  strengthen  our  defences.  Now  we 
can  only  say  to  the  British  that  the  monarchical  utterances  in 
question  need  not  be  taken  too  tragically,  because  we  have 
learned  by  experience  that  big  words  are  not  followed  by 
big  deeds.  We  know  now  that  the  Kruger  telegram,  the 
Imperial  call  to  arms  against  the  Yellow  Peril,  the  Emperor's 
speech  at  Damascus,  his  journey  to  Tangier  and  the  despatch  of 
the  Panther,  were  only  dramatic  gestures  devoid  of  conse- 
quences. However,  they  have  had  the  unfortunate  effect  of 

R 


258  MODERN    GERMANY 

evoking  hostility  on  the  one  side  and  high  hopes  on  the  other, 
which  soon  were  converted  into  bitter  disappointment,  and 
people  received  the  impression  that  German  policy  was  either 
dangerous  or  unreliable.  Of  late  things  have  improved 
because  injudicious  utterances  from  the  highest  quarter  are 
no  longer  reported.  Still  the  distrust  of  Germany  remains, 
and  we  cannot  be  surprised  at  it.  We  tell  the  English  un- 
ceasingly that  the  German  nation  is  peaceful,  and  that  it 
desires  to  live  in  harmony  with  England  and  all  other  nations. 
However,  these  assurances  make  no  impression,  for  we  are 
told  :  We  are  quite  sure  that  the  German  people  is  peaceful, 
but  the  German  people  does  not  make  German  policy.  German 
policy  is  made  in  a  single,  irresponsible,  and  incalculable 
quarter.  Therefore  the  peaceful  assurances  of  the  German 
people  have  for  us  not  a  practical,  but  merely  a  Platonic, 
value.  What  can  we  reply  to  that  argument  ?  " 

In  Bismarck's  time  German  diplomacy  enjoyed  a 
twofold  distinction :  it  pursued  a  wise,  sane,  and 
far-seeing  policy,  and  the  diplomatic  apparatus  was 
faultlessly  served  by  men  of  high  ability.  Modern 
German  diplomacy  fails,  unfortunately,  in  both  respects, 
and  the  German  people  have  begun  to  complain  bit- 
terly about  the  men  in  their  diplomatic  service. 
Towards  the  end  of  December  1911,  Mr.  L.  Raschdau, 
a  former  German  ambassador,  published  in  several 
German  papers  an  article  on  German  diplomacy  in 
which  he  stated  that  the  German  ambassadorial  service 
had  become  defective  because  the  diplomatic  career 
had  been  reserved  to  members  of  the  German  aris- 
tocracy. On  this  point  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  wrote 
editorially  on  the  2gth  December  1911  : — 

"  The  Emperor's  advisers  and  assistants  are  not  selected 
according  to  their  talent  and  experience  but  according  to 
circumstances  unconnected  with  their  career  and  duties. 
One  man  is  made  an  ambassador  because  he  is  an  aristocrat 
and  a  man  of  wealth,  another  one  because  he  has  pleasing 
social  talents,  and  the  third  is  simply  '  commanded  '  to  take 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        259 

up  the  post  of  Imperial  Chancellor.  The  result  of  such  a 
system,  if  one  can  call  it  a  system,  is  naturally  incapacity, 
amateurishness  and  lack  of  success." 

In  the  foregoing  pages  it  has  been  shown  exclusively 
by  means  of  reliable  German  evidence  that  Germany 
is  responsible  for  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  Anglo- 
German  relations,  that  Anglo-German  relations  have 
become  what  they  are  because,  as  the  German  wit- 
nesses quoted  have  admitted,  Germany  has  deliber- 
ately pursued  an  anti-British  policy  during  a  con- 
siderable number  of  years.  It  has  furthermore  been 
shown  that  Germany's  colonial  and  transmaritime 
policy,  with  its  strong  anti-British  bias,  was  dis- 
approved of  by  Prince  Bismarck,  and  that  many 
thinking  Germans  are  profoundly  dissatisfied  not  only 
with  the  direction  of  Germany's  foreign  policy,  but 
also  with  the  men  who  occupy  high  positions  in  the 
German  diplomatic  service. 

Now  we  must  ask  ourselves,  Why  does  Germany 
pursue  towards  Great  Britain  a  policy  which  has 
compromised  her  position  in  the  world,  which  has 
caused  great  disappointments  to  her,  and  which  in 
the  end  may  lead  to  a  national  disaster  ?  The  answer 
is  simple.  Before  the  Boer  War,  when  Germany  em- 
barked upon  her  trans-oceanic  and  anti-British  policy, 
Great  Britain's  power  was  much  under-estimated  in 
Germany.  During  many  decades  German  university 
professors,  schoolmasters,  and  publicists  had  taught 
the  doctrine  that  Englishmen  were  too  selfish  and  too 
cowardly  to  defend  their  country,  and  that  England, 
like  Carthage,  was  bound  to  fall  through  the  lack  of 
patriotism  among  the  people  and  their  reliance  upon 
hired  soldiers.  They  had  taught  that  the  principal 
characteristics  of  the  people  in  the  British  colonies 
also  was  selfishness,  that  they  lacked  patriotism,  that 


260  MODERN   GERMANY 

they  would  cling  to  the  motherland  only  as  long  as 
the  connection  was  profitable  to  them,  that  the  dis- 
solution of  the  British  Empire  was  inevitable,  that 
Canada  and  the  other  great  British  dominions  would 
earlier  or  later  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States 
and  secede.  Roscher,  Treitschke,  Schmoller,  and  many 
other  eminent  German  writers  propounded  these 
views.  Thus  Germany's  colonial  and  anti-British 
policy  was  based  upon  a  false  estimate  of  the  char- 
acter and  the  latent  strength  of  Great  Britain  and  her 
daughter  States,  and  that  false  estimate  was  not 
revised  when  the  colonies  supported  Great  Britain  in 
the  Boer  War  in  splendid  loyalty  with  troops  and 
money,  when  Canada  initiated  the  system  of  inter- 
imperial  preferences  and  bore  cheerfully  Germany's 
fiscal  hostility,  when  a  number  of  imperial  conferences 
and  imperial  defensive  arrangements  created  the 
nucleus  of  an  imperial  army  and  navy  and  of  an 
imperial  organisation,  when  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
introduced  universal  military  service,  and  when 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  Canada  began  to  build 
powerful  squadrons  of  their  own  and  voluntarily  took 
a  share  in  the  Empire's  burden  of  defence. 

In  their  endeavours  to  challenge  British  naval 
supremacy  the  Germans  were  encouraged  by  a  sin- 
gular misconception.  They  had  been  told  by  numerous 
writers  on  naval  and  political  subjects  that,  whilst 
the  British  yards  could  provide  any  number  of  war- 
ships, the  British  nation  could  not  furnish  enough 
sailors  for  manning  them.  On  the  28th  October  1908 
the  Daily  Telegraph  had  published  an  interview  with 
the  German  Emperor  in  which  he  had  declared  that, 
in  opposition  to  the  majority  of  the  German  nation, 
he  was  a  sincere  friend  of  England.  The  Emperor's 
Anglophil  utterances  aroused  the  fury  of  the  German 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        261 

Nationalist  press,  and,  referring  to  that  interview,  the 
Allgemeine  Evangelische  Lutherische  Kirchenzeitung,  a 
leading  Protestant  Church  paper,  wrote  in  November 
of  the  same  year  : — 

"  The  Emperor  labours  strenuously  with  the  object  of 
gaining  the  goodwill  of  the  British  nation.  That  is  not  very 
inspiring  for  us,  but  that  policy  is  necessary  as  long  as  we 
have  to  avoid  a  war  with  England  for  which  we  are  as  yet 
not  strong  enough.  Only  since  a  short  time  has  the  German 
nation  learned  to  understand  the  necessity  of  having  a 
powerful  fleet.  And  we  must  continue  building  ships  in 
competition  with  England  till  the  moment  arrives  when 
England  may  still  possess  many  more  ships  than  we  Germans 
have,  but  when  the  English  can  no  longer  find  the  men  for 
navigating  and  fighting  their  fleet.  Until  that  moment  has 
arisen,  it  is  madness  to  urge  for  war,  and  meanwhile  the  Em- 
peror tries  to  make  up  for  the  indiscretions  of  the  German 
press  by  his  advances  to  England." 

The  Kirchenzeitung  summed  up  in  a  few  lines  the 
policy  which  Germany  has  pursued  towards  Great 
Britain  during  more  than  a  decade.  There  is  evi- 
dently a  confusion  of  thought  somewhere.  Even  in 
the  best-informed  circles  of  Germany  the  opinion  is 
widely  held  that  Great  Britain  cannot  find  as  many 
sailors  as  she  requires,  probably  because  the  British 
merchant  marine  is  always  short  of  British  sailors  and 
has  to  employ  many  thousands  of  Scandinavians, 
Lascars,  &c.  Only  a  very  short  time  ago  one  of  the 
most  eminent  and  best-informed  German  professors 
told  me  that  Great  Britain  experienced  already  the 
greatest  difficulty  in  manning  her  fleet,  and  he  looked 
at  me  with  open-eyed  astonishment  when  I  told  him 
that  the  British  naval  authorities  can  always  obtain 
ten  recruits  for  every  single  one  they  want,  and  when 
I  suggested  to  him  that  he  should  study  the  official 
recruiting  returns. 


262  MODERN   GERMANY 

Germany's  transmaritime,  anti-British  policy  is 
founded  on  a  series  of  misconceptions  and  erroneous 
estimates.  Herein  lies  the  reason  that  her  foreign 
policy  has  been  a  gigantic  mistake,  a  mistake  which 
may  have  the  most  serious  consequences  for  her. 
Germany's  position  is  a  dangerous  one.  A  great 
defeat  may  mean  for  her  the  upbreak  of  the  empire. 
France  still  remembers  Sedan,  and  wishes  to  revenge 
her  defeat,  and  Russia  is  France's  ally.  Italy  is  not 
trusted  by  Germany,  and  Austria  may  at  the  critical 
moment  choose  to  remember  that  from  1740  to  1866 
she  has  been  attacked  and  despoiled  by  Prussia,  and 
that  Prussia  has  deprived  her  of  the  leading  place 
among  the  Germanic  States  which  she  used  to  occupy. 
Should  Germany  be  involved  in  a  great  European 
war,  Austria-Hungary  might  conceivably  choose  to 
observe  a  waiting  attitude,  and  abandon  it  only  when 
the  probable  issue  had  become  apparent.  The  Ger- 
mans are  still  the  ruling  race  in  Austria.  They  are 
the  natural  supporters  of  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  but 
their  number  is  too  small,  for  they  form  only  a  minority. 
The  incorporation  of  Southern  Germany,  which  is  more 
Austrian  than  Prussian  in  character,  would  greatly 
strengthen  the  German  element  in  Austria,  and  might, 
at  the  same  time,  give  back  to  Austria  the  hegemony 
in  Germany.  It  follows  that,  should  fortune  desert 
Germany  in  a  great  continental  conflict,  Austria  may 
revenge  herself  on  Prussia  for  her  past  wrongs,  and 
try  to  wrest  from  Prussia  the  paramount  position  in 
Germany  and  recreate  a  greater  Austria  at  Germany's 
expense.  Thus  "  the  war  on  three  fronts,"  which  was 
Bismarck's  nightmare,  might  end  not  only  in  Ger- 
many's defeat,  but  in  Germany's  partition. 

If,   as  so   many  leading   Germans   assert,   it   was 
Great  Britain's  constant  aim  to  bring  about  Germany's 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        263 

downfall,  Great  Britain  should  welcome  such  an 
event.  It  is  true  that,  as  many  German  observers 
have  told  us,  Germany's  defeat  would  benefit  British 
trade  and  industry.  However,  Great  Britain's  policy 
is  not  made  by  shopkeepers.  A  disastrous  defeat  of 
Germany  would  upset  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
It  would  greatly  increase  the  power  of  France  and 
Russia,  it  would  logically  lead  to  a  series  of  great 
wars  on  the  Continent,  and  in  the  end  Great  Britain 
might  have  to  step  in  and  to  rebuild  Germany  at  the 
cost  of  a  great  war  in  order  to  re-establish  a  balance 
of  power  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Only  the  short- 
sighted and  the  foolish  can  wish  for  Germany's  downfall. 

Great  Britain  has  little  cause  to  plead  for  Ger- 
many's goodwill,  for  she  suffers  little  through  the 
existing  Anglo-German  tension,  whilst  isolated  Ger- 
many suffers  much  and  risks  more.  Whilst  Great 
Britain's  position  throughout  the  world  is  secure,  that 
of  Germany  is  very  precarious  because  of  her  exposed 
frontiers.  As  matters  stand  at  present,  Germany  has 
far  more  need  of  Great  Britain's  support  than  Great 
Britain  has  of  Germany's.  It  is  true  that  Germany 
possesses  still  the  strongest  army  in  Europe,  but  it 
is  not  strong  enough  to  face  a  great  European  com- 
bination. She  is  no  longer  a  danger  to  the  peace  of 
the  world,  owing  to  her  isolation  and  to  the  estrange- 
ment of  Great  Britain.  The  minds  of  her  statesmen 
must  rather  be  preoccupied  with  the  problem  of  de- 
fending Germany  than  with  ambitious  wars  of  aggres- 
sion. Under  these  circumstances  it  is  madness  for 
Germany's  rulers  to  continue  proclaiming  that  Ger- 
many requires  more  Dreadnoughts,  and  still  more 
Dreadnoughts,  and  ever  more  Dreadnoughts  against 
Great  Britain. 

Germany's   prospects   are   dark   and   threatening. 


264  MODERN   GERMANY 

She  is  not  rich  enough  and  not  strong  enough  to 
maintain  at  the  same  time  the  strongest  army  and  a 
navy  able  to  challenge  the  strongest  navy.     Every 
nation  which  has  tried  to  become  supreme  on  land 
and    sea    has    failed.      Germany    has    undoubtedly 
neglected    her    army    whilst    constructing    her    fleet. 
Already  some  of  her  leading  men  are  pointing  out 
her  danger.     In  the  Preussische  Jahrbticher  for  January 
1912    Professor    Hans    Delbriick,    one    of    Germany's 
leading  historians  and  political  writers,   warned  the 
Government  not  to  enlarge  once  more  the  Navy  Bill 
of  1900  at  the  bidding  of  the  German  Navy  League, 
but   to  increase  instead  the  insufficient   strength  of 
the  German  army.     In  Der  Tag  of  the  loth  January 
1912  General  von  Loebell  complained  that  Germany 
raises  yearly  only  44  recruits  per  10,000  of  population, 
whilst  France  raises  63  recruits  per  10,000  of  popula- 
tion.    In  Die  Post  of  the  gth  January  1912,  a  leading 
article  urged  the  Government  to  increase  the  German 
army  greatly,  because  "  the  German  army  was  of  a 
strength  commensurate  to  a  nation  of  45,000,000,  but 
not  of  65,000,000  people."     Many  similar  views  have 
been    expressed,    and    so    concerned    have    patriotic 
Germans  become  about  the  exposed  position  of  their 
country  and  the  insufficient  strength  of  their  army  that, 
on  the  model  of  the  great  German  Navy  League,  a  Wehr- 
verein,  a  society  for  promoting  a  great  increase  of  the 
German  army,  has  lately  been  founded  by  the  citizens. 

Can  Anglo-German  relations  be  improved,  and 
what  should  be  done  to  improve  them  ? 

Unfortunately,  deep  distrust  exists  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany.  That  distrust  is  unwarranted 
on  the  part  of  Germany,  and  it  has  been  artificially 
created  among  them  by  a  campaign  of  misrepresenta- 
tion. The  German  masses  have  so  persistently  been 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES         265 

told  that  Great  Britain  is  envious  of  Germany's  pros- 
perity, and  that  she  plots  to  bring  about  her  down- 
fall, that  they  have  at  last  come  to  believe  it,  and  are 
clamouring  for  a  powerful  fleet  for  their  defence  against 
Great  Britain.  British  distrust  of  Germany,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  due  to  this  artificial  German  agitation, 
to  the  attitude  of  Germany's  diplomacy,  to  the  anti- 
British  pronouncements  of  Germany's  leaders  and  the 
German  press,  and  especially  to  the  most  palpable 
evidence  of  Germany's  intentions,  the  great  German 
fleet,  which,  as  many  Germans  have  admitted,  can 
only  be  meant  for  use  against  Great  Britain. 

The  continued  enlargement  of  the  German  fleet 
will  not  increase  Germany's  security,  for  under  no 
conceivable  circumstances  will  Great  Britain  and  her 
colonies  allow  the  unchallengeable  supremacy  of  the 
British  navy  to  be  in  the  least  reduced  by  Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  continued  enlargement  of  the 
German  fleet  is  bound  to  increase  the  tension  between 
the  two  countries.  Therefore  the  first  step  towards 
an  improvement  of  Anglo-German  relations  must  be 
taken  by  Germany,  and  it  must  take  the  shape  of  a 
limitation  of  naval  armaments. 

The  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  with  its  subsequent  enlarge- 
ments of  1905  and  1908,  fixed  Germany's  output  of 
warships  till  1917,  and  provided  for  two  large  ships  in 
every  year  between  1912  and  1917,  or  twelve  altogether. 
However,  the  German  Navy  League  and  the  German 
Nationalist  Press  demanded  in  1912  that  the  Navy 
Bill  of  1900  should  again  be  increased,  and  that  in 
every  year  from  1912  to  1917  three  super-Dread- 
noughts should  be  constructed.  Their  demands  were 
granted.  If  the  German  Government  construct  be- 
tween 1912  and  1917  eighteen  super-Dreadnoughts, 
Great  Britain  will  have  to  produce  thirty-six  super- 


266  MODERN   GERMANY 

Dreadnoughts.  Had  the  German  Government  really 
wished  to  improve  Anglo-German  relations,  it  could 
have  shown  that  it  was  in  earnest  by  keeping  her 
shipbuilding  programme  within  the  limits  laid  down 
by  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  and  the  amendments  of 
1905  and  1908.  It  has  missed  a  great  opportunity, 
and  in  view  of  Germany's  attitude  and  naval  arma- 
ments, it  is  quite  useless  for  Germans  and  Englishmen 
to  talk  of  Anglo-German  friendship  and  co-operation 
and  of  the  natural  union  of  the  countries  of  Goethe 
and  Shakespeare. 

As  soon  as  Germany  has  shown  by  deeds  that  she 
wishes  to  live  on  good  terms  with  Great  Britain,  as 
soon  as  she  has  shown  that  she  desires  no  longer  to 
create  for  herself  "  a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  a 
war  with  the  mightiest  naval  Power  would  involve 
risks  threatening  the  supremacy  of  that  Power," 
Great  Britain  will  reciprocate.  Great  Britain  can 
give  valuable  assistance  to  Germany  in  all  parts  of  the 
world.  As  soon  as  Great  Britain  feels  convinced  that 
Germany's  intentions  are  peaceful,  the  Anglo-German 
differences  regarding  the  greatest  transmaritime  under- 
taking of  Germany,  the  Baghdad  Railway,  which  at 
present  is  considered  in  Great  Britain  to  be  rather  a 
German  strategical  railway  than  a  Turkish  business 
undertaking,  will  no  doubt  be  adjusted.  In  course  of 
time  colonies  may  come  into  the  market,  and  with 
British  support  Germany  will  easily  obtain  the  out- 
lets which  she  requires.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Ger- 
many again  enlarges  her  naval  programme  and  con- 
tinues antagonising  and  demonstratively  threatening 
Great  Britain,  Anglo-German  relations  will  steadily 
become  worse,  and  we  shall  have  every  reason  to  take 
a  pessimistic  view  of  the  future. 

I  have  lately  spent  six  weeks  in  Germany,  where 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        267 

I  have  met  many  of  the  leading  people,  and  I  have 
unfortunately  received  the  distinct  impression  that 
the  German  Government  does  not  wish  for  an  im- 
provement in  Anglo-German  relations.  Apparently 
its  policy  is  to  keep  alive  the  artificially  created  national 
animosity  against  Great  Britain  by  encouraging  the 
unceasing  misrepresentations  and  attacks  upon  Great 
Britain  in  the  semi-official  Press.  Its  principal  aim 
seems  to  be  the  creation  of  an  extremely  powerful 
navy.  Ever  since  1900  it  has  appealed  to  popular 
passion  for  support,  and  has  called  upon  the  people 
to  provide  the  necessary  sums  "  to  protect  Germany 
against  England's  hostility."  As  long  as  the  posses- 
sion of  a  powerful  navy  is  Germany's  principal  aim, 
it  does  not  suit  the  German  Government  to  be  on 
good  terms  with  Great  Britain.  In  view  of  Germany's 
deliberate  and  calculated  ill-will,  all  advances  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  will  be  useless. 

The  German  Press  is  still  repeating  the  fable  that, 
during  the  Morocco  crisis,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  threa- 
tened Germany,  who  had  never  intended  to  occupy 
a  part  of  Morocco.  Unfortunately  a  portion  of  the 
British  Press  have  echoed  the  German  story,  and  has 
violently  attacked  Sir  Edward  for  his  unwarranted 
interference.  It  is  true  that  the  German  Chancellor 
and  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  have  publicly 
declared  that  Germany  had  never  intended  to  occupy 
Moroccan  territory,  but  since  then  revelations  have 
been  made  which  belie  their  assertions.  Before  a 
court  of  law,  in  a  political  libel  suit  brought  by  the 
editor  of  the  Rheinisch-W estfalische  Zeitung  against 
the  Grenzboten,  the  editor  of  the  former  paper  stated 
on  the  igth  January  1912  :— 

"  Mr.  Class,  the  President  of  the  Pan-Germanic  League,  is 
prepared  to  state  upon  oath  before  this  Court  that  the 


268  MODERN   GERMANY 

Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr  von  Kiderlen 
Wachter,  writing  to  him  from  Kissingen,  requested  Mr.  Class 
to  meet  him  at  the  Hotel  Pfalzer  Hof  in  Mannheim.  During 
the  interview,  which  occupied  several  hours,  Herr  von 
Kiderlen  Wachter  stated  :  '  The  Pan-Germanic  demand  for 
the  possession  of  Morocco  is  absolutely  justified.  You  can 
absolutely  rely  upon  it  that  the  Government  will  stick  to 
Morocco.  Monsieur  Cambon  is  wriggling  before  me  like  a 
worm.  The  German  Government  is  in  a  splendid  position. 
You  can  rely  upon  me,  and  you  will  be  very  pleased  with  our 
Morocco  policy.  I  am  as  good  a  Pan-German  as  you  are.' 
On  the  ist  July  Mr.  Class  called  at  the  German  Foreign 
Office  and,  failing  to  find  Herr  von  Kiderlen  Wachter,  was 
received  by  Herr  Zimmermann,  the  Under-Secretary.  Mr. 
Zimmermann  told  him  :  '  You  come  at  an  historic  hour. 
To-day  the  Panther  appears  before  Agadir,  and  at  this 
moment  (12  o'clock  midday)  the  Foreign  Cabinets  are  being 
informed  of  its  mission.  The  German  Government  has  sent 
two  agents  provocateurs  to  Agadir,  and  these  have  done  their 
duty  very  well.  German  firms  have  been  induced  to  make 
complaints  and  to  call  upon  the  Government  in  Berlin  for 
protection.  It  is  the  Government's  intention  to  seize  the 
district,  and  it  will  not  give  it  up  again.  The  German  people 
require  absolutely  a  settlement  Colony.  Please  prevent, 
wherever  in  the  Press  you  have  influence,  the  raising  of 
claims  for  compensation  elsewhere.  Possibly  France  will 
offer  us  the  Congo.  However,  the  German  Government 
does  not  want  compensation  elsewhere,  but  a  part  of 
Morocco.' " 

The  foregoing  most  important  and  most  interesting 
statement  throws  a  vivid  light  upon  the  Morocco 
crisis  and  explains  its  genesis.  This  statement  ap- 
peared, as  far  as  I  am  aware,  only  in  the  Rheinisch- 
Westfdlische  Zeitung  and  in  the  Tdgliche  Rundschau, 
but  it  was  suppressed  by  the  German  semi-official 
Press,  which  preserved  a  judicious  and  significant 
silence.  However,  as  it  was  not  repudiated  by  Herr 
Class,  by  Herr  von  Kiderlen  Wachter,  or  by  Herr 
Zimmermann,  we  must  assume  that  it  was  correct 


ANGLO-GERMAN    DIFFERENCES        269 

in  substance  and  in  detail.  The  statement  shows 
clearly  that  it  was  Germany's  deliberate  intention  to 
occupy  Morocco,  notwithstanding  the  protestations  to 
the  contrary  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  the  Foreign 
Secretary.  It  has  made  it  clear  that,  but  for  Great 
Britain's  energetic  intervention,  war  would  most 
probably  have  broken  out  between  Germany  and 
France  over  Morocco.  We  may  therefore  conclude 
that,  through  the  British  Government's  timely  and 
vigorous  action,  peace  was  preserved,  and  that  the 
German  complaints  about  Sir  Edward  Grey's  "  un- 
warranted interference  "  are  baseless. 


CHAPTER   XII 

THE  TRIPLE   ALLIANCE — CAN   GERMANY   RELY   UPON 
HER  PARTNERS  ? 

WHENEVER  one  of  the  Powers  belonging  to  the  Triple 
Alliance  takes  some  decisive  action  without  consulting 
its  partners,  statesmen  and  politicians  begin  to  specu- 
late whether  the  Triple  Alliance  is  still  valid.  Soon 
their  speculations  are  reflected  in  the  public  Press, 
and  in  due  course  semi-official  and  official  statements 
appear  assuring  us  that  the  Triple  Alliance  is  more 
necessary  than  ever  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  that 
its  binding  power  continues  unimpaired,  and  that  the 
tie  between  the  three  allied  monarchs  and  nations 
is  stronger  than  ever.  Therefore  many  people  have 
come  to  believe  that  the  Triple  Alliance  is  as  strong 
and  as  permanent  a  factor  in  international  politics  as 
is  the  German  Empire  or  the  Swiss  Confederation. 

Italy's  seizure  of  Tripoli  and  her  attack  upon 
Turkey  has  been  strongly  disapproved  of  by  her 
partners,  and  especially  by  Austria  -  Hungary. 
Austria's  reproaches  have  met  with  very  vigorous 
Italian  replies.  However,  acts  are  more  important 
than  words.  It  was  noticed  that  practically  the 
whole  of  the  Italian  expeditionary  force  sent  to  Tripoli 
was  drawn  from  the  8th,  gth,  loth,  and  I2th  army 
corps,  that  is,  from  the  west  of  Italy  and  Sicily. 
Whilst  Italy  thus  to  some  extent  denuded  of  troops 
her  western  frontier  facing  France,  she  not  only 

maintained   unimpaired,    but    actually   strengthened, 

270 


THE   TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  271 

her  garrisons  facing  the  territory  of  her  ally,  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  her  garrisons  on  the  shore  of  the  Adri- 
atic, where  an  Austrian  landing  might  possibly  take 
place.  The  military  correspondent  of  The  Times 
wrote  :  "  The  Italian  Staff  retains  as  much  as  pos- 
sible the  power  to  act  against  Austria  should  the 
necessity  arise."  Commenting  on  this  curious  fact, 
and  various  other  facts  of  similar  portent,  we  have 
again  been  told  that  the  Triple  Alliance  is  breaking 
up,  but  once  more  the  official  sources  of  information 
have  assured  us  that  nothing  has  occurred  to  weaken 
the  tie  between  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy. 

Many  British  people  are  insufficiently  acquainted 
with  the  binding  force  of  international  agreements  in 
general,  and  very  few  people  are  aware  of  the  serious 
differences  which  exist,  and  which  have  existed  for 
a  long  time,  within  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  especially 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy.  These  differ- 
ences are  so  great,  and  they  have  lately  become  so 
acute,  that  they  may  and  probably  will  lead  at  an 
early  date  to  an  important  change  in  the  grouping 
of  the  Powers.  Therefore  we  should  ask  ourselves  : 
What  is  the  binding  fgrce  of  international  treaties  and 
alliances,  and  what  is  Italy's  position  in  the  Triple 
Alliance  ? 

Agreements  between  States  are  frequently  com- 
pared with  agreements  between  persons  because  of 
the  similarity  of  the  quasi-legal  wording  used  in  both. 
However,  notwithstanding  the  analogy  of  the  lan- 
guage used,  and  the  apparent  similarity  of  the  trans- 
action, such  comparison  is  not  justified.  A  civil 
agreement  is  absolutely  binding  upon  its  signatories 
and  can  be  enforced  by  a  court  of  law.  A  merchant 
who  has  agreed  to  sell  certain  goods  at  a  certain  price 
cannot  successfully  try  to  avoid  performance  by  ad- 


272  MODERN   GERMANY 

vancing  the  plea  that  fulfilment  of  the  contract  would 
be  unprofitable  or  disastrous  to  him.     The  binding 
force  of  a  civil  contract  is  absolute.     On  the  other 
hand,  an  agreement  between  nations  possesses  neither 
unconditional   validity   nor  unlimited   binding   force. 
By  signing  a  contract  a  merchant  binds  only  himself, 
and  he  must  fulfil  the  contract  even  if  he  has  signed 
away  his  property.     His  misfortune  affects  only  him- 
self.    Hence  it  is  right  that  the  law  courts  enforce 
the    unconditional    fulfilment    of    private    contracts. 
But   an   agreement   between   States   bears   a   totally 
different  character.     Such  an  agreement  is  concluded, 
not  by  the  principals — that  is,  by  the  nations  them- 
selves— acting  in  full  knowledge  of  the  case  and  of 
their    responsibility,    but    only    by    their    temporary 
agents  who  are  acting  on  the  nation's  behalf,  by  states- 
men who  have  been  appointed  to  promote  the  interests 
of  the  nation  and  to  increase  the  prosperity  of  the 
people.     They   are   the   trustees   of   the   nation,    and 
they  are  neither  entitled  to  sign  away  the  happiness 
and  prosperity  of  the  nation  on  behalf  of  which  they 
are  acting,  nor  to  fulfil  treaty  obligations  if  they  are 
convinced  that  their  performance  would  be  ruinous 
to  the  people.     Hence  a  statesman  is  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances bound  to  deny  the  validity  and  binding 
force  of  an  international  agreement,   even  if  it  has 
been  signed,  not  by  a  predecessor  in  office,  but  by 
himself.     Treaties  of  alliance  resemble  laws  in  their 
conditional  validity.     Laws  lapse  automatically  when 
they  are  no  longer  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of 
the  time. 

On  the  British  statute  book  there  are  many  laws 
which  can  no  longer  be  enforced,  although  they  have 
not  been  formally  repealed.  Similarly  treaties  of 
alliance,  having  been  concluded  between  nations  with 


THE    TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  273 

the  object  of  promoting  their  common  interests,  lapse 
automatically  when  the  treaty  Powers  cease  to  possess 
those  common  interests  and  aims  in  furtherance  of 
which  the  treaties  were  originally  concluded.  Bis- 
marck, the  father  of  modern  statesmanship,  explained 
repeatedly  with  his  usual  directness  and  lucidity  that 
treaties  of  alliance  possess  neither  unconditional 
validity  nor  unlimited  binding  force,  that  both  were 
affected  by  changing  times  and  circumstances.  He 
stated,  for  instance,  in  the  Reichstag  on  February 
6th,  1888  :- 

"  No  great  Power  can,  for  any  length  of  time,  be  tied  by  the 
wording  of  a  treaty  which  is  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the 
people,  and  if  it  has  done  so  it  will  eventually  be  compelled 
openly  to  declare  :  '  The  times  have  altered.  I  cannot  do 
it.'  And  it  must  justify  its  action  before  the  people  and 
before  its  allies  as  best  it  can.  But  to  riu'n  its  own  people  by 
fulfilling  one's  treaty  duties  to  the  letter,  that  is  an  action 
which  no  great  Power  can  assent  to.  However,  this  is  by  no 
means  demanded  in  any  treaty.  .  .  .  Treaties  are  only  the 
expression  of  a  community  of  aims  and  of  risks  which  are  run 
by  the  treaty-concluding  Powers." 

In  his  political  testament,  his  Gedanken  und  Erin- 
nerungen,  Bismarck  wrote  : — 

"  All  contracts  between  great  States  cease  to  be  uncon- 
ditionally binding  as  soon  as  they  are  tested  by  the  struggle 
for  existence.  No  great  nation  will  ever  be  induced  to 
sacrifice  its  existence  on  the  altar  of  treaty  fidelity.  .  .  . 
To-day  it  is  hardly  possible  for  the  Government  of  a  great 
Power  to  place  its  resources  at  the  disposal  of  a  friendly  State 
when  the  sentiment  of  the  people  disapproves  of  it.  ...  The 
clause  Rebus  sic  stantibus  is  tacitly  understood  to  apply  to  all 
treaties  which  involve  performance." 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  originally  a  purely  defen- 
sive instrument.  It  has  been  repeatedly  renewed,  and 

s 


274  MODERN   GERMANY 

there  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  it  has  changed 
its  character.  Bismarck  foresaw  that  this  Alliance 
might  come  to  an  end  by  a  change  in  the  political 
conditions  of  Europe,  for  he  wrote  in  his  Gedanken 
und  Erinnerungen : — 

"  The  Triple  Alliance  has  the  significance  of  a  strategical 
position  which  was  taken  up  in  view  of  the  threatening  dangers 
which  prevailed  at  the  time  of  its  conclusion.  It  has  been 
prolonged  from  time  to  time,  and  it  may  be  possible  to  prolong 
it  still  further,  but  eternal  duration  is  assured  to  no  treaty 
between  great  Powers,  and  it  would  be  unwise  to  consider  it  as 
affording  a  permanently  secure  guarantee  against  all  possible 
contingencies  which  may  modify  the  political,  material  and 
moral  conditions  under  which  it  was  brought  into  being. 
The  Triple  Alliance  no  more  constitutes  a  foundation  capable 
of  offering  perennial  resistance  to  time  and  change  than  did 
the  numerous  other  Triple  or  Quadruple  Alliances  which 
preceded  it." 

The  great  German  statesman  actually  foretold  that 
the  Triple  Alliance  would  come  to  an  end  if  the  rela- 
tions between  Italy  and  France  should  become  friendly, 
that  Italy  might  turn  against  Austria-Hungary  if  she 
could  feel  secure  of  French  aggression.  He  told 
Moritz  Busch  in  1888  :  "  We  cannot  quite  rely  upon 
Italy.  The  French  may  again  gain  ground  in  that 
country.  France  and  Italy  may  become  friends  not 
only  after  a  change  has  taken  place  in  France's  form 
of  Government,  but  even  if  the  Republic  should  be 
maintained.  In  case  of  a  reconciliation  with  France, 
Italy  might  resume  her  Irredentist  policy  and  renew 
her  claims  upon  Austrian  territory."  It  will  ap- 
pear in  the  following  pages  that  Bismarck's  prophecy 
has  come  true.  However,  before  considering  Austro- 
Italian  relations  and  Italy's  policy  towards  Austria- 
Hungary,  let  us  inquire  why  Italy  joined  the  Triple 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  275 

Alliance,  for  only  then  shall  we  be  able  to  understand 
Italy's  attitude  towards  her  allies. 

Bismarck  created  bitter  hostility  between  France 
and  Italy  by  giving  Tunis  to  France  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin.  Tunis  lies  at  a  distance  of  only  a  hundred 
miles  from  the  coast  of  Sicily  and  from  that  of  Sar- 
dinia. Italy  had  the  strongest  claims  upon  Tunis, 
partly  because  of  her  geographical  proximity,  partly 
because  nearly  all  the  European  residents  in  Tunis 
were  Italian  citizens.  Under  these  circumstances 
France's  occupation  of  Tunis  was  felt  as  a  serious 
attack  upon  Italy's  interests.  Soon  after  having 
taken  possession  of  Tunis,  France  converted  into  a 
first-class  arsenal  and  war  harbour  the  port  of  Bizerta, 
which  is  equidistant  from  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  and 
stationed  a  fleet  there.  Thus  she  was  able  to  threaten 
Italy's  enormous  and  exposed  coast-line  simultaneously 
in  the  north-west  from  Toulon  and  in  the  extreme 
south  of  the  country.  It  is  widely  known  that  Bis- 
marck caused  Italy  to  join  the  Austro-German  Alli- 
ance by  giving  Tunis  to  France,  but  only  a  few  people, 
most  of  whom  are  diplomats,  are  aware  that  Bismarck 
threatened  Italy  with  a  war  with  Austria-Hungary 
unless  she  should  ally  herself  with  the  two  Germanic 
States,  that  Italy  did  not  join  the  Austro-German 
Alliance  by  her  own  free  choice,  but  was  actually 
coerced  into  joining  it.  Describing  the  foreign  policy 
of  Count  Robilant,  a  former  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  who  took  a  very  prominent  part  in  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Triple  Alliance,  the  Marchese  Cappelli, 
who  himself  has  been  a  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
wrote  in  his  book,  La  Politico,  ester a^  del  conte  de 
Robilant : — 

"  None  knew  better  than  Count  Robilant  how  much  we 
were  isolated  and  how  great  was  the  danger  arising  from  the 


276  MODERN   GERMANY 

hostility  which  certain  Powers  displayed  towards  us.  When 
Prince  Bismarck  went  to  Vienna  in  1879  in  connection  with 
the  conclusion  of  the  Austro-German  Alliance,  the  Italian 
Ambassador  was  the  only  Ambassador  in  Vienna  who  was 
not  visited  by  the  Prince.  That  was  not  the  only  evidence 
of  Germany's  attitude  towards  Italy.  The  Austrian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  Andrassy,  told  Bismarck  that 
Austria  had  been  constantly  provoked  by  the  agitation  of  the 
Italian  Irredentists  and  that  she  might  at  last  feel  compelled  to 
make  war  upon  Italy,  and  he  asked  the  Prince  whether,  in 
that  event,  Germany  would  have  any  objection  to  Austria 
taking  possession  of  part  of  those  Italian  Provinces  which 
had  been  Austrian  and  which  Austria  had  lost  to  Italy  in 
1859  and  1866.  Bismarck  hesitated  a  moment  and  then 
answered  :  '  No,  we  would  not  raise  any  objections.  Italy  is 
none  of  our  friends.'  About  the  same  time  the  Papal  Nuncio 
inquired  whether  Germany  would  object  to  the  re-establish- 
ment, or  at  least  the  partial  re-establishment,  of  the  Pope's 
temporal  power,  and  he  received  exactly  the  same  reply. 
These  utterances  showed  Germany's  sentiments  towards 
Italy." 

Monsieur  A.  Billot,  who  from  1890  to  1897  was  the 
French  Ambassador  in  Rome,  wrote  : — 

"  Italy's  hesitation  to  join  the  Austro-German  Alliance  was 
overcome  by  alarming  the  Italian  Government.  Germany 
pretended  to  be  favourably  inclined  towards  the  Vatican,  and 
took  openly  steps  towards  a  reconciliation  with  the  Pope. 
Thus  Italy  was  trapped  into  an  alliance  of  which  the  first 
advantage  was  to  be  this,  that  Italy  would  be  guaranteed 
against  all  attempts  to  restore  the  temporal  power  of  the 
Pope,  a  policy  which  was  favoured,  or  at  least  not  disapproved 
of,  by  Germany." 

Apparently  Bismarck  had  the  greatest  contempt 
for  Italy.  In  1880  he  said  to  Busch  :  "  The  Italians 
are  like  carrion  crows  on  the  battlefield  that  let  others 
provide  their  food.  They  were  prepared  in  1870  to 
fall  upon  us  with  others  if  they  were  promised  a 
piece  of  Tyrol.  At  that  time  a  Russian  diplomat 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  277 

said  :  '  What !  They  are  asking  for  something  again, 
although  they  have  not  yet  lost  a  battle !  '  Never- 
theless he  forced  Italy  into  joining  the  Austro-German 
Alliance,  because  he  wished  to  be  sure  that  in  a  war 
between  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  on  the  one 
side,  and  France  and  Russia  on  the  other  side,  Austria- 
Hungary  should  be  able  to  use  her  entire  army  against 
Russia. 

Long  before  1883,  the  year  when  Italy  joined  the 
Austro-German  Alliance,  it  had  been  Bismarck's  policy 
to  create  differences  between  France  and  Italy  with 
regard  to  the  Mediterranean,  differences  which  by 
weakening  France  were  likely  to  benefit  Germany. 
He  wrote,  in  1868,  to  Count  Usedom,  his  Ambassador 
in  Italy  : — 

"  Italy  is  France's  natural  rival,  and  the  two  countries  will 
always  be  rivals  and  sometimes  enemies.  Nature  has  thrown 
between  the  two  an  apple  of  contention,  for  which  they  will 
fight  for  ever  :  the  Mediterranean,  that  wonderful  inter-con- 
tinental harbour  of  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  that  channel 
between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  that  basin  which  is 
surrounded  by  the  fairest  countries  in  the  world.  It  is  surely 
not  idle  to  believe  that  France  envies  Italy  and  its  position, 
which  stretches  far  into  the  Mediterranean,  and  which  pos- 
sesses the  most  beautiful  shores  and  the  shortest  route  to  the 
Orient.  France  and  Italy  can  never  become  allies,  sharing 
the  advantages  of  the  Mediterranean,  for  this  is  an  indivisible 
heritage.  It  belongs  undoubtedly  to  Italy,  whose  Mediterranean 
shores  are  twelve  times  as  extensive  as  are  the  Mediterranean 
shores  of  France." 

How  deeply  Italy  was  wounded  by  France's  occu- 
pation of  Tunis  will  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the 
signature  of  the  Franco-Tunisien  Treaty  on  the  I2th 
May  1 88 1  was  followed  two  days  later  by  the  fall 
of  the  Cairoli  Cabinet.  Franco-Italian  relations  be- 
came exceedingly  strained.  Italy  began  in  haste  to 


278  MODERN   GERMANY 

increase  her  army  and  to  build  a  fleet  able  to  en- 
counter the  strong  French  navy.  The  tension  between 
the  two  countries  caused  the  outbreak  of  a  customs 
war  which  lasted  ten  years.  Her  vast  expenses  on 
armaments,  and  the  virtual  closing  of  the  French 
frontier  to  Italian  products,  and  of  the  Paris  money 
market  to  Italian  loans,  impoverished  Italy  greatly 
and  brought  her  to  the  verge  of  national  bankruptcy. 

The  policy  of  keeping  France  and  Italy  apart  by 
artificial  means  was  successful  only  as  long  as  Bis- 
marck directed  Germany's  policy.  After  his  dismissal 
Germany's  policy  lacked  a  firm,  directing  hand, 
France  began  to  display  independent  diplomatic  initia- 
tive, and  to  pull  the  diplomatic  wires  of  Europe  as 
Bismarck  had  done  during  thirty  years.  Monsieur 
Delcasse  resolved  to  clear  away  the  differences  which 
Bismarck  had  created  between  France  and  Great 
Britain  on  the  one  side,  and  between  France  and  Italy 
on  the  other,  and  he  succeeded.  The  Franco-Italian 
understanding  began  with  the  Agreement  of  1898 
regarding  Crete,  and  with  a  Treaty  regarding  Tripoli 
in  1899.  The  Franco-Italian  customs  war,  which  had 
been  so  disastrous  to  Italy,  was  ended.  France  and 
Italy  arrived  at  a  thorough  understanding  as  to  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  two  Powers  became  friends. 
Italy  felt  no  longer  threatened  by  France,  for  France 
acted  towards  her  with  the  greatest  loyalty.  As  far 
as  Italy  was  concerned,  the  Triple  Alliance  was  no 
longer  a  necessity. 

If  we  wish .  to  understand  Italy's  foreign  policy, 
we  must  acquaint  ourselves  with  two  great  political 
currents — the  Irredentist  movement,  and  the  Ex- 
pansionist movement.  Irredenta  Italia  means  the  un- 
redeemed Italy.  The  larger  part  of  Italy  was  until 
lately  under  Austrian  domination.  The  policy  of  the 


THE   TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  279 

Irredentists  is  to  "  redeem  "  those  territories  which, 
though  Italian  in  character,  still  belong  to  foreign 
countries,  and  to  unite  them  with  the  kingdom  of 
Italy.  The  lands  which  the  Irredentists  claim  most 
loudly  and  most  persistently  belong  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary. They  are  the  Southern  Tyrol  and  parts  of  the 
provinces  of  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  with  the  towns  of 
Trieste,  Pola,  and  Fiume.  The  spirit  of  the  Irredentist 
has  become  the  spirit  of  Young  Italy  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Italian  Government.  In  the  school- 
book  history  of  Giovanni  Soli,  which  is  used  in  the 
majority  of  elementary  schools  in  Italy,  occurs  the 
following  passage  :  "  By  the  conquest  of  Rome  Italy 
was  freed  nearly  entirely  from  the  domination  of 
foreigners.  We  say  nearly  entirely,  because  two  parts 
of  Italy  belong  still  to  Austria — namely,  the  South 
of  Tyrol  and  Istria  with  Trieste,  two  beautiful  coun- 
tries which  possess  more  than  1,000,000  inhabitants." 

Austria-Hungary  possesses,  indeed,  almost  1,000,000 
Italian  inhabitants,  and  these  live  in  dense  masses 
close  to  the  Italian  frontier.  It  is  not  generally  known 
that  of  the  900,000  inhabitants  of  the  Austrian  Tyrol 
about  400,000  are  Italians,  and  that  the  south  of  that 
country,  with  the  towns  of  Trento,  Rovereto,  Ala, 
Bondo,  Borgo,  &c.,  is  purely  Italian,  95  per  cent,  of 
the  inhabitants  being  Italians.  France  and  Switzer- 
land also  possess  small  districts  peopled  by  Italians, 
but  the  Irredentists  are  particularly  hostile  to  Austria- 
Hungary  because  the  Austrians  have  in  the  past 
ruled  Italy  tyrannically,  and  are  endeavouring  now 
to  stifle  and  suppress  Italian  culture  among  the 
Italians  living  in  the  Dual  Monarchy  by  opposing  the 
creation  of  Italian  schools,  &c. 

Austria's  greatest  harbour  is  Trieste.  Trieste,  the 
Hamburg  of  Austria,  is  as  Italian  as  is  Genoa  :  nine- 


280  MODERN    GERMANY 

tenths  of  its  inhabitants  are  Italians.     Of  the  inhabi- 
tants   of    Fiume,    Austria-Hungary's    second    largest 
commercial  harbour,   one-half   are   Italians ;    and   of 
the  inhabitants  of   Pola,  her  most  important  naval 
harbour,    more    than    half    are    Italians.     Italy    has 
ancient    historical    claims    to    the    possession    of    the 
whole  of  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  and  espe- 
cially to  that  part  which  is  now  in  Austria's  hands. 
The  coasts  of  the  Adriatic  Sea  were  conquered,  colon- 
ised, and  civilised  by  the  Venetians.     The  names  of 
the  greatest  Austrian  coast  towns  on  the  Adriatic, 
such  as  Trieste,  Capo  d'Istria,  Parenzo,  Rovigno,  Pola, 
Alona,  Fiume,  Veglia,  Zara,  Sebenico,  Spalato,  Ragusa, 
&c.,  proclaim  their  Italian  origin.     They  are  Italian 
in   appearance   and  in   civilisation,    and  in   most   of 
them  the  emblem  of  the  Venetian  lion  will  still  be 
found  prominently  displayed  on  the  old  public  build- 
ings and  on  the  gates  and  walls.     The  Adriatic  used 
to  be  a  purely  Italian  sea.     In  old  Italian  documents 
it  is  called  II  Golfo  di  Venezia,  or  simply  II  Golfo,  and 
the  modern  Italians  refer  to  it  frequently  and  sig- 
nificantly as  "II  mare  nostro." 

Italy  is  a  very  densely  populated  country,  and  as 
the  birth-rate  is  very  high  she  has  a  great  surplus 
population.  Italy  is  naturally  a  poor  country,  for 
she  possesses  practically  no  coal,  no  iron,  and  scarcely 
any  timber.  The  largest  part  of  her  territory  is 
covered  with  mountains  and  rocks.  Owing  to  the 
natural  poverty  of  Italy,  her  citizens  are  forced  to 
emigrate  in  large  numbers.  Italian  emigration  is  by 
far  the  largest  in  the  world.  In  1909  it  amounted  to 
625,637  people.  Per  thousand  of  population  there 
were,  in  1909,  3.9  emigrants  in  Germany,  64.2  emi- 
grants in  Great  Britain,  and  no  less  than  182.6  emi- 
grants in  Italy.  These  extraordinary  figures  show 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  281 

that  Italy's  need  for  settlement  colonies  is  far  greater 
and  far  more  urgent  than  that  of  Great  Britain  or  of 
Germany.  Italy  is  loath  to  strengthen  foreign  nations 
with  her  surplus  population. 

In  which  direction  can  Italy  expand  ? 

Modern  Italy  is  the  heir  of  ancient  Italy.  She 
wishes  to  renew  the  ancient  greatness  and  glory  of 
the  country  and  to  increase  its  national  strength.  She 
cannot  expand  to  the  north,  west,  and  south,  but  only  to 
the  east.  She  sees  in  the  western  part  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  a  natural  and  legitimate  field  for  expansion 
and  colonisation.  Albania,  which  lies  almost  within 
sight  of  the  Italian  shore,  is  her  more  immediate  goal. 

The  King  of  Italy,  the  Italian  Government,  and 
the  Italian  people  have  shown  that  they  take  the 
strongest  interest  in  Albania.  Numerous  Italian  travel- 
lers have  visited,  studied,  and  described  the  country, 
and  numerous  Italian  capitalists  have  financed  Albanian 
enterprises.  The  Government  has  endeavoured  to 
befriend  the  Albanians  and  to  win  their  goodwill  by 
creating  and  subsidising  Italian  schools  in  the  country, 
and  by  sending  there  medical,  scientific,  and  charitable 
missions.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment does  not  subsidise  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
except  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  especially  in 
Albania.  It  has  created  commercial  agencies  and  has 
subsidised  lines  of  steamers  trading  between  Albania 
and  Italy,  and  the  result  of  these  endeavours  has 
been  very  gratifying  to  the  Italians,  but  not  at  all 
pleasing  to  the  Austrians. 

The  marriage  of  King  Vittorio  Emanuele  of  Italy 
to  the  fourth  daughter  of  King  Nicolas  of  Montenegro, 
which  took  place  in  1896,  was  not  by  any  means 
devoid  of  political  significance.  Already  in  1896  Italy 
looked  towards  Albania  as  a  promising  field  of 


282  MODERN   GERMANY 

expansion,  and  was  concerned  about  the  future  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.     The  young  Italian  king  testified 
to  his  interest  in  the  Balkans  by  marrying  a  Balkan 
princess.     Montenegro   is   the   neighbour   of   Albania. 
The  country  is  very  small.     It  forms  a  natural  moun- 
tain fortress  of  great  strength.     It  has  only  250,000 
inhabitants,  and  the  population  is  exceedingly  brave 
and  warlike.     Montenegro  is  likely  to  play  an  impor- 
tant part  in  the  settlement  of  the  Balkan  question. 
One  daughter  of  the  King  of  Montenegro  has  married 
the  King  of  Italy,  another  one  has  married  the  King 
of  Servia,  and  two  others  have  married  Russian  Grand 
Dukes.     Owing  to  his  powerful  friends  and  relatives 
he  wields  an  influence  which  is  quite  out  of  proportion 
to   the  size   of  his   country.     He  is   "the   father-in- 
law  of  Eastern  Europe,"  and  his  little  State  is  a  pivot 
of  European  policy.     Montenegro  stands,  so  to  say, 
under  Russia's  and  Italy's  joint  protection,  and  Russia 
and  Italy  have  provided  the  little  State  with  an  ample 
supply  of  guns,  rifles,  ammunition,  &c.,  for  the  country 
is  too  poor  to  supply  its  own  arms.     Thus  Montenegro 
has  become  a  fortified  Russian-Italian  outpost  on  the 
road  from  Vienna  to  Salonica,  and  it  is  able  to  block 
that  road.     Herein  lies  its  great  importance. 

Austria's  ambition  to  acquire  Salonica  is  nearly  as 
old  as  Russia's  ambition  to  acquire  Constantinople. 
Austria  recognised  the  strategical  importance  of  Monte- 
negro in  connection  with  Salonica  many  years  ago, 
and  in  1879,  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  she  took  steps 
designed  to  bring  Montenegro  into  her  power.  Article 
29  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  placed  the  policing  of  the 
port  of  Antivari,  Montenegro's  only  port,  under 
Austria's  control.  It  closed  Antivari  to  the  warships 
of  all  nations,  and  forbade  the  Montenegrins  to  have 
a  navy  of  their  own.  It  also  allowed  Austria  to  control 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  283 

the  building  of  a  road  and  of  a  railway  in  Montenegro. 
Last,  but  not  least,  Austria  insisted  in  Berlin  upon 
the  cession  of  Spizza,  a  point  which  dominates  the 
harbour  of  Antivari,  and  upon  the  right  of  fortifying 
it,  and  she  obtained  what  she  had  asked  for.  When 
at  the  Congress  Count  Launay,  the  Italian  plenipo- 
tentiary, asked  why  Austria  wished  to  annex  Spizza, 
and  explained  that  Italy  had  special  interests  to 
guard  in  the  Adriatic,  Baron  Haymerle,  the  Austrian 
representative,  replied  that  the  territory  of  Spizza 
covered  only  about  half  a  square  mile  and  had  a 
population  of  only  about  350  families.  Austria  was 
guided  in  her  demand  by  the  consideration  that  the 
possession  of  Spizza,  which  dominates  the  port  of 
Antivari,  would  ensure  that  Antivari  and  the  sur- 
rounding coast  should  preserve  a  purely  commercial 
character. 

Austria's  real  reasons  are  evident.  The  two  most 
important  towns  in  Montenegro  are  Cettinje,  the 
capital,  and  Antivari,  its  only  seaport.  Cettinje  lies 
at  a  very  short  distance  from  the  Austrian  harbour 
of  Cattaro.  Spizza  might  be  made  to  dominate  Anti- 
vari, and  Cattaro  Cettinje.  Since  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
Austria  has  strongly  fortified  Cattaro  and  Spizza,  and 
has  mounted  heavy  guns  in  both  places.  From  the 
new  Austrian  fortress  of  Cattaro  shells  can  be  thrown 
into  Cettinje,  and  the  guns  at  Spizza  can  easily  destroy 
Antivari  and  the  shipping  in  the  port.  When  the 
King  of  Montenegro  looks  out  of  the  window  of  his 
palace  at  Cettinje,  he  can  almost  look  down  the 
muzzles  of  the  Austrian  guns  mounted  at  Cattaro  ; 
and  when  he  goes  down  to  Antivari,  his  only  seaport, 
he  is  within  range  of  the  Austrian  guns  at  Spizza. 
Austria  has  deliberately  tried  to  strangle  Montenegro. 
She  is  not  beloved  at  Cettinje. 


284  MODERN    GERMANY 

Salonica  is  likely  to  become  the  most  important 
harbour  in  the  Mediterranean,  being  situated  close  to 
Constantinople  and  the  Suez  Canal  and  on  the  most 
direct  route  from  London,  Paris,  Berlin,  and  Vienna 
to  the  countries  of  Asia  Minor  and  the  Far  East.  It 
may  in  the  future  almost  monopolise  the  European 
trade  with  the  East  via  the  Mediterranean.  But  in 
order  to  be  able  to  hold  that  port,  Austria  must  secure 
the  possession  of  its  hinterland,  of  Albania,  and  she 
cannot  tolerate  that  Albania  should  fall  into  Italy's 
hands.  Freiherr  von  Chlumecky  wrote  : — 

"  The  possession  of  Salonica  is  our  hope  for  the  future.  At 
a  time  when  Asia  Minor  has  been  opened  to  civilisation,  and 
when  railways  cross  Mesopotamia,  Macedonia  will  nourish 
greatly,  Salonica  will  become  a  place  of  very  great  importance. 
However,  the  possession  of  Salonica  could  never  make  up  for 
the  loss  of  the  Adriatic  which  would  be  caused  if  Albania 
should  become  Italian.  Salonica  would  be  of  value  to  us 
only  as  a  complement  to  Trieste  and  Fiume." 

Ten  years  ago,  on  the  yth  June  1901,  Signer 
Guicciardini,  who  at  one  time  was  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  said  in  the  Italian  Parliament : — 

"  The  principal  interests  of  Italy  are  in  the  Mediterranean. 
They  centre  round  Tripoli  and  Albania.  Whilst  Tripoli  is  a 
great  Italian  interest,  Albania  is  an  absolutely  vital  interest 
of  ours.  We  can  never  allow  Albania  to  fall  into  the  hands 
of  a  first-class  Power,  and  we  can  still  less  allow  it  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  a  second-class  Power  which  belongs  to  the 
political  system  of  a  first-class  Power.  We  have  tolerated 
the  rise  of  Bizerta,  but  we  cannot  tolerate  the  creation  of 
another  Bizerta  at  Valona  or  at  Durazzo." 

Valona  and  Durazzo  are  the  principal  harbours  of 
Albania.  The  foregoing  quotations  show — and  many 
similar  ones  might  be  given — that  Austria's  and  Italy's 
aims  and  ambitions  in  Albania  are  incompatible. 


THE   TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  285 

Apparently  Austria  aims  at  obtaining  the  direct 
control  of  Albania,  whilst  Italy,  in  conjunction  with 
Montenegro,  aims  at  creating  an  independent  Balkan 
Federation.  The  Serbians,  Bulgarians,  Croats,  and 
Montenegrins  belong  all  to  the  Serbian  race.  They 
speak  the  same  language,  and  no  valid  reason  against 
the  co-operation  of  the  different  Serbian  nations  can 
be  urged  by  any  nation — except  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Austrian  provinces  of  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and 
Dalmatia  are  inhabited  principally  by  Serbians. 
Austria-Hungary  keeps  all  her  different  nationalities 
together  by  the  principle  Divide  et  impera.  The 
creation  of  a  great  Serbian  confederation  in  the  Bal- 
kans close  to  the  Austrian  frontier — there  are  alto- 
gether about  8,000,000  Serbians  in  the  east  of  Europe, 
and  of  these  about  3,000,000  live  in  Austria-Hungary 
itself — might  make  her  Serbian  provinces  untenable 
to  Austria. 

King  Nicolas  of  Montenegro  is  not  only  the  greatest 
citizen  but  also  the  greatest  poet  of  his  country,  and 
his  great  ideal  has  always  been  that  peace  and  pros- 
perity should  be  created  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
through  the  co-operation  of  all  the  Serbian  Balkan 
nations.  He  has  expressed  this  ideal  in  numerous 
poems,  songs,  and  dramas  which,  as  far  as  I  am  aware, 
have  not  been  translated  from  the  Serbian  into  the 
English  language.  I  have  endeavoured  to  render 
some  characteristic  and  significant  lines  from  his 
allegorical  drama  The  Empress  of  the  Balkans,  which 
run  approximately  as  follows  : — 

"  In  fervent  love  for  our  ancestral  soil 
Let  us  replant  that  grand  and  ancient  tree, 
And  'neath  its  boughs  let  all  the  Serbians  dance 
In  God-like  liberty.     And  those  who  fall 
In  fighting  for  their  country  will  be  blest. 


286  MODERN   GERMANY 

And  let  the  Serbian  to  his  Bulgar  brother 
Say  :  Now  this  Servia  does  belong  to  me, 
Yours  is  Bulgaria,  and  these  other  lands 
Belong  to  the  Croatians. — Oh,  my  brothers, 
We  three  must  stand  together  and  must  call 
For  the  assistance  of  the  clever  Greeks, 
And  let  the  angels  upon  high  Olympus 
Rejoice  at  our  great  unity." 

One  of  the  characters  in  the  play  is  made  to  say  : — 

"  The  Germans  and  the  Magyars,  I  am  sure, 
Will  help  us  mightily  to  free  our  country." 

To  this  the  father  replies  : — 

"  May  of  the  Germans  and  of  the  Magyars 
Almighty  God  defend  us.     For  the  wolf 
Will  never  change  his  skin.     We  fought  alone 
In  our  great  past,  and  fate  decrees 
That  men  cannot  have  liberty 
Unless  they  pay  for  it  with  pain  and  tears." 

If  the  problem  of  European  Turkey  should  be 
solved  by  the  creation  of  a  great  Balkan  Confedera- 
tion— and  this  solution  seems  quite  feasible — the 
question  of  the  presidency  will  arise.  Possibly  the 
presidency  will  be  offered  to  the  King  of  Montenegro. 
Possibly,  and  perhaps  one  ought  to  say  probably,  it 
will  be  offered  to  an  Italian  Prince  or  to  the  King  of 
Italy  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  King  of  Monte- 
negro. He  might  become  Emperor  of  the  Balkans. 
Italy  would  acquire  a  position  of  the  greatest  prestige 
and  influence  in  the  Balkans,  a  protectorship  but  not 
a  protectorate.  However,  Italy  would  first  have  to 
overcome  Austria-Hungary's  determined  opposition, 
for  Austria  will  not  easily  give  up  her  claims  to  Salo- 
nica.  The  policies  pursued  by  Austria  and  Italy, 
not  only  in  Albania,  but  throughout  the  Balkan 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  287 

Peninsula,    are    incompatible.      Yet   the   Powers   are 
allies. 

The  first  need  of  a  great  country  is  security  from 
foreign  aggression.  The  Italian  Irredentists  and  Ex- 
pansionists are  equally  anxious  that  their  country 
should  be  secure  from  foreign  attack.  Now,  although 
Italy  is  separated  from  France  and  Austria-Hungary 
by  great  mountain  ranges,  her  position  on  the  land 
side  is  by  no  means  secure  except  towards  France, 
because  in  that  direction  large  mountain  chains  situ- 
ated on  Italian  territory  impede  an  invasion.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  mountain  ranges  which  separate  Italy 
from  Austria-Hungary  are  situated,  not  on  Italian 
soil,  but  in  the  Austrian  Tyrol.  An  Austrian  army 
can  without  difficulty  descend  from  the  Tyrolese 
mountains  into  the  plains  of  Italy,  and,  by  the  irony 
of  Fate,  the  Tyrolese  mountains  which  should  protect 
Italy  are  inhabited  by  Italians. 

Italy  is  extremely  vulnerable,  not  only  on  her 
Austrian  land  frontier,  but  also  on  the  coasts,  and 
especially  on  the  coasts  of  the  Adriatic  facing  Austria. 
Many  large  towns,  such  as  Genoa,  Livorno,  Naples, 
Reggio,  Messina,  Palermo,  Catania,  Taranto,  Brindisi, 
Ancona,  Venice,  and  countless  smaller  ones,  are  open 
coast  towns  which  are  exposed  to  forced  contribution, 
bombardment,  and  capture  from  the  sea.  Rome, 
Padua,  Ravenna,  Pisa  lie  only  about  ten  miles  from 
the  coast.  Itaty's  principal  railways  and  high-roads 
hug  the  shore  from  one  end  to  the  other  of  the  penin- 
sula, and  they  can  easily  be  destroyed  in  many  places 
by  small  landing-parties.  Nature  has  been  very 
partial  in  creating  the  Adriatic.  She  has  given  an 
open  and  almost  defenceless  coast  to  Italy,  and  has 
created  a  large  number  of  excellent,  natural  harbours 
protected  by  high  surrounding  hills  and  mountains 


288  MODERN   GERMANY 

all  along  the  coast  which  faces  Italy.  The  western, 
or  Italian,  shore  of  the  Adriatic  is  mostly  flat  and 
sandy,  and  is  devoid  of  natural  bays  and  harbours. 
Therefore  the  ships  anchoring  in  the  small  Italian  ports 
are  exposed  to  all  winds,  and  especially  to  the  Bora, 
the  most  dangerous  wind  of  the  Adriatic.  The  flat- 
ness of  the  shore  makes  the  landing  of  an  army  on 
the  beach  easy.  The  eastern,  or  Austrian  and  Albanian, 
shore  of  the  Adriatic  is  rocky  and  mountainous,  and 
possesses  a  profusion  of  deep  and  excellent  bays, 
harbours,  and  inlets.  The  Austrian  ports  of  Pola, 
Cattaro,  and  Sebenico  are  among  the  finest  and  largest 
protected  natural  harbours  in  the  world.  Between 
Pola  and  Ragusa,  a  distance  of  three  hundred  miles, 
there  are  some  sixty  ports  on  the  Austrian  part  of  the 
Adriatic  shore  which  can  be  used  as  stations  for 
torpedo-boats.  The  southern  prolongation  of  the 
Austrian  coast,  the  Albanian  coast,  also  has  excellent 
natural  harbours,  which  could  easily  be  fortified  and 
converted  into  war  harbours. 

At  present  Italy's  only  important  naval  harbour 
on  the  Adriatic  is  Venice,  which,  by  its  geographical 
position  and  through  the  absence  of  surrounding  hills, 
is  of  very  little  value  if  compared  with  the  Austrian 
port  of  Pola  which  faces  it.  The  harbour  of  Pola, 
situated  near  the  northern  end  of  the  Adriatic  Sea, 
consists  of  a  spacious  bay.  It  is  surrounded  with 
hills,  and  it  is  protected  from  the  sea  by  several  well- 
fortified  hilly  islands  lying  in  front  of  it.  It  is  de- 
fended by  no  less  than  twenty-eight  forts.  Signer 
Pellegrini  wrote  :  "A  naval  balance  of  power  in  the 
Adriatic  could  be  said  to  exist  only  if  there  were  on 
the  Italian  coast  a  counterpoise  to  the  Austrian  Pola, 
but  there  is  no  such  counterpoise.  It  is  merely  a 
phrase  devoid  of  meaning  to  speak  of  a  balance  of 


THE   TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  289 

power  in  the  Adriatic  as  long  as  there  exists  the  naval 
harbour  of  Pola."  Similar  views  have  been  uttered 
by  the  highest  naval  authorities  in  Italy. 

South  of  Pola,  and  125  miles  distant  from  it,  lies 
the  magnificent  natural  harbour  of  Sebenico.  It  is 
surrounded  by  an  amphitheatre  of  hills.  Several 
large  fleets  could  find  shelter  in  its  waters,  which  are 
more  than  a  hundred  feet  deep.  South  of  Sebenico, 
and  185  miles  distant  from  it,  lies  the  magnificent  and 
strongly-fortified  harbour  of  Cattaro,  which  domi- 
nates Cettinje.  Naturally  the  Italians  are  asking 
themselves  :  "  Against  which  Power  is  Austria  forti- 
fying the  Dalmatian  coast  of  the  Adriatic  ?  What 
use  will  she  make  of  the  magnificent  natural  harbours 
opposite  our  own  unprotected  shore  ?  "  South  of 
Cattaro,  and  ninety  miles  distant  from  it,  in  Albanian- 
Turkish  territory,  lies  the  magnificent  and  naturally- 
protected  harbour  of  Durazzo  ;  and  south  of  Durazzo, 
and  sixty  miles  distant  from  it,  lies  the  magnificent 
and  naturally-protected  harbour  of  Valona,  which  is 
also  called  Ablona.  The  Adriatic  is  a  long  arm  of  the 
Mediterranean.  It  has  a  narrow  opening,  the  Strait 
of  Otranto.  Now  the  port  of  Valona  lies  on  the  nar- 
rowest part  of  the  Strait  of  Otranto,  and  is  separated 
by  a  distance  of  only  forty  miles  from  the  Italian 
shore  opposite.  By  its  position  at  the  narrow  open- 
ing of  the  Adriatic  and  its  great  natural  strength, 
Valona  is  undoubtedly  the  most  valuable  among  the 
many  valuable  strategical  harbours  which  face  the 
east  coast  of  Italy,  and  Austria  and  Italy  are  equally 
anxious  to  secure  its  control.  The  question  whether 
Austria  or  Italy  is  to  control  the  Adriatic  is  another 
point  with  regard  to  which  Austrian  and  Italian  in- 
terests are  irreconcilable.  Whilst  Italy  argues  that 
her  security  compels  her  to  control  the  Adriatic,  and 

T 


290  MODERN    GERMANY 

especially  its  strong  eastern  shore,  Austria  argues  that 
her  only  way  to  the  sea  is  vid  the  Adriatic,  and  that 
she  cannot  allow  another  nation  to  control  her  only 
outlet  to  the  sea.  Besides,  she  argues  that  the  trade 
of  Albania  is  by  nature  Austria's  trade,  for  the  whole 
of  Austria's  inward  and  outward  shipping  must  pass 
the  Albanian  coast,  whilst  the  Italian  steamers  have 
to  go  out  of  their  way  if  they  wish  to  touch  Albania. 
Italy's  economic  policy  in  Albania,  and  Austria's 
economic  policy  in  that  country,  are  evidently  as 
conflicting  as  are  the  political  aims  of  the  two  coun- 
tries in  that  region. 

The  modern  history  of  Italy  is  the  history  of  her 
wars  with  Austria.  In  the  Southern  Tyrol  Austria 
holds  the  key  to  Italy's  door.  In  the  Adriatic  and  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  Austria  opposes  Italy's  political 
and  economic  expansion.  Besides,  she  oppresses  the 
Italians  living  in  Austria.  Italy  was  forced  against 
her  will  to  enter  the  Austro-German  Alliance.  It  is 
therefore  only  natural  that  many  patriotic  Italians 
are  bitterly  opposed  to  Austria  and  to  the  Triple 
Alliance. 

In  the  year  1906  Signor  Pellegrini  wrote  in  his 
important  book,  Verso  la  Guerra  ? — II  dissidio  fra 
I' Italia  e  I' Austria  : — 

"  I  believe  we  cannot  live  any  longer  under  an  illusion  which 
deceives  us.  We  have  lived  under  the  impression  that  the 
internal  difficulties  of  Austria-Hungary  are  so  great  as  to 
prevent  her  from  aggressive  action  towards  ourselves  and 
from  expansion  towards  the  East.  We  have  believed  that 
Austria-Hungary  would  fall  to  pieces  after  the  death  of  the 
present  Emperor.  These  views  are  erroneous.  If  the  political 
crisis  in  Austria-Hungary  should  become  more  acute,  and 
there  is  reason  for  doubting  this,  Austria-Hungary's  need  to 
expand  and  to  acquire  new  markets  in  the  East  will  become 
all  the  greater.  And  as  long  as  Italian  commerce  pursues  its 


THE   TRIPLE    ALLIANCE  291 

triumphant  course  in  the  East,  the  more  are  the  opposing 
interests  of  the  two  nations  likely  to  bring  about  the  final 
collision.  .  .  . 

"  We  cannot  continue  a  policy  of  vassalage  which  will 
compromise  for  all  time  Italy's  future  in  order  to  preserve  the 
outward  form  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  We  must  ask  ourselves  : 
What  are  our  interests  ?  Are  we  ready  to  defend  them  ? 
What  are  the  conditions  of  the  Italians  who  dwell  on  the 
shore  of  the  Adriatic  under  foreign  domination  ?  What  are 
our  interests  on  the  Adriatic  compared  with  those  of  Austria  ? 
What  are  the  wishes  of  our  people,  and  what  is  Italy's  mission 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  ?  Is  it  possible  to  avoid  a  conflict  with 
Austria  ?  I  believe  I  have  shown  that  Austria-Hungary  is 
at  the  same  time  our  ally  and  our  open  enemy,  against  whom 
we  must  prepare  for  war." 

Signer  Pellegrini  proposed  to  meet  the  danger  of 
a  collision  with  Austria-Hungary  by  an  Alliance  be- 
tween Italy  and  Russia  : — 

"  We  have  to  calculate  in  the  future  with  the  fact  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  though  nominally  our  ally,  is  our 
determined  enemy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Therefore,  it  is 
meet  that  we  should  enter  into  more  intimate  relations  with 
Russia,  the  only  nation  which,  in  co-operation  with  Italy, 
can  act  as  an  adequate  counterpoise.  Only  thus  we  can 
secure  the  maintenance  of  the  threatened  balance  of  power 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula." 

Already  in  1902  Monsieur  Delcasse"  had  recom- 
mended to  Italy,  in  an  interview  which  was  published 
in  the  Giornale  d' Italia  on  the  4th  January  of  that 
year,  that  she  should  enter  upon  intimate  relations 
with  France  and  Russia  for  the  protection  of  her 
interests  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

For  some  considerable  time  the  Italians  have  been 
earnestly  considering  the  possibility  of  a  war  with 
Austria-Hungary.  The  Rassegna  Contemporanea,  per- 
haps the  best  Italian  monthly,  which  seems  to  be  quite 
unknown  in  this  country  because  it  was  started  only 


292  MODERN   GERMANY 

a  few  years  ago,  began  publishing  in  July  1911  a  series 
of  articles  by  Colonel  Angelo  Tragni,  entitled  "  Ai 
Confini  d'ltalia,"  in  which  the  military  factors  which 
are  important  in  a  war  with  Austria-Hungary  are  dis- 
cussed at  length.  Italian  military  and  naval  men 
have  published  many  books,  pamphlets,  and  articles 
on  the  same  subject.  However,  the  Italian  soldiers 
are  not  alone  in  considering  professionally  and  publicly 
the  possibility  of  an  Austro-Italian  war.  One  of  the 
leading  Austrian  military  papers,  the  very  important 
Danzer's  Armeezeitung,  printed  during  1911  a  series 
of  articles  on  a  possible  Austro-Italian  war.  They 
were  recently  printed  in  pamphlet  form  under  the 
significant  title,  "  Without  Victory  on  Sea  no  Victory 
on  Land  :  the  Decisive  Significance  of  a  Naval  Vic- 
tory in  the  Conduct  of  a  Land  War  with  Italy."  The 
pamphlet  has  a  preface  written  by  the  Austrian  Vice- 
Admiral  Chiari,  in  which  we  read  : — 

"  Alliances  do  not  last  for  ever  and  the  ally  of  to-day  may  be 
the  enemy  of  to-morrow.  One  must  not  under-estimate  one's 
opponents.  We  should  no  longer  meet  the  Italian  soldiers 
who  were  beaten  by  the  Austrians  at  Novara,  and  still  less 
the  Italian  sailors  who  were  beaten  by  the  Austrians  at  Lissa. 
I  have  always  admired  the  splendid  naval  material  of  Italy 
with  feelings  of  envy." 

The  most  important  passages  of  the  pamphlet 
itself  follow,  and  I  would  mention  that  the  italicised 
portions  of  its  preface  and  of  its  text  are  also  itali- 
cised in  the  original.  All  military  technicalities  have 
been  omitted : — 

"  The  crisis  during  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina has  shown  that  notwithstanding  our  alliances  we  must 
still  reckon  with  the  possibility  of  a  war  on  several  fronts.  .  .  . 
In  Italy  nearly  all  warlike  preparations  are  directed  against 
Austria,  her  hereditary  enemy,  and  her  standard  of  armaments 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  293 

is  supplied  not  by  Italy's  interests,  but  by  our  own  military 
power.  We  must  prepare  armaments  sufficient  to  meet  the 
whole  force  of  Italy,  but  not  of  the  Italy  of  to-day,  but  of 
the  Italy  of  to-morrow,  when  the  unavoidable  collision  will 
occur.  .  .  .  It  is  certain  that  we  have  to  reckon  with  a  war  on 
several  fronts.  Without  hesitation  one  can  prophesy  that  our 
ally  in  peace  will  be  our  enemy  in  war,  that  Italy  will  rather 
be  found  on  the  side  of  our  enemies  than  on  our  side,  that  we 
shall  have  to  meet  the  combined  armies  of  Russia,  Italy, 
Servia,  and  Montenegro.  That  was  probably  in  the  mind  of  the 
Minister  of  War  when  he  spoke  of  the  possibility  of  a  war  on 
several  fronts.  .  .  .  We  should  naturally  aim  our  first  and  our 
strongest  blow  at  our  nearest  and  most  dangerous  opponent, 
at  Italy.  .  .  . 

"  During  forty-five  years  we  have  been  perfecting  Austria's 
armaments  in  order  to  arrive  at  military  superiority  in 
general,  and,  since  some  time,  to  be  able  to  defeat  Italy  in 
particular.  But  we  must  not  deceive  ourselves.  We  shall 
no  longer  meet  the  Italians  of  Novara  and  Custoza,  for  Italy 
has  not  stood  still.  Nor  shall  we  meet  the  Italians  who  were 
defeated  on  the  Adowa,  for  she  has  made  up  for  past  neglect 
with  redoubled  energy.  .  .  . 

"  Is,  in  case  of  a  European  conflagration,  the  superiority  of 
our  armies  operating  in  the  Italian  province  of  Venetia  against 
the  Italian  army  so  striking  that  we  may  reckon  upon  the  imme- 
diate and  sweeping  success  which  is  necessary  for  us  in  view  of 
the  difficult  position  in  which  we  may  find,  ourselves  ?  Con- 
sideration of  all  factors  shows  that  this  question  must  be 
answered  in  the  negative.  Our  superiority  is  not  sufficiently 
great.  The  Italian  army  is,  through  its  numbers,  organisa- 
tion, armament,  and  training,  able  to  offer  the  most  deter- 
mined resistance  even  against  the  mightiest  enemy,  and  its 
power  of  resistance  will  be  greatly  increased  in  a  war  which  the 
Italian  nation  will  wage  with  all  its  heart.  .  .  . 

"  Whilst  the  North-east  of  Austria-Hungary  has  sufficient 
room  for  employing  armies  of  from  fifteen  to  twenty  army 
corps,  the  territory  of  Venetia  is  limited.  Its  narrowness 
is  a  factor  of  the  greatest  importance.  Owing  to  its  narrow- 
ness we  can  turn  the  flank  of  the  Italian  army  only  by  operating 
over  sea,  and  herein  lies  one  of  our  best  chances  and  the  absolutely 
necessary  condition  of  a  victory  on  land.  A  decisive  victory  of 
our  fleet  enables  us  to  turn  the  Italian  position  and  leaves  unde- 


294  MODERN   GERMANY 

fended,  the  great  centres  of  the  country.  Preparations  must  be 
made  on  the  largest  scale  for  the  transport  of  troops  across  the  sea 
in  very  large  numbers.  A  decisive  victory  on  sea  I  That  wilt  be 
the  principal  need  of  the  situation  in  a  land  war  against  Italy. 
The  protection  of  our  coasts  and  harbours,  which,  according 
to  semi-official  statements  is  the  object  of  our  fleet,  is,  in 
reality,  an  unimportant  matter." 

Deeds  reveal  most  clearly  a  country's  aims  and 
intentions.  Of  late  years  the  Italian  and  Austrian 
naval  manoeuvres  were  frequently  merely  rehearsals 
of  an  Austro-Italian  war.  Both  Italy  and  Austria 
have  greatly  strengthened  their  fortifications  and 
their  garrisons  on  the  Austro-Italian  frontier,  and, 
following  Germany's  example,  Austria-Hungary  has 
begun  building  a  large  fleet.  At  present  she  is  build- 
ing or  completing  four  Dreadnoughts  of  20,000  tons 
each.  Many  English  people  have  surmised  that  the 
Austrian  and  Italian  Dreadnoughts  were  intended  to 
fight  on  Germany's  side  against  Great  Britain.  The 
foregoing  pages  should  make  it  clear  that  the  Austrian 
Dreadnoughts  are  perhaps  more  likely  to  be  em- 
ployed against  Italy. 

The  Italians  are  not  idly  looking  on  whilst  Austria- 
Hungary  is  building  Dreadnoughts  and  creating 
numerous  naval  bases  opposite  the  Italian  coast. 
Italy  is  rapidly  increasing  her  fleet  so  as  to  maintain 
her  present  lead,  and  she  is  transferring  its  head- 
quarters from  the  west  coast  of  Italy  to  the  Adriatic. 
She  has  considered  creating,  at  the  cost  of  £40,000,000, 
a  war  harbour  to  the  south  of  the  Isole  delli  Tremiti. 
She  has  begun  converting  the  port  of  Taranto,  close 
to  Brindisi,  into  a  war  harbour,  and  she  has  created 
bases  for  torpedo-boats  on  her  eastern  coast  at  An- 
cona,  Porto  Corsini,  Isole  delli  Tremiti,  Manfredonia, 
Barletta,  Bari,  Brindisi,  Otranto. 

An   alliance   is   an  impossibility  without   mutual 


THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE  295 

trust  and  without  a  community  of  aims  and  interests. 
Between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary  there  exists 
evidently  not  a  community,  but  an  incompatibility, 
of  aims  and  interests. 

By  her  attack  upon  Turkey  Italy  has  seriously 
damaged  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  support  of  Turkey 
in  case  of  an  Austro-German  war  against  Russia  would 
have  been  far  more  valuable  than  the  support  of 
Italy  in  case  of  a  war  with  France.  Italy  could  only 
have  done  a  little  damage  on  the  strongly-fortified 
and  very  mountainous  French  frontier,  but  Turkey 
could  have  aided  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
against  Russia  very  materially  in  the  Black  Sea. 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  allowed  their 
unreliable  partner  to  knock  down  their  strong  and 
reliable  friend.  Italy's  ultimatum  to  Turkey  ought 
to  have  been  answered  by  a  German  ultimatum  to 
Italy  which  would  have  prevented  the  war.  By  ab- 
staining from  action,  Germany  and  Austria  have  at 
the  same  time  lost  the  friendship  of  Turkey  and  not 
gained  the  goodwill  of  Italy.  By  attacking  Turkey, 
Italy  has  revenged  herself  upon  Germany  and  Austria 
for  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  For  all  practical  purposes 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  dead. 

Italy  may  conceivably  remain  a  member  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  and  enter  into  suitable  secret  arrange- 
ments elsewhere.  If  she  should  formally  withdraw 
from  the  Alliance,  she  will  probably  immediately  join 
the  Triple  Entente,  for  she  is  not  strong  enough  to 
stand  alone.  In  that  case  Germany's  only  ally  will 
be  Austria-Hungary.  Except  for  Austria-Hungary, 
Germany  would  be  isolated  in  the  world,  and  then 
another  prophecy  of  Bismarck  might  come  true.  He 
wrote  in  his  Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen  : — 

"  In  taking  account  of  Austria  it  is  even  to-day  an  error  to 
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  policy  such  as  was  pursued 


296  MODERN    GERMANY 

by  Thugut,  Schwarzenberg,  Buol,  Bach,  and  Beust.  May 
not  the  policy  which  made  ingratitude  a  duty,  the  policy  on 
which  Schwarzenberg  plumed  himself  in  regard  to  Russia,  be 
again  pursued  against  another  Power  ?  .  .  . 

"  The  field  in  which  Russia  can  make  offers  to  Austria  is  a 
very  wide  one  ;  there  is  not  only  the  East  at  the  expense  of 
the  Porte,  but  Germany,  at  our  expense.  If  Russian  policy 
succeeds  in  winning  Austria,  then  the  coalition  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War  against  us  is  complete,  for  France  can  always  be 
induced  to  act  against  us,  her  interests  on  the  Rhine  being 
more  important  than  those  in  the  East  and  on  the  Bosphorus." 

The  weakening  of  the  central  European  group  of 
Powers  by  the  secession  of  Italy,  and  the  strengthen- 
ing of  the  Franco-Russian  group  by  Italy's  joining 
them,  would  alter  completely  the  balance  of  power 
in  Europe.  It  would  again  make  France  the  pre- 
dominant Power  on  the  Continent,  and  then  France 
might  feel  tempted  to  seek  revenge  for  Sedan  and 
endeavour  to  induce  Austria  to  seek  revenge  for 
Koniggratz.  Germany  is  in  danger  of  becoming  com- 
pletely isolated,  Herein  lies  the  great  seriousness  of 
the  situation. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY 

ALL  the  great  empires  which  the  world  has  seen, 
with  perhaps  one  solitary  exception,  that  of  the 
Chinese  Empire,  have  become  great  by  force;  and 
all  the  great  empires  which  have  declined,  or  which 
have  disappeared  from  the  world's  stage,  have  been 
diminished  or  destroyed  by  force.  Diplomacy  is 
fond  of  euphemisms,  and  diplomats  like  to  speak  of 
gradual  expansion  by  allowing  free  play  to  the 
national  forces  and  to  the  forces  of  Nature.  They 
speak  of  creating  protectorates,  of  mapping  out 
spheres  of  interest,  &c.,  when  they  are  in  reality 
bent  on  the  aggrandisement  of  the  nation  by  force. 
Hence  it  comes  that  countries  are  permanently  and 
forcibly  taken  from  their  rightful  owners  by  what 
diplomats  are  pleased  to  call  temporary  occupation, 
by  peaceful  penetration,  by  lease,  by  loan,  &c. 
However,  notwithstanding  all  these  conventional 
euphemisms  and  diplomatic  fictions,  and  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  foreign  policy  of  all  countries 
is  always  ostensibly  guided  by  the  noblest  motives, 
such  as  justice  and  humanity,  the  fact  remains  that 
all  policy  is  based  on  force.  Might  is  right  between 
nations.  The  territories  which  are  possessed  by 
modern  States  are  held  by  right  of  conquest — that  is, 
by  that  right  which  springs  from  the  possession  of 
superior  force. 

Even  the  cleverest  diplomat  will  prove  unsuccess- 

297 


298  MODERN   GERMANY 

ful  unless  his  words  are  backed  with  adequate  force. 
The  diplomatic  ability  and  success  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  Napoleon  I.,  Talleyrand,  Metternich,  Palmer- 
ston,  Bismarck,  &c.,  consisted  largely,  if  not  princi- 
pally, in  the  superior  material  force  which  these  men 
were  able  to  wield ;  and,  owing  to  the  fact  that  their 
diplomacy  was  backed  by  sufficient  force,  they  were 
exceedingly  successful  in  their  policy. 

The  fact  that  all  policy  is  based  upon  force  was 
nowhere  more  clearly  understood  than  in  Prussia, 
the  forerunner  of  Modern  Germany;  and  Modern 
Germany  remains  faithful  to  Prussian  traditions  and 
to  the  Prussian  faith,  that  the  best  policy  is  the  ultima 
ratio  regis..  For  two  hundred  and  fifty  years,  since 
the  time  of  the  Great  Elector,  Prussia  has  been 
always  proportionately  by  far  the  strongest  military 
power  in  Europe. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  the  military  burden 
which  is  borne  by  Continental  nations  was  never  so 
heavy  and  so  crushing  as  it  is  at  the  present  time ; 
but  that  assumption,  which  is  very  widely  held, 
especially  among  the  members  of  the  various  Peace 
Societies  and  their  friends,  is  by  no  means  in  accord- 
ance with  fact.  The  standing  armies  of  the  great 
Continental  nations  amount  now,  on  an  average, 
only  to  one  per  cent,  of  the  population.  Formerly, 
the  proportion  of  soldiers  to  the  total  population  was 
much  higher,  especially  in  Prussia. 

At  the  death  of  Frederick  William  I.,  Prussia, 
which  then  had  only  about  3,000,000  inhabitants, 
had  a  standing  army  of  80,000  soldiers  ;  at  the  death 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  Prussia  had  5,500,000  in- 
habitants and  an  army  of  no  less  than  195,000  soldiers. 
Modern  Germany  has  a  population  of  66,000,000 
inhabitants  and  a  standing  army  of  630,000  men, 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   299 

but  if  the  proportion  of  soldiers  to  the  total  popula- 
tion were  now  as  great  as  it  was  at  the  time  of 
Frederick  William  I.  or  Frederick  the  Great,  she 
would  have  a  standing  force  ot  more  than  2,000,000 
men. 

Germany  is  a  nation  in  arms.  Every  able-bodied 
man  has  to  serve  in  the  army,  and  the  number  of 
men  enrolled  year  by  year  amounts  now  to  about 
280,000.  The  army  on  a  war  footing  is  made  up  of 
a  number  of  these  levies,  and  it  can  be  made  greater 
or  smaller  at  will  by  calling  out  a  greater  or  lesser 
number  of  such  yearly  levies  which  are  called  Reserves, 
Landwehr,  and  Landsturm. 

The  number  of  men  yearly  enrolled  has  of  late 
greatly  increased,  in  accordance  with  the  increase  in 
the  peace  strength  of  the  army.  Therefore,  the  aver- 
age number  enrolled  every  year  is  considerably  smaller 
than  280,000.  Besides,  we  must  make  allowance  for 
those  trained  soldiers,  who,  through  disease,  are  not 
able  to  serve  in  the  ranks  in  case  of  mobilisation,  and 
for  those  who  have  died.  Hence,  we  may  assume  that 
the  average  yearly  levy  will,  in  case  of  war,  produce 
about  200,000  men. 

Service  in  the  army  begins  when  men  reach  twenty 
years,  and  the  men  who  have  passed  through  the 
army  may  be  called  upon  up  to  the  age  of  forty-five  ; 
but,  in  case  of  need,  the  age  at  which  men  may  be 
called  for  military  service  can  be  extended.  It  there- 
fore follows  that  the  war  strength  of  the  German 
army  amounts  to  about  2,400,000  trained  soldiers, 
if  the  men  between  twenty  and  thirty-two  years  are 
called  out,  that  about  4,000,000  trained  soldiers 
could  be  raised  if  the  men  between  twenty  and  forty- 
two  years  are  enrolled,  &c.  The  arms,  ammunition, 
and  accoutrements  existing  should  suffice  for  equip- 


300  MODERN    GERMANY 

ping  at  least  4,000,000  soldiers  with  everything  that 
is  required  for  war. 

Every  nation  strives  to  create  an  army  com- 
mensurate in  number  and  adapted,  as  to  its  organisa- 
tion, composition,  equipment,  and  training,  to  the 
tasks  which  it  may  be  called  upon  to  fulfil  in  case 
of  war.  Great  Britain  has  an  insular  army  and  a 
colonial  army,  and  she  relies  for  the  defence  of  her 
home  frontiers  and  of  her  colonial  frontiers  mainly 
upon  her  enormous  navy.  Germany  requires  an 
enormous  army  for  the  defence  of  her  extensive  land 
frontiers,  or  for  a  possibly  necessary  attack  upon  her 
neighbours,  and  her  navy  is  distinctly  of  secondary 
importance  to  her,  especially  as  her  coast  line  is  most 
excellently  protected  by  extensive  sandbanks,  which 
make  the  approach  of  warships  almost  an  impossi- 
bility, as  the  tortuous  channels  which  lead  through 
these  sandbanks  to  the  German  harbours  change 
their  shape  continually. 

Germany,  like  all  other  great  Continental  nations, 
can  raise  enormous  masses  of  soldiers,  and  as  her 
huge  armies  will  have  to  fight  on  comparatively 
exceedingly  restricted  ground,  they  are  trained  to 
fight  in  more  or  less  dense  masses.  The  central- 
continental  theatre  of  war  is  not  large  enough  to  allow 
of  individual  fighting  between  millions  of  men,  especi- 
ally as  natural  obstacles  and  fortresses  abound.  On 
either  side  of  the  Franco-German  frontier,  for  instance, 
there  are  only  two  or  three  narrow  gaps  between 
fortifications  where  battles  can  take  place,  and  where 
an  extension  of  troops  such  as  we  have  seen  during 
the  Boer  War  and  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
could  not  possibly  be  effected. 

Individual  training  is  difficult  with  a  citizen  army, 
an  armed  nation.  Hence,  Continental  army  com- 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   301 

manders  try  to  utilise  rather  the  enormous  weight 
and  momentum  of  a  mass  of  armed  men,  making 
their  armies,  by  constant,  wearisome  drill,  huge  and 
absolutely  obedient  fighting  machines,  than  to  trust 
to  the  highly  trained  righting  capacities  of  the  in- 
dividual soldier. 

Great  Britain  has  a  comparatively  very  small 
military  force,  which  is  exceedingly  costly,  and  she 
has  the  good  fortune  that  the  geographical  position 
of  the  country  and  of  its  colonies  makes  impossible 
a  sudden  invasion  by  a  million  armed  men,  which 
Germany  must  be  prepared  to  meet  ten  days  after 
a  declaration  of  war.  Evidently  the  military  tasks  of 
Great  Britain  and  of  Germany  are  totally  different. 
The  British  army  would  be  useless  to  Germany,  and 
likewise  Great  Britain  would  have  no  use  for  an 
immense  citizen  army  after  the  German  model,  for 
which  many  statesmen  and  generals  are  clamouring. 
The  position  of  Great  Britain  and  that  of  her  colonies, 
as  well  as  the  independent  character  of  the  popula- 
tion, compels  her  to  strike  out  an  original  line.  She 
cannot  possibly  create  an  immense,  well-drilled,  well- 
armed,  and  absolutely  obedient  citizen  army,  and  she 
is  therefore  forced  to  create  an  individualistic  army 
composed  of  individualistic  fighters.  The  national 
character  makes  that  necessary. 

How  useless  Continental  tactics  are  for  British 
soldiers  and  for  British  fighting-tasks,  was  clearly 
seen  in  the  Boer  War.  Continental  mass  tactics  are 
excellent  for  the  densely  populated  Continent  and 
for  the  "  Massenschlacht."  Out  of  Europe  the  best 
German  soldiers  and  the  most  approved  German 
tactics  are  apt  to  prove  a  complete  failure.  In  the 
Boer  War,  the  best  drilled  German  soldiers  would 
have  done  no  better,  perhaps  they  would  have  done 


302  MODERN    GERMANY 

worse,  than  did  British  soldiers,  who.  with  their 
national  individualism,  had  not  entirely  lost  their 
adaptability  in  strange  surroundings.  In  fighting  the 
natives  in  her  South- West  African  colony,  the  German 
army,  which  was  such  an  excellent  instrument  of  war 
against  the  French  and  the  Austrians,  has  proved  an 
instrument  totally  unsuited  for  its  task.  Directed 
against  a  European  foe  on  a  European  field  of  battle, 
the  same  soldiers  would  probably  prove  excellent. 

From  the  foregoing,  it  should  be  clear  that  an 
attempt  to  copy  the  German  army  would  prove 
disastrous  to  Great  Britain,  and  British  officers  might 
give  up  studying  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870-71, 
which,  for  thirty  years,  has  been  almost  exclusively 
studied  in  the  country,  and  which  has  a  large  share 
of  the  responsibility  for  the  numerous  defeats  in  the 
Boer  War. 

It  is  true  that  the  Franco-German  War  is  unique 
as  a  military  success  in  the  world's  history.  It  is 
true  that  six  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war  all 
the  French  armies  were  swept  from  the  field  and 
Napoleon  a  prisoner.  It  is  true  that  in  six  months 
the  Germans  took  400,000  prisoners,  about  8,000  guns; 
and  more  than  800,000  rifles.  But  it  is  also  true 
that  Great  Britain  will  scarcely  be  called  upon  to 
fight  a  war  on  a  similar  scale  on  similar  lines,  on  a 
similar  field,  with  a  similar  army  against  a  similar 
enemy.  Great  Britain  should  certainly  not  copy  the 
German  army,  but  she  can  learn  much  from  the 
organisation  of  that  army,  which,  on  the  whole, 
appears  to  be  almost  perfect,  and  which  is  far  too 
little  studied. 

The  Prusso-German  army  has  gone  through  vary- 
ing vicissitudes.  Under  Frederick  the  Great  it  proved 
itself  to  be  the  first  army  in  Europe.  Twenty  years 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   303 

after  Frederick's  death,  it  was  found  to  be  quite 
worthless  against  Napoleon  I.,  and  it  fell  to  pieces 
at  Jena  and  Auerstadt.  After  the  fatal  year  1806, 
the  Prussian  army  was  rapidly  reorganised  and 
reformed  by  Scharnhorst  and  his  able  co-workers, 
and  later  on  it  was  again  reorganised  and  remodelled 
by  Roon  and  Moltke.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
British  army  wants  reforming  very  badly,  it  is  worth 
while  to  see  why  Frederick  the  Great's  incomparable 
army  so  rapidly  decayed  after  his  death,  and  how 
the  rotten  army  of  1806  was  rapidly  and  thoroughly 
reformed. 

The  army  with  which  Frederick  the  Great  had 
successfully  fought  the>  united  forces  of  nearly  the 
whole  Continent  during  the  Seven  Years'  War  was 
organised  upon  an  utterly  bad,  wrong,  and  unhealthy 
basis.  Only  noblemen  could  become  officers,  advance- 
ment went  by  length  of  service,  obedience  was  absolute 
and  blind,  restricting  all  initiative  among  officers  as 
well  as  among  the  rank  and  file.  Detailed  regulations 
made  thinking  unnecessary,  and  had  to  be  carried 
out  to  the  letter  without  question.  The  whole 
military  organisation  of  Prussia  was  absolutely  cen- 
tralised in  Frederick  the  Great,  who  attended  to  its 
smallest  details.  If  a  foreigner  wished  to  witness 
a  parade,  he  had  to  appeal  to  the  King.  But  what 
the  army  lacked  in  a  practical  common-sense  organisa- 
tion, in  individuality,  and  in  initiative,  which  qualities 
alone  can  make  an  army  a  healthy  living  organism, 
was  amply  made  up  for  by  the  King's  immense  per- 
sonal capacity.  He  ruled  the  army  with  a  hand  of 
iron,  and  knew  how  to  manage  it  notwithstanding 
its  fundamental  unsoundness.  He  inspected  his 
troops  very  frequently,  his  sharp  eyes  saw  every- 
thing,  and  every  officer  who  did  not  come  up  to  the 


304  MODERN   GERMANY 

King's  expectations  was  immediately  dismissed.  He 
knew  the  capacity  of  every  officer,  foresaw  all  and 
prepared  all,  his  detailed  regulations  were  to  the 
point,  his  magazines  were  well  filled,  all* was  ready 
for  war,  and  his  army  remained  up  to  his  death  by 
far  the  first  in  Europe.  Yet,  but  twenty  years  after 
his  death,  it  was  easily  smashed  by  Napoleon  the 
First  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt.  When  the  great  King 
was  dead  the  faulty  system  remained,  and  no  per- 
sonality arose  either  to  fill  his  place  in  that  perverted 
system  or  to  reform  it  root  and  branch.  With  the 
death  of  Frederick  the  Great  the  huge  Prussian  army 
became  a  body  without  a  soul,  imposing  to  look 
upon  by  reason  of  its  size,  but  deficient  in  every 
other  qualification.  Therefore  it  was  predestined 
to  fall. 

Lacking  the  necessary  understanding  and  energy, 
his  two  successors,  Frederick  William  II.  and  Frederick 
William  III.,  were  contented  to  administer  the  army 
according  to  Frederickian  tradition,  exactly  in  the 
spirit  of  precedent  and  with  the  same  absence  of 
thought  with  which  the  British  army  was  until  lately 
administered.  They  would  have  considered  it  a 
crime  to  introduce  any  reform  into  the  army,  and 
blasphemy  to  doubt  its  proved  excellence.  The 
warnings  and  entreaties  of  sagacious  patriots  to 
modernise  the  army  fell  on  deaf  ears,  and  the  whole 
interest  of  Frederick  William  the  Third  with  regard 
to  military  matters  was  concentrated  upon  parades 
and  drills,  the  buttons  and  laces  of  uniforms,  the 
shape  of  shakos  and  helmets,  and  similar  futilities, 
in  which,  as  Napoleon  remarked,  he  was  a  greater 
expert  than  any  army  tailor. 

Only  after  Prussia's  terrible  defeat,  and  the  loss 
of  half  her  territory  in  1806,  did  the  King  and  his 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   305 

advisers  wake  up  and  begin  to  inquire  seriously  into 
the  state  of  the  army  and  the  cause  of  its  defeats. 
Progressive  military  men,  among  them  the  future 
Field-Marshal  Gneisenau,  the  intellectual  leader  of 
Bliicher's  army  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  attributed  the 
collapse  of  the  army  largely  to  the  neglect  of  pre- 
parations for  war  in  time  of  peace,  to  its  occupation 
with  futile  drill  exercises  calculated  only  for  show 
on  the  parade-ground,  to  the  neglect  of  warlike 
manoeuvres  and  of  target-shooting,  to  the  inferiority 
of  the  Prussian  arms  as  compared  with  the  armament 
of  the  French  in  guns  and  rifles,  to  the  slavish  copy- 
ing of  various  institutions  existing  hi  foreign  armies, 
which  were  quite  unsuitable  to  the  needs  of  Prussia, 
to  the  blind  conceit  of  officers  and  of  the  nation  in 
the  invincibility  of  the  army,  and  to  the  incapacity 
of  generals  automatically  promoted  by  length  of 
service,  and  not  by  merit,  who  had  partly  become 
imbecile  with  old  age. 

A  commission  for  the  reorganisation  of  the  army 
was  called,  which  happily  did  not  consist  of  fossilised 
generals,  or  of  civilians  unacquainted  with  war  and 
with  the  military  needs  of  the  nation,  but  of  a  select 
few  of  the  ablest  young  officers  who  had  proved  their 
value  in  the  field,  and  who  were  sure  neither  to 
be  doctrinaires  nor  to  be  unduly  bound  by  tradi- 
tions and  text-books.  This  commission  consisted  of 
two  major-generals,  four  lieutenant-colonels,  and  one 
major.  It  did  not  dazzle  the  nation  with  an  imposing 
array  of  titles,  but  it  was  destined  to  accomplish  great 
things,  for  among  its  members  were  men  like  Scharn- 
horst,  Gneisenau,  Grolmann*  and  Boyen.  The 
members  of  this  commission  were  young  men.  Scharn- 
horst,  the  oldest  commissioner,  was  52  years  old, 
Grolmann,  the  youngest,  was  only  29  years  old.  It 

u 


306  MODERN    GERMANY 

was  essentially  not  an  old  men's  commission.  Their 
recommendations  were  thorough  and  to  the  point. 
Soldiering  was  to  be  taken  seriously  by  the  officers. 
The  army  was  to  lose  its  character  of  a  Society  institu- 
tion, it  was  to  be  democratised,  and  was  to  be  managed 
on  business  principles.  Among  the  recommendations 
of  the  committee  the  following  were  the  most  im- 
portant : — 

"  Advancement  shall  take  place,  without  regard  to  the  years 
of  service,  solely  by  merit.  In  case  it  is  found  necessary, 
the  youngest  general  is  to  command  all  others.  Age  or 
length  of  service  is  to  have  no  influence  upon  appointments. 
Few  generals  are  to  be  made  in  peace,  and  brigades  are  to  be 
largely  commanded  by  staff  officers  in  war,  so  that  those 
who  prove  themselves  the  worthiest  on  active  service  may  be 
advanced  to  generalship.  In  peace  a  claim  to  officer's  posi- 
tion can  only  rest  upon  military  knowledge  and  education, 
and  in  war  upon  conspicuous  bravery,  activity,  and  circum- 
spection. Therefore  all  individuals  in  the  whole  nation  who 
possess  these  qualifications  have  a  claim  to  the  highest 
command. 

"  In  giving  only  to  the  nobility  those  privileges,  all  talent 
and  ability  in  the  other  classes  of  the  nation  was  lost  to  the 
army,  and  the  nobility  did  not  consider  itself  under  the  obliga- 
tion to  take  soldiering  seriously,  and  acquire  military  know- 
ledge, as  good  birth  and  a  long  life  were  bound  to  advance 
well-born  individuals  to  the  most  exalted  military  commands, 
without  either  merit  or  exertion  on  their  part. 

"  This  is  the  reason  why  our  officers  were  so  behindhand 
in  knowledge  and  education  as  compared  with  men  of  other 
professions  in  Prussia.  For  these  reasons  the  army  had 
become  a  State  within  the  State,  instead  of  being  the  union 
of  all  moral  and  physical  forces  of  the  nation.  Advancement 
by  years  of  service  had  killed  all  ambition  and  emulation 
among  officers,  for  a  good  robust  constitution  alone  granted 
all  that  could  be  desired.  True  merit  and  talent  proved  in 
free  competition  among  officers  was  lost  to  the  State,  and  the 
deserved  advancement  of  military  genius  became  impossible." 

Besides,    the  commission  insisted  on  the  decen- 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   307 

tralisation  of  the  administrative  machinery  of  the 
army.  Each  corps  was  to  be  made  independent,  but 
was  to  be  fully  responsible,  and  everything  required 
for  mobilisation,  arms,  stores,  horses,  commis- 
sariat, &c.,  was  to  be  kept  at  the  headquarters  of 
each  corps  or  division  in  order  to  facilitate  rapid  and 
smooth  mobilisation  in  case  of  war.  The  endless 
train  of  baggage,  which  had  so  greatly  hampered  the 
movements  of  the  Prussian  army  when  opposed  to 
the  mobile  troops  of  Napoleon,  was  to  be  diminished, 
new  arms  were  to  be  introduced,  up-to-date  tactics 
were  to  take  the  place  of  obsolete  barrack-square 
drills,  and  the  soldier  was  to  be  treated  better  in  peace 
time  in  order  to  make  soldiering  more  attractive. 

Greatly  owing  to  the  measures  taken  upon  these 
recommendations,  without  overmuch  regard  to  the 
obstinate  resistance  of  the  tradition-bound  generals 
of  the  old  school,  Prussia,  which  Napoleon  believed 
crippled  for  ever,  was  able  seven  years  later  to  meet 
the  French  army  in  the  field  with  conspicuous  success. 

The  failure  of  the  Prussian  army  in  1806  affords 
an  excellent  parallel  to  the  failure  of  our  own  army 
in  Africa,  and  the  recommendations  of  the  famous 
Scharnhorst  Commission  might  largely,  and  perhaps 
in  toto,  be  applied  to  the  British  army.  At  the  same 
time  we  ought  not  to  forget  that  since  the  tune  of 
Napoleon  the  First  the  art  and  science  of  war  has 
made  enormous  progress.  A  new  era  opened  with 
the  advent  of  the  prince  of  military  scientists,  the 
"  Schlachtendenker,"  Moltke,  who  has  elevated  the 
art  of  war  to  the  level  of  an  exact  science.  Let  us 
see  what  Moltke  can  teach  us. 

Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon  the  First  used 
already  to  make  elaborate  preparations  for  war,  but 
their  preparations  were  clumsy  and  superficial  if 


308  MODERN   GERMANY 

compared  with  the  minute  study  and  the  detailed 
preparations  for  war  made  by  Moltke.  As  Napoleon 
concentrated  the  fire  of  hundreds  of  guns  on  that 
point  of  the  enemy's  position  which  to  him  was  of 
the  greatest  importance,  and  battered  it  in,  even  so 
Moltke  concentrated  the  organised  intelligence  of 
hundreds  of  the  best  brains  in  his  army  on  the  one 
point  which  to  him  was  the  most  valuable  one. 
Moltke's  chief  aim  was  to  surprise  the  enemy  by  the 
unparalleled  celerity  of  the  mobilisation  of  his  army, 
to  fall  upon  him  while  he  was  still  unprepared,  and 
to  smash  him  before  an  attack  was  expected.  With 
this  end  in  view  he  recreated  the  Prussian  General 
Staff,  and  made  it  the  active  brain  of  the  army. 

Moltke,  like  most  great  commanders,  did  not  lay 
down  his  principles  for  the  conduct  of  war  in  the 
shape  of  a  book.  He  evidently  did  not  believe  in 
taking  the  world  and  possible  enemies  of  his  country 
into  his  confidence.  We  must  therefore  look  to  his 
campaigns  and  to  the  official  accounts  of  his  wars 
for  his  guiding  principles.  In  the  introduction  to 
the  history  of  the  Franco-German  war,  edited  by  the 
historical  department  of  the  Generalstab,  over  which 
Moltke  presided,  occurs  the  celebrated  passage  : — 

"  One  of  the  principal  duties  of  the  General  Staff  is  to  work 
out  during  peace  in  the  most  minute  way  plans  for  the  con- 
centration and  the  transport  of  troops,  with  a  view  to  meet 
all  possible  eventualities  to  which  war  may  give  rise. 

"  When  an  army  first  takes  the  field  the  most  multifarious 
considerations — political,  geographical,  as  well  as  military — 
have  to  be  borne  in  mind.  Mistakes  in  the  original  concentra- 
tion of  armies  can  hardly  ever  be  made  good  in  the  whole 
course  of  a  campaign.  All  these  arrangements  can  be  con- 
sidered a  long  time  beforehand,  and — assuming  the  troops 
are  ready  for  war  and  the  transport  service  properly  organised 
— must  lead  to  the  exact  result  which  has  been  contemplated.' 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   309 

How  Moltke  acted  upon  the  principle  of  "  working 
out  all  possible  eventualities  of  war  in  the  most 
minute  way "  may  be  seen  from  a  few  examples. 
Every  reservist  and  every  militiaman  (Landwehrmann) 
possessed  written  or  printed  instructions  which  told 
him  exactly  to  which  place  he  had  to  go  for  enrolment 
in  case  of  war.  When  he  arrived  at  his  place  of  enrol- 
ment, his  complete  outfit  for  war,  measured  to  his 
person  in  peace,  would  be  found  waiting  for  him. 
Every  commander  throughout  the  empire  had  com- 
plete general  instructions  what  to  do  in  the  case  of 
war.  The  confidential  particular  instructions  regard- 
ing the  final  disposition  and  direction  of  troops, 
transport,  &c.,  towards  the  frontier,  were  also  in  the 
possession  of  each  commander,  contained  in  sealed 
envelopes,  which  were  only  to  be  opened  on  the  receipt 
of  the  order  to  mobilise.  The  military  stores  were 
placed  where  they  were  wanted  in  case  of  war,  in 
order  to  avoid  loss  of  time  and  congestion  of  railways 
in  forwarding  them.  A  special  department  of  the 
General  Staff,  consisting  now  of  about  twenty  officers, 
studied  the  means  of  transport,  the  capacities  of  the 
railways,  and  the  number  of  trucks  and  engines  re- 
quired for  the  conveyance  of  each  unit,  and  drew 
up  a  most  marvellously  complete  programme  for  the 
despatch  of  the  countless  trains  required  in  case  of 
war,  upon  which  programme  the  confidential  sealed 
instructions  were  founded.  Consequently  the  trans- 
port of  a  million  men  or  more,  with  their  horses,  guns, 
stores,  and  baggage,  to  any  frontier  could  take  place 
smoothly  and  rapidly  without  a  hitch.  The  arrival 
of  each  corps  at  the  point  where  it  would  be  required, 
was  calculable,  so  to  say,  to  the  minute,  and  every 
now  and  then  the  whole  enormous  arrangement  of 
time-tables  had  to  be  recast  in  order  to  allow  for  the 


3io  MODERN    GERMANY 

conveyance  of  additional  troops  or  stores,  or  for  the 
use  of  an  additional  piece  of  railway  recently  com- 
pleted. Furthermore,  the  detailed  plans  for  any  and 
every  campaign  in  which  Prussia  could  possibly  be 
involved  were  always  kept  ready  in  time  of  peace, 
and  were  frequently  changed  and  brought  up  to 
date.  For  instance,  Moltke's  first  plan  of  campaign 
in  case  of  a  war  with  France  was  dated  1857,  and  his 
final  dispositions,  which  were  exactly  carried  out  in 
1870,  were  made  in  winter,  1868. 

However,  not  only  were  the  resources  of  Germany 
studied  "  in  the  most  minute  way  "  by  Moltke  and 
his  staff,  but  also  those  of  all  possible  enemies.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  he  knew  more  about  the  strength 
and  armaments  of  the  French  army,  the  time  required 
for  its  mobilisation,  the  configuration  of  the  French 
frontier  provinces,  the  capacity  of  the  French  rail- 
ways for  transport,  &c.,  than  did  any  man  in  the 
French  War  Office.  In  other  words,  Moltke  created 
an  organisation  which,  by  means  of  most  minute 
studies  and  the  painstaking  collection  and  comparison 
of  countless  exact  data,  made  war  no  longer  the  risky 
vague  encounter  with  hostile  elements  of  uncertain 
strength,  at  an  uncertain  time,  and  in  an  uncertain 
and  unknown  country,  as  it  had  formerly  been,  but 
made  war  an  encounter  with  certainties,  and  with 
clearly  defined  calculable  chances. 

How  well  Germany  was  prepared  for  war  may 
be  seen  from  the  fact  that  we  read  in  the  Denkwilr- 
digkeiten  of  the  then  Prussian  Minister  of  War,  Count 
Roon  : — 

"  Roon  has  frequently  said  that  the  two  weeks  following  the 
memorable  night  of  the  mobilisation  have  perhaps  been  the 
idlest  and  the  freest  from  care  during  his  career.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  mobilisation  machine  worked  with  such  exemplary 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   311 

exactitude,  and  so  completely  without  friction,  that  Roon 
and  the  War  Office  had  not  to  reply  to  one  inquiry  of  the 
commanding  generals  or  of  other  commanders.  This  was  the 
case  though  the  order  for  mobilisation  was  given  without 
any  previous  warning,  and  though  many  commanding  generals 
and  Staff  officers  were  on  their  summer  holiday,  and  a  good 
number  of  them  were  even  abroad." 

Napoleon  the  Third  was  vaguely  aware  of  the 
numerical  inferiority  of  his  army,  as  compared  with 
the  troops  of  Germany.  Consequently  his  idea  had 
been  to  act  with  the  lightning  rapidity  and  energy 
of  his  great  ancestor,  to  throw  himself  upon  the 
south  of  Germany  before  Germany  was  ready,  carry 
the  Southern  States  with  him,  whether  they  offered 
resistance  or  not,  and  then  march  against  Prussia, 
strengthened  by  the  accession  of  the  South  German 
contingents.  The  plan  was  well  conceived,  and 
might  have  succeeded  if  Napoleon  the  Third  had 
calculated,  not  guessed,  how  long  it  would  take  France 
and  Germany  to  mobilise  their  respective  armies,  and 
if  he  had  prepared  everything  hi  peace  time  for  such 
a  rapid  stroke  in  the  complete  manner  of  the  Prussian 
Generalstab.  But  in  view  of  the  preparedness  of 
Prussia,  and  of  France's  unpreparedness,  this  plan 
of  campaign  was  simply  childlike.  The  Prussian 
Generalstab  knew  better  than  Napoleon  the  Third 
what  France  was  able  to  do.  In  Moltke's  memoir 
of  1868  we  find  the  time  necessary  for  the  mobili- 
sation of  the  French  army  correctly  given.  While 
France  wanted  three  weeks  to  complete  the  mobilisa- 
tion of  her  army,  Germany  took  only  eleven  days. 
Consequently  Napoleon's  brilliant  plan  of  campaign, 
which  looked  as  fine  on  paper  as  did  his  army,  mis- 
carried, for  the  well-schooled  and  perfectly-equipped 
German  army  corps  fell  into  their  places  with  the 
mathematical  precision  of  a  well-timed  clockwork, 


312  MODERN    GERMANY 

and  with  incredible  rapidity  crossed  the  frontier  in 
overwhelming  numbers  long  before  the  French  were 
ready  for  their  contemplated  dash  into  the  south  of 
Germany. 

The  terrible  defeats  of  France  were  the  natural 
and  logical  consequence  of  her  going  lightly  to  war 
with  an  army  which  was  chiefly  for  show  on  parade, 
and  which  was  only  able  to  win  easy  victories  over 
inferior  races.  It  was  a  court  and  society  army,  in 
which  the  best  men  of  the  nation  found  no  place.  It 
was  neglected  by  the  people,  and  ruled  by  society 
men,  not  according  to  common  sense,  but  according 
to  tradition,  and  was  managed  by  a  bureaucracy 
devoid  of  foresight,  prudence,  and  common  sense,  but 
endowed  with  determined  meanness,  narrow-minded- 
ness, and  an  exaggerated  sense  of  its  own  importance, 
being  at  the  same  time  stupid,  petty,  and  tyrannical. 

Germany's  victory  over  France  was  less  due  to 
superior  strategy  or  to  superior  tactics  than  to  her 
great  superiority  in  methodic  organisation  for  war. 
The  victory  of  1870-71  is  a  triumph  of  German 
organisation,  and  if  we  study  the  history  of  the 
collapse  of  the  French  army  in  1870  in  detail,  and 
try  to  deduce  the  principal  causes  of  the  success  of 
the  German  army,  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that 
highly  organised  foresight,  fore-study,  and  fore-calcu- 
lation, represented  by  the  Prussian  Generalstab,  led 
the  Germans  to  victory,  and  that  the  absence  of  these 
qualities  caused  the  defeat  of  the  French. 

The  Prussian  Generalstab  did  not  only  directly 
prepare  for  war  in  the  manner  already  described,  but 
it  also  prepared  indirectly  for  war  by  studying  strategy 
and  the  innovations  introduced  into  the  tactics  of 
other  nations,  studying  new  arms  and  equipments, 
investigating  everything  and  adopting  what  was  use- 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   313 

ful,  educating  officers  in  regular  courses  under  Moltke's 
personal  supervision,  surveying  the  country,  &c.  In 
short,  the  Generalstab  served  as  the  intellectual  centre 
of  the  army,  as  the  clearing-house  of  most  valuable 
information.  It  was  the  highest  supervising,  inspect- 
ing, inventing,  and  organising  authority.  It  was  an 
organism  which  enabled  Moltke  to  hold  all  the  threads 
of  the  army  in  his  hand,  and  make  it  obey  the  slightest 
pressure  like  a  well-trained  horse. 

Ruled  by  the  Generalstab,  the  German  army  was 
no  longer  a  clumsy  and  soulless  military  machine  as 
it  was  in  1806,  but  became  a  living,  sensitive,  and 
intelligent  organism,  which  acted  like  one  man,  and 
to  perpetuate  his  work  Moltke  implanted  firmly  his 
spirit  of  thoroughness  and  his  strategical  ideas  into 
the  Generalstab,  being  its  chief  during  thirty-one 
years.  Thus  Moltke  has  not  only  served  as  an  example 
to  his  officers,  and  has  created  a  school,  not  of 
imitators,  but  of  independent  military  thinkers,  in 
Germany ;  but  his  principles  of  minute  comprehensive 
inquiry  and  of  careful  foresight  have  also  been  applied 
to  commerce  and  industry,  and  have  made  Germany 
surprisingly  successful  in  the  more  peaceful  arts. 

It  appears  that  to  a  modern  army  an  effective 
Generalstab  like  that  of  Moltke  is  as  indispensable 
for  modern  warfare  as  is  smokeless  powder  or  the 
repeating  rifle.  What  the  laboratory  is  to  a  chemical 
factory,  that  is  the  Generalstab  to  the  modern  army, 
and  its  place  can  as  little  be  taken  by  the  ablest 
commanding  general  as  the  analytical  chemist,  with 
his  assistants,  can  be  replaced  by  a  practical  manu- 
facturer who  goes  by  rule  of  thumb  and  his  grand- 
father's prescriptions,  and  disdains  new-fashioned 
inventions. 

The  success  of  Germany  in  1870  has  led  to  the 


314  MODERN   GERMANY 

adoption  of  certain  German  institutions  in  the  British 
army,  but  unfortunately  the  spirit  of  the  German 
army  has  not  been  adopted.  Among  others,  a  General 
Staff  was  created,  but  while  the  German  General 
Staff  is  of  supreme  weight  and  importance,  employ- 
ing over  400  officers  and  spending  altogether  some 
£270,000  per  year,  or  twice  as  much  as  is  spent  on 
the  Prussian  War  Office,  the  Intelligence  and  Mobilisa- 
tion Division  at  the  War  Office  was  a  shabby  hole-and- 
corner  institution,  which  employed  recently  seventeen 
officers  at  a  cost  of  £11,000.  The  disproportion 
between  the  British  and  the  German  institutions 
became  particularly  startling  when  we  remember  how 
restricted  the  confines  of  Germany  are,  and  how 
few  the  possible  points  of  attack,  if  compared  with 
the  huge  British  Empire,  its  worldwide  responsi- 
bilities, and  its  countless  possible  fields  of  action. 
While  over  400  officers  are  thought  necessary  to 
serve  a  homogeneous  sedentary  army  in  one  country, 
seventeen  officers  were  thought  sufficient  to  attend 
to  the  complex  problems  of  a  world  empire  which 
extends  over  five  continents,  and  to  an  army  whose 
contingents  are  strewn  all  over  the  globe. 

Our  General  Staff  really  smacked  of  Savoy  Opera. 
The  seventeen  officers  composing  it  were  gravely  sub- 
divided. Two  officers  were  to  look  after  the  Colonial 
section,  two  after  France,  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal — and 
all  America,  &c.  The  task  allotted  to  each  officer 
was  simply  ludicrous,  and  their  position  was  even 
more  grotesque  than  that  of  a  former  Chinese  ambas- 
sador who  was  appointed  to  the  courts  of  Spain  and 
Russia,  and  to  the  United  States.  In  consequence 
of  this  state  of  affairs  the  British  Intelligence  Office 
was  reduced  to  the  ignominious  position  of  a  second- 
hand information  bureau,  for  it  was  evidently  impos- 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   315 

sible  for  these  few  men  unaided  to  get  information 
themselves,  or  to  accomplish  anything  really  useful. 

While  the  Prussian  Generalstab  represents  the 
highest  intelligence  in  the  army,  and  while  its  chief 
is  the  greatest  military  genius,  as  Moltke  was,  who 
does  not  waste  his  time  in  administrative  routine 
work,  but  is  free  to  use  his  talents  to  rule  and  improve 
the  army  through  the  Generalstab,  and  to  prepare 
everything  for  every  possible  war,  the  chief  of  the 
British  General  Staff  was,  until  recently,  a  subordinate 
officer  of  unknown  military  capacity,  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
consequently  considered  the  second-hand  information 
which  that  shabby  office  could  supply  hardly  worth 
looking  at.  Happily,  British  statesmen  have  at  last 
recognised  the  necessity  of  providing  an  Imperial 
General  Staff.  However,  even  to-day  the  functions 
of  a  General  Staff  are  not  sufficiently  appreciated, 
and  the  provisions  made  for  it  appear  quite  insufficient. 
Still,  a  very  good  beginning  has  been  made,  and  it  is 
to  be  hoped  that  the  Imperial  General  Staff  will  grow 
in  power  and  become  an  adequate  instrument  for  the 
organisation  of  imperial  defence. 

Because  we  have  had  commanders  like  the  Duke 
of  Wellington,  or  Lord  Roberts,  or  Lord  Kitchener, 
who  have  helped  the  country  with  their  brilliant 
successes  out  of  military  scrapes,  and  have  made  up 
for  the  brainlessness  of  our  army  by  their  own  great 
capacity,  we  evidently  believe  more  in  a  commander 
of  genius  than  in  a  good  system,  forgetting  that  a 
commander  of  genius  and  a  good  system  is  a  far 
more  valuable  possession  to  the  nation  than  the  same 
commander  without  a  good  system.  Besides,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  coincidence  of  an  inferior 
commander  and  a  bad  system  would  be  absolutely 
fatal  to  the  empire  in  case  of  war ;  while  a  good 


3i6  MODERN   GERMANY 

system,  like  that  of  the  Prussian  army  with  its 
Generalstab,  will  single  out  able  commanders  and  is 
devised  to  constantly  regenerate  the  army. 

In  former  centuries,  when  armies  were  small, 
armaments  simple,  and  the  problems  of  war  few 
and  of  easy  solution,  a  good  general  was  able,  with 
the  help  of  some  assistants,  to  create  his  army,  to 
administer  it  in  peace,  educate  it,  prepare  it  for  war, 
and  lead  it  in  battle,  as  did  Frederick  the  Great. 
The  British  army  organisation  has  been  handed  down 
from  former  centuries  when  it  was  adequate,  and  it 
has  unfortunately  not  been  sufficiently  adapted  to 
modern  requirements.  Hence  our  discomfitures  in 
South  Africa. 

The  highly  complicated  machinery  of  civilisation, 
the  rapidity  of  progress,  and  the  manifold  inventions 
influencing  war  have  caused  rapid  changes  in  the 
art  of  war,  and  have  made  the  preparation  for  war 
a  most  important  and  most  complicated  duty.  Con- 
sequently, we  require  now  for  the  conduct  of  war 
and  for  the  organisation  of  an  army  what  we  require 
for  the  successful  conduct  of  a  very  large  business — 
a  chief  unhampered  by  routine  work  who  can  devote 
all  his  tune  to  improving  the  service,  intelligent  division 
of  labour,  the  service  of  highly-trained  specialists, 
wise  decentralisation,  free  competition  among  officers, 
free  play  to  individual  initiative  coupled  with  abso- 
lute responsibility,  a  clearing-house  of  information, 
the  best  appliances  and  arms,  and,  before  all,  the 
application  of  science  to  warfare  by  an  organised 
thinking  department. 

Unless  an  Imperial  department  on  the  lines  of  the 
Prussian  Generalstab  is  created,  with  the  ablest 
soldier  of  the  nation  at  its  head,  the  important  duties 
of  preparing  for  war  in  the  most  minute  way,  of 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   317 

educating  officers  for  the  highest  commands,  not  by 
Staff  College  theorists  but  by  a  Roberts  or  a  Kit- 
chener, will  remain  neglected,  and  the  important  duty 
of  reforming  and  regenerating  the  army  will  remain 
unfulfilled.  The  British  army  will  remain  brainless, 
and  the  nation  will  in  the  next  war  experience  disap- 
pointments similar  to,  if  not  worse  than,  those  it  has 
experienced  during  the  late  South  African  campaign. 

The  German  navy  had  to  be  created  out  of 
nothing,  for,  until  a  few  decades  ago,  Prusso-Germany 
possessed  no  warships  whatever.  In  1848,  the  first 
attempt  was  made  to  create  a  German  fleet,  which 
was  largely  paid  for  by  voluntary  contributions,  as 
has  been  mentioned  in  the  chapter  on  Germany's 
world-policy.  A  few  small  ships  were  got  together, 
and  a  Mr.  Bromme,  an  adventurer,  who  had  served 
in  the  Greek  navy,  was  made  "  Captain  of  the  Im- 
perial Marine,"  which,  four  years  after  its  creation, 
in  1852,  was  sold  by  public  auction. 

In  1849,  Prussia  created  a  navy  of  her  own,  and 
a  Dutchman,  Commodore  Schroder,  was  made  the 
commander  of  the  Prussian  fleet,  which  at  the  be- 
ginning was  composed  of  two  armed  steam-boats 
and  27  rowing  gun-boats  (which  mounted  together 
67  guns),  37  officers,  and  1521  men.  I  believe  the 
present  navy  of  Siam  or  Liberia  is  considerably  more 
formidable  than  was  the  Prussian  navy  at  its  com- 
mencement. From  these  small  beginnings  sprang 
the  present  German  fleet.  Prusso-Germany's  mari- 
time experience  was  so  small  that  foreigners  had  to 
be  engaged  as  instructors  and  commanders,  and  not 
only  fifty  years  ago,  but  even  until  a  comparatively 
recent  date,  it  was  thought  advisable  to  entrust  the 
supreme  command  of  the  German  navy  to  military 
officers  of  proved  ability,  not  to  naval  men. 


318  MODERN    GERMANY 

After  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire,  in 
1871,  Lieutenant-General  von  Stosch  was  made  Chief 
of  the  Admiralty.  His  successor  was  Lieutenant- 
General  von  Caprivi,  who  became  Chief  of  the 
Admiralty  in  1883.  Only  since  1888  has  the  German 
Admiralty  received  an  Admiral  for  its  head. 

In  Cromwell's  time,  the  British  navy,  which  then 
was  in  a  very  bad  state,  was  handed  over  to  Colonels 
Blake  and  Monk,  who  were  made  "  Generals  at  sea," 
and  they  reformed  the  navy  by  adapting  Cromwell's 
excellent  army  organisation  to  the  sister  service. 
Strange  to  say,  Colonels  Blake  and  Monk  proved 
themselves  two  of  the  most  capable  British  Admirals. 
Germany,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  followed 
Cromwell's  precedent,  and  she  has  no  reason  to  regret 
that  she  put  two  of  her  ablest  Generals  at  the  head 
of  her  new  navy.  Stosch  and  Caprivi  proved  ex- 
cellent organisers,  and  under  their  command  the 
German  navy  became  thoroughly  up-to-date,  exceed- 
ingly well-managed,  thoroughly  efficient,  and  com- 
pletely ready  for  war.  The  organisation  of  the 
German  General  Staff  was  adapted  to  naval  require- 
ments, and  Germany  created  an  Admiral  Staff,  which 
she  possessed  for  some  considerable  time,  until,  at 
Lord  Charles  Beresford's  urgent  representations,  a 
similar,  but  apparently  insufficiently  strong,  organisa- 
tion has  been  created  for  the  British  navy. 

The  German  navy  is  numerically  smaller  than  the 
British  navy,  but  it  is  very  rapidly  growing.  It  is 
perfectly  prepared  for  war,  down  to  the  smallest 
detail,  and  practically  the  entire  fleet  is  kept  in 
home  waters,  ready  to  strike  with  full  force  at  once 
when  war  breaks  out.  According  to  Monsieur 
Lockroy,  the  former  Minister  of  the  Marine  of  France, 
who  was  granted  special  facilities  by  the  Emperor 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   319 

to  study  the  German  navy,  the  German  fleet  is  the 
best  organised  in  the  world,  and  the  Germans  are 
confident  that  they  can  defeat  any  navy  except  that 
of  Great  Britain. 

On  sea  and  land,  Germany  is  equally  ready  for 
war,  and  equally  able  to  strike  with  surprising  celerity 
and  with  all  her  force  at  once.  The  maxim  of  Arch- 
duke Charles,  "  He  who  is  surprised  in  war  is  already 
half-defeated,"  has  become  the  motto  of  the  armed 
forces  of  Germany,  and  at  the  next  war  Germany 
may  surprise  the  world  by  the  suddenness  with  which 
she  will  strike  her  first  blows,  and  these  first  blows 
may  decide  the  issue. 

Many  people  believe  that  armies  and  navies  are 
relics  of  a  barbaric  age,  that  wars  will  soon  be  abolished 
by  international  agreement,  that  in  the  future  inter- 
national differences  will  be  settled  not  by  force  of  arms 
but  by  the  force  of  the  law,  by  international  arbitra- 
tion. Let  us  see  whether  international  arbitration 
is  a  practicable  policy,  or  merely  a  chimera  and  a 
delusion,  as  is  international  Free  Trade,  which  exists 
only  in  the  text-books,  and  consider  Germany's  views 
on  war  and  peace. 

International  arbitration  is  by  no  means  an  in- 
vention of  yesterday,  as  many  believe.  Since  the  day 
when,  more  than  2000  years  ago,  the  Amphictyonic 
Council  was  created,  which,  by-the-by,  did  not  prevent 
Greeks  exterminating  Greeks,  numerous  international 
tribunals  have  been  in  existence,  but  they  have  in- 
variably proved  utterly  unsuccessful,  and  the  cause 
of  their  failure  is  obvious.  Every  vigorous  State 
pursues  two  principal  aims  :  to  enlarge  its  dominions 
and  to  preserve  its  independence.  Every  healthy 
nation,  like  every  healthy  tree,  endeavours  to  grow 
and  to  increase.  Besides,  neither  right  nor  chance 


320  MODERN   GERMANY 

but  the  instinct,  and,  before  all,  the  will,  of  expansion 
supported  by  might  have  created  nations  out  of 
tribes,  and  evolved  empires  out  of  nations.  By  the 
right  of  the  stronger  a  little  tribe  of  Northmen 
possessed  itself  of  England,  and  by  the  right  of  the 
stronger  England  acquired  her  enormous  empire.  By 
the  right  of  the  stronger  the  Hohenzollerns,  a  poor 
Swabian  family  who  came  to  the  wilds  of  Prussia  with 
a  handful  of  retainers  a  few  centuries  ago,  created 
modern  Germany.  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Switzerland,  Holland,  the  United  States,  in  fact  all 
States,  were  created  by  might,  not  by  right.  To 
might  all  States  owe  the  title  to  their  possessions, 
and  only  by  might  can  their  possessions  be  retained. 

Might  being  the  foundation  of  every  State  and 
practically  the  sole  title  to  its  possessions,  no  powerful 
nation  is  willing  to  stake  its  possessions  which  were 
won  by  force  upon  the  hazard  of  a  judicial  decision, 
especially  as  the  law  is  proverbially  uncertain  and 
unsatisfactory.  Therefore  every  great  nation,  and 
none  more  than  Germany,  relies  upon  its  armed 
strength  for  the  defence,  not  of  her  "  rights,"  which 
are  disputable,  but  of  her  "  interests,"  of  which  every 
nation  claims  to  be  the  sole  competent  judge.  Only 
trifling  questions  have  so  far  been  submitted  by  nations 
to  the  decision  of  foreigners,  and  it  seems  unlikely  that 
any  great  nation  would  leave  the  adjustment  of  her 
vital  interests  to  outsiders  who  can  only  be  expected 
to  weigh  legal  "  rights,"  but  who  cannot  be  expected 
sympathetically  to  weigh  justified  national  aspirations, 
pretensions  and  claims  to  expansion,  to  supremacy  and 
to  dominion.  Prince  Bismarck  said  on  this  subject : 

"  It  is  true  that  great  armies  are  a  great  burden.  By  our 
armaments  we  conduct  a  kind  of  warfare  with  other  nations 
in  which  we  give  blows  to  one  another  with  our  money-bags. 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   321 

Armed  peace  may  be  ruinous,  but  disarmament  is  a  chimera, 
for  who  will  enforce  an  unpalatable  decision  upon  a  strong 
nation  unwilling  to  submit  to  it  ?  To  make  international 
decisions  enforceable  by  third  parties  would  mean  to  make 
the  casus  belli  permanent  among  nations." 

The  leading  German  authority  on  political  theory 
agrees  with  the  leading  German  authority  on  practical 
statesmanship,  for  Professor  von  Treitschke  wrote  in 

his  Politik  : 

"  The  institution  of  a  permanent  international  court  of 
arbitration  is  incompatible  with  the  very  nature  of  the  State, 
for  a  State  can  only  by  its  own  will  set  limits  to  itself.  Only 
questions  of  secondary  or  tertiary  importance  can  be  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration,  for  in  matters  of  vital  national  im- 
portance an  impartial  referee  does  not  exist.  Could  we 
seriously  expect  to  find  an  impartial  arbitrator  to  decide  on 
the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  ?  Besides,  it  is  a  matter  of 
national  honour  that  a  nation  should  settle  her  difficulties 
without  foreign  interference.  An  authoritative  tribunal  of 
nations  is  impossible.  To  the  end  of  history  national  arms 
will  preserve  their  rights,  and  herein  lies  the  sacredness 
of  war." 

In  another  place  von  Treitschke  says  : 

"  Wars  will  never  be  abolished  by  international  courts  of 
arbitration,  for  in  judging  of  the  vital  questions  between  two 
States  other  States  cannot  be  impartial.  In  the  society  of 
nations  the  interests  of  every  nation  are  so  interwoven  with 
the  interests  of  every  other  nation  that  impartiality  cannot 
be  reckoned  on." 

Numerous  speeches  of  William  the  Second  and 
innumerable  declarations  of  German  statesmen  and 
professors  confirm  that  the  leading  political,  scientific, 
and  social  circles  of  Germany  rely  exclusively  on 
Germany's  army  and  navy  for  the  defence  of  German 
"  rights,"  among  which  there  is  the  "  right "  to  the 
possession  of  extensive  colonies  in  a  temperate  zone. 

x 


322  MODERN   GERMANY 

Therefore,  all  German  statesmen  and  responsible 
thinkers  unconditionally  reject  a  League  of  Peace 
and  Goodwill  and  international  arbitration  in  Lord 
Avebury's  sense.  By  her  attitude  at  the  first  Hague 
Conference,  official  Germany  has  clearly  shown  her 
conviction  that  the  international  tribunal  and  the 
Czar's  scheme  of  international  disarmament  were  not 
to  be  taken  seriously.  Germany's  statesmen  believe 
with  Lord  Bacon  that  "  wars  are  no  massacres  and 
confusions,  but  the  highest  trials  of  right." 

The   corrosive  influence  of   Free-trade  cosmopoli- 
tanism has  no  doubt  blunted  the  sense  of  nationality 
and  of  patriotism  in  Great  Britain,  and  has  raised  in 
it  many  supporters  of  internationalism  in  the  form  of 
international  Free  Trade,  international  disarmament, 
and  international  arbitration.     Whilst  at  the  bidding 
of  unpractical  doctrinaires,  pushful  manufacturers  and 
political    intriguers,    Great    Britain   has    wasted   her 
political  and  her  economic  strength  to  the  benefit, 
the   delight,   and   the   derision   of   foreign   countries, 
Germany  has  steadfastly  and  determinedly  pursued 
a  thoroughly  national  and  deliberately  selfish  policy, 
a  policy  which  is  based  on  might,  which  is  promoted 
by   a  most   unscrupulous   diplomacy,   and   which    is 
furthered  by  conquest. 

It.  cannot  be  pointed  out  too  strongly  that  Anglo- 
Saxon  and  German  ideas  of  the  State,  its  nature,  its 
functions,  and  its  policy,  vastly  differ.  The  German 
political  philosophers  teach,  in  accordance  with 
Machiavein,  "  the  State  is  power."  Bismarck  stated 
"  the  only  healthy  basis  of  a  great  State  is  national 
selfishness,  and  not  romantic  idealism  ;  "  and  in  taking 
office  he  gave  to  the  world  his  programme,  to  which 
he  has  unflinchingly  adhered,  in  the  words  "  the 
German  question  will  be  decided,  not  by  parliamentary 


THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  OF  GERMANY   323 

speeches,  but  by  diplomatic  action  and  by  war."  A 
year  later  Bismarck  made  the  ominous  declaration, 
"  Not  by  speeches  and  resolutions  of  majorities  are 
great  questions  decided,  but  by  blood  and  iron." 
Germany  is  determined  to  rely  for  her  greatness  on 
blood  and  iron  rather  than  on  beautiful  sentiments. 

The  romantic  and  idealistic  ideas  of  a  league  of 
peace  and  of  international  goodwill  created  and  headed 
by  Great  Britain  may  be  excellent  in  the  abstract, 
and  they  may  be  very  profitable,  if  generally  adopted, 
from  the  British  point  of  view,  for  Great  Britain  has 
all  the  territory  she  wants,  and  she  strives  only  to 
preserve  in  peace  that  which  she  has  won  by  war. 
However,  Englishmen  must  be  simple  if  they  believe 
that  beautiful  speeches  and  beautiful  sentiments  will 
cause  Germany  to  be  satisfied  with  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain  has  practically  all  the  colonies  in  the 
world  whilst  Germany  has  none. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  GERMAN  NAVY  LEAGUE  AND  THE  NAVY 

FOR  those  who  wish  to  understand  Germany's  foreign 
policy,  and  especially  Germany's  policy  towards  Great 
Britain,  it  is  quite  indispensable  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  organisation,  character,  power,  influence,  and 
policy  of  the  German  Navy  League,  and  to  closely 
follow  its  activity.  This  is  all  the  more  necessary 
because  very  little  is  known  of  this  organisation  out- 
side of  Germany,  and  because  the  vast  majority  of 
Englishmen  believe  that  the  German  Navy  League 
is  an  enthusiastic,  somewhat  noisy,  and  not  very  in- 
fluential body,  composed  of  private  and  irresponsible 
individuals,  which  in  scope  and  in  character  closely 
resembles  the  British  Navy  League.  In  the  following 
it  will  be  shown  that  this  conception  of  the  German 
Navy  League,  which  is  generally  held  in  this  country, 
is  erroneous.  It  will  be  shown  that  the  German  Navy 
League  is  a  huge  official  organisation,  and  that  its 
political  power  and  influence  in  Germany  are  exceed- 
ingly great,  and  probably  greater  than  that  wielded 
by  any  of  the  German  political  parties. 

When  the  German  Emperor  and  his  advisers  con- 
templated creating  a  navy  which  was  to  rival,  and 
perhaps  even  to  exceed,  that  of  Great  Britain,  they 
were  fully  aware  that  the  Reichstag  would  not  be 
found  willing  to  vote  the  huge  funds  which  would  be 
required  for  carrying  out  such  a  policy.  The  small 


THE    GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         325 

Navy  Bill  of  1898,  which  embodied  only  a  part  of  the 
Emperor's  great  naval  programme,  had  with  difficulty 
been  passed  through  the  Reichstag,  on  March  28,  1898, 
and  it  was  clear  that  any  further  demands  for  the  navy 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  would  be  refused  by 
the  German  Parliament.  Therefore,  it  was  recognised 
that  some  means  would  have  to  be  found  where- 
with to  overcome  the  expected  Parliamentary  oppo- 
sition against  any  further  naval  demands,  and  it  was 
thought  best  that  the  electorate  should  be  influenced 
by  a  huge  organisation,  founded  on  the  model  of  the 
British  Navy  League,  which,  by  extra-Parliamentary 
agitation,  should  exercise  an  irresistible  pressure  on 
the  German  Parliament.  With  this  object  in  view, 
the  German  Navy  League  was  founded  on  April  30, 
1898,  exactly  a  month  after  the  first  Naval  Bill  had 
been  passed  by  the  Reichstag.  The  chief  and  most 
active  mover  in  the  foundation  of  the  German  Navy 
League  was  the  late  Mr.  Alfred  Krupp,  an  intimate 
friend  of  the  Emperor.  The  Emperor's  brother, 
Prince  Henry,  immediately  on  the  foundation  of  the 
League,  was  made  the  "  Protector,"  that  is,  the 
honorary  President  of  the  Society,  Prince  William 
of  Wied,  who  then  was  the  President  of  the  Upper 
Chamber  of  the  Prussian  Diet,  became  its  acting  chair- 
man, and  the  venerable  and  generally  beloved  Grand 
Duke  of  Baden  joined  the  German  Navy  League  as 
honorary  member. 

The  fact  that  the  three  most  prominent  men  in 
Germany  had  placed  themselves  at  the  head  of  the 
German  Navy  League  gave  it  the  greatest  prestige 
from  the  very  outset.  Soon,  many  of  the  foremost 
aristocrats  and  of  the  highest  military  officers  and 
officials  all  over  Germany  offered  their  services  to  the 
League.  The  services  of  these  men  were  accepted, 


326  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  official  and  social  leaders  of  Germany  were  directed 
to  enrol  members  of  the  League  among  the  masses, 
and  soon  a  keen  competition  for  winning  the  greatest 
number  of  adherents  to  the  League  arose  among  the 
high  officials  of  Germany. 

In  most  countries  the  man  in  the  street  dearly 
likes  to  be  associated  with  the  aristocracy  in  some 
movement  or  another,  but  nowhere  in  the  world  is 
that  desire  stronger  than  in  Germany,  where  the 
nobility  and  the  high  officers  and  officials  form  a 
caste  of  the  greatest  exclusiveness,  being  placed  by 
the  State  on  a  level  high  above  the  masses  of  the 
people.  Skilfully  taking  advantage  of  this  disposi- 
tion of  the  German  masses,  the  Navy  League  was 
designed  to  be  an  organisation  popular  and  demo- 
cratic in  character,  but  most  aristocratic  in  organisation 
and  government,  thoroughly  centralised  to  ensure 
absolute  discipline,  yet  giving  the  greatest  scope  to 
individual  emulation  and  exertion.  The  people,  irre- 
spective of  age,  sex,  means,  rank,  party  and  creed, 
were  invited  to  join  the  League,  but  at  the  same  time 
the  foremost  men  were  designed  to  be  the  organisers 
and  the  officers  of  its  local  branches. 

Not  only  were  leisured  aristocrats,  generals  and 
admirals  on  half-pay,  and  retired  Secretaries  of  State 
appointed  as  agents  and  officers  of  the  League,  but 
the  State  placed  the  whole  of  the  governmental 
machine  of  Germany  at  the  disposal  of  the  society. 
The  highest  officials  in  the  provinces,  the  Regierung- 
sprasidenten,  who  occupy  a  position  similar  to  that 
of  our  Lord-Lieutenants,  were  allowed  to  become  the 
chairmen  of  the  provincial  centres  of  the  Navy  League. 
The  Navy  League  associations  in  the  administrative 
sub-divisions  of  the  provinces  were  placed  under  the 
direction  of  the  highest  acting  officials,  the  Regier- 


THE   GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         327 

ungsrate,  and  in  the  towns  the  mayors,  or  the  most 
prominent  citizens,  were  induced  to  undertake  the 
organisation  and  the  management  of  the  local  branches. 
The  provincial  Government  offices  and  the  local 
town-halls  everywhere  were  placed  at  the  disposition 
of  the  League,  and  became  the  domicile  of  the  Navy 
League.  Thus  the  official  character  and  the  prestige 
of  the  League  was  greatly  increased  in  the  eyes  of 
the  German  masses.  As  there  are  more  than  four 
thousand  local  branches  of  the  Navy  League  in 
Germany,  almost  every  village  has  now  its  naval 
society  which  is  directed  by  the  local  magnates,  the 
squire,  the  doctor,  the  clergyman,  the  forester,  the 
chemist  and  the  schoolmaster,  who  divide  among 
themselves  the  various  honorary  offices,  and  who  can 
easily  gain  adherents  or  create  "  a  popular  move- 
ment "  among  the  villagers  without  much  trouble 
and  within  a  few  hours,  especially  as  the  headquarters 
of  these  rural  branches  of  the  Navy  League  are 
usually  at  the  principal  inn. 

In  order  to  attract  people  of  all  ranks,  the  amount 
of  the  yearly  subscription  was  left  by  the  founders 
of  the  League  to  the  discretion  of  the  members  who 
were  asked  to  tax  themselves  for  the  benefit  of  the 
German  navy  and  of  the  Fatherland  in  accordance 
with  their  means.  The  minimum  contribution  of  a 
member  of  the  Navy  League  was  placed  as  low  as 
fifty  pfennigs  (sixpence)  a  year,  in  order  to  enable 
even  the  poorest  men  to  join  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  single  donation  of  1000  marks  (£50),  created 
the  donor  a  life-member  of  the  League,  and  brought 
him  a  diploma  which  was  handed  to  him  by  the 
aristocratic  President  of  the  League.  Thus  well-to-do 
shopkeepers  were  given  an  opportunity  of  satisfying 
their  desire  of  coming  into  contact  with  the  aristo- 


328  MODERN    GERMANY 

cratic  personages  who  filled  the  presidential  position 
in  the  various  districts,  and  of  approaching  the  local 
celebrities.  To  stimulate  the  ambition  of  all  members 
to  carry  on  the  propaganda  and  to  obtain  new 
adherents  to  the  League,  marks  of  distinction  were 
conferred  upon  the  most  successful  promoters  of  the 
League.  By  permission  of  the  Emperor,  Navy  League 
Badges,  and  a  special  Navy  League  flag  were  created, 
and  enthusiastic  young  Germans  were  officially  en- 
couraged to  parade  the  emblem  of  the  Navy  League  in 
the  form  of  tie-pins,  cuff-links,  brooches,  &c. 

The  Emperor  has,  for  various  reasons,  kept  per- 
sonally away  from  the  League.  Nevertheless,  he  has 
identified  himself  with  the  Navy  League  and  with  its 
ceaseless  agitation  in  every  possible  manner,  and  has 
shown  himself  the  chief  promoter  and  protector  of 
that  society.  During  the  year  1905,  for  instance, 
the  Emperor  sent  numerous  telegrams  of  congratu- 
lation and  of  encouragement  to  the  League.  On 
the  ist  January  he  telegraphed  to  the  President  of 
the  Navy  League,  "  hearty  thanks  for  your  loyal 
congratulations.  May  your  wishes  for  the  strengthen- 
ing of  our  naval  power  be  fulfilled,  and  may  your 
ambitions  and  those  of  the  German  Navy  League  be 
crowned  with  success."  On  the  gth  March  his  Majesty 
wired,  "  I  thank  the  assembled  representatives  of 
the  German  Navy  League  for  the  expression  of  their 
homage,  especially  as  I  see  in  that  expression  the 
embodiment  of  patriotic  sentiments  which  still  further 
increase  and  strengthen  my  confidence  in  the  activity 
of  the  Navy  League."  On  the  27th  May  he  tele- 
graphed to  the  President  of  the  League,  "  I  thank  you 
for  the  greetings  and  the  homage  of  the  Navy  League, 
the  patriotic  activity  of  which  is  a  strong  guarantee 
for  me  that  I  shall  attain  the  end  which  I  have  in 


THE    GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         329 

view."  The  other  German  sovereigns  have  naturally 
followed  the  Emperor's  example,  and  they  have  done 
all  in  their  power  to  strengthen  the  League. 

How  important  is  the  position  which  the  German 
Navy  League  holds  may  be  seen  by  its  yearly  meetings, 
such  as  that  which  took  place  in  Stuttgart,  from 
the  25th  to  the  2gth  of  May  1905.  The  festivities 
began  with  a  State  dinner  at  the  Royal  Palace  of 
Stuttgart,  to  which  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg  had 
invited  the  leading  men  of  the  Navy  League.  The 
26th  of  May  was  dedicated  to  business.  On  the 
27th  the  general  meeting  took  place,  which  was 
attended  by  Prince  Henry,  the  Emperor's  brother, 
and  by  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg.  On  the  evening  of 
the  same  day  an  entertainment  was  given  to  the 
members  of  the  Navy  League,  which  was  attended 
by  Prince  Henry,  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg,  numerous 
German  princes,  and  by  the  whole  Cabinet  of  Wiirtem- 
berg. On  the  28th  the  members  of  the  League  were 
received  by  the  King  and  Queen  of  Wiirtemberg  and 
by  Prince  Henry  of  Germany.  On  the  2Qth  a  per- 
formance was  given  for  the  members  of  the  Navy 
League  at  the  Opera,  which  also  was  attended  by  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Wiirtemberg  and  by  Prince  Henry. 
After  the  meeting,  the  President  of  the  Wiirtemberg 
branch  of  the  Navy  League,  Prince  Carl  Von  Urach, 
and  his  assistant,  Herr  Pflaum,  received  each  a  framed 
and  signed  picture  of  the  Emperor,  "  as  a  token  of 
his  Majesty's  recognition  of  the  services  which  they 
had  rendered  to  the  League." 

The  meetings  of  the  provincial  Navy  League 
associations  closely  resemble  the  general  meeting  held 
at  Stuttgart.  These  provincial  meetings  are  attended 
by  all  the  foremost  people  of  the  district,  who  provide 
a  brilliant  reception  and  a  sumptuous  entertainment. 


330  MODERN    GERMANY 

and  thus  these  provincial  meetings  powerfully  assist 
in  gaining  new  members  for  the  Navy  League,  perhaps 
more  from  social  than  from  patriotic  reasons. 

Owing  to  the  skilful  organisation  of  the  German 
Navy  League  and  to  the  most  liberal  imperial,  royal, 
and  official  patronage  bestowed  on  it,  the  members 
of  the  League  rapidly  increased  in  number,  especially 
in  the  large  towns.  But  the  villages  were  not  to  be 
neglected.  In  order  to  enrol  the  country  people  as 
well,  an  army  of  travelling  lecturers  were  engaged 
by  the  Navy  League,  and  a  number  of  cinemato- 
graphic apparatuses  were  purchased,  which  all  the 
year  round  travel  through  the  districts  allotted  to 
them,  and  bring  the  idea  of  the  German  navy  to 
the  door  of  the  peasants  who  live  far  away  from  the 
coast,  in  remote  rural  or  mountainous  districts. 
From  the  statistics  published  by  the  Navy  League, 
it  appears  that,  on  an  average,  about  150,000  people 
attend  every  month  these  cinematographic  perfor- 
mances. The  Emperor  William  takes  a  great  interest 
in  them.  On  February  22,  1905,  for  instance,  the 
Navy  League  was  commanded  to  give  a  cinemato- 
graphic performace  before  the  Emperor  at  the  Palace 
in  Berlin. 

In  order  to  strengthen  the  local  navy  societies, 
frequent  social  meetings  take  place.  To  make  these 
a  success  the  central  office  of  the  Navy  League  issues 
suitable  instructions  for  holding  such  meetings,  supplies 
lists  of  lecturers  and  their  topics,  sends  out  lecturers 
and  theatrical  plays  written  for  promoting  the  objects 
of  the  League,  &c.  Besides,  the  Navy  League  has 
published  a  book  of  popular  naval  songs,  which  con- 
tains no  less  than  sixty-seven  songs  on  the  subject 
of  "  Our  future  lies  upon  the  water." 

The  German  Navy  League  has  not  only  individual 


THE   GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         331 

members,  but  it  admits  whole  societies,  clubs,  &c., 
to  membership.  Even  a  number  of  town  corporations 
are  members  of  the  German  Navy  League. 

Apart  from  the  four  thousand  branches  in  Germany, 
the  German  Navy  League  has  about  one  hundred 
branches  in  foreign  countries,  "  excepting  the  United 
States  and  Russia,"  and  the  German  consuls  abroad 
are,  in  many  cases,  the  founders  and  chairmen  of 
these  naval  associations.  These  foreign  naval  asso- 
ciations contributed  during  the  first  ten  months  of 
1905  considerably  more  than  £2000  to  the  central 
association  in  Berlin,  an  amount  which  was  larger 
than  the  takings  of  the  British  Navy  League  in  the 
whole  British  Empire  during  that  year,  and  it  is 
remarkable  that  the  largest  individual  contribution 
came  from  Cape  Town,  which,  m  January,  sent  to 
Berlin  2034  marks  ;  in  June,  10,200  marks  ;  and  in 
October,  1543  marks,  or  about  £700  in  all.  It  is 
certainly  remarkable  that  so  much  enthusiasm  for 
the  creation  of  an  overwhelmingly  strong  German 
navy  should  be  found  in  Cape  Town,  and  it  is  perhaps 
allowable  to  surmise  that  the  larger  part  of  this  con- 
tribution came  from  the  pockets  of  South  African 
Boers,  and  not  from  German  colonists,  especially  as 
the  contributions  sent  from  all  other  British  colonies 
and  from  England  itself  are  exceedingly  small,  the 
largest  contribution  from  Great  Britain  being  that  of 
Glasgow,  which  sent  £30  zos.  to  Berlin  during  the 
year,  whilst  London  sent  only  £6  8s. 

The  foregoing  details  show  clearly  that  the  German 
Navy  League  is  a  private  association  only  inasmuch 
as  its  members  join  the  League  voluntarily,  but  the 
fact  that  its  central  and  its  local  organisations  are 
in  the  hands  of  the  highest  German  aristocrats  and 
officials  show  that,  by  its  direction,  it  is  an  official 


332  MODERN   GERMANY 

body  which  stands  under  the  influence  and  constant 
control  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the  highest  officials. 
Therefore  we  may  assume,  as  will  be  shown  in  the 
following,  that  the  policy  of  the  Navy  League  is  the 
policy  of  the  German  Emperor. 

Now,  let  us  consider  the  strength  of  the  German 
Navy  League,  and  let  us  see  what  it  has  achieved  so 
far,  what  it  is  likely  to  achieve  in  the  future,  and 
how  it  is  likely  to  make  use  of  its  power. 

According  to  the  latest  statements  of  the  monthly 
journal,  Die  Flotte,  which  is  published  by  the  German 
Navy  League,  that  association  has  more  than  1,000,000 
members,  and  is  therefore  the  largest  voluntary  asso- 
ciation for  patriotic  purposes,  not  only  in  Germany 
but  in  the  world.  The  income  of  the  German  Navy 
League  should,  in  the  present  year,  amount  to  more 
than  £50,000.  The  monthly  journal  of  the  Navy 
League,  Die  Flotte,  is  issued  in  no  less  than  370,000 
copies,  and  it  has  very  likely  a  larger  circulation  than 
all  other  monthly  periodicals  published  in  Germany 
combined.  How  enormous  a  circulation  of  370,000 
copies  is  for  Germany  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
figures,  giving  the  circulation  of  the  leading  political 
dailies  of  that  country  : 

Frankfurter  Zeitung 32,000  copies 

Kdlnische  Zeitung  .......  30,000      „ 

Berliner  Tageblatt 65,000      „ 

Vossische  Zeitung 25,000      „ 

Total 152,000      „ 

The  circulation  of  the  other  leading  dailies  of  Germany 
is  not  obtainable,  but  the  foregoing  statement  shows 
that  the  four  leading  political  journals  of  Germany 
combined  have  less  than  half  the  circulation  of  the 
journal  of  the  German  Navy  League. 


THE   GERMAN   NAVY    LEAGUE         333 

The  greatness  and  importance  of  the  German 
Navy  League  becomes  clear  to  us  only  if  we  compare 
it  with  the  British  Navy  League.  The  German  Navy 
League  has  almost  a  million  paying  members,  the 
British  has  but  a  few  thousand.  The  organ  of  the 
German  Navy  League,  Die  Flotte,  is  to  be  found  in 
almost  every  restaurant,  every  inn,  every  hairdresser's 
shop,  and  in  almost  every  private  house  of  the 
well-to-do  in  Germany.  The  Navy  League  journal, 
although  it  is  far  better  written  than  the  very  dull 
Flotte,  may  occasionally  be  found  in  an  English  club, 
but  hardly  anywhere  else  is  it  to  be  seen.  Of  a 
hundred  Englishmen  hardly  one  has  ever  seen  the 
Navy  League  journal,  of  a  hundred  Germans  probably 
ninety  know  Die  Flotte.  The  British  Navy  League 
has,  on  an  average,  an  income  of  about  £2000  per 
year,  out  of  which  amount  only  about  £500  are  spent 
upon  propaganda,  the  rest  being  swallowed  up  by 
salaries,  postages,  and  sundry  expenses.  The  German 
Navy  League  has  now  an  income  of  about  £50,000 
per  annum,  and  of  this  sum  nearly  the  total  is  avail- 
able for  purposes  of  agitation.  As  postages,  fares, 
and  various  other  expenses  for  carrying  on  a  campaign 
of  propaganda  are  very  low  in  Germany,  and  as 
countless  workers  for  the  German  Navy  League  can 
be  obtained  gratis,  £50,000  in  the  hands  of  the  German 
Navy  League  will  probably  go  as  far  for  naval  agita- 
tion as  would  £150,000  in  the  hands  of  the  British 
Navy  League,  which  has  to  pay  heavily  for  all  it  does 
in  the  absence  of  a  large  number  of  efficient  voluntary 
workers.  The  funds  in  hand  of  the  British  Navy 
League  amount,  as  a  rule,  to  about  £200,  whilst  the 
funds  of  the  German  Navy  League  are  so  large  that 
that  organisation  actually  suffers  from  a  glut  of  money. 
Therefore,  the  German  Navy  League  has  presented 


334  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  nation  with  a  small  gun-boat,  and  has  given  very 
substantial  donations  for  the  troops  which  took  part 
in  the  expedition  against  the  Boxers,  for  the  troops 
which  were  fighting  in  South- West  Africa,  for  missions 
to  seamen,  and  for  charitable  purposes.  Besides,  the 
German  Navy  League  trains  a  number  of  cadets  free 
of  charge,  and  distributes  gratis  an  enormous  quantity 
of  literature  for  obtaining  seamen  and  naval  officers 
from  the  inland  population.  Placards  illustrating 
"  Germany's  sea  power,"  which  are  revised  every  two 
years,  are  sent  by  the  Navy  League  free  of  charge  to 
all  schools  which  apply  for  them,  and  these  placards 
are  fastened  to  the  wall  and  serve  to  impress  the 
youthful  mind  with  the  conviction  that  "  Germany 
stands  in  bitter  need  of  a  strong  navy." 

The  German  Navy  League  endeavours  to  create 
national  enthusiasm  for  the  navy  among  the  German 
children.  Not  only  provides  the  Society  literature, 
pictures,  lectures,  entertainments,  cinematographic 
performances,  naval  exhibitions,  &c.,  for  the  young, 
but  it  takes  every  year  a  large  number  of  children  to 
the  sea.  This  is  a  very  useful  and  a  very  wise  step, 
for  most  German  towns  lie  so  far  inland  that  hardly 
i  per  cent,  of  the  German  children  have  seen  the  sea. 
Every  summer  the  German  Navy  League  brings  many 
thousands  of  children  to  the  sea,  and  many  of  these 
will,  when  they  are  grown  up,  no  doubt,  owing  to  their 
trip,  be  induced  to  enter  upon  a  naval  career.  These 
children,  of  whom  hundreds  come  from  far  away 
Bavaria  and  Thuringia,  are  accompanied  by  their 
teachers,  and  they  are  frequently  conducted  by  a 
retired  major  or  colonel,  whose  duty  it  is  to  show 
them  what  is  to  be  seen,  and  to  rouse  the  military 
spirit  in  the  future  defenders  of  their  country.  These 
children  are  taken  over  the  warships,  they  are  feted 


THE   GERMAN   NAVY    LEAGUE         335 

everywhere,  and  everything  is  done  to  ensure  that 
their  holiday  will  for  ever  remain  one  of  their  most 
pleasant  recollections,  and  thus,  these  excursions  pro- 
bably assist  very  materially  in  converting  a  race  of 
landsmen  into  potential  seamen. 

Now  let  us  see  what  the  German  Navy  League  has, 
so  far,  achieved. 

At  the  beginning  of  January  1900,  within  two  years 
from  its  foundation,  the  German  Navy  League  had 
created  a  perfect  organisation  for  carrying  through  a 
campaign  of  propaganda  among  the  masses,  286  local 
naval  societies  had  been  established,  and  246,967 
members  had  been  enrolled.  On  January  25,  1900, 
the  celebrated  Navy  Bill  was  brought  forth,  which, 
according  to  the  preamble  of  the  Bill,  was  to  create 
a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  "  a  war  with  the  mightiest 
naval  Power  would  involve  risks  threatening  the 
supremacy  of  that  Power." 

Even  before  this  Bill  had  been  announced,  the 
Navy  League  had  begun  its  campaign  in  the  electorate, 
which  shows  that  the  League  must  have  been  taken 
into  the  confidence  of  the  Government,  or  rather  of 
the  Emperor,  before  the  public,  and  the  Navy  League 
commenced  a  campaign  of  agitation  which  is  unpre- 
cedented in  the  history  of  Germany.  In  the  spring 
of  1900,  countless  meetings  in  favour  of  the  creation 
of  a  fleet  sufficiently  strong  to  meet  the  British  navy 
were  held  all  over  the  country,  an  army  of  lecturers 
taken  from  the  elite  of  official,  intellectual,  and  social 
Germany,  delivered  3000  lectures  to  several  million 
people,  generals,  admirals,  Regierungsprasidenten,  and 
the  most  distinguished  University  professors  vied  with 
one  another  in  demonstrating  to  the  public  that  the 
rapacity  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  was  a  danger 
to  Germany,  that  Great  Britain  intended  to  attack 


336  MODERN   GERMANY 

Germany's  trade,  that  the  danger  could  only  be  pro- 
vided against  by  a  fleet  strong  enough  to  overawe 
Great  Britain,  and  that  it  would  be  best  for  Germany 
if  Great  Britain's  naval  supremacy  was  destroyed. 
In  the  course  of  this  extraordinary  campaign,  books 
and  pamphlets  advocating  the  creation  of  a  fleet  of 
overwhelming  strength  were  sold  by  ten  thousands 
by  the  League,  and  no  less  than  seven  million  books 
and  pamphlets  were,  according  to  the  Year-Book  of 
the  Navy  League  for  1901,  distributed  gratis  by  that 
Society.  We  cannot  wonder  that  this  strenuous 
campaign  caused  the  Reichstag  to  pass  the  Navy  Bill 
of  1900,  for  the  violent  agitation  of  the  Navy  League 
had  proved  irresistible,  and  had  carried  before  itself 
all  parties,  including  even  the  Social  Democrats.  On 
January  24,  1901,  the  President  of  the  Navy  League 
summed  up  the  result  of  the  campaign  in  favour  of  a 
navy  strong  enough  to  meet  the  British  fleet,  and  he 
announced  with  pride  that,  during  the  year,  the 
number  of  local  naval  societies  had  increased  from 
286  to  1010,  that  the  number  of  members  had  grown 
from  246,967  to  566,141,  and  that  during  the  year 
939,251  marks,  or  almost  £50,000  had  been  spent  on 
the  anti-British  propaganda  in  favour  of  the  German 
fleet.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  as  the  Year-Book 
of  the  German  Navy  League  declared,  "  the  successful 
passing  of  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  was  principally  due 
to  the  enormous  strength  and  the  excellent  organisa- 
tion of  the  German  Navy  League,  which  embraced 
the  whole  Empire,  and  to  its  energetic  agitation." 

During  the  four  years  following  the  passing  of 
the  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  the  membership  of  the  Navy 
League  grew  but  slowly.  On  January  i,  1904,  the 
membership  had  risen  to  633,000,  and  was,  therefore, 
only  a  little  larger  than  in  1900.  On  the  other  hand, 


THE    GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         337 

the  number  of  the  all-important  local  societies  had 
grown  meanwhile  from  1010  to  3600,  and  thus  the 
potential  strength  of  the  Navy  League  had  been  more 
than  trebled  during  four  years  of  suspended  agitation. 
Hence,  a  future  naval  agitation  will  find  the  German 
Navy  League  a  still  more  formidable  factor  than  it 
was  in  1900. 

The  enormous  strength  of  the  German  Navy 
League  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  number 
of  its  paying  members  is  about  as  large  as  the  average 
number  of  the  members  of  the  great  political  parties 
of  Germany,  excepting  only  the  Social  Democratic 
party.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it  would  appear 
that  the  German  Navy  League  is,  in  reality,  much 
stronger  than  any  of  the  Parliamentary  parties, 
because  apart  from  the  million  paying  members,  it 
possesses  probably  a  much  larger  number  of  adherents 
who  are  unwilling  to  pay  a  yearly  contribution  to 
that  association.  Besides,  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  almost  the  whole  of  the  aristocracy,  of  the 
bureaucracy,  of  the  military  and  naval  officers,  and 
of  the  professors  and  schoolmasters  are  active  sup- 
porters of  the  League.  Therefore,  it  may  well  be 
assumed  that  the  German  Navy  League  is,  for  all 
practical  purposes,  much  stronger  than  any  one  of  the 
German  parties.  Its  organisation  is  perfect,  it  dis- 
poses of  ample  funds,  and  its  agitations  will  probably, 
in  the  future,  prove  as  irresistible  as  it  proved  in 
1900. 

The  Navy  Bill  of  1900  was  brought  forward  only 
after  the  Navy  League  had  carefully  prepared  the 
ground  by  an  unceasing  agitation.  A  similar  agitation 
was  going  on  in  Germany  in  1905.  In  January  1905, 
Die  Flotte,  the  official  organ  of  the  German  Navy 
League,  brought  a  diagram  which  was  to  show  that  of 


338  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  thirty-eight  battleships  which  had  been  sanctioned 
by  the  Bill  of  1900,  thirteen  were  antiquated,  and 
four  of  little  fighting  value,  so  that  Germany  possessed, 
apart  from  those  ships  building  and  contemplated,  in 
reality  only  ten  battleships  of  full  fighting  value.  In 
an  article  by  Major-General  Keim  accompanying  that 
diagram,  it  was  stated  "  unfortunately,  we  are  at 
present,  and  shall  be  in  the  immediate  future,  not 
strong  enough  at  sea,  notwithstanding,  or  rather  be- 
cause of,  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  for  that  Bill  unfortu- 
nately laid  down  too  long  a  time  for  the  construction  of 
the  ships  voted."  Since  January  i,  1905,  when  this 
statement  was  issued,  down  to  the  end  of  that  year, 
the  German  Navy  League  has  unceasingly  condemned 
the  Navy  Bills  of  1898  and  1900  as  being  totally 
inadequate.  Although  by  the  latter  more  than 
£200,000,000  were  altogether  voted  for  naval  pur- 
poses, that  enormous  amount  was  treated  as  a  con- 
temptible contribution  towards  the  German  fleet. 
The  leading  article  of  Die  Flotte  for  February  1905 
closes :  "  We  Germans  spend  £150,000,000  a  year,  or 
one-seventh  of  the  national  income,  on  drink,  but 
the  whole  country,  headed  by  the  Reichstag,  shrieks 
aloud  if  another  shilling  is  demanded  for  the  German 
fleet.  A  nation  which  can  spend  hundreds  of  millions 
every  year  upon  alcohol  has  money  in  heaps  for 
warships,  but  let  us  spend  our  money  quickly,  for, 
otherwise,  it  will  be  too  late." 

During  the  whole  of  1905  it  rained  pamphlets  and 
newspaper  articles  in  Germany,  which  painted  Ger- 
many's future  in  the  blackest  colours.  Germany  was 
declared  to  be  helpless  on  the  sea,  and  to  be  surrounded 
by  watchful  enemies  who  were  only  too  anxious  to 
destroy  Germany.  Only  an  overwhelming  fleet  could 
save  the  country  from  destruction.  Notwithstanding 


THE   GERMAN   NAVY    LEAGUE         339 

these  hysterical  declamations,  the  German  public 
could  not  be  roused  to  the  necessary  frenzy  of  en- 
thusiasm as  in  1900,  and  it  seemed  that  the  agitation 
of  the  Navy  League  would  be  unsuccessful  when,  to 
the  great  relief  of  the  directors  of  that  organisation, 
the  visit  of  the  British  fleet  to  the  Baltic  was 
announced.  The  Reichsbote,  the  Staatsbiirger  Zeitung, 
and  the  Rheinisch-W  estfalische  Zeitung,  which  always 
have  preached  that  Germany  required  an  overwhelm- 
ing navy  to  protect  German  commerce  against  Great 
Britain,  declared  in  articles,  which  certainly  were 
inspired  from  Berlin,  that  Great  Britain  was  bent  on 
destroying  the  German  fleet,  that  the  errand  of  the 
Channel  Fleet  was  a  reconnoitring  expedition,  that 
the  Baltic  should  be  closed  to  the  English,  &c.  Whilst 
these  and  other  papers  went  into  hysterics,  and 
shrieked  that  it  was  now  too  late  to  increase  the 
German  fleet,  Admiral  Tirpitz  smilingly  declared  that 
the  visit  of  the  British  fleet  was  a  godsend,  and  the 
greatest  blessing  that  could  happen  to  the  German 
Navy,  for  it  would  bring  home  to  all  Germans  the 
necessity  for  a  stronger  fleet,  and  the  German  State 
railways  announced  that  they  would  run  excursion 
trains  at  specially  low  rates  to  the  sea  in  order  to 
enable  all  Germans  to  convince  themselves  of  Ger- 
many's helplessness  against  Great  Britain. 

Whilst  the  Press  of  Germany  thus  endeavoured 
to  frighten  the  general  public,  until  the  people  them- 
selves should  clamour  for  an  augmentation  of  the 
navy,  the  German  Navy  League  issued  in  its  Mitteil- 
ungen  the  following  notice  : 

"  Part  of  the  German  Press  has  seen  in  the  visit  of  the 
British  warships  to  the  Baltic  a  hostile  demonstration  against 
Germany.  We  believe  this  opinion  to  be  unjustified,  for 
England  is  as  much  entitled  to  send  her  ships  to  the  Baltic 


340  MODERN    GERMANY 

as  Germany  has  a  right  to  send  her  ships  to  the  North  Sea. 
However,  the  appearance  of  the  powerful  British  fleet  will 
be  of  advantage  to  us,  inasmuch  as  all  Germans  may  now 
convince  themselves  with  their  own  eyes  how  great  is  the 
inferiority  of  the  German  ships  in  size,  armament,  &c.,  if 
compared  with  the  British  fleet,  and  it  should  be  noted  that 
these  British  ships  are  not  even  the  most  powerful  ones  which 
England  possesses." 

Commenting  upon  this  notice,  the  Berliner  Tage- 
blatt  of  August  2  observed  that  this  statement  appeared 
to  have  emanated  from  an  official  source,  and  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  this  was  the  case. 

The  chief  business  of  the  great  gathering  of  the 
Navy  League  at  Stuttgart,  which  has  been  described 
in  the  foregoing,  consisted  in  the  passing  of  two  resolu- 
tions. In  the  first  resolution  the  Navy  League  de- 
clared emphatically  that  it  would  support  with  all  its 
power  the  policy  of  the  Government  to  increase  the 
number  of  cruisers  and  of  torpedo  boats.  In  the  second 
resolution  it  had  formulated  a  policy  of  its  own,  which 
it  was  determined  to  urge  upon  the  Government.  This 
resolution  was  worded  as  follows  :  "  The  German  Navy 
League  recommends  an  acceleration  in  the  building  of 
the  German  fleet,  and  wishes  energetically  to  express 
the  desire  that  the  German  battleships  of  inferior 
strength  should  as  rapidly  as  possible  be  replaced  by 
battleships  of  full  fighting  value."  This  resolution,  by 
which  the  Government  was  called  upon  very  largely 
to  extend  the  great  shipbuilding  programme  of  1900 
has,  since  then,  been  vigorously  endorsed  by  naval 
meetings  all  over  Germany. 

Since  the  time  when  these  resolutions  were  passed, 
the  German  Government  allowed  the  Navy  League  to 
prepare  the  public  for  the  new  naval  demands  which 
were  placed  before  the  Reichstag  early  in  1906.  The 
Government  asked  that  the  eighteen  battleships  of 


THE    GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         341 

medium  size,  which  under  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  were 
to  be  laid  down,  should  be  replaced  by  battleships  of 
the  very  largest  size,  that  six  cruiser-battleships  of  the 
very  largest  size  should  in  addition  be  constructed,  and 
that  the  German  harbours  and  docks  and  the  Kiel 
Canal  should  be  enlarged.  All  these  demands  were 
readily  passed.  About  £50,000,000  were  voted,  and 
Germany  is  planning,  or  already  constructing,  twenty- 
four  ships,  each  of  which  will  be  larger  and  more  power- 
fully armed  than  our  own  Dreadnought. 

As  soon  as  the  Navy  Bill  of  1906  was  passed,  it  was 
denounced  and  condemned  by  the  League  as  utterly 
insufficient,  and  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  League 
at  Cologne  in  May  1907  the  following  resolution  was 
unanimously  and  most  enthusiastically  passed  : 

"  In  view  of  the  fact  that  other  nations  constantly 
strengthen  their  fleet  in  such  a  degree  as  to  increase  the 
disadvantage  of  our  naval  position,  and  in  view  of  the  serious 
dangers  in  which  the  insufficient  strength  of  our  naval  forces 
involves  Germany,  the  seventh  annual  general  meeting  of 
the  German  Navy  League  hereby  resolves  as  follows  :  It  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  accelerate  the  completion  of  the  naval 
programmes  of  1900  and  1906." 

This  semi-official  resolution  has  been  supported  by 
numerous  articles  to  the  same  effect  which  have  lately 
appeared  in  the  inspired  section  of  the  German  press. 
Their  coincidence  is  hardly  fortuitous,  and  it  appears 
likely  that  the  German  Government,  as  is  generally 
believed  in  Germany,  intends  greatly  to  extend  the 
shipbuilding  programme  of  1900-1906,  and  especially 
to  accelerate  the  completion  of  the  ships  voted.  It  is 
also  noteworthy  that  a  petition,  covered  with  more  than 
three  hundred  thousand  signatures,  the  largest  petition 
that  has  been  got  up  ever  since  the  foundation  of  the 
Empire,  was  sent  to  the  Reichstag,  in  which  it  was 


342  MODERN   GERMANY 

prayed  that  the  building  of  the  German  fleet  should  be 
greatly  accelerated.  These  straws  show  in  which  direc- 
tion the  official  wind  is  blowing  in  Germany. 

It  might  be  thought  that  the  Germans  would  be- 
come tired  of  adding  additional  enormous  sums  to 
those  already  devoted  for  their  huge  naval  armaments, 
but  so  far  there  are  no  indications  that  Germany  will 
refuse  to  pay  for  her  navy  whatever  the  Government 
chooses  to  ask  for.  Through  the  unceasing  agitation 
of  her  Navy  League,  Germany  has  grown  navy-mad. 
Toyshops  which  were  filled  with  tin  soldiers  are  now 
filled  with  tin  battleships. 

All  differences  of  party  have  disappeared  before 
Germany's  ambition  to  conquer  the  rule  of  the  sea. 
Although  the  Social  Democratic  deputies  vote,  for 
party  reasons,  against  naval  supplies,  and  ostensibly 
condemn  them  as  unnecessary,  they  heartily  approve 
of  them  in  reality,  and  not  a  few  Social  Democrats 
belong  to  the  German  Navy  League.  The  Social 
Democratic  party  of  Germany  will  certainly  support 
a  further  increase  of  the  German  navy,  and  the  com- 
mercial circles  and  the  agrarians  also  will  not  oppose 
a  large  additional  increase  of  the  fleet.  Many  German 
Chambers  of  Commerce  have  lately  passed  resolutions 
recommending  that  the  German  navy  should  be  greatly 
augmented,  and  although  a  substantial  minority  may 
possibly  in  Parliament  vote  against  increasing  the  fleet, 
it  seems  likely  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  nation  will 
be  in  favour  of  such  a  step,  unless  some  unforeseen 
event  should  suddenly  intervene. 

In  1900  it  was  the  argument  of  the  German  Navy 
League  that  the  German  fleet  was  weaker  than  that 
of  Russia  or  France  or  Japan.  At  present  the  German 
fleet  is  in  tonnage  inferior  only  to  the  British  fleet. 
The  German  fleet  is  considerably  stronger  than  the 


THE    GERMAN    NAVY    LEAGUE         343 

French  fleet.  France  has  to  distribute  her  ships  over 
two  seas,  she  has  numerous  coast  towns  to  protect, 
and  her  ships  are,  on  the  whole,  old,  slow,  ill-built, 
and  they  lack  uniformity  and  homogeneity.  The 
French  have  une  ftotte  d'echantillons,  as  they  say 
themselves,  and  they  will  find  it  very  difficult  to 
manoeuvre  them  in  battle.  Germany,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  nothing  to  protect  with  her  fleet.  Her 
coasts  are  so  well  defended  by  extensive  sandbanks 
that  they  require  no  protection.  Hence  Germany 
can,  with  her  modern  homogeneous  and  exceedingly 
well-managed  fleet,  easily  defeat  the  French  squadrons. 
The  leading  naval  authorities  in  Germany  admit  no 
longer  even  a  paper  superiority  on  the  part  of  the 
French  fleet,  and  have  no  hesitation  as  to  the  issue 
of  a  naval  struggle  between  the  two  countries.  As 
Germany  feels  confident  that  she  could  defeat  France 
on  the  ocean,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  additional 
naval  armaments  which  are  now  clamoured  for  can 
only  be  directed  either  against  this  country,  which 
alone  possesses  a  distinct  superiority  over  Germany 
on  the  sea,  or  against  the  United  States. 

We  have  heard  much  of  the  agitation  of  the  Pan- 
Germanic  League,  but  that  League,  though  violent  in 
agitation,  indiscreet  in  its  statements,  and  most  ag- 
gressive by  its  programme,  is  not  very  dangerous,  for 
it  has  no  settled  policy,  and  before  all  it  possesses  com- 
paratively little  influence  in  Germany.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  German  Navy  League,  with  which,  by-the- 
bye,  the  Pan-Germanic  League  is  very  intimately 
associated,  is  very  dangerous.  The  German  Navy 
League  does  not  try  to  astonish  the  world  with  bound- 
less plans  of  conquest,  but  it  works  quietly  and  in  silence 
at  creating  for  Germany  an  irresistible  weapon  where- 
with the  ambitions  of  the  Pan-Germans  may  some  day 


344  MODERN   GERMANY 

be  satisfied,  and  the  danger  of  the  German  Navy 
League  is  all  the  greater  because  it  has  only  a  narrow 
programme,  because  it  concentrates  all  the  energy  of 
the  nation  upon  a  solitary  and  eminently  practical 
purpose,  because  it  is  most  discreet,  and  because  it 
never  indulges  in  bluster.  For  these  reasons  Great 
Britain  ought  to  watch  the  activity  of  the  German 
Navy  League  with  the  greatest  attention. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  GERMAN  NAVY  AND  OPERATIONS  OVER  SEA 

AGAINST  which  Power  is  the  German  fleet  likely  to 
be  used  ?  Germany  need  not  spend  several  hundred 
million  pounds  on  her  fleet  in  order  to  be  able  to  defeat 
France,  which  has  an  open  frontier  towards  Germany, 
nor  need  Germany  fear  the  Russian  fleet.  Therefore 
the  great  German  fleet,  which  is  building,  can  logically 
have  only  two  opponents — either  the  United  States 
or  Great  Britain. 

We  have  been  assured  by  a  British  Prime  Minister 
and  various  politicians  and  officers  that  Great  Britain 
cannot  be  invaded.  Are  their  assurances  to  be  relied 
upon  ?  Does  Germany  also  believe  that  an  invasion 
of  Great  Britain  is  impossible  ?  According  to  all  great 
Austrian  authorities,  it  was  hopeless  for  Prussia  to 
attack  Austria  in  1866.  According  to  most  of  the 
great  French  authorities,  it  was  hopeless  for  Prussia 
to  attack  France  in  1870.  According  to  various 
British  authorities,  it  is  hopeless  for  Germany  to  at- 
tack this  country.  "  Pride  goeth  before  destruction, 
and  a  haughty  spirit  before  a  fall."  In  the  knap- 
sacks of  Austrian  prisoners,  taken  by  the  Prussians 
in  1866,  proclamations  to  the  inhabitants  of  Berlin 
were  found ;  the  troops  of  Napoleon  the  Third  were 
lavishly  supplied  with  maps  of  Germany,  but  with 
none  of  France  ;  the  British  troops  entered  upon  the 
South  African  War  with  maps  of  the  Transvaal,  but 


346  MODERN    GERMANY 

with  none  of  the  British  colonies,  where  they  so  often 
were  defeated.  History  is  apt  to  repeat  itself,  and 
Great  Britain  may  experience  a  naval  "  black  week  " 
if  she  thinks  that  the  German  navy  need  not  be  taken 
seriously. 

Of  course,  if  Germany  was  stupid  enough  to  give 
Britain  fair  warning  and  to  meet  her  in  fair  battle,  the 
superiority  of  the  British  fleet  would  be  overwhelming  ; 
but  wars  are  not  conducted,  at  least  not  by  Germany, 
on  the  principles  of  a  cricket  match.  Germany  will, 
in  a  difficult  war,  certainly  follow  the  advice  which 
Bismarck  gave  to  his  nation  in  his  memoirs.  He  said  : 

"  When  it  becomes  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  one  does 
not  look  at  the  weapons  that  one  seizes,  nor  the  value  of 
what  one  destroys  in  using  them.  One  is  guided  at  the 
moment  by  no  other  thought  than  the  issue  of  the  war." 

In  diplomatic  and  military  warfare  Germany  has 
no  other  object  than  to  defeat  and  crush  her  opponents. 
In  politics  and  in  war  she  leaves  sentimentality  to  old 
women  and  amateur  statesmen  who  have  gathered 
their  wisdom  from  shallow  theorists,  for  Germany  is 
administered  by  men  of  action,  not  by  a  miscellaneous 
crowd  of  glib  orators  and  skilful  vote-catchers. 

The  highest  naval  officers  of  Germany  have  an  as- 
tonishing confidence  in  their  well-handled  and  ever- 
ready  fleet,  and  they  do  not  fear  an  encounter  with  a 
superior  British  force.  At  the  same  time  the  German 
navy  would  not  rashly  attack  a  superior  British  fleet 
under  normal  conditions.  A  declaration  of  war  is, 
according  to  usage  and  to  the  law  of  nations,  unneces- 
sary. Therefore  Germany  need  not  scruple  to  choose 
the  most  convenient  moment  for  an  attack  on  this 
country,  and  she  may  conceivably  defeat  a  superior, 
but  unprepared,  British  fleet  in  the  same  way  in  which 
she  has  defeated  superior  forces  on  land. 


OPERATIONS    OVER    SEA  347 

Very  possibly  Germany  will  endeavour  to  effect  a 
landing  in  Great  Britain.  It  is  true  that  Lord  Haldane 
has,  on  the  8th  of  March  1906,  assured  us  that  "  the 
navy  in  the  present  strength  is  capable  of  defending 
these  shores  from  invasion,"  and  that  "our  coasts  are 
completely  defended  by  the  fleet,  and  our  army  is 
wanted  for  purposes  abroad  and  oversea."  Therefore 
Lord  Haldane  proposed,  for  the  sake  of  economy,  to 
"  do  away  "  with  numerous  defensive  positions  on  the 
coast  and  around  London.  Although  Lord  Haldane 
considered  that  a  landing  in  considerable  force  was 
impossible  on  our  shores,  Lord  Roberts  and  the  lead- 
ing German  officers  who  have  studied  the  question  are 
of  a  different  opinion.  The  German  army  is  constantly 
ready  for  war.  In  a  few  hours  all  the  ships  which 
happen  to  be  in  the  German  harbours  could  be  seized, 
filled  with  soldiers,  and  sent  to  the  British  coast,  in 
accordance  with  detailed  plans  which  the  general  staff 
has  prepared.  According  to  Lord  Haldane,  the  risk 
of  such  an  enterprise  would  be  very  great,  but  in 
reality  the  risk  run  by  Germany  in  such  an  expedition 
is  so  infinitesimally  small  that  it  certainly  should  be  run 
in  time  of  war.  The  Germans  know  that  the  British 
are  a  humane  people,  not  cannibals.  If  a  hundred 
thousand  men  can  be  landed  in  England,  Germany's 
object  may  possibly  be  attained.  If  the  transports 
are  discovered  in  time  and  are  attacked  by  a  superior 
British  force  they  will  hoist  the  white  flag,  and  Britain 
will  have  to  feed  a  hundred  thousand  prisoners,  whose 
loss  will  make  no  appreciable  difference  to  an  army  of 
6,000,000  trained  men.  Lord  Haldane's  arguments 
may  seem  plausible  to  unmilitary  people,  but  they  are 
singularly  unconvincing  to  all  those  who  have  had  some 
experience  in  handling  large  bodies  of  troops.  But  that 
was,  after  all,  not  Lord  Haldane's  profession. 


348  MODERN   GERMANY 

A  superior  British  fleet,  "  capable  of  defending 
these  shores  from  invasion,"  may  at  the  critical  moment 
have  been  lured  away,  or  it  may  be  occupied  in  another 
quarter  of  the  world,  for  Britain  cannot  permanently 
tether  up  her  fleet  at  her  front  door  and  convert  her 
ships  into  floating  coast  fortifications.  In  the  absence 
of  the  fleet,  a  hundred  thousand  German  soldiers,  per- 
haps more,  could  be  landed,  but,  according  to  the 
Parliamentary  arm-chair  strategists,  they  would  soon 
be  "  cut  off  from  their  base  "  by  our  ships.  That 
operation  would  be  very  serious  if  Great  Britain  was 
a  savage  country.  However,  as  the  troops  landed 
would  find  in  the  country  plenty  of  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion in  the  arsenals  near  the  coast,  and  as  plenty  of 
horses,  carts,  &c.,  could  be  "  commandeered,"  the 
lightest  equipment  and  a  few  guns  would  suffice,  and 
immediately  a  rush  for  London  could  be  made.  With 
London  the  British  Empire  would  fall.  I  do  not  think 
that  I  betray  a  secret  if  I  mention  that  the  German 
General  Staff  has  made  a  most  careful  study  of  England, 
and  that  the  country  has  to  such  an  extent  been  travelled 
over  and  surveyed  by  German  officers  that  a  German 
invading  force  would  feel  as  much  at  home  in  England's 
winding  lanes  as  on  the  straight  chaussees  of  Germany. 

The  German  troops  would  meet  with  the  resistance 
of  some  hastily  collected  British  regulars,  territorials, 
and  volunteers,  but  the  highest  German  officers  have 
singularly  little  respect  for  British  troops,  as  I  have 
had  occasion  to  ascertain.  Since  Free  Trade  has 
ruined  agriculture,  the  army  has  become  composed  of 
starving  slum-dwellers,  who,  according  to  the  German 
notion,  are  better  at  shouting  than  at  fighting.  Ger- 
man generals  have  pointed  out  that  in  the  South 
African  War  British  regular  and  auxiliary  troops  often 
raised  the  white  flag  and  surrendered,  without  neces- 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  349 

sity,  sometimes  to  a  few  Boers,  and  they  may  do  the 
same  to  a  German  invading  force.  Free  Trade,  which 
"  benefits  the  consumer  "  and  the  capitalist,  has,  un- 
fortunately, through  the  destruction  of  agriculture  and 
through  forcing  practically  the  whole  population  of 
Great  Britain  into  the  towns,  destroyed  the  manhood 
of  the  nation.  Lord  Roberts' s  recent  statement  that 
"  our  armed  forces  as  a  body  are  as  absolutely  unfitted 
and  unprepared  for  war  as  they  were  in  1899  "  is,  un- 
fortunately, only  too  true.  Of  course,  if  Lord  Roberts 
and  the  German  generals  are  right  and  Lord  Haldane  is 
wrong,  which  very  likely  is  the  case,  we  may  impeach 
him  or  his  successor — if  there  is  a  Parliament  left  by 
the  invader  who  may  have  come  to  stay. 

The  essence  of  maritime  warfare,  especially  for  a 
country  the  interests  of  which  are  worldwide,  is  mo- 
bility. Therefore  Britain  cannot  tie  her  ships  to  her 
shores.  Her  shores  must  defend  themselves.  The 
army  cannot  leave  the  defence  of  our  coast  to  the 
navy.  Our  coasts  can  easily  be  defended,  for  we  have 
a  sufficient  number  of  citizens  willing  to  bear  arms  and 
to  defend  their  country,  and  owing  to  the  density  of 
our  population  and  of  our  railway  net  we  can,  with 
some  little  preparation,  assemble  200,000  armed  men, 
almost  at  any  possible  spot  of  debarkation,  within  a 
few  hours.  But  that  cannot  be  done  if  the  necessary 
organisation  is  created  by  orating  amateurs.  Military 
experts  must  be  allowed  to  manage  military  affairs. 

If,  in  case  of  an  Anglo-German  war,  an  invasion  of 
Great  Britain,  which  almost  certainly  will  be  attempted, 
should  prove  a  failure,  Germany  might  either  try  to 
cause  Russia  to  invade  India,  or  she  might  strive  to 
invade  India  in  co-operation  with  Russia.  Such  an 
attack  would  be  exceedingly  dangerous,  since  the  new 
Russian  railways  have  placed  Moscow  within  easy  reach 


350  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  India.  The  support  of  Russia  against  Great  Britain 
would  be  invaluable  to  Germany,  and  this  is  one  of  the 
principal  reasons  for  Germany's  unvarying  friendship 
for  her  Eastern  neighbour,  but  our  armchair  strategists 
have  apparently  never  thought  of  a  Russo-German 
attack  on  India.  Happily  the  Anglo-Russian  Entente 
protects  Great  Britain  against  such  a  contingency,  and 
in  that  protection  lies  one  of  the  most  important 
reasons  for  the  existence  of  that  arrangement.  Un- 
fortunately it  has  been  attacked  by  many  who  have 
never  given  a  thought  to  the  great  strategical  problems 
of  Great  Britain  in  Asia.  Notwithstanding  the  Entente 
many  Germans  hope  for  Russia's  co-operation  in  case 
of  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  Hence  the  possibility  of 
a  Russo-German  attack  upon  India  must  not  be  lost 
sight  of,  for  alliances  do  not  possess  eternal  duration. 

The  foregoing  shows  that  a  war  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  might,  even  at  the  present  time,  not 
be  confined  to  target  practice  on  moving  objects  on  the 
part  of  the  British  fleet.  A  very  few  years  hence 
Germany  may  even  be  able  to  challenge  our  fleet  on 
the  high  sea.  At  any  rate  she  has  already  immo- 
bilised our  entire  naval  resources  and  confined  our 
naval  power  to  the  seas  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
our  coast,  especially  as  we  have  neglected  our  coast 
defences  and  home  army,  and  thus  Germany  is  making 
it  impossible  for  us  to  assert  our  rights  in  any  quarter 
of  the  globe  except  with  Germany's  permission. 

I  would  now  give,  in  extract,  a  translation  of  a  very 
interesting  German  pamphlet  entitled  Operationen 
iiber  See,  by  von  Edelsheim,  a  member  of  the  German 
General  Staff : — 

"  Moltke  declared  that  landings  and  operations 
with  landed  troops  were  enterprises  of  subordinate 
importance ;  but  the  military  commanders  of  the 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  351 

future  will  have  to  count  the  preparation  for,  and  the 
execution  of,  wars  over  sea  among  their  most  im- 
portant tasks.  There  is  no  State  in  the  whole  world 
which  possesses  better  forces  and  greater  means  than 
Germany  for  the  enterprise  of  war  by  landing.  In  the 
first  place  the  excellence  and  the  readiness  of  our  army, 
and  the  celerity  with  which  large  masses  of  troops  can 
be  mobilised,  are  not  equalled  by  any  other  great 
Power  ;  in  the  second  place,  Germany  disposes  of  the 
second  largest  commercial  marine  in  the  world,  and  has 
in  the  rapid  large  steamers  of  her  shipping  companies  a 
splendid  transport  fleet,  the  excellence  of  which  is  not 
exceeded  even  by  that  of  England  herself ;  in  the  last 
place,  the  increase  and  strengthening  of  our  navy  which 
is  at  present  taking  place  will  guarantee  increased 
security  to  the  transport  of  our  troops  over  sea.  These 
factors,  which  are  peculiarly  favourable  for  Germany's 
power,  open  a  large  field  for  our  world  policy,  and 
render  it  possible  for  us  to  make  our  strong  military 
forces  also  useful  for  the  greatness  of  the  Empire,  and 
to  conquer  by  the  development  of  German  power  over 
sea  the  same  feared  and  esteemed  position  in  the  world 
which  our  victories  of  the  last  decennia  have  earned 
for  us  in  Central  Europe. 

"  A  further  stimulus  hi  this  direction  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  our  navy  will  not  be  able  at  once  to 
attain  such  development  that  it  can  alone  solve  all 
tasks  which  may  have  to  be  solved  in  an  energetic 
world  policy.  Therefore  it  is  desirable  that  the  strength 
of  our  army  should  be  made  visible  and  available  over 
sea  to  such  nations  as  have  so  far  looked  at  Germany 
as  a  State  by  which  they  cannot  be  reached.  Thus 
we  must  consider  not  only  landings  in  conjunction  with 
territorial  wars  but  also  operations  against  States 
which  we  can  reach  only  by  sea. 


352  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  Operations  over  sea  must  not  be  improvised, 
because  there  is  hope  for  their  success  only  when  the 
whole  complicated  mechanism  down  to  the  smallest 
details  has  been  prepared  in  time. 

"  The  possibility  of  utilising  favourable  situations 
and  favourable  times  for  undertaking  operations  over 
sea  is  one  of  the  most  important  conditions  for  their 
success.  When  the  landing  has  been  effected  in  such 
a  way  that  the  opponent  has  been  taken  by  surprise, 
even  a  strong  country  will  hardly  succeed  in  concen- 
trating sufficient  forces  in  time  wherewith  to  meet  the 
invader.  The  preparations  for  landing  operations  must 
therefore  be  furthered  in  tune  of  peace  to  such  an  extent 
that  in  time  of  war  we  feel  sure  of  having  the  advantage 
of  surprising  the  enemy  by  our  celerity  in  mobilising 
and  transporting  our  troops. 

"  The  aim  of  our  operations  must  be  kept  entirely 
secret,  and  attempts  should  be  made  to  deceive  the 
enemy  at  least  with  regard  to  the  purpose  for  which 
the  first  preparations  are  undertaken.  Napoleon's 
expedition  to  Egypt  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was 
commenced  may  be  considered  still  to-day  as  a  model. 

"  A  landing  on  the  coast  of  the  enemy  is  only 
possible  if  the  assailant  has  forces  superior  to  those 
which  the  defender  can  collect  at  the  decisive  moment 
in  order  to  prevent  a  landing.  If  a  landing  has  taken 
place,  even  a  victorious  naval  battle  is  useless  to  the 
defender  unless  he  disposes  of  armies  sufficiently  strong 
to  meet  the  invader  with  success.  Therefore  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  strength  of  our  German 
navy  should  be  developed  so  far  that  the  security 
of  the  troops  during  a  possible  crossing  is  certain,  and 
that  it  is  able  to  defeat,  or  at  least  to  detain,  any  hostile 
fleet  which  the  opponent  may  collect  at  the  moment 
when  the  landing  operation  is  contemplated.  There- 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  353 

fore  the  way  for  a  transport  of  troops  over  sea  should 
usually  be  opened  by  an  operation  of  the  fleet,  and  the 
fact  that  a  landing  becomes  absolutely  impossible  if 
the  battle  on  sea  has  an  unfavourable  issue  for  us  has 
to  be  taken  into  account.  Thus  the  principle  may  be 
deduced  that  all  men-of-war  which  can  be  used  should 
be  used  for  operations  over  sea  in  order  to  open  the 
way  for  a  fleet  of  transports. 

"  For  operations  over  sea  a  detailed  plan  of  mobilisa- 
tion must  be  drawn  up  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  is 
done  for  operations  on  land.  The  troops  which  are  to 
be  mobilised  must  be  determined  in  peace,  their  trans- 
port by  railway,  their  harbour  of  embarkation  and  the 
preparation  for  embarkation  must  be  prepared  in  order 
to  ensure  the  greatest  possible  celerity.  As  we  have 
seen  in  the  foregoing,  it  is  before  all  necessary  to  pro- 
ceed with  a  surprising  quickness  which  alone  can  assure 
us  success. 

"  If  the  opponent  disposes  of  considerable  forces  a 
simultaneous  landing  at  several  spots  seems  question- 
able. ...  If  several  places  of  debarkation  are  chosen, 
the  protection  of  these  places  towards  the  sea  requires 
many  ships  of  war ;  the  scouting  towards  the  land  is 
made  more  difficult,  and  the  enemy  will  easier  be  able 
to  attack  in  superior  numbers  the  separate  parts  of 
the  landing  troops.  Lastly,  the  unity  of  command  at 
the  beginning  of  the  operations  will  meet  with  great 
difficulties,  and  time  and  means  will  be  missing  to 
obviate  these  difficulties.  Therefore  it  is  recommend- 
able,  if  it  is  at  all  possible,  to  select  only  one  spot  of 
debarkation  and  to  bring  up  the  transport  fleet  as 
closely  as  possible  to  the  coast. 

"For  a  debarkation  a  harbour  is  naturally  best.  Less 
favourable  but  still  advantageous  is  a  closed,  protected 
bay ;  least  favourable  is  the  open  coast.  On  the  other 

z 


354  MODERN   GERMANY 

hand,  a  landing  on  the  open  coast  will  find  the  least 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  because  it  can  be 
executed  with  the  greatest  chance  of  surprise.  If  the 
point  of  landing  selected  is  close  to  a  bay  or  to  a  har- 
bour the  first  task  of  the  troops  which  are  landing  will 
be  to  take  possession  of  such  a  place  in  order  to  enable 
the  fleet  of  transports  to  disembark  the  majority  of 
the  troops,  horses,  and  material  at  that  spot.  The 
possession  of  a  harbour  will  greatly  accelerate  these 
operations  and  increase  the  security  of  the  disembarka- 
tion against  a  hostile  attack  from  sea  and  land.  If  such 
a  coup  does  not  succeed  the  landing  of  the  whole  ex- 
peditionary army  must  immediately  take  place  by 
boats  on  the  coast  without  loss  of  time,  and  all  pre- 
parations must  be  made  for  such  a  possibility.  Every 
transport  must  have  with  it  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
material  for  disembarkation  in  order  to  be  able  to  land 
everything  on  the  open  shore.  It  is  impossible  to  land 
in  the  face  of  strong  fortifications  or  of  a  strong  hostile 
force  ;  the  Russian  landing  manoeuvres  which  have 
been  made  have  fully  proved  that. 

"  The  best  security  for  landing  by  boats  is  always 
afforded  by  the  surprise.  Therefore  it  is  impossible 
to  explore  a  point  of  landing  by  ships  sent  in  advance, 
which  would  only  show  the  opponent  which  the  pro- 
bable point  of  landing  would  be  and  he  would  there- 
fore be  enabled  to  take  his  measures  in  time.  Such 
proceedings  can  only  be  used  in  order  to  deceive  the 
enemy.  The  exploration  of  the  possible  points  of  land- 
ing must  have  taken  place  already  before  the  begin- 
ning of  the  operations. 

"  The  well-known  naval  author.  Mahan,  recognises 
that  the  offensive  is  characteristic  of  landing  opera- 
tions. The  history  of  war  teaches  how  the  success  of 
well-executed  landings,  such  as  those  at  Aboukir  or 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  355 

Cape  Breton,  have  been  partly  marred  by  over-great 
caution  of  the  landed  troops,  because  it  was  not  re- 
cognised by  the  commanders  that  energy  and  celerity 
in  execution  will  counterbalance  all  strategical  dis- 
advantages to  such  an  operation.  Quick  and  ener- 
getic operations  with  closely  concentrated  forces  on 
the  line  of  the  smallest  resistance  are  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  success  of  landing  operations. 

"  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Egypt  proves  that  an  army 
may  subsist  for  years,  even  in  a  country  possessing 
poor  resources,  when  the  connection  with  the  home 
country  is  cut  off.  Such  independence  is  greatly  facili- 
tated in  a  civilised,  thickly  peopled,  and  rich  country, 
as  it  will  then  be  much  easier  to  get  all  that  is  required 
in  the  way  of  food,  horses,  material,  &c.,  from  local 
sources,  and  even  ammunition  may  be  manufactured 
in  the  enemy's  country. 

"  An  expeditionary  army  must  economise  to  the 
greatest  extent  its  forces.  Bloody  victories  may  act 
like  defeats  on  them.  Therefore,  attacks  on  fortifica- 
tions must  be  avoided  if  they  are  avoidable.  The 
chief  thing  is  always  the  surprising  celerity  of  the 
operations,  and  in  order  to  attain  the  main  object 
aimed  at  all  forces  must  be  used  with  the  greatest 
energy  and  with  an  absolute  lack  of  all  consideration. 

"  At  present  the  view  prevails  in  our  military  circles 
that  operations  over  sea  in  connection  with  territorial 
wars  are  worthless,  and  are  even  harmful,  as  greater 
success  appears  likely  by  using  those  troops  on  land 
which  might  be  used  as  an  expeditionary  force. 

OPERATIONS  AGAINST  ENGLAND 

"  A  conflict  with  England  must  be  considered  by 
Germany,  for  a  powerful  progressive  German  trade 


356  MODERN    GERMANY 

forms  for  the  power  of  England  at  least  as  great  a 
danger  as  the  progress  of  Russia  towards  India.  In  a 
purely  naval  war  with  England  we  could  count  on 
success  only  at  the  beginning  of  operations,  but  soon 
England  would  be  able  to  bring  to  the  field  such  enor- 
mous naval  forces  that  we  should  be  limited  to  the 
defensive  and  could  hardly  count  on  a  fortunate  issue 
of  such  operations.  Even  if  we  conclude  an  alliance 
with  Russia  we  might  harm  England  permanently,  but 
we  would  not  be  able  to  directly  threaten  that  State. 
Only  an  alliance  with  France  could  menace  England, 
but  owing  to  her  geographical  position  and  the  great 
loss  of  time  which  is  occasioned  by  every  operation 
initiated  by  allies,  England  would  always  be  able  to 
bring  into  the  field  a  maritime  superiority  even  against 
that  alliance  unless  she  be  taken  by  surprise. 

"  England's  weakness  lies  in  that  factor  which  con- 
stitutes our  strength,  the  army.  The  English  army 
corresponds  neither  in  quantity  nor  quality  with 
England's  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  does  not 
even  correspond  with  the  size  of  the  country,  for 
England  feels  convinced  that  the  invasion  of  her 
territory  can  be  prevented  by  the  fleet.  That  con- 
viction is,  however,  not  at  all  justified  .  .  .  for 
though  England  can  collect  immense  fleets  after  some 
time,  those  of  her  naval  forces  which  are  ready  for 
war  during  the  very  first  days  are  not  so  overwhelming. 
Consequently  an  opponent  who  is  considerably  weaker 
on  the  sea,  and  who  concentrates  his  forces  and  keeps 
them  in  a  state  of  readiness  can  expect  a  temporary 
success.  Therefore,  in  case  a  war  with  England 
should  be  threatening,  Germany  should  endeavour  to 
throw  part  of  her  army  on  the  English  coast,  and  thus 
to  shift  the  decision  from  the  sea  on  to  the  enemy's 
country.  As  our  troops  are  far  superior  to  the 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  357 

English  troops,  England's  enormous  naval  power  would 
not  have  the  slightest  influence  upon  the  final  decision. 
"  The  army  of  England  consists  of  the  field  army, 
the  reserve,  the  militia,  the  volunteers  and  the  yeo- 
manry. In  case  of  an  invasion  by  surprise,  we 
need  only  consider  of  these  the  field  army  with  its 
reserve.  The  militia  requires  so  much  time  for  con- 
centration and  equipment  that  only  a  small  fraction 
will  be  able  to  assist  the  field  army  in  the  first  and 
decisive  struggle.  The  volunteers  and  the  yeomanry 
cannot  in  a  short  time  bring  into  the  field  any  consider- 
able forces  useful  for  war.  Besides,  we  must  remember 
their  small  military  value,  owing  to  which  they  would 
not  be  serious  opponents  to  our  well-trained  troops. 
The  English  field  army  consists  nominally  of  three 
army  corps,  each  composed  of  three  divisions.  Of 
these  corps  half  the  third  is  composed  of  militia. 
Therefore  it  has  either  to  be  completed  from  the 
militia  and  will  then  come  too  late  for  action  in  the 
first  decisive  battles,  or  it  will  march  in  its  peace 
strength,  and  can  then  not  be  much  stronger  than  a 
division.  Of  the  second  army  corps  two  divisions  and 
one  brigade  of  cavalry  are  quartered  in  Ireland,  of 
which  at  any  rate  the  larger  part  will  remain  there  in 
order  to  prevent  a  rising  of  the  Irish,  to  whom  the 
German  invasion  would  bring  the  liberty  they  long 
for.  Immediately  ready  for  war  are  therefore  only  : 

Three  divisions  of  the  first  army  corps, 
About  two  divisions  of  the  second  army  corps, 
About  one  combined  division  of  the  third  army 
corps  and  three  brigades  of  cavalry. 

"  As  the  mobilised  strength  of  an  English  division 
amounts  in  round  numbers  only  to  10,000  men,  whilst 


358  MODERN   GERMANY 

that  of  a  German  division  amounts  to  16,000  men, 
four  German  divisions  and  one  cavalry  division  would 
already  possess  a  superiority  over  the  British  field 
army.  However,  we  are  able  to  ship  in  the  shortest 
time  six  infantry  divisions,  or  five  infantry  and  one 
cavalry  division,  to  England.  How  such  an  operation 
against  England  over  sea  should  be  conducted  can  of 
course  not  be  described  in  this  place. 

"  If  the  weather  be  fair,  the  transport  from  our 
North  Sea  harbours  should  be  effected  in  little  more 
than  thirty  hours.  The  English  coast  offers  extensive 
stretches  which  are  suitable  for  landing  troops.  The 
country  contains  such  great  resources  that  the  army 
of  invasion  could  permanently  live  on  these  resources. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  extent  of  the  island  is  so  small 
that  the  English  would  never  succeed  in  vanquishing 
any  army  of  invasion,  once  it  had  been  victorious. 
It  is  unlikely  that  such  a  war  would  be  long  drawn  out, 
or  that  considerable  reserves  would  be  required.  The 
material  is  largely  renewable  in  the  country  itself. 
Therefore  we  may  without  hesitation  maintain  that  it 
will  be  unnecessary  to  keep  open  communications  with 
our  own  country. 

"  The  first  object  to  be  aimed  at  in  invading  England 
would  be  the  English  field  army  ;  the  second  would  be 
London.  However,  in  all  probability  both  objects 
would  be  attained  simultaneously,  as  in  view  of  the 
small  value  of  the  volunteers  the  whole  field  army 
would  be  required  for  the  defence  of  the  fortifications 
of  London.  It  would  obviously  be  impossible  to  let 
the  capital  fall  into  the  hands  of  an  invader,  especially 
in  view  of  the  pressure  of  public  opinion.  But  if 
London  is  taken  by  an  army  of  invasion,  one  or  the 
other  naval  harbours  will  also  have  to  be  occupied  in 
order  to  create  a  base  for  supplies  and  for  further 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  359 

operations  which  we  are  justified  to  think  will  lead 
to  the  conquest  of  England. 


OPERATIONS  AGAINST  THE  UNITED  STATES 

"  Operations  against  the  United  States  of  North 
America  would  have  to  be  conducted  in  a  different 
manner.  During  the  last  years  political  friction  with 
that  State,  especially  friction  arising  from  commercial 
causes,  has  not  been  lacking,  and  the  difficulties  that 
have  arisen  have  mostly  been  settled  by  our  giving 
way.  As  this  obliging  attitude  has  its  limits,  we  have 
to  ask  ourselves  what  force  we  can  possibly  bring  to 
bear  in  order  to  meet  the  attacks  of  the  United  States 
against  our  interests  and  to  impose  our  will.  Our 
fleet  will  probably  be  able  to  defeat  the  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States,  which  are  distributed  over  two 
oceans  and  over  long  distances.  But  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that  the  defeat  of  their  fleet  will 
force  the  United  States  with  its  immense  resources 
into  concluding  peace. 

"  In  view  of  the  small  number  of  American 
merchant-men,  in  view  of  the  small  value  of  the 
American  colonies  which  are  not  even  pacified,  in  view 
of  the  excellent  fortifications  with  which  the  great 
American  seaports  are  provided,  and  which  cannot  be 
taken  except  with  very  heavy  losses,  and  in  view  of  the 
large  number  of  American  seaports,  all  of  which  we 
cannot  blockade  at  the  same  time,  our  fleet  has  no 
means  to  force  that  opponent  through  successful  mari- 
time operations  to  conclude  a  peace  on  our  terms. 

"  The  possibility  must  be  taken  into  account  that 
the  fleet  of  the  United  States  will  at  first  not  venture 
into  battle,  but  that  it  will  withdraw  into  fortified 
harbours,  in  order  to  wait  for  a  favourable  opportunity 


360  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  achieving  minor  successes.  Therefore  it  is  clear  that 
naval  action  alone  will  not  be  decisive  against  the  United 
States,  but  that  combined  action  of  navy  and  army 
will  be  required.  Considering  the  great  extent  of  the 
United  States,  the  conquest  of  the  country  by  an  army 
of  invasion  is  not  possible.  But  there  is  every  reason 
to  believe  that  victorious  enterprises  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  and  the  conquest  of  the  most  important  arteries 
through  which  imports  and  exports  pass,  will  create 
such  an  unbearable  state  of  affairs  in  the  whole  country 
that  the  Government  will  readily  offer  acceptable  con- 
ditions in  order  to  obtain  peace. 

"  If  Germany  begins  preparing  a  fleet  of  transports 
and  troops  for  landing  purposes  at  the  moment  when 
the  battle  fleet  steams  out  of  our  harbours,  we  may 
conclude  that  operations  on  American  soil  can  begin 
after  about  four  weeks,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  United  States  will  not  be  able  to  oppose  to  us 
within  that  time  an  army  equivalent  to  our  own. 

"  At  present  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States 
amounts  to  65,000  men,  of  whom  only  about  30,000 
could  be  disposed  of.  Of  these  at  least  10,000  are 
required  for  watching  the  Indian  territories  and  for 
guarding  the  fortifications  on  the  sea  coast.  Therefore 
only  about  20,000  men  of  the  regular  army  are  ready 
for  war.  Besides,  about  100,000  militia  are  in  exist- 
ence, of  whom  the  larger  part  did  not  come  up  when 
they  were  called  out  during  the  last  war.  Lastly,  the 
militia  is  not  efficient ;  it  is  partly  armed  with  muzzle- 
loaders,  and  its  training  is  worse  than  its  armament. 

"As  an  operation  by  surprise  against  America  is 
impossible,  on  account  of  the  length  of  time  during 
which  the  transports  are  on  the  way,  only  the  landing 
can  be  affected  by  surprise.  Nevertheless,  stress  must 
be  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  rapidity  of  the  invasion 


OPERATIONS    OVER   SEA  361 

will  considerably  facilitate  victory  against  the  United 
States,  owing  to  the  absence  of  methodical  preparation 
for  mobilisation,  owing  to  the  inexperience  of  the  per- 
sonnel, and  owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  regular  army. 

"  In  order  to  occupy  permanently  a  considerable 
part  of  the  United  States  and  to  protect  our  lines  of 
operation  so  as  to  enable  us  to  fight  successfully  against 
all  forces  which  that  country,  in  the  course  of  time,  can 
oppose  to  us,  considerable  forces  would  be  required. 
Such  an  operation  would  be  greatly  hampered  by  the 
fact  that  it  would  require  a  second  passage  of  the 
transport  fleet  in  order  to  ship  the  necessary  troops 
that  long  distance.  However,  it  seems  questionable 
whether  it  would  be  advantageous  to  occupy  a  great 
stretch  of  country  for  a  considerable  time.  The 
Americans  will  not  feel  inclined  to  conclude  peace 
because  one  or  two  provinces  are  occupied  by  an  army 
of  invasion,  but  because  of  the  enormous  material 
losses  which  the  whole  country  will  suffer  if  the  At- 
lantic harbour  towns,  in  which  the  threads  of  the  whole 
prosperity  of  the  United  States  are  concentrated,  are 
torn  away  from  them  one  after  the  other. 

"  Therefore  the  task  of  the  fleet  would  be  to  under- 
take a  series  of  large  landing  operations,  through  which 
we  are  able  to  take  several  of  these  important  and 
wealthy  towns  within  a  brief  space  of  time.  By  inter- 
rupting their  communications,  by  destroying  all  build- 
ings serving  the  State,  commerce,  and  the  defence,  by 
taking  away  all  material  for  war  and  transport,  and, 
lastly,  by  levying  heavy  contributions,  we  should  be 
able  to  inflict  damage  on  the  United  States. 

"  For  such  enterprises  a  smaller  military  force  will 
suffice.  Nevertheless,  the  American  defence  will  find 
it  difficult  to  undertake  a  successful  enterprise  against 
that  kind  of  warfare.  Though  an  extremely  well- 


362  MODERN    GERMANY 

developed  railway  system  enables  them  to  concentrate 
troops  within  a  short  time  on  the  different  points  on 
the  coast,  the  concentration  of  the  troops  and  the 
time  which  is  lost  until  it  is  recognised  which  of  the 
many  threatened  points  of  landing  will  really  be 
utilised  will,  as  a  rule,  make  it  possible  for  the  army 
of  invasion  to  carry  out  its  operation  with  success 
under  the  co-operation  of  the  fleet  at  the  point  chosen. 
The  corps  landed  can  either  take  the  offensive  against 
gathering  hostile  forces  or  withdraw  to  the  transports 
in  order  to  land  at  another  place. 

"  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  Germany  is  the  only 
Great  Power  which  is  able  to  tackle  the  United  States 
single-handed.  England  could  be  victorious  on  sea, 
but  would  not  be  able  to  protect  Canada,  where  the 
Americans  could  find  consolation  for  their  defeats  on 
sea.  Of  the  other  Great  Powers,  none  possess  a  fleet 
of  transports  required  for  such  an  operation." 


CHAPTER   XVI 

THE   GERMAN   EMPEROR   AS   A  POLITICAL  FACTOR 

THE  Emperor  is  no  doubt  the  most  potent  factor  in 
German  foreign  and  domestic  politics,  whether  he 
rules  personally  like  William  II.,  or  impersonally, 
through  a  powerful  statesman,  like  William  I.  The 
political  influence  of  the  Emperor,  whether  direct  or 
indirect,  is  always  very  great.  Hence  it  is  worth 
while  to  study  the  character  and  influence  of  the 
present  occupant  of  the  German  throne. 

William  II.  is,  perhaps,  the  most  picturesque  and 
the  most  talked  about  figure  on  the  stage  of  the 
world,  and,  if  a  computation  should  be  made,  it 
would  very  likely  be  found  that  more  columns  of 
the  international  press  are  daily  filled  with  accounts 
of  his  doings  and  sayings  than  with  those  of  all  other 
sovereigns  taken  together.  We  have  seen  William  II. 
not  only  as  an  emperor  and  a  king,  but  also  as  a 
statesman  and  a  politician,  a  general  and  an  admiral, 
a  painter  and  a  composer,  a  stage-manager,  a  con- 
ductor of  an  orchestra,  and  a  sportsman.  We  have 
heard  him  preach  sermons,  and  give  lectures  on  naval 
matters  and  on  commerce,  on  yachting  and  on 
socialism,  on  agriculture  and  on  new  art,  on  archaeo- 
logy and  on  boat-building,  on  education,  and  on 
countless  other  subjects.  In  consequence  of  his 
numerous  accomplishments  and  his  feverish  activity, 
he  has  come  to  be  considered  either  as  a  genius  of 

infinite   range   and   wonderful   intelligence,    or   as   a 

563 


364  MODERN    GERMANY 

restless,  many-sided,  over-ambitious,  and  over-enthu- 
siastic amateur. 

However,  whilst  people  are  always  discussing  every 
one  of  the  Emperor's  minor  acts,  they  usually  omit 
to  take  a  more  comprehensive  view,  and  to  consider 
him  in  his  most  interesting  aspect  as  a  political  factor 
by  weighing  his  importance  for  his  own  and  other 
countries  by  the  general  trend  and  character  of  his 
actions  during  the  whole  time  of  his  reign.  By  sum- 
ming up  the  net  results  of  his  restless  activity  during 
his  long  rule,  an  appreciation  of  his  political  weight 
and  tendencies  may  be  possible,  and  an  opinion  may 
be  formed  as  to  his  future  influence,  for  good  or  for 
evil,  upon  the  history  of  his  own  country  and  of  the 
world. 

In  order  to  understand  the  Emperor  as  a  political 
factor,  it  is  necessary  to  study  his  personality,  char- 
acter, and  surroundings,  as  well  as  his  rule,  his 
ambitions,  and  his  achievements. 

William  II.  is  distinctly  a  talented  man,  endowed 
by  nature  with  a  very  active  brain,  rapid  compre- 
hension, a  retentive  memory,  and  a  fertile  imagina- 
tion. These  characteristics  showed  themselves  already 
in  his  earliest  childhood.  For  instance,  once,  when 
his  governess,  before  inflicting  bodily  chastisement, 
solemnly  assured  the  little  prince  that  his  punish- 
ment would  hurt  her  more  than  it  would  hurt  him, 
little  William  at  once  inquired  naively  whether  it 
would  hurt  her  in  the  same  place  where  it  would 
hurt  him. 

The  German  Emperor  is  very  highly  strung, 
nervous,  and  irritable  ;  impetuous  to  rashness,  swayed 
by  sudden  impulses,  possessed  of  unbounded  self- 
confidence,  and  imbued  with  that  fervent  belief  in 
himself,  in  his  divine  mission,  and  in  the  special 


THE   GERMAN   EMPEROR  365 

protection  of  Providence,  which  is  usually  found  in 
great  men  of  the  first  order,  such  as  Alexander  and 
Caesar,  Cromwell  and  Napoleon.  Having  a  consider- 
able gift  of  speech,  it  is  only  natural  that  his  utterances 
are  never  commonplace,  but  highly  dramatic,  strenuous 
and  emphatic,  testifying  to  the  rich  mind  from  which 
they  have  sprung,  and  to  the  peculiarities  of  his 
character  and  views  just  described.  The  Emperor 
possesses  a  rare  energy,  considerable  moral  and  physical 
courage,  and  much  tenacity  of  purpose.  Though  he 
is  able  to  form  deep  political  plans  and  pursue  them 
for  years  in  close  secrecy,  he  has  been  known  to 
commit  an  indiscretion  in  a  moment  of  weakness, 
and  to  shatter  his  deeply  laid  plans  by  a  sudden 
ebullition. 

William  II.  is  well  aware  of  his  talent  and  ability, 
which  are  no  doubt  greater  than  that  of  any  of  his 
predecessors,  excepting,  perhaps,  Frederick  the  Great. 
As  Frederick  the  Great  treated  the  "  Unterthanen- 
Verstand  "  with  sublime  contempt,  administered  at 
the  same  time  all  the  great  offices  of  State  in  peace, 
commanded  the  armies  in  war,  and  whiled  away  his 
spare  time  with  his  flute  and  philosophy,  with  writing 
poetry  and  sketching,  thinking  himself  great  in  all 
these  subjects,  to  the  amusement  of  Voltaire,  even 
so  William  II.  feels  capable  not  only  of  ruling  the 
empire,  so  to  say,  single-handed,  but  also  of  directing 
its  commerce  and  education,  its  music  and  art — in 
short,  the  whole  fabric  of  the  empire,  and  the  whole 
intelligence  and  activity  of  the  nation.  Frederick 
the  Great  is  the  Emperor's  ideal  and  model,  and,  in 
fact,  there  is  much  resemblance  between  William  II. 
and  his  great  ancestor.  Bismarck  already  remarked 
of  the  then  Prince  William  :  "In  him  there  is  some- 
thing of  Frederick  the  Great,  and  he  is  also  able  to 


366  MODERN   GERMANY 

become  as  despotic  as  Frederick  the  Great.  What  a 
blessing  that  we  have  a  parliamentary  government !  " 

The  self-will  and  self-assertion  of  William  II.  spring 
from  the  same  cause  as  the  despotism  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  namely,  from  the  very  full  knowledge  of 
his  own  ability  and  an  insufficient  knowledge  of  the 
ability  of  other  people.  These  characteristics  of 
William  II.  were  known  to  the  initiated  before  he 
ascended  the  throne.  Bismarck  had  prophesied  that 
the  Emperor  would  be  his  own  Chancellor,  but,  never- 
theless, he  was  unwise  enough  not  to  resign  when 
the  old  Emperor  died.  Hence  his  fall.  Moltke  was 
wiser.  He  resigned  six  weeks  after  the  death  of  the 
Emperor  Frederick. 

Frederick  the  Great  was  a  poet,  an  administrator, 
a  philosopher,  and  an  author,  but  he  was  essentially 
a  soldier.  In  him  the  ambition  to  enlarge  his  dominions 
which  is  characteristic  of  all  the  Hohenzollerns,  was 
particularly  strongly  developed,  and  he  succeeded  in 
nearly  doubling  the  territory  under  his  sway,  and  in 
elevating  Prussia  to  the  rank  of  a  Great  Power. 
William  II.,  whose  interests  and  pursuits  are  far  more 
multifarious  than  even  those  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
is  also  principally  a  soldier,  and  his  desire  to  increase 
the  territory  of  his  country  is  more  than  an  ambition 
with  him  ;  it  is  a  violent  passion,  just  as  it  was  with 
Frederick  the  Great. 

The  Emperor  is  a  soldier  by  nature.  Nowhere 
does  he  feel  more  at  home  than  amongst  the  officers 
of  his  army  and  navy,  and  he  visits  their  mess-rooms 
very  frequently,  not  as  an  Emperor,  but  as  a  comrade, 
and  stays  for  hours  with  them,  talking,  jesting,  and 
laughing  ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  has  not  been  known 
to  mix  with  civilians  in  a  similarly  cordial  and  un- 
ceremonious way.  His  military  education,  as  well 


THE    GERMAN    EMPEROR  367 

as  his  inborn  military  inclinations,  together  with  his 
love  for  Frederickian  traditions,  have  not  only  coloured 
his  political  views  and  ambitions,  and  influenced  his 
ideas  of  government,  but  they  have  also  tinged  his 
public  utterances,  which  therefore  usually  take  the 
form  of  Imperial  commands.  Consequently,  his 
frequent  pronouncements  on  art  and  education,  re- 
ligion, socialism,  &c.,  are  not  only  of  startling  origi- 
nality, but  of  a  still  more  startling  vigour,  especially 
as  the  Emperor  has  never  hesitated  to  fling  the  whole 
weight  of  his  Imperial  authority  into  the  balance  in 
order  to  enforce  his  private  views  upon  an  unwilling 
section  of  the  community,  or  upon  the  whole  nation. 

The  former  rulers  of  Germany  stood,  on  principle, 
above  the  parties.  William  II.  has  descended  into 
the  arena,  and  has  joined  the  fray  with  the  greatest 
vigour,  and,  sometimes,  with  very  unfortunate  results. 
Utterances  such  as  the  following  are  typical  for  his 
Majesty  : — 

"  For  me,  every  Social  Democrat  is  synonymous  with 
enemy  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Fatherland." 

This  was  addressed  to  the  largest  German  party  in 
his  speech  of  the  i4th  May  1889. 

"  Suprema  lex  regis  voluntas,"  written  as  a  demon- 
stration to  parliamentary  and  popular  opposition  in 
the  Golden  Book  at  Munich. 

"  Sic  volo  sic  jubeo,"  written  under  his  portrait 
given  to  the  Minister  of  Public  Worship  and  Edu- 
cation. 

"  Only  one  is  master  in  the  country.  That  am  I.  Who 
opposes  me  I  shall  crush  to  pieces." 

These  sayings  sound  especially  strange  if  we  re- 
member that  Germany  is  not  an  absolute,  but  a 


368  MODERN   GERMANY 

constitutional,  monarchy,  and  that,  for  instance,  the 
"  crushing  to  pieces  "  of  German  subjects  can  only 
be  effected  by  means  of  properly  constituted  and 
independent  law  courts.  These  utterances,  and  many 
more  of  similar  purport,  which  have  caused  much 
speculation  in  other  countries,  and  consternation  in 
Germany,  do  not  so  much  spring  from  the  sudden 
impulse  of  a  passionate  mind  as  from  the  Emperor's 
deep-rooted  conviction  of  his  own  ability,  and  from 
a  mystical  belief  in  the  absolute  monarchical  power 
by  Divine  right,  vested  by  Providence  in  the  German 
Emperor. 

Under  the  Imperial  Constitution  of  1871  the  powers 
of  the  German  Emperor  are  extremely  great.  The 
Constitution  says : — 

"  .  .  .  .  The  Emperor  can  declare  war  and  conclude  peace, 
make  alliances,  and  other  treaties,  and  nominate  and  receive 
ambassadors.  (Art.  n.) 

"  The  Emperor  can  call,  open,  adjourn,  and  dissolve  the 
Federal  Council  and  the  Imperial  Diet.  (Art.  12.) 

"  The  Emperor  can  issue  and  promulgate  laws,  and  super- 
vises their  execution.  The  Imperial  enactments  .  .  .  require 
the  counter-signature  of  the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  assumes 
the  responsibility  for  them.  (Art.  17.) 

"  The  Emperor  nominates  officials  .  .  .  and  orders  their 
dismissal."  (Art.  18). 

Besides  appointing  all  Imperial  officials,  the 
Emperor  appoints  all  officers  of  the  German  navy 
and  of  the  Prussian  army,  as  well  as  the  highest  officers 
of  the  armies  belonging  to  the  other  German  States 
included  in  the  Empire. 

Compared  with  the  power  of  the  British  monarch, 
the  power  of  the  German  Emperor  with  regard  to 
foreign  and  home  politics  seems  almost  boundless. 
Nevertheless,  William  II.  has  not  been  satisfied  with 


THE   GERMAN    EMPEROR  369 

this  power,  but  has  increased  it  at  the  cost  of  his 
Cabinet  and  of  the  Imperial  Diet.  Similar  struggles 
for  power  may  be  found  in  nearly  all  constitu- 
tional monarchies,  and  at  all  times.  I  may  recall 
the  gentle  struggle  for  power  between  Parliament 
and  Crown  under  Henry  VIII.  and  Elizabeth,  and 
the  violent  ones  under  James  I.  and  Charles  I.  Im- 
perial decrees  have  been  issued  by  the  Emperor 
without  the  counter-signature  of  the  Chancellor,  re- 
quired by  Article  17  of  the  Constitution.  Besides, 
it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  counter-signature 
of  the  German  Chancellor,  who  by  counter-signing 
assumes  the  responsibility  for  the  Emperor's  acts, 
becomes  a  mere  formality  when  the  Chancellor  is  not 
an  independent  official,  but  simply  an  obedient  tool 
whose  duty  it  is  to  put  the  Imperial  will  on  paper. 

In  Bismarck's  time  the  actual  administration  of 
the  country  was  in  the  hands  of  a  Cabinet  composed 
of  responsible  experts,  and,  what  is  more  important 
for  other  countries,  German  policy  was  directed  by 
the  wise  foresight,  unrivalled  experience,  calm  de- 
liberation, and  firmness  of  purpose,  of  a  great  states- 
man. Though  Bismarck  was  generally  believed  to 
be  all-powerful,  if  not  tyrannical,  a  belief  that  stood 
him  in  good  stead,  his  position,  as  a  matter-of-fact, 
was  much  less  commanding  than  is  generally  known. 
His  plans  had  to  be  submitted  to  the  Emperor,  who, 
in  his  turn,  used  to  talk  the  matter  over  with  his 
wife.  The  old  Emperor  was  the  soul  of  honour,  con- 
servative, cautious,  and  somewhat  slow  to  move. 
The  Empress  was  pious  and  peace-loving,  with  a 
distinct  leaning  towards  Liberalism.  Consequently, 
Bismarck's  boldness  and  dash  in  foreign  affairs  were 
often  tempered  by  the  Emperor's  wisdom  and  caution, 
and  the  influence  of  the  Empress  over  her  husband 

2  A 


370  MODERN   GERMANY 

made  for  moderation  in  home  affairs.  In  effect,  the 
old  Emperor  acted  as  a  brake  upon  Bismarck,  and 
the  Empress  us  a  brake  upon  her  husband.  Thus 
William  I.  was  to  Bismarck  what  the  House  of  Lords 
is  to  a  Liberal  House  of  Commons,  and  the  combina- 
tion of  Bismarck,  the  Emperor,  and  his  wife  was  an 
ideal  one  for  foreign  policy,  insuring  the  even  con- 
tinuance of  a  vigorous,  wise,  discreet,  and  successful 
policy. 

Whilst  Bismarck  was  in  office  German  foreign  and 
domestic  policy  ran  an  even  course,  German  policy 
was  understandable  abroad,  and  Bismarck  did  not 
embark  upon  many  risky  enterprises  at  once,  but 
concentrated  his  master-mind  upon  a  few  really  im- 
portant questions.  His  policy  was  at  the  same  time 
great  and  simple,  as  was  his  character.  The  present 
Emperor  appears  not  to  have  the  commanding  talent 
of  a  Bismarck  for  foreign  policy,  nor  is  he  subject 
to  the  restraining  influences  which  moderated  the 
more  adventurous  plans  of  the  great  Chancellor. 
Furthermore,  William  II.  takes,  apparently,  as  much 
interest  in  the  direction  of  the  army  and  navy,  of 
shipping  and  commerce,  of  education,  art,  sport,  and 
countless  other  matters,  as  he  does  in  the  direction 
of  foreign  politics.  Consequently,  he  has  not  sufficient 
leisure  to  concentrate  his  mind  upon  foreign  policy. 
Hence  German  foreign  policy  has  become  fitful, 
enigmatic,  and  unstable,  a  replica  of  the  Emperor's 
impulsive  character. 

During  Bismarck's  Chancellorship,  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  a  solid  combination,  a  healthy  business 
partnership,  with  a  unity  of  purpose,  whose  reliability 
in  case  of  war  was  not  doubted  even  by  its  enemies. 
At  present  the  Triple  Alliance  exists  still  in  name, 
but  its  solidarity  has  been  impaired ;  it  has  latterly 


THE   GERMAN   EMPEROR  371 

come  dangerously  near  breaking  up,  and  protestations 
as  to  its  strength  are  becoming  suspiciously  frequent 
and  painfully  emphatic — especially  on  the  part  of 
Germany.  However,  notwithstanding  the  loudly 
assured  impregnability  of  the  Alliance,  Austria  and 
Italy  have  thought  it  wise,  if  not  necessary,  to  enter 
into  various  engagements  with  France  and  Russia,  in 
order  to  provide  against  certain  contingencies,  and 
Germany  also  is  casting  about  for  other  possible 
partners.  The  Triple  Alliance  seems,  in  fact,  to  have 
become  a  paper  fiction,  a  result  which  may  be  laid 
directly  at  the  door  of  the  German  Emperor's  rest- 
less and  impulsive  policy. 

Bismarck's  diplomatic  activity  after  the  Franco- 
German  War  was  chiefly  directed  towards  two  great 
objects :  the  maintenance  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
and  the  prevention  of  an  alliance  between  France 
and  Russia.  As  long  as  Bismarck  was  in  office, 
France  and  Russia  were  kept  asunder,  and  Germany 
could  feel  absolutely  safe  from  foreign  aggression. 
Therefore  she  was  the  strongest  and  most  respected 
power  on  the  Continent,  and  its  arbiter.  Soon  after 
Bismarck's  dismissal  Germany  ceased  to  be  the  first 
power  on  the  Continent,  and  her  place  was  taken 
by  Russia,  which  for  the  time  being,  but  possibly 
not  for  long,  has  been  eclipsed  by  her  defeat  in  the 
Far  East.  Through  Russia's  downfall,  which  must 
have  been  exceedingly  welcome  to  German  diplomacy, 
Germany  has  again  become  the  leading  power  on  the 
Continent.  Whether  she  will  keep  that  position  will 
depend  on  Russia's  recuperative  power  and  the  action 
of  Germany's  and  of  Russia's  diplomacy. 

Russia,  who  had  been  a  reliable  friend  to  Germany 
until  William  II.  came  to  the  throne,  was  estranged 
by  the  Emperor,  and  the  traditional  good  relations 


372  MODERN   GERMANY 

between  Russia  and  Germany,  which  had  proved  so 
valuable  to  her  in  1870,  came  to  an  end.  Only  fifteen 
months  after  Bismarck's  dismissal,  in  July  1891,  the 
rejoicings  occasioned  by  the  visit  of  the  French  fleet 
at  Cronstadt  proclaimed  to  the  world,  what  politicians 
had  known  for  some  time,  that  William  II.  had  not 
only  been  unable  to  continue  the  skilful  isolation  of 
France  and  to  enjoy  the  friendship  of  Russia,  but 
that  the  Emperor  had  even  driven  these  powers  into 
one  another's  arms,  by  sheer  bad  diplomacy.  The 
work  of  which  Bismarck  was  even  more  proud  than 
of  the  fashioning  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  the  keeping 
apart  of  France  and  Russia,  had  thus  been  rapidly 
destroyed  by  his  successor. 

Since  Bismarck  has  left,  the  German  as  well  as 
the  Prussian  Cabinet  have  been  filled  not  with  in- 
dependent Ministers  whose  activity  is  supervised  by 
the  Sovereign,  but  with  figureheads  whose  power  is 
extremely  circumscribed.  From  a  powerful,  im- 
personal, and  therefore  national,  ministerial  policy 
by  experienced  men,  tempered  by  the  moderation  of 
a  wise  and  cautious  ruler,  German  foreign  and  domestic 
policy  has  become  the  personal  uncontrolled  policy 
of  a  talented,  vigorous,  impulsive,  and  highly  self- 
conscious  monarch,  and  is  tinged  by  accidents 
of  his  health,  and  by  his  personal  feelings  and 
prejudices. 

The  Emperor  considers  his  Ministers  not  as  ex- 
perienced and  independent  chiefs  of  the  Departments 
of  State,  entitled  to  opinions  of  their  own,  but  as 
the  executors  of  his  will,  and  he  removes  them  as 
soon  as  they  do  not  succeed  in  fulfilling  his  wishes. 
Consequently  his  Ministers  of  State  have  been  changed 
with  surprising  rapidity,  a.  continuity  of  policy  in 
foreign  and  home  affairs  has  become  impossible,  pro- 


THE   GERMAN    EMPEROR  373 

jects  of  great  importance  are  brought  forward  in  an 
immature  state,  and  dropped  in  nervous  haste,  and 
the  suddenness  with  which  the  highest  officials  are 
being  replaced  has  taught  them  that  it  is  not  safe 
for  them  to  oppose  or  to  criticise  the  wishes  of  the 
Emperor,  and  that  it  is  wisest  for  them  to  execute 
his  wishes  without  question. 

Only  in  money  matters  has  the  German  Parlia- 
ment any  weight  with  the  Imperial  will  as  represented 
by  the  Cabinet.  The  German  Parliament  was  already 
in  Bismarck's  time  little  more  than  a  money-voting 
and  law-assenting  machine,  plus  a  general  talking- 
shop,  possessed  of  hardly  any  influence,  and  of  no 
control  whatever,  over  the  administration  and  policy 
of  the  Government.  However,  it  would  not  have 
happened  in  Bismarck's  time  that  a  costly  expedition 
like  the  German  China  expedition  would  have  been 
undertaken,  and  that  fresh  regiments  would  have  been 
raised  without  the  assent  of  Parliament. 

The  phenomenon  of  powerful  and  constant  inter- 
ference from  an  exalted  quarter  is  to  be  found  in 
Germany  not  only  in  matters  of  State,  but  is  be- 
coming more  and  more  frequent  in  minor  matters, 
for  which  the  following  anecdote,  told  by  a  prominent 
German  architect,  may  serve  as  an  illustration : 
Drawings  for  a  new  church  in  Berlin  were  submitted 
to  the  Emperor  for  assent  or  correction.  His  Majesty, 
intending  to  make  a  marginal  remark  with  regard 
to  the  cross  on  the  top  of  the  steeple,  put  a  letter 
for  reference  above  the  cross,  and  drew  a  straight 
line  from  the  letter  down  to  the  cross.  Then  he 
changed  his  mind,  and  crossed  the  letter  vigorously 
through.  When  the  architect  received  back  his  plans 
he  studied  carefully  all  the  Emperor's  corrections,  but 
mistook  the  crossed-through  letter  for  a  star.  Knowing 


374  MODERN    GERMANY 

better  than  to  ask  questions,  he  built  the  church,  and 
put  a  big  star  on  a  huge  iron  pole  high  above  the 
top  of  the  cross.  This  strange  excrescence  was  in 
existence  a  few  years  ago,  and  is  probably  still  visible. 
For  similar  reasons  many  monuments  and  public 
buildings  in  Berlin  and  other  parts  of  Germany  are 
of  astonishing  ugliness. 

Blind  obedience  has  become  the  watchword  in 
official  circles  throughout  the  Empire,  and  even  hi 
professorial  appointments  by  the  independent  uni- 
versities and  in  judicial  decisions  by  independent 
judges  a  desire  to  please  his  Majesty  and  to  nominate 
professors  and  to  shape  judgments  in  accordance  with 
the  Imperial  wishes  is  becoming  painfully  apparent. 
As  the  Emperor,  apart  from  the  powers  already  cited, 
can  influence  those  whom  he  wishes  to  influence  by 
bestowing  titles  and  decorations,  and  by  social  pre- 
ferment, abject  flattery  has  become  rife  in  his  sur- 
roundings and  throughout  the  empire.  Examples  of 
such  flattery  by  the  highest  dignitaries  of  the  empire, 
described  in  Germany  under  the  name  of  "  Byzan- 
tinism,"  are  on  record. 

The  domestic  policy  of  the  Emperor  has  been  an 
unfortunate  one.  His  anti-Polish  policy  has  infuriated 
the  Poles,  not  only  in  Germany,  but  also  in  Austria, 
Germany's  ally,  where  their  number  is  very  great, 
and  where  their  influence  upon  the  Government  is 
very  considerable. 

The  lack  of  toleration  which  has  become  char- 
acteristic of  German  home  policy  has  driven  the 
Liberal  elements  of  Germany  into  the  ranks  of  the 
Social  Democratic  Party,  which  is  no  more  exclusively 
a  party  of  malcontents,  recruited  from  the  labour- 
ing classes,  but  which  now  includes  numerous  manu- 
facturers, merchants,  bankers,  professional  men,  &c.f 


THE   GERMAN    EMPEROR  375 

a  proof  of  the  discontent  of  the  middle  class.  Social 
Democracy  being  the  strongest  party  in  Germany, 
people  who  wish  for  reforms  begin  to  think  it  useless 
to  support  any  of  the  numerous  small  and  unim- 
portant factions  in  the  Reichstag,  and  vote  for  Social 
Democracy. 

During  the  reign  of  William  II.  Social  Democracy 
has  become  by  far  the  strongest  party  in  the  empire. 
The  following  figures,  showing  the  numbers  of  Social 
Democratic  votes  polled  at  the  various  general  elec- 
tions, are  highly  significant  regarding  the  home  policy 
of  Germany  under  the  government  of  the  present 
Emperor,  and  prove  the  growth  of  popular  discon- 
tent :— 

Percentage  of  Social 
Total  of  Votes.         Social  Democratic  Votes.          Democratic  Votes. 

1887  7,540,900  763,100  io.li  percent. 

1888  (Accession  of  William  II.) 

1890  7,228,500  1,427,300  19.74 

1893  7.674,000  1,786,700  23.30 

1898  7.757.700  2,107,076  27.18 

1903  9.495,586  3,010,771  3i.7i 

1907  11,262,800  3,259,000  28,94 

1912  12,206,808  4,250,329  34.82 

Is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  Social  Democracy  is 
growing  by  leaps  and  bounds,  trebling  its  votes  in 
ten  years,  when  the  Emperor  began  his  reign  as  the 
"  Arbeiter-Kaiser,"  called  an  international  congress  for 
the  benefit  of  the  German  workers,  and  received 
their  deputation,  then  turned  round  and  proclaimed, 
"  For  me  every  Social  Democrat  is  synonymous  with 
enemy  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Fatherland,"  and, 
lastly,  had  a  Bill  brought  before  the  Reichstag,  upon 
his  personal  initiative,  making  incitement  to  strikes 
a  felony  punishable  with  penal  servitude,  from  three 
to  five  years  ?  If  anything  was  calculated  to  shake 
the  confidence  of  the  German  workers  in  their  Kaiser, 
and  to  increase,  not  to  repress,  Social  Democracy,  it 


376  MODERN    GERMANY 

was  the  Emperor's  untimely,  impulsive,  and  ilJ- 
advised  vigour  and  the  "  Penal  Servitude  Bill." 

As  there  are  more  than  a  dozen  weak  and  dis- 
united parties,  or  rather  factions,  in  the  German 
Imperial  Diet,  and  as  Social  Democratic  teachings 
are  fast  spreading  towards  the  country  parts  of 
Germany,  the  Social  Democratic  Party  promises  to 
acquire  an  overwhelming  strength,  and  may  in  time 
become  a  dangerous  opponent  to  the  Cabinet  policy 
at  present  prevailing  in  Germany,  as  will  be  shown 
in  another  place. 

If  we  overlook  the  results  of  the  Emperor's  reign 
with  regard  to  foreign  politics,  we  find  that  up  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  Germany 
had  to  cede  the  first  place  in  Europe  to  Russia,  that 
the  Triple  Alliance  has  become  little  more  than  a 
name,  that  the  Dual  Alliance  has  become  a  potent 
and  dangerous  factor  to  Germany,  that  Great  Britain 
has  been  estranged  by  the  Emperor's  desperate 
attempts  to  gain  a  footing  in  South  Africa  and  on 
the  Yangtse,  and  that  the  United  States  have  become 
suspicious  of  German  designs  after  the  well-known 
Manila  incident,  the  Venezuela  expedition,  and  various 
other  occurrences  due  to  the  Emperor's  initiative. 
In  consequence  of  these  and  numerous  other  faux  pas, 
Germany  has  estranged  her  former  friends,  and  has 
created  for  herself  many  potential  enemies. 

As  the  Emperor  has  not  succeeded  in  increasing 
his  territories  by  the  peaceful  arts  and  stratagems 
of  diplomacy,  he  has  turned  towards  his  armed  forces, 
and  has  immensely  strengthened  his  army  and  navy 
— a  precaution  which  became  absolutely  necessary  in 
view  of  his  venturesome  foreign  policy,  and  the 
wavering  attitude  of  his  allies.  A  comparison  of 
Germany's  armed  strength  in  1888,  the  year  of  the 


THE    GERMAN    EMPEROR  377 

Emperor's   accession,    and   its   present   strength   will 
therefore  be  interesting  : — 

PEACE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMY 

1888  .    .    .    491,726  men  84,091  horses  i,374  guns 

1911  .     .     .     626,732     „  118,246      ,,  3»444     »» 

Increase      +135,006  men        +34>I55  horses        +2,070  guns 

This  great  increase  of  the  peace  army  is,  however, 
small  if  compared  with  the  increase  in  its  war  strength. 
Since  1893  the  three  years'  service  with  the  infantry 
has  been  shortened  to  two  years,  and  consequently 
the  yearly  enrolment  of  men  for  the  army  has  risen 
from  185,224  men  in  1888  to  282,554  men  in  1909. 
As  the  mobilised  German  army  consists  of  at  least 
twelve  of  these  yearly  levies,  it  appears  that  the  war 
strength  of  the  German  army  has  been  increased 
under  William  II.  by  more  than  1,000,000  soldiers. 

The  following  was  the  strength  of  the  German 
navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  Emperor's  reign  and 
in  1910  : — 

1888    .    .     189,136  tons      182,470  horse-power      15,573  men 
1911    .    .    789,720    ,,       1,294,580     ,,         „  60,804    »» 

Increase  +600,584  tons  +  i, 112,110  horse-power  +45,231  men 

From  these  figures  it  appears  that  the  strength  of 
the  German  navy  has  been  enormously  increased  under 
the  Emperor's  reign.  However,  it  should  be  added 
that  the  incomparably  larger  German  navy  of  the 
future,  for  which  the  Reichstag  has  voted  credits, 
amounting  together  to  more  than  £250,000,000,  is  at 
present  only  beginning  to  take  shape. 

The  financial  results  which  these  greatly  increased 
armaments  have  brought  about  are  very  interesting. 
The  ordinary  recurring  expenditure  alone  for  the 


378  MODERN   GERMANY 

army  has  risen  from  364,301,000  marks  in  1888  to 
714,496,000  marks  in  1910,  an  increase  of  95  per  cent.  ; 
the  navy  estimates  have  risen  from  48,675,000  marks 
in  1888  to  458,033,700  marks  in  1911,  a  rise  of  940 
per  cent.  Furthermore,  the  debt  of  the  young 
empire,  exclusive  of  paper  money,  has  risen  from 
486,201,000  marks  in  1887  to  4,896,633,500  marks 
in  1909,  or  has  grown  more  than  tenfold,  and 
the  total  Imperial  expenditure  has  mounted  from 
876,934,000  marks  in  1888  to  no  less  than  2,924,790,100 
marks  in  1911. 

Germany  has,  fortunately,  gone  through  a  period 
of  great  industrial  prosperity  during  the  Emperor's 
reign,  and  these  very  heavy  burdens  have  consequently 
been  easily  borne  by  the  population.  At  the  same 
time  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  present  burdens 
might  prove  extremely  onerous  to  the  people  in  a 
period  of  economic  adversity,  and  that  the  rapid 
increase  of  the  Imperial  expenditure  cannot  go  on 
indefinitely  at  the  present  rate  without  ruining  the 
country  in  the  end. 

If  we  survey  the  result  of  the  Emperor's  home 
policy,  we  find  that  the  differences  between  the  various 
religions,  races,  and  classes  within  the  empire  have 
been  sharply  accentuated  of  late,  largely  owing  to 
the  policy  of  discrimination  practised  by  the  Govern- 
ment. To  attain  to  the  position  of  an  officer,  judge, 
magistrate,  civil  servant,  university  professor,  or  a 
school  teacher,  is  easy  for  a  Protestant,  difficult  for 
a  Roman  Catholic,  and  next  to  impossible  for  a  Jew 
or  a  Pole.  From  the  Government  intolerance  has 
spread  to  the  public,  and  advertisements  for  clerks, 
apprentices,  domestic  servants,  &c.,  stipulating  their 
religion,  can  daily  be  found  in  the  German  press. 

The    result    of    the    Emperor's    Polish    policy    of 


THE    GERMAN    EMPEROR  379 

coercion  is  well  known,  and  has  been  contrary  to 
his  expectation.  Similarly  his  violent  antagonism 
to  the  Social  Democratic  Party  has  given  it  an  ex- 
cellent advertisement,  and  has  made  it  a  powerful 
factor  in  Germany,  and  all  the  thundering  anathemas 
lately  launched  against  it  have  made  it  still  stronger, 
as  will  be  seen  in  another  chapter  of  this  book.  With 
these  and  various  extreme  measures  the  German 
Emperor  has  created  among  his  adherents  the  belief 
in  the  omnipotence  of  "  Machtpolitik,"  the  policy  of 
force  ;  but,  so  far,  the  results  of  that  policy,  which  is 
the  natural  policy  of  the  soldier,  but  not  of  the  poli- 
tician, have  been  singularly  disappointing.  Strange 
to  say,  in  the  recent  agitation  for  an  enormous  increase 
of  the  fleet,  and  for  the  acquisition  of  colonies  in 
temperate  zones,  the  use  of  "  Machtpolitik "  was 
recommended  by  all  the  orators  who,  in  the  same 
breath,  passionately  condemned  the  policy  of  force 
and  the  rapacity  of  Anglo-Saxon  nations,  which 
crush  weaker  nations,  as  evidenced  in  the  Boer  War 
of  Great  Britain  and  in  the  Spanish  War  of  the 
United  States,  and  yet  recommended  the  crushing  of 
the  Poles  under  the  heel  of  Germany. 

If  we  sum  up,  the  net  result  of  the  Emperor's 
unceasing  activity  during  all  the  long  years  of  his 
reign  seems  to  be  that  Germany  has  lost  ground  and 
prestige  in  foreign  politics.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Emperor  has  communicated  his  own  nervous  restless- 
ness to  the  political  atmosphere  of  the  entire  world. 
As  regards  home  politics,  dissatisfaction  within  the 
Empire  has  greatly  increased,  notwithstanding  the 
great  prosperity  of  the  country,  which  usually  tends 
to  weaken  the  Radical  parties,  or  at  least  to  stop 
their  progress.  The  friction  between  the  classes  has 
become  more  acute,  the  "  State-subverting  "  parties, 


380  MODERN    GERMANY 

as  they  are  called  in  Germany,  have  become  enor- 
mously strong,  and  none  of  the  Emperor's  great 
measures  have  materialised. 

It  is  true,  Germany  has  grown  much  richer  during 
the  Emperor's  reign,  and  the  number  of  her  inhabi- 
tants has  increased  by  nearly  twenty  millions,  but 
these  facts,  for  which  he  is  not  responsible,  can  offer 
him  little  consolation  for  his  disappointments  and 
foiled  ambitions  in  the  political  field.  On  the  other 
hand,  William  II.  has  certainly  succeeded  not  only 
in  strengthening  his  fleet  and  in  increasing  his  army 
by  more  than  a  million  soldiers,  but  he  has  also  main- 
tained it  at  a  high  degree  of  efficiency  as  far  as  out- 
ward appearances  go.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  believed 
that  the  German  army  no  longer  possesses  its  old  pre- 
eminence. 

Being  more  a  soldier  than  a  diplomat,  and  being 
aware  that  the  greatness  of  Germany  was  won  on 
the  field  of  battle,  William  II.  has  naturally  turned 
in  his  political  disappointments  towards  the  ultima 
ratio  regis.  When  his  campaign  against  the  Social 
Democrats  had  failed,  he  addressed  the  officers  of 
the  Berlin  garrison,  and  admonished  them  to  stand 
by  him  and  to  shoot  the  malcontents  in  case  he  com- 
manded them  to  do  so,  as  the  Prussian  soldiers  shot 
the  Berlin  revolutionaries  in  1848.  Again,  when  his 
attempts  at  colonisation  in  the  Philippines  and  his 
pro-Kruger  campaign  had  failed,  he  turned  towards 
his  fleet.  On  the  gth  October  1899,  the  Boers  issued 
their  ultimatum  ;  nine  days  later,  on  the  i8th  Octo- 
ber, the  Emperor  made  the  celebrated  speech  in 
Hamburg  containing  the  winged  words,  "  Bitter  not 
ist  uns  eine  starke  Deutsche  Flotte."  German 
colonial  aspirations  in  Africa  had  been  foiled  by 
British  diplomacy,  and  the  speech  mentioned  was 


THE   GERMAN   EMPEROR  381 

the  starting-point  of  the  violent  anti-British  agita- 
tion in  Germany  which  culminated  in  the  passing  of 
a  Bill  authorising  the  expenditure  of  altogether 
about  £200,000,000  for  a  fleet,  intended,  according 
to  its  preamble,  to  be  so  strong  as  to  be  able  to 
oppose  successfully  the  most  powerful  enemy  on  the 
seas. 

Whilst  the  German  Emperor  is  showering  the  most 
assiduous  attentions  upon  England  and  America,  as 
well  as  upon  France  and  Russia,  and  while  peace  is 
in  his  mouth,  his  huge  fleet  is  being  built  with  the 
greatest  possible  despatch.  Naturally  enough,  people 
have  indulged  in  surmises  against  which  power  this 
enormous  fleet  is  intended  to  be  used.  However, 
such  speculations  appear  to  be  utterly  vain,  for  it 
seems  unlikely  that  either  the  huge  German  army 
of  the  present,  or  the  proportionately  equally  huge 
German  navy  of  the  near  future,  are  intended  for  some 
clearly  defined  purpose.  It  would  seem  far  more 
probable  that  the  Emperor  has  arrived  at  the  con- 
viction that  it  will  be  impossible  for  him  to  acquire 
new  territories  in  Europe  or  colonies  abroad  by  peace- 
ful means,  and  therefore  he  wishes  to  be  absolutely 
ready  to  strike  with  both  his  army  and  navy,  should 
a  suitable  opportunity  offer  for  the  acquisition  of 
new  territories  in  or  out  of  Europe.  Circumstances 
alone  will  determine  against  which  power  the  German 
army  and  fleet  will  be  used. 

The  German  Emperor  possesses  a  considerable 
versatility  and  flexibility  of  mind,  which  is  sometimes 
described  with  a  different  name.  First  he  sat  at 
Bismarck's  feet  as  his  admiring  disciple,  then  he 
dismissed  his  great  master  without  ceremony,  and 
completely  changed  the  Bismarckian  foreign  and 
domestic  policy  of  Germany.  First  he  gave  Caprivi 


382  MODERN    GERMANY 

a  free  hand,  then  he  ruled  alone  ;  first  he  took  up 
the  cause  of  the  working  men,  and  then  he  threw 
them  over ;  first  he  was  anti-colonial,  and  gave  away 
the  best  German  colonies  in  exchange  for  the  then 
valueless  rock  of  Heligoland,  now  he  strains  every 
nerve  to  acquire  colonies ;  first  he  provoked  France, 
and  then  he  flattered  her ;  first  he  flirted  with  the 
Poles,  and  now  he  forbids  Polish  school-children  to 
say  even  their  prayers  in  their  own  language. 

In  view  of  the  Emperor's  rapid  and  alarmingly 
frequent  changes  of  mood,  and  the  equally  rapid 
and  kaleidoscopic  changes  of  his  policy,  in  view  of 
the  bitterness  which  must  have  been  engendered  in 
his  mind  by  the  failure  of  his  attempts  at  territorial 
aggrandisement  and  domestic  legislation,  and  in  view 
of  the  nearly  absolute  control  which  the  German 
Emperor  exercises,  perhaps  not  de  jure  but  certainly 
de  facto,  over  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany  and  over 
her  army  and  navy,  it  appears  not  unlikely  that 
William  II.  may  some  day  act  against  some  "  friendly  " 
power  with  the  same  startling  rapidity  with  which 
his  great  ancestor,  Frederick  the  Great,  acted  against 
Austria,  when  he  flung  his  armies  into  Silesia  without 
any  warning  and  without  any  cause. 

It  has  been  said  that  Great  Britain  has  nothing 
to  fear  from  Germany,  because  of  the  family  ties 
which  connect  the  Emperor  with  the  British  dynasty. 
Those  who  believe  that  sentimental  considerations 
of  a  purely  personal  kind  will  be  allowed  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  the  Emperor's  policy  can  hardly  be 
acquainted  with  the  diplomatic  steps  which  William  II. 
took  against  Great  Britain  when  he  despatched  his 
telegram  to  Mr.  Kruger.  They  should  also  remember 
that  the  German  Emperor  placed  himself  unreservedly 
on  the  side  of  the  Turks  in  the  Greco-Turkish  War, 


THE   GERMAN   EMPEROR  383 

notwithstanding  the  fact  that  his  own  sister  was  the 
wife  of  the  heir  to  the  Greek  throne. 

In  view  of  the  character  of  the  German  Emperor, 
his  well-known  ambitions  and  his  enormous  power,  it 
would  seem  that  those  nations  at  the  cost  of  which 
Germany  could  possibly  increase  her  territory  should 
ever  be  watchful,  and  should  ever  be  prepared  against 
sudden  surprises.  They  would  do  well  to  study  the 
pan-Germanic  manifestoes,  which,  though  they  are, 
of  course,  disavowed  and  discredited  in  official  circles, 
give  certainly  some  indication  of  Germany's  political 
aspirations.  We  find  in  them  recommendations  for 
the  "  alliance  or  absorption  "  of  "  Germanic  "  Holland, 
Switzerland,  and  Denmark,  for  the  incorporation  of 
the  western  half  of  Austria-Hungary,  creating  a 
German  Empire  stretching  across  Europe  from  the 
Baltic  down  to  Trieste,  and  for  the  acquisition  of 
colonies  in  a  temperate  zone  in  Asia  Minor,  South 
Brazil,  Argentina,  South  Africa,  or  "  wherever  else 
opportunity  should  offer."  How  many  of  these 
projects  will  be  accomplished  within  the  Emperor's 
lifetime  ? 

The  theory  has  often  been  advanced  that  the  time 
of  the  personal  policy  of  kings  and  emperors  is  gone 
never  to  return.  The  future  may  disprove  that 
theory,  and  may  prove  the  German  Emperor  a 
political  factor  of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  of 
unexpected  influence  upon  the  history  of  Europe  and 
of  the  world.  Since  the  storm  which  followed  the 
publication  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  interview  in  winter 
1908  the  German  Emperor  has  stepped  back  from  the 
world's  stage.  Has  he  done  so  for  good  ?  It  must 
be  doubted.  Men,  and  especially  kings,  do  not  easily 
change  their  character  at  a  mature  age. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC   PARTY 

ALMOST  every  country  possesses  a  more  or  less  tur- 
bulent party  which  is  considered  to  be  a  party 
of  subversion  :  Great  Britain  has  the  Irish  National- 
ists, France  the  Nationalists,  Germany  the  Social 
Democrats.  That  subversive  party  represents  either 
unruly  or  unhappy  men  of  limited  numbers  who  are 
united  by  a  common  grievance,  such  as  the  Irish 
Nationalists  ;  or  it  is  composed  of  a  moderate  number 
of  malcontents  of  every  kind,  class,  and  description, 
who  are  loosely  held  together  by  their  common  desire 
to  fish  in  troubled  waters,  such  as  the  French 
Nationalists  ;  or  it  consists  of  vast  multitudes  of  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men,  such  as  the  Social 
Democrats  in  Germany,  and  is  then  the  unmistakable 
symptom  of  deep-seated,  wide-spread,  and  almost 
universal  popular  discontent.  In  Germany  alone,  of 
all  countries  in  and  out  of  Europe,  it  has  happened 
that  by  far  the  strongest  political  party  has  received 
neither  sympathy  nor  consideration  at  the  hands  of 
the  Government.  Instead,  it  has  again  and  again, 
officially  and  semi-officially,  been  branded  as  the 
enemy  of  society  and  of  the  country,  "  Die  Umsturz- 
partei,"  the  party  of  subversion.  For  instance,  at 
the  Sedan  banquet  on  the  2nd  of  September  1895, 
the  Emperor  William  declared  in  a  speech  that  the 
members  of  that  vast  party  which  had  polled 

1,786,000  votes  in  1893  were  "  a  band  of  fellows  not 

384 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     385 

worthy  to  bear  the  name  of  Germans,"  and  on  the 
8th  of  September  in  a  letter  to  his  Chancellor  his 
Majesty  called  the  Social  Democrats  "  enemies  to 
the  divine  order  of  things,  without  a  fatherland." 

It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  in  the  future,  and 
perhaps  earlier  than  is  generally  expected,  the  Social 
Democrats  will  be  called  upon  to  play  a  great  part 
in  German  politics,  and  possibly  also  in  international 
politics,  though  their  influence  upon  foreign  policy 
would  be  indirect  and  unintentional.  It  would  there- 
fore seem  worth  while  to  look  into  the  history,  views, 
composition,  and  aims  of  that  interesting  party, 
which  may  be  said  to  be  in  many  respects  unique. 
As  the  full  history  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party 
in  Germany  would  be  as  bulky  as  that  of  the  British 
Liberal  Party,  it  will,  of  course,  be  impossible  to 
give  more  than  a  mere  sketch  of  it  in  these  pages. 
It  may,  however,  be  found  that  a  sketch  brings 
out  the  essential  points  and  light  and  shade  more 
clearly  and  more  strongly  than  would  a  lengthy  and 
detailed  account. 

The  creation  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  in 
Germany,  like  the  inauguration  of  many  other  political 
movements  in  that  country,  is  not  due  to  the  practical 
politician  but  to  the  bookish  doctrinaire.  Roughly 
speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  that  party  has  been 
created  by  the  writings  of  the  well-known  Socialist 
authors,  Karl  Marx,  Friedrich  Engels,  and  Ferdinand 
Lassalle.  It  suffices  to  mention  these  names  in  order 
to  understand  that  German  Social  Democracy  was 
at  first  animated  by  the  spirit  of  the  learned  and 
well-meaning,  but  somewhat  nebulous  and  very  un- 
practical, idealists  who  had  read  many  books,  and 
who  sincerely  wished  to  lead  democracy  from  its 
misery  and  suffering  straight  into  a  millennium  of 

2B 


386  MODERN    GERMANY 

their  own  creation,  without  delay  and  without  any 
intermediate  stations. 

The  fate  of  the  followers  of  Marx,  Engels,  and 
Lassalle  varied  greatly.  Some  of  them  dissented 
and  founded  comparatively  unimportant  political 
schools  and  groups  of  their  own,  some  became 
anarchists  like  Johann  Most,  some  lost  themselves 
in  theoretical  speculations  and  became  respectable 
professors ;  but  the  vast  majority  of  Lassalle's  fol- 
lowers developed  into  the  Social  Democratic  Party 
in  Germany,  and  that  party  became,  by  gradual 
evolution,  the  level-headed  political  representative  of 
German  labour  under  the  able  guidance  of  talented 
working  men.  Its  great  leader  was  the  turner,  August 
Bebel,  and  among  the  most  prominent  members  of 
the  party  were  workmen  such  as  Mr.  Grillenberger, 
a  locksmith ;  Mr.  Auer,  a  saddler ;  Messrs.  Molken- 
buhr  and  Meister,  cigar-workers  ;  Mr.  Bernstein,  the 
son  of  an  engine-driver  ;  Mr.  von  Vollmar,  formerly 
a  post-office  official.  Working  men  such  as  those 
mentioned  manage,  lead,  and  control  the  party,  which 
may  be  said  to  embrace  more  than  4,000,000  men,  and 
maintain  perfect  order  and  absolute  discipline  amongst 
that  vast  number. 

From  its  small  beginnings  up  to  the  time  of  its 
present  greatness,  German  Social  Democracy  has  been 
democratic  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  Some 
working  men  of  a  similar  stamp  to  those  mentioned, 
together  with  Wilhelm  Liebknecht,  a  poor  journalist, 
created  the  party,  organised  it,  and  led  it.  These 
leaders  were  always  under  the  constant  and  strict 
control  of  the  members  of  the  party.  Individual 
members  often  inquired,  sometimes  in  an  uncom- 
fortably democratic  spirit,  not  only  into  the  expendi- 
ture of  the  meagre  party  fund,  which  for  a  long 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     387 

time  did  not  run  into  three  figures,  and  of  which 
every  halfpennny  had  to  be  accounted  for,  but  even 
cross-examined  the  party  leader,  the  aged  Liebknecht, 
as  to  his  household  expenses,  and  censured  him  for 
taking  a  salary  as  editor-in-chief  of  the  Vorwarts,  the 
great  Social  Democratic  Party  organ,  and  keeping  a 
servant,  instead  of  living  like  an  ordinary  work- 
ing man. 

The  idea  of  absolute  equality,  which  is  often  found 
in  small  democratic  societies,  but  which  is  usually 
lost  when  the  society  expands  into  a  party,  especially 
if  that  party  is  of  enormous  size,  has  been  strictly 
preserved  by  the  Social  Democrats  in  Germany.  This 
conservation  of  its  original  character  was  all  the 
easier  as  the  party  had  neither  a  great  nobleman  nor 
a  distinguished  professor  for  a  figure-head,  nor  even 
wealthy  brewers  and  bankers  for  contributors  to  the 
party  fund,  who  might  have  influenced  the  party 
policy  as  they  do  in  other  countries.  Thus  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  was,  and  has  remained,  essentially 
a  Labour  Party  ;  it  has  preserved  its  truly  democratic, 
one  might  almost  say  its  proletarian,  character. 
However,  it  has  been  sensible  enough  not  to  write 
consistency  on  its  banners,  and  has  quietly  dropped 
one  by  one  the  Utopian  views  and  doctrines  which 
it  had  taken  over  from  the  bookish  doctrinaires  who 
were  its  originators. 

The  Constitution  of  the  German  Empire  gave 
universal  suffrage  to  its  citizens,  and  the  number  of 
Social  Democratic  votes,  which  had  amounted  to 
only  124,700  in  1871,  rose  rapidly  to  342,000  in  1874, 
and  to  493,300  in  1877.  Bismarck  had  been  watch- 
ing the  rapid  development  of  Social  Democracy  with 
growing  uneasiness  and  dislike,  and  was  casting  about 
for  a  convenient  pretext  to  strike  at  it  when,  on  the 


388  MODERN   GERMANY 

nth  of  May,  1878,  Hodel,  an  individual  of  illegiti- 
mate birth,  besotted  by  drink,  and  degraded  by  vice, 
and  consequent  disease,  fired  a  pistol  at  the  Emperor 
William. 

Long  before  his  attempt  on  the  Emperor,  Hodel 
had  been  expelled  from  the  Social  Democratic  Party, 
to  which  he  had  once  belonged,  on  account  of  his 
personal  character  and  his  anarchist  leanings,  and 
he  had  joined  the  "  Christian  Socialist  Working  Men's 
Party  "  of  Mr.  Stocker,  the  court  preacher.  Conse- 
quently it  was  not  possible,  by  any  stretch  of  imagina- 
tion, to  lay  the  responsibility  for  his  attempt  at  the 
doors  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  Nevertheless, 
Bismarck  endeavoured  to  turn  this  attempt  to  account 
in  the  same  way  in  which,  in  1874,  he  had  laid  the 
moral  responsibility  for  Kullmann's  murderous  attempt 
on  himself  upon  the  Clerical  Party,  against  which  he 
was  then  fighting.  He  at  once  brought  forward  a 
Bill  for  the  suppression  of  Social  Democracy,  but  that 
Bill  was  rejected  by  251  votes  against  57. 

By  one  of  those  fortunate  coincidences  which  have 
always  played  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  Bismarck's 
career,  a  second  attempt  on  the  Emperor's  life  was 
made  by  Nobiling,  only  three  weeks  after  that  of 
Hodel,  and  this  time  the  aged  monarch  was  very 
seriously  wounded.  At  one  moment  the  doctors 
feared  for  his  life,  but  in  the  end  the  copious  bleed- 
ing was  a  blessing  in  disguise,  for  it  rejuvenated  the 
Emperor  in  mind  and  body. 

The  two  murderous  attempts,  following  one  another 
so  closely,  naturally  infuriated  the  population  of 
Germany,  and,  though  Nobiling  also  was  not  a  Social 
Democrat,  Bismarck  succeeded  this  time  in  turning 
the  feelings  of  the  people  against  Social  Democracy. 
He  immediately  dissolved  the  Reichstag  and  fanned 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     389 

the  universal  indignation  at  the  crime  to  fever  heat 
by  his  powerful  press  organisation  ;  in  the  numerous 
journals  throughout  the  land  which  were  influenced 
from  the  Chancellory  in  Berlin,  it  was  constantly 
declared  that  these  repeated  outrages  were  the 
dastardly  work  of  Social  Democracy.  At  the  same 
time  a  reign  of  terrorism  against  Social  Democracy 
was  initiated  by  the  German  police  authorities. 
Countless  political  meetings  of  the  Social  Democrats 
were  forbidden,  a  large  number  of  Social  Democratic 
newspapers  were  suppressed,  and  the  law  courts  in- 
flicted in  one  month  no  less  than  500  years  of  im- 
prisonment for  fese-majeste. 

During  the  enormous  excitement  prevailing  and 
in  the  seething  turmoil  caused  by  those  two  attempts, 
by  the  critical  state  of  the  Emperor,  by  the  passionate 
campaign  of  the  semi-official  press  against  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  and  by  the  relentless  persecutions 
waged  against  the  members  of  that  party  by  the 
police,  the  new  elections  took  place,  and,  naturally 
enough,  their  result  was  that  a  majority  in  favour 
of  exceptional  legislation  against  Social  Democracy 
was  returned  into  the  Reichstag.  Bismarck  brought 
the  famous  Socialist  Law  before  Parliament  without 
delay,  and  it  was  quickly  passed,  and  was  published 
on  the  2ist  October  in  the  Reichsanzeiger. 

Then  the  reign  of  terror,  of  which  the  Social 
Democrats  had  already  received  a  foretaste,  began 
in  earnest  for  that  unhappy  party.  Within  eight 
months  the  authorities  dissolved  222  working  men's 
unions  and  other  associations,  and  suppressed  127 
periodical  publications  and  278  other  publications, 
by  virtue  of  the  discretionary  powers  given  to  them 
by  the  Socialist  Law.  Innumerable  bona  fide  co- 
operative societies  were  compelled  by  the  police  to 


390  MODERN    GERMANY 

close  their  doors  without  any  trial  and  without  the 
possibility  of  appeal,  and  numerous  Social  Democrats 
were  equally  summarily  expelled  from  Germany  at  a 
few  days'  notice,  through  the  discretion  which  the 
new  Act  had  vested  in  the  police.  Many  were  placed 
under  police  supervision,  others  were  not  allowed  to 
change  their  domicile.  Thousands  of  Social  Demo- 
crats were  thus  reduced  to  beggary,  many  being 
thrown  into  prison,  and  many  fleeing  to  Switzerland, 
England,  or  the  United  States. 

The  first  effect  of  the  new  law  upon  Social 
Democracy  was  staggering.  The  entire  party  or- 
ganisation, the  entire  party  press,  and  the  right  of 
the  members  of  the  party  to  free  speech,  had  been 
destroyed  by  the  Government,  and  for  the  moment 
the  party  had  become  a  disorganised  and  terrified 
mob.  Everywhere  in  Germany  scenes  of  tyranny 
were  enacted  by  the  police.  In  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main,  a  Social  Democrat  was  buried,  and,  for  some 
trifling  reason,  the  police  attacked  the  mourners  in 
the  very  churchyard  with  drawn  swords,  and  thirty 
to  forty  of  the  men  were  wounded.  In  1886  a  col- 
lision took  place  between  some  Social  Democrats  and 
some  policemen  in  plain  clothes,  who,  according  to 
Social  Democratic  evidence,  were  not  known  to  be 
policemen.  With  incredible  severity,  eleven  of  the 
Social  Democrats  were  punished  for  sedition,  some 
with  no  less  than  ten  and  a  half  years'  penal  servi- 
tude, some  with  twelve  and  a  half  years  of  imprison- 
ment. For  the  moment  the  Social  Democratic 
Party  was  staggered  by  the  rapidly  succeeding  blows. 
The  election  of  1878  reduced  the  number  of  Social 
Democratic  votes  from  493,300  to  437,100,  and  in 
the  next  election,  that  of  1881,  it  sank  even  as  low 
as  312,000. 


THE   SOCIAL    DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     391 

Prosecutions  were  not  brought  merely  against 
such  Social  Democrats  as  were  considered  lawbreakers 
by  the  local  authorities  and  the  police.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  German  Government  directed  the  law  with 
particular  severity  against  the  intellectual  leaders  of 
the  party  in  Parliament,  in  the  vain  hope  of  thus 
extirpating  it.  Bebel  and  Liebknecht,  the  heads  of 
the  party  and  its  leaders  in  the  Reichstag,  were 
dragged  again  and  again  before  the  law  courts  by 
the  public  prosecutor,  often  only  in  the  attempt  to 
construct,  by  diligent  cross-examination,  a  punishable 
offence  out  of  some  inoffensive  words  which  they 
had  said,  and  time  after  time  the  prosecution  collapsed 
ignominiously,  and  both  men  were  found  not  guilty  ; 
time  after  time  they  were  condemned  to  lengthy 
terms  of  imprisonment  for  Itse-majestt,  high  treason, 
and  intended  high  treason. 

Liebknecht  received  his  last  conviction  of  four 
months  of  imprisonment,  for  lese-majeste,  as  a  broken 
man  of  nearly  seventy  years,  and  even  his  burial  in 
August  1900  was  marked  by  that  petty  and  annoying 
police  interference  under  which  he  had  suffered  so 
much  during  his  life.  No  less  than  2000  wreaths 
and  other  floral  tributes  had  been  sent  by  Liebknecht's 
admirers,  yet,  in  the  immense  funeral  procession,  in 
which  about  45,000  people  took  part,  not  one  wreath, 
not  one  banner  was  to  be  seen,  for  the  police  had 
forbidden  their  inclusion  in  the  procession.  Though 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  Social  Democrats  attended 
the  funeral  in  the  procession  and  in  the  streets  of 
Berlin,  and  in  spite  of  the  provocative  orders  of  the 
police,  no  breach  of  the  peace  occurred,  no  arrest 
took  place,  an  eloquent  testimonial  to  the  orderliness 
and  discipline  of  the  party  of  subversion. 

Bismarck  soon  recognised  that  his  policy  of  force 


3Q2  MODERN    GERMANY 

and  violence  promised  to  be  unsuccessful.  Therefore 
he  tried  not  only  to  vanquish  Social  Democracy  by 
breaking  up  the  party  organisation,  confiscating  its 
books  and  documents,  by  destroying  the  party  press, 
and  by  taking  from  Social  Democrats  the  right  of 
free  speech,  but  he  tried  at  the  same  time  to  reconcile 
the  German  working  men  with  the  Government  which 
persecuted  them  by  a  law  instituting  State  Insurance 
for  workmen  against  old  age  and  disablement,  in 
order  to  entice  them  away  from  their  leaders,  and  to 
make  them  look  to  the  State  for  help.  However,  his 
Workmen's  Insurance  Laws  failed  to  fulfil  the  chief 
object  which  they  were  to  serve. 

According  to  the  Social  Democratic  leaders  the 
Imperial  Insurance  scheme  kept  not  one  vote  from 
Social  Democracy,  especially  as  the  Insurance  Law 
did  not  satisfy  the  workers  by  its  performance. 
German  workmen  complain  that  the  benefits  which 
they  derive  under  the  Insurance  scheme  are  purely 
nominal,  that  the  premiums  paid  come  chiefly  out 
of  their  own  pockets,  that  the  contributions  made  by 
the  employers  are  insufficient,  and  that  the  cost  of 
the  management  is  excessive.  Consequently  it  is 
only  natural  that  this  law  has  failed  to  appease  out- 
raged German  democracy,  and  that  it  is  scorned  by 
it  as  a  bribe. 

Gradually  the  terror  of  prosecution  wore  off  and 
became  familiar  to  Social  Democrats,  political  meet- 
ings were  held  in  secret,  party  literature  printed  in 
Switzerland  was  smuggled  over  the  frontier  and  sur- 
reptitiously distributed.  By-and-by  the  party  pulled 
itself  together,  and  found  that  determination  and 
perseverance  which  are  only  born  from  adversity, 
and  which  are  bound  to  lead  individuals  and  parties 
possessing  these  qualities  to  greatness.  The  campaign 


THE    SOCIAL    DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     393 

of  oppression  and  the  creation  of  martyrs  had  done 
its  work.  As  Bismarck  had  created  the  greatness  of 
the  Clerical  Party  by  the  "  Kulturkampf,"  with  its 
prosecution  of  Roman  Catholicism,  even  so  he  created 
the  greatness  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  Social 
Democracy  began  again  to  take  heart,  and,  from  1881 
onwards,  we  find  a  marvellous  increase  in  the  Social 
Democratic  votes  recorded,  notwithstanding,  or  rather 
because  of,  all  the  measures  taken  against  it  by  the 
Government.  Since  1881  the  Social  Democratic  vote 
has  increased  more  than  fourfold.  The  astonishing 
progress  of  the  party  since  1881  is  apparent  from  the 
following  table  : — 


Election. 

Social  Democratic 
Votes  polled. 

Total  Votes  polled. 

Percentage  of  Social 
Democratic  Votes. 

1881 

312,000 

5,097,800 

6.  1  2  per  cent. 

1884 

550,OOO 

5,663,000 

9.68 

1887 

763,100 

7,540,900 

IO.II 

1890 

1,427,300 

7,228,500 

19.74 

1893 

1,786,700 

7,674,000 

23-30 

1898 

2,107,076 

7,752,700 

27.18 

1903 

3,010,771 

9,495,586 

3i-7i 

1907 

3,259,000 

11,262,800 

28.94       > 

1912 

4,250,329 

12,206,808 

34.82 

When  Bismarck  saw  Social  Democracy  increasing, 
notwithstanding  all  his  efforts  at  repression,  he  tried 
another  method.  It  happens  very  frequently  in 
Germany  that  three,  four,  or  more  candidates,  re- 
presenting as  many  parties,  stand  for  one  seat.  If 
in  such  a  case  none  of  the  candidates  obtains  a 
majority  over  the  combined  votes  given  to  all  the 
other  candidates,  a  second  poll  has  to  take  place 
between  the  two  candidates  who  have  received  the 
largest  number  of  votes,  whilst  the  other  candidates 
have  to  withdraw.  In  the  elections  of  1898,  for 


394  MODERN    GERMANY 

instance,  a  second  poll  took  place  for  no  less  than 
48  per  cent,  of  the  seats.  In  order  to  destroy  the 
chances  of  Social  Democratic  candidates  in  the  very 
frequent  second  polls,  Bismarck  and  his  press  used 
to  constantly  brand  the  Social  Democratic  Party  as 
the  State-subverting  Party,  and  to  enjoin  "  the 
parties  of  law  and  order,"  as  he  called  the  other 
parties,  to  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  against  the 
common  enemy  of  Society  and  of  the  Fatherland. 

Many  years  have  passed  since  Bismarck's  dis- 
missal, but  official  Germany  has  not  yet  discovered 
a  new  method  for  the  treatment  of  Social  Democracy, 
and  therefore  it  merely  copies  Bismarck's  example. 
The  Social  Democratic  Party  is  still  loudly  denounced 
to  every  good  patriot  as  the  party  of  subversion, 
which  has  to  be  shunned  and  combated,  and  thus 
the  election  managers  of  the  numerous  parties  and 
factions,  which  number  more  than  a  dozen,  have, 
up  to  now,  in  case  of  a  second  poll,  preferred  giving 
the  votes  of  their  party  to  the  candidate  of  any  other 
party  to  incurring  the  odium  in  official  circles  of 
having  helped  a  Social  Democrat  into  the  Reichstag. 
But  voices  of  protest  begin  to  be  heard  all  over 
Germany  against  the  official  fiction  which  brands 
Social  Democracy  as  a  pest,  the  enemy  of  the  Country, 
of  Society,  of  Monarchy,  of  Family,  and  of  the 
Church.  In  December  1902,  Professor  Mommsen,  the 
greatest  German  historian,  wrote  in  the  Nation : — 

"  There  must  be  an  end  of  the  superstition,  as  false  as  it 
is  perfidious,  that  the  nation  is  divided  into  parties  of  law 
and  order  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  party  of  revolution  on  the 
other,  and  that  it  is  the  prime  political  duty  of  citizens  belong- 
ing to  the  former  categories  to  shun  the  Labour  Party  as  if 
it  were  in  quarantine  for  the  plague,  and  to  combat  it  as  the 
enemy  of  the  State." 


395 

In  March  1890  Bismarck  was  dismissed  by  the 
Emperor  William,  and  a  few  months  later  the  excep- 
tional law  against  Social  Democracy  disappeared. 
The  net  result  of  that  law  had  been  that  1500  Social 
Democrats  had  been  condemned  to  about  rooo  years 
of  imprisonment,  and  that  the  Social  Democratic  vote 
had  risen  from  437,158  to  1,427,298.  The  effect  of 
the  Socialist  Law,  with  all  its  persecution,  was  the 
reverse  of  what  Bismarck  had  expected,  for  it  has 
made  that  party  great.  If  less  drastic  means  had 
been  employed  by  Bismarck,  if  less  contempt  and 
contumely  had  been  showered  upon  Social  Democracy 
by  the  official  classes  and  society,  and  if  instead 
consideration  for  the  legitimate  wishes  and  confidence 
in  the  common  sense  of  the  working  men's  party 
had  been  shown  by  the  Government,  Social  Demo- 
cracy would  not  have  attained  its  present  formidable 
strength. 

Among  the  various  causes  which  led  to  the  rupture 
between  the  present  Emperor  and  Prince  Bismarck, 
a  prominent  place  may  be  assigned  to  the  difference 
in  their  views  with  regard  to  the  treatment  of  Social 
Democrats.  When  William  the  Second  came  to  the 
throne  he  clearly  saw  the  failure  of  Bismarck's  policy 
of  oppression,  and,  probably  influenced  by  the  liberal 
views  of  his  English  mother,  resolved  to  kill  Social 
Democracy  with  kindness.  This  idea  dictated  his 
well-known  retort  to  Bismarck,  "  Leave  the  Social 
Democrats  to  me  ;  I  can  manage  them  quite  alone  !  " 
Even  before  Bismarck's  dismissal  William  the  Second 
demonstrated  to  the  world  his  extremely  liberal  view 
regarding  the  German  workmen  with  that  astonish- 
ing impetuousness  and  with  that  complete  disregard 
of  the  views  of  his  experienced  official  advisers  to 
which  the  world  has  since  become  accustomed.  On 


396  MODERN   GERMANY 

the  4th  of  February  1890  an  Imperial  rescript  was 
published  which  lacked  the  necessary  counter-signature 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  whereby  the  responsibility 
for  that  document  would  have  been  fixed  upon  the 
Government.  This  Imperial  pronouncement  declared 
it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  State  "  .  .  .  to  regulate  the 
time,  the  hours,  and  the  nature  of  labour  in  such  a 
way  as  to  insure  the  preservation  of  health,  to  fulfil 
the  demands  of  morality,  and  to  secure  the  econo- 
mic requirements  of  the  workers,  to  establish  their 
equality  before  the  law,  and  to  facilitate  the  free  and 
peaceful  expression  of  their  wishes  and  grievances." 
A  second  rescript  called  together  an  International 
Conference  for  the  Protection  of  Workers. 

These  Imperial  manifestations,  which  emanated 
directly  from  the  throne,  were  greeted  with  jubilation 
by  German  democracy;  but  the  extremely  liberal 
spirit  which  these  documents  breathed  vanished  as 
suddenly  as  it  had  appeared,  and  gave  way  to  more 
autocratic  and  directly  anti-democratic  pronounce- 
ments, with  that  surprising  rapidity  of  change  which 
has  become  the  only  permanent  and  calculable  factor 
in  German  politics.  Whilst  the  words  of  the  Imperial 
rescripts  were  still  fresh  in  every  mind,  and  whilst 
German  democracy  still  hoped  to  receive  greater 
consideration  at  the  hands  of  the  Government  than 
heretofore,  and  looked  for  a  more  liberal  and  more 
enlightened  regime,  messages  like  the  following,  ad- 
dressed to  democracy,  fell  from  the  Imperial  lips  : — 

We  Hohenzollerns  take  Our  crown  from  God  alone,  and 
to  God  alone  We  are  responsible  in  the  fulfilment  of  Our 
duties. 

The  soldier  and  the  army,  not  Parliamentary  majorities 
and  resolutions,  have  welded  together  the  German  Empire. 

Suprema  lex  regis  voluntas. 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     397 

Only  One  is  master  in  the  country.  That  am  I.  Who 
opposes  Me  I  shall  crush  to  pieces. 

Sic  volo,  sic  jubeo. 

All  of  you  shall  have  only  one  will,  and  that  is  My  will  ; 
there  is  only  one  law,  and  that  is  My  law. 

Parliamentary  opposition  of  Prussian  nobility  to  their 
King  is  a  monstrosity. 

For  Me  every  Social  Democrat  is  synonymous  with  enemy 
of  the  nation,  and  of  the  Fatherland. 

On  to  the  battle,  for  Religion,  Morality,  and  Order,  and 
against  the  parties  of  subversion.  Forward  with  God  !  Dis- 
honourable is  he  who  forsakes  his  King  ! 

The  Emperor  did  not  confine  himself  to  making 
in  public  pronouncements  highly  offensive  and  hostile 
to  German  democracy  such  as  those  mentioned,  but 
set  himself  the  task  of  actively  combating  Social 
Democracy.  Consciously  or  unconsciously,  he  gradu- 
ally dropped  into  Bismarck's  ways,  which  he  had 
formerly  condemned,  and  copied,  to  some  extent, 
Bismarck's  methods,  Bismarck's  tactics,  and  Bis- 
marck's mistakes.  When,  on  the  isth  of  October 
1895,  a  manufacturer  named  Schwartz  was  murdered 
in  Miilhausen  by  a  workman  who  had  been  repeatedly 
convicted  of  theft,  William  the  Second  telegraphed 
to  his  widow,  "  Again  a  sacrifice  to  the  revolutionary 
movement  engendered  by  the  Socialists,"  imitating 
Bismarck's  attempt  at  foisting  the  guilt  for  an  in- 
dividual crime  upon  a  Parliamentary  party  which  then 
comprised  2,000,000  members. 

The  Socialistic  Law  of  1878  had  been  a  complete 
failure,  as  has  already  been  shown.  Nevertheless, 
the  Government  tried  not  exactly  to  revive  it  but  to 
introduce,  under  a  different  title,  a  near  relative  of 
that  law  of  exception,  which  breathed  the  same  spirit 
of  intolerance  and  violence ;  for  in  1894  a  Bill  which 
is  known  under  the  name  "  Umsturz  Vorlage  "  (Sub- 


398  MODERN    GERMANY 

version  Bill)  was  brought  out  by  the  Government. 
This  Bill  made  it  punishable  "  to  attack  publicly 
by  insulting  utterances  Religion,  the  Monarchy, 
Family,  or  Property  in  a  matter  conducive  to  provoke 
a  breach  of  the  peace,  or  to  bring  the  institutions  of 
the  State  into  contempt."  That  Bill,  which,  with 
its  flexible  provisions,  would  have  allowed  of  the 
most  arbitrary  interpretations,  and  would  have  virtu- 
ally given  a  free  hand  to  the  police  and  to  public 
prosecutors  and  judges  anxious  to  show  their  zeal 
and  patriotism  in  the  relentless  persecution  of  Social 
Democracy,  was  thrown  out  in  the  Imperial  Reichs- 
tag. Notwithstanding  the  failure  of  that  Bill  another 
Bill,  of  similar  character,  but  intended  for  Prussia 
alone,  was  laid  before  the  Prussian  Diet  on  the  loth 
of  May  1897,  empowering  the  police  to  dissolve  all 
meetings  "  which  do  not  conform  with  the  law,  or 
endanger  public  security,  especially  the  security  of 
the  State  or  of  the  public  peace."  This  Bill  also 
was  rejected  by  the  Prussian  Diet. 

Shortly  after  this  second  failure,  William  the 
Second  made  another  and  still  more  startling  attempt 
to  suppress  Social  Democracy.  On  the  5th  of 
September  1898,  he  declared  at  a  banquet  in  Oeyn- 
hausen,  "...  A  Bill  is  in  preparation,  and  will  be 
submitted  to  Parliament,  by  which  every  one  who 
tries  to  hinder  a  German  worker  who  is  willing  to 
work  from  doing  his  work,  or  who  incites  him  to 
strike,  will  be  punished  with  penal  servitude." 
Naturally  this  announcement,  which  promised  that 
strikers  and  strike-agitators  would  in  future  be  treated 
as  felons,  created  an  enormous  sensation  throughout 
the  country.  After  a  delay  of  nine  months,  which 
betrayed  its  evident  hesitation,  the  Government 
brought  out  a  Bill,  which,  however,  had  been  con- 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     399 

siderably  toned  down  with  regard  to  its  promised 
provisions.  Still  it  was  draconic  enough,  for  it  made 
threats  against  non-strikers,  inducing  to  strike,  and 
picketing  punishable  with  imprisonment  up  to  one 
year.  Its  piece  de  resistance  was  the  following 
paragraph  : — 

"  If,  through  a  strike,  the  security  of  the  Empire  or  of  one 
of  the  single  States  has  been  endangered,  or  if  the  danger  of 
loss  of  human  lives  or  of  property  has  been  brought  about, 
penal  servitude  up  to  three  years  is  to  be  inflicted  on  the  men, 
and  penal  servitude  up  to  five  years  on  the  leaders." 

This  Bill,  like  that  of  1894,  possessed  an  unpleasant 
elasticity  which  could  make  it  an  instrument  of 
tyranny  in  the  hands  of  judges  anxious  to  please  in 
an  exalted  quarter,  and  the  "  Penal  Servitude  Bill," 
which  had  so  rashly  and  so  loudly  been  announced 
urbi  et  orbi  by  his  Majesty,  shared  the  ignominious 
fate  of  the  two  Bills  before  mentioned. 

The  attempt  to  pass  a  Bill  of  repression  directed 
against  Social  Democracy  through  either  the  Reichs- 
tag or  the  Prussian  Diet  will  probably  not  be  so  soon 
renewed  by  the  Emperor ;  but  those  who  know  William 
the  Second  can  hardly  doubt  that  his  Majesty  deeply 
resents  his  repeated  failure  to  crush  Social  Democracy 
by  legislation,  notwithstanding  the  repeated  "  solemn 
promises  "  which  he  has  made  in  public  that  he  would 
initiate  such  legislation.  Therefore  the  question  is 
often  raised  among  the  people,  "  Will  the  impetuous 
Emperor  continue  to  tamely  give  way  to  Social 
Democracy  and  to  the  Reichstag,  or  what  will  he 
do  to  enforce  his  will  ?  " 

The  Conservative  parties  and  the  National  Liberal 
Party,  which  cultivates  chiefly  that  kind  of  Liberalism 
which  is  pleasing  to  the  Government,  have  already 
loudly  recommended  a  solution  of  that  difficulty.  I 


400  MODERN   GERMANY 

give  the  views  of  some  of  the  most  prominent  members 
of  the  Conservative  Party.  Count  Mirbach  stated 
at  the  meeting  of  his  party,  on  the  ist  of  January 
1895,  that  universal  suffrage  was  a  derision  of  all 
authority,  and  recommended  the  abolition  of  the 
secret  ballot.  The  same  gentleman  stated  in  the 
Prussian  Upper  House,  on  the  28th  of  March  1895, 
"  The  country  would  greet  with  jubilation  a  decision 
of  the  German  Princes  to  create  a  new  Reichstag 
on  the  basis  of  the  new  Election  Law."  In  the 
same  place  Count  Frankenberg  stated  two  days  later, 
"  We  hope  to  obtain  a  new  Election  Law  for  the 
German  Empire,  for  with  the  present  Election  Law 
it  is  impossible  to  exist."  Freiherr  von  Zedlitz, 
Freiherr  von  Stumm,  and  Von  Kardorff  uttered 
similar  sentiments.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Conserva- 
tive Party  on  the  8th  of  March  1897,  Freiherr  von 
Stumm  said,  "  The  right  to  vote  should  be  taken  away 
from  the  Social  Democrats,  and  no  Social  Democrat 
should  be  permitted  to  sit  in  the  Diet,"  and  Count 
Limburg-Stirum  likewise  advocated  their  exclusion. 
The  official  handbook  of  the  Conservative  Party, 
most  Conservative  and  many  Liberal  papers,  have 
warmly  applauded  these  views,  whereby  a  coup  d'etat 
by  the  Government  is  cordially  invited. 

Will  the  Emperor  listen  to  these  sinister  sugges- 
tions when  the  difficulties  in  German  home  politics 
become  acute,  for  their  chief  importance  lies  in  the 
fact  that  they  have  largely  been  made  in  the  confident 
assumption  that  they  would  please  William  the  Second. 
Will  he  act  rashly  on  the  impulse  of  the  moment,  or 
will  he  act  with  statesmanlike  prudence  ?  Or  will 
he  allow  a  chance  majority  of  Conservatives  and 
National  Liberals  to  alter  the  Constitution  and  to 
disfranchise  democracy  ?  So  much  is  certain,  that 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     401 

the  Emperor's  personal  influence  for  good  or  for  evil 
will  be  enormous  when  the  Social  Democratic  question 
comes  up  for  settlement.  Will  he  use  his  vast  power 
with  the  recklessness  of  the  soldier  or  with  the 
caution  of  the  politician  ? 

The  aims  of  the  Social  Democrats  in  Germany, 
generally  speaking,  are  similar  to  those  of  the  workers 
in  all  other  countries — they  wish  to  better  themselves 
politically,  economically,  and  socially. 

Politically,  German  democracy  is  not  free.  Though 
universal  suffrage  exists  for  the  Imperial  Reichstag, 
it  little  helps  German  democracy,  for  the  German 
Parliament  has  far  less  power  over  the  Government 
than  had  the  English  Parliament  under  Charles  the 
First.  The  facts  that  the  Emperor  can,  at  will,  dis- 
solve Parliament,  according  to  Article  12  of  the  Con- 
stitution ;  that  he  nominates  and  dismisses  officials, 
according  to  Article  18  ;  and  that  the  Cabinet  is 
responsible  only  to  the  Emperor,  prove,  if  any  proof 
is  needed,  the  helplessness  of  the  German  Parliament 
before  the  Emperor  and  his  officials,  who  are  nomi- 
nated and  dismissed,  promoted  and  decorated  by 
him,  and  by  him  alone.  Parliament  in  Germany 
has  no  control  whatever  over,  and  hardly  any  in- 
fluence upon,  the  policy  of  the  Empire  and  upon 
its  administration.  Its  sole  duty  is  to  vote  funds 
and  laws. 

In  the  single  States,  German  democracy  fares  still 
worse.  The  election  for  the  Prussian  Diet,  to  give  an 
instance,  takes  place  upon  the  following  system.  The 
whole  body  of  the  electors  is  divided  into  three  classes 
according  to  the  amount  of  taxes  paid,  each  class 
contributing  an  equal  amount  and  having  the  same 
voting  power.  The  practical  working  of  this  curious 
system  may  be  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Berlin.  The 

2C 


402  MODERN    GERMANY 

voters  of  Berlin  belonging  to  those  three  classes  were 
in  1895  distributed  in  the  following  way  : — 

Voters  of  the  first  class 1,469 

„          „      second  class    .     .     .     *        9»372 
„  „       third  class 289,973 


Total  of  voters  in  Berlin      .     300,814 

The  figures  given  prove  that  the  three  classes 
system  is  the  capitalistic  system  par  excellence,  for 
each  of  the  rich  men  voting  in  the  first  class  in  Berlin 
possesses  two  hundred  votes,  each  of  the  well-to-do 
men  in  the  second  class  has  thirty  votes,  and  the 
combined  first  and  second  classes,  or  3^  per  cent, 
of  the  electorate  in  the  case  of  Berlin,  form  a  solid 
two- thirds  majority  over  the  remaining  96^  per  cent, 
of  the  electorate.  There  are,  besides,  some  further 
complications  in  that  intricate  system  which  it  would 
lead  too  far  to  enumerate.  At  any  rate,  it  is  clear 
that  that  kind  of  franchise  is  worthless  to  democracy. 
A  similar  kind  of  franchise  prevails  in  other  German 
States. 

Socially  also,  German  democracy  has  much  to 
complain  of.  Except  in  the  large  centres,  the  position 
of  the  German  working  man  is  a  very  humble  one. 
There  are  two  words  for  employer  in  German,  which 
are  frequently  heard  in  Germany,  "  brodgeber  "  and 
"  brodherr,"  which  translated  into  English  mean 
"  breadgiver  "  and  "  breadmaster."  These  two  words 
may  be  considered  illustrative  of  the  German  worker's 
position  toward  his  employer  in  the  largest  part  of  the 
country.  Further  grievances  of  German  Social  Demo- 
cracy are  the  all-pervading  militarism,  the  exceptional 
and  unassailable  position  of  the  official  classes,  the 
prerogatives  of  the  privileged  classes,  and  the  wide- 
spread immorality  which  has  undermined  and  debased 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     403 

the  position  of  woman  in  Germany.  Nothing  can 
better  illustrate  the  latter  grievance  of  Social  Demo- 
cracy, which  is  not  much  known  abroad,  than 
reference  to  the  daily  papers.  For  instance,  in  a 
number  of  the  Berlin  Lokalanzeiger  under  my  notice, 
there  are  to  be  found  the  following  advertisements  : — 

Seventy-four  marriage  advertisements  (some  doubtful). 

Forty-nine  advertisements  of  lady  masseuses  (all  doubtful). 

Nine  demands  for  small  loans,  usually  of  ^5,  by  "  modest 
widows  "  and  other  single  ladies  (all  doubtful). 

Six  acquaintances  desired  by  ladies  (all  doubtful). 

Five  widows'  balls,  "  gentlemen  invited,  admission  free  " 
(all  doubtful). 

Thirty  apartments  and  rooms  "  without  restrictions  "  by 
the  day  (all  doubtful). 

Forty-seven  maternity  homes,  "  discretion  assured  ;  no 
report  home  "  (all  doubtful). 

Sixteen  babies  to  be  adopted. 

Sixteen  specialists  for  contagious  disease. 

These  advertisements,  found  in  one  daily  journal  of 
a  similar  standing  to  that  of  the  Daily  Telegraph, 
and  similar  in  kind  and  extent  of  circulation,  explain 
better  the  state  of  morality  in  Germany,  and  the 
consequent  attitude  of  the  German  Social  Democratic 
working  man  towards  morality,  than  would  a  lengthy 
dissertation  illustrated  with  voluminous  statistics. 
This  state  of  affairs  explains  the  importance  with 
which  the  question  of  morality  and  of  the  position  of 
women  is  treated  in  the  political  programme  of  Social 
Democracy,  and  redounds  to  the  credit  of  the  German 
working  man. 

In  order  to  become  acquainted,  not  only  with  the 
actual  wishes  of  Social  Democracy,  but  also  with  the 
tone  in  which  those  wishes  are  expressed,  and  with 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  formulated,  we  cannot 
do  better  than  turn  to  the  Official  Handbook  for  Social 


404  MODERN    GERMANY 

Democratic  Voters  of  1898.  The  passages  selected  are 
such  as  prove  in  the  eyes  of  German  officialdom  that 
Social  Democracy  is  the  enemy  of  the  Country,  of 
Society,  of  Monarchy,  of  the  Family,  and  of  the 
Church.  At  the  same  time,  they  clearly  show  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  that  party,  and  clearly  reveal 
the  spirit  by  which  it  is  animated.  The  Handbook 
says : — 

"  The  aim  of  Social  Democracy  is  not  to  divide  all  property, 
but  to  combine  it  and  use  it  for  the  development  and  improve- 
ment of  mankind,  in  order  to  give  to  all  a  life  worthy  of  man. 
Work  shall  become  a  duty  for  all  men  able  to  work.  The 
word  of  the  Bible,  '  He  that  does  not  work  neither  shall  he 
cat,'  shall  become  a  true  word. 

"Marriage,  in  contradiction  to  religious  teachings,  is  in 
innumerable  cases  a  financial  transaction  pure  and  simple. 
Woman  has  value  in  the  eyes  of  men  only  when  she  has  a 
fortune,  and  the  more  money  she  has  the  higher  rises  her 
value.  Therefore  marriage  has  become  a  business,  and  thou- 
sands meet  in  the  marriage  market,  for  instance,  by  advertise- 
ments in  newspapers,  in  which  a  husband  or  a  wife  is  sought 
in  the  same  way  in  which  a  house  or  a  pig  is  offered  for  sale. 
Consequently  unhappy  marriages  have  never  been  more 
numerous  than  at  the  present  time,  a  state  of  affairs  which 
is  in  contradiction  to  the  real  nature  of  marriage.  Social 
Democracy  desires  that  marriages  be  concluded  solely  from 
mutual  love  and  esteem,  which  is  only  possible  if  man  and 
woman  are  free  and  independent,  if  each  has  a  free  existence 
and  an  individual  personality,  and  is  therefore  not  compelled 
to  buy  the  other  or  to  be  bought.'  This  state  of  freedom  and 
equality  is  only  possible  in  the  socialistic  society. 

"  Who  desires  to  belong  to  a  Church  shall  not  be  hindered, 
but  he  shall  pay  only  for  the  expenses  of  his  Church  together 
with  his  co-religionists. 

"  The  schools  and  the  whole  educational  system  shall  be 
separated  from  the  Church  and  religious  societies,  because 
education  is  a  civil  matter. 

"  The  God  of  Christians  is  not  a  German,  French,  Russian, 
or  English  god,  but  a  God  of  all  men,  an  international  God. 
God  is  the  God  of  love  and  of  peace,  and  therefore  it  borders 
upon  blasphemy  that  the  priests  of  different  Christian  nations 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC   PARTY     405 

invoke  this  God  of  love  to  give  victory  to  their  nation  in  the 
general  slaughter.  It  is  equally  blasphemous  if  the  priest  of 
one  nation  prays  the  God  of  all  nations  for  a  victory  over 
another  nation.  In  striving  to  found  a  brotherhood  of 
nations  and  the  peaceful  co-operation  of  nations  in  the  service 
of  civilisation,  Social  Democracy  acts  in  a  most  Christian 
spirit,  and  tries  to  realise  what  the  Christian  priests  of  all 
nations,  together  with  the  Christian  monarchs,  hitherto  would 
not,  or  could  not,  realise.  By  combining  the  workers  of  all 
nations,  Social  Democracy  tries  to  effect  a  federation  of 
nations  in  which  every  State  enjoys  equal  rights,  and  in 
which  the  peculiarities  of  the  inner  character  of  every  nation 
may  peacefully  develop." 

In  reading  through  the  lines  quoted,  or  indeed 
through  the  whole  book,  or  the  whole  Social  Demo- 
cratic literature  available,  one  cannot  help  being  struck 
with  respect  for  this  huge  party  of  working  men 
and  its  powerful  aspirations  towards  a  higher  level, 
notwithstanding  a  certain  crudity  of  thought,  and  a 
certain  amateurishness  of  manner  which  occasionally 
betrays  itself,  but  which  time  and  experience  will 
easily  rectify. 

Ideas  such  as  those  quoted  have  been  instrumental 
in  framing  the  programme  of  the  party,  which  is 
idealistic  as  well  as  utilitarian.  The  ten  demands 
of  the  programme  are  given  in  abstract : — 

(1)  One  vote  for  every  adult  man  and  woman  ; 

a  holiday  to  be  election  day ;  payment  of 
members. 

(2)  The  Government  to  be  responsible  to  Parlia- 

ment ;  local  self-government ;   referendum. 

(3)  Introduction  of  the  militia  system. 

(4)  Freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  of  the  press. 

(5)  Equality  of  man  and  woman  before  the  law. 

(6)  Disestablishment  of  the  Churches. 

(7)  Undenominational    schools,    with   compulsory 

attendance  and  gratuitous  tuition. 


406  MODERN   GERMANY 

(8)  Gratuitousness  of  legal  proceeding. 

(9)  Gratuitous  medical  attendance  and  burial. 

(10)  Progressive  Income  Tax  and  Succession  Duty. 
Were  the  Social  Democrats  as  black  as  they  have 

been  painted,  the  leaders  could  not  have  kept  the 
millions  of  their  followers  in  such  perfect  order. 
Again,  if  the  Social  Democratic  politicians  were  selfish 
or  mercenary,  as  has  been  asserted,  they  would  not 
die  poor  men.  Liebknecht  once  said,  and  his  case  is 
typical  for  the  leaders  of  Social  Democracy,  "  I  have 
never  sought  my  personal  advantage.  If  I  am  poor 
after  unprecedented  persecutions,  I  do  not  account 
it  a  disgrace.  I  am  proud  of  it,  for  it  is  an  eloquent 
testimony  to  my  political  honour."  The  Kolnische 
Zeitung,  commenting  on  these  words,  justly  observed, 
"  It  would  be  unjust  to  deny  Social  Democracy  the 
recognition  of  the  high  personal  integrity  of  its 
leaders."  While  the  gravest  scandals  have  discredited 
more  than  one  German  party  and  its  leaders,  the 
Social  Democratic  Party  has,  so  far,  stood  immacu- 
late— an  eloquent  vindication  of  the  moral  force  of 
democracy,  which  force  has  been  so  thoroughly  mis- 
understood in  Germany. 

The  lack  of  understanding  and  of  sympathy  with 
Social  Democracy  and  its  aims  is  not  restricted  to 
official  circles  in  Germany,  which  are  entirely  out  of 
touch  with  democracy.  Typical  of  these  views  on 
Social  Democracy  is  the  following  pronouncement  by 
Professor  H.  Delbriick,  the  distinguished  historian, 
which  appeared  in  the  Preussische  Jahrbucher  for 
December  1895  : — 

"  The  duty  of  the  Government  is  not  to  educate  Social 
Democracy  to  decent  behaviour,  but  to  suppress  it,  or,  if  that 
should  be  impossible,  at  least  to  repress  it,  or,  if  that  be  im- 
possible, at  least  to  binder  its  further  growth.  .  .  .  What  is 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC   PARTY     407 

necessary  is  that  the  sentiment  should  be  awakened  among 
all  classes  of  the  population  that  Social  Democracy  is  a  poison 
which  can  be  resisted  only  by  the  strongest  and  united  moral 
opposition." 

German  democracy  in  the  shape  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  can  not  only  raise  the  claim  of 
moral  force  and  numerical  strength,  of  discipline  and 
integrity,  but  can  also  be  proud  of  the  consummate 
political  ability  of  its  leaders  and  of  the  spirited 
support  which  these  leaders  have  received  from  all 
the  members  of  the  party.  No  better  and  no  juster 
testimonial,  with  regard  to  these  qualities,  can  be 
given  than  the  recent  pronouncement  of  the  great 
German  historian,  Professor  Mommsen  : — 

"  It  is  unfortunately  true  that  at  the  present  time  the  Social 
Democracy  is  the  only  great  party  which  has  any  claim  to 
political  respect.  It  is  not  necessary  to  refer  to  talent.  Every- 
body in  Germany  knows  that  with  brains  like  those  of  Bebel 
it  would  be  possible  to  furnish  forth  a  dozen  noblemen  from 
east  of  the  Elbe  in  a  fashion  that  would  make  them  shine 
among  their  peers. 

"  The  devotion,  the  self-sacrificing  spirit  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic masses,  impresses  even  those  who  are  far  from  sharing 
their  aims.  Our  Liberals  might  well  take  a  lesson  from  the 
discipline  of  the  party." 

Whilst  other  German  parties  have  split  into 
factions  or  have  decayed,  owing  to  the  unruliness  of 
their  undisciplined  members  or  to  the  apathetic 
support  given  by  the  voters,  or  to  the  skilful  action 
of  the  Government  which  brought  about  disintegra- 
tion, the  Social  Democratic  Party  alone  in  Germany 
has,  since  its  creation,  constantly  been  strong  and 
undivided,  notwithstanding  the  many  and  serious 
difficulties  which  it  has  encountered.  It  is,  no  doubt, 
by  far  the  best-led,  the  best-managed,  and  the  most 


408  MODERN    GERMANY 

homogeneous  party  in  Germany,  and  is,  indeed,  the 
only  party  which,  from  an  English  point  of  view, 
can  be  considered  a  party.  Similarly,  there  is  in 
Germany  no  journal  more  ably  conducted,  for  the 
purpose  which  it  is  meant  to  serve,  than  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  organ  the  Vorwarts. 

The  Social  Democratic  Party  does  not  possess  in 
the  Reichstag  that  numerical  strength  which  one 
might  expect  from  the  numerical  strength  of  its 
supporters,  for  it  is  greatly  under-represented  in  that 
assembly.  This  great  under-representation  springs 
partly  from  the  fact  that,  in  the  frequently  occurring 
second  polls,  the  other  parties  have  usually  combined 
to  oust  the  Social  Democratic  candidate  as  before 
related  ;  partly  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  German 
towns  are  still  represented  by  the  same  number  of 
deputies  as  they  were  in  1871,  notwithstanding  the 
immense  increase  in  the  German  town  population 
since  that  year.  No  redistribution  has  been  effected 
or  seems  likely  to  be  effected,  because  the  German 
Government  does  not  wish  to  strengthen  the  Liberal 
and  Social  Democratic  parties  which,  so  far,  have  had 
their  chief  hold  on  the  towns,  and  Parliament  has 
no  means  of  enforcing  redistribution.  Owing  to  the 
rapid  growth  of  the  towns,  they  are  greatly  under- 
represented,  whilst  the  country  is  correspondingly 
over-represented.  In  1893  the  voters  in  the  Parlia- 
mentary country  divisions  of  the  Empire  numbered 
on  an  average  22,537,  whilst  the  voters  in  the  town 
divisions  numbered  on  an  average  41,098,  and  that 
disproportion  has  been  still  further  increased  since 
1893.  In  that  year  there  were  seventy-five  Parlia- 
mentary country  divisions  with  less  than  20,000 
voters,  whilst  there  were  twenty-nine  town  divisions 
with  more  than  40,000  voters;  and  in  consequence 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC   PARTY     409 

of  this  state  of  affairs  it  happens  that  Schaumburg, 
with  only  10,000  voters,  and  the  district  Berlin  VI., 
with  no  less  than  200,000  voters,  are  each  represented 
in  the  Imperial  Diet  by  one  deputy.  Berlin  is  entitled 
to  twenty  deputies,  yet  it  is  represented  in  the 
Reichstag  by  only  six  deputies. 

How  enormous  is  the  disproportion  between  votes 
and  representatives  in  the  Reichstag,  and  how  this 
disproportion  works  in  favour  of  the  two  Conserva- 
tive parties  and  of  the  Conservative  Clerical  Party, 
and  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Liberal  Parties  and  the 
Social  Democratic  Party,  may  be  seen  from  the  follow- 
ing table  : — 

Resist  of  the  General  Election  of  1907. 


Votes. 

Members  in 
Imperial 
Diet. 

Average  Number 
of  Votes 
per  Member. 

Social  Democrats 
Centre      (Roman 
Catholic  Party) 
National  Liberals 
Conservatives 
Freisinnige  (  People's  ) 
Party      .     .     . 
Free  Conservatives 
Poles      

3,259,000 

2,179,800 
1,637,000 
1,060,200 

736,000 
471,900 
453,9OO 

43 

104 

55 
62 

27 
24 
20 

75,790 

20,959 
29,764 
17,132 

27,259 
19,662 
22,69"; 

Seven    parties    and 
factions  .... 

1,465,000 

61 

24,016 

Total    .... 

11,262,800 

396 

28,441 

The  consequence  of  this  disproportion  of  votes  to 
members  in  the  different  parties  is  that  the  Social 
Democrats,  who  commanded  28.94  per  cent,  of  the 
votes,  had  only  10.9  per  cent,  of  the  seats  in  the 
Reichstag,  whilst  the  Conservative  Party,  with  only 


410  MODERN    GERMANY 

9.4  per  cent,  of  the  votes,  had  18.24  Per  cent-  °f  tne 
seats,  and  the  conservatively-inclined  Centre  Party, 
with  19.33  per  cent,  of  the  votes,  had  no  less  than 
26.26  per  cent,  of  the  seats.  Based  upon  the  same 
proportion  of  votes  to  members  which  obtains  with 
the  Centre  Party  and  with  the  two  Conservative 
Parties,  the  representatives  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party  in  the  Imperial  Diet  should  have  numbered 
more  than  150,  and  not  43. 

Whilst  Social  Democracy  has  been  flourishing  and 
increasing,  the  various  Liberal  parties  in  Germany 
have  been  decaying  for  many  years.  The  reason  for 
that  phenomenon  is  that  the  Liberal  Party  has  striven 
to  represent  only  such  Liberalism  as  was  approved 
of  by  the  Government.  Therefore  Liberalism  shunned 
the  Social  Democratic  Party  and  its  leaders,  in  Parlia- 
ment and  out  of  it,  like  poison,  in  accordance  with 
the  official  mot  d'ordre.  Consequently  the  liberally- 
inclined  German  workman,  small  trader,  clerk,  teacher, 
&c.,  whom  that  approved  Court  Liberalism — which  in 
reality  was  Conservatism  in  disguise — did  not  suit, 
dropped  Liberalism  and  gave  his  vote  to  the  Social 
Democratic  candidate.  But  the  German  Liberal 
Party  leaders  were  blind  and  obstinate,  and  thus 
the  disintegration  of  their  following  is  proceeding 
further.  Now  the  well-to-do  Liberal  citizens  also  are 
beginning  to  turn  away  from  the  Liberal  parties  in 
large  numbers,  disgusted  with  the  servile  attitude 
which  these  parties  have  adopted,  and  are  joining 
Social  Democracy,  hoping  for  reforms  from  that  party, 
which  is  the  strongest  party  in  the  country,  and  which, 
at  least,  has  the  merit  of  being  straightforward.  It 
appears  that  an  incredibly  large  number  of  bankers, 
merchants,  and  professional  men  of  Liberal  views  have 
of  late  years  given  their  vote  for  Social  Democracy. 


THE   SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    PARTY     411 

In  view  of  the  disintegration  of  the  old  Liberal 
parties,  many  Liberals  are  strongly  recommending  the 
co-operation  of  the  Liberal  parties  with  Social  Demo- 
cracy. Whether  such  co-operation  will  take  place 
in  the  near  future  remains  to  be  seen.  So  far  the 
middle-class  Liberals  have  been  fighting  shy  of  associ- 
ating themselves  and  identifying  themselves  with  the 
working  men,  but  there  are  strong  reasons  for  be- 
lieving that  the  Liberal  parties  are  being  democratised 
and  that  the  Social  Democratic  Party  is  being  liberal- 
ised. We  may  see  a  fusion  of  the  Liberal  Party  with 
the  Workmen's  Party.  Such  a  party  would  be  of 
irresistible  strength,  for  the  majority  of  the  German 
people  incline  towards  Liberalism  and  Democracy. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

THE  TRIUMPH  OF  IMPERIALISM  OVER  SOCIAL  DEMO- 
CRACY— THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GERMAN  ELEC- 
TION OF  1907 

A  SURVEY  and  careful  examination  of  the  Reichstag 
Election  of  1907  make  it  appear  that  that  Election 
has  been  a  political  event  of  first-rate  importance,  and 
that  it  is  likely  to  have  a  very  far-reaching  influence 
not  only  upon  German,  but  also  upon  British  affairs. 
Therefore,  it  behoves  us  carefully  to  consider  the 
lessons  which  it  teaches. 

The  old  Reichstag  was  dissolved,  not  because  "  a 
conflict  arose,"  as  we  have  been  told,  but  because  the 
Government,  wishing  to  dissolve  the  Reichstag,  caused 
a  conflict  to  arise.  The  German  Imperial  Govern- 
ment deliberately  and  quite  unnecessarily  quarrelled, 
at  the  end  of  1906,  with  the  Centre  Party  over  the 
paltry  sum  of  £400,000  demanded  for  the  South- West 
African  colony,  and  then  appealed  to  the  people.  On 
the  day  after  the  dissolution,  the  North-German 
Gazette,  the  leading  semi-official  organ  in  Germany, 
proclaimed  to  the  world  that  the  impending  General 
Election  was  to  decide  whether  Germany  was  to 
remain  a  European  Great  Power,  or  whether  she  was 
to  become  a  World-Power.  The  people  were  told 
that  Germany  stood  at  the  parting  of  the  ways,  and 
they  were  asked  to  choose  between  an  uneventful, 
cheap,  and  safe  policy  of  natural  development  in 


IMPERIALISM    v.    SOCIAL   DEMOCRACY     413 

Germany's  European  sphere,  and  an  adventuresome, 
very  expensive,  and  risky  policy  of  trans-maritime 
expansion,  and  they  chose  the  latter,  as  the  result 
of  the  election  has  shown. 

At  the  time  of  the  dissolution  the  outlook  seemed 
most  unfavourable  for  the  German  Government  and 
its  world-political  aims.  The  difference  between  the 
Government  and  the  Centre  Party  had  arisen  through 
a  long  series  of  disgraceful  colonial  scandals  which 
that  party  had  brought  to  light.  All  Germany  knew 
that  the  rising  in  South- West  Africa  had  been  caused 
by  sheer  bad  management  on  the  part  of  the  officers 
and  officials  sent  out ;  that,  as  the  former  Governor, 
Major-General  Leutwein,  has  repeatedly  shown,  the 
cruelty  and  rapacity  of  the  civil  and  military  adminis- 
trators, and  their  connivance  at  the  heartless  exploita- 
tion of  the  blacks  by  German  traders,  had  driven 
them  into  despair  and  rebellion.  The  war  in  South- 
West  Africa,  a  worthless  colony,  had  cost  Germany 
two  thousand  lives  and  more  than  £20,000,000;  and 
that  war,  after  having  been  a  traders'  war,  had  become 
an  army  contractors'  war.  The  German  army  con- 
tractors in  South  West  Africa,  and  the  firm  of  Tippels- 
kirch  in  Berlin,  who  provided  the  troops  with  all 
necessaries,  made  immense  profits  whilst  the  war  lasted, 
and  they  had  an  interest  in  keeping  it  alive.  It  was 
discovered  that  a  very  influential  Prussian  Secretary 
of  State  participated,  through  his  wife,  to  a  large 
extent  in  the  profits  realised  by  the  firm  of  Tippels- 
kirch,  which  had  been  given  the  monopoly  of  fitting 
out  the  troops  ;  and  the  Secretary  of  State  in  ques- 
tion had  to  resign.  Germany  was  disgusted,  not  only 
with  her  South- West  African  colony  and  the  scandals 
connected  with  the  war,  but  with  all  her  colonies, 
which,  since  1884,  had  swallowed  up  about  £75,000,000, 


414  MODERN   GERMANY 

but  which  had  failed  to  benefit  the  country  in  an 
appreciable  manner. 

During  a  long  time  before  the  dissolution  of  the 
Reichstag  the  newspapers  of  Germany  had  been  full 
of  complaints  not  only  about  the  colonial  scandals 
and  the  great  waste  of  money  spent  in  the  South- West 
African  War,  but  also  about  the  dearness  of  food  of 
every  kind.  Not  only  had  the  import  duties  of  foreign 
food-stuffs  been  greatly  increased,  but  the  same 
Minister  who  had  participated  in  the  monopoly  profits 
made  by  the  firm  of  Tippelskirch  had  practically 
closed  the  frontiers  against  foreign  meat  and  cattle 
by  vexatious  regulations,  which  were  ostensibly  made 
in  order  to  prevent  diseased  meat  and  animals  being 
imported.  In  consequence  of  these  steps  the  cost 
of  living  had  greatly  increased  in  Germany.  Day 
after  day  the  newspapers  of  the  Opposition  brought 
lengthy  accounts  of  the  meat  famine.  Indignation 
meetings  were  held  all  over  the  country,  numerous 
establishments  had  to  increase  the  wages  paid  to 
their  employees.  The  politicians  of  the  Opposition 
constantly  worked  upon  the  masses  with  that  most 
convincing  and  most  effective  of  all  arguments 
and  cries  —  the  stomach  argument  and  the  cheap- 
food  cry. 

As  the  masses  had  been  inflamed  against  the 
Government  during  many  months  by  countless  articles 
and  speeches  about  dear  food  and  colonial  waste  and 
scandals,  and  as,  furthermore,  the  Reichstag  had 
been  frivolously  dissolved  because  the  Centre  Party 
had  very  properly  insisted  upon  exercising  some 
control  over  the  limitless  expenditure  in  South- West 
Africa,  it  was  generally  expected,  both  in  Germany 
and  abroad,  that  an  Anti-Expansionist  majority  would 
be  returned,  that  the  Social  Democrats  would  make 


IMPERIALISM    v.    SOCIAL    DEMOCRACY      415 

an  end  to  Germany's  ambitions,  and  enter  the  Reich- 
stag more  than  a  hundred  strong. 

The  fact  that  the  German  Government  dissolved 
the  Reichstag  upon  the  worst  case  of  political  mis- 
management known  in  recent  German  history,  the  fact 
that  it  appealed  to  the  people  at  the  most  inopportune 
moment,  seems  so  strange  that  it  is  worth  while  in- 
quiring into  the  causes  of  that  sudden  dissolution. 

Since  William  II.  has  come  to  the  throne,  he  has 
striven  to  elevate  Germany  to  the  rank  of  a  World- 
Power,  and  he  has  given  utterance  to  his  hopes  and 
ambitions  in  innumerable  speeches  with  which  all 
readers  of  this  book  are  acquainted.  The  Emperor 
clearly  recognised  that  Germany  could  not  acquire 
by  peaceful  means  colonies  fit  for  the  settlement  of 
white  men,  as  the  world  has  been  divided  up  ;  that 
Germany  could  obtain  territories  over  sea  suitable 
for  the  foundation  of  a  Greater  Germany  only  by 
conquest ;  and  that  transmaritime  conquest  required 
the  support  of  a  navy  strong  enough  to  overawe  the 
mightiest  Sea  Power  with  which  Germany  might 
conceivably  come  into  conflict  in  her  intended  career 
of  forceful  colonisation.  Therefore  the  preamble  to 
the  German  Navy  Bill  of  1900  stated  :  "  Germany 
must  possess  a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  a  war  against 
the  mightiest  naval  Power  would  involve  risks 
threatening  the  supremacy  of  that  Power."  That 
phrase  has  been  the  watchword  and  the  guiding 
principle  of  official  Germany  which  has  deliberately 
formulated  and  uttered  it. 

By  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  about  £200,000,000 
were  voted  for  naval  purposes,  but  that  immense 
sum  seemed  by  no  means  sufficient  to  those  who 
desired  to  challenge  the  naval  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain.  Therefore  the  German  Navy  League  began, 


416  MODERN   GERMANY 

towards  the  end  of  1905,  vigorously  to  agitate  for 
the  doubling  of  the  German  fleet.  However,  the 
country  was  not  prepared  to  make  the  immense 
sacrifices  needed,  and  the  Government  had  to  be 
satisfied  with  about  £50,000,000  in  1906  voted  by  the 
late  Reichstag.  In  consequence  of  this  additional 
sum  voted  Germany  will  in  a  few  years  possess  some 
twenty  ships,  each  of  which  is  to  be  larger  and  more 
powerful  than  the  British  Dreadnought. 

As  soon  as  these  £50,000,000  were  obtained  the 
agitation  for  the  doubling  of  the  fleet  recommenced, 
but  as  the  old  Reichstag  seemed  unwilling  to  vote 
the  enormous  sums  required  it  was  only  logical  to 
dissolve  it  and  to  make  an  attempt  at  obtaining  a 
set  of  men  in  that  assembly  willing  to  extend  Germany's 
naval  armaments  to  the  utmost. 

During  many  months  the  German  Navy  League, 
which  has  a  million  members,  and  which  is  osten- 
tatiously patronised  by  the  Emperor  and  the  Princes 
of  Germany,  had  agitated  for  the  doubling  of  the 
German  Navy,  and  the  leaders  of  that  agitation  had 
not  hesitated  to  recommend  to  the  Government,  in 
speeches  and  lectures  addressed  to  the  masses,  that, 
if  the  Reichstag  was  not  willing  to  vote  the  credits 
necessary  for  doubling  the  fleet,  a  coup  cTttat  should 
be  effected  by  the  Government ;  that  the  Govern- 
ment should  levy  the  taxes  necessary  for  the  doubling  of 
the  fleet  with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag  ; 
that,  in  case  of  need,  it  should  govern  against  the  will 
of  Parliament  or  without  Parliament. 

The  Government  had  dissolved  the  Reichstag, 
apparently  in  a  fit  of  temper,  at  the  most  unpropitious 
moment.  In  the  highest  circles  it  was  evidently 
believed  that  an  anti-expansionist  majority  would 
very  probably  be  returned.  If  that  should  be  the 


IMPERIALISM    v.  SOCIAL    DEMOCRACY      417 

case,  the  doubling  of  the  fleet  could  be  effected  only 
against  the  will  of  Parliament.     Parliamentary  Govern- 
ment might   have   to   be   temporarily   suspended   or 
modified   or   definitely   abolished   in    Germany,    and 
absolute  government  in  some  veiled  form  or  other  be 
reintroduced   in   order   to   obtain    "  a   fleet   of  such 
strength    that    a    war    against    the    mightiest    naval 
Power  would  involve  risks  threatening  the  supremacy 
of  that  Power."     The  possibility  of  a  coup  d'Jtat  was 
in  everybody's  mind  between  the  time  of    the  dis- 
solution and  the  General  Election.     It  was  universally 
discussed.     Many  Conservative  politicians  and  many 
prominent  Conservative  journals,  such  as  the  Kreuz- 
Zeitung,    the    Post,    the    Deutsche    Tageszeitung,    the 
Hamburger  Nachrichten  demanded  an  Imperial  coup 
d'Jtat    disguised    in    the    phrase    "  Reform    of    the 
Franchise,"  and  Prince  Billow  seemed  to  contemplate 
the  possibility  of  abolishing  or  at  least  modifying, 
Parliamentary  Government  in  Germany  by  force  of 
arms    if   an    anti-expansionist    Reichstag   should   be 
elected,  for  in  his  election  Manifesto  he  threatened 
the  anti-expansionist  part  of  the  German  community 
in  no  uncertain  tone  with  "  the  sword  of  Buonaparte." 
Before  the  German   Election   the  words  coup  cTttat, 
Restriction   of   the   Franchise,    Government   without 
Reichstag,  Revolution  were  on  everybody's  lips.     The 
Social  Democratic  Party  informed  its  adherents  that 
Parliamentary  Government  was  at  stake,  and  adjured 
the  people  to  vote  against  the  Government  for  the 
defence  of  the   franchise.     Bebel   and  other  leaders 
threatened   to   retaliate   against   a  coup   d'ttat  by  a 
general  strike  throughout  Germany. 

Whilst  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  Parties  ap- 
pealed to  the  people  to  vote  for  cheap  food,  low 
taxation,  for  a  policy  of  social  improvement  and 


418  MODERN   GERMANY 

civic  ideals,  and  for  the  defence  of  the  franchise,  the 
Governmental  parties  appealed  to  the  people  to  vote 
for  "Ships,  Colonies  and  Empire,"  and  notwithstand- 
ing dear  food,  notwithstanding  high  taxation,  and 
notwithstanding  the  threats  of  abolishing,  or  at  least 
modifying,  Parliamentary  Government,  Prince  Billow 
obtained  an  Expansionist  majority,  and  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  the  party  which  had  been  loudest 
in  its  denunciations  of  "  bread-usury  "  and  "  meat- 
usury,"  of  capitalism  and  of  high  protective  duties,  of 
the  colonial  scandals  and  of  the  contemplated  "  theft 
of  the  franchise,"  was  reduced  from  power  to  insignifi- 
cance. Its  parliamentary  strength  shrank  from  eighty- 
one  to  forty-three  members.  The  triumph  of  militant 
Imperialism  was  most  remarkable,  for  it  showed  that 
the  German  people  were  determined  to  follow  the  lead  of 
the  Emperor  and  his  Navy  League,  and  that  they  were 
determined  to  compete  with  Great  Britain  for  the  rule 
of  the  sea,  for  colonies  and  empire,  regardless  of  cost. 

Before  the  Election  of  1907  there  were  about 
twenty  parties  and  political  groups  in  the  Reichstag, 
but  at  the  Election  there  were  but  two  parties  among 
the  people,  an  imperialist  party  and  an  anti-imperialist 
party,  and  the  imperialist  party  proved  victorious. 
It  is  most  significant,  and  perhaps  ominous,  that 
when  at  the  last  General  Elections  in  Great  Britain  the 
contest  was  also  between  an  imperialist  and  a  non- 
imperialist  party,  the  nation  decided  in  favour  of 
parochialism.  Whilst  Germany  is  striving  after  Empire 
and  world-wide  greatness  with  all  her  might,  Great 
Britain  is  apparently  tiring  of  Empire  and  world-wide 
greatness.  We  can  therefore  not  wonder  that  many 
Germans  begin  to  think  that  Germany  may  become 
heir  to  the  British  Empire  when  the  colonies  are 
slipping  from  Great  Britain's  ageing  hands. 


IMPERIALISM    v.    SOCIAL    DEMOCRACY      419 

Although  the  German  Government  avoided  as 
much  as  possible  to  awaken  the  militant  enthusiasm 
of  the  German  masses  in  order  not  to  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  foreign  countries,  and  especially  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  to  the  great  issue  at  stake 
in  the  Election,  an  issue  which  is  most  interesting  to 
the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  in  both  hemispheres,  and 
although  the  Government  hardly  mentioned  the  great 
question  upon  which  the  Election  was  fought,  the 
people,  informed  by  a  few  newspapers  and  pamphlets, 
clearly  understood  the  immense  importance  of  their 
decision  for  the  whole  future  of  Germany.  Therefore 
they  voted  in  unprecedented  numbers  and  with  un- 
precedented eagerness — 11,262,800  people  voted  in 
1907  whilst  only  9,495,600  people  voted  in  1903 — and 
the  result  of  the  elections  was  greeted  with  an 
enthusiasm  which  has  its  only  parallel  in  the  en- 
thusiasm which  was  aroused  by  the  declaration  of 
war  against  France  in  1870.  The  Emperor  himself 
seems  to  have  been  completely  carried  away  by  the 
prevailing  sentiment.  At  midnight  he  addressed  the 
cheering  crowds  which  thronged  round  his  palace,  and 
his  words,  which  seem  to  have  come  spontaneously 
from  the  bottom  of  his  heart,  throw  a  flood  of  light 
upon  his  aims  and  ambitions  and  upon  Germany's 
future  policy.  The  Emperor  said :  "  Gentlemen,  I 
thank  you  for  your  ovation.  To-day  all  of  you  have 
put  your  hands  to  the  work  and  have  proved  the 
word  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  '  Germany  can  ride 
if  she  cares  to.'  I  hope  this  will  be  true  not  only 
to-day  but  also  in  future.  If  men  of  all  ranks  and 
faiths  stand  together,  we  can  ride  down  all  those  who 
block  our  path." 

The    spectacle    of    an    Emperor    enthusiastically 
addressing  a  miscellaneous  election  crowd  at  midnight 


420  MODERN   GERMANY 

from  the  windows  of  his  palace,  like  some  successful 
politician,  is  a  new  one  in  German  history,  and  it 
seems  unlikely  that  his  Majesty's  enthusiasm  was 
caused  by  the  fact  that  a  Reichstag  had  been  elected 
which  would  vote  the  £400,000  for  South- West  Africa 
which  the  late  Reichstag  had  refused.  The  Emperor's 
unusual  action  shows  clearly  that  he  saw  in  the  result 
of  the  Election  an  event  of  the  greatest  political 
importance,  that  he  expected  great  things  from  the 
new  Reichstag ;  and  if  we  ask  ourselves  what  was 
in  the  Emperor's  mind  when  he  said :  "If  men  of 
all  ranks  and  faiths  stand  together  we  can  '  ride 
down '  all  those  who  block  our  path,"  we  are  irre- 
sistibly reminded  of  the  preamble  to  the  German  Navy 
Bill  of  1900  which  has  been  quoted  in  the  foregoing. 
Apparently  the  German  Emperor  intended  to  make 
soon  a  more  energetic  bid  for  the  rule  of  the  sea  than 
he  had  done  hitherto,  and  he  hoped  that  the  new 
Reichstag  would  vote  the  enormous  sums  which  he  re- 
quired for  challenging  Great  Britain's  naval  supremacy. 
Most  people  in  this  country  believe  that  Germany 
cannot  possibly  compete  with  Great  Britain  for  the 
rule  of  the  sea,  and  many  say  that  for  every  ship 
laid  down  by  Germany,  Great  Britain  will  lay  down 
two  ships.  Great  Britain  could  certainly  easily  out- 
build Germany  in  the  past,  but  whether  she  will  be 
able  to  continue  outbuilding  her  in  the  future  appears 
somewhat  doubtful.  Let  us  not  forget  that  the 
struggle  for  maritime  supremacy  is  in  the  first  place 
a  financial  struggle,  and  that  the  time  when  Great 
Britain  was  the  richest  nation  in  the  world  is  past. 
At  present  Germany  is  undoubtedly  richer  than  Great 
Britain,  and  Great  Britain  may  be  defeated  in  the 
financial  duel  for  naval  supremacy  in  which  she  is 
engaged. 


IMPERIALISM    v.    SOCIAL    DEMOCRACY      421 

It  is  true  that  the  exports  and  imports  of  Great 
Britain  are  larger  than  those  of  Germany,  but  the 
export  and  import  trade  is  only  one  of  the  resources 
of  a  nation,  and  by  no  means  the  most  important  one. 
The  wealth  of  a  nation  does  not  consist  in  its  "  com- 
modities "  and  "  securities,"  dead  things  which  occupy 
an  unduly  large  space  in  the  text-books  of  political 
economy.  National  wealth  consists,  in  the  first  place, 
in  the  number  of  people  employed  in  active  produc- 
tion who  create  commodities  and  securities  by  their 
labour.  Germany  has  66,000,000  people,  Great 
Britain  has  45,000,000  people,  and  whilst  the  popula- 
tion of  Germany  increases  at  present  by  about  900,000 
a  year,  the  population  of  Great  Britain  increases  by 
only  about  400,000  a  year.  In  Germany  man-power, 
which  is  after  all  the  most  important  national  asset, 
is  not  only  50  per  cent,  larger  than  it  is  in  this  country, 
but  it  increases  almost  three  times  faster  than  it  does 
over  here. 

If  we  compare  the  position  of  the  industries  in 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  we  find  that  all  the 
German  industries  are  flourishing  whilst  most  British 
industries  are  stagnant  or  decadent,  only  a  few  being 
really  prosperous.  Hence  from  200,000  to  300,000 
people  have  to  emigrate  from  this  country  every  year 
from  lack  of  work,  whilst  in  Germany,  whence  only 
from  20,000  to  30,000  people  yearly  emigrate,  immigra- 
tion is  actually  from  three  to  four  times  larger  than 
emigration.  Whilst  the  British  workers  suffer  from 
lack  of  work  the  German  industries  suffer  from  lack 
of  labour.  Unemployment  in  Germany  among  all  the 
workers  in  the  country  amounts,  as  a  rule,  only  to 
about  i  per  cent.,  and  the  German  statistics  are  very 
reliable.  Unemployment  in  Great  Britain  among  the 
Trade  Unionists,  our  best  employed  workers,  amounts 


422  MODERN    GERMANY 

as  a. rule  to  about  5  per  cent.  The  number  of  un- 
employed non-Unionists  in  Great  Britain,  of  whom  no 
statistics  exist,  should  be  much  greater  and  should 
amount  to  from  8  to  10  per  cent.  Germany  has  an 
exceedingly  prosperous  agriculture.  Since  1879  her 
production  of  corn,  other  crops,  and  meat  has  doubled, 
the  number  of  cattle  has  grown  by  more  than  3,500,000, 
and  the  number  of  pigs  by  more  than  10,000,000, 
whilst,  during  the  same  period,  agriculture  in  Great 
Britain  has  been  shrinking,  and  the  number  of  animals 
kept  has  been  practically  stationary.  Germany's 
manufacturing  industries  are  progressing  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  She  produces  already  much  more  iron  and 
steel  than  does  Great  Britain,  which  formerly  was  the 
forge  of  the  world,  and  she  raises,  inclusive  of  lignite, 
almost  as  much  coal  as  Great  Britain.  In  a  few  years 
Great  Britain  will  occupy  the  third  rank  in  the  world, 
not  only  as  a  producer  of  iron,  but  also  as  a  producer 
of  coal. 

The  marvellous  prosperity  of  Germany  is  visible 
to  all  who  periodically  visit  that  country,  but  those 
who  have  not  seen  the  progress  of  Germany  during 
the  last  two  or  three  decades  can  easily  realise  it 
from  a  few  figures  which  should  convince  the  most 
sceptical  that  Germany  is  richer  than  Great  Britain, 
that,  in  a  struggle  for  naval  supremacy,  Germany 
may  financially  defeat  Great  Britain.  Between  1892 
and  1905  the  income  subject  to  Income  Tax  in  Prussia 
has  increased  by  about  75  per  cent.,  whilst  the  income 
subject  to  Income  Tax  in  Great  Britain  has  increased 
only  by  about  15  per  cent.  The  deposits  in  the  British 
Savings  Banks  amounted  in  1907  to  £210,000,000, 
the  deposits  in  the  German  Savings  Banks  amounted 
in  1907  to  £650,000,000.  From  1900  to  1907  the 
British  Savings  Banks  deposits  have  increased  by 


IMPERIALISM   v.    SOCIAL   DEMOCRACY      423 

£17,000,000,  whilst  during  the  same  period  the  German 
Savings  Banks  deposits  have  increased  by  no  less 
than  £170,000,000.  The  foregoing  facts  and  figures 
show  that  in  the  struggle  for  naval  supremacy  the 
chances  are  apparently  all  in  favour  of  Germany. 
It  seems  that  industries,  men,  and  capital  are  migrating 
from  Great  Britain,  and  facts  such  as  that  exports  and 
imports  are  large  and  increasing,  or  that  certain 
quantities  of  paper  wealth — in  the  shape  of  bills  of 
exchange,  cheques,  or  investments — change  hands, 
cannot  make  up  for  the  fact  that  the  solid  wealth 
of  Great  Britain,  men  and  industries,  is  deserting  the 
country,  and  that  incomes  and  savings  are  apparently 
stagnant.  It  seems  clear  that,  unless  this  drain 
of  wealth  is  stopped,  unless  Great  Britain  recreates 
her  industries  by  a  wise  and  energetic  policy,  and 
becomes  again  richer  than  Germany,  she  will  not 
long  be  able  to  lay  down  two  ships  for  every  German 
ship.  Germany  may  defeat  Great  Britain  without  a 
war.  Great  Britain  may  prove  not  wealthy  enough 
to  compete  with  Germany  in  ship-building,  although 
her  latent  resources — such  as  geographical  position, 
climate,  soil,  coast-line,  harbours,  coal,  colonies,  &c. 
— are  infinitely  superior  to  those  of  Germany. 

At  first  sight  it  may  seem  curious  that  the  cheap- 
food  cry,  which  has  proved  so  very  effective  in  Great 
Britain,  has  proved  utterly  ineffective  at  the  German 
Election.  The  cause  of  this  strange  difference  can 
easily  be  explained.  Whilst  the  ideal  of  the  working 
population  of  Great  Britain,  which  chronically  suffers 
from  unemployment  and  consequent  distress  and 
hunger,  is  cheap  food,  the  ideal  of  the  fully-employed 
working  population  of  Germany  is  plenty  of  work, 
constant  employment,  good  wages,  and  "  ships,  colonies 
and  empire,"  which  stimulate  production,  and  therefore 


424  MODERN    GERMANY 

increase  work  and  wages.  To  the  German  working- 
man,  the  pauper  argument  of  the  "  cheap  loaf  "  does 
not  appeal.  In  Great  Britain  wages  may  be  high,  on 
paper,  and  food  may  be  cheap,  on  paper,  but  the 
evidence  of  great  and  widespread  distress,  consequent 
upon  unemployment  or  insufficient  and  precarious  em- 
ployment, is  to  be  seen  everywhere.  In  Germany 
wages  may  be  low,  on  paper,  and  food  may  be  dear, 
on  paper,  but  the  evidence  of  general  prosperity  is  to 
be  seen  everywhere  ;  and  a  comparison  of  the  emigra- 
tion statistics  and  the  Savings  Bank  statistics  of  both 
countries  shows  clearly  that  the  working-men  of  Ger- 
many are  far  better  off  than  are  those  of  Great  Britain. 
The  German  working-man  is  exceedingly  prosperous, 
and  he  knows  it ;  and,  therefore,  the  cheap-food  cry 
has,  in  1907,  fallen  upon  deaf  ears,  notwithstanding 
the  frantic  agitation  of  the  Social  Democrats. 

Great  Britain  has  followed  an  economic  policy 
which  benefits  the  consumer  and  the  middleman,  and 
which  starves  the  producer  and  drives  him  out  of  the 
country.  Germany  has  followed  an  economic  policy 
which  benefits  the  producer,  but  does  not  hurt  either 
the  consumer  or  the  middleman.  In  the  Election 
of  1907  the  German  working  masses  have  emphati- 
cally and  deliberately  endorsed  the  economic  policy  of 
their  country,  notwithstanding  the  loud  clamour  of 
their  leaders  about  "  bread-usury  "  and  "  meat-usury." 
The  German  workmen  in  the  towns  know  quite 
well  that  unduly  cheap  food  would  ruin  the  rural 
industries,  depopulate  the  country  districts,  and  de- 
stroy the  manhood  of  Germany  and  half  her  home 
market. 

The  imperial  instinct  is  stronger  in  Germany  than 
in  Great  Britain.  Germany  is  becoming  an  imperial 
nation — a  nation  with  imperial  instincts  and  aspira- 


IMPERIALISM    v.    SOCIAL    DEMOCRACY      425 

tions,  as  Great  Britain  was  in  the  olden  days  ;  and  we 
can  hardly  wonder  that  the  thought  of  Empire  is 
becoming  stronger  in  Germany  at  a  time  when  it  is 
weakening  in  this  country.  Germany  follows  a  policy 
of  imperialism  and  energy  born  of  success,  whilst 
Great  Britain  seems  to  follow  a  policy  of  parochialism 
and  lassitude  born  of  weariness  and  non-success. 

The  German  Election  of  1907  teaches  us  a  few 
lessons,  and  the  importance  of  these  lessons  can  hardly 
be  exaggerated.  It  teaches  us  : 

(1)  That  the  ambition  to  make  Germany  a  great 
Colonial  Empire,  and  to  conquer  for  her  the  rule  of 
the  sea,  is  no  longer  restricted  to  the  Emperor  and  to 
the  naval  enthusiasts,   but  that   that  ambition  has 
powerfully  taken  hold  of  the  whole  nation. 

(2)  That  Germany  is  richer  than  Great  Britain,  and 
that  she  can  afford  to  outbuild  our  fleet. 

(3)  That  the  German  working  population  is  far 
more  prosperous  than  the  British  working  population, 
and  that  the  German  working  masses  have  deliberately 
and  emphatically  endorsed  the    economic   policy  of 
Germany  which  benefits  the  producer. 

(4)  That  Social  Democracy  in  Germany  will  not 
provide  the  hoped-for  antidote  to  the  necessarily  anti- 
British  expansionist  and  naval  policy  of  Germany. 

(5)  That,   unless  Great   Britain  recreates  her  in- 
dustries by  a  policy  which  benefits  the  producer  and 
stimulates    the    production    of    solid    wealth,    Great 
Britain  is  bound  to  lose  the  rule  of  the  sea,  and  with  the 
rule  of  the  sea  her  Colonies  and  much  of  her  trade, 
her  shipping,  and  her  remaining  wealth. 

Will  Great  Britain  learn  the  lessons  of  the  German 
Election  of  1907  ? 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE   TRIUMPH   OF   LIBERALISM   OVER   REACTION — THE 
LESSONS   OF   THE   GERMAN   ELECTION   OF   IQI2 

THE  German  Reichstag  Election  which  took  place  on 
the  I2th  January  1912  is  likely  to  have  a  far-reaching 
influence  upon  Germany's  foreign  and  domestic  policy 
and  upon  Germany's  future.  Its  full  significance  will 
be  clear  to  us  only  after  a  short  preliminary  survey 
of  the  previous  Election  and  its  result. 

According  to  the  German  Constitution  and  to  the 
law  of  the  igth  March  1898,  which  amended  it,  the 
German  Reichstag  is  elected  for  a  period  of  five  years. 
The  last  Election  took  place  in  1907,  and  a  few  days 
before  that  Election  the  Government  appealed  to  the 
people  to  elect  a  patriotic  Reichstag.  The  North 
German  Gazette,  the  principal  semi-official  organ  of 
Germany,  proclaimed  on  behalf  of  the  Government 
that  the  General  Election  of  1907  was  to  decide  whether 
Germany  was  to  remain  a  European  Great  Power  or 
whether  she  was  to  become  a  World  Power.  The 
people  were  told  that  Germany  stood  at  the  parting 
of  the  ways,  and  were  asked  to  choose  between  an 
uneventful,  cheap,  and  safe  policy  of  natural  develop- 
ment in  Germany's  European  sphere,  and  an  adven- 
turous and  expensive  policy  of  transmaritime  expan- 
sion, and  they  chose  the  latter.  The  Social  Democrats 
had  previously  opposed  the  Imperialist  policy  of 
Germany,  and  the  electors  had  been  enjoined  by  the 

Government    to    vote   against    them,    and   to   smash 

426 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM       427 

Social  Democracy.  In  consequence  of  this  appeal  to 
the  patriotism  of  the  nation,  the  Social  Democratic 
Party  suffered  severely.  They  saw  the  number  of 
their  representatives  in  the  Reichstag  reduced  from 
81,  who  had  been  elected  in  1903,  to  43.  Patriotic 
Germans  were  delighted  with  that  defeat.  The  Em- 
peror himself  could  not  restrain  his  exuberant  en- 
thusiasm ;  and  at  midnight,  when  the  results  of  the 
day's  poll  had  become  known,  he  addressed,  like  a 
successful  Party  politician,  the  cheering  crowd  which 
had  gathered  around  his  palace.  He  stepped  to  a 
window  and  said  to  the  masses  below  :  "  Gentlemen, 
I  thank  you  for  your  ovation.  To-day  all  of  you  have 
put  your  hands  to  the  work,  and  have  proved  the 
word  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  '  Germany  can  ride 
if  she  cares  to.'  I  hope  this  will  be  true  not  only 
to-day,  but  also  in  the  future.  If  men  of  all  ranks 
and  faiths  stand  together  we  can  ride  down  all  those 
who  block  our  path." 

Who  were  those  who  in  1907  blocked  Germany's 
path  and  were  to  be  ridden  down  with  the  help  of  a 
patriotic  Reichstag  ?  The  record  of  its  activity  sup- 
plies the  answer.  The  German  Navy  Bill  of  1900  had 
laid  down  a  gigantic  and  irreducible  shipbuilding 
programme  up  to  the  year  1917,  and  in  the  memoran- 
dum introductory  to  that  Bill  the  German  Govern- 
ment had  proclaimed  :  "  Germany  requires  a  fleet  of 
such  strength  that  a  war  with  the  mightiest  naval 
Power  would  involve  risks  threatening  the  supremacy 
of  that  Power."  Germany's  interference  in  Morocco 
in  1905  had  had  an  unsatisfactory  result,  because 
Great  Britain  had  stepped  in  and  taken  the  part  of 
France.  The  recollection  of  that  failure  rankled  still 
in  1907.  The  new  Reichstag  was  from  its  beginning 
considered  to  be  an  Imperialist  Reichstag.  Soon  a 


428  MODERN    GERMANY 

violent  anti-British  campaign  for  the  extension  of  the 
German  navy  far  beyond  the  limits  laid  down  by  the 
great  Navy  Bill  of  1900  was  begun,  and  although  the 
shipbuilding  programme  provided  by  the  Navy  Bill 
of  1900  had  already  been  greatly  increased  by  the 
amendment  of  1905,  it  was  still  further  enlarged  by 
the  new  Reichstag  by  the  amendment  of  1908,  which 
provided  for  the  building  of  five  Dreadnoughts  of  the 
largest  type.  The  enormous  increase  of  Germany's 
naval  expenditure  from  less  than  £4,000,000  in  1891 
to  considerably  more  than  £20,000,000  in  1908,  and 
a  simultaneous  great  increase  in  the  expenditure  on 
the  army  and  on  various  other  services,  had  tem- 
porarily been  financed  by  free  recourse  to  loans.  A 
great  increase  in  taxation  was  necessary,  and  the  new 
Reichstag  provided  a  number  of  new  taxes  which 
were  to  produce  an  additional  revenue  of  £25,000,000 
per  year.  Thus  the  principal  patriotic  achievements 
of  the  Reichstag  elected  in  1907  were  a  considerable 
increase  of  the  German  navy,  and  the  provision  of 
about  £25,000,000  per  year  in  additional  taxation.  It 
should  here  be  noted  that  the  then  chancellor,  Prince 
Biilow,  had  proposed  to  the  majority  of  the  old 
Reichstag  on  which  he  relied,  to  the  old  Bloc,  which 
was  composed  of  the  Conservative  and  Liberal  Parties, 
to  distribute  the  new  taxes  fairly  between  the  classes 
and  the  masses.  But  the  large  Conservative  land- 
owners objected  to  certain  taxes,  especially  to  the 
Death  Duties.  They  threw  over  their  Liberal  allies, 
and  with  the  help  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Centre  Party, 
with  which  they  had  hitherto  usually  co-operated,  intro- 
duced hastily  another  but  ill-devised  scheme  of  taxa- 
tion, which  placed  the  bulk  of  the  new  taxes  upon 
the  shoulders  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  step  Prince  Biilow  retired.  Herr  von 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        429 

Bethmann  Hollweg  succeeded  him,  and  he  governed 
with  a  Reichstag  majority  composed  of  the  Con- 
servative and  Clerical  Centre  Parties,  the  so-called 
Blue-black  Bloc. 

The  Reichstag  period  1907-12  has  not  fulfilled  the 
high  hopes  of  the  German  patriots.  The  five  years' 
period  has  been  barren  of  notable  achievements.  It 
has  not  increased  Germany's  power,  prestige,  and 
possessions,  and  it  has  not  made  Germany  a  World 
Power,  but  it  has  led  to  great  disappointments.  In 
1911  the  German  Government  raised  the  Morocco 
question  for  a  second  time,  and  for  the  second  time 
the  result  of  Germany's  interference  was  very  gratify- 
ing to  France  and  extremely  disappointing  to  Germany. 
Notwithstanding  the  assistance  of  a  patriotic  Reichstag 
majority,  the  German  Government  has  not  secured 
the  triumph  of  German  world  policy  which  the  North 
German  Gazette  had  promised  before  the  Election  of 
1907.  Instead  of  riding  down  all  those  who  blocked 
her  path,  as  the  Emperor  had  promised  in  his  mid- 
night speech,  Germany  has  suffered  a  severe  defeat 
in  the  domain  of  foreign  policy  through  the  lack  of 
foresight  and  capacity  of  her  own  leaders.  Hence  the 
significance  of  the  legislative  period  of  1907-12,  which 
was  ushered  in  with  such  high  hopes  and  promises, 
lies  in  the  failure  of  Germany's  world-policy,  lies  in 
Germany's  failure  to  threaten  Great  Britain's  naval 
supremacy,  for  which  purpose  the  great  Navy  Bill  of 
1900  and  the  supplementary  Bills  of  1905  and  1908 
were  introduced,  lies  in  her  failure  to  become  a  great 
transmaritime  Power  in  opposition  to  Great  Britain. 

Patriotism  and  patience  are  the  two  great  charac- 
teristics of  the  German  people.  In  the  past  the 
German  people  have  always  cheerfully  borne  a  severe 
and  autocratic  rule,  and  high  and  even  crushing 


430  MODERN    GERMANY 

taxation,  for  they  felt  that  they  were  being  governed 
and  taxed  for  the  good  of  their  country,  that  they 
were  ruled  by  able  men  who  were  increasing  the 
greatness  and  renown  of  their  fatherland.  To  them 
the  German  Government  officials  were  men  endowed 
with  almost  supernatural  ability,  who  stood  high  above 
the  criticism  of  the  ordinary  citizens.  But  whilst  the 
old  German  policy,  the  Continental  policy,  which 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Bismarck  had  created,  was 
a  universal  success,  the  "  new  course "  which  the 
Emperor  William  II.  had  inaugurated  with  so  many 
rousing  speeches  and  dramatic  pronouncements  and 
actions  has  been  a  universal  and  unmitigated  failure. 
That  is  now  generally  recognised  in  Germany.  Hence 
the  broad  masses  of  the  people  and  the  business  section 
of  the  community,  who  are  asked  to  provide  heavier 
and  ever  heavier  taxes  for  the  glory  of  the  country, 
are  loudly  and  ever  more  loudly  complaining  that 
untold  millions  are  squandered  by  an  incapable  but 
ambitious  Government,  whilst  many  members  of  the 
Prussian  aristocracy,  and  many  high  Government 
officials,  officers  of  the  army  and  navy,  university 
professors,  clergymen,  lawyers,  doctors,  writers,  &c., 
who  used  to  be  the  most  enthusiastic  defenders  of  the 
throne  and  the  existing  institutions,  have  become 
exasperated  with  an  Emperor  and  a  Government  who, 
during  a  long  period  of  years,  and  at  an  enormous 
expenditure  of  energy  and  of  money,  have  not  increased 
the  country's  power  and  prestige,  but  have  created  to 
Germany  enemies  everywhere,  have  lost  to  Germany 
that  preponderant  position  in  Europe  which  she  used 
to  occupy,  have  almost  isolated  Germany  in  the 
world,  and  are  now  threatening  Germany  with  defeat 
and  ruin.  Whilst  the  German  people  went  to  the 
poll  in  1907  in  a  spirit  of  joyous  and  patriotic  en- 
thusiasm and  hope,  they  went  to  the  poll  on  the  i2th 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        431 

January  1912  in  a  spirit  of  disappointment,  of  re- 
sentment, and  of  general  dissatisfaction  with  the 
Government  and  with  the  Parties  which  had  lately 
supported  it.  The  prevalence  of  that  spirit  has,  of 
course,  affected  the  Election  results. 

In  consequence  of  the  Election  of  1912,  the  strength 
of  the  seven  principal  Parties  has  changed  as  follows  :— 

Votes  cast  for.  Election  of  Election  of 

1907.  1912. 

Conservative  Party 1,060,209  1,129,916 

Conservative  Reichs  Partei      .     .     .  471,863  370.387 

Roman  Catholic  Centre  Party       .     .  2,179,743  2,035,290 

Poles '         .....  453.858  44L736 

Total  4,165,673  3.977.329 

Loss  of  Conservative  and  Centre 
Parties  which  supported  the 
Government -  188,344  votes 

National  Liberal  Party  ....  1,637,048  1,672,619 
Radical  Forschrittliche  Volkspartei  1,233,935  1, 558,330 
Social  Democratic  Party  ....  3,259,020  4,250,329 

Total     6,130,003         7,481,278 

Gain    of    Liberal,    Radical    and 

Social  Democratic  Parties        .     .  +1,351,275  votes 

Although  the  German  Government  enumerates  in 
its  Election  statistics  no  less  than  twenty-three  separate 
political  Parties  and  Groups,  only  the  figures  relating 
to  the  seven  principal  Parties  have  been  given  in  the 
foregoing.  The  sixteen  remaining  small  Parties  and 
Groups  received  between  them  only  about  750,000 
votes.  They  affect  very  little  the  general  result,  and 
as  their  enumeration  might  be  confusing,  statistics 
relating  to  them  have  been  omitted. 

In  1907  11,262,775  voters  went  to  the  poll,  whilst 
in  1912  12,206,808  voters  went  to  the  poll.  In  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  number  of  votes  cast  increased  by 


432  MODERN    GERMANY 

almost  a  million,  the  loss  of  188,344  votes  by  the 
Government-supporting  Parties,  the  combined  Con- 
servative and  Centre  Parties,  was  very  heavy.  It  was 
particularly  heavy  when  we  contrast  it  with  the  gain 
of  1,351,275  votes  by  the  Liberal,  Radical,  and  Social 
Democratic  Parties  which  opposed  the  Government. 
The  result  of  the  German  Elections  was  therefore  a 
defeat  of  the  Government-supporting  Parties,  and  at 
least  a  moral  defeat  of  the  Government  itself. 

The  feature  of  the  German  Election  of  1912  has 
been  the  enormous  increase  of  the  Social  Democratic 
vote.  The  unjust  distribution  of  the  £25,000,000  of 
new  taxes  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  which  pressed 
particularly  heavily  upon  the  masses,  naturally  brought 
about  a  great  increase  of  the  Social  Democratic  vote. 
According  to  the  figures  published  by  the  Govern- 
ment, the  Social  Democratic  candidates  polled  no  less 
than  4,250,329  votes,  as  compared  with  3,259,020 
votes  in  1907.  In  five  years  the  Social  Democrats 
have  gained  practically  a  million  votes.  The  rapid 
growth  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  table  : — 

Social  Democratic  Votes  polled. 

1871  .....  101,927 

1874  .....  35I.6?o 

1877 493,447 

1878 437,!58 

1881 311,961 

1884 549,990 

1887 763,128 

1890 1,427,098 

1893  .    .    ...  1,786,738 

1898       .     .    -  4  '   .     .   2,107,076 

1903     •    •    :« •'• '  •    -  3,010,771 
1907     .  :-;ir.-jffr  •   • 
1912 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   LIBERALISM       433 

In  the  course  of  the  last  forty  years  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  has  grown  more  than  forty-fold,  in- 
creasing from  101,927  to  4,250,329.  Nothing  seems 
able  to  arrest  its  progress.  It  is  now  by  far  the  largest 
Party  in  Germany.  It  has  polled  far  more  votes  than 
the  Conservative  and  Central  Parties  combined.  At 
the  1912  Election  Germany  had  an  electorate  of 
14,236,722  voters,  of  whom  12,206,808,  or  85.6  per  cent., 
went  to  the  poll.  Consequently  it  appears  that  consider- 
ably more  than  one-third  of  the  male  population  of 
Germany  are  supporters  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party. 

Three  phenomena  in  German  politics  seem  almost 
inexplicable  to  the  average  Englishman — the  fact  that 
Germany  should  possess  not  two  large  Parties,  but  a 
large  number  of  comparatively  small  and  independent 
political  Parties  and  Groups  ;  the  fact  that  Germany, 
which  is  essentially  a  liberal-minded  country,  should 
lack  a  powerful  Liberal  Parly  ;  the  fact  that  more 
than  one-third  of  the  German  citizens,  who  are  very 
prosperous,  who  receive  the  advantages  of  a  paternal 
Government,  such  as  State  Insurance  against  sick- 
ness, accident,  invalidity  and  old  age,  and  who  enjoy 
universal  manhood  suffrage,  should  be  found  in  the 
Socialist  camp  in  a  country  which  is  supposed  to  be 
a  model  to  all  other  countries  as  regards  education 
and  efficient  administration.  These  three  phenomena 
deserve  inquiring  into. 

Germany  is  a  democratic  country  only  in  outward 
appearance.  It  is  true  that  she  possesses  universal 
manhood  suffrage,  that  plural  voting  is  practically 
unknown,  and  that  the  principle  of  one  man  one  vote 
is  strictly  carried  out.  As  far  as  the  voting  goes,  Ger- 
many is  the  most  democratic  country  in  the  world. 
But  here  the  democratic  character  of  Germany's 
political  institutions  ends.  Germany's  Constitution 

2E 


434  MODERN   GERMANY 

was  neither  gradually  evolved  by  a  people  struggling 
to  be  free  and  to  govern  itself  as  was  the  British  Con- 
stitution, nor  was  it  devised  in  free  discussion  by  a 
number  of  eminent  democratic  statesmen  and  poli- 
ticians of  different  views  as  was  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  Germany  is  an  enlarged  Prussia. 
The  German  Constitution  was  drawn  up  by  a  single 
man,  by  Prince  Bismarck,  a  Prussian,  and  he  aimed 
at  creating  an  instrument  which,  though  democratic 
in  appearance,  would  not  be  an  efficient  obstacle  to 
the  absolutistic  rule  traditional  in  Prussia.  Before  all 
he  desired  to  have  a  Constitution  for  Germany  which 
would  make  it  easy  and  convenient  for  him  to  ad- 
minister the  country  according  to  his  will.  Whilst 
giving  to  the  people  universal  manhood  suffrage,  he 
took  good  care  that  their  representatives  in  the 
Reichstag  should  be  powerless  to  influence  the  national 
government  and  administration,  which  were  to  remain 
in  the  hands  of  an  all-powerful  bureaucracy. 

Bismarck  came  to  power  at  a  moment  when  the 
internal  position  of  Prussia  had  become  so  desperate, 
when  the  conflict  between  the  King  and  his  Parlia- 
ment had  become  so  hopeless,  that  William  I.,  who 
then  was  only  King  of  Prussia,  could  no  longer  find  a 
ministry  willing  to  carry  on  the  government  of  the 
country.  The  King  had  become  so  hopeless  that  he 
had  actually  drawn  up  an  Act  of  Abdication,  and 
was  about  to  retire  into  private  life.  Bismarck  in- 
duced William  I.  to  entrust  him  with  the  government 
of  the  country,  and  to  tear  up  the  Act  of  Abdication. 
Having  been  given  full  power,  Bismarck  governed 
Prussia  with  a  hand  of  iron.  He  collected  illegally 
the  taxes  in  opposition  to  a  hostile  and  protesting 
Parliament,  and  he  conducted  three  successful  wars 
which  made  little  Prussia  the  most  powerful  State 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM       435 

in  Europe,  and  which  made  William  I.  Emperor  of  a 
united  Germany.  William  I.  was  loyalty  personified. 
He,  who  had  been  about  to  abdicate  and  leave  the 
country,  owed  his  great  position  to  Bismarck.  His 
gratitude  to  Prince  Bismarck  was  great.  Bismarck 
felt  certain  that  he  could  absolutely  rely  upon  the 
Emperor,  that  the  Emperor  was  likely  to  act  always  in 
accordance  with  his  own  views.  Therefore,  in  drawing 
up  the  German  Constitution,  Bismarck  could  most  easily 
secure  all  influence  and  authority  to  himself  by  plac- 
ing all  power  nominally  into  the  old  Emperor's  hands. 
According  to  the  Bismarckian  Constitution,  Ger- 
many has  no  responsible  ministers,  but  only  one  re- 
sponsible minister,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  to  whom 
all  the  Secretaries  of  State  are  responsible.  The 
Chancellor,  who  thus  undertakes  the  responsibility  for 
the  conduct  of  all  the  departments  of  State,  is  re- 
sponsible not  to  Parliament,  but  only  to  the  Emperor. 
In  Germany,  ministers  and  other  high  dignitaries  are 
taken  not  from  the  parliamentary  Parties,  as  they  are 
in  other  parliamentary  countries,  but  from  the  ranks 
of  the  bureaucracy,  the  army,  and  the  courtiers. 
Hence  Government  and  Parliament,  and  Government 
and  people,  are  out  of  touch.  The  ministers  are  the 
Emperor's  servants.  They  are  appointed  and  dis- 
missed by  the  Emperor,  and  they  stand  outside  and 
above  the  Reichstag  and  the  Parties.  No  vote  of  lack 
of  confidence  will,  therefore,  shake  the  position  of  a 
minister  as  long  as  he  continues  to  enjoy  the  support 
of  the  monarch.  When  Emperor  and  Chancellor 
agree,  Parliament  is  practically  powerless,  especially 
as  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  German  Reichstag  is, 
according  to  the  Constitution,  entitled  to  withhold 
supplies  by  refusing  the  granting  of  taxes  which  had 
previously  been  established  for  an  indefinite  number 


436  MODERN   GERMANY 

of  years.  In  Germany,  in  Prussia,  and  in  all  the 
minor  German  states,  the  ministers  are  chosen  and 
dismissed  by  the  sovereign,  and  they  are  responsible 
not  to  Parliament,  but  only  to  the  sovereign.  There- 
fore the  people  represented  in  Parliament  cannot  rid 
themselves  of  an  incapable  or  unpopular  minister  by 
voting  against  him,  by  withholding  supplies,  or  by 
not  voting  his  salary.  On  the  other  hand,  a  Reichstag 
which  has  become  obnoxious  to  the  Emperor  or  to  his 
Chancellor  can  be  dissolved  by  the  Government,  for, 
according  to  the  Constitution,  the  Emperor  is  en- 
titled to  dissolve  it.  An  inconvenient  Reichstag  is 
simply  sent  home  in  the  hope  that  the  next  Reichstag 
will  be  of  a  different  character,  and  in  that  case  the 
powerful  Government  apparatus  is  set  in  motion  to 
influence  the  people  at  Election  time  in  the  desired 
way.  Hence  in  Germany,  and  also  in  the  individual 
States  composing  it,  all  real  power  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  hereditary  ruler,  who  is  often  far  more  strongly 
influenced  by  the  views  of  his  courtiers  and  his  aris- 
tocratic entourage  than  by  the  views  of  the  people, 
especially  as  the  views  of  the  people  are  only  too  often 
distorted  by  a  venal  press.  In  Germany  parliamen- 
tarism is  merely  a  form.  The  people  are  practically 
powerless  to  interfere  in  matters  of  Government  and  ad- 
ministration or  to  influence  appointments  which,  espe- 
cially if  the  ruler  is  incapable  and  headstrong,  often 
go  rather  by  favour  than  by  merit.  The  Handbuch 
fur  Sozialdemokratische  Wahler  wrote  quite  correctly  :— 

"  A  Constitution  was  given  by  Bismarck  to  Germany 
which  provided  for  a  democratic  parliament  based  on  uni- 
versal manhood  suffrage,  but  which,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
it  left  unclear  the  question  whether  the  Reichstag  is  entitled 
to  withhold  supplies,  placed  all  actual  power  into  the  hands  of 
the  Federal  Government,  or  rather  into  those  of  the  Prussian 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        437 

Government  which  serves  as  its  centre.  The  King  of  Prussia 
and  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  Prussian  Cabinet,  who  acts  at 
the  same  time  as  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire,  hold  in 
their  hands  all  real  power.  Bismarck  made  a  Constitution 
which  would  suit  himself. 

"  Prussia  rules  in  Germany,  and  Germany  is  ruled  by  the 
aristocrats  and  plutocrats  who  are  all  powerful  in  the  un- 
democratic and  non-representative  Prussian  parliament  who 
possess  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  Court  and  the  army.  .  .  . 
Opinions  differ  as  to  the  Reichstag's  power  of  withholding 
supplies.  However,  so  much  is  certain  that  taxes  and  other 
sources  of  the  national  income  which  have  once  been  voted 
cannot  be  discontinued  in  consequence  of  the  veto  of  the 
Reichstag." 

The  new  Constitution  had  laid  down  the  principle 
that  there  was  to  be  one  member  of  the  Reichstag  for 
every  100,000  inhabitants.  Germany  had  then  a 
little  less  than  40,000,000  inhabitants,  and  in  accor- 
dance with  the  population  of  the  time  the  new  Im- 
perial Reichstag  was  composed  of  397  members.  The 
Germans  are  constitutionally  a  liberal-minded  people. 
The  middle  classes  in  the  towns  had  agitated  during 
many  decades  for  democratic  and  parliamentary  govern- 
ment, and  they  received  with  delight  the  gift  of  uni- 
versal manhood  suffrage,  which  seemed  to  promise 
the  advent  of  parliamentary  government  in  Germany. 
Liberalism  was  in  excelsis,  and  not  unnaturally  it 
became  the  controlling  element  in  the  new  Reichstag. 
At  the  first  Election  in  the  German  Empire,  that  of 
1871,  the  Liberal  Groups  elected  203  members,  and 
had  therefore  the  absolute  majority  in  the  House. 
At  the  second  Election,  that  of  1874,  they  were  repre- 
sented by  212  members,  and  commanded  an  increased 
majority.  Bismarck  had  meant  to  give  to  Germany 
only  the  semblance  of  parliamentary  government. 
He  did  not  wish  to  see  his  policy  circumscribed  by  a 
Party  which  possessed  the  majority  in  the  Reichstag. 


438  MODERN    GERMANY 

Therefore  he  endeavoured  to  break  up  the  great 
Liberal  Party,  and  he  succeeded.  Through  Bismarck's 
activity  the  great  Liberal  Party  was  divided  and  sub- 
divided into  a  number  of  quarrelling  and  powerless 
factions. 

In  all  countries  Liberalism  has  found  its  adherents 
chiefly  in  the  large  towns,  and  especially  among  the 
working  men  in  shop  and  factory.  The  German 
Liberal  Party,  the  Party  which  strove  for  real  parlia- 
mentary government,  and  which,  therefore,  was  dan- 
gerous to  the  Government,  could  be  rendered  impotent 
by  separating  the  middle  class  of  the  towns,  which 
furnished  the  leaders,  from  the  working  men  in  the 
towns,  who  were  their  natural  followers.  When  the 
Social  Democratic  Party  arose,  Bismarck  saw  his 
opportunity  of  crippling  German  Liberalism.  Two 
attempts  on  the  life  of  the  Emperor  William  I.  gave 
him  the  opportunity  of  accusing  the  Social  Democrats 
of  that  crime,  and  of  branding  them  as  a  Party  of 
traitors,  of  assassins,  and  of  enemies  to  the  established 
order.  He  instituted  a  campaign  of  persecution 
against  the  Social  Democrats.  He  raised  the  red 
spectre.  He  declared  that  the  Socia  Democrats  were 
the  enemies  of  religion,  the  nation,  and  the  fatherland, 
and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  all  good  citizens  to  com- 
bine in  fighting  "  the  Party  of  revolution  and  of 
subversion." 

Germany  has  a  considerable  number  of  parties  and 
political  groups,  and  these  are  apt  to  undergo  kaleido- 
scopic changes — between  1871  and  1912  there  have 
been  n  Conservative  Parties,  14  Liberal  Parties,  2 
Clerical  Parties,  9  Nationalist  and  Particularist  Parties, 
and  5  Socialist  Parties — but  in  reality  Germany,  like 
every  other  country,  has  only  two  great  Parties,  a 
Conservative  Party  and  a  Liberal  Party.  Each  of 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        439 

these  two  great  Parties  is,  through  the  lack  of  Party 
discipline  and  through  Governmental  machinations, 
subdivided  into  a  number  of  Groups.  The  Clerical 
Centre  Party,  which  represents  chiefly  the  Roman 
Catholic  country  districts  of  Germany,  is  naturally 
Conservative  in  character.  The  Conservative  and  the 
Centre  Parties  would  probably  form  one  great  Party 
had  not  Bismarck  divided  them  by  his  persecution  of 
Roman  Catholicism,  the  Kulturkampf,  which  made 
the  Roman  Catholic  section  a  close  union  for  mutual 
defence,  and  which  divided  the  Conservative  Party 
into  a  Roman  Catholic  and  into  a  Protestant  Group, 
which  at  one  time  fought  one  another.  The  old 
Liberal  Party  of  Germany  has  been  broken  up  into 
a  number  of  more  and  of  less  advanced  sections,  and 
the  Social  Democratic  Party  is,  rightly  considered,  not 
a  revolutionary  Party,  and  not  even  a  Socialist  Party, 
but  only  the  most  advanced  and  the  most  dissatisfied 
wing  of  the  old  Liberal  Party  of  Germany.  Formerly 
the  German  working  men  voted  for  the  Liberal  candi- 
dates, and  they  would  probably  do  so  still  had  it 
not  been  for  Bismarck's  policy. 

The  Social  Democratic  Party  was  created  by  a 
number  of  enthusiastic  working  men  and  of  friends 
of  the  working  men.  It  was  in  the  beginning  merely 
a  small  working-men's  Party,  which  was  led  by 
working  men  and  by  a  few  unpractical  political 
enthusiasts,  doctrinaires,  and  philanthropists.  Bis- 
marck's persecution  of  the  Social  Democrats  had  a 
threefold  effect.  In  the  first  place  it  converted  the 
workmen  leaders  of  the  Party  into  martyrs,  and 
caused  the  workmen  to  join  in  thousands  the  Social 
Democratic  Party.  In  the  second  place,  it  embittered 
the  Social  Democratic  leaders,  drove  them  to  extreme 
views,  caused  them  to  make  violent  speeches,  and 


440  MODERN    GERMANY 

gave  colour  to  their  doctrine  of  the  Class  War.  In 
the  third  place,  it  caused  the  Liberal  leaders  and  the 
Liberal  Party  to  become  suspicious  of  working  men 
inclined  towards  Socialism,  and  of  every  measure 
which  might  be  interpreted  and  denounced  by  the 
Government  as  helpful  to  Social  Democracy ;  and 
thus  a  gulf  was  dug  between  Liberalism  and  Labour. 
Labour  was  driven  out  of  the  Liberal  Party  through 
the  Government's  policy.  The  German  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party  is  in  reality  a  Liberal  Party  which  is 
largely  recruited  from  the  working  men,  and  which  is 
led  by  Social  Democratic  spokesmen  who  propound 
out-of-date  doctrines  and  Party  programmes. 

Germany  is  still,  as  she  was  in  1871,  an  absolutis- 
tically  ruled  country  with  a  democratic  franchise.  A 
German  comic  paper,  the  SimpliciSsimus,  printed  just 
before  the  Election  a  cartoon  in  which  a  gentleman 
of  aristocratic  appearance  was  addressing  a  number 
of  people.  Underneath  were  the  words  :  "  Gentle- 
men, you  have  now  to  fulfil  that  most  important  duty 
of  German  citizens  of  voting  for  the  Reichstag.  When 
you  have  done  so,  it  will  again  be  the  Emperor's  turn 
during  the  next  five  years."  The  absolute  supremacy 
of  the  Emperor,  the  bureaucracy,  and  the  aristocracy 
is  as  great  as  ever,  but  it  can  continue  only  as  long 
as  the  Government  need  not  fear  a  strong  hostile 
majority  in  the  Reichstag.  The  German  Government, 
which  is  Prussian  Conservative  in  character,  can 
practically  always  count  upon  the  support  of  the 
Conservative  Party,  which  represents  the  privileges 
of  aristocracy,  and  upon  that  of  the  Centre  Party, 
which  represents  the  most  conservative  institution  in 
the  world,  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  The  German 
Government  need  fear  the  Centre  Party  only  if  it 
should  antagonise  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        441 

this  it  cannot  afford  to  do.  As  at  present  constituted, 
the  German  Government  need  fear  only  the  Liberal 
Parties. 

At  the  General  Election  of  1912  the  Conservative 
Parties  polled  together  4,500,000  votes,  whilst  the 
Liberal  and  Socialist  Parties  polled  together  no  less 
than  7,500,000  votes.  One  may  therefore  say  that  there 
is  a  majority  of  3,000,000  votes  against  the  Govern- 
ment, that  the  Conservative  Parties  which  support 
the  Government  are  in  a  small  minority.  These 
figures  make  it  clear  that  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  the  German  Government  to  prevent  the  propor- 
tional representation  of  the  people  in  the  Reichstag, 
and  to  prevent  the  representatives  of  the  7,500,000 
voters,  who  are  opposed  to  Conservatism,  acting  in 
union.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the  Govern- 
ment that  the  Liberal  Party  should  remain  irrecon- 
cilably divided  against  itself,  that  there  should  con- 
tinue to  be  a  capitalistic  section  and  a  Socialistic 
section  of  the  Liberal  Party,  and  that  these  two  sections 
should  make  war  upon  one  another  in  accordance 
with  Bismarck's  policy.  Bismarck  has  had  four  suc- 
cessors, but  every  one  of  them  has  seen  the  danger 
which  threatens  Germany's  present  form  of  uncon- 
trolled and  pseudo-popular  Government  from  a  re- 
union of  the  great  Liberal  Party  of  1871  through  a 
reconciliation  of  the  Liberal  sections  with  the  Social 
Democratic  section.  Hence  every  one  of  Bismarck's 
successors  has  entreated  all  good  citizens  to  combine 
against  "  the  Party  of  subversion  and  of  revolution." 
Before  the  General  Election  of  1907  it  was  Prince 
Biilow,  and  before  that  of  1912  it  was  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg,  who  painted  to  the  electors  in  lurid 
colours  the  danger  of  the  "  Red  Peril." 

Germany  has  a  peculiar  form  of  election.     A  candi- 


442  MODERN   GERMANY 

date  is  elected  only  when  he  receives  an  absolute 
majority  of  all  the  votes  given  in  his  district.  If, 
owing  to  the  number  of  candidates  standing  for  the 
Reichstag,  none  of  them  receives  an  absolute  majority 
of  all  the  votes,  a  second  poll  is  held  between  those 
two  candidates  who  have  received  the  largest  number 
of  votes  and  therefore  head  the  poll.  If,  as  is  fre- 
quently the  case,  there  are  three  candidates — let  us 
say  a  Conservative,  a  Liberal,  and  a  Social  Democratic 
candidate — who  fairly  evenly  divide  the  poll  between 
them,  a  second  poll  has  to  take  place.  If  now  the  "  State- 
supporting  Parties  "  can  be  induced  to  vote  against 
the  Social  Democrat  and  for  the  Conservative  candi- 
date, the  Liberal  Party  to  its  own  harm  will  strengthen 
the  Conservative  Party  and  the  Government.  There- 
fore the  Government  has  found  it  particularly  im- 
portant at  Election  times  to  bring  out  the  Red  Peril, 
and  especially  at  the  moment  when  the  arrangements 
for  the  second  polls  have  to  be  made.  That  has 
always  been  the  time  when  the  German  Government 
found  it  most  desirable  to  keep  wide  open  the  division 
between  the  capitalistic  and  the  Social  Democratic 
wing  of  the  Liberal  Party  by  persuading  all  good 
citizens  to  vote  against  the  Red  Peril.  The  importance 
of  the  second  poll  may  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that 
out  of  the  397  members  of  the  Reichstag  only  206 
were  elected  at  the  first  poll  in  1912.  It  is,  therefore, 
not  unnatural  that  on  the  I3th  January  1912,  the 
day  following  the  first  poll,  which  had  shown  a  great 
decrease  in  the  votes  given  to  the  Conservative  Parties 
and  an  enormous  increase  in  those  given  to  the  Liberal 
Parties,  the  North  German  Gazette  published  a  Govern- 
ment appeal  in  which  we  read  : — 

"  At  the  second  polls  Social  Democracy  cannot  conquer  by 
its  own  strength.      Every  mandate  which  it  wins  it  will  owe 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM        443 

to  the  non-Socialist  citizens  of  Germany.  The  non-Socialist 
Parties  themselves  will  have  to  bear  the  blame  if  the  red 
flood  rises  still  higher.  .  .  .  What  non-Socialist  Party  can 
make  common  cause  with  an  enemy  who  proudly  shrieks 
his  furious  hatred  in  the  face  of  them  all  and  of  the  whole 
existing  order  of  the  State  ?  And  what  is  the  attitude  of 
Social  Democracy  to  our  national  demands  and  tasks  ?  At 
home  the  Socialists  strive  to  isolate  the  working  classes  from 
all  the  other  classes  of  the  people.  The  Class  War  is  the 
element  in  which  they  live.  Social  Revolution,  with  the 
abolition  of  private  property,  is  their  goal.  Whilst  they 
foment  hatred  and  practise  terrorism  at  home,  they  worship 
the  phantom  of  universal  brotherhood  among  nations  abroad. 
Therefore  they  are  the  hope  of  the  foreign  nations  which  envy 
and  oppose  the  German  Empire. 

"  Our  peace  and  prosperity  can  be  preserved  only  if  we 
maintain  ourselves  as  a  strong  and  united  nation  able  to  face 
the  world.  Among  the  immediate  tasks  of  the  new  Reichstag 
will  be  the  task  of  increasing  our  armed  strength.  A  Party 
which  calls  itself  international  and  which  dares  to  entertain 
the  thought  of  a  general  strike  in  case  of  a  mobilisation  is 
by  its  very  nature  incapable  of  fulfilling  these  important 
tasks." 

Hypocritical  and  hysterical  appeals  against  the 
Social  Democrats  such  as  the  foregoing  emanate  not 
only  from  German  officials  and  from  the  politicians 
belonging  to  the  Conservative  Parties.  The  Emperor 
himself  has  branded  the  Social  Democrats  in  various 
speeches  as  "a  band  of  fellows  not  worthy  to  bear 
the  name  of  Germans,"  "  enemies  to  the  Divine  order 
of  things  without  a  fatherland,"  &c.  It  is  of  course 
ridiculous  to  describe  a  Party  which  embraces  more 
than  4,250,000  grown-up  men  and  considerably  more 
than  one-third  of  the  German  population  as  "  not 
worthy  to  bear  the  name  of  Germans,"  "enemies  to 
the  Divine  order  of  things  without  a  fatherland." 
It  is,  however,  equally  ridiculous  to  believe  that  the 
4,250,329  people  who  in  1912  gave  their  votes  to  Social 


444  MODERN   GERMANY 

Democratic  candidates  would  subscribe  to  the  orthodox 
Socialist  doctrines.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Socialist 
Party  had  in  1911  only  837,000  members,  of  whom 
108,000  were  women.  Deducting  these,  we  find  that 
of  the  4,250,329  Social  Democratic  voters  only  729,000, 
or  about  one-sixth,  were  avowed  Socialists.  We  may 
therefore,  perhaps,  conclude  that  the  remaining  five- 
sixths  were  men  who  voted  for  Social  Democratic 
candidates  without  being  Socialists. 

The  reason  that  millions  of  Germans  who  belong 
to  all  classes  of  society — bankers,  merchants,  doctors, 
school  teachers,  and  a  very  large  number  of  Govern- 
ment officials — vote  for  Social  Democratic  candidates 
lies  in  this,  that  the  Social  Democrats  are  the  only 
Party  which  determinedly  and  unceasingly  opposes  the 
German  Government  as  at  present  constituted,  and 
fights  continually  for  real  parliamentary  government. 
All  the  other  Parties,  the  capitalistic  Liberal  Parties 
included,  oppose  the  Government  only  here  and  there 
in  the  hope  of  becoming  the  Government  Party  and 
benefiting  by  the  Government's  bounty.  The  German 
Government  is  not  averse  from  rewarding  political 
services  with  official  positions,  rapid  promotion  in  the 
Government  service,  titles,  decorations,  and  even 
with  financial  favours.  Therefore  all  opponents  to 
the  Government  are  meek  and  mild  in  their  criticism 
of  the  Government's  policy  and  of  the  existing  German 
institutions,  and  they  accept  uncomplainingly  the 
subordinate  position  given  to  the  people  and  its 
representatives.  I  give  one  example  out  of  many. 
The  German  Emperor's  indiscretion  in  publishing  in 
the  Daily  Telegraph  in  1908,  without  the  Chancellor's 
consent,  an  interview  which  was  very  damaging  to 
Germany's  foreign  policy,  created  enormous  excite- 
ment throughout  the  country,  and  led  to  what  was' 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF   LIBERALISM       445 

called  a  "  constitutional  crisis."  All  the  Party  leaders 
made  violent  speeches  against  the  Emperor's  usurpa- 
tion of  political  action  in  violation  of  the  German 
Constitution,  which  expressly  lays  down  that  every 
political  act  of  the  Emperor  must  be  approved  of  and 
countersigned  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  However, 
only  the  Social  Democrats  took  political  action  devised 
to  make  the  German  Government  responsible  to  Parlia- 
ment by  moving  various  amendments  to  the  German 
Constitution,  the  principal  of  which  ran  as  follows  : 
"  The  Imperial  Chancellor  is  responsible  for  his  official 
actions.  His  responsibility  covers  all  political  actions 
of  the  Emperor.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  must  be 
dismissed  if  the  Reichstag  demands  it."  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  say  that  the  other  Parties  opposed  the 
Social  Democratic  proposals,  which  would  have  intro- 
duced the  beginning  of  parliamentary  government — 
which,  by  the  way,  is  very  unsympathetic  to  many, 
perhaps  most,  Prussian  Conservatives. 

The  German  Government  has  tried  to  prevent  the 
Liberal  Party  becoming  too  powerful  in  the  Reichstag, 
not  only  by  endeavouring  unceasingly  to  keep  it 
divided  against  itself,  but  also  by  securing  the  over- 
representation  in  the  Reichstag  of  the  Conservative 
and  the  under-representation  of  the  Liberal  section 
of  the  community.  Since  1871,  and  especially  since 
1879,  when  Protection  was  introduced  into  Germany, 
the  population  of  the  industrial  and  commercial  centres 
has  grown  enormously,  whilst  that  of  the  country 
districts  has  remained  almost  stationary.  The  towns 
in  Germany,  as  the  towns  in  all  countries,  are  the 
stronghold  of  Liberalism,  Radicalism,  and  Socialism. 
Now,  although  the  population  of  the  German  towns 
has  grown  enormously,  no  redistribution  of  the  elec- 
toral districts  has  been  effected.  The  Reichstag  has 


446  MODERN    GERMANY 

still  397  members  as  in  1871.  Berlin  has  still  only  six 
representatives  in  the  Reichstag,  although,  according 
to  its  population,  it  should  have  more  than  twenty. 
However,  by  giving  Berlin  fourteen  additional  repre- 
sentatives, the  Government  would  merely  add  fourteen 
members  to  the  Liberal  and  Social  Democratic  Parties 
in  the  Reichstag.  Therefore  Berlin  has  to  be  satisfied 
with  six  members.  A  similar  state  of  affairs  prevails 
in  all  the  large  towns  of  Germany.  How  glaringly 
electoral  districts  differ  in  town  and  country,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  tremendous  growth  of  the  German  towns 
during  the  last  forty  years,  may  be  seen  from  this, 
that  in  1907  the  electoral  district  of  Teltow,  near 
Berlin,  had  248,000  voters,  whilst  that  of  Schaumburg- 
Lippe  had  only  10,000  voters  ;  that  the  electoral  dis- 
trict of  Berlin  (VI.)  had  195,000  voters,  whilst  that  of 
Lauenburg  had  only  13,000  voters  ;  that  the  district 
of  Bochum-Gelsenkirchen  had  144,000  voters,  whilst 
that  of  Waldeck  had  13,000  voters  ;  that  the  district 
of  Hamburg  (III.)  had  137,000  voters,  whilst  that  of 
Rappoltsweiler  had  only  13,000  voters  ;  that  Berlin 
(IV.)  had  134,000  voters,  whilst  that  of  Lowenberg 
had  only  14,000  voters  ;  that  the  district  of  Duisburg- 
Miilheim  had  108,000  voters,  whilst  that  of  Deutsch 
Krone  had  13,000  voters.  The  foregoing  list  of 
anomalies  could  be  very  greatly  extended,  but  the 
few  examples  given  suffice  to  show  the  injustice  of 
the  system.  In  numerous  instances  from  10,000  to 
14,000  voters  in  the  country  districts  send  one  repre- 
sentative to  the  Reichstag,  and  from  100,000  to  250,000 
town  voters  send  also  but  one  representative  to  the 
Reichstag.  How  these  startling  differences  between 
the  size  of  the  electoral  districts  in  town  and  country 
and  the  Governmental  policy  of  inducing  the  Liberal 
voters  to  vote  rather  for  the  Conservative  or  the  Centre 


THE    TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM       447 

candidate  than  for  the  Social  Democratic  candidate  at 
the  second  polls,  affect  the  general  results  of  the 
German  Elections  will  be  seen  from  the  following 
figures  relating  to  the  General  Election  of  1907  : — 

Votes  Polled        Reichs^Members 

Social  Democratic  Party  .     .     3,259,000  43 

Conservative  Party       .     .     .     1,100,000  63 

Centre  Party 2,159,000  104 

In  1907  the  Conservative  and  the  Centre  Parties 
received  together  3,259,000  votes,  or  exactly  the  same 
number  of  votes  as  that  given  to  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party.  However,  whilst  the  3,259,000  Con- 
servative and  Centre  voters  sent  167  members  to  the 
Reichstag,  the  3,259,000  Social  Democratic  voters 
sent  only  43  members  to  the  Reichstag.  The  National 
Liberals,  who  likewise  represent  chiefly  the  population 
of  the  towns,  polled  in  1907  1,737,000  votes,  or  nearly 
60  per  cent,  more  than  the  Conservatives.  Neverthe- 
less the  1,737,000  Liberal  voters  sent  only  56  members 
to  the  Reichstag,  whilst  the  1,100,000  Conservative 
voters  were  represented  by  63  members.  Year  in  and 
year  out  the  German  Reichstag  is  controlled  by  the 
representatives  of  a  minority  of  the  German  people. 
At  the  1912  Election  the  Liberal,  Radical,  and  Socialist 
Parties  received  7,500,000,  and  the  Conservative  and 
Centre  Parties  only  4,500,000  votes.  Nevertheless, 
the  Blue- Black  B  oc,  the  combined  Conservative  and 
Centre  Parties,  reckon  upon  having  again  a  majority 
in  the  1912  Reichstag ;  and  if  the  Liberal  members 
of  the  Reichstag  can  once  more  be  induced  by  the 
Government  to  vote  with  the  Conservative  Parties 
and  for  the  Government,  their  calculation  may  prove 
correct.  German  parliamentary  government — if  one 


448  MODERN   GERMANY 

can  speak  of  parliamentary  government  in  Germany — 
is  based  on  minority  rule.  By  refusing  the  readjust- 
ment of  electoral  districts,  the  German  Government 
tries  to  establish  minority  rule  in  permanence  and  to 
secure  the  predominance  of  the  Conservative  and 
reactionary  Parties. 

Parliamentary  misrepresentation  of  the  people  is 
the  ideal  of  the  Prussian  aristocrats  and  bureaucrats, 
who  hate  popular  government,  and  who  have  had 
experience  of  the  advantages  which  the  Prussian 
franchise  gives  to  the  privileged  classes.  According 
to  the  Prussian  franchise,  the  electors  in  every  district 
are  divided  into  three  classes.  Each  class  represents 
the  same  amount  of  wealth  measured  by  taxation, 
and  each  class  has  the  same  voting  power.  The  first 
class  is  composed  of  the  richest  men,  the  second  of 
men  of  medium  weal  h,  and  the  third  of  the  poorer 
voters.  According  to  the  official  statistics,  the  voters 
of  Prussia  were  in  1908  divided  as  follows  :— 

First  class 293,402  electors 

Second  class 1,065,240       „ 

Third  class 6,324,079       „ 

Total     7,682,721       „ 

As  each  of  the  three  classes  possesses  equal  voting 
power,  it  follows  that  the  6,324,079  citizens  in  the 
third  class,  or  82.32  per -cent,  of  the  people,  are  prac- 
tically disfranchised.  Consequently  there  sat  in  1908 
in  the  Prussian  Diet  316  representatives  of  the  Con- 
servative and  Centre  Parties,  101  Liberals  and  Radicals, 
19  Poles,  Danes,  &c.,  and  only  7  Social  Democrats. 
The  representative  system  of  Prussia  is  a  travesty  of 
parliamentarism,  and  the  refusal  of  the  Prussian 
Government  to  enfranchise  the  people  suffices  to  show 
that  the  German  Government,  which  is  merely  the 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   LIBERALISM       449 

Prussian  Government  writ  large,  has  no  particular 
liking  for  parliamentarism,  and  may  be  expected  to 
do  everything  in  its  power  to  hinder  its  development. 
The  humiliating  way  in  which  the  payment  of  the 
Reichstag  members  has  been  arranged  is  characteristic 
of  the  Government's  attitude  towards  them.  Since 
1906  every  member  of  the  Reichstag  is  paid  £150 
per  year,  but  from  this  sum  £i  is  deducted  for  every 
day  on  which  the  member  has  either  not  attended  at 
all  or  has  not  attended  a  division.  In  order  to  prove 
that  he  has  actually  attended  the  sitting,  every  member 
must,  like  an  office  boy,  put  down  his  name  in  an 
attendance  book  provided  for  the  purpose  of  control. 

From  year  to  year  it  is  becoming  more  difficult  for 
the  Government  to  continue  governing  the  country 
with  a  Reichstag  elected  under  a  manhood  franchise 
and  with  a  Reichstag  majority  representing  not  a 
majority  but  only  a  small  minority  of  the  people. 
The  German  population  is  increasing  by  about  900,000 
per  year,  and  that  increase  takes  place  practically 
exclusively  in  the  towns,  the  strongholds  of  Liberalism 
and  of  Social  Democracy.  Through  this  natural 
growth  of  the  population  the  Liberal  and  Social  Demo- 
cratic Parties  receive  every  year  an  accession  of  about 
200,000  voters.  At  the  1912  Election  the  Liberal  and 
the  Social  Democratic  Parties  obtained  already  61.5 
per  cent.,  or  almost  two-thirds,  of  all  the  votes  given. 
Within  a  few  years  the  proportion  of  Liberal  and 
Social  Democratic  voters  may  rise  to  70  per  cent,  of 
the  electorate,  and  perhaps  higher.  Year  by  year  the 
injustice  of  not  effecting  a  redistribution  of  seats 
becomes  more  glaring  and  more  intolerable.  Year  by 
year  the  present  minority  rule  becomes  more  absurd 
and  indefensible. 

Whilst  the  Liberal  and  Social  Democratic  Parties 

2F 


450  MODERN   GERMANY 

draw  their  strength  chiefly  from  the  towns,  the  Con- 
servative and  Centre  Parties  draw  theirs  chiefly  from 
the  country.  The  German  towns  are  the  seats  of 
Germany's  wealth,  industry,  and  intelligence,  and  the 
German  townspeople  are  getting  more  and  more  im- 
patient of  being  ruled  and  taxed  by  the  country,  or 
rather  by  the  country  squires,  the  "  Junkers  "  and 
their  Clerical  allies.  They  are  getting  more  and  more 
impatient  of  being  governed  and  shepherded  and 
ordered  about  by  bureaucrats  over  whom  they  have 
no  control.  They  are  getting  more  and  more  im- 
patient of  the  constant  and  irksome  restraints  which 
are  imposed  upon  them  by  a  paternal,  honest,  and 
hard-working,  but  clumsily  and  constantly  interfering, 
police  and  officialdom.  They  have  at  last  discovered 
that,  however  they  may  vote  at  Election  time,  they 
cannot  influence  in  the  slightest  Germany's  legislation 
and  administration.  They  have  discovered  that  they 
cannot,  with  their  votes,  give  effective  expression  to 
their  desire  for  the  redress  of  their  grievances  or  compel 
the  institution  of  those  reforms  which  they  desire. 
The  people  have  discovered  that  parliamentary  govern- 
ment under  the  present  German  Constitution  is  a  sham. 
As  the  Liberals  and  the  Social  Democrats  are 
equally  opposed  to  reactionary  Conservatism  and  to 
Roman  Catholic  Clericalism,  and  are  equally  strongly 
in  favour  of  parliamentary  government,  and  as, 
furthermore,  Social  Democracy  becomes  every  year 
more  moderate  and  Liberalism  less  narrow,  the  entire 
co-operation  of  German  Liberals  and  Social  Democrats 
seems  only  a  question  of  time.  With  the  growth  of 
the  anti-absolutistic  movement  among  the  German 
masses,  it  becomes,  therefore,  from  year  to  year  more 
difficult  for  the  German  Government  to  rule  the 
country  with  the  support  of  a  constantly  shrinking 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF    LIBERALISM       451 

minority  of  the  people,  and  a  crisis  may  be  close  at 
hand.  Before  long  the  Government  may  have  to 
make  up  its  mind  whether  it  will  give  to  the  people 
the  real  parliamentary  and  representative  government 
which  the  people  demand,  or  whether  it  will  try  to 
maintain  the  unchecked  supremacy  of  the  Govern- 
ment, the  aristocracy,  and  the  officials  by  a  restriction 
of  the  franchise. 

During  several  years  many  of  the  leading  Con- 
servative politicians  and  newspapers  have  urged  the 
Government  to  "  reform  "  the  German  franchise  and 
to  remodel  it  on  the  Prussian  franchise,  whilst  others 
have  urged  the  disfranchisement  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats as  enemies  of  the  nation.  Only  a  short  time  ago 
a  Mr.  Tille  published  a  book,  Die  Berufsstandsfiolitik 
des  Gewerbe  und  Handelsstandes,  in  which  he  proved 
scientifically  the  necessity  of  Prussianising  the  German 
franchise.  Although  the  army  and  the  police  may 
be  relied  upon,  such  a  suffrage  reform  will  not  be  an 
easy  matter.  The  organisation  of  the  German  work- 
ing men  is  not  an  ephemeral  one.  Apart  from  the 
great  Social  Democratic  Party,  which  has  837,000 
members  and  which  possesses  no  less  than  eighty-one 
daily  papers,  there  are  the  German  trade  unions  to 
be  reckoned  with,  with  4,040,000  members,  and  the 
German  co-operative  societies  with  4,580,000  members. 
If  the  Government  wishes  to  crush  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic organisation,  it  must  also  crush  the  gigantic 
trade  unions  and  co-operative  societies  and  bring 
about  a  position  of  affairs  resembling  civil  war,  con- 
ditions which  may  be  fatal  to  Germany's  economic 
condition  and  prosperity. 

Possibly  the  Government  may  try  to  escape  from 
the  critical  domestic  position  towards  which  it  is 
drifting  by  engaging  in  a  great  war,  which,  if  it  be 


452  MODERN    GERMANY 

victorious,  would  give  new  prestige  and  a  fresh  lease 
of  power  to  the  German  autocracy.  However,  heroic 
measures,  such  as  a  coup  d'etat,  involving  the  dis- 
franchisement  of  millions  of  people,  or  a  foreign  war 
which,  owing  to  Germany's  isolated  position,  would 
be  extremely  risky,  requires  an  emperor  or  a  chancellor 
of  genius  and  determination,  and  it  seems  extremely 
doubtful  whether  Germany  will  produce  another  Bis- 
marck at  the  psychological  moment.  It  is  perhaps 
more  likely  that  the  new  Reichstag  will  establish  the 
failure  of  Germany's  domestic  policy  as  the  Reichstag 
of  1907-12  established  that  of  Germany's  foreign 
policy. 


CHAPTER   XX 

EDUCATION   AND   MIS-EDUCATION   IN   GERMANY 

THE  battles  of  Sadowa  and  Sedan  caused  us  to  model 
our  military  machine  upon  that  of  Germany  ;  the 
"  Generalstabswerk  "  became  as  authoritative  to  our 
officers  as  the  Bible  is  to  our  clergy.  Moltke,  Verdy 
du  Vernois,  Boguslawski,  Von  der  Goltz,  dictated  to 
us  our  strategy  and  our  tactics,  and,  having  carefully 
copied  the  German  army,  we  thought  that  we  had 
an  excellent  fighting  machine  until  our  defeats  in 
South  Africa  disillusioned  us  and  taught  us  that 
German  tactics,  though  possibly  well  adapted  to 
German  circumstances,  are  quite  unsuitable  to  British 
requirements.  During  more  than  thirty  years  the 
Emperor  Frederick's  winged  word,  "  The  Prussian 
schoolmaster  has  won  the  battle  of  Sadowa,"  has  been 
dinned  into  our  ears,  and  we  have  so  often  been  told 
that  Germany  owes  her  great  political,  and  especially 
her  still  greater  economic  success,  to  her  excellent 
education,  that  we  have  set  about  to  copy  closely 
the  educational  system  of  Germany,  although  it  is 
probably  as  unsuitable  to  British  requirements  as 
German  military  tactics  have  proved  themselves  to 
be.  England  and  America  have  been  flooded  with  a 
constantly-flowing  stream  of  books  in  praise  of  German 
education,  but  I  have  failed  to  discover  a  single  book 
on  the  failure  of  German  education,  although  such  a 
book  seems  to  be  very  urgently  required.  It  is  to 

433 


454  MODERN    GERMANY 

be  hoped  that  a  book  pointing  out  the  grave  defects 
of  German  education  from  the  English  point  of  view 
will  soon  be  written.  Meanwhile,  I  intend  in  the 
following  pages  to  point  out  some  of  the  shortcomings 
as  well  as  some  of  the  very  important  characteristics 
and  factors  of  German  education  which  have  hitherto 
escaped  observation,  and  I  hope  that  this  chapter  will 
cause  a  more  critical  investigation  and  appreciation 
of  German  education,  which  at  present  enjoys  an 
admiration  and  a  prestige  which  the  practical  results 
achieved  by  it  do  not  seem  to  justify. 

According  to  the  latest  statistics,  Germany  has 
some  60,000  elementary  State  schools,  with  about 
150,000  teachers,  who  instruct  some  10,000,000  chil- 
dren ;  she  has  more  than  1000  higher  schools,  where 
about  20,000  teachers  instruct  more  than  300,000 
pupils,  whilst  at  the  numerous  universities,  poly- 
technics, and  other  technical  high  schools,  about  6000 
professors  and  lecturers  instruct  some  95,000  students. 
If  we  include  the  professional  private  tutors  we  find 
that  the  army  of  German  educationalists  number 
about  300,000.  These  figures  are  truly  astounding 
in  their  magnitude,  and  if  "  most  educated "  be 
synonymous  with  "  best  educated,"  the  Germans  are 
undoubtedly  the  best  educated  nation  in  the  world. 
In  fact,  there  are  practically  no  uneducated  people 
in  Germany.  Of  the  260,000  recruits  who  in  1905 
joined  the  German  army,  only  82  men  coming  from 
the  frontier  districts,  where,  for  obvious  reasons,  control 
is  sometimes  impossible,  were  unable  to  read  and 
write.  It  may  therefore  be  asserted  that  in  Germany 
proper  no  uneducated  people  exist. 

The  genesis  of  the  national  educational  system  and 
of  the  educational  policy  of  Germany  is  a  curious  one. 
The  German  school  is  by  its  history  not  a  social  but 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       455 

a  purely  political  institution.  To  make  the  revolu- 
tion against  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  successful, 
Luther  found  it  necessary  to  oppose  the  powerful 
organisation  of  the  Church  which  directed  the  mind 
of  the  German  masses  and  which  held  the  people  in 
a  grip  of  iron  with  a  national  and  popular  organisation 
powerful  enough  to  oppose  the  Almighty  Church,  and 
able  to  agitate  among  the  masses  and  to  propagate 
the  Protestant  idea  far  and  wide.  The  spiritual 
guidance  and  direction  of  the  Church  of  Rome  and 
its  world-embracing  organisation  could  be  opposed 
only  by  a  machine  able  to  control  the  national  mind 
of  Germany  in  the  Protestant  interest,  and  to  deprive 
the  Roman  Church  of  its  supporters  in  the  country. 
Hence  Luther  strenuously  advocated  the  introduction 
of  a  national  and  Protestant  education  in  Germany. 
Education  was  not  to  benefit  the  few,  but  to  embrace 
all.  Thus,  through  the  revolt  of  Luther,  and  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  struggling  Protestantism 
against  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  the  idea  of  a 
national,  democratic,  and  compulsory  education  arose, 
and  was  taken  up  by  the  Protestant  princes  of  Ger- 
many, who  as  a  rule  had  become  Protestant  in  order 
to  spoliate  the  wealthy  Roman  Catholic  Church.  The 
assertion  that  a  wave  of  idealistic  sentiment  and  of 
religious  zeal  created  Protestantism  in  Germany,  that 
it  was  a  pure  and  purely  democratic  movement,  and 
that  the  spirit  of  benevolence  and  of  democracy 
created  the  German  school,  is  a  fable,  for  schools  and 
serfdom  existed  side  by  side  in  Germany  up  to  the 
nineteenth  century.  In  fact,  in  Germany,  and  espe- 
cially in  Prussia,  school  and  serfdom,  education  and 
tyranny,  went  hand  in  hand,  and  education  was  used 
by  the  Government  as  a  means  for  keeping  the  people 
in  a  state  of  subjection  and  of  mental  servitude. 


456  MODERN    GERMANY 

Up  to  the  thirteenth  century,  Prussia  was  inhabited 
by  heathen  savages,  the  ancient  Prussians,  who  were 
completely  extirpated  by  the  knights  of  the  Teutonic 
Order,  to  whom  that  savage  country  had  been  granted, 
and  when  they  had  desolated  it  by  fire  and  sword, 
Prussia  was  colonised  not  only  from  all  parts  of 
Germany  but  from  all  parts  of  Europe.  Germans, 
Frenchmen,  Dutchmen,  Swiss,  Poles,  &c.,  were 
attracted  by  the  early  rulers  of  Prussia  to  that 
country  ;  partly  to  people  the  desolate  land,  partly 
to  work  for  their  feudal  masters,  and  some  sort  of 
compulsory  national  education  was  evidently  neces- 
sary to  unify  all  these  incongruous  elements,  and  to 
obviate  the  danger  of  the  country  falling  to  pieces. 
Besides,  a  common  language  was  absolutely  necessary 
in  matters  of  administration.  However,  matters  educa- 
tional remained  in  a  very  chaotic  state,  until  Frederick 
William  I.,  one  of  the  greatest  rulers,  and  certainly 
the  ablest  and  the  most  energetic  administrator,  of 
Prussia,  resolved  to  convert  the  loosely-jointed,  ill- 
organised,  and  promiscuously-peopled  provinces  of 
Prussia  into  a  thoroughly  unified,  firmly-welded,  and 
absolutely  centralised  State.  Therefore  he  meant 
to  Germanise  the  people.  Frederick  William  was  a 
ruler  who  did  not  brook  delay.  In  1713,  the  very 
year  in  which  he  came  to  the  throne,  he  issued 
an  edict  which  aimed  at  compulsory  education  in 
Prussia,  and  as  rapidly  as  the  scanty  funds  at  his 
disposal  allowed  it,  schools  were  built,  teachers  pro- 
cured or  trained,  and  education  extended.  In 
Lithuania  alone,  1105  new  schools  were  erected,  in 
order  to  convert  the  Slav  inhabitants  of  that  country 
into  German-speaking  Prussians,  industrious,  useful, 
and  loyal  citizens  and  obedient  soldiers. 

Frederick  William's  successor,  Frederick  the  Great, 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION      457 

vastly  enlarged  the  territory  of  Prussia,  adding  by  his 
conquests  to  the  country  large  districts  inhabited  by 
Austrians,  and  by  the  division  of  Poland,  of  which 
Prussia  received  a  considerable  part,  extensive  pro- 
vinces peopled  with  Poles.     Modern  Germany,  Prusso- 
Germany,  is  a  country  which  has  sprung  by  conquest 
from  the  smallest  beginning  from  which  ever  a  great 
State  has  arisen,  and  the  different  nationalities  which 
had  been  conquered  and  joined  together  could  not  be 
kneaded  into  a  homogeneous  mass,  and  into  a  nation, 
except    by   compulsory   education.     Germany   would 
bear  an  aspect  similar  to  that  borne  at  present  by 
Austria-Hungary,   with   its   numerous   unassimilating 
nationalities,  which  fight  among  themselves,  had  not 
the    rulers   of   Prussia    vigorously   Germanised    their 
country  by  means  of  the  schools  and  of  compulsory 
education.     The  first  twenty- three  years  of  Frederick 
the  Great's  rule  were  years  of  war,  but  in  1763,  the 
year  in  which  the  Seven  Years'   War,   the  struggle 
with  Austria  and  the  great  Prussian  War  period  ended, 
he  introduced  the  celebrated  "  Generallandschulrecht," 
the  law  of  compulsory  and  general  education  for  the 
whole  of  his  dominions  and  all  the  multifarious  nation- 
alities   dwelling    in    them.     Whilst    compulsory    and 
general  education  exists  nominally  in  this  country, 
since  some  thirty  years — in  practice,  British  education 
is  even  now  neither  general  nor  compulsory,  whatever 
it  may  be  in   theory — Prussia  has  had   compulsory 
and  general  education  during  almost  a  century  and 
a  half. 

The  educational  organisation  of  Germany  was,  and 
is  still,  an  absolutist  machine,  though  at  first  sight  it 
bears  a  strongly  democratic  appearance.  In  the  char- 
acter of  Frederick  the  Great,  the  will  of  the  autocrat 
and  the  mind  of  the  philosopher  and  democrat  were 


458  MODERN    GERMANY 

curiously  mingled.  Though  he  treated  his  subjects 
like  beasts  of  burden,  he  frequently  declared  that  a 
king  should  be  the  first  servant  of  the  State  ;  in  1739 
he  proclaimed  to  the  world  in  his  "  Anti-Machiavel " 
that  he  was  a  lover  of  peace,  that  his  ideal  was  Mark 
Aurelius,  and  in  1740  he  attacked  Austria  in  a  time 
of  profound  peace.  In  matters  educational  we  find 
the  same  curious  contradictions  in  that  great  ruler. 
Whilst  some  of  the  edicts  on  education  issued  by 
the  philosopher-king  breathed  the  most  enlightened 
Liberalism — an  example  will  be  given  in  the  course 
of  this  paper — a  "  Cabinet's  Ordre "  of  the  7th 
September,  1779,  issued  by  the  king-autocrat,  laid 
down  that  "  The  people  in  the  country  are  only  to 
learn  a  little  reading  and  writing,  for  if  they  are 
taught  too  much  they  will  run  to  the  towns  in  order 
to  become  clerks,  &c."  Frederick  the  Great  and  his 
successors  did  not  wish  to  spread  enlightenment  among 
the  masses  by  means  of  the  schools,  but  intended  to 
educate  the  people  to  be  dutiful  subjects  to  their 
king,  hard-working  peasants  and  labourers  satisfied 
with  their  station,  and  reliable  and  patriotic  soldiers, 
ready  to  sacrifice  their  lives  for  their  country.  For 
these  reasons,  the  Prusso-German  educational  estab- 
lishment has  always  borne  a  distinctly  military  char- 
acter, in  its  direction  and  organisation,  and  its  first 
and  principal  object  has  been  to  teach  and  to  enforce 
discipline,  to  nationalise  the  people,  and  to  create  a 
strong  sense  of  patriotism  among  them.  That  the 
elementary  schools  of  Germany  with  their  10,000,000 
children  are  still  a  most  powerful,  perhaps  the  most 
powerful,  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  German  Government, 
may  be  seen  from  the  guiding  regulations  laid  down 
in  1872  by  Dr.  Falk,  the  Prussian  Minister  of  Educa- 
tion, for  in  these  regulations  we  read  : — 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION      459 

"  The  object  of  the  Prussian  elementary  school  has  always 
been  to  educate  the  growing  generation  to  become  pious, 
patriotic  men  and  women  who  are  able  by  means  of  the 
general  education  and  training  they  receive  to  fill  an  honour- 
able position  in  civil  society.  In  whatever  way  the  relations 
of  Church  and  State  have  been  conceived,  and  whatever 
theological  tendency  was  paramount  at  any  period,  the  re- 
ligious and  moral  education  of  youth  has  at  all  times  been 
considered  the  foremost  purpose  of  the  schools,  and  never 
have  the  administrative  authorities  of  the  State  wavered  in 
pursuing  the  high  ideal  to  sow  the  seeds  of  patriotic,  religious, 
and  moral  sentiment  in  the  children,  so  that  they  will  become 
citizens  whose  inner  worth  can  secure  the  welfare  and  pre- 
servation of  the  State. 

"  But  side  by  side  with  this  exalted  ideal,  the  requirements 
of  practical  life  have  not  been  left  out  of  sight.  Children 
must  learn  at  school  how  to  perform  duties,  they  are  to  be 
habituated  to  work,  to  take  pleasure  in  their  work,  so  as  to 
become  efficient  workers.  This  has  been  the  aim  of  popular 
education  in  Prussia  since  the  earliest  times,  and  to  this  day 
it  is  plainly  understood  by  all  administrative  officers  and 
teachers,  and  by  the  majority  of  parents,  that  it  is  the  busi- 
ness of  the  elementary  school  not  merely  to  teach  reading, 
writing,  and  arithmetic,  but  to  teach  the  citizens  cheerfully 
to  serve  their  God,  their  native  country,  and  themselves." 

The  Sunday  schools  in  Great  Britain  have  some 
8,000,000  scholars,  the  Sunday  schools  of  Germany 
have  only  some  800,000  scholars.  These  two  figures 
indicate  at  a  glance  the  fundamental  difference  between 
English  and  German  education.  Whilst  the  leading 
feature  in  English  schools  is  piety,  the  teaching  of 
religion  and  the  training  of  the  character  of  the  young, 
the  leading  feature  of  the  German  elementary  schools 
is  militant  patriotism  and  militarism,  whilst  moral  and 
religious  education  is  treated  as  a  matter  of  secon- 
dary importance.  Singing  plays  a  very  large  part 
in  German  education,  and  especially  in  elementary 
education,  because  singing  assists  splendidly  in  march- 


460  MODERN    GERMANY 

ing,  and  battles  may  be  won  by  outmarching  the 
enemy.  Hence  the  very  first  songs  which  a  German 
child  learns  are  military  songs,  such  as  : — 

I  had  a  faithful  comrade  once, 

No  better  could  there  be, 
The  drum  was  beat,  the  charge  was  led, 
Together  to  the  strife  we  sped, 

And  he  kept  step  with  me. 

A  bullet  came,  &c.,  &c. 

Dawn  of  day,  dawn  of  day  I 
To  death  thou  showest  me  the  way, 
For  when  the  bugles  loudly  blow, 
Full  soon  shall  I  be  lying  low, 

With  many  a  comrade  true. 
&c.,  &c. 

I  have  given  all  I  am  and  have, 

My  heart,  my  head,  my  hand, 
To  you  for  which  I  like  and  love, 

My  dear  old  Fatherland. 

&c.,  &c. 

The  Chinese  child  learns  spelling  from  the  Con- 
fucian classics,  the  German  child  from  tales  illustrating 
German  military  valour.  Whilst  the  English  schools 
strive  to  elevate  the  child's  character  by  installing 
the  civic  virtues,  the  German  schools  strive  almost 
exclusively  to  teach  discipline  and  to  arouse  and  to 
develop  the  military  inclinations,  or  rather  the  spirit 
of  Jingoism,  giving  little  consideration  to  the  train- 
ing of  character  and  practically  none  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  civic  virtues.  The  birthday  of  the 
Emperor  and  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Sedan 
are  the  two  great  school  festivals,  not  only  in  the 
elementary  schools  but  in  the  higher  schools  as  well, 
and  they  are  celebrated  with  patriotic  songs,  recita- 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       461 

tions,  speeches,  &c.  The  "  Hereditary  Enemy  "  plays 
a  very  large  part  in  the  elementary  history  books  of 
Germany.  No  wonder,  then,  that  the  principal  and 
almost  the  only  game  of  German  school-children  con- 
sists in  playing  at  soldiers  or  as  Frenchmen  and 
Germans,  which  lately  has  been  superseded  by  play- 
ing at  Boers  and  Englishmen.  In  Bismarck's  words, 
*'  The  mighty  influence  which  the  schools  exercise  in 
the  education  of  the  nation  consists  in  this,  that  the 
German  child,  when  handed  over  to  the  teacher,  is 
like  a  blank  sheet  of  paper,  and  all  that  is  written 
upon  it  during  the  course  of  elementary  education  is 
written  with  indelible  ink,  and  will  last  through  life. 
The  soul  of  a  child  is  like  wax.  Therefore  he  who 
directs  the  school  directs  the  country's  future."  From 
the  earliest  time  to  the  present  day,  the  Prussian 
Government  has  educated  the  young  to  an  aggressive 
military  patriotism,  and  therefore  it  may  be  said  that 
the  German  elementary  school  is  a  branch  establish- 
ment of  the  German  barracks. 

In  view  of  the  rapid  growth  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party  in  Germany,  particular  stress  has,  during  the 
last  few  decades,  constantly  been  laid  upon  the  duty 
of  the  schools  to  combat  the  Social  Democratic  move- 
ment, by  pointing  out  its  wickedness  to  the  children. 
In  an  order  of  the  ist  of  May,  1889,  William  II.  said  : 
"  I  have  for  a  long  time  been  occupied  with  the 
thought  of  making  use  of  the  schools  in  their  various 
grades  for  combating  the  spread  of  Socialistic  and 
Communist  ideas.  .  .  .  The  school  must  endeavour 
to  create  in  the  young  the  conviction  that  the  teach- 
ings of  Social  Democracy  contravene  not  only  the 
Divine  command  and  Christian  morals,  but  are  more- 
over impracticable."  However,  the  strenuous  exertions 
of  all  the  German  schools  to  fight  Socialism  by  de- 


462  MODERN    GERMANY 

picting  it  as  being  wicked,  unpatriotic,  and  opposed 
to  the  Divine  command,  have  been  perfectly  fruitless. 
The  fact  that  the  Social  Democrats,  who  are  not 
merely  a  party  of  opposition,  but  a  party  which 
opposes  the  German  Government  root  and  branch  in 
all  its  works  and  all  its  ways,  polled  more  than 
3,000,000  votes  in  1907,  that  almost  one-third  of  the 
highly-educated  German  electorate  is  composed  of 
"  fellows  without  a  Fatherland,  and  enemies  of  their 
nation,"  as  they  have  been  called  by  a  most  august 
personage  in  Germany,  shows  that  the  German 
elementary  schools  have  glaringly  failed  in  fulfilling 
the  first  and  principal  aim  and  purpose  for  which 
they  have  been  created  and  for  which  they  are  strenu- 
ously working. 

The  aim  of  the  German  elementary  schools  is, 
according  to  Dr.  Falk,  firstly,  to  promote  patriotism  ; 
secondly,  to  foster  religion  and  morality ;  thirdly,  to 
fit  the  young  for  practical  life.  The  tree  is  known  by 
its  fruit,  and  education  by  its  results.  We  have  seen 
that  the  German  elementary  schools  have  largely 
failed  in  their  first  and  principal  aim.  Let  us  now 
investigate  the  results  of  their  religious,  moral,  and 
practical  education. 

There  are  but  two  great  religions  in  Germany. 
The  Roman  Catholics,  who  form  one-third  of  the 
population,  are  religious  and  pious,  but  their  religious- 
ness is  not  due  to  the  influence  of  the  State  schools 
but  to  that  of  their  Church,  as  may  be  seen  from  the 
fact  that  the  Protestants  of  Germany,  who  form  two- 
thirds  of  the  population,  are  not  at  all  religious. 
Protestantism  is  the  State  religion  of  Prussia,  but  all 
the  endeavours  of  the  Government  to  make  the  people 
religious  have  been  in  vain.  Church-going  is  not  even 
a  social  obligation  in  the  Protestant  parts  of  Germany, 


EDUCATION   AND   MIS-EDUCATION      463 

where  churches  are  few,  and  Berlin  is,  according  to 
the  complaint  of  the  Emperor  William,  that  capital 
of  the  world  which  is  worst  provided  with  churches. 
Besides,  the  few  Protestant  churches  in  existence  stand 
almost  empty  if  we  deduct  the  soldiers  and  officers 
who  have  compulsorily  to  attend  Divine  service. 

Religiousness  and  morality  ought  to  manifest 
themselves  in  action,  not  merely  in  church-going. 
The  fact  that  there  are  on  an  average  every  year 
about  180,000  illegitimate  births  in  Germany,  whilst 
there  are  only  about  50,000  illegitimate  births  in  Great 
Britain,  and  the  fact  that  there  are  every  year  about 
12,000  suicides  in  Germany,  as  compared  with  only 
3000  suicides  in  Great  Britain,  seem  conclusively  to 
prove  that  the  German  schools  have  ill  succeeded  in 
fulfilling  their  second  aim  and  object.  Both  Chris- 
tianity and  morality  preach  toleration,  yet  toleration 
is  in  Germany  conspicuous  by  its  absence.  Roman 
Catholics  are  ill-treated  by  the  German  Protestants, 
and  Jews  are  ill-treated  by  both.  It  is  difficult  for 
Roman  Catholics  to  follow  an  official  career,  for  all 
Government  posts  are  preferably  given  to  Protestants, 
and  for  a  Jew  it  is  almost  impossible  to  become  a 
State  official  or  military  officer.  In  German  advertise- 
ments for  clerks,  commercial  travellers,  domestic  ser- 
vants, &c.,  stipulations  as  to  religion  are  frequent. 
From  the  foregoing  it  will  be  seen  that  as  regards 
religious  and  moral  education,  the  German  schools 
can  hardly  be  said  to  have  achieved  a  pronounced 
success. 

The  third  aim  of  the  elementary  schools  of  Ger- 
many is  to  prepare  the  young  for  practical  life.  As 
regards  teaching,  the  German  elementary  schools 
compare  favourably  with  the  British  elementary 
schools,  not  in  their  completeness,  but  in  the  wise 


464  MODERN    GERMANY 

limitation  of  their  programmes.  The  German  elemen- 
tary schools  teach  chiefly  homely  and  necessary  sub- 
jects, the  elements  of  knowledge,  whilst  the  English 
elementary  schools,  having  more  ambitious  aims, 
strive  to  give  to  the  child  of  the  people  a  knowledge 
more  for  show  than  for  practical  use,  a  smattering  of 
everything,  but  often  not  a  sufficient  knowledge  of 
the  most  necessary  things,  such  as  writing  and  spell- 
ing. The  German  child  learns  a  few  necessary  things 
fairly  well,  the  English  child  learns  many  things  ill, 
of  which  most  are  not  only  unnecessary,  but  positively 
harmful.  The  German  elementary  schools  educate 
the  young  to  be  successful  workers  in  their  station, 
the  English  elementary  schools  endeavour  to  convert 
the  children  of  the  poor  into  ladies  and  gentlemen 
able  to  discuss  all  the  ologies.  Whilst  German  peasant 
children  are  satisfied  to  follow  the  occupation  of  their 
fathers,  English  country  children  hate  the  country, 
sneer  at  the  rural  occupations,  and  desert  the  country 
for  town,  largely  in  consequence  of  the  townified  and 
totally  unsuitable  primary  education  which  they  have 
received.  It  is  a  misfortune  when  the  town  legislates 
for  the  country  and  determines  its  education. 

The  German  child  learns  in  the  primary  school  to 
obey,  perhaps  too  slavishly  to  obey ;  English  Board 
School  education,  erring  in  the  opposite  direction, 
gives  the  child  too  much  liberty,  often  allows  it  to 
disobey,  to  be  unruly.  German  school  children  are 
made  to  be  orderly,  punctual,  courteous,  clean ; 
English  Board  School  children  are  only  too  often 
allowed  to  be  dirty,  untidy,  and  rude  to  their  teachers, 
and  their  teachers  have  hardly  sufficient  power  to 
correct  them  when  admonition  has  failed.  The 
German  teacher  is  an  autocrat  with  a  stick,  who,  it 
must  be  admitted,  occasionally  abuses  his  authority 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       465 

and  ill-treats  the  children  ;  the  English  teacher  is 
only  too  often  a  meek  man  or  woman  of  sorrows,  who 
is  ill-treated  by  the  children.  Discipline  is  the  char- 
acteristic of  the  German  school,  lawlessness  that  of 
the  English  school.  As  regards  order,  discipline,  and 
the  sane  limitation  of  learning,  I  think  that  the 
German  elementary  schools  compare  favourably  with 
the  English  schools,  but  the  German  masses  are  quite 
as  ignorant  and  as  narrow-minded  as  the  English 
masses,  perhaps  more  so,  because  they  are  naturally 
less  curious.  Germans  read  less  than  Englishmen. 
A  navvy  reading  a  newspaper  during  the  dinner-hour 
is  a  sight  almost  unknown  in  Germany.  The  German 
workman  is  often  content  to  obtain  his  political 
information  from  gossip  with  his  comrades,  whilst 
drinking  his  beer  in  the  Wirtshaus,  where  he  spends 
as  a  rule  several  hours  a  day. 

Unfortunately,  English  Board  Schools  are  assuming 
more  and  more  the  character  of  charity  schools,  where 
charity  is  somewhat  indiscriminately  distributed  to 
all  applicants.  Hence  most  parents  who  can  afford 
to  do  so  send  their  children  to  private  schools,  and 
the  Board  Schools  have  become  preserves  for  the 
children  of  the  poor,  and  centres  and  breeding-places 
of  social  dissatisfaction  and  revolt.  In  Germany,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  children  of  the  rich  and  poor 
mingle  in  all  the  schools  as  freely  as  they  mingle  in 
the  army.  The  cause  of  this  difference  between  the 
English  and  the  German  educational  system  is  obvious. 
In  Great  Britain  the  children  of  the  well-to-do  used 
in  the  pre-Board  School  times  to  go  to  private  schools, 
and  the  children  of  the  poor  to  charity  schools.  As 
the  Board  Schools  were  unfortunately  evolved  out  of 
the  old  charity  schools,  the  elementary  schools  of  the 
English  nation  were  born  with  the  pauper  stigma 

2G 


466  MODERN    GERMANY 

branded  upon  them.  Hence  they  are  charity  schools, 
schools  for  paupers,  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  and  it 
is  to  be  feared  that  a  too  open-handed,  and  therefore 
unwise,  philanthropy  is  strengthening  the  impression 
of  the  nation  that  the  Board  School  is  a  branch  of  the 
workhouse.  In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  where 
compulsory  education  for  all  was  suddenly  introduced, 
so  to  say  on  the  same  day,  all  children  had  from  the 
first  to  go  to  the  schools  which  the  Government  had 
provided,  especially  as  the  German  Government  have 
never  encouraged,  but  have  distinctly  discountenanced, 
the  creation  of  private  schools  which  would  have 
infringed  upon  the  education  monopoly  of  the  State. 
Numerous  large  private  schools  and  church  and  chapel 
schools  similar  to  those  existing  in  England,  are  un- 
known in  Germany.  Whilst  there  are  in  Germany 
60,000  elementary  State  schools  with  10,000,000  chil- 
dren, there  are  only  643  private  elementary  schools, 
with  41,000  children.  In  other  words,  in  Germany 
only  one  child  out  of  every  250  goes  to  a  private 
school.  England  has  class  schools  and  mass  schools, 
Germany  has  practically  one  kind  of  school — national 
schools.  In  England  education  of  a  class  type,  or, 
rather,  education  differentiating  absolutely  between 
classes  and  masses,  tends  to  keep  classes  and  masses 
asunder  and  to  set  them  against  each  other ;  in 
Germany  education  of  a  democratic  type  causes  classes 
and  masses  to  commingle  and  to  appreciate  and  to 
understand  each  other. 

The  English  Board  School  child  receives  his  tuition, 
his  books,  and,  if  necessary,  his  meals,  his  boots,  and 
his  clothes  gratis,  and  the  child  is  thus  encouraged 
to  become  a  clamorous,  rapacious,  and  unblushing 
pauper,  relying  on  charity,  not  on  work,  for  a  living. 
Besides,  things  which  one  can  get  for  nothing  are 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION      467 

not  appreciated  because  they  are  considered  to  be 
worth  nothing.  Consequently,  English  parents  ac- 
cept gratuitous  education  grumblingly,  as  they  would 
accept  doles,  and  they  take  on  the  whole  little  interest 
in  the  training  of  their  children.  The  German  parents, 
on  the  other  hand,  have,  as  a  rule,  to  pay  small  sums 
for  the  tuition  of  their  children,  to  pay  for  their  books, 
&c.,  and  the  free  gift  of  meals,  boots,  and  clothes  to 
school-children  is  very  little  known  in  that  country. 
Consequently,  the  thrifty  German  parents  who  have 
to  pay  for  the  training  of  their  children  mean  to  get 
full  value  for  their  money,  and  take  an  interest  in 
their  children's  education.  An  English  child  can 
easily  avoid  going  to  school  by  the  flimsiest  of  excuses, 
and  parents  often  connive  at  the  avoidance  of  school. 
Therefore  school  attendance  is  very  irregular  in  Eng- 
land, and  little  work  is  done.  In  Germany,  a  rigorous 
supervision  and  drastic  and  immediate  punishment  of 
parents,  masters,  and  others  responsible  for  lack  of 
attendance,  causes  avoidance  of  school  attendance  to 
be  rare. 

Education,  as  service  in  the  army,  is  democratic  in 
Germany  in  so  far  as  it  is  compulsory  and  equal  for 
all.  The  children  of  rich  and  poor  sit  on  the  same 
bench.  The  present  Emperor  was  educated  at  the 
ordinary  intermediate  school  of  Cassel,  sitting  in  the 
same  room  with  the  sons  of  the  people,  children  of 
professional  men,  petty  tradesmen,  and  the  like. 
Whilst  this  indiscriminate  mixing  of  the  classes  and 
masses  in  the  elementary  and  intermediate  schools 
may,  and  probably  does,  lower  the  tone  in  the  upper 
ranks  of  German  society,  it  certainly  tends  to  elevate 
the  tone  in  the  lower  sphere,  and  to  lift  up  the  sub- 
merged millions.  The  unwashed  sons  of  German 
artisans  feel  uncomfortable  in  their  grime  when  look- 


468  MODERN    GERMANY 

ing  at  their  better-cared-for  schoolfellows,  and  learn 
to  wash  themselves  even  without  compulsion,  for 
example  is  better  than  precept,  whilst  dirty  Board 
School  children  feel  quite  comfortable,  being  exclu- 
sively surrounded  by  their  more  or  less  uncleanly 
mates  of  the  slums.  Besides,  this  mingling  of  the 
classes  urges  the  children  of  the  poor  to  become  better 
off  by  hard  work  and  thrift,  and  kindles  ambition  in 
them  at  their  most  important  period  of  life,  while  the 
English  School  Board  child  is  only  too  apt  to  herd 
with  the  herd,  to  learn  to  be  improvident,  and  to  rely 
more  on  the  bounty  of  the  rich  and  of  the  local 
authorities,  who  generously  provide  for  all,  than  on 
his  own  exertions.  The  ideal  of  the  English  middle- 
class  thus  is  to  become  gentlemen — that  is,  to  live  a 
life  of  ease  without  work,  and  the  ideal  of  the  poor  to 
live  a  life  of  ease  at  the  cost  of  the  community,  whilst 
the  ideal  of  the  German  middle-class  and  lower-class  is 
to  become  rich  by  work.  Thus  German  education  pro- 
vides a  powerful  direct  stimulus  for  national  activity 
in  Germany,  whilst  class  education  in  England  acts 
as  an  incentive  to  work  as  little  as  possible. 

The  ambition  of  the  children  of  the  German  poor 
often  causes  them  to  be  the  best  scholars,  and  the 
spirit  of  emulation  compels  the  children  of  the  rich, 
who  otherwise  would  be  lazy,  relying  on  their  fathers' 
wealth  and  their  assured  prospects,  to  work  much 
more  energetically  than  they  would  do  in  schools 
where  they  need  compete  only  with  their  social  equals. 
Owing  to  the  great  educational  opportunities  given  to 
the  German  poor  and  to  the  ambition  awakened  in 
them  to  get  on,  many  of  the  leading  scientists,  medical 
men,  lawyers,  Government  officials,  &c.,  of  Germany, 
have  risen  from  the  very  lowest  social  stratum,  whilst 
in  Great  Britain  hardly  any  except  the  children  of 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION      469 

the  middle-class  are  to  be  found  in  scientific  and  pro- 
fessional circles. 

The  mingling  of  the  classes  in  the  lower  and  the 
higher  schools  of  Germany  is  due  partly  to  the  influence 
of  Luther  already  referred  to,  but  chiefly  to  that  of 
Napoleon  I.  When  both  the  professional  army  and 
the  caste  system  of  Prussia  were  defeated  on  the  fields 
of  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  it  became  clear  to  Prussian 
patriots  that  the  era  of  national  armies  and  of  a 
national  organisation  of  the  State  had  arrived,  that 
the  time  of  class  rule,  of  the  "  Klassenstaat,"  had 
gone  by.  The  "  Tugendbund,"  the  Moral  and  Scientific 
League  of  Virtue,  which  was  created  after  the  disasters 
of  1806,  strove  to  regenerate  and  to  lift  up  the 
humiliated  country  by  elevating  the  masses.  Stein, 
Hardenberg,  Fichte,  Niebuhr,  and  the  two  Hum- 
boldts  wished  to  bind  rich  and  poor,  classes  and  masses 
together,  into  a  harmonious  co-operating  whole  for 
the  defence  of  the  country.  With  this  object  in  view, 
they  strove  to  give  equal  educational  opportunities 
to  all,  and  to  give  to  all  citizens  an  equal  intellectual 
and  educational  stake  in  the  country.  Napoleon's 
motto,  "  La  carriere  ouverte  aux  talents,"  was  adopted 
by  Prussia.  Notwithstanding  the  reactionary  ten- 
dencies of  later  times,  equality  in  education,  which 
had  sprung  from  the  disastrous  war  of  1806-7,  re~ 
mained  a  characteristic  of  the  Prusso-German  schools. 
Hence  we  do  not  find  in  Germany  a  strong  desire, 
based  on  social  prejudices,  to  prevent  the  children  of 
the  lower  classes  from  enjoying  a  liberal  education. 

The  secondary  schools  of  Germany  are  in  the  main 
cramming  establishments  of  the  worst  type,  and  they 
are  treated  by  parents  and  children  as  a  great  but 
unavoidable  evil.  Professional  careers  require,  as  a 
rule,  nine  years'  preparatory  study  at  the  Gymnasium 


470  MODERN    GERMANY 

which  German  boys  enter  when  nine  years  old,  and 
between  the  ninth  and  the  eighteenth  year  German 
boys  studying  at  the  Gymnasia  are  exclusively  occu- 
pied with  cramming.  The  Gymnasium  is  the  classical 
school  of  Germany,  in  which  Latin  and  Greek  form 
the  nucleus  of  tuition,  and  in  those  schools  the  dead 
languages  as  well  as  the  modern  ones  are  taught  in 
the  most  pitiful  manner.  Nothing  in  literature  is 
more  beautiful,  and  nothing  can  be  more  elevating 
and  more  beneficial  for  the  development  of  the  intellect 
and  of  taste  than  the  reading  of  the  Greek  and  Latin 
classics  either  in  the  original  or  in  translation  ;  but 
the  Greek  and  Latin  classics  are  not  read  but  "  trans- 
lated," slowly  dissected,  and  every  fragment  carefully 
examined  under  the  microscope,  by  the  unfortunate 
scholar  under  the  direction  of  dry-as-dust  philologists. 
A  brilliant  speech  of  Cicero  or  Demosthenes,  which 
requires  to  be  read  in  a  few  hours  in  order  to  be  appre- 
ciated, is  slowly  chewed,  re-chewed,  and  again  re- 
chewed  during  three  months.  The  modern  languages 
are  taught  in  the  same  idiotic  fashion,  and  even  the 
masterpieces  of  German  literature  are  not  read  and 
enjoyed,  but  pedantically  pulled  to  pieces  line  by  line 
and  word  by  word,  as  if  it  were  the  aim  of  the  German 
intermediate  schools  to  convert  the  German  nation 
into  a  race  of  philologists,  of  authors  of  grammars,  and 
compilers  of  dictionaries.  Other  subjects  are  similarly 
treated.  History,  for  instance,  is  learned  from  hand- 
books which,  in  the  smallest  possible  compass,  give 
the  maximum  of  facts  and  dates,  and  in  these  no 
attempt  is  made  to  show  the  organic  development  of 
states  and  the  causes  and  consequences  of  historical 
events.  Therefore,  the  German  school-books  of  history 
are  merely  compendia  of  facts  and  dates,  and  are 
about  as  interesting  as  is  a  railway  time-table.  During 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       471 

nine  years,  the  unfortunate  German  boys  are  com- 
pelled to  commit  to  memory  an  immense  quantity  of 
unconnected,  unpalatable,  and  mostly  useless  informa- 
tion presented  in  the  most  repelling  form. 

It  may  be  that  nine  years  of  continual  cramming 
is  useful  in  this,  that  it  improves  the  memory  of  the 
pupils,  but  it  seems  more  likely  that  the  memorj^ 
suffers  by  being  overtaxed.  On  the  other  hand  the 
harm  done  by  constant  cramming,  which  is  merely 
undertaken  for  the  object  of  passing  an  examination, 
is  incalculable.  Since  no  attempt  is  made  to  develop 
the  independent  thinking  power  of  the  scholar,  the 
unfortunate  pupils  become  learned  automatons,  and 
though  they  have  some  knowledge  of  Latin  and  Greek 
and  French  and  various  sciences,  they  are  usually  not 
able  to  write  German  correctly.  The  German  news- 
papers and  modern  German  books  are  atrociously 
written.  Since  the  examination  with  which  the  nine 
years'  torture  ends  has  to  be  passed  to  enable  the 
scholar  to  attend  the  university  and  to  become  a 
professional  man,  the  insane  tyranny  of  the  Gym- 
nasium has  to  be  borne.  When  at  last  freedom  dawns 
for  the  martyr,  the  first  act  of  those  who  after  nine 
years'  weary  and  almost  useless  labour  have  passed 
the  concluding  examination,  often  is  to  make  a  bon- 
fire of  their  books.  A  German  who  has  passed  the 
Arbiturienten  Examen  endeavours,  as  a  rule,  to  forget 
as  rapidly  as  possible  all  the  useless  stuff  which  he 
had  to  learn  during  nine  years  mis-spent. 

In  order  to  show  that  the  foregoing  statements 
are  not  exaggerated  I  would  give  two  German 
opinions  in  support  of  them.  In  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  of  the  i4th  December  1906,  an  article  entitled 
"  Education  to  Manliness  "  was  published  in  which 
we  read  :— 


472  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  Our  schools  do  not  form  the  character.  That  is  the 
complaint  which,  more  or  less  clearly  formulated,  may  be 
found  in  all  the  books  which  advocate  the  reform  of  out 
education.  Our  German  schools  turn  men  into  machines, 
educate  them  to  submissiveness,  to  cowardice,  to  pettiness 
and  pedantry,  to  much  that  is  unlovely  and  pernicious,  and 
they  fail  to  form  strong-minded,  self-conscious  men.  And  the 
State  requires  nothing  more  than  men,  manly  men.  In  short 
our  German  schools  spoil  the  character  of  the  child  and  his 
intelligence  by  systematically  shackling  his  mind,  by  cramming 
his  brain,  and  by  filling  it  with  dead  matter.  Thus  the 
thinking  power  is  killed,  individuality  is  destroyed,  and  the 
mental  horizon'  and  the  development  of  moral  sentiment  are 
narrowed  and  repressed." 

In  his  recently  published  book,  Deutsche  Schuler- 
ziehung,  Professor  W.  Rein,  one  of  the  leading 
educational  authorities  of  Germany,  said  in  the 
preface : — 

"  It  cannot  be  denied  that  our  schools  have  achieved 
much.  However  it  was  thought  that  the  principal  object  of 
schools  was  to  distribute  knowledge  so  as  to  prepare  youth 
for  the  labour  of  active  life.  Our  schools  were  and  are  still 
in.  the  main  devoted  to  instilling  knowledge,  and  in  that  they 
have  done  much,  but  they  have  neglected  the  formation  of 
character. 

"  In  this  respect  the  good  English  schools  are  no  doubt 
ahead  of  the  German  schools,  because  the  former  strive  not 
only  to  increase  knowledge  but  also  to  raise  men  of  char- 
acter, firmness,  and  energy  ;  and  the  history  of  England  shows 
clearly  to  all  those  who  have  eyes  to  see  what  strong  and 
energetic  men  who  know  what  they  are  doing  are  able  to 
achieve.  Only  a  few  German  schools  exist  where  workshops, 
playing-fields,  school-gardens,  common  walks,  and  excursions 
break  the  monotony  of  the  study  of  dead  books. 

"  We  require  educators  not  merely  teachers.  A  teacher 
requires  nothing  but  knowledge.  An  educator  requires  more." 

The  authorities  responsible  for  the  programme  of 
the  German  Gymnasium  probably  think  that  that 
institution  is  most  admirably  adapted  for  preparing 


EDUCATION    AND   MIS-EDUCATION      473 

the  young  intelligence  for  successful  professional  or 
administrative  careers,  but  they  might  be  enlightened 
as  to  the  proper  character  of  intermediate  education 
by  the  broad-minded  instructions  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  delivered  to  the  professors  of  the  Civil  and 
Military  Academy  for  Young  Gentlemen,  in  which 
the  King  said : — 

"  The  masters  shall  studiously  endeavour  not  only  to  store 
the  memories  of  the  pupils  with  useful  knowledge,  but  above 
all  to  create  in  them  a  certain  agility  of  mind,  which  shall 
render  them  capable  of  applying  themselves  not  to  one  study 
alone  but  to  any  that  may  be  found  expedient,  in  particular 
to  the  cultivation  of  their  reason  and  to  the  forming  of  their 
judgment.  To  this  end,  it  is  necessary  that  the  masters 
should  accustom  their  pupils  to  form  just  and  clear  ideas 
of  things." 

Besides,  Frederick  the  Great  wished  the  young 
intelligence  of  the  nation  to  be  fully  and  liberally 
instructed  in  political  matters,  for  he  wrote  in  the 
same  Memoire: — 

"  The  preceptor  will  confine  himself  to  giving  his  pupils 
an  idea  of  the  rights  of  citizens,  the  rights  of  the  people, 
the  rights  of  the  monarch,  and  of  that  which  is  called  Law. 
He  will  not  fail  to  impress  upon  their  minds  that  Law,  being 
destitute  of  any  actual  sanctity  for  enforcing  its  observance, 
is  a  vain  phantom  that  sovereigns  do  not  fail  to  display  in 
their  instructions  and  manifestoes,  though  they  often  violate 
its  principles  in  their  own  conduct." 

The  broad-minded  precepts  of  Frederick  the  Great 
have  been  utterly  forgotten  in  Germany.  A  highly- 
educated  young  German,  who  has  spent  twelve  years 
at  school,  has  as  a  rule  not  sufficient  knowledge  of 
the  political  affairs  of  his  country  to  be  able  to  read 
the  newspaper  with  profit,  and  he  has,  as  a  rule,  no 
knowledge  whatever  of  his  rights. 

On  the  4th  of  December,  1890,  William  II.  made 


474  MODERN    GERMANY 

a  very  long  speech  on  the  reform  of  intermediate 
education  in  Germany,  which  is  all  the  more  interest- 
ing as  the  Emperor,  through  his  own  experience  in 
Cassel,  was  practically  acquainted  with  the  tyranny 
of  the  Gymnasium  and  its  worthlessness.  In  that 
speech  he  bitterly  complained  : — 

'  .  .  .  The  cause  of  the  mis-education  given  is  this,  that 
the  philologists  have  been  the  beati  possidentes  of  the 
Gymnasium,  and  that  these  have  laid  all  stress  upon  the 
matters  to  be  learned  but  not  upon  the  forming  of  character 
and  upon  the  requirements  of  practical  life.  They  think  that 
the  chief  thing  is  that  the  young  man  should  "  know  "  as 
much  as  possible.  Whether  their  knowledge  be  useful  or 
useless  to  them  in  after  life,  is  treated  as  a  matter  of  secondary 
importance.  We  ought  to  educate  young  Germans  sons  of 
the  nation,  not  young  Greeks  and  Romans.  We  ought  to 
desert  the  programme  received  from  the  ancient  monasteries. 
We  cannot  go  on  in  this  manner." 

Many  years  have  passed  since  this  speech  was 
made,  but  the  passive  resistance  of  the  German  philo- 
logists has  proved  stronger  than  the  Emperor's  re- 
forming zeal.  The  German  intermediate  schools  are 
still  torture  houses  for  the  mind,  where  the  memory 
is  overloaded  and  the  intelligence  stunted  and  de- 
stroyed. The  education  given  at  the  intermediate 
schools  of  Germany  should  be  a  warning  example  to 
England,  the  admiration  and  eulogy  of  English 
philologists  notwithstanding.  After  all,  we  are  not 
all  philologists. 

In  his  speech  of  the  4th  of  December,  1890,  the 
Emperor  also  mentioned  that,  owing  to  over-study, 
often  three-quarters  of  the  scholars  in  the  upper 
classes  are  short-sighted,  that  in  his  own  class  at  Cassel 
eighteen  young  men  out  of  twenty-one  had  to  wear 
glasses.  No  doubt  over-study  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  prevalence  of  short-sightedness  in  Germany, 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       475 

but  the  evil  effect  of  constant  cramming  of  the  mind 
is  aggravated  by  the  utter  neglect  of  the  body  of  the 
German  pupil.  According  to  the  ideas  of  the  mediaeval 
Churchmen,  who  are  responsible  for  the  programme 
of  the  German  Gymnasium,  the  body  was  vile  matter 
and  was  to  be  neglected,  and  to  be  chastised  when 
the  flesh,  the  devil,  rebelled  against  the  soul,  whilst 
mind  and  soul  were  to  be  cherished  and  cultivated. 
Already  St.  Paul  had  taught  "  Bodily  exercise  pro- 
fiteth  little,"  and  bodily  exercise  was,  until  lately, 
considered  by  German  thinkers  not  only  to  be  un- 
profitable, but  also  to  be  little  in  accordance  with 
that  dignified  bearing  which  a  devotee  of  science 
ought  to  manifest  in  his  deportment  and  in  his  every 
action. 

Germany  is  by  nature  a  gameless  country.  Whilst 
the  sporting  history  of  Great  Britain  can  be  traced 
back  at  least  a  thousand  years,  sport,  in  the  English 
sense,  was  until  lately  unknown  among  the  masses  of 
Germany.  Prussia's  defeat  by  Napoleon  I.  in  1806 
created  a  kind  of  sport,  Turnen,  German  gymnastics. 
Jahn,  an  enthusiastic  patriot,  wished  to  raise  in 
Prussia  a  race  of  warriors  similar  to  the  ancient 
Germans  described  by  Tacitus.  He  introduced  not 
only  modern  gymnastics,  but  strove  at  the  same  time 
to  arouse  the  fighting  spirit  and  the  sense  of  inde- 
pendence among  the  people.  By  his  agitation  he 
made  himself  and  his  gymnasts  obnoxious  to  the 
reactionary  Government  which  ruled  Prussia  after 
the  defeat  of  Napoleon,  and  the  result  was  that  the 
Government  imprisoned  Jahn  and  dissolved  the  gym- 
nastic society  as  dangerous  to  the  State.  After  a 
time  gymnastics  were  again  encouraged  by  the  State, 
and  now  every  intermediate  school  possesses  a  gym- 
nasium similar  to  the  English  gymnasia.  The 


476  MODERN    GERMANY 

gymnastic  exercises  with  bars,  ladders,  &c.,  are  excel- 
lent, but  only  two  hours  a  week  were  allotted  to  them 
up  to  1891,  when,  through  the  Emperor's  action,  a 
third  hour  was  added.  As  the  number  of  apparatus 
is  limited,  the  German  schoolboy  has  on  an  average 
hardly  more  than  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  of  gym- 
nastic exercise  during  the  week.  Games  such  as 
football  and  cricket  being  unknown  in  Germany,  the 
Government  tried  to  add  "  regulated  play  "  in  homoeo- 
pathic doses  to  regulated  gymnastics.  Even  at  the 
universities  organised  sport,  a  little  fencing  excepted, 
is  practically  non-existent.  Playfulness  is  neither  a 
characteristic  of  the  German  people  nor  of  German 
life,  and  as  regards  physical  education,  the  German 
schools  are  worthless. 

Germany  has  no  less  than  23  universities,  at  which 
almost  3000  professors  and  lecturers  teach  about 
66,000  students,  and  the  number  of  the  university 
students  in  Germany  is  increasing  at  a  most  remark- 
able rate.  In  1870-1,  there  were  12,256  university 
students  in  Germany ;  in  1911,  66,358  were  counted 
in  that  country.  In  the  short  space  of  forty  years 
the  number  of  students  in  the  German  universities 
has  more  than  quintupled,  and  it  is  still  growing  by 
leaps  and  bounds.  However,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
it  is  a  matter  for  congratulation  that  the  German  uni- 
versities are  turning  out  an  ever-growing  army  of  un- 
employed doctors,  lawyers,  theologians,  and  teachers, 
who,  by  the  pressure  of  their  competition,  lower  the 
status  of  all  professions  and  form  a  huge  learned,  and 
therefore  the  more  dangerous,  proletariat.  Although 
the  German  universities  are  still  leading  in  various 
departments  of  abstract  science,  they  do  not  appear 
to  be  superior  to  the  high  schools  of  Great  Britain  in 
direct  national  utility.  In  fact,  I  venture  to  affirm 


EDUCATION    AND   MIS-EDUCATION      477 

that  the  average  British  doctor,  lawyer,  clergyman, 
and  schoolmaster  is  distinctly  superior  to  his  German 
colleague.  The  superiority  of  the  German  universities, 
which  was  very  great  in  the  time  when  university 
teaching  in  Great  Britain  was  at  its  lowest  ebb,  is  a 
thing  of  the  past.  The  chief  effect  of  the  activity  of 
the  German  universities  in  creating  a  huge  proletariat 
of  unemployed  professional  men  is  this,  that  the 
output  of  books,  mostly  worthless,  has  enormously 
increased  in  Germany.  During  the  last  thirty  years 
the  number  of  new  books  published  in  that  country 
has  in  round  figures  increased  from  about  10,000  to 
about  30,000  per  year. 

Although  Germany  is  no  longer  a  model  to  Great 
Britain  in  elementary,  intermediate,  and  practical 
university  education,  she  is  no  doubt  far  ahead  of 
this  country  in  technical  education.  Therefore  the 
German  technical  high  schools  are  far  more  popular 
with  foreign  students  than  are  the  German  univer- 
ties.  Of  the  students  at  the  polytechnica,  20  per 
cent,  are  foreigners  ;  of  the  students  at  the  forestry 
academies,  30  per  cent,  are  foreigners  ;  of  the  students 
at  the  mining  academies,  almost  40  per  cent,  are 
foreigners  ;  of  the  students  at  the  universities  only 
8  per  cent,  are  foreigners.  The  efficiency  and  the 
benefit  of  technical  education  in  Germany  have  been 
very  much  exaggerated  in  Great  Britain.  German 
technical  education,  like  German  general  education, 
is  more  extensive  than  intensive,  more  showy  than 
practical  and  thorough,  and  in  not  a  few  instances 
its  efforts  are  misdirected.  For  instance,  enormous 
exertions  have  been  made  to  advance  architecture 
and  the  building  trade,  and  no  expenses  have  been 
spared,  but  the  results  achieved  are  the  reverse  of 
satisfactory.  The  design  of  the  public  and  private 


478  MODERN    GERMANY 

buildings  which  during  the  last  decade  have  been 
erected  is  as  a  rule  laboured,  unpleasing,  or  ugly,  and 
the  inner  arrangements  are  unpractical.  The  new 
House  of  Parliament  is  a  case  in  point.  The  numerous 
pretentious  but  ugly  monuments  lately  erected  in 
Berlin  and  elsewhere  also  testify  to  the  fact  that 
schools  may  give  knowledge  but  cannot  give  ability. 
There  is  a  German  proverb,  "  Je  gelehrter  desto 
verkehrter,"  "  The  greatest  fool  is  a  learned  fool." 
There  is  much  truth  in -that  proverb. 

Germany  has  a  huge  number  of  technical  schools 
of  every  grade.  There  are  technical  schools  for 
apprentices,  for  artisans,  for  foremen,  for  managers, 
for  directors  of  industrial  establishments,  for  mer- 
chants and  bankers,  &c.,  and  every  day  additional 
technical  schools  are  created.  Besides,  itinerant  in- 
structors visit  the  villages,  which  are  too  small  to 
have  technical  schools  of  their  own.  In  many  in- 
stances technical  education  is  compulsory.  The  thing 
is  being  overdone.  Felisch  wrote  :  "  We  pay  for  our 
greater  theoretical  knowledge  with  diminished  prac- 
tical ability,"  and  Von  Steinbeis  lately  complained, 
"  Theoretical  education  has  been  given  such  a  pre- 
ponderance that  even  in  our  smallest  workshops  the 
pedantic  spirit  of  the  school  penetrates  the  air,  a  spirit 
which  is  not  exactly  conducive  to  quick  and  efficient 
work,  and  which  is  absent  in  countries  which  have 
arrived  at  a  higher  stage  of  industrial  development 
than  Germany."  Carl  Roscher,  speaking  of  the 
learned  proletariat  issuing  from  the  Technical  High 
Schools,  complained  about  the  insufficient  supply  of 
practical  workers  of  the  better  class,  and  is  of  opinion 
that,  "  compared  with  England  and  the  United  States, 
the  education  of  our  young  engineers  at  the  Technical 
High  Schools  costs  too  much  money  and  too  much 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       479 

time."  In  a  lengthy  report  on  German  technical 
education,  published  in  1902  by  the  United  States 
Commissioner  of  Labour,  we  read  with  regard  to  the 
Technical  High  Schools,  "  The  education  here  received 
often  exceeds  the  real  needs  of  many  branches  of 
industry.  Hence  there  may  result  a  loss  of  time 
which  could  have  been  devoted  to  obtaining  practical 
skill." 

Many  similar  opinions  given  by  high  authorities  on 
technical  education  could  be  quoted,  which  show  that 
Charlottenburg  and  the  other  Technical  High  Schools 
of  Germany,  at  which  an  army  of  more  than  12,000 
students  are  trained,  are  not  an  unmixed  blessing,  and 
it  is  not  without  cause  that  the  best  engineers  in  the 
world  are  the  practically  trained  English  engineers, 
although  their  theoretical  knowledge  is  small,  if  com- 
pared with  that  of  their  inferior  German  competitors. 
It  can  also  not  be  admitted  that  the  industrial  success 
of  Germany  is  due  to  the  general  education  of  the 
masses  of  industrial  workers.  The  fact  that  practi- 
cally every  man  in  Germany  can  read  and  write  has 
little  if  anything  to  do  with  that  country's  prosperity 
and  the  flourishing  state  of  its  industries.  The  Belgian 
industries  are  comparatively  far  more  flourishing  than 
are  those  of  Germany ;  yet  in  Belgium  128  out  of 
every  1000  recruits  are  unable  to  write.  It  should 
also  not  be  forgotten  that  Great  Britain  had  the  best 
workmen  in  the  world  at  the  time,  when  her  workers 
were  practically  uneducated. 

The  foregoing  sketch,  which,  for  want  of  space,  is 
necessarily  incomplete,  should  suffice  to  show  that 
German  education,  although  it  has  not  a  few  excellent 
points,  is  in  many  respects  exceedingly  unsatisfactory. 
The  chief  practical  value  of  the  German  schools  con- 
sists, in  my  opinion,  not  in  the  knowledge  dissemi- 


480  MODERN   GERMANY 

nated,  but  in  the  discipline  instilled,  but  that  part  of 
German  education  has  not  been  copied  by  the  educa- 
tional authorities  of  Great  Britain  who  have  merely 
looked  at  the  programme  of  the  German  schools,  and 
who  have  taken  the  shadow  of  German  education  for 
its  substance.  English  education,  and  especially 
English  primary  education,  is  apt  to  make  men  lazy 
and  women  flighty.  It  teaches  them  the  way  of 
getting  a  living  without  labour,  it  teaches  them  self- 
indulgence  and  selfishness.  Individualism  in  the 
worst  sense,  every  one  for  himself,  is  the  motto  of 
the  English  school,  and  the  result  is  that  the  people 
endeavour  to  make  a  living  rather  by  exploiting 
others  than  by  working  themselves.  Even  coster- 
mongers  and  crossing-sweepers  endeavour  to  be  "  em- 
ployers of  labour,"  and  to  live  by  other  people's  work. 
German  education,  on  the  other  hand,  teaches  the 
young  to  work,  to  obey,  and  before  all  to  obey  the 
authorities,  and  that  lesson  is  still  further  driven  into 
every  German  man  after  he  has  left  school  by  the 
most  powerful  educational  agency  of  Germany,  the 
German  Army.  German  education,  both  civil  and 
military,  has,  by  its  teaching  of  discipline,  created  a 
docile  population  of  willing  workers,  who  are  easily 
led  by  a  conscientious,  able,  and  well-intentioned 
administration;  it  has  created  a  population  which, 
more  readily  than  the  British  population,  places  the 
interests  of  the  country  above  personal  and  pecuniary 
interests.  Bagehot  wrote  :  "  The  natural  impulse  of 
the  English  people  is  to  resist  authority,"  and  he 
might  have  added,  "  to  resist  each  other."  That 
spirit  is  a  national  misfortune.  In  Germany  no 
similar  spirit  of  instinctive  and  unreasoning  resistance 
to  the  authorities  and  no  similar  spirit  of  mutual  dis- 
trust among  the  citizens,  which  is  the  natural  corollary 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION       481 

of  individualism  and  of  free,  unlimited  and  mutually 
destructive  competition  of  all  with  all — the  bellum 
omnium  contra  omnes  of  Hobbes — is  noticeable.  There- 
fore national  organisation  and  national  co-operation 
in  matters  political  and  economical,  which  have  made 
Germany  great,  could  easily  be  established  in  that 
country.  It  cannot  too  often  and  too  loudly  be 
asserted  that  Germany  has  become  great  and  powerful 
not  through  her  education,  as  synonymous  with  know- 
ledge, but  through  her  discipline.  National  co-opera- 
tion, the  co-ordination  of  all  the  national  forces,  which 
is  developed  to  a  higher  extent  in  Germany  than  in 
any  other  country,  has  proved  stronger  than  indi- 
vidualism which  squanders  the  national  forces  in 
constant  internecine  warfare.  But  co-ordination  is 
impossible  without  subordination.  Unfortunately  the 
spirit  of  subordination  seems  to  be  incompatible  with 
the  spirit  of  Democracy.  According  to  a  great  philo- 
sopher, the  spirit  of  Democracy  is  the  spirit  of  jealousy 
and  distrust.  German  administration,  with  its  highly- 
developed  centralisation  and  its  vast  discretionary 
powers,  is  based  on  the  confidence  of  the  ruled  in  their 
rulers  ;  British  administration,  with  its  minute  sub- 
division of  power,  and  its  countless  checks  and  counter- 
checks, which  serve  rather  to  obstruct  than  to  regulate, 
is  based  upon  distrust. 

Germany  owes  her  political  and  economic  success 
certainly  not  to  the  book  knowledge  which  her  citizens 
receive  in  her  schools,  for  the  German  schools,  like  all 
other  schools,  merely  turn  out  a  mob  of  semi-educated 
mediocrities  possessed  of  an  overworked  and  tortured 
memory  and  of  an  under-developed  or  an  undeveloped 
intelligence.  Indeed,  I  venture  emphatically  to  affirm 
that  Germany,  with  all  her  schools  and  universities, 
and  with  her  army  of  300,000  teachers,  is  a  far  less 

2H 


482  MODERN    GERMANY 

intelligent  and  far  less  cultured  nation  than  is  the 
British  nation.  The  general  intelligence  and  culture 
of  a  nation  may  be  measured  by  the  Press,  which 
appeals  to  all,  and  which  reflects  the  national  mind 
as  in  a  mirror,  and  I  think  that  no  educated  German 
will  contradict  me  if  I  state  that  the  whole  Press  of 
Germany — dailies,  weeklies,  monthlies — is  not  only 
vastly  inferior  to  the  British  Press,  but  is  quite 
unworthy  of  the  intelligence  of  a  cultured  nation. 
The  German  newspapers  and  periodicals,  generally 
speaking,  are  filled  not  with  facts  but  with  trash,  and 
the  leading  dailies,  such  as  the  Kolnische  Zeitung, 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  Vossische  Zeitung,  which  contain 
very  little  positive  information  even  if  compared  with 
a  minor  provincial  English  paper,  are  read  only  by  a 
few,  having  on  an  average  a  circulation  of  only  about 
30,000.  A  comparison  of  the  Times  with  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung,  of  the  Daily  Mail  with  the  Berliner  Lokalan- 
zeiger,  or  Der  Tag,  of  Punch  with  Kladderadatsch,  of  the 
Deutsche  Rundschau  and  the  Deutsche  Revue  with  the 
great  English  monthlies,  will  show  that  the  reading 
matter  presented  to  all  ranks  and  classes  of  German 
society  is  of  a  deplorable  type.  The  German  Press  is 
a  century  behind  the  English  Press,  and  the  low 
standard  of  the  whole  German  Press  shows  that  the 
German  nation  is  not  a  nation  of  thinkers.  On  the 
contrary. 

Schopenhauer  wrote  :  "  Few  learned  men  have  as 
much  common-sense  as  is  frequently  found  in  the 
quite  unlearned."  Most  great  men  have  either  lacked 
school  training  or  have  been  amateurs.  Our  greatest 
engineering  geniuses  were  working  men  devoid  of 
technical  education.  Arkwright,  originally  a  barber, 
was  never  at  school,  Josiah  Wedgwood  started  work 
when  eleven  years  old,  Alfred  Krupp  was  a  smith, 


EDUCATION    AND    MIS-EDUCATION      483 

Edison  was  a  newsvendor,  and  a  hundred  similar 
examples  could  easily  be  quoted.  The  greatest  men 
not  only  in  industry,  but  in  all  ranks  of  life,  were  self- 
taught.  After  all  a  teacher  cannot  teach  more  than 
he  knows,  and  teachers,  being  usually  mediocrities, 
turn  out  mediocrities.  Art,  industry,  and  science 
flourished  most  in  Great  Britain  when  education  was  at 
its  lowest  ebb.  Education  will  give  us  neither  poli- 
tical nor  industrial  leaders,  for  these  must  educate 
themselves.  At  the  same  time  it  should  not  be  for- 
gotten that  leaders  without  followers  are  almost  use- 
less, and  the  utility  of  the  German  schools  lies  in  this 
that  they  turn  out  a  huge  rank  and  file  of  educated 
mediocrities.  The  hosts  of  mediocre  German  chemists 
have  established  the  most  flourishing  industry  in  the 
world  by  making  use  of  the  inventions  of  the  great 
chemical  geniuses  of  England  and  France  who,  lacking 
an  adequate  rank  and  file,  were  unable  to  utilise  their 
inventions  in  their  own  country. 

The  foregoing  pages  show  that  German  education 
has  in  Great  Britain  been  much  overvalued  and  much 
misunderstood,  and  it  seems  to  be  a  dangerous  experi- 
ment to  model  British  education  on  the  more  unsatis- 
factory part  of  German  education,  the  dissemination 
of  knowledge,  which  is  by  no  means  the  strong  point 
of  the  German  educational  system,  except  from  the 
philologist's  point  of  view.  After  all,  great  national 
institutions,  such  as  Parliament,  civil  service,  army, 
and  schools,  cannot  mechanically  be  copied  from 
other  nations,  because  such  institutions  are  not  dead 
things,  but  living  organisms  which  have  slowly  grown 
up  from  a  deep  historical  and  national  foundation. 
National  education  and  national  armies  must  before 
all  be  national,  they  must  be  in  accordance  not  only 
with  the  peculiar  requirements  of  the  country,  but 


484  MODERN    GERMANY 

also  with  the  peculiar  character  and  spirit  of  its 
inhabitants.  If  we  wish  to  introduce  the  German 
educational  system  into  Great  Britain,  and  to  make 
it  a  success,  we  must  begin  by  turning  Englishmen 
into  Germans. 


CHAPTER    XXI 

THE   RURAL   INDUSTRIES   OF   GERMANY 

DURING  about  forty  years  British  agriculture  has 
steadily  been  losing  ground,  and  the  consequence  to 
agriculturists  and  to  those  whose  means  are  invested 
in  agricultural  property  have  been  disastrous.  The 
total  loss  of  capital  invested  in  agriculture  which  has 
taken  place  since  1874,  owing  to  the  decay  of  the 
rural  industries,  has  been  estimated  to  amount  to  the 
colossal  sum  of  about  £1,000,000,000  ;  but  it  seems 
likely  that  that  estimate  is  too  low,  and  that  the  total 
loss  is  about  twice  larger  than  the  whole  amount  of 
our  National  Debt.1  Some  people  are  of  opinion  that 
the  further  decay  of  our  agriculture  may  be  stopped 
by  cheap  freights,  co-operation,  &c. ;  but  others,  and 
they  are  the  vast  majority,  frankly  despair  of  our 
rural  industries.  In  fact,  most  British  statesmen, 
politicians,  political  economists,  and  publicists  declare 
that  the  destruction  of  our  rural  industries  was  in- 
evitable ;  and  the  axiom  has  been  laid  down  that  a 
European  State  cannot  possibly,  on  its  limited  and 
overcrowded  territory,  pursue  agriculture  at  a  profit, 
because  it  cannot  compete  with  the  United  States, 
Argentina,  &c.,  where  good  land  is  cheap  and  plentiful. 
It  has  become  a  conviction  with  most  Englishmen 
that  a  European  State  cannot  possess  at  the  same 
time  flourishing  manufacturing  and  prosperous  rural 

1  Sir  Inglis  Palgrave,  in  a  lecture  held  on  the  22nd  February  1905,  esti- 
mated that  the  agricultural  loss  during  the  last  thirty  years  amounted  to 
£1,700,000,000. 

485 


486  MODERN    GERMANY 

industries,  and  the  industrial  backwardness  of  France, 
Holland,  Denmark,  countries  where  agriculture  is 
prosperous,  appears  to  confirm  this  theory.  But, 
as  Belgium  and  Germany  possess,  side  by  side,  both 
highly  developed  manufacturing  industries  and  a 
flourishing  agriculture,  that  theory  appears  to  be  un- 
tenable. Therefore,  it  is  worth  while  to  investigate 
whether  the  agricultural  prosperity  of  Germany,  our 
chief  industrial  competitor,  is  real  or  apparent, 
ephemeral  or  likely  to  last,  harmful  or  helpful  to  her 
manufacturing  efficiency;  and  it  is  clear  that,  if 
Germany  can  make  her  rural  industries  pay,  Great 
Britain,  which  is  far  more  favoured  by  Nature  for 
the  successful  pursuit  of  agriculture,  should  certainly 
be  able  to  do  better  than  Germany. 

Compared  with  Great  Britain,  Germany  possesses 
a  poor  soil,  an  unfavourable  geographical  position 
and  structure,  and  an  unfavourable  climate,  her 
winter  being  long  and  very  severe.  Her  transport 
facilities  for  agricultural  produce  by  land  and  water, 
were  formerly  quite  insufficient,  and  even  now  her 
agricultural  produce  has  to  be  carried  for  hundreds 
of  miles  inland  to  the  markets,  whilst  British  fields 
are  everywhere  in  easy  reach  of  the  sea  and  of  cheap 
transport.  Even  to-day,  German  agriculture  has  to 
battle  with  long  distances.  In  East  Prussia  and 
Pomerania,  for  instance,  there  are  agricultural  districts 
which  lie  twenty  miles  from  the  nearest  railway 
station.  The  rural  labour  of  Germany  also  was,  and 
probably  is  still,  inferior  to  that  of  Great  Britain. 
A  century  ago,  the  German  peasants  were  serfs — 
serfdom  lingered  in  places  until  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century ;  and  even  now  the  independence 
of  the  peasantry  is,  in  many  parts  of  Germany,  more 
theoretical  than  real.  Therefore  Germany's  rural 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     487 

population  was,  and  in  certain  parts  of  Germany  is 
still,  obstinately  and  stupidly  conservative.  When 
Frederick  the  Great  distributed  clover  seed  to  the 
peasantry,  they  refused  to  sow  it.  When  ordered 
to  sow  the  seed,  the  peasants  boiled  it  first  in  order 
to  prevent  it  sprouting  ;  when  given  seed  potatoes, 
they  boiled  the  seed  potatoes  before  putting  them 
in  the  ground. 

Owing  to  the  poverty  of  the  soil,  the  inclemency 
of  the  climate,  long  distances,  the  difficulties  of  trans- 
port, and  the  backwardness  and  poverty  of  her  rural 
population,  agriculture  in  Germany  was  extremely 
primitive  when  it  was  highly  successful  and  pros- 
perous in  this  country.  Some  decades  ago,  prices 
for  corn  and  meat  were  exceedingly  low  in  Germany, 
cattle  were  kept  chiefly  for  ploughing  and  for  manure, 
and  were  largely  fed  on  straw.  Agricultural  Germany 
used  to  bear  an  aspect  similar  to  that  of  agricultural 
Russia  of  to-day.  However,  during  forty  or  fifty 
years,  the  rural  industries  of  Germany  have  continu- 
ally progressed,  and  they  have  even  progressed  during 
the  last  decades,  when  Great  Britain  suffered  from 
an  unparalleled  agricultural  depression. 

Between  1875  and  1908,  3,200,000  acres  which 
were  under  cereals,  and  1,000,000  acres  which  were 
under  green  crops,  have  in  Great  Britain  gone  out  of 
cultivation,  and  nothing  but  grass  grows  now  where 
the  plough  used  to  work.  But,  notwithstanding  the 
great  increase  of  pastures,  the  number  of  live  stock 
in  Great  Britain  has,  during  that  time,  increased 
by  only  10  per  cent.  If  we  now  turn  from  this 
dismal  picture  of  decay  to  Germany,  we  find  that 
during  the  most  trying  period  of  our  agriculture, 
the  rural  industries  of  Germany  show  the  following 
record  : — 


1883 


488  MODERN  GERMANY 

AGRICULTURAL  AREA  OF  GERMANY 
Hectares  (i  hectare  is  equal  to  2j  acres) 

Corn  crops  Green  crops  Gardens  Grass  lands 

151723,970  6,700,600  415,950  3,336,830 

I5,992,i20  7,018,120  472,620  2,760,350 

1900       16,050,990  7,437,790  482,790  2,285,740 

From  the  foregoing  figures  we  see  that,  during  a 
period  when,  in  Great  Britain,  an  enormous  area 
which  was  under  the  plough  was  abandoned  to  grass, 
the  area  under  grass  in  Germany  has  shrunk  by  no 
less  than  one-third,  because  that  portion  has  been 
taken  under  the  plough  and  has  been  converted  into 
fields.  But  not  only  has  the  acreage  of  fields  on 
which  cereals  and  vegetables  are  grown  been  con- 
siderably increased  in  Germany,  at  the  same 
time  agricultural  processes  have  so  greatly  been 
improved  that  each  acre  of  agricultural  land  produces 
now  very  much  more  than  it  used  to  produce  in 
former  times.  This  appears  from  the  following  table  :  — 

YIELD 


PER  HECTARE  OF  GROUND  IN  KILOGRAMMES 

Wheat 

Rye 

Barley 

Oats 

Potatoes 

Hay 

1670 

1490 

1480 

1070 

I3,4io 

2230 

1690 

1340 

1780 

1680 

II,  IIO 

3830 

1640 

1320 

1680 

1550 

12,390 

3700 

1770 

H30 

1650 

1500 

10,590 

3900 

1700 

1370 

1560 

1430 

11,010 

4280 

1840 

1520 

1730 

1690 

1  1  ,920 

4380 

1910 

1480 

1820 

1720 

12,290 

4040 

1870 

1440 

1800 

1720 

12,610 

3910 

1580 

1400 

1790 

1600 

14,670 

3760 

2040 

1540 

1890 

1800 

13,410 

4370 

1970 

1650 

1950 

1840 

I3-2§0 

4450 

1920 

1560 

1790 

1570 

14,570 

4410 

1990 

1610 

2060 

2090 

13,810 

4170 

2050 

1850 

2I2O 

2120 

14,050 

3710 

1990 

1700 

I850 

1840 

13,190 

4740 

From  the  foregoing    tables  it   appears  that   the 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    489 

agricultural  area  of  Germany  has  been  considerably 
extended,  and  that  the  produce  per  acre  has  been 
universally  and  enormously  increased.  At  the  same 
time  the  live  stock  of  Germany  has  astonishingly 
multiplied  notwithstanding  the  great  shrinkage  of 
grass  lands.  The  following  figures  give  a  record  of 
the  fluctuation  in  the  numbers  of  live  stock  since 
1873  :- 

LIVE  STOCK  OF  GERMANY 


Horses 

Cattle 

Sheep 

Pigs 

1873 

3.352,231 

15,776,702 

24,999,406 

7,124,088 

1883 

3.522,525 

15,786,764 

19,189,715 

9,206,195 

1892 

3,836,256 

13,555,694 

13,589,612 

12,174,288 

1897 

4,038,485 

18,490,772 

10,866,772 

14,274,557 

1900 

4,184,099 

19,001,106 

9,672,143 

16,758,436 

1907 

4,337.263 

20,589,856 

7,681,072 

22,080,008 

From  the  foregoing  table  we  see  that,  whilst 
British  live  stock,  owing  to  the  enormous  increase 
of  the  area  under  grass,  has  increased  by  only  about 
10  per  cent.,  the  horses  of  Germany  have  increased 
by  about  33  per  cent.,  the  cattle  by  about  31  per 
cent.,  and  the  pigs  by  no  less  than  215  per  cent., 
notwithstanding  the  decrease  of  pasture  land  in 
Germany.  It  is  true  that  at  the  same  time  the 
number  of  sheep  has  declined  by  more  than  17,000,000, 
largely  owing  to  the  shrinkage  of  pasture  land  which 
was  turned  into  fields  ;  but  this  shrinkage  is  not  so 
serious  as  it  seems.  In  Germany  two  pigs  represent 
about  the  same  value  as  do  five  sheep.  Consequently, 
the  15,000,000  pigs  which  have  been  added  represent 
more  than  double  the  value  of  the  17,000,000  sheep 
which  have  been  lost. 

During  the  Live  Stock  Census  of  1873,  the  animals 
kept  in  Germany  were  not  valued,  but  when  we 
compare  the  years  1883  and  1900,  we  find  that  the 


490  MODERN    GERMANY 

value  of  the  live  stock  has,  during  these  seventeen 
years,  risen  from  £278,845,000  in  1883,  to  £384,920,000 
in  1900.  During  that  short  period,  the  value  of  the 
German  live  stock  has  therefore  increased  by 
£106,075,000,  or  by  about  40  per  cent.,  an  amount 
which  is  equal  to  about  one-sixth  of  our  National 
Debt,  and  which  would  buy  an  overwhelming  fleet  of 
first-class  battleships. 

The  total  area  of  Germany  is  about  70  per  cent, 
greater  than  that  of  Great  Britain,  and  as  the  popula- 
tion of  Germany  is  about  50  per  cent,  larger  than 
is  that  of  this  country,  Great  Britain  is  not  much 
more  densely  populated  than  is  Germany,  and  both 
countries  may  fairly  be  compared  by  size  and  popula- 
tion with  regard  to  agriculture.  We  find  that,  both 
per  square  mile  of  territory  and  per  thousand  of 
population,  there  are  more  horses  and  more  cattle 
in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain.  Besides,  there 
are  five  times  more  pigs  in  that  country  than  there 
are  in  Great  Britain.  Only  in  sheep  Great  Britain 
has  a  great  advantage  over  Germany,  but  this  is 
not  an  advantage  for  which  German  agriculturists 
will  be  envious.  Sheep  require  to  be  kept  in  the  open 
— that  is,  on  grass  land.  Hence,  only  waste  lands  in 
the  interior  of  Australia  and  of  Argentina,  but  not 
valuable  agricultural  land  in  populous  parts  of  Europe 
and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  their  natural 
markets,  are  considered  in  Germany  proper  for  rear- 
ing sheep.  The  soil  of  Germany  is  thought  to  be 
too  valuable  to  serve  as  prairie  land. 

How  severely  the  value  of  agricultural  land  has  fallen 
in  Great  Britain,  and  how  ruinously  low  is  the  price  of 
land,  is  too  well  known  to  require  description.  In  Germany 
agricultural  land  has  not  fallen,  but  has  considerably  in- 
creased in  value  with  the  increase  in  its  productive  power. 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    491 

The  Schlesische  Volkszeitung  wrote  in  December 
1909  :  "  The  Quirren  Estate  of  625  acres  was  bought 
in  1891  for  70,000  marks,  it  was  re-sold  in  the  same 
year  for  120,000  marks,  it  was  sold  in  1895  for  160,000 
marks,  it  was  sold  in  1907  for  196,000  marks,  and  it 
was  re-sold  in  1908  for  240,000  marks."  In  the  Prussian 
Diet  Mr.  Meyenschein,  a  Conservative,  stated : 
"  During  the  last  few  years  the  price  of  land  in  Hessen 
has  increased,  and  for  that  increase  the  following 
results  are  representative.  A  property  bought  for 
45,000  marks  was  sold  for  63,372  marks,  with  a  profit  of 
40  per  cent.  Another  one  was  bought  for  32,500  marks 
and  was  sold  for  45,283  marks,  with  a  profit  of  51^  per 
cent.  A  third,  which  was  bought  for  12,000  marks, 
realised  20,000  marks,  the  profit  being  68  per  cent. 
A  fourth  bought  for  19,000  marks  was  sold  for  30,000 
marks  with  a  profit  of  74  per  cent.  A  fifth  bought  for 
40,026  marks  was  sold  for  76,000  marks  with  a  profit 
of  90  per  cent."  Everywhere  in  Germany  agricultural 
land  has  been  rising  in  value. 

If  we  now  look  into  the  remuneration  of  rural 
labour  in  Germany,  we  find  that,  between  1873  and 
1892,  agricultural  wages  have  changed  as  follows  : — 

AVERAGE  OF  AGRICULTURAL  WAGES  IN  GERMANY,  PER  DAY 

1873  1892 

Saxony 1.61  marks  2.30   marks 

Rhine  Province        „     .     1.78  „  2.00        „ 

Westphalia     ....     1.72  „  1.86        „ 

Pomerania      ....     1.62  „  1.83        „ 

East  Prussia  ....     1.14  „  1.50        „ 

In  examining  the  foregoing  table,  it  should  be 
remembered  that  agricultural  labourers  receive  almost 
universally,  in  addition  to  their  money  wages,  a 
participation  in  the  harvest,  and  other  payments  in 


492  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  shape  of  agricultural  produce,  &c.  On  an  average, 
agricultural  wages  have  risen  by  about  25  per  cent, 
between  1873  and  1892,  and  they  have  risen  by 
another  25  per  cent,  since  the  latter  year.  Conse- 
quently, it  is  clear  that  the  prosperity  of  Germany's 
agriculture  is  not  due,  as  some  assert,  to  the  station- 
ariness  of  rural  wages. 

If  a  German  agriculturist  fails,  his  lands  are  sold 
by  public  auction.  Consequently,  the  statistics  of 
such  forced  sales  give  a  good  indication  of  the  real 
position  of  Germany's  agriculture.  The  number  of 
forced  sales  has,  since  1886,  declined  as  follows,  in 
Prussia : — 

FORCED  SALES  IN  PRUSSIA 

1886-7  2979  holdings 

1889-90  2014 

1892-3  2299 

1895-6  1834 

1898-9  1210 

1903  1047 

1907  737 

1909  668        „ 

On  an  average  not  one  holding  out  of  every  two 
thousand  is  yearly  sold  by  public  auction,  and  it 
should  be  noted  that,  on  an  average,  nine-tenths  of 
these  sales  take  place  in  Eastern  Germany,  where 
peculiar  agricultural  conditions  prevail,  which  will 
be  described  in  the  course  of  this  chapter,  and  that 
the  larger  part  of  the  holdings  sold  consists  of  large 
farms  and  estates  from  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  acres  upwards.  Forced  sales  are  exceedingly 
rare  in  the  middle  and  west  of  Germany,  and  especially 
in  the  case  of  small  and  medium-sized  farms. 

How  exceedingly  profitable  agriculture  is  in  Ger- 
many may  be  seen  by  comparing  it  with  that  of 
Great  Britain.  If  we  make  such  a  comparison,  we 


RURAL   INDUSTRIES    OF   GERMANY    493 

find  not  only  that  there  is  proportionately  more 
live  stock  in  Germany  than  in  this  country,  but 
also  that  the  area  under  corn-crops,  potatoes,  &c., 
is  six  times  greater  in  that  country  than  in  Great 
Britain,  and  that  the  rural  industries  of  Germany 
afford  a  very  good  livelihood  to  a  rural  population  which 
is  many  times  greater  than  that  of  this  country. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  inquire  why  Germany, 
with  a  poor  soil,  an  unfavourable  climate,  bad  geo- 
graphical conditions,  and  a  somewhat  intractable 
peasantry,  possesses  a  prosperous  and  vigorously  ex- 
panding agriculture,  whilst  the  agriculture  of  Great 
Britain,  which  possesses  a  better  soil,  better  climate, 
a  better  geographical  position,  a  more  open-minded 
and  progressive  rural  population,  better  markets, 
and  which  had  a  far  better  start,  and  far  more 
capital,  is  rapidly,  and,  it  is  said,  irretrievably 
decaying. 

If  a  man  takes  a  railway  trip  through  the  British 
Islands,  and  looks  frequently  out  of  the  window,  he 
will  notice  chiefly  grass  fields,  which  cover  60  per 
cent,  of  the  agricultural  area  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
but  he  will  rarely  see  cereals  growing.  If  he  takes 
a  railway  journey  through  Germany,  he  will  see 
chiefly  cereals,  which,  in  that  country,  take  up  more 
than  60  per  cent,  of  the  agricultural  ground.  The 
proportion  of  grass  lands  in  Germany  is  no  greater 
than  is  the  proportion  of  oat-fields  in  Great  Britain. 
In  other  words,  pastures  are  met  with  as  rarely  in 
Germany  as  oat-fields  are  in  this  country. 

The  following  most  important  table  shows  how 
agricultural  land  is  owned  in  Germany,  and  there- 
fore gives  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  distribution  of 
agricultural  land  in  that  country. 


494 


MODERN    GERMANY 


AGRICULTURAL  HOLDINGS  IN  GERMANY  IN  1907. 


Size  of  Holdings. 

Less  than  5  acres 
5  to  12  J  acres     . 
12^  to  50  acres  . 
50  to  125  acres  . 
125  to  250  acres 
250  to  1250  acres 


Number  of 
Holdings. 

Acreage 
Hectares  (i  Hec- 
tare =2^  Acres). 

Percentage 
of  Agricul- 
tural Area. 

3.378.509 

1,731.317 

5-4 

1,006,277 

3,304,872 

10.4 

1.065,539 

10,421,565 

32.7 

225,697 

6,821,301 

21.4 

36,494 

2,500,805 

7-9 

2O,o68 

4,503,159 

14.2 

3,498 

2,551,854 

8.0 

Total     5,736,082          31,834,873 


100.  o 


In  the  whole  of  Germany  there  were  in  1907, 
5,736,082  agricultural  properties,  and  the  average 
size  of  the  properties  was  about  fifteen  acres  of  agri- 
cultural land.  It  is  remarkable  that  there  were  no 
less  than  3,378,509  individual  holdings  of  average 
size  of  three  acres  and  under.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  should  be  observed  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of 
the  agricultural  soil  of  Germany,  namely,  84  per  cent. 
of  the  total,  was  owned  by  agriculturists  who  cul- 
tivated more  than  I2|  acres.  Consequently,  it  is 
apparent  that  German  agricultural  land  is  chiefly 
exploited,  not  by  small  peasants,  as  is  so  often  asserted 
in  this  country,  but  by  well-to-do  farmer-peasants, 
who  possess  substantial  properties. 

The  difference  in  the  size  of  the  individual  hold- 
ings appears  to  bring  with  it  a  striking  difference  in 
the  way  in  which  these  are  cultivated,  as  will  be 
seen  in  the  following  :  — 

Germany  may  be  divided  into  two  agricultural 
spheres,  the  Eastern  part  and  the  Central  and  Western 
part.  The  east  of  Germany  is  flat,  sandy,  and  some- 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    495 

what  thinly  populated.  It  is  insufficiently  opened  by 
waterways  and  railways,  and  land  is  chiefly  in  the 
hands  of  aristocratic  owners,  who  possess  large,  and 
sometimes  huge,  estates.  In  the  middle  and  the 
west  of  Germany  the  country  is  broken,  the  soil 
is  more  fruitful,  the  population  is  denser,  manufac- 
tures prevail,  markets  are  near  at  hand,  waterways 
and  railways  are  plentiful,  and  land  is  chiefly  held 
by  small  farmers  and  peasants  who,  as  a  rule,  work 
on  freehold  land. 

In  Prussia  of  the  properties  below  five  acres,  73.4 
per  cent,  are  freehold  ;  of  those  from  five  acres  to 
fifty  acres,  87.3  per  cent,  are  freehold ;  of  those  from 
fifty  to  two  hundred  and  fifty  acres,  93  per  cent,  are 
freehold  ;  of  those  above  two  hundred  and  fifty  acres, 
81.8  per  cent,  are  freehold.  It  therefore  appears  that 
the  proportion  of  freeholders  is  smallest  among  the  very 
small  and  among  the  very  large  proprietors.  Of  the 
properties  of  medium  size  which  cover  the  greater  part 
of  agricultural  Germany,  the  proportion  of  freehold 
land  is  largest,  and  more  than  90  per  cent,  of  the 
ground  of  medium-sized  agricultural  establishments 
consists  of  freehold  properties. 

The  small  agriculturists  of  Germany  produce,  on 
the  whole,  larger  harvests  per  acre  than  do  the  large 
landowners,  who  cultivate  their  fields  with  hired 
labour.  Largely  owing  to  this  difference,  the  middle 
and  the  west  of  Germany  are  chiefly  devoted  to 
high  culture.  In  the  east  of  Germany,  where  the 
large  landowners  sit,  we  find  poor  fields,  less  thorough 
cultivation,  and  smaller  crops.  East  Germany  thus 
resembles  Great  Britain  not  only  in  this,  that  the 
land  is  in  the  hands  of  a  few  large  owners,  who  like 
to  enjoy  themselves  in  town,  and  who  leave  the 


496  MODERN    GERMANY 

supervision  of  their  estates  to  their  paid  underlings ; 
but  a  further  resemblance  to  this  country  may  be 
found  in  the  fact  that,  in  those  districts,  the  raising 
of  live  stock  is  more  developed  than  is  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  soil.  Nevertheless,  we  discover  the  sur- 
prising fact  that  the  small  landowners  in  the  middle 
and  the  west  of  Germany  are  not  only  more  efficient 
in  agriculture,  but  also  in  stock-raising,  for  the  small 
agriculturists  raise  on  their  holdings  far  more  horses, 
cattle,  and  pigs  per  acre  than  do  the  large  proprietors 
in  the  east.  Some  years  ago  the  German  live  stock 
was  distributed  as  follows  between  large  and  small 
agriculturists  : — 

AVERAGE  QUANTITY  OF  LIVE  STOCK  KEPT  ON  250 
ACRES  OF  GROUND 

On  properties  from  On  properties  from  50  acres 

5  to  50  acres  and  more 

1 6  horses  n    horses 

147  cattle  37  cattle 

242  pigs  20  pigs 

In  Germany  one  head  of  cattle  is  considered  to 
be  equal  in  value  to  two-thirds  of  a  horse,  or  to  four 
pigs.  If  we  now  reduce  the  live  stock  kept  on  the 
farms  of  the  two  types  given,  to  "  pig-units,"  if  such  a 
word  may  be  coined,  we  find  that  the  owners  of  fifty 
and  more  acres  raise  only  227  pig-units  on  the  same 
quantity  of  ground  on  which  smaller  farmers  raise  915 
pig-units.  In  other  words,  on  an  area  of  the  same  size 
small  agriculturists  raise  a  little  more  than  four  times 
more  live  stock  than  is  raised  by  the  bigger  landowners. 

The  following  somewhat  more  detailed  figures 
give  a  most  interesting  picture  of  the  greatly  vary- 
ing density  of  the  live  stock  population  on  farms  of 
different  sizes.  They  show  that  small  holdings  are 
most  favourable  for  raising  pigs,  that  middle-sized 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    497 

properties  are  most  suitable  for  raising  cattle  and 
horses,  and  that  large  properties  are  least  suitable 
for  raising  live  stock,  excepting  the  comparatively 
valueless  sheep.  In  Germany  one  pig  is  estimated 
to  be  equal  in  value  to  two  and  a  half  sheep,  as  has 
already  been  mentioned. 

AVERAGE  NUMBER  OF  ANIMALS  PER  250  ACRES  ON 
PROPERTIES  OF  VARIOUS  SIZES  IN  1907 

Size  of  Holding  Horses     Cattle        Pigs         Sheep 

Below  ij  acres     .          .       1.5         31.7         319.0         29.0 


to  5  acres 
5  to  12^  acres 
12  £  to  50  acres     . 
50  to  250  acres    . 
250  to  500  acres 
500  and  more  acres 


3.3  59.7  128.6  12.6 
5.6  73.2  71.3  8.3 
9-6  57-2  47-5  10.5 

9.5  42.0  29.0  18.4 

6.6  17.3  14.0  44.0 

6.4  22.0  13.3  50.3 


From  the  foregoing  tables  it  appears  that  the 
large  holdings  of  Germany  are  unfavourable  to  the 
thorough  pursuit  of  agriculture  and  to  efficiency  in 
cattle-raising  as  well.  But  here,  as  in  other  things, 
les  extremes  se  touchent.  If  holdings  become  too  small, 
animals  can  neither  be  raised  nor  be  employed  in  the 
fields,  spade  work  becomes  necessary,  and  human 
labour  has  to  take  the  place  of  animal  labour  or 
machine  labour. 

ANIMALS  KEPT  IN  JUNE  1907  ON  AGRICULTURAL 
PROPERTIES  ONLY 


On  Properties  of 

Horses 

Cattle 

Pigs 

jfif.ep  unu 

Less  than  5  acres   . 

71,369 

1,315,572 

4,383,244 

415,750 

5  to  12  \  acres    .     . 

241,636 

3.I55.323 

3,107,008 

359,943 

12  \  to  50  acres  .     . 

1,323,290 

7,873.092 

6,334,238 

1,448,535 

50  to  250  acres  .     . 

1,202,176 

5.305.871 

3,655,156 

2,326,268 

250  acres  and  more 

652,536 

2,327,291 

1,386,272 

4,371,103 

Total 

3,491,007 

I9.977,H9 

18,865,918 

8,921,599 

In  1907  the  peasants  who  farmed  less  than  fifty 
acres  possessed  one-half  of  all  the  horses,  two-thirds 
of  all  the  cattle  and  three-fourths  of  all  the  pigs. 

21 


498  MODERN    GERMANY 

Evidently  the  very  small  peasant  cannot  always 
avail  himself  of  animal  labour  on  his  tiny  holding, 
owing  to  poverty,  lack  of  accommodation,  or  lack 
of  fodder.  Therefore  we  find  that  the  men  who 
own  less  than  five  acres  use,  on  an  average,  one-third 
of  the  horse  power  which  is  employed  on  properties 
of  larger  size.  The  very  small  cultivator  makes,  how- 
ever, a  greater  use  of  cattle  for  pulling  his  plough 
than  does  the  owner  of  a  medium-sized  farm,  and 
his  only  cow  has  not  infrequently  to  labour  in  the 
fields.  The  large  landowner,  on  the  other  hand, 
appears  not  to  make  the  fullest  use  of  animal  power, 
for  we  find  that  he  employs  a  smaller  number  of 
horses  and  cattle  for  work  than  does  the  smaller 
cultivator. 

It  might  be  expected  that  the  large  German  land- 
owners, who  use  less  animal  power  for  cultivation 
than  do  the  small  farmers,  would  be  easily  first  in 
the  use  of  labour-saving,  steam-driven  machinery. 
This  appears  not  to  be  the  case,  for  we  find  that  the 
smallest  number  of  steam-driven  agricultural  machines 
is  used  in  the  province  of  East  Prussia,  where  huge 
estates  are  common,  whilst  the  largest  number  of 
machines  is  employed  in  the  province  of  Saxony, 
where  middle-sized  and  small  holdings  prevail.  The 
fact  that  labour-saving  machinery  is  more  used  on 
medium-sized  than  on  large  properties  is  clearly 
brought  out  in  the  following  figures,  which  relate  to 
those  two  provinces  : — 

AGRICULTURAL  STEAM  MACHINERY  USED  IN  1907 

Steam  Drills  Seed-casting    Steam  Threshing 

Ploughs  Machines  Machines 

Saxony  ...     439  46,898  46,898  I7,569 

East  Prussia  .       80  4,639  4,639  3,928 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    499 

The  difference  in  the  quantity  of  machinery  used 
in  purely  agricultural  East  Prussia,  with  its  huge 
estates,  and  in  chiefly  industrial  Saxony,  with  its 
small  agriculturists  and  independent  peasants,  is 
startling ;  and  this  difference  in  the  manner  of  culti- 
vation goes  far  to  explain  why  the  German  agrarians 
east  of  the  Elbe  loudly  complain  about  agricultural 
depression,  whilst  the  peasants  west  of  the  Elbe  appear 
to  be  doing  very  well,  and  to  be,  on  the  whole,  pros- 
perous and  contented. 

If  we  now  look  into  the  indebtedness  of  the 
agricultural  soil  in  Germany,  we  find  the  following 
astonishing  variations  in  the  various  districts  : — 

ESTIMATED  INDEBTEDNESS  OF  THE  AGRICULTURAL  SOIL 
East  Germany 

District     Konigsberg .     50.90  per  cent. 

„         Gumbinnen 48.58       „ 

Dantzig 55.11       „ 

„         Marienwerder  55-68       „ 

Central  Germany 

„        Magdeburg 22.82       „ 

„        Merseburg       27.82       „ 

„         Erfurt 23.40 

West  Germany 

„         Cologne 17.94  „ 

„         Treves 15.83  „ 

„         Aix-la-Chapelle    .     .     .     .     .     .  13.32  „ 

The  foregoing  table  is  based  on  carefully  compiled 
official  estimates,  and  the  thoroughly  representative 
figures  used  are  taken  from  the  official  hand-book 
of  the  Agrarian  Party.  From  this  table  it  appears 
that  the  agricultural  indebtedness  of  the  soil  is 
dangerously  large  in  the  east  of  Germany,  medium- 
sized  in  the  centre  of  the  country,  and  small  in  the 


500  MODERN    GERMANY 

west  of  Germany.  This  curious  difference  arises  from 
the  fact  that  in  the  east  of  Germany  huge  estates 
preponderate,  whilst  in  the  centre  of  Germany  middle- 
sized  properties  and  in  the  west  small  holdings  pre- 
vail. The  large  German  landowner  in  Pomerania 
and  East  Prussia,  who  bears  a  well-known  name,  can 
easily  borrow  from  banks  and  other  institutions  at 
a  reasonable  rate  of  interest,  and  he  does  so  freely 
and  somewhat  indiscreetly.  Hence,  his  estates  are 
encumbered  with  debts  up  to  the  hilt.  The  medium- 
sized  and  somewhat  obscure  agriculturist  in  Middle 
Germany  cannot  so  easily  raise  money  on  his  land. 
Lastly,  the  small  cultivators  who  prevail  in  the 
Rhenish  Province,  where,  owing  to  the  use  of  the 
Code  Napoleon  and  the  French  law  of  succession,  the 
land  has  been  divided  and  subdivided  in  equal  parts 
among  the  children  so  often  that  individual  holdings 
have  become  very  small,  find  it  often  absolutely  im- 
possible to  raise  money  on  their  freehold  properties 
at  any  price. 

In  Great  Britain  such  small  landowners  and 
peasants  would  find  no  difficulty  in  raising  money  on 
their  land,  for  local  usurers  would  prosper  on  the 
ignorance,  the  improvidence,  or  the  inexperience  of 
the  small  cultivators  to  whom  they  would  lend  money 
at  30,  50,  or  more  per  cent.  But  the  paternal  Govern- 
ment of  Germany  is  sensible  enough  not  to  allow 
usurers  to  prey  upon  the  ignorant  or  foolish  producers. 
Usury  is  as  good  as  non-existent  in  Germany,  owing 
to  most  stringent  usury  laws.  Consequently,  if  the 
German  cultivator  cannot  raise  money  at  low  rates 
(up  to  6  per  cent.)  and  on  fair  security,  he  cannot 
borrow  money  at  all.  This  disability  is,  no  doubt,  very 
inconvenient  to  some  improvident  individuals,  but  from 
the  point  of  view  of  truly  national  economy  it  seems  a 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     501 

lesser  evil  to  suppress  the  usurers  altogether  than  to 
allow  them  to  become  prosperous  by  relentlessly  ex- 
ploiting the  poor,  the  weak,  and  the  foolish. 

From  the  facts  and  figures  which  have  so  far  been 
given,  it  is  clear  that  the  rural  industries  of  Germany 
are  highly  prosperous,  but  it  is  equally  clear  that  the 
prosperity  of  the  German  agriculturists  is  variable,  and 
that  it  stands  in  a  somewhat  close  relation  to  the  size 
of  their  holdings.  The  larger  properties  appear  to 
be  somewhat  unproductive,  and  to  be  uneconomically 
exploited,  largely  because  their  owners  are  not  quali- 
fied, or  not  willing,  to  manage  their  estates  themselves. 
That  large  estates  should  yield  disappointing  results 
is  only  natural.  Hired  labourers  will  work  as  little 
as  possible  for  their  wages,  and  managers  and  over- 
seers will  act  in  a  similar  manner.  But  even  if  these 
paid  agents  are  conscientious,  their  supervision  will, 
in  any  case,  cause  a  considerable  extra  expense  which 
burdens  the  land. 

Many  large  landowners  in  Germany  wish  to  shine 
in  Parliament  or  in  society,  or  simply  to  enjoy  them- 
selves, finding  the  country  too  dull.  Such  men — and 
they  are  very  numerous  among  the  large  landed  pro- 
prietors— desire  to  spend  much  money,  which  they 
can  easily  raise  on  their  estates.  Hence,  the  large 
estates  of  Germany  are  not  only  the  most  wastefully 
exploited  rural  properties,  but  they  are  at  the  same 
time  those  which  are  most  heavily  burdened  with 
mortgages. 

Whilst  the  large  estates  suffer  from  the  super- 
fluity of  land  and  the  extravagance  of  their  owners, 
who,  in  their  turn,  suffer  from  superfluity  of  leisure,  the 
very  small  peasants'  properties  suffer  from  lack  of 
capital  and  from  lack  of  labour-saving  animal  and 
machine  power.  For  these  reasons,  inefficient  culti- 


502  MODERN    GERMANY 

vation  is  common  on  both  the  largest  and  the  smallest 
agricultural  properties.  Therefore  land  passes  from 
the  hands  of  very  small  peasants  and  of  very  large 
landowners  into  the  hands  of  townsmen,  and  in  the 
end  the  former  freeholders  are  replaced  by  agri- 
tultural  leaseholders  and  labourers.  For  these 
reasons,  we  find  that  men  who  work  less  than  five 
acres  have  only  73.4  per  cent,  of  freehold  land,  and 
that  the  men  who  cultivate  more  than  two  hundred 
and  fifty  acres  have  only  81.8  per  cent,  of  the  whole 
land,  whilst  the  agriculturists  who  possess  medium  pro- 
perties have  more  than  90  per  cent,  of  freehold  land. 

On  properties  measuring  from  five  to  two  hundred 
and  fifty  acres  are  found  the  substantial  peasants  and 
peasant-farmers  who  are  the  backbone  of  Germany's 
agriculture.  Nine-tenths  of  their  fields  are  freehold 
land.  Their  land  belongs  to  them  and  to  their  de- 
scendants for  ever.  These  peasant  proprietors  usually 
cultivate  their  holdings  with  the  assistance  of  their 
families.  The  men  do  the  hard  work  in  the  fields, 
the  women  look  after  the  cattle  and  the  children, 
help  at  harvest-time,  when  the  rural  schools  close  in 
order  to  enable  the  small  peasants  to  get  assistance 
of  their  youngsters  in  picking  up  potatoes,  gathering 
sheaves,  picking  fruit,  &c.  Each  member  of  the 
peasant's  family  works  with  love  and  earnestness, 
not  for  a  daily  wage,  but  for  himself,  with  the  sense 
and  pride  of  property,  and  of  absolute  ownership. 
Where  holdings  are  so  large  that  outside  assistance 
is  required,  farm  servants  or  labourers  are  hired  who, 
as  a  rule,  live  with  the  peasants.  They  form  part 
of  the  peasant's  family,  and  work  under  the  constant 
supervision  of  the  owner.  Consequently,  an  agri- 
cultural labourer  is  certain  to  do  far  more  work  on 
a  peasant's  farm  in  Westphalia,  under  the  eye  of  the 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    503 

master  and  owner  of  the  farm,  than  on  a  big  estate  in 
Pomerania  under  the  supervision  of  paid  stewards 
and  inspectors,  who  strut  or  ride  about  in  a  leisurely 
fashion,  who  become  lazy  in  their  comfortable  and 
easy  posts,  and  who  half  the  time  think  of  their 
private  affairs.  The  well-to-do  peasant  is  thrifty, 
robust,  healthy,  and  contented,  whilst  the  small 
peasant,  who  has  but  a  few  acres,  works  himself  to 
death,  owing  to  lack  of  land,  lack  of  capital,  and  lack 
of  labour-saving  animal  and  machine  power. 

Some  distinguished  British  politicians  and  states- 
men have  recommended  dividing  the  agricultural 
land  of  Great  Britain,  which  policy  has  been  summed 
up  in  the  cry  "  Three  acres  and  a  cow."  Three  acres 
and  a  cow  may  perhaps  be  a  good  electioneering  cry, 
but  it  is  not  a  good  policy.  Although  life  with  three 
acres  and  a  cow  may  appear  most  idyllic  to  the  towns- 
man, who  takes  his  armchair  as  a  coign  of  vantage,  it 
is  the  reverse  of  idyllic  from  the  countryman's  point 
of  view.  If  the  policy  of  "  three  acres  and  a  cow  " 
should  ever  be  carried  out  in  Great  Britain,  it  would 
lead,  no  doubt,  to  a  resettlement  of  the  people  on 
the  land.  But  it  seems  hardly  desirable  that  the 
proletariat  of  the  slums  of  our  congested  towns  should, 
by  an  ill-considered  but  well-meant  policy,  at  a  huge 
cost  to  the  nation,  be  dumped  into  the  country  and 
be  transformed  into  an  equally  wretched  and  miser- 
able proletariat  of  the  country.  Besides,  such  an 
artificially  created  proletariat  could  not  be  made  to 
stop.  A  cloud  of  usurers  would  descend  on  the 
country,  and  the  British  stage-peasants,  after  having 
eaten  their  cow,  would  as  rapidly  as  possible  raise 
enough  money  on  their  three  acres  to  buy  a  ticket 
for  the  United  States  or  for  Canada,  and  the  British 
country  districts  would  be  left  more  desolate  and 


504  MODERN    GERMANY 

more  unproductive  than  before.     Such  an  experiment 
would  certainly  end  in  failure. 

What  Great  Britain  requires  for  the  salvation  of 
her  agriculture  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  gradual 
creation  of  a  substantial  peasant  class,  who  work  with 
their  own  hands  on  freehold  agricultural  properties 
of  moderate  size,  as  I  have  shown  in  my  book  Great 
and  Greater  Britain,  2nd  edition. 

In  every  business  a  certain  fixity  of  conditions  is 
required  in  order  to  make  it  attractive  to  men  who 
are  willing  to  work.  Where  that  fixity  of  conditions 
is  lacking,  a  calculation  of  risks  and  chances  is  im- 
possible, and  business  is  turned  into  speculation.  If 
the  peasant  has  no  land  of  his  own,  but  has  to  pay 
rent,  his  heart  is  not  in  his  work,  and  cannot  be  in 
his  work.  The  improvements  which  he  undertakes 
may  eventually  benefit  the  landlord.  His  rent  will, 
in  bad  seasons,  be  so  unbearably  high  as  to  ruin  him  ; 
in  good  seasons  it  will  be  so  low  as  to  allow  him  to 
sublet  his  land  at  a  profit.  Hence  agriculture,  under 
a  tenant  system,  lacks  stability  and  security.  The 
peasant  or  farmer  will  be  turned  into  a  speculator, 
but  not  into  a  cultivator. 

Politicians  who  are  insufficiently  acquainted  with 
the  real  conditions  of  agriculture  may,  of  course,  devise 
an  elaborate  system  for  the  fair  and  automatic  adjust- 
ment of  rents,  and  for  securing  to  the  cultivators  at 
the  end  of  their  tenure  the  fruit  of  their  labour,  by 
making  enactments  which  are  to  insure  these  ends. 
But  such  a  system,  which  may  look  very  excellent 
on  paper,  would  hardly  work  in  practice.  In  the 
first  place,  such  a  system  would  be  too  complicated 
to  make  it  understandable  and  attractive  to  the 
average  countryman.  In  the  second  place,  a  huge 
and  costly  official  machinery  would  have  to  be  created, 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    505 

and  the  peasant  would,  in  the  end,  have  to  pay  for 
that  mediating  and  adjusting  service  which  would 
be  chiefly  productive  of  dissatisfaction  and  much 
costly  litigation.  Therefore  a  freehold  peasantry 
must  be  created,  and  it  could  be  created  out  of  our 
so  greatly  reduced  army  of  rural  labourers.  Only 
then  will  Great  Britain  have  again  a  sturdy,  pro- 
sperous, and  contented  yeomanry  as  of  old. 

The  creation  of  peasant  freeholders  should  be  ac- 
companied by  legislation  abolishing  the  necessity  of 
enclosing  agricultural  properties  with  hedges,  fences, 
&c.  Our  hedges  give,  no  doubt,  a  peculiar  charm  to  the 
landscape,  and  are  therefore  dear  to  the  town-dweller, 
but  they  constitute  a  very  onerous  burden  for  all 
agriculturists.  The  expense  of  planting  a  hedge,  and 
of  keeping  it  in  order  year  in  year  out,  is  very  great. 
Besides,  the  agricultural  ground  which  is  wasted 
through  hedges  is  not  only  the  strip  on  which  the 
hedge  grows ;  for,  as  it  is  difficult  to  go  close  to  the 
hedge  with  plough  and  harrow,  two  huge  additional 
strips  on  both  sides  of  every  hedge  around  every  en- 
closed field  remain  unproductive.  Thus  hedges  and 
fences  cause  an  enormous  unnecessary  expense  and 
waste,  which  would  be  much  increased  if,  through 
the  creation  of  small  holdings,  hedges  would  have  to 
be  multiplied.  Surely,  in  Great  Britain,  as  in  most 
other  European  countries,  boundary  stones  at  the 
corners  of  every  field,  together  with  carefully-kept 
local  registers  of  rural  properties,  should  suffice  to 
show  the  limits  of  individual  holdings,  and  should  make 
our  wasteful  and  primitive  methods  of  enclosing  un- 
necessary. No  doubt  the  fall  of  the  hedges  would 
diminish  the  picturesqueness  of  the  country,  but  their 
fall  would  immediately  enhance  the  value  of  our 
agricultural  soil  by  many  millions  of  pounds,  and  the 


506  MODERN    GERMANY 

army  of  men  who  now  every  year  clip  the  hedges  may 
turn  their  hands  from  useless  to  productive  labour. 

In  most  countries  of  Europe  the  peasants  were 
formerly  landless  serfs,  who  had  to  be  liberated  and 
to  be  enabled  to  acquire  land  of  their  own  by  gradual 
payments  spread  over  a  number  of  years.  Germany 
did  so  a  century  ago,  and  Great  Britain  will  have 
to  do  likewise  for  the  continuance  of  the  impossible 
tenant  system  means  the  extinction  of  our  agriculture. 
If  we  wish  to  possess  again  flourishing  rural  industries, 
we  must  begin  at  the  base,  and  must  first  of  all  abolish 
the  present  system  of  land  tenure,  and  replace  it  by 
a  system  of  freehold  property.  We  must  begin  by 
giving  to  our  agriculture  a  stable,  safe,  and  permanent 
basis.  If  the  cultivator  has  ground  of  his  own,  he 
will  love  and  cherish  it.  Otherwise,  he  will  desert 
the  country  without  a  regret,  and  either  emigrate  or 
come  to  reside  in  the  slums.  Landowners  will  find  it 
in  their  interests  to  sell  gradually  their  land,  instead 
of  letting  it  to  cultivators  under  a  system  which 
greatly  benefits  a  host  of  unproductive  and  useless 
middlemen,  such  as  solicitors,  stewards,  managers, 
rent  -  collectors,  bailiffs,  &c.,  whom  landlords  and 
tenants  have  to  keep  at  a  large  expense  to  themselves. 

British  farmers  complain  loudly  of  the  insufficient 
number  of  rural  labourers,  and  the  lack  of  agricultural 
workers  is  so  great  in  this  country  that  at  harvest 
time  swarms  of  town  loafers,  of  casual  labourers,  and 
of  out-of-works  migrate  from  the  slums  to  the  country, 
and  these  men  are  employed  by  the  farmers,  notwith- 
standing their  utter  unsuitability.  In  Germany,  the 
army  of  agricultural  labourers  has  not  been  shrinking, 
but  it  has  greatly  increased,  partly  by  the  immigration 
of  Russians,  Austrians,  Poles,  &c.  At  the  census  of 
1882  there  were  5,763,970  rural  labourers,  male  and 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    507 

female,  in  Germany.  At  the  census  of  1895,  5,445,924 
agricultural  hands  were  counted.  At  the  census  of 
1907,  7,054,900  rural  labourers  of  both  sexes  were 
counted.  Of  these  almost  a  million  are  foreigners 
who  come  into  Germany  for  the  harvest  and  go  back 
to  their  homes  across  the  frontier  when  winter  comes. 

The  increase  in  the  number  of  rural  labourers  in 
Germany,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  machine  power  has 
largely  supplanted  men  power  and  animal  power  in 
agriculture,  is  very  remarkable.  In  Prussia  alone,  the 
power  of  machinery  used  in  agriculture  has  risen 
from  24,000  horse-power  in  1879  to  133,000  horse- 
power  in  1897,  and  at  present  the  horse-power  avail- 
able for  agriculture  in  Germany  should  amount  at 
least  to  350,000.  At  first  sight  it  seems  almost  in- 
credible that  an  army  of  seven  million  men  and  women 
should  be  available  as  farm  hands  in  Germany,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  manufacturing  industries 
are  most  flourishing  in  that  country,  that  town  wages 
are  far  higher  than  country  wages,  that  the  attractions 
of  town  are  as  enticing  in  Germany  as  they  are  over 
here,  and  that  all  farm  labourers  make  a  lengthy 
acquaintance  with  town  life  when  serving  as  soldiers 
in  garrison  towns.  Consequently,  it  is  worth  noting 
why  the  country  population  remains  almost  stationary 
in  industrial  Germany. 

Two  classes  of  agricultural  workers  have  to  be 
considered,  viz.  farm  servants,  who  are  engaged  for 
a  lengthy  term,  and  day  labourers.  The  huge  army 
of  farm  servants,  male  and  female,  is  composed  of 
the  sons  and  daughters  of  small  peasants,  who  send 
their  children  into  service,  partly  in  order  that  they 
should  earn  a  living,  partly  in  order  that  they  should 
learn  improved  methods  on  the  larger  farms.  The 
male  farm  servants  expect  to  come,  in  course  of  tune, 


508  MODERN    GERMANY 

into  the  freehold  property  of  their  parents,  and  there- 
fore refuse  to  sacrifice  a  certain  livelihood  in  the 
country  to  an  uncertain  one  in  the  towns  ;  whilst 
the  female  farm  servants  naturally  wish  to  work  near 
their  home  and  their  friends.  The  day  labourers  also 
are  partly  the  children  of  small  peasants,  and  they 
refuse  to  leave  the  country  in  which  they  have  a 
substantial  stake ;  partly  are  they  small  peasant  pro- 
prietors, with  properties  of  their  own,  which  are  so 
small  that  they  have  to  accept  some  outside  work  in 
order  to  make  a  living.  The  following  most  interest- 
ing table  gives  a  clear  picture  of  the  different  status 
of  agricultural  day  labourers  in  the  east  and  in  the 
west  of  Germany. 

Eastern  Germany 

Agricultural  day  Agricultural  day 

labourers  with  land  labourers  without  land 

East  Prussia     .     .     .     12,935  1 54.777 

Westphalia    ....     13,578  117,927 

Pomerania    ....     14,475  m»457 

Western  Germany 

Rhenish  Province       .     28,866  38,411 

Hesse-Nassau     .     .     .     12,172  !S>744 

Westphalia    ....     15,828  16,425 

From  the  foregoing  figures  we  see  that  the  landless 
labourers,  the  agricultural  proletariat,  form  in  the 
east  of  Germany,  as  they  do  in  Great  Britain,  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  agricultural  hands,  for  in 
that  part  of  Germany  hardly  one  labourer  out  of 
ten  has  land  of  his  own.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
Western  Provinces,  the  day  labourers  who  own  land, 
and  those  who  do  not  own  land  are  about  equal  in 
numbers.  In  the  Eastern  Provinces,  where  huge 
estates  owned  by  noblemen  are  to  be  found,  the  day 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    509 

labourers  are  considered  by  the  lord  of  the  manor 
merely  as  two-legged  cattle,  and  they  are  only  too 
often  treated  as  such.  Therefore  the  whole  interest 
of  these  landless  labourers  lies  in  their  daily  wages, 
exactly  as  it  does  with  British  rural  labourers,  and 
they  leave  the  country  for  the  town  in  order  "  to 
better  themselves,"  without  hesitation  and  without 
regret,  as  do  our  own  agricultural  hands.  Therefore, 
it  comes  that  in  the  east  of  Germany,  where  agri- 
culture bears  some  resemblance  to  that  of  this  country, 
the  cry  of  lack  of  labour  on  the  part  of  the  farmers  is 
just  as  loud  and  as  bitter  as  it  is  in  Great  Britain, 
and  there  also  the  owners  of  the  big  estates  complain 
that  the  labourers  take  no  interest  in  their  work. 
The  lack  of  rural  labour  both  in  east  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  springs  evidently  from  the  same 
cause — the  landlessness  of  the  rural  labourer. 

Many  British  landowners  have  been  wise  enough 
to  give  to  their  day  labourers  a  stake  in  the  country 
in  the  shape  of  a  cottage  and  a  plot  of  ground,  and 
their  labourers  stay  in  consequence  ;  but  the  great 
proprietors  in  the  east  of  Germany,  instead  of  acting 
likewise  and  thus  settling  their  men  on  the  land, 
have  had  the  incredible  heartlessness  and  hardihood  to 
propose  and  to  clamour  for  legislation  restricting  the 
freedom  of  migration  for  rural  labourers.  In  the 
west  of  Germany,  where  middle-sized,  small,  and  very 
small  farms  are  mixed,  the  scarcity  of  rural  labour 
appears  to  be  much  less  in  evidence.  Happily  for 
the  employers  of  agricultural  labour  in  Germany,  the 
rural  wages  paid  in  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  are 
so  low  that  every  year  an  army  of  from  200,000 
to  400,000  rural  labourers  flock  from  Poland  and 
Galicia  into  Germany.  These  temporary  immigrants 
supply  the  needful  labour  at  the  most  critical  time  of 


510  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  year,  exactly  as  do  the  Italian  labourers,  who 
yearly  migrate  for  a  time  in  hundred  thousands  into 
France,  Switzerland,  the  United  States,  and  Argentina. 
It  would  seem  dangerous  for  Germany's  agriculture 
to  rely  to  too  large  an  extent  on  such  temporary 
assistance,  and  Germany  will  do  well  to  make  the 
acquisition  of  land  as  easy  as  possible  for  those  of 
her  rural  labourers  who  at  present  are  without  land. 

British  agriculture  has  the  alternative  either  of 
creating  a  large  number  of  peasant  proprietors  and 
peasant  labourers,  or  of  employing  in  constantly 
growing  numbers  our  slum-dwellers,  who,  of  course, 
may  be  reinforced  by  immigrants  from  abroad.  As 
foreign  agricultural  labourers  will  probably  prove 
more  suitable,  it  seems  very  possible  that  our  rural 
districts  will,  in  future,  be  populated  only  by  rich 
men,  their  servants,  tradesmen,  &c.,  and  that  the 
work  which  has  to  be  done  will  be  done  by  foreign 
temporary  immigrants,  unless  we  create  a  huge  number 
of  freeholders.  If  British  freeholders  should  not  be 
created  in  large  numbers  as  rapidly  as  possible,  our 
agricultural  work  will  have  to  be  done  by  foreigners ; 
the  British  population,  the  rich  men  excluded,  will 
almost  exclusively  live  in  town ;  and  the  national 
physique  will  still  further  deteriorate. 

The  foregoing  shows  that  the  possession  of  free- 
hold land  is  not  only  most  important  to  the  farmer 
as  an  inducement  to  do  his  best,  but  that  it  is  also 
of  great  importance  inasmuch  as  it  attaches  rural 
labour  to  the  soil. 

In  the  manufacturing  industries  and  in  trade, 
young  men  are  chiefly  wanted,  and  in  advertisements 
for  labour  it  is  frequently  stated  that  men  above 
forty  or  fifty  years  need  not  apply.  Old  men  are 
almost  useless  for  manual  labour  in  towns,  and  they 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF   GERMANY     511 

easily  become  paupers  there,  whilst  they  could  find 
plenty  of  work  in  the  country.  According  to  a  census 
which  was  taken  on  the  I4th  June  1895,  the  pro- 
portion of  agricultural  labourers  above  fifty  years  in 
Germany  was  15.80  per  cent.,  while  the  proportion 
of  industrial  labourers  above  fifty  years  was  only 
9.30  per  cent.  ;  the  proportion  of  agricultural  labourers 
above  sixty  years  was  7.31  per  cent.,  whilst  the  pro- 
portion of  industrial  labourers  above  sixty  years  was 
only  2.93  per  cent.  ;  the  proportion  of  agricultural 
labourers  above  seventy  years  was  1.94  per  cent., 
whilst  the  proportion  of  industrial  labourers  above 
seventy  years  was  only  0.53.  From  these  figures  it 
appears  that  the  chance  for  old  men  to  find  employ- 
ment in  agriculture  is  in  Germany  from  two  to  four 
times  greater  than  is  their  chance  to  find  occupation  in 
trade  and  in  the  manufacturing  industries.  In  Great 
Britain,  where  town  life  and  town  work  is  more  of  a 
rush  and  scramble  than  in  Germany,  the  chance  of 
finding  occupation  for  men  above  forty  or  fifty  years 
should  be  from  three  to  six  times  greater  in  agriculture 
than  in  the  manufacturing  industries  and  in  trade. 
From  three  to  six  times  more  old  men  could  earn  a 
living  in  agriculture  than  they  can  in  industrial  pur- 
suits ;  and  if  our  agriculture  should  again  become 
prosperous,  the  nation  might  usefully  employ  many 
thousands  of  old  men  in  the  fields  and  the  farms 
who  live  now  in  the  workhouse,  and  millions  which 
are  yearly  spent  in  poor  relief  might  be  saved. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  it  has  been  ex- 
plained that  Germany's  agriculture  was  very  poor  and 
most  primitive  at  a  time  when  the  rural  industries  of 
Great  Britain  were  most  advanced  and  most  flourish- 
ing. When  British  agriculture  was  at  the  height  of 
its  success,  and  when  our  farmers  made  money,  the 


512  MODERN    GERMANY 

spirit  of  scientific  inquiry  and  experiment  arose,  and 
the  ambition  to  make  improvements  of  every  kind 
was  very  strong  in  this  country.  Hence,  French  and 
German  agriculturists  and  economists  flocked  to  this 
country  to  study  and  to  copy  our  then  so  highly  ad- 
vanced agricultural  methods,  which  served  as  a  model 
to  all  nations. 

On  the  model  of  British  agriculture  the  present 
prosperity  of  the  agriculture  of  Germany  and  France 
was  founded,  incredible  as  it  may  seem  if  we  compare 
the  agricultural  position  of  those  countries  with  ours 
at  the  present  day.  Between  1798  and  1804,  Albrecht 
Thaer  published  his  celebrated  work,  "  Introduction 
to  the  Knowledge  of  English  Agriculture,"  in  three 
volumes,  which  was  followed  by  a  work  in  four 
volumes,  entitled  "  The  Fundamental  Principles  of 
Agriculture,"  which  was  also  based  on  his  study  of 
our  rural  industries.  These  books  became  the  German 
agriculturist's  Bible,  honours  were  showered  upon 
Thaer  during  his  lifetime,  and  life-sized  statues  in 
marble  and  in  bronze  of  the  man  who  introduced 
British  agricultural  methods  into  Germany  may  now 
be  found  in  Celle,  in  Leipzig,  and  in  Berlin.  The 
grateful  agriculturists  of  Germany  would  act  more 
justly  if  they  erected  in  the  country  statues  repre- 
senting British  Agriculture.  Later  on,  Wilhelm 
Hamm's  book,  "  The  Agricultural  Implements  and 
Machines  of  England,"  which  was  published  in  1845 
in  Brunswick,  exerted  almost  as  great  an  influence 
as  did  Thaer's  writings  in  Anglicising  German  agricul- 
tural methods. 

Great  Britain  was  the  pioneer  not  only  in  empiric 
methods  of  cultivation,  and  in  the  introduction  of 
improved  machinery,  but  also  in  making  scientific 
experiments  in  matters  agricultural.  Through  the 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     513 

munificence  of  Sir  John  Lawes,  the  experimental 
station  of  Rothamsted  was  founded  in  1840,  and 
only  eleven  years  later  Germany  followed  our  example 
by  opening  an  experimental  station  in  Mockern,  near 
Leipzig.  But  whilst  Great  Britain  opened  her  second 
experimental  station  more  than  thirty  years  after  the 
creation  of  the  Rothamsted  establishment,  Germany 
opened  station  after  station  in  rapid  succession.  In 
1856,  two  experimental  stations  were  opened  at  Bonn 
and  at  Breslau;  in  1857,  three  experimental  stations 
arose  in  Gottingen,  Dahme,  and  Munich  ;  in  1858, 
another  institution  was  created  in  Insterburg ;  and  at 
the  present  moment  there  exist  no  less  than  seventy 
experimental  stations,  all  over  Germany,  where,  by 
constant  research  and  practical  investigation  scientific 
agriculture  is  advanced,  seeds  and  manures  are  tested, 
&c.,  &c. 

Great  Britain,  after  having  been  the  first  and  the 
foremost  nation  in  applying  science  to  agriculture, 
has  now  become  the  last.  Private  enterprise,  which 
was  the  pioneer,  has  done  wonders  in  this  country 
here  and  there,  but  the  isolated  efforts  which  have 
been  made  by  some  munificent,  unselfish,  and  patriotic 
individuals  have,  on  the  whole,  proved  as  ineffective 
to  the  multitude  as  isolated  efforts  at  making  im- 
provements are  always  apt  to  prove.  On  the  other 
side  of  the  Channel,  the  German  Governments  have 
taken  up  the  ideas  which  they  received  from  England. 
They  have  exploited  and  have  applied  our  discoveries 
not  here  and  there,  but  throughout  Germany,  by 
disseminating  knowledge  all  over  the  country  by 
means  of  the  Government  machinery,  and  by  en- 
couraging scientific  agricultural  investigation  with 
liberal  grants.  At  the  present  moment,  even  Japan 
is  far  ahead  of  England  in  applying  science  to  agri- 

2K 


514  MODERN    GERMANY 

culture,  although  agricultural  science  was,  until  lately, 
unknown  in  that  country. 

Whilst  Germany  imitated  this  country  in  many 
respects,  she  struck  out  a  line  of  her  own  by  the 
work  of  Justus  von  Liebig.  That  great  chemist 
published  in  1840  his  celebrated  work,  "  Organic 
Chemistry  applied  to  Agriculture  and  Physiology," 
which  has  proved  revolutionary  in  Germany's  agri- 
culture. If  Liebig  had  lived  in  Great  Britain,  his 
work  would  have  benefited  only  the  far-seeing  few, 
because  our  officials  would  have  remained  indifferent 
to  his  discoveries,  even  if  they  had  understood  their 
value.  They  would  have  left  their  exploitation  and 
fruition  to  unaided  private  initiative.  But  the 
German  Government  took  care  that  the  brilliant  dis- 
coveries of  Von  Liebig  should  prove  beneficial  to  the 
whole  nation.  Chemical  investigation  and  tuition 
was  promoted  and  spread  by  the  liberal  aid  of  the 
Governments  which  opened  chemical  laboratories  and 
created  chairs  of  Chemistry  throughout  Germany. 
Thus  the  chemical  industry  of  Germany  has  become 
the  foremost  in  the  world,  and  it  has  proved  of  in- 
calculable help  to  Germany's  agriculture.  The 
greatest  chemists  were,  and  are  still,  Frenchmen  and 
Englishmen.  Nevertheless,  Germany  has  the  fore- 
most chemical  industry,  not  because  she  possesses 
the  greatest  chemists,  but  because  she  has  an  enormous 
number  of  working  chemists,  and  an  organisation 
which  favours  the  exploitation  of  chemical  and  other 
inventions  throughout  the  whole  of  the  empire. 

When  the  German  chemists  produced  sugar  from 
beetroots,  the  West  Indian  planters  laughed  at  the 
chemical  sugar;  but  at  present  the  German  sugar 
industry  stands  supreme  in  the  world,  perhaps  less 
because  of  the  bounties  which  the  Government  grant 


Percentage  of  Raw  Sugar 
extracted  from  Beet 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     515 

it  than  because  of  the  improvements  which  the 
German  chemists  have  gradually  effected  both  in 
agriculture  and  in  the  utilisation  of  the  roots.  How 
marvellously  the  German  sugar  industry  has  improved 
with  the  assistance  of  the  chemist  may  be  seen  from 
the  substantial  increase  in  the  percentual  yield  of 
sugar,  which  has  gradually  been  effected.  How  great 
and  how  continuous  this  improvement  has  been,  and 
how  greatly  the  production  of  sugar  has  increased 
at  the  same  time,  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
figures  : — 

Production  of  Sugar 
in  Germany 

358,048  tons. 
573>°3°    » 

838,105  „ 
1,336,221  „ 
1,637,057  „ 

1,979,000  „ 

2,400,771  „ 

2,079,221  „ 

2,037,397  ,, 

Without  the  marvellous  improvements  in  the  per- 
centage of  sugar  extracted,  the  sugar  production  of 
Germany  would  certainly  not  have  grown  sixfold  since 
the  year  1875-6  and  be  now  by  far  the  largest  in 
the  world.  At  present,  the  German  raw  sugar  factories 
employ  about  100,000  men  during  part  of  the  year, 
whilst  about  650,000  men  are  occupied  with  growing 
the  roots,  which  represent  a  value  of  about  £12,500,000. 
The  sugar  extracted  is  worth  about  £20,000,000  per 
annum,  of  which  half  is  exported,  and  probably  about 
£15,000,000  per  annum  are  spent  in  wages  in  the  sugar 
industry.  The  tops  of  the  roots  are  locally  used  for 
fodder,  and  the  residue  of  the  roots,  from  which  the 
sugar  has  been  extracted,  is  dried  and  sold  for  fodder 
which  can  be  preserved  through  the  whole  year,  and 
which  represent  a  value  of  about  £2,000,000.  Thus 
the  German  chemists  have,  with  the  liberal  assistance 


1875-6 

8.60  per  cent. 

1880-1 

9.04 

1885-6 

11.85 

1890-1 

12.54 

i  895-6 

14.02 

1900-1 

14-93 

1905-6 

15.27 

1908-9 

17.60 

1909-10 

15.80 

5i6  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  the  Government,  artificially  created  this  enormous 
and  most  valuable  additional  crop. 

Evidently  the  policy  of  non-interference  in  busi- 
ness matters  is  not  without  its  disadvantages,  but 
discretion  and  knowledge  is  needed  on  the  part  of  the 
Government  which  wishes  to  interfere  in  matters  of 
business.  If  Great  Britain  wishes  to  apply  science 
to  industry,  and  make  it  more  than  a  fashionable 
and  popular  cry,  our  higher  education  must  be  re- 
formed root  and  branch,  and  State  aid  must  be 
forthcoming  without  stint.  But  not  only  must 
money  be  spent  like  water,  it  must  be  spent  in 
the  right  direction,  for  this  country  has  frightfully  fallen 
behind-hand  in  the  organised  pursuit,  and  especially  in 
the  organised  application,  of  science.  The  cleverest 
chemists  are  of  little  service  to  this  country  if,  for 
lack  of  rank  and  file,  their  inventions  are  exploited 
abroad.  Our  great  chemists,  who  are  the  foremost  in 
the  world,  are  of  little  use  to  our  chemical  industries. 
They  might  just  as  well  live  in  Germany  or  the  United 
States,  for  in  those  countries  their  inventions  are 
universally  appreciated  and  exploited. 

British  education  is,  unfortunately,  more  orna- 
mental than  useful.  Therefore  the  most  valuable 
schools  of  practical  agriculture  are  sadly  lacking  in 
this  country,  whilst  Greek  is  still  compulsory  at  the 
Universities.  In  Prussia  alone  there  are  seven  agri- 
cultural High  Schools,  where  about  2500  pupils  are 
trained  by  200  teachers.  According  to  the  latest 
return,  these  High  Schools  were  attended  by  1889 
German  students,  and  by  no  less  than  524  foreigners. 
Evidently,  these  courses  are  very  popular  not  only 
with  German  agriculturists,  who,  by-the-bye,  are  very 
foolish  not  to  keep  their  knowledge  for  themselves. 
The  State  aids  -these  High  Schools  with  grants  ot 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    517 

£37,000  per  annum.  Besides  there  are  200  ambulant 
lecturers  provided  by  the  State,  who  teach  scientific 
agriculture.  Furthermore,  there  are  in  Prussia  350 
other  agricultural  schools,  with  2000  teachers  and 
25,000  pupils,  and  facilities  are  provided  in  every 
direction  for  spreading  the  scientific  knowledge  of 
agriculture  far  and  wide.  Many  teachers  in  rural 
elementary  schools  voluntarily  study  agriculture  in 
the  High  Schools,  in  order  to  be  able  to  teach  some 
useful  and  valuable  things  to  the  country  children 
and  their  parents.  The  Prussian  Ministry  of  Agri- 
culture spends  yearly  about  £200,000  on  agricultural 
education  in  all  its  branches,  and  the  sum  total  spent 
by  all  the  German  Governments  and  local  authorities 
in  this  direction  should  at  present  amount  to  about 
£500,000. 

The  general  education  in  the  rural  districts  of 
Great  Britain  is  unfortunately  too  townified,  and 
the  little  boys  and  girls  are  taught  subjects  at  the 
schools  which  not  only  are  useless,  but  which  unfit 
the  children  for  rural  life.  The  boy  who  leaves  the 
elementary  schools  has  only  too  often  been  estranged 
from  the  country,  and  has  been  taught  to  turn  up 
his  nose  at  agriculture  ;  the  girl  aspires  to  a  situa- 
tion in  Kensington,  and  the  possession  of  a  piano; 
and  if  she  marries  a  countryman  she  reads  penny 
novelettes,  and  thinks  it  beneath  her  dignity  to  milk 
a  cow  or  look  after  the  chickens,  for  that  would  not 
be  ladylike. 

Unfortunately,  the  mistakes  which  are  made  in 
our  primary  education  can  never  be  rectified.  The 
youthful  minds  which,  by  a  totally  unsuitable  educa- 
tion, have  been  made  to  despise  the  country  and  the 
country  occupations,  will  not  easily  take  to  country 
life  and  love  it.  Because  of  our  misdirected  primary 


518  MODERN    GERMANY 

education,  many  farmers  and  many  manufacturers 
also  have  become  altogether  hostile  to  the  Board 
Schools,  and  they  sigh  for  illiterate  workers.  In  this 
they  are  wrong.  Education  in  itself  is  not  an  evil. 
The  right  education  is  a  blessing,  the  wrong  one  a 
curse.  However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume 
that  German  education  is  perfect,  or  even  near  per- 
fection. It  is  good  at  the  top  and  at  the  bottom. 
Her  primary  schools  and  her  Universities  are  very 
good,  but  her  intermediate  schools,  and  especially 
the  classical  gymnasia,  through  which  most  Uni- 
versity students  have  to  pass,  are  bad,  and  are  totally 
unsuitable  for  preparing  young  men  for  practical 
vocations.  They  develop  only  the  memory,  but  train 
neither  the  character  nor  the  mind,  and  the  tuition 
received  in  them  is,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  alto- 
gether useless.  They  are  merely  cramming  estab- 
lishments. 

Co-operation  for  agricultural  purposes  first  sprang 
up  in  this  country,  but  owing  to  the  indifference  of 
the  State  co-operation  among  farmers  has  not  spread 
in  Great  Britain.  The  lack  of  co-operation  among 
British  agriculturists  is  due  not  only  to  the  in- 
difference of  the  State  and  the  insularity  of  our  habits, 
but  also  to  the  fact  that  every  rural  property  is  en- 
closed by  a  fence  or  a  hedge  in  England  and  by  stone 
walls  in  Ireland  and  Scotland.  Not  only  are  these 
hedges  unnecessary  and  exceedingly  wasteful,  as  has 
already  been  mentioned,  but  they  form  at  the  same 
time  a  most  effective  barrier  to  progress,  inter-com- 
munication, and  co-operation.  A  farmer  does  not 
like  to  look  over  another  man's  fence,  and  he  does 
not  like  his  neighbour  to  look  into  his  fields. 

In  Germany,  in  France,  in  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Switzerland,  and  in  other  countries  matters  are  dif- 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    519 

ferent.  Boundary  stones,  deeply  sunk  into  the  ground, 
show  the  limits  of  individual  properties,  and  farmers 
do  not  work  each  for  himself  behind  the  screen  of  a 
hedge.  Cultivators  in  Germany  and  elsewhere  con- 
stantly observe  one  another,  freely  talk  to  one  another, 
and  often  take  their  meals  together  on  the  boundary 
between  their  fields.  Observations  are  thus  con- 
tinually exchanged,  and  a  community  of  interest  is 
established.  Thus,  German  agriculturists  are  drawn 
to  one  another  through  the  absence  of  artificial 
obstructions,  whilst  British  farmers  shut  one  another 
out,  and  are  apt  to  look  on  their  neighbours  with 
suspicion.  For  these  reasons,  the  co-operative  move- 
ment could  more  easily  develop  in  Germany  than 
it  has  done  in  this  country,  especially  as  the  extension 
of  the  co-operative  movement  was  actively  assisted 
and  promoted  by  the  Government,  which  saw  in  it 
a  powerful  factor  for  the  advancement  of  agriculture. 

Aided  by  the  State  and  by  the  communities, 
co-operation  among  the  German  agriculturists  has 
developed  with  ever-increasing  rapidity.  In  1890 
there  were  in  Germany  3,000  co-operative  agricultural 
societies.  In  1908  there  were  no  less  than  22,000 
societies  of  this  kind  in  existence.  Of  these,  16,092 
were  credit  societies,  1,845  were  societies  for  co-opera- 
tive buying  and  selling,  2,980  were  co-operative  dairy 
societies  and  societies  which  deal  with  milk,  and  more 
than  1,000  associations  were  devoted  to  various  pur- 
poses. How  vast  the  number  of  these  societies  is 
in  Germany  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  there 
is  now  on  an  average  one  co-operative  society  fol 
every  three  hundred  individual  holdings. 

There  are  numerous  associations  for  building  dykes 
against  floods,  for  developing  irrigation,  for  draining 
fields,  drying  swamps,  acquiring  bulls  and  stallions 


520  MODERN    GERMANY 

for  breeding  purposes,  for  milling  and  storing  grain, 
for  effecting  insurance,  &c.,  and  in  consequence  small 
and  poor  farmers  may  have  the  use  of  steam  ploughs, 
threshing  machines,  &c.,  at  most  moderate  rates. 
Thus  a  comparatively  small  quantity  of  expensive 
agricultural  machinery  is  made  to  do  service  to  large 
numbers  of  peasants,  much  capital  is  saved,  and 
small  cultivators  receive  all  the  advantages  which 
otherwise  are  only  within  the  reach  of  wealthy  land- 
owners. 

The  State  and  local  bodies  assist  in  the  forming 
of  such  associations,  and  often  provide  funds.  Two 
or  three  small  and  poor  local  bodies  agree  to  buy  on 
joint  account  certain  expensive  machinery,  and  hire 
it  out  by  the  day,  whilst  the  State  or  individual 
provinces  undertake  larger  works  for  the  benefit  of 
agriculture,  such  as  the  draining  of  the  extensive 
marshes  near  the  coasts  of  the  Baltic  and  of  the 
North  Sea. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  co-operative  enter- 
prise created  by  the  State  is  the  Preussische  Central- 
genossenschaftskasse,  the  Central  Bank  of  Co-operative 
Associations.  This  huge  bank,  which  was  created  in 
1895,  is  meant  to  be  the  banker  of  the  co-operative 
societies.  It  accepts  deposits,  grants  loans,  &c.,  and 
the  State  started  it  on  its  career  with  a  capital  of 
£2,500,000  in  cash.  How  great  the  service  of  that 
bank  has  been  to  the  co-operative  associations  may 
be  gauged  from  the  fact  that  its  turnover  amounted 
to  no  less  than  £560,795,300  in  1908,  and  that  it 
served  as  a  bank  to  no  less  than  1,213,194  producers. 
The  rate  of  interest  charged  by  that  institution  is 
extremely  low,  and  fluctuates,  as  a  rule,  between 
3  per  cent,  and  4  per  cent. 

Whilst  agricultural  co-operation  in  Germany  is  a 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     521 

powerful  factor  in  the  economic  life  of  the  nation, 
it  figures  in  this  country  chiefly  in  the  speeches  of 
politicians,  who  very  often  have  a  somewhat  hazy 
idea  of  the  meaning  of  co-operation.  Though  not  a  few 
parliamentarians  glibly  recommend  co-operation  as  a 
panacea  for  all  the  ills  from  which  agriculture  is 
suffering,  they  do  nothing  practically  to  further  that 
movement.  After  all,  it  is  easier  to  give  good  advice 
than  to  act.  It  is  true  that  the  co-operative  move- 
ment has  made  some  headway  in  Ireland ;  but  whilst 
agricultural  co-operative  societies  count  by  many 
thousands  in  Germany,  they  count  only  by  a  few 
hundreds  in  this  country. 

Apart  from  the  co-operative  associations,  the  rural 
industries  of  Germany  possess  numerous  huge  and 
powerful  societies  for  improving  the  breed  of  horses 
and  cattle,  promoting  the  keeping  of  fowls,  for  grow- 
ing hops  and  fruit,  for  keeping  bees,  &c. ;  and  many 
of  these  societies  receive  considerable  subventions 
from  the  State. 

The  whole  of  the  agricultural  population  of  Ger- 
many is  organised  in  some  enormous  political  associa- 
tions, namely,  Farmers'  Associations  and  Peasants' 
Societies,  which  have  about  a  million  members. 
Through  these  enormous  associations  the  agricultural 
interest  of  Germany  exercises  some  considerable  in- 
fluence in  the  Imperial  Parliament,  and  in  the  various 
local  Parliaments  of  Germany,  whilst  in  England, 
the  classical  land  of  political  organisation,  agriculture 
is  politically  inarticulate,  and  therefore  neglected — 
an  unknown  factor,  a  plaything,  and  a  victim  to 
the  political  parties  and  to  local  authorities,  with- 
out a  friend,  without  an  advocate,  and  without  a 
champion,  especially  as  "  the  man  in  the  street "  is 
unfortunately  a  townsman. 


522  MODERN    GERMANY 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  powerful  combination  of 
all  the  agriculturists,  and  for  the  determined  agitation 
of  their  representatives  in  Parliament,  the  rural  in- 
dustries of  Germany  would  certainly  not  have  obtained 
the  strong  fiscal  protection  which  they  enjoy  under 
the  German  tariff.  The  moderate  protective  tariff  on 
all  agricultural  products  which  has  formerly  prevailed 
in  Germany  has  been  a  great  blessing  to  Germany's 
agriculture,  and  it  has  done  no  harm  to  her  manu- 
facturing industries,  which  have  marvellously  de- 
veloped at  the  same  time.  But  whether  the  higher 
duties  on  agricultural  products  of  the  last  tariff  will  be 
beneficial  or  harmful  to  industrial  Germany  remains 
to  be  seen. 

The  wholesale  prices  of  wheat  are  higher  in 
Germany  than  they  are  in  Great  Britain,  but  it  does 
by  no  means  follow  that  the  retail  prices  of  food  in 
general,  which  alone  are  of  importance  to  the  consumer, 
are  also  higher  in  that  country.  In  Germany  the  con- 
sumer buys  agricultural  produce  directly  from  the 
producer.  There  are  huge  markets  in  all  German 
towns,  even  in  the  very  largest,  and  there  the  peasants 
from  the  surrounding  districts  will  be  found  offering 
their  produce  for  sale.  The  charges  made  for  the 
use  of  these  markets  is  either  purely  nominal  or  nil. 
In  Great  Britain,  where  similar  markets  are  known 
only  in  out-of-the-way  places,  the  working  man  cannot 
buy  agricultural  products  from  the  farmer,  but  has 
to  purchase  them  from  a  shopman,  who,  in  turn, 
receives  his  goods  from  a  wholesale  dealer.  There- 
fore it  is  not  the  British  farmer  only  who  has  to 
maintain  a  host  of  unnecessary  and  unproductive 
middlemen,  as  has  already  been  shown  ;  the  British 
consumer  also  has  to  maintain  an  army  of  middlemen, 
which  does  not  exist  in  Germany,  and  which  need 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    523 

not  exist  in  this  country.  In  Germany,  no  thrifty 
housewife  would  dream  of  buying  her  vegetables,  her 
fruit,  her  poultry,  her  eggs,  her  butter,  &c.,  at  a 
shop.  She  goes  to  the  market  for  her  supply.  In 
this  country  she  has  to  go  to  the  shops,  unless  the 
shopman  "  calls  for  orders,"  and  as  the  turnover  of 
the  average  greengrocer  is  very  small,  and  as  the 
goods  are  easily  perishable,  the  shopman  has  to  charge 
two,  three,  or  four  times  the  price  which  the  pro- 
ducer receives.  Therefore,  vegetables  and  fruit,  which 
are  a  luxury  in  this  country,  are  often  the  poor  man's 
food  in  Germany. 

In  the  biggest  towns  of  Great  Britain,  and  at  the 
seaports  where  foreign  agricultural  produce  arrives  in 
huge  quantities,  and  has  to  be  sold  quickly,  food  is 
cheap,  and  is  often  cheaper  than  it  is  in  the  country. 
In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  where  duties  on 
imported  food  are  levied  on  arrival  at  the  harbours, 
food  is  much  cheaper  in  the  country  districts  where 
it  is  raised.  Hamburg,  the  German  Liverpool,  is  the 
most  expensive  town  in  Germany.  Families  in  re- 
duced circumstances  in  Germany  migrate  to  the 
country  for  cheapness,  whilst  people  living  in  the 
country  districts  of  Great  Britain  find  it  often  cheaper 
to  get  their  agricultural  produce  from  London.  Our 
towns  have  grown  out  of  all  proportion,  not  only 
because  the  chances  of  finding  employment  for  labour 
and  of  relief  for  the  destitute  are  greater  in  the 
towns,  and  because  we  have  no  peasant  proprietors, 
but  also  because  food  is  cheaper  in  town  than  it  is 
in  the  country. 

That  agricultural  products  are  cheaper  in  London 
than  they  are  in  the  country  is  most  unnatural  and 
most  unfortunate.  This  artificial  cheapness  is  an 
additional  cause  of  the  ruin  of  our  agriculture.  If 


524  MODERN    GERMANY 

we  look  at  wholesale  prices,  food  is  so  cheap  in  Great 
Britain  that  agriculture,  which  in  selling  its  produce 
receives  only  the  wholesale  price,  cannot  be  carried 
on  with  a  profit ;  but  if  we  look  at  the  retail  prices, 
we  find  the  same  products  to  be  so  dear,  owing  to 
the  exactions  of  the  middleman,  that  this  country 
compares  unfavourably  with  Germany  with  regard  to 
the  price  of  food.  The  hosts  of  middlemen  have 
spoiled  the  market  for  OUT  rural  industries.  Hence, 
the  rural  industries  should  strive  to  bring  producers 
and  consumers  together,  and  to  eliminate  those  crowds 
of  unproductive  and  unnecessary  middlemen,  who 
flourish  whilst  our  rural  industries  decay. 

Our  agriculture  suffers  not  only  from  the  exactions 
of  the  go-between,  but  also  from  outrageously  high 
transport  charges.  In  Germany  agricultural  produce 
has  to  travel  enormous  distances  by  rail,  and  it  can 
be  carried  cheaply.  In  Great  Britain,  where,  owing  to 
the  size  and  happy  configuration  of  the  country, 
agricultural  products  need  travel  only  trifling  dis- 
tances over  land  in  order  to  be  brought  to  the  large 
towns,  railway  carriage,  even  in  bulk,  is  so  dear  as 
often  to  make  it  prohibitive  to  farmers.  Our  rail- 
ways are  even  allowed  to  exact  far  more  from  the 
reduced  British  farmer  than  they  charge  to  the  State- 
protected  and  prosperous  foreign  agriculturists.  There- 
fore it  comes  that  American,  Australian,  and  Con- 
tinental fruit  can  be  sold  in  London  at  a  profit,  whilst 
English  fruit  often  rots  on  the  trees  not  far  from 
town,  because  our  railways  choose  to  charge  freight 
rates  which  often  make  it  impossible  for  the  British 
farmer  to  sell  his  produce  at  a  profit  in  the  nearest 
and  most  natural  market.  Thus,  foreign  producers 
receive  a  greater  bounty  from  the  British  railway 
companies  in  the  shape  of  preferential  railway  rates 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    525 

than  they  receive  from  their  own  Governments  in  the 
shape  of  fiscal  protection.  Such  is  the  blessing  of  so- 
called  Free  Competition  among  our  railways. 

It  is  scandalous  that  our  railways  may  thus  help 
to  foster  foreign  rural  industries  and  to  kill  our  own, 
and  it  is  a  disgrace  that  no  British  statesman  has  so 
far  had  the  courage  to  abolish  the  crying  abuse  of 
differential  rates  favouring  the  foreigner  which  exist 
in  no  country  except  Great  Britain.  Whilst  the 
German  peasants  travel  fourth-class  at  about  a  farthing 
a  mile,  and  are  allowed  to  take  into  the  carriages, 
which  are  specially  built  for  that  purpose,  huge 
baskets  full  of  produce  which  are  carried  free  of 
charge,  British  railway  charges  are  so  high,  even  for 
carrying  large  quantities  of  farm  produce,  that  every 
night  long  strings  of  carts  may  be  seen  carrying 
agricultural  produce  from  the  country  into  London 
and  other  big  towns.  Only  in  the  country  which 
was  the  pioneer  in  railway  transport,  the  railways 
are  allowed  to  extort  from  the  countrymen  freight 
charges  which  even  now  make  the  mediaeval  form 
of  transport  the  cheaper  one.  In  that  country  which, 
after  Belgium,  possesses  the  densest  railway  net  in 
the  world,  droves  of  cattle  and  flocks  of  sheep  may- 
be seen  walking  from  Scotland  to  London,  whilst 
in  Germany  cattle  transport  by  road  is  almost 
unknown. 

In  our  congested  towns,  millions  of  poor  are  cry- 
ing for  cheap  food,  and  in  our  deserted  and  reduced 
country  districts  hundreds  of  thousands  of  impoverished 
farmers  are  crying  for  town  prices  for  their  vegetables, 
their  meat,  their  fruit,  &c.  Yet  the  bitter  cry  of 
country  and  town  remains  unheard.  Consumers  and 
producers  cannot  meet  because  our  railway  com- 
panies stand  between  the  two  and  exact  a  ruinous 


526  MODERN    GERMANY 

toll  in  the  form  of  railway  rates  which  are  without 
a  parallel  in  the  world. 

Englishmen  who  have  travelled  in  France,  Italy, 
or  Spain  have  bitterly  complained  of  the  octroi  duties 
which  are  charged  on  every  basketful  of  food  which 
is  brought  into  the  town,  but  no  octroi  duty  charged 
abroad  is  as  high,  as  arbitrary,  as  vexatious,  and  as 
pernicious  as  that  exacted  by  our  railway  companies 
from  British  farm  produce.  Nowhere  in  Europe, 
Belgium  excepted,  is  the  natural  distance  between 
town  and  country  smaller  than  in  Great  Britain,  but 
nowhere  in  the  world  is  the  artificial  distance  between 
town  and  country  greater  than  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
owing  to  the  selfish  and  openly  anti-national  policy 
of  our  railways,  which  have  callously  destroyed  im- 
portant industries,  and  have  made  it  almost  impos- 
sible for  town  and  country  to  exchange  their  natural 
products  in  a  natural  manner. 

We  have  of  late  heard  much  of  the  deterioration 
of  the  national  physique,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  sturdy  English  race  of  former  times  is  be- 
coming almost  extinct,  and  is  being  replaced  by  a  puny, 
stunted,  sickly,  sterile,  narrow-chested,  weak-boned, 
short-sighted,  and  rotten-toothed  race.  Our  magni- 
ficent physique,  which  used  to  be  the  envy  of  all 
foreign  nations,  is  rapidly  disappearing,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that,  according  to  the  statistics, 
no  nation  in  Europe  consumes  more  meat  per  head 
of  population  than  does  Great  Britain.  But  at 
the  same  time,  no  nation  in  Europe  leads  a  more 
unnatural  and  a  more  artificial  .life.  Out  of  one 
hundred  Britons,  no  less  than  sixteen  are  Londoners, 
and  almost  four-fifths  of  our  population  live  in  towns. 
In  Germany  only  three  men  out  of  one  hundred  live 
in  Berlin,  and  only  half  of  the  population  are  town- 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY     527 

dwellers.  In  Prussia  and  Bavaria,  which  combined 
have  as  many  inhabitants  as  Great  Britain,  only  six 
million  people  live  in  towns  of  above  a  hundred 
thousand  inhabitants,  whilst  in  this  country  fifteen 
million  people  unhealthily  live  crowded  together  in 
towns  of  above  a  hundred  thousand  inhabitants. 

But  not  only  live  four-fifths  of  the  people  in 
unnatural  surroundings,  they  are  also  unnaturally 
fed.  Town  mothers  rarely  have  a  sufficiency  of  good 
milk  ;  hence,  the  poor  town  babies  are  brought  up 
on  artificially  coloured,  chemically  treated,  impure, 
and  often  adulterated  cows'  milk,  on  patent  food,  &c., 
whilst  country  babies  are  usually  brought  up  on 
their  mothers'  milk.  Later  on,  the  town  children, 
who  had  never  a  proper  start  and  a  fair  chance  in 
life,  are  to  a  large  extent  fed  on  tinned,  chilled, 
frozen,  chemically  prepared,  and  adulterated  agricul- 
tural products,  which  are  sent  to  this  country  from 
abroad.  That  a  race  which  is  brought  up  in  such 
a  manner  is  not  a  healthy  one  cannot  be  wondered  at. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Ireland,  where  there  is  pro- 
portionately a  huge  agricultural  population,  by  far 
the  finest  specimens  of  British  manhood  are  to  be 
found,  although  the  Irish  country  population  is  poor 
and  is  chronically  under-fed.  The  striking  difference 
between  the  under-fed  but  country-bred  Irishmen 
and  over-fed,  town-bred  Englishmen  should  give  food 
for  reflection. 

German  economists,  German  statisticians,  and 
German  generals  have  from  time  to  time  drawn  atten- 
tion to  the  physical  deterioration  of  the  population 
in  the  large  German  towns,  and  have  made  compari- 
sons by  means  of  the  statistics  of  births  and  deaths, 
the  recruiting  tables  for  town  and  country,  &c.,  from 
which  it  is  apparent  that  the  birth  rate  in  the  German 


528  MODERN    GERMANY 

towns  is  rapidly  falling,  and  that  townsmen  in  Germany 
are  physically  deteriorating  and  becoming  sterile. 
Therefore  Bismarck  refused  to  allow  Germany  to 
become  a  purely  industrial  State  like  England,  and 
he  fostered  the  rural  industries  of  Germany  directly 
and  indirectly,  in  every  way,  so  as  to  preserve  the 
physical  strength  and  health  of  the  nation,  which, 
after  all,  is  its  most  valuable  asset.  Whilst  our  birth 
rate  is  rapidly  falling  and  is  almost  the  lowest  in 
Europe,  the  proportionate  increase  of  the  German 
population  is  becoming  greater  from  year  to  year, 
and  is  now  the  greatest  in  Europe.  Whilst  the  cry  of 
physical  degeneration  is  on  everybody's  lips  in  this 
country,  no  similar  complaints  are  raised  in  Germany, 
and  the  fact  that  the  rapid  increase  of  the  population 
is  not  accompanied  by  a  falling-off  of  the  national 
physique  is  attributed  by  German  statesmen  to  her 
prosperous  agriculture. 

The  foregoing  short  sketch  shows  why  Germany, 
which  has  a  poor  soil,  an  unfavourable  climate,  and  an 
unfortunate  geographical  position  and  structure,  and 
a  somewhat  dull-minded  country  population,  possesses 
a  powerful,  flourishing,  and  expanding  agriculture, 
whilst  Great  Britain,  which  has  the  most  fruitful  soil 
in  Northern  Europe,  a  mild  and  equable  climate,  a 
most  favourable  geographical  position  and  structure, 
an  enterprising  and  energetic  population,  and  a  great 
agricultural  past,  has  rural  industries  which  have 
been  decaying  for  four  decades.  This  chapter  shows 
that  the  ills  from  which  our  rural  industries  are  suffer- 
ing are  not  incurable,  but  they  can  only  be  cured  by 
a  man  of  action  and  of  determination,  who  is  backed 
by  a  Government  which  is  willing  to  lead. 

Before  all,  the  powerful  agricultural  interest  must 
strive  to  gain  power  by  combination.  It  must  form 


RURAL    INDUSTRIES    OF    GERMANY    529 

a  solid  phalanx,  and  must  assert  its  claims  with  energy 
in  Parliament  and  before  the  local  authorities,  which 
only  too  often  tax  and  worry  agriculturists  out  of 
existence.  If  the  agricultural  interest  remains  politi- 
cally formless,  shapeless,  voiceless,  and  inert,  it  will 
continue  neglected.  If  it  is  united  in  mind  and 
united  in  purpose,  the  great  political  leader  will  be 
forthcoming  who  will  make  the  cause  of  agriculture 
his  own,  and  who  is  prepared  to  create  conditions 
which  will  make  our  rural  industries  powerful  and 
prosperous.  Our  latent  agricultural  resources  are 
probably  unparalleled  in  Europe,  and  Great  Britain 
may  again  become  the  envy  and  the  model  of  all 
European  nations  by  the  unrivalled  excellence  and 
the  unrivalled  prosperity  of  her  agriculture.  But 
much  hard  work  will  have  to  be  done  to  achieve  such 
a  result,  which  is  worthy  of  a  great  statesman's  ambi- 
tion, for  he  who  recreates  our  agriculture  will  regenerate 
Great  Britain. 

Detailed  proposals  for  the  re-creation  of  British 
agriculture  will  be  found  in  the  second  edition  of  my 
book  Great  and  Greater  Britain  (Smith,  Elder  &  Co.). 


2L 


CHAPTER    XXII 

WATERWAYS   AND   CANALS 

OUR  most  active  and  most  dangerous  industrial  rival, 
both  as  regards  our  home  and  our  export  trade,  is 
Germany,  and  we  have  often  been  told  by  merchants 
and  manufacturers  that  the  German  industries  are  so 
exceedingly  and  so  uncomfortably  successful  in  Great 
Britain  and  abroad,  and  are  constantly  ousting  British 
manufacture,  because  they  enjoy  cheaper  transport 
facilities.  Therefore  loud  complaints  have  from  time 
to  time  been  raised  in  this  country  by  manufacturers 
and  traders  against  the  exactions  of  our  carrying 
trades,  and  the  spokesmen  of  the  carrying  trades 
have  again  and  again  assured  the  public  that  their 
charges  were  exceedingly  moderate  ;  that  they  could 
not  possibly  accept  freight  at  lower  prices  ;  that  the 
conditions  for  economical  transport  in  Great  Britain 
were  totally  different  from,  and  could  not  be  compared 
with,  the  conditions  existing  in  Germany,  &c.  The 
first  two  arguments  appear  incorrect,  but  the  last 
argument  is  quite  true.  The  natural  conditions  for 
cheap  transport  in  Great  Britain  and  Germany  are 
indeed  totally  and  absolutely  different,  but  they  are 
not  by  any  means  in  favour  of  Germany.  On  the 
contrary,  they  are  in  favour  of  this  country,  and  so 
much  so  that,  if  our  transport  system  was  properly 
arranged  and  managed,  Germany  would  be  utterly 
incapable  to  compete  industrially  with  this  country. 
A  glance  at  a  map  of  Europe  will  prove  this  assertion 

53° 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  531 

to  be  true,  and  show  the  fundamental  difference 
existing  between  the  two  countries  as  regards  cheap 
transport. 

The  greatest  industrial  and  exporting  centres  of 
Germany  are  the  following  : — The  Rhenish-Westphalian 
centre,  with  the  towns  of  Dortmund,  Gelsenkirchen, 
Ruhrort,  Barmen,  Elberfeld,  Essen,  Bochum,  Diissel- 
dorf,  Cologne,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  &c. ;  the  Alsatian 
centre,  with  Miilhausen,  Gebweiler,  Dornach,  Col- 
mar,  &c.  ;  the  various  centres  situated  in  the  Pala- 
tinate, Hesse,  Baden,  Wiirtemberg  and  Bavaria,  with 
the  towns  of  Hochst,  Ludwigshafen,  Carlsruhe,  Mann- 
heim, Offenbach,  Frankfort,  Reutlingen,  Bamberg, 
Nuremberg,  &c.  ;  the  centre  in  the  Saxonies,  with 
Chemnitz,  Glauchau,  Zwickau,  Plauen,  Greiz,  Gera, 
Dresden,  Leipzig,  &c. ;  and  the  Berlin  district.  In 
the  north  of  Germany,  near  the  sea  border,  there 
are  practically  no  industrial  towns,  and  the  country 
is  almost  exclusively  devoted  to  agriculture.  Bremen, 
Hamburg,  Kiel,  Lubeck,  Stettin,  Dantzig,  Konigsberg, 
do  some  manufacturing,  as  every  town  does,  but  they 
can  hardly  be  called  manufacturing  towns.  The 
manufacturing  districts  are  to  be  found  in  Central 
Germany,  and  especially  in  Southern  Germany,  but 
not  near  the  sea.  If  we  draw  a  straight  line  from 
the  Rhenish-Westphalian  centre,  which  is  chiefly  de- 
voted to  the  coal  and  iron  industries,  to  its  nearest 
harbour,  Antwerp,  the  distance,  according  to  the  towns 
chosen,  comes  to  100  to  150  miles.  Berlin  is  sepa- 
rated by  90  miles  of  land  from  the  sea.  All  the 
other  manufacturing  towns  belonging  to  the  other 
centres  are  separated  from  their  nearest  harbour  or 
from  the  sea  border  by  a  distance  of  from  200  to  350 
miles,  and  it  may  be  said,  if  we  look  at  the  German 
industries  as  a  whole,  that  they  are  carried  on  at  an 


532  MODERN    GERMANY 

average  distance  of  more  than  200  miles  from  their 
harbours. 

If  we  now  look  at  a  map  of  Great  Britain,  we  find 
that  our  industrial  towns  are  in  most  instances  situ- 
ated either  on  the  sea,  or  but  a  few  miles  distance 
from  the  sea.  Our  industries  are  carried  on  as  a  rule 
not  further  than  10,  20,  or  30  miles  away  from  the 
sea  border,  and  the  maximum  distance  which  need 
be  considered  for  industrial  inland  transport,  and 
which  is  altogether  exceptional,  is  but  60  miles  in  a 
straight  line.  Consequently,  it  appears  that  the  raw 
materials  imported  from  abroad  by  sea  which  are  used 
in  the  German  manufacturing  industries,  such  as 
cotton,  wool,  ores,  metals,  wood,  &c.,  and  the  articles 
for  the  consumption  of  the  industrial  labourers,  the 
prices  of  which  indirectly  affect  the  cost  of  manu- 
facturing and  therefore  the  welfare  of  the  industries, 
such  as  wheat,  flour,  meat,  petroleum,  &c.,  have  to 
travel  a  distance  which  in  Germany  is  from  eight 
to  ten  times  longer  than  it  is  in  Great  Britain.  The 
industrial  products  exported,  also,  have  in  Germany 
to  be  laboriously  transported  inland  eight  or  ten 
times  the  distance  which  they  have  to  travel  in  this 
country.  Evidently  the  German  industrial  army  has 
to  fight  far  away  from  its  base,  and  its  lines  of  com- 
munication are  exceedingly  long. 

Whilst  Inverness,  Aberdeen,  Dundee,  Perth, 
Glasgow,  Edinburgh,  Greenock,  Newcastle-on-Tyne, 
Sunderland,  Middlesborough,Stockton-on-Tees,  Bristol, 
Cardiff,  Swansea,  Manchester,  Preston,  Barrow-in- 
Furness,  London,  Belfast,  &c.,  can  manufacture  on 
the  very  sea  border,  their  German  competitors,  the 
shipbuilding  industry  of  course  excepted,  have  to 
labour  more  than  100  miles  inland.  But  even  the 
German  shipbuilding  industry  is  at  a  great  disad- 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  533 

vantage,  compared  with  the  shipbuilding  industry  of 
this  country,  for  it  also  has  to  rely  on  the  far-away 
industrial  Hinterland,  whence  it  draws  a  large  part 
of  its  supplies,  notably  coal  and  iron.  Therefore  it 
is  absolutely  clear,  and  it  is  beyond  all  doubt  or  contra- 
diction, that  this  country  is,  as  regards  manufacturing, 
infinitely  more  favourably  situated  than  Germany, 
because  it  operates  close  to  its  sea  base,  and  it  may 
be  asserted,  and  cannot  be  gainsaid,  that  the  natural 
advantages  of  Great  Britain  are  so  immensely  in  our 
favour  that  the  German  industries  would  be  abso- 
lutely incapable  of  competing  with  the  industries  of 
this  country  if  the  enormous  advantages  which  our 
geographical  position  offers  were  fully  utilised. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  clear  that  Germany  is 
very  heavily  handicapped  by  nature  in  the  race  for 
industrial  success,  and  the  position  of  most  Conti- 
nental countries,  which  wish  to  develop  their  in- 
dustries, is  similarly  unfavourable.  The  manufacturing 
industries  of  France,  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Russia,  also,  are  carried  on  far  inland.  Lyons  lies 
160  miles  from  the  sea  ;  the  distance  between  Milan 
and  Genoa  is  80  miles,  but  Italy  has  no  coal ;  the 
manufacturing  towns  of  Bohemia  are  300  miles  distant 
from  their  harbour,  and  Lodz  in  Russian  Poland  is 
separated  by  170  miles  from  the  coast.  One  might 
almost  say  that  in  Europe  the  industries  are  situated 
in  the  centre  of  the  Continent,  with  the  exception  of 
Great  Britain,  where  they  are  placed  on,  or  close  to, 
the  sea  border.  Therefore  Great  Britain  might  again 
acquire  and  maintain  the  industrial  monopoly,  or  at 
least  industrial  predominance,  in  Europe  if  she  avails 
herself  of  her  most  favoured  position.  When  Cobden 
prophesied  with  emphasis  that  this  country  "  was  and 
always  would  remain  the  workshop  of  the  world," 


534  MODERN    GERMANY 

he  probably  based  this  proud  and  sweeping  assertion, 
which  time  unfortunately  has  completely  disproved, 
more  on  our  magnificent  and  unique  geographical 
position,  and  the  peculiar  structure  of  this  country, 
into  which  the  sea  deeply  penetrates  from  all  sides, 
inviting  us  to  pursue  manufacture  and  foreign  trade, 
than  upon  his  fiscal  panacea.  Natural  conditions  are 
always  in  the  end  much  stronger  than  any  policy. 

Industrial  Germany  is  hampered  in  many  ways. 
Her  climate  is  very  severe,  her  coal  is  of  poor  quality 
and  is  found  only  far  inland,  her  inhabitants  used  to 
be  engaged  chiefly  in  agriculture,  and  had  neither 
natural  ability  nor  inclination  for  manufacturing  and 
trade,  and  she  used  to  possess  little  accumulated 
wealth.  Consequently  it  was  of  vital  importance  for 
the  industries  of  Germany  that  the  enormous  diffi- 
culties and  obstacles  which  nature  and  custom  had 
placed  in  the  way  of  her  industrial  success  should 
be  overcome.  Conditions  sine  qua  non  for  giving 
vitality  to  the  German  industries  were  a  practical, 
businesslike  education,  the  application  of  science  to 
industry,  thrift,  and,  before  all  and  most  of  all,  a 
comprehensive  and  efficient  system  of  cheap  trans- 
port whereby  to  bridge  over  and  shorten  the  long 
distances  which  separate  the  numerous  interdependent 
industrial  centres  from  one  another  and  which  part 
these  centres  from  the  sea. 

Already  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  foreign  trade  of 
Germany  relied  chiefly  on  her  waterways.  The 
Valley  of  the  Rhine  was  the  highway  over  which  for 
more  than  1,000  years  the  commerce  flowed  between 
the  Orient  and  Great  Britain,  going  via  Italy,  Switzer- 
land, and  the  towns  of  Flanders  and  Holland.  Before 
the  age  of  steam  and  of  machinery,  the  German 
industries  flourished  in  the  towns  on  the  Rhine,  Elbe, 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  535 

and  Danube,  and  their  tributary  streams.  Their 
prosperity  was  founded  on  cheap  water  transport. 
"  Navigare  necesse  est,  vivere  non  necesse  est,"  was 
the  motto  of  Liibeck.  Nature  and  tradition  point  to 
the  waterways  for  Germany's  prosperity,  and  modern 
Germany  resolved  to  extend  the  use  of  her  historic 
waterways  to  the  utmost,  notwithstanding  the  example 
of  Great  Britain,  which  at  the  time  of  Germany's  in- 
dustrial transition  was  still  the  foremost  industrial 
country  in  the  world  and  a  model  to  all  nations. 

When  the  railways  were  introduced,  Great  Britain 
ceased  to  extend  her  system  of  waterways,  which 
in  past  decades  she  had  built  up  with  the  greatest 
energy.  Her  system  of  canals,  which  were  the  fore- 
most in  Europe,  and  which  used  to  be  the  admiration 
and  envy  of  all  foreign  nations,  were  declared  to  be 
useless  by  the  promoters  of  railways  and  their  friends, 
and  the  nation  weakly  and  foolishly  allowed  its  canals 
to  fall  into  decay  at  the  bidding  of  those  interested 
in  railways.  One  of  the  greatest  German  authorities 
on  inland  navigation  speaks  as  follows  of  our  canals 
in  a  most  important  book  on  "  Inland  Navigation  in 
Europe  and  North  America,"  which  he  compiled  by 
order  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  for  the  informa- 
tion of  the  Government,  and  which  was  published  in 
1899.  His  words  are  weighty  and  to  the  point,  and 
we  shall  do  well  not  only  to  read  them,  but  also  to 
heed  them. 

"  The  artificial  waterways  of  England  are  the 
oldest  in  Europe.  .  .  .  Next  to  Sweden  and  Finland, 
Great  Britain  possesses  the  closest  net  of  water-courses 
in  Europe,  and  she  is  exceedingly  favoured  by  nature 
for  inland  transport  by  water  owing  to  the  climatic 
conditions  prevailing,  the  plenty  and  equal  distri- 
bution of  rain,  and  the  mild  winters  usual  in  that 


"536        MODERN  GERMANY 

country,  as  well  as  owing  to  the  formation  of  the 
coast  with  its  numerous  inlets  of  the  sea,  which  deeply 
penetrates  from  all  sides  into  the  land. 

"  With  the  arrival  of  railways,  the  building  of 
canals  ceased  almost  completely  in  1830.  The  rail- 
ways were  placed  in  a  position  in  which  they  could 
easily  destroy  the  canals.  Through  traffic  on  the 
most  important  canal  routes  had  to  pass  through  a 
number  of  different  and  independent  canal  systems. 
As  soon  as  a  railway  succeeded  in  obtaining  the 
control  of  an  indispensable  part  of  the  canal  route 
by  purchase,  lease,  or  traffic  agreement,  it  took  to 
destroying  the  traffic  on  the  adjoining  canals,  either 
by  enforcing  maximum  rates  or  by  numerous  other 
expedients.  After  having  been  damaged  in  this 
manner,  canals  were  bought  up  cheaply  by  the  rail- 
ways, which  used  them  for  traffic  which  could  not 
conveniently  be  handled  by  the  railroads  or  which 
stopped  the  canal  traffic  altogether.  The  numerous 
independent  canal  companies  possessed  no  central 
organisation,  and  when  in  1844  an  organisation  for 
combined  defensive  action  was  created,  important 
parts  of  the  canal  system  were  already  in  the  possession 
or  under  the  influence  of  the  railways,  and  it  was 
too  late  to  oppose  their  further  encroachments.  In 
1871  canal  property  had  on  an  average  fallen  to  one- 
third  of  its  former  value.  Only  in  1873  were  the 
railways  prohibited  to  close  for  traffic  canals  in  their 
possession,  or  to  allow  them  to  fall  into  disrepair." 

Germany  has  tried  in  the  past  to  learn  from  us  in 
order  to  become  also  a  great  industrial  nation.  She 
has  copied  Great  Britain  in  many  ways,  but  she  has 
not  by  any  means  copied  us  blindly  and  in  every- 
thing. She  has  refused  to  adopt  Free  Trade,  not- 
withstanding the  vigorous  agitation  of  the  Cobden 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  537 

Club  and  its  professorial  sympathisers  in  Germany  ; 
she  has  declined  to  hand  over  the  whole  of  her  pro- 
ductive industries  to  the  tender  mercies  of  her 
transport  industries,  relying  on  the  dogma  of  free 
competition  which  was  preached  by  the  same  political 
economists  who  championed  Free  Trade  ;  she  has 
declined  to  let  her  agriculture  be  ruined  on  the 
strength  of  certain  theories  propounded  by  professors, 
manufacturers,  and  clergymen;  and  she  has  firmly 
refused  to  let  her  canal  system  decay  and  be  partly 
destroyed  in  the  interests  and  at  the  bidding  of  the 
railways.  Germany  has  most  successfully  tried  to 
develop  all  her  industries  harmoniously,  and  not  to 
allow  one  or  the  other  to  become  great  and  prosperous 
at  the  expense  of  another.  In  this  country  the  lack 
of  harmony  and  unity  is  ruining  our  industries. 
Agriculture  has  been  ruined  by  our  manufacturing 
industries,  and  our  manufacturing  industries  are  in 
their  turn  being  ruined  by  our  carrying  trades.  Great 
Britain  has  been  an  example  to  industrial  Germany 
in  many  ways,  but  as  regards  her  industrial  policy 
Great  Britain  has  been  a  warning  example  to  Germany, 
and  is  cited  as  such. 

Recognising  the  importance  of  cheap  transport 
and  of  an  alternative  transport  system,  which  would 
bring  with  it  wholesome  competition,  Germany  has 
steadily  extended,  enlarged,  and  improved  her  natural 
and  artificial  waterways,  and  keeps  on  extending 
and  improving  them  year  by  year;  and  if  a  man 
would  devote  some  years  solely  to  the  study  of  the 
German  waterways,  and  make  the  necessary  but  very 
extensive  and  exceedingly  laborious  calculations,  he 
would  probably  be  able  to  prove  that  Germany's  in- 
dustrial success  is  due  chiefly  to  cheap  transport,  and 
especially  to  the  wise  development  of  her  waterways. 


538  MODERN    GERMANY 

During  the  thirty  years  from  1871  to  1900  this 
country  has  done  practically  nothing  as  regards 
inland  navigation,  for  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  is 
a  sea  canal.  During  the  same  period,  Germany 
has  built  1091  kilometres  of  inland  canals,  she  has 
immensely  improved  all  her  navigable  rivers,  and  the 
German-Austrian  canals  lately  proposed  or  begun  have 
a  length  of  3657  kilometres,  whilst  their  probable 
cost  has  been  estimated  at  the  gigantic  sum  of  about 
£50,000,000.  The  Rhine-Elbe  Canal  Bill  of  1901  pro- 
posed to  spend  £19,450,000  on  this  undertaking  alone 
within  fifteen  years.  Among  these  canals  there  are 
some  very  vast  schemes,  such  as  the  Rhine-Elbe 
Canal,  the  Danube-Oder  Canal,  and  the  Danube-Elbe 
Canal,  enterprises  which  on  an  average  require  an 
outlay  of  above  £10,000,000  each.  Some  of  these 
may  perhaps  not  be  constructed  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  present  generation,  but  it  is  worth  while  to  take 
note  of  these  gigantic  projects  which,  after  careful 
investigation,  have  deliberately  been  proposed  because 
the  fact  of  their  being  proposed  or  begun  shows  that 
canals  have  proved  such  an  immense  benefit  to  Ger- 
many that  the  very  cautious  and  very  thrifty  Govern- 
ment of  that  country  is  willing  to  sink  such  immense 
sums  in  them  notwithstanding  the  certainty  that  these 
canals  will  prove  exceedingly  able  competitors  to  the 
State  railways.  Here  we  have  the  unusual  spectacle 
of  the  State  monopolist  deliberately  creating  a  most 
powerful  competition  to  itself. 

Germany  possesses  a  number  of  big  rivers,  but 
these  were,  until  a  very  recent  period,  in  the  same 
state  of  neglect  hi  which  the  rivers  of  this  country 
are  at  the  present  moment.  They  were  natural  water- 
courses with  a  natural,  unevenly  deep  and  partly 
shallow  bed,  which  did  not  allow  of  the  use  of  big 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  539 

ships,  and  the  soft  natural  banks  of  these  rivers  pre- 
vented ships  from  going  at  a  considerable  speed, 
because  the  heavy  waves  created  by  their  rapid  pro- 
gress would  have  washed  the  river  banks  down  into 
the  river.  For  this  reason  ships  had  to  travel  at  a 
very  low  speed  in  Germany  exactly  as  they  have  to 
proceed  on  British  rivers,  and  even  on  those  which 
are  emphatically  industrial  rivers. 

The  larger  a  ship  or  barge  is,  the  cheaper  is  the 
cost  of  transport,  for  the  same  number  of  men  who 
are  required  for  looking  after  a  small  barge  can  handle 
a  large  one.  Besides,  the  dead  weight  of  the  hull, 
the  proportion  of  living  room  to  stowage  room,  &c., 
is  of  course  far  greater  in  a  small  than  in  a  large 
vessel.  For  the  same  reason  for  which  ocean  steamers 
are  increasing  in  size  from  year  to  year,  the  ships 
and  barges  used  in  inland  navigation  are  growing 
continually  bigger  in  those  countries  where  inland 
navigation  is  systematically  fostered.  Again,  the 
quicker  a  cargo  boat  can  travel,  the  more  economical 
it  is,  for  time  is  money.  In  order  to  make  it  possible 
to  use  large  and  swift  cargo  boats  on  her  rivers, 
Germany  set  to  work  to  regulate  her  natural  rivers 
and  to  convert  them  into  artificial  water-courses  of 
that  type  which  has  been  found  most  fit  for  economical 
and  rapid  navigation. 

With  this  object  in  view,  the  natural  earthbanks 
of  rivers  and  canals  were  replaced  by  solid  masonry 
walls,  the  river  beds  were  narrowed  and  deepened,  so 
as  to  allow  the  use  of  large  boats,  the  rocks  which 
in  many  parts — for  instance  in  the  Rhine  at  Bingen — 
were  a  danger  to  navigation  were  blasted  away,  and 
provisions  were  made  to  prevent  the  ice  forming 
during  severe  winters  and  closing  streams  and  canals 
to  navigation.  Numerous  well-equipped  harbours  and 


540  MODERN    GERMANY 

quays  were  built  by  all  towns  within  reach  of  inland 
navigation,  and  gradually  all  the  more  important 
German  waterways  were  greatly  perfected  and  im- 
proved as  channels  for  commercial  navigation.  On 
the  regulation  of  the  river  bed  of  the  Rhine  alone 
more  than  £1,000,000  were  expended  during  the  last 
thirty  years  ;  and,  in  consequence  of  the  energetic 
measures  which  have  been  taken  for  the  purpose  of 
deepening  the  channel  of  that  river,  Cologne,  which 
in  a  straight  line  is  situated  about  150  miles  from  the 
sea,  has  become  a  seaport,  inasmuch  as  thirty-four 
steamers,  which  have  been  specially  built  for  that 
purpose,  trade  now  regularly  between  Cologne  and 
various  harbours  in  England,  Scandinavia,  and  Russia. 
High  up  the  Rhine  and  300  miles  inland  lies  Strasburg, 
which  formerly  could  be  reached  only  by  the  smallest 
river  craft,  but  now  boats  carrying  600  tons  are  going 
to  and  from  that  town,  and  Strasburg  has  spent  an 
enormous  sum  of  money  in  creating  the  most  modern 
facilities  for  loading  and  unloading,  storing,  &c.,  of 
merchandise. 

The  tributary  streams  of  the  Rhine  also  have  been 
very  greatly  improved.  The  Mam,  for  instance,  was 
a  shallow  stream  with  a  depth  of  only  2f  feet  which 
could  not  be  used  for  shipping.  This  depth  has  gra- 
dually been  increased  to  no  less  than  8£  feet  for  a 
distance  of  twenty  miles  up  stream,  and  at  a  cost  of 
£400,000,  in  order  to  provide  the  industries  of  Frank- 
fort with  cheap  transport  by  water.  Up  to  Frank- 
fort, the  bed  of  the  river  Main  is  as  deep  as  that  of 
the  Rhine,  and  the  same  steamers  which  can  travel 
on  the  Rhine  can  now  go  up  to  Frankfort. 

The  towns  at  or  near  the  Rhine  are  vying  one 
another  in  tapping  that  stream  exactly  as  Frankfort 
has  done,  and  they  do  so  regardless  of  cost.  Crefeld 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  541 

and  Carlsruhe,  which  are  situated  some  distance  away 
from  the  Rhine,  have  dug  canals  to  that  stream  in 
order  to  give  the  most  economical  outlet  to  their 
industries,  and  many  old-world  sleepy  towns  on  the 
Rhine,  which  used  to  subsist  on  the  wine-trade  and 
on  tourist  traffic,  have  equipped  the  water's  edge 
with  the  most  perfect  and  most  up-to-date  installa- 
tions for  warehousing  and  for  loading  and  unloading 
goods  directly  from  train  to  steamer  or  barge,  and 
from  boat  to  train.  Ten  or  fifteen  years  ago,  sacks 
of  wheat  weighing  2  cwt.  each,  could  be  seen  carried 
laboriously  on  the  shoulder  by  sturdy  men  from  the 
small  grain  boats  to  old-fashioned  sheds,  where  they 
were  stacked.  Now  huge  ships  filled  with  wheat  in 
bulk  are  unloaded  by  suction  in  a  few  hours,  and  the 
grain  is  automatically  weighed  whilst  being  whisked 
from  steamer  to  store,  or  is  put  into  sacks  at  an  in- 
credibly high  speed  by  machinery  and  dropped  into 
railway  trucks.  Electricity  is  largely  made  use  of 
for  working  the  machinery  of  these  harbours,  and 
some  of  these  are  very  likely  the  best  equipped  inland 
harbours  in  the  world. 

Formerly  the  greatest  attraction  for  travellers  on 
the  Rhine  was  its  romantic  scenery  and  its  ruined 
castles,  and  the  stream  appealed  most  of  all  to  those 
who  are  poetically  inclined.  Now  its  character  has 
completely  changed,  and  its  greatest  interest  lies  in 
this,  that  it  is  perhaps  the  most  perfect  waterway 
in  the  world  for  the  promotion  of  industry.  Its 
shores  are  no  longer  so  remarkable  for  their  romantic 
views  as  they  are  for  their  countless  smoking  factory 
chimneys,  and  the  beautiful  scenery  begins  to  be 
overhung  by  a  pall  of  smoke  which  reminds  of  the 
Midlands.  However,  this  bustling  activity  is  not  by 
any  means  restricted  to  the  Rhine.  Everywhere  in 


542  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany  water  transport  is  being  developed  with 
the  utmost  vigour  and  energy.  On  all  the  rivers 
and  all  the  canals  commercial  and  industrial 
activity  is  marvellously  developing,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  water  transport  is  becoming  almost 
a  sport,  if  not  a  passion,  with  the  German  business 
community. 

On  the  canals  of  this  country,  which  in  reality  are 
only  shallow  ditches  filled  with  water,  and  on  the 
majority  of  its  rivers,  which  are  not  much  better, 
tiny  barges  loaded  with  from  30  to  50  tons  may 
be  seen  which  are  laboriously  moved  either  by  the 
arms  of  men  or  which  are  hauled  by  horses  at  a  speed 
of  about  three  miles  an  hour.  On  the  German  rivers 
and  canals,  boats  and  trains  of  barges  of  300,  500,  or 
1000  tons  each,  which  are  hauled  by  steamers,  may  at 
every  hour  and  on  every  day  be  seen  proceeding  at 
a  very  considerable  speed.  The  traveller  who  journeys 
by  railway  along  the  Rhine  or  the  Elbe  cannot  fail 
to  see  strings  of  barges  carrying  several  thousand 
tons  of  goods  constantly  passing  by. 

The  great  advantages  which  water  transport 
possesses  over  transport  by  land,  be  it  by  road  or  rail, 
may  be  seen  at  a  glance  from  the  following  facts 
and  figures.  A  large  iron  barge  of  a  loading  capacity 
of  2000  tons,  and  of  the  type  which  is  used  on  the 
Rhine,  costs  only  about  £5000,  or  about  £2.  los.  per 
ton  of  load  room.  A  German  railway  waggon  of  ten 
tons'  capacity  costs  about  £125,  or  £12.  los.  per  ton 
of  load  room,  and  is  therefore,  as  a  vessel  for  carrying 
freight,  five  times  more  costly  than  is  the  barge.  As 
regards  the  cost  of  moving  freight  by  land  and  water, 
the  following  will  show  the  immense  advantage  which 
water  transport  possesses  over  land  transport.  On  a 
horizontal  road,  and  at  a  speed  of  about  three  miles 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  543 

per  hour,  a  horse  can  pull  about  two  tons  ;  on  a 
horizontal  railway  it  can  pull  about  15  tons,  and  on 
a  canal  it  can  pull  from  60  to  100  tons.  Therefore, 
from  four  to  six  times  the  energy  is  required  in  hauling 
goods  by  rail,  and  thirty  to  fifty  times  more  force 
is  expended  in  hauling  it  by  road,  whatever  the 
motive  force  may  be.  Therefore,  the  cost  of  pro- 
pulsion by  water,  whether  the  motive  force  be  horse 
traction,  steam,  or  electricity,  is  only  a  fraction  of 
the  cost  arising  from  propulsion  by  road  or  rail. 
Furthermore,  the  construction  of  railways  is  exceed- 
ingly costly.  On  an  average  at  least  £20,000  to 
£30,000  per  mile  are  required  to  build  a  railway  in 
a  country  such  as  Great  Britain  or  Germany,  whilst 
a  canal  can  be  built  at  considerably  smaller  cost. 
A  further  circumstance  in  favour  of  water  traffic  lies 
in  this,  that  far  more  traffic  can  pass  over  a  broad  canal 
than  can  be  sent  over  railway,  as  will  be  seen  later 
on.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  transport  by  water  is, 
and  must  always  remain,  owing  to  its  very  nature, 
so  very  much  cheaper  than  land  transport,  be  it  by 
road  or  by  rail,  that  railways  cannot  possibly  com- 
pete with  properly  organised,  properly  managed, 
properly  planned,  and  properly  equipped  waterways. 
Hence  it  is  economically  wasteful  not  to  extend  and 
develop  the  natural  and  artificial  waterways  which 
a  country  possesses,  and  it  is  absolutely  suicidal 
and  criminal  to  let  them  fall  into  neglect  and 
decay. 

Canals  and  rivers  are  most  suitable  for  the  trans- 
port of  bulky  goods  which  are  not  easily  perishable, 
and  which  need  not  be  delivered  in  the  shortest 
possible  time.  Therefore  canals  and  rivers  are  par- 
ticularly suitable  for  transporting  cotton,  ore,  metal, 
coal,  wood,  petroleum,  grain,  manure,  chemicals, 


544  MODERN    GERMANY 

fodder,  wool,  potatoes,  cement,  stone,  leather,  salt, 
sugar,  vegetables,  fruit,  &c.,  and  machinery,  and  those 
manufactured  goods  which  are  despatched  in  fairly 
big  parcels  or  which  are  packed  in  strong  boxes  and 
bales. 

If  it  were  not  for  the  existence  of  the  German 
waterways,  the  German  industries  would  certainly 
not  be  in  the  flourishing  condition  in  which  they  are 
now.  When  ice  closes  the  German  rivers  and  canals, 
the  export  and  import  trades  are  at  once  very 
seriously  affected,  and  if  the  German  waterways 
should  be  blocked  for  a  whole  year,  the  whole  of 
Germany  would  probably  be  ruined,  for  Germany 
cannot  live  without  her  waterways.  Certain  valuable 
products  and  by-products  of  the  German  mines  and 
ironworks,  and  the  more  bulky  products  of  the 
chemical  industries  of  Germany  can,  according  to 
Major  Kurs,  who  is  a  leading  authority  on  inland 
navigation  in  Germany,  only  be  sold  in  Germany  and 
abroad  owing  to  the  cheapness  of  transport  by  water, 
and  in  many  cases  the  profit  is  cut  so  fine  that  an 
increase  of  the  freight  charges  by  about  one-fiftieth 
of  a  penny  per  ton  per  mile  would  inevitably  kill 
important  industries  which  it  seems  are  at  present 
killing  the  industries  of  countries  competing  with 
Germany.  Thus  Germany's  industrial  success  is  no 
doubt  due  to  a  very  large  extent  to  the  immense 
assistance  which  she  receives  from  her  water- 
ways. 

In  consequence  of  the  energetic  steps  which  were 
taken  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  navigable 
channel  of  the  Rhine,  the  volume  of  transport  flowing 
over  that  river  has,  according  to  the  official  statistics 
published,  increased  in  the  following  remarkable 
manner  ; — 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS 

THROUGH  TRAFFIC  OF  GOODS  PASSING  EMMERICH 
(GERMAN-DUTCH  FRONTIER) 


545 


Up-stream 

Down-streai 

1889 

2,799,800  tc 

ns        2,593,000  tor 

1894 

4,771,500 

3,142,000 

1897 

6,929,100 

3,480,200 

1900 

9,036,400 

4,129,700 

1903 

10,027,900 

7,211,900 

1906 

13,402,400 

71678,300 

1909 

14,881,300 

9,964,700 

An  almost  equally  rapid  increase  in  the  traffic  has 
taken  place  on  all  the  other  rivers  and  canals  in 
Germany,  and  the  quantity  of  goods  transported  by 
water  has  in  consequence  more  than  trebled  in  a  short 
space  of  time.  Owing  to  the  marvellous  expansion  of 
traffic  which  had  to  be  handled,  the  tonnage  of  the 
fleet  of  ships  used  in  German  inland  navigation  has 
increased  in  the  following  manner  : — 

TONNAGE  OF  THE  GERMAN  INLAND  FLEET 
Number  of  Ships  Tonnage 

1882 18,715  1,658,266  tons 

1887 20,930  2,100,705 

1892 22,848  2,760,553 

1897 22,564  3,370,447 

1902 24,839  4,873,502 

1907 26,235  5,914,020 

From  the  foregoing  figures  it  appears  that  between 
1882  and  1907  the  tonnage  of  the  German  inland  fleet 
has  very  nearly  been  quadrupled.  We  have  often 
heard  of  the  marvellous  progress  of  the  German 
merchant  marine,  but  it  would  appear  that  the  pro- 
gress of  the  German  inland  fleet  has  been  much  more 
rapid,  although  it  has  not  aroused  such  widespread 
attention.  Whilst  the  German  inland  shipping  has 
increased  between  1882  and  1907  from  1,658,266  tons 
to  5,914,020  tons,  the  German  merchant  marine  has 
between  1881  and  1910  only  increased  from  1,181,525 
tons  to  2,859,307  tons.  The  tonnage  of  German  inland 

2M 


546  MODERN    GERMANY 

shipping,  which  in  the  year  1882  was  but  50  per  cent, 
larger  than  the  tonnage  of  German  sea  shipping,  is 
now,  notwithstanding  the  marvellous  growth  of  the 
German  merchant  marine,  100  per  cent,  larger  than 
the  tonnage  of  German  sea  shipping.  The  full  signi- 
ficance of  this  enormous  increase  in  the  tonnage  of 
inland  shipping  is  brought  out  only  if  we  take  note 
of  the  change  in  the  character  of  Germany's  inland 
fleet,  which  is  apparent  in  the  following  table  : — 

CLASSIFICATION  OF  SHIPS  OF  THE   GERMAN   INLAND  FLEET 

Ships  of  Ships  of  Ships  of  Ships  of  Ships  of 
less  than  100-150  150-250  250-600  600  and 
100  tons  tons  tons  tons  more  ton.' 


1887  . 

11,281 

5.460 

L757 

1,271 

220 

1892  . 

11,430 

6,326 

2,343 

1,822 

457 

1897  . 

10,390 

4.405 

3,754 

2,746 

650 

1902  . 

10,764 

J.705 

5,732 

4,087 

1,661 

1907  . 

10,930 

1,859 

6,301 

4,987 

2,112 

The  ships  and  barges  of  less  than  150  tons  have 
decreased  in  number  during  the  last  twenty  years, 
and  the  whole  of  the  immense  increase  in  inland 
tonnage  has  taken  place  in  ships  of  larger  and  of  the 
largest  size.  Those  above  150  tons  have  rapidly  in- 
creased, and  this  increase  is  particularly  striking  in 
the  case  of  ships  of  600  tons  and  more,  which  have 
increased  almost  tenfold,  whilst  those  measuring 
from  250  to  600  tons  have  increased  fourfold  in 
number.  The  decrease  of  the  boats  measuring  less 
than  150  tons  should  be  particularly  interesting  to 
Great  Britain,  inasmuch  as  a  ship  or  a  barge  of  150 
tons,  which  is  too  small  for  German  inland  transport, 
and  is  considered  to  be  ripe  for  the  shipbreaker,  is 
a  very  large  vessel  in  British  inland  navigation,  in 
which  ships  of  30  or  50  tons  abound.  We  are  still 
relying  for  inland  water  transport  upon  our  ancient 
water-ditches,  miscalled  canals,  and  on  tiny  vessels 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  547 

which   are   being   discarded    by   Germany   as   being 
antiquated,  wasteful,  and  therefore  useless. 

How  enormous  the  influence  of  the  size  of  ships 
is  on  the  cost  of  transport  may  be  seen  from  the 
following  table,  which  was  supplied  by  one  of  the 
leading  German  authorities  on  inland  navigation  ; — 

COST  OF  TRANSPORT  PER  TON  PER  KILOMETRE  ON  CANALS, 
IN  SHIPS  OF  VARIOUS  SIZES,  DURING  A  TEN  MONTHS' 
SHIPPING  SEASON 

150       200       300      400      450      600     looo     1500    tons. 
0.79     0.63      0.48      0.41      0.38     0.30      0.23       0.21     pfg. 

One  pfennig  being  about  one-eighth  of  a  penny, 
these  rates  are  roughly  equal  to  the  incredibly  low 
charge  of  from  one-seventh  to  one-twentyfourth  of  a 
penny  per  ton  per  mile  !  If  British  industries  would 
be  able  to  secure  rates  approximating  those  given 
above  for  their  transport  requirements,  a  new  era 
would  dawn  for  our  country,  and  German  industrial 
competition,  of  which  we  now  hear  so  much,  would 
become  a  thing  of  the  past. 

From  the  foregoing  table  it  is  clear  how  exceedingly 
uneconomical  the  toy  barges  are  which  ply  upon 
British  canals  and  rivers.  The  cost  of  transport  in 
boats  of  150  tons  is  about  four  times  as  great  as 
in  boats  of  1500  tons.  Nevertheless,  even  boats  of 
but  150  tons  are  hardly  to  be  found  on  British  canals 
and  rivers,  where  barges  of  smaller  size,  such  as  30 
and  50  tons  for  instance,  are  still  transporting  goods 
at  a  leisurely  speed  and  excessive  costs,  exactly  as 
they  did  in  the  era  of  the  mail  coaches  and  turnpikes 
a  hundred  years  ago. 

The  cost  of  transport  per  ton  per  kilometre  for 
barges  of  a  smaller  size  than  150  tons  cannot  be 


548  MODERN    GERMANY 

given,  for  such  barges  are  no  longer  of  importance 
on  the  German  waterways,  and  the  rates  for  such 
small  boats  are  not  given  by  the  German  source  from 
which  the  foregoing  figures  are  taken. 

Boats  of  a  size  which  Germany  considers  beneath 
notice  as  being  antediluvian  and  incredibly  wasteful 
appear  to  be  good  enough  for  this  country,  which, 
in  spite  of  these  mediaeval  appliances  for  transport, 
aspires  to  be  the  first  industrial  country  in  the  world. 
The  average  size  of  the  large  boats  plying  on  the 
German  waterways  is  from  200  to  400  tons  on  the 
minor  waterways,  on  the  Elbe  it  is  1000  tons  and 
more,  and  on  the  Rhine  barges  from  2000  to  2350 
tons  may  be  seen.  If  we  take  the  general  average, 
the  size  of  the  average  barge  on  the  Rhine  was  450 
tons  in  1896,  and  it  should  now  be  more  than  500 
tons. 

The  exceedingly  low  costs  of  transport  given  in 
the  foregoing  for  ships  of  various  sizes  apply  of  course 
only  to  a  new  and  perfectly-equipped  water-course, 
such  as  the  proposed  Rhine-Elbe  Canal,  and  pre- 
suppose a  well-filled  ship.  But  as  the  ideal  state  of 
the  perfectly-equipped  water-course  and  the  well-filled 
ship  is  at  present  rather  the  exception  than  the  rule 
in  Germany,  for  there  are  still  many  ships  about 
which  can  only  be  described  as  misfits,  it  is  worth 
while  to  take  note  of  the  average  cost  of  transport  on 
the  German  rivers,  and  allow  for  the  fact  that  a 
large  portion  of  the  tonnage  is  during  part  of  the 
year  only  partly  employed  or  even  unemployed.  One 
of  the  foremost  German  authorities  has  furnished  the 
following  table  of  the  actual  costs  of  water  transport, 
which  is  most  interesting  in  so  far  as  it  gives  a  fair 
idea  of  the  real,  not  the  ideal,  business  conditions  at 
present  prevailing. 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS 


549 


0.46  pfennig. 


i-  0.60  pfennig. 


COST  OF  TRANSPORT  ON  PRINCIPAL  GERMAN  RIVERS 

Average  Cost  of  Transport  per  Ton  per  Kilometre 
On  the  Rhine. 

Full  load  during  one-third  of  year. 
Three-quarter  load   during  one-third  of 

year. 
Half  load  during  one-third  of  year. 

On  the  Elbe. 

Full  load  during  two-fifths  of  year. 
Three-quarter   load    during   one-fifth   of 

year. 

Half  load  during  one-fifth  of  year. 
Quarter  load  during  one-fifth  of  year. 

On  the  Oder. 

Full  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 
Three-quarter  load  during  one- quarter  of 

year.  j-  0.92  pfennig. 

Half  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 
Quarter  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 

On  the  Weichsel. 

Full  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 
Three-quarter  load  during  one-quarter  of 

year.  J.  1.38  pfennig. 

Half  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 
Quarter  load  during  one-quarter  of  year. 

The  rivers  Oder  and  Weichsel  flow  through  the 
chiefly  agricultural  provinces  in  the  east  of  Germany 
where  freight  is  less  plentiful  and  less  regular,  and 
where  the  equipment  for  economic  transport  is  less 
advanced  than  it  is  in  Central  and  West  Germany. 
Therefore  the  cost  of  transport  is  comparatively 
high  on  these  rivers,  being  equal  to  about  one-sixth 
of  a  penny  per  ton  per  mile  on  the  Oder,  and  one- 
fourth  of  a  penny  per  ton  per  mile  on  the  Weichsel. 
On  the  Elbe  the  cost  of  transport  is  about  one-eighth 
of  a  penny  per  ton  per  mile,  and  on  the  Rhine  it  is 
as  low  as  one-eleventh  of  a  penny  per  ton  per  mile. 


550  MODERN    GERMANY 

As  in  the  foregoing  table  full  allowance  appears  to 
have  been  made  for  slack  time  and  for  the  time  when 
navigation  has  to  be  stopped  in  consequence  of  frost, 
these  figures  should  give  a  fair  indication  of  the  actual 
cost  of  transport  on  the  rivers  in  Germany. 

However,  the  costs  of  transport  from  place  to 
place  are  not  merely  the  costs  of  water  carriage. 
Therefore  we  can  obtain  a  real  insight  into  the  costs 
of  transport  by  water  only  if  we  compare  all  the 
costs  occasioned  by  water  transport  with  all  the  costs 
of  transport  by  railway.  In  the  following  table,  three 
typical  cases  are  given  in  which  all  the  costs  of  water 
transport  and  of  transport  partly  by  water  and  partly 
by  rail  are  compared  with  all  the  costs  of  transport 
by  rail  only.  The  costs  of  water  transport  are  cal- 
culated on  the  basis  of  600  ton  vessels,  a  size  which 
may  be  considered  a  fair  average  on  the  up-to-date 
waterways  of  Germany.  The  costs  of  railway  carriage 
are  those  of  the  Prussian  State  railways,  the  transport 
costs  and  freight  charges  of  which  are  exceedingly 
low,  as  is  generally  known. 

ALL  COSTS  FOR  SENDING  COAL 

From  Herne  (Westphalia)  to  Hanover,     By  Canal    By  Railway 

Distance  260  kilometres     .     .     .  3.43  Mks.      5.80  Mks. 
From  Herne  to  Schonebeck  on  the  Elbe. 
Distance    444     kilometres,    the 
mine     lying    7     kilometres 

away  from  Herne  Harbour  .  7.00  Mks.        9.00  Mks. 
From  Herne  to  Mannheim  on  the  Rhine. 

Distance  393  kilometres     .     .     .  3.88  Mks.      8.30  Mks. 

From  the  foregoing  figures  it  appears  that  if  all 
incidental  expenses  are  duly  considered,  the  costs  of 
carrying  coal  between  two  of  the  places  mentioned 
are  roughly  from  50  to  115  per  cent,  higher  by  rail- 
way than  the  costs  of  carrying  coal  between  the 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  551 

same  points  by  canal  only,  by  canal  and  river,  or  by 
railway  and  canal.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
transport  costs  on  the  Prussian  State  railways  are 
exceedingly  moderate — they  are  probably  the  lowest 
in  Europe — this  result  is  surely  very  remarkable. 

Owing  to  the  greater  cheapness  of  transport  by 
water,  huge  and  increasing  quantities  of  freight  are 
naturally  being  diverted  from  the  German  railways 
to  the  waterways,  especially  as  it  has  been  found  that 
well-equipped  waterways  of  sufficient  size  can  deal 
more  satisfactorily  and  more  rapidly  with  large  quan- 
tities of  goods  than  can  the  best-equipped  railways. 
Railway  stations  are  always  apt  to  become  congested 
owing  to  their  very  nature,  and  they  cannot  so  easily 
be  enlarged  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  the  growing 
traffic  requirements  of  the  time  as  quays  along  the 
banks  of  rivers  and  canals  can  be  extended.  Besides, 
the  number  of  goods  trains  which  can  be  despatched 
over  a  railway  is  naturally  limited  in  consequence  of 
the  exigency  of  the  general  traffic,  which  must  not 
be  disturbed,  whilst  on  a  river  or  canal  of  sufficiently 
generous  size  a  practically  unlimited  number  of  cargo 
boats  can  be  sent  at  all  times  and  in  either  direction. 
Lastly,  a  goods  train  can  carry  but  a  few  hundred 
tons  of  goods — 300  tons  is  an  exceedingly  satisfactory 
performance  for  a  British  goods  train — whilst  a  train 
of  barges  can  easily  transport  several  thousand  tons 
of  freight.  For  these  reasons  a  far  larger  quantity 
of  goods  can  be  sent  over  a  fair-sized  waterway  than 
can  be  sent  over  a  railway  of  similar  length,  and  on 
a  river  or  a  well-equipped  canal  enormous  masses  of 
goods  can  easily,  quickly,  and  without  delay  be  for- 
warded, which  would  cause  congestion,  confusion,  and 
ultimately  a  complete  breakdown  on  the  best-equipped 
and  best-managed  railway.  The  progressive  use  of 


552  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  waterways  in  Germany  and  their  ability  to  handle 
considerably  larger  quantities  of  freight  than  are 
handled  by  the  railways,  may  be  seen  from  the  follow- 
ing figures  : — 

TRANSPORT  OF  GOODS  ON  THE  GERMAN  WATERWAYS 

Arrivals  Departures 

1875         11,000,000  tons  9,800,000  tons 

1885         14,500,000     „  13,100,000     „ 

1895         25,800,000     „  20,900,000     „ 

I9°5         56,400,000     „  47,000,000     „ 

TRANSPORT  OF  GOODS  ON  THE  GERMAN  RAILWAYS 

Arrivals  Departures 

J875          83,500,000  tons  83,500,000  tons 

1885         100,000,000    „  100,000,000    „ 

1895         164,000,000    „  167,000,000    ,, 

1905        291,000,000     „  297,700,000    ,, 

These  figures  show  that  during  the  thirty  years 
from  1875  to  1905  the  quantity  of  freight  handled 
by  the  German  railways  has  increased  by  a  little  less 
than  250  per  cent.,  whilst  the  quantity  of  freight 
despatched  over  the  German  waterways  has  increased 
by  considerably  more  than  400  per  cent. 

If  we  now  look  at  the  record  of  ton  kilometres, 
and  at  the  quantity  of  freight  carried  per  kilometre 
on  both  railways  and  waterways,  we  find  the  following 
figures  : — 

FREIGHT  RECORD  ON  GERMAN  RAILWAYS 

Ton  kilometre*  Tom  of  freight  despatched 

per  kilometre 

1875  ....  10,900,000,000  410,000  tons 

1885  ....  16,600,000,000  450,000     „ 

1895  ....  26,500,000,000  590,000     „ 

1905  ....  51,200,000,000  820,000     „ 

FREIGHT  RECORD  OF  GERMAN  WATERWAYS 
Ton  kilometres 

1875  ....  2,900,000,000                 290,000  tons 

1885  ....  4,800,000,000                 480,000     „ 

1895  ....  7,500,000,000                 750,000     „ 

1905  ....  15,000,000,000  1,500,000     „ 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  553 

From  the  foregoing  figures  it  appears  that  the 
quantity  of  goods  which  have  been  despatched  over 
each  kilometre  of  railway  has  increased  during  the 
thirty .  years  under  review  from  410,000  to  820,000 
tons,  or  by  only  100  per  cent.,  whilst  during  the  same 
period  the  quantity  of  goods  which  have  been  des- 
patched over  each  kilometre  of  waterway  has  in- 
creased from  290,000  tons  to  1,500,000  tons,  or  by  no 
less  than  417  per  cent.  Therefore,  rightly  considered, 
water  carriage  in  Germany  has  expanded  a  little  more 
than  four  times  more  quickly  than  has  railway  carriage. 
In  1875  the  goods  traffic  was  410,000  tons  per  kilo- 
metre of  railway,  and  only  290,000  tons  per  kilometre 
of  waterway.  At  that  time  the  railways  were  still 
supreme.  In  1905  this  position  had  been  completely 
reversed,  for  the  railways  dealt  in  that  year  with 
820,000  tons  of  freight  per  kilometre,  whilst  the  water- 
ways handled  no  less  than  1,500,000  tons  per  kilo- 
metre. Evidently  the  waterways  are  in  the  ascendant 
in  Germany,  and  if  later  figures  were  available,  it 
would  probably  be  seen  that  the  waterways  have  con- 
siderably improved  upon  their  record  of  1905. 

The  effect  of  the  extension  and  improvement  of 
the  German  waterways,  both  natural  and  artificial, 
may  be  gauged  from  the  significant  fact  that  the 
most  prosperous  industrial  centres  in  Germany,  though 
they  lie  far  inland,  are  situated  close  to  the  water- 
ways of  which  they  make  the  most  extensive  use. 
The  most  prosperous  part  of  industrial  Germany  is 
the  Rhenish-Westphalian  district,  which  might  be 
called  the  German  Midlands.  A  few  years  ago  a 
statement  was  published  according  to  which  the  two 
provinces  of  Rhenish  Prussia  and  Westphalia,  which 
cover  but  15  per  cent,  of  the  German  territory,  and 
which  possess  29  per  cent,  of  the  population  of 


554  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany,  consumed  no  less  than  71  per  cent,  of  the 
coal  used  in  that  country,  they  produced  81  per  cent. 
of  the  iron,  and  86  per  cent,  of  the  steel  made  in 
Germany,  and  they  kept  83  per  cent,  of  the  German 
spindles  running.  How  rapid  the  rise  of  the  Rhenish- 
Westphalian  district  as  an  industrial  centre  has  been 
may  be  gauged  from  the  following  figures  : — 

COAL  RAISED  IN  THE  DORTMUND  DISTRICT 

1870 12,219,432  tons 

1880 22,364,311 

1890 35.577,083 

1895 4i,i45,744 

1900 59,618,900 

1907 94,658,769 

If  we  now  remember  that  the  coal  raised  in  the 
Rhenish- Westphalian  district  is  very  inferior  to  British 
coal,  that  this  manufacturing  centre  lies  not,  like  the 
British  manufacturing  centres,  close  to  the  sea,  but 
from  100  to  150  miles  inland,  according  to  the  town 
chosen,  and  that  a  large  part  of  the  raw  products 
used  in  manufacturing  and  part  of  the  coal  comes 
from  German  inland  centres,  which  in  many  instances 
are  hundreds  of  miles  away,  the  rapid  growth  of  the 
Rhenish- Westphalian  district  can  only  be  called  mar- 
vellous. If  we  wish  to  find  an  instance  of  similar 
expansion,  we  have  to  look  to  the  United  States,  and 
even  there  the  record  of  the  Rhenish- Westphalian 
industries  will  very  likely  not  be  beaten.  If  we 
inquire  why  this  district,  which  by  nature  is  so  little 
favoured  compared  with  Great  Britain,  where  harbours, 
excellent  coal,  iron  and  manufacturing  towns  are 
found  in  the  closest  proximity,  is  the  most  strenuous, 
the  most  successful,  and  the  most  dangerous  com- 
petitor to  those  British  industries  which  are  so  greatly 
favoured  by  nature,  we  find  that  the  industrial  success 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  555 

of  the  Rhenish- Westphalian  district  would  have  been 
impossible  had  it  not  been  for  the  cheap  carriage 
of  goods  afforded  by  the  Rhine.  Therefore  we  may 
expect  to  find  an  indication  of  the  use  to  which  the 
Rhine  is  put  by  the  Rhenish- Westphalian  industries 
in  the  statistics  of  the  port  of  Hochfeld-Duisburg- 
Ruhrort,  which  is  the  outlet  of  those  industries  to- 
wards the  Rhine.  The  following  figures  clearly  show 
what  water  traffic  has  meant  for  the  chief  industrial 
centre  of  Germany  : — 

WATER  TRAFFIC  OF  HOCHFELD-DUISBURG-RUHRORX 

1875 2,900,000  tons 

1880 3,500,000 

1885 4,500,000 

1890 6,200,000 

1894 8,200,000 

1896 9,700,000 

1900 13,000,000 

1909 17,000,000 

The  traffic  of  that  most  important  inland  harbour, 
which  is  unknown  to  most  Englishmen,  has  more  than 
quintupled  since  the  year  1875.  Hochfeld-Duisburg- 
Ruhrort  stands  now  amongst  the  very  foremost 
harbours  of  the  world,  and  only  those  who  have 
thoroughly  examined  that  enormous  inland  harbour 
can  form  an  idea  of  its  vastness,  the  excellence  of  the 
harbour  appliances,  and  its  activity.  The  Port  of 
London  appears  behind  the  times  and  asleep  if  com- 
pared with  that  German  inland  port,  the  name  of 
which  is  hardly  known  outside  that  country. 

The  enormous  activity  of  the  German  waterways 
has  greatly  benefited  Holland,  for  three-quarters  of 
the  through  trade  of  Holland  is  German  water-borne 
trade.  Holland  lives  largely  on  German  trade,  and 
Germany  resents  that  the  trade  on  her  chief  stream 
has  to  pass  through  a  foreign  country  to  which  it 


556  MODERN    GERMANY 

has  to  pay  a  heavy  tribute.  The  unceasing  agitation 
of  the  Pan-Germanic  League  against  Holland,  and  its 
advocacy  of  the  incorporation  of  Holland  into  Ger- 
many in  some  form  or  the  other  springs  to  a  great 
extent  from  the  resentment  that  the  mouth  of  the 
Rhine  is  situated  in  a  non-German  country.  This 
feeling  of  resentment  is  not  confined  to  the  Pan- 
Germans,  for  it  was  one  of  the  principal  causes  which 
determined  the  Government  to  construct  at  immense 
expense  the  Rhine-Ems  Canal  with  the  object  of 
giving  to  the  Rhine  an  outlet  at  Emden,  which  was 
converted  into  a  well-equipped  port.  It  was  intended 
to  divert  the  export  and  import  traffic  of  Germany 
on  the  Rhine  from  Rotterdam  to  Emden,  impoverish 
Holland,  and  bring  her  on  her  knees  by  economic 
pressure.  On  the  nth  of  August  1899,  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal  was  opened,  and  the  year  book 
"  Nauticus,"  which  may  be  described  as  officially  in- 
spired, wrote  hi  the  same  year  : — 

"  In  our  time  our  dependence  on  foreign  countries 
has  frequently  been  felt  by  the  circumstance  that  the 
mouth  of  the  Rhine  is  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign  country, 
and  that  that  country  in  consequence  draws  away  the 
chief  profit  of  our  export  industry.  This  state  of  de- 
pendence will  be  ended  by  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal, 
which  gives  to  the  Rhine,  at  least  for  the  Province  of 
Westphalia,  a  German  outlet  in  Emden"1 

Rotterdam  has  taken  energetic  measures  to  keep 
the  German  trade.  It  has  deepened  the  waterway 
to  the  North  Sea  in  the  course  of  years  from  15  feet 
to  29^  feet,  it  has  increased  its  dock  area  from  96 
acres  to  309  acres,  and  it  has  spent  more  than  £2,000,000 
on  improving  the  harbour.  Whether  the  Dortmund- 
Ems  Canal  will  in  course  of  time  succeed  in  diverting 

1  The  italics  are  in  the  German  original 


557 

the  Rhine  trade  from  the  Dutch  harbours  to  Emden 
remains  to  be  seen.  It  is  possible  that  it  will  eventu- 
ally have  that  effect,  although  it  does,  at  present, 
not  seem  very  likely.  At  any  rate,  the  German 
Government  has  made  enormous  exertions  to  achieve 
that  end  by  building  a  canal  of  record  dimensions. 
The  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  is  168  miles  long,  the  water 
is  8J  feet  deep,  or  as  deep  as  that  of  the  Rhine  up 
to  Cologne,  ships  of  about  1000  tons  can  use  it,  and 
it  has  twenty  locks,  of  which  the  most  important 
ones  have  the  enormous  length  of  542  feet.  About 
£4,000,000,  or  almost  £25,000  per  mile,  have  been 
spent  on  that  canal,  and  the  harbour  dues  at  Emden 
have  been  fixed  so  low  as  to  give  inducement  to  traffic 
to  desert  the  Dutch  trade  route  for  the  purely  German 
one.  Evidently  Rotterdam  will  have  to  look  to  its 
laurels. 

Roads  and  canals  are  open  to  all.  Hence,  free 
competition  will  insure  on  both  roads  and  canals  a 
cheap  and  effective  service  on  the  part  of  the  numerous 
carriers  who  make  use  of  them.  When  our  railways 
were  in  their  infancy  it  was  expected  by  many 
sagacious  men  that  the  iron  road  also  would  be 
common  road  for  the  use  of  all  on  which  many  com- 
peting carriers  would  travel  with  conveyance  of  their 
own  ;  but  their  anticipations  were  not  realised.  The 
owners  of  the  iron  roads,  unlike  the  owners  of  roads 
and  canals,  became  the  only  carriers  on  them,  and 
thus  a  monopoly  arose  somewhat  unexpectedly,  our 
productive  industries  were  given  over  to  the  mercy 
of  our  railways,  and  these  hastened  to  close  as  quickly 
as  possible  the  only  alternative  inland  trade  routes, 
existing,  by  acquiring  and  obstructing  our  canals  or 
by  "  repairing "  them  out  of  existence.  If  we  re- 
generate our  ancient  canal  system,  re-open  these 


558  MODERN    GERMANY 

obstructed  outlets,  and  bring  them  up  to  the  highest 
standard  of  efficiency,  we  shall  again  have  free  com- 
petition among  common  carriers  travelling  on  the 
same  route,  and,  in  view  of  our  unrivalled  position  for 
industrial  purposes,  our  declining  industries  should 
rapidly  revive  by  the  cheap  transport  rates  which  a 
good  system  of  canals  would  insure. 

It  may  be  objected  that  the  example  of  Germany 
cannot  be  followed  by  this  country,  because  Great 
Britain  possesses  no  natural  rivers  which  are  at  all 
comparable  to  the  Rhine  and  Elbe,  that  therefore 
Great  Britain's  position  for  developing  her  means  of 
water  transport  is  far  less  favourable  than  is  that  of 
Germany's.  There  is  apparently  much  force  in  such 
an  argument.  In  reality,  however,  it  appears  to  be 
quite  incorrect.  The  great  and  somewhat  wild 
German  rivers  had  to  be  made  fit  for  commercial 
navigation,  and  at  so  enormous  an  expense,  that  a 
similar  sum  of  money  should  almost  suffice  to  give  to 
our  chief  industrial  centres,  which  after  all  lie  only 
a  few  miles  from  the  sea,  canals  of  so  much  width 
and  depth  that  they  will  be  as  useful  to  them  as 
the  Rhine  and  Elbe  are  to  the  German  industrial 
centres  which  lie  100  and  200  miles  inland.  Besides, 
we  have  an  enormous  advantage  over  Germany,  not 
only  in  our  insular  position  and  in  the  configuration 
of  the  country  where  industrial  centres,  coal,  iron,  and 
harbours  lie  in  the  closest  proximity,  but  also  in  our 
climate.  The  Rhine  may  often  be  seen  so  low  that 
ships  and  boats  have  to  lie  up  for  lack  of  water,  and 
at  the  time  whan  the  snow  melts  in  the  Alps,  that 
river  is  often  so  much  swollen  that  it  is  like  a  raging 
torrent,  and  that  navigation  is  impossible .  Nearly  every 
winter  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe  are  so  full  of  floating 
blocks  of  ice  that  navigation  has  to  be  suspended. 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  559 

The  great  rivers  of  Germany  are  no  doubt  magnifi- 
cent arteries  of  trade,  but  they  had  to  be  regulated 
and  tamed,  and  at  enormous  expense,  before  they 
could  be  utilised,  and  the  great  changes  which  occur 
every  year  in  their  depth  of  water,  their  strength  of 
current,  and  their  closing  hi  consequence  of  the  very 
severe  winter  usual  in  Germany,  make  them  far  less 
desirable  as  waterways  than  they  appear  at  the  first 
glance.  Therefore,  the  advantages  of  Germany's 
magnificent  natural  waterways  are  far  less  great  than 
it  seems  at  the  first  glance,  especially  as  these  natural 
waterways  had  to  be  made  navigable  at  enormous 
cost.  The  frequent  and  often  lengthy  interruptions 
in  traffic  which  occur  on  the  Rhine  and  Elbe  would 
hardly  happen  in  this  country,  where  rain  falls  more 
regularly,  where  floods  by  the  melting  of  snow  in 
the  mountains  need  not  be  reckoned  with,  and  where 
streams  and  canals  very  rarely  are  frozen  over. 

Great  Britain  possesses  no  adequate  waterways  foi 
her  industries  not  because  Nature  has  been  unkind, 
but  because  men  have  been  short-sighted  and  neglect- 
ful. Whilst  Germany  has  vigorously  developed  her 
waterways  hundreds  of  miles  inland,  Great  Britain 
has  not  even  adequately  regulated  the  Thames. 
London,  with  its  incomparable  position,  might  become 
the  finest  entrepot  hi  the  world  by  making  a  barrage 
east  of  London,  and  converting  the  stream  for  many 
miles  below  London  into  a  gigantic  lake  of  still  water 
where  undisturbed  by  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides 
ships  could  load  and  unload  on  the  quays  from  train 
to  ship  and  from  ship  to  train,  and  where  they  could 
store  their  goods  in  gigantic  modern  warehouses. 
Instead  of  such  a  harbour,  we  find  a  mediaeval  river 
with  mediaeval  docks  and  mediaeval  warehouses  and 
appliances,  where  goods  have  to  be  "  lightered," 


560  MODERN    GERMANY 

exactly  as  in  the  time  of  Charles  I.,  and  even  in  the 
heart  of  industrial  and  commercial  London,  the 
Thames,  which  ought  to  be  the  best-equipped  com- 
mercial river  in  the  world,  presents  its  ancient  and 
unlovely  mud  banks  at  low  tide  exactly  as  it  did 
1000  years  ago. 

We  may  again  possess  ourselves  of  the  foremost 
system  of  inland  navigation  in  the  world,  which  was 
ours  100  years  ago,  and  it  can  be  recreated  easily 
and  speedily  at  a  moderate  cost.  During  the  last 
20  years  or  so,  Germany  has  spent  about  £30,000,000 
on  her  waterways.  Such  an  enormous  sum  would 
endow  this  country,  where  distances  are  small,  with 
the  most  magnificent  net  of  canals  which  the  world 
has  seen.  At  the  extravagant  cost  of  £25,000  per 
mile,  1200  miles  of  wide  and  deep  waterways  could  be 
constructed  over  which  the  goods  of  our  manufacturing 
industries  would  flow  at  a  cost  which  now  appears 
incredibly  low,  and  in  an  unthought-of  volume. 

The  policy  of  the  German  Government  with  regard 
to  her  waterways  has  been  deliberately  and  clearly 
laid  down  in  an  official  publication  which  appeared 
some  time  ago,  and  it  is  worth  our  while  to  carefully 
study  and  to  bear  in  mind  the  principles  which  are 
guiding  that  industrially  so  exceedingly  progressive 
country.  We  read  : — 

"  Any  means  whereby  the  distances  which  separate 
the  economic  centres  of  the  country  from  one  another 
can  be  diminished,  must  be  welcomed  and  be  con- 
sidered as  a  progress,  for  it  increases  our  strength 
in  our  industrial  competition  with  foreign  countries. 
Every  one  who  desires  to  send  or  to  receive  goods 
wishes  for  cheap  freights.  Hence  the  aim  of  a  healthy 
transport  policy  should  be  to  diminish  as  far  as  possible 
the  economically  unproductive  costs  of  transport.  A 


WATERWAYS    AND    CANALS  561 

country  such  as  Germany,  which  is  happy  enough  to 
produce  on  her  own  soil  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the 
raw  material  and  food  which  it  requires,  occupies  the 
most  independent  and  the  most  favourable  position 
if,  owing  to  cheap  inland  transportation,  its  economic 
centres  are  placed  as  near  as  possible  to  one  another. 
When  this  has  been  achieved,  Germany  will  be  able 
to  dispense  with  many  foreign  products,  and  it  will 
occupy  a  position  of  superiority  in  comparison  with 
all  those  States  which  do  not  possess  similarly  perfect 
means  of  transport. 

"  Many  circumstances  which  in  former  times  gave 
superiority  to  certain  countries,  such  as  the  greater 
skill  of  their  workmen,  superior  machinery,  cheaper 
wages,  greater  natural  fertility  of  the  soil :  all  these 
advantages  are  gradually  being  levelled  down  by  time 
and  progress.  But  what  will  remain  is  the  advantage 
of  a  well-planned  system  of  transportation  which  makes 
the  best  possible  use  of  local  resources  and  local  advan- 
tages.1 It  is  to  this  that  England  owes  to  a  large 
extent  her  unique  position  for  commercial  exchange 
with  other  countries." 

These  words  are  well  worth  reading,  re-reading, 
and  remembering.  Our  "  unique  position  for  com- 
mercial exchange,"  as  the  German  document  calls  it, 
still  remains,  whilst  our  equally  unique  position  for  in- 
dustrial pursuits  has  been  spoilt  and  partly  lost  through 
the  insufficiency,  the  inefficiency,  and  the  expensive- 
ness  of  British  inland  transport.  It  is  for  the  nation 
and  its  Government  to  decide  whether  they  will  allow 
Great  Britain's  industrial  supremacy,  which  nature  has 
put  into  her  reach,  which  she  once  possessed,  which 
she  has  lost,  and  which  is  still  within  her  grasp,  to 
be  finally  lost  or  to  be  regained. 

1  The  italics  are  in  the  German  original. 

2N 


562  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany  owes,  no  doubt,  much  of  her  industrial 
success,  to  her  wise  policy  of  protection.  But  with 
her  protection  is  not  merely  a  fiscal  policy,  but  a 
general  and  comprehensive  policy.  Industrial  pro- 
tection is  extended  in  that  country  to  all  productive 
interests  alike,  and  harmonious  co-operation,  not 
ruthless  and  mutually  destructive  competition,  which 
unfortunately  means  not  only  the  destruction  of  com- 
petitors, but  also  the  destruction  of  national  re- 
sources, is  her  watch-word.  Germany  protects  her 
population,  not  only  against  the  tariff  attacks  of 
foreign  nations  from  without,  but  also  against  the  far 
more  dangerous  attacks  upon  their  prosperity  from 
within.  Hence  Germany  protects  and  fosters  her 
industries,  not  only  by  her  tariff,  but  also  by  a  prac- 
tical national  education,  by  equitable  and  cheap  laws, 
and  before  all  by  the  provision  of  adequate,  efficient, 
and  cheap  means  of  transport. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

THE   RAILWAYS   AND   THE   RAILWAY   POLICY 
OF  GERMANY 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  railway  era,  Great  Britain 
pursued  a  vigorous  national  policy,  whilst  the  Govern- 
ments of  divided  Germany  were  cosmopolitan  in  theory 
and  parochial  in  practice ;  Great  Britain  was  Pro- 
tectionist, but  Germany  followed  hazy  ideas  of  Free 
Trade  and  Individualism ;  Great  Britain  was  truly 
a  United  Kingdom,  in  Germany  Particularism  was 
in  excelsis,  and  German  unity  existed  only  in  the 
minds  of  some  German  idealists  ;  Great  Britain  was 
progressive,  active  and  hustling,  whilst  Germany  was 
backward,  conservative,  impractical,  and  indolent. 
Industry  in  Germany  was  incredibly  behindhand.  The 
country  was  peopled  by  peasants  and  professors. 
Berlin  had  but  200,000  inhabitants,  and  large  towns 
did  not  exist. 

When  in  1825  Great  Britain  opened  the  celebrated 
Stockton-Darlington  Railway,  and  started  railway 
building  with  the  greatest  energy,  Germany  philo- 
sophised, gazed,  and  wondered  at  the  sudden  out- 
break of  British  industrial  activity.  Only  ten  years 
later,  Germany  timidly  followed  England's  lead  by 
opening,  on  the  7th  December  1835,  the  Nuremberg- 
Fiirth  Railway,  which,  incredible  as  it  may  sound, 
was  less  than  four  miles  in  length.  Only  in  1838, 
when  in  this  country  already  540  miles  of  railway 

were  opened  to  traffic,  Prussia  opened  her  first  line 

563 


564  MODERN    GERMANY 

from  Potsdam  to  Zehlendorf,  which  was  about  thirteen 
miles  long,  or  exactly  one-fortieth  the  length  of  the 
then  existing  British  railways. 

But  in  the  same  year  which  saw  the  birth  of  her 
first  railway,  Prussia  passed  a  wise  and  far-seeing 
law,  the  law  of  the  3rd  November  1838,  by  which  the 
State  gave  the  greatest  liberty  to  enterprising  indi- 
viduals to  construct  railways,  but  which  at  the  same 
time  reserved  to  the  State  powers  which  insured  an 
adequate  control  over  the  construction  and  the  manage- 
ment of  the  railways  and  over  the  determination  of 
fares,  freight  rates,  &c.  Furthermore,  this  law  laid 
down  the  principle  that  the  State  should  be  entitled 
to  take  over  private  railways  after  thirty  years  at 
an  exceedingly  fair  valuation  based  on  the  actual 
capital  outlay,  and  provided  that  fares  and  freights 
had  to  be  proportionately  lowered  whenever  the  net 
profit  of  railway  companies  should  exceed  10  per  cent. 
on  the  capital  actually  invested.  Evidently  great 
care  was  taken  to  safeguard  Prussia's  national  interests 
and  to  protect  them  against  being  exploited  by  the 
railway  companies.  Although  this  law  was  exceed- 
ingly wise  and  marvellously  far-seeing,  it  remained 
for  a  long  tune  a  dead  letter,  inasmuch  as  the  State 
did  not  expropriate  private  railways  with  that  energy 
that  might  have  been  expected ;  and  the  reason  why 
the  Government  did,  in  the  sixties,  not  act  on  those 
views  on  which  the  railway  legislation  of  1838  was 
based  is  not  difficult  to  understand. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  railway  era,  the  economic 
views  of  the  German  Government  and  of  their  officials 
were  tinged  by  philosophy,  philanthropy,  and  roman- 
ticising cosmopolitanism.  They  were  guided  rather 
by  lofty,  abstract  principles,  beautiful  theories,  and 
sentimental  reasons  than  by  practical,  cold-blooded 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF   GERMANY        565 

business  considerations.  One  hundred  and  fifty  years 
ago,  Voltaire  had  coined  the  witty  phrase,  "  England 
rules  the  sea,  France  the  land,  Germany  the  clouds," 
and  that  saying  still  applied  to  Germany  of  eighty 
years  ago.  Germany  was  then  a  land  of  dreamers  and 
visionaries.  Hence  the  voice  of  that  great  economic 
reformer,  Friedrich  List,  who  so  eloquently  and  so 
passionately  pleaded  for  a  "  national "  economic  policy, 
was  a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness.  He  was 
hounded  out  of  Germany  by  the  official  advocates 
of  official  indolence  and  indifference,  scientifically 
called  "  Non-interference,"  and,  disappointed,  abused, 
persecuted,  and  impoverished,  he  shot  himself  in  1846. 
Truly,  no  prophet  is  honoured  in  his  own  country 
during  his  lifetime ;  but  now  the  nation  has  erected 
a  monument  to  the  man  who  is  the  intellectual 
originator  of  Bismarck's  protective  policy  and  of  his 
railway  policy. 

List's  magnum  opus,  "  The  National  System  of 
Political  Economy,"  appeared  only  in  1840 ;  but 
already  in  1833,  two  years  before  the  miniature 
railway  from  Nuremberg  to  Fiirth  was  opened,  that 
far-seeing  man  wrote,  "  On  a  Saxon  Railway  System 
as  the  basis  of  a  German  Railway  System,"  and  in 
1838,  the  year  when  Prussia  built  her  first  railway,  he 
published  "The  National  Transport  System."  Evi- 
dently, List  was  greatly  in  advance  of  his  time. 
Although  his  strenuous  recommendations  to  organise 
railway  transport  and  to  develop  industries  in  Ger- 
many on  a  national  basis  with  the  assistance  of  the 
State  were  little  heeded  by  the  doctrinaire  politicians 
of  his  time,  List  had  at  least  the  satisfaction  that, 
owing  to  his  agitation,  the  Saxon  Government  assisted 
the  building  of  the  first  Saxon  railway  from  Leipzig 
to  Dresden,  which  had  the  respectable  length  of 


566  MODERN    GERMANY 

almost  seventy  miles,  by  a  strange  expedient.  It 
allowed  the  railway  to  issue  500,000  thalers,  or  about 
£75,000,  in  bank-notes. 

Railways  were  to  Germany  a  British  invention, 
and  Germany  imported  with  the  invention  not  only 
British  railway  materials,  locomotives,  &c.,  but  also 
the  British  idea  that  the  State  must  by  no  means 
interfere  with  industrial  freedom  or  engage  in  business 
pursuits  of  any  kind.  Guided  by  the  axioms  which 
were  suggested  to  British  professors  of  political 
economy  by  the  late  Mr.  Cobden  and  his  satellites, 
Brunswick,  which  in  1838  built  the  first  State  rail- 
way in  Germany,  the  line  Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel, 
sold  that  line  in  1869  to  a  private  company,  from 
which  it  was  purchased  by  the  Prussian  State  in  1880; 

The  railway  systems  of  Great  Britain  and  of  Ger- 
many are  fundamentally  different.  Whilst  in  this 
country  all  the  railways  are  private  companies  and 
are  privately  managed  and  directed,  with  hardly  any 
supervision  on  the  part  of  the  State,  more  than  nine- 
tenths  of  the  German  railways  are  owned,  managed, 
and  directed  by  the  various  German  Governments. 
Out  of  a  total  extent  of  58,215  kilometres  (the  figures 
are  those  for  1909),  54,611  kilometres  are  State  rail- 
ways and  only  3604  kilometres,  or  almost  exactly 
one-sixteenth  of  the  total  mileage,  are  private  railways. 
In  Germany,  as  in  this  country,  the  railway  interest, 
the  majority  of  the  professors  of  political  economy, 
the  Liberal  Party,  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  re- 
sponsible officials  were  in  favour  of  unrestricted  private 
ownership,  and  to  them  Great  Britain  served  as  an 
ideal  and  a  model.  Hence  it  is  worth  while  to  take 
note  of  the  weighty  considerations  which  caused  the 
German  States  to  buy,  at  a  gigantic  figure  and  at 
more  than  their  then  market  value,  practically  the 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        567 

whole  of  the  country's  railways  and  to  incur  the 
enormous  and  onerous  responsibilities  of  managing  and 
extending  them. 

Up  to  the  seventies  the  German  States  had  not 
pursued  a  settled  and  well-planned  railway  policy, 
but  had  acted  in  accordance  with  the  requirements 
of  the  moment.  When  private  enterprise  came  for- 
ward, railways  were  built  by  limited  companies;  but 
in  cases  when  important  strategical  or  commercial 
railway  lines  were  not  undertaken  by  private  builders, 
the  government  either  assisted  private  companies  or 
built  the  lines  itself.  In  consequence  of  the  different 
policies  which  had  been  followed  in  the  different 
German  States  as  regards  railways,  the  organisation  of 
Railway  Germany  was  as  confused  as  was  the  organisa- 
tion of  Political  Germany.  Consequently  there  was 
muddle,  disorder,  wastefulness,  sloth,  and  injustice  in 
matters  of  transport.  Side  by  side  existed  inde- 
pendent private  companies  on  the  model  of  the  English 
railways,  private  companies  over  which  the  State  had 
some  control,  and  railways  which  were  run  and  com- 
pletely controlled  by  the  State.  Freights  were  dear, 
rates  were  uncertain,  railway  business  was  exceedingly 
complicated  and  involved,  and  in  many  instances 
railway  charges  were  fixed  on  the  principle,  "  Charge 
what  the  traffic  will  bear."  Where  there  was  com- 
petition, freights  were  cheap ;  where  there  was  no 
competition,  the  unfortunate  people  had  to  suffer  at 
the  hands  of  the  railway  tyrant,  who  demanded  the 
uttermost  farthing ;  where  there  were  wars,  or  com- 
petition, between  railway  companies,  direct  travel  and 
the  speedy  despatch  of  goods  were  often  impeded  by 
the  trickery  of  the  contending  railways.  Owing  to 
the  arbitrariness  and  the  exactions  of  the  railways, 
and  the  uncertainty  of  the  constantly  fluctuating 


568  MODERN    GERMANY 

rates,  which  were  capriciously  fixed,  business  suffered 
as  severely  in  Germany  in  the  seventies  as  it  does 
at  present  in  Great  Britain. 

The  year  1879  is  a  memorable  one  for  Germany, 
inasmuch  as  it  witnessed  both  the  birth  of  Protection 
and  the  rise  of  the  magnificent  system  of  the  German 
State  Railways.  Already  in  1876  Bismarck  had  tried 
to  initiate  both  these  measures  for  developing  the 
foreign  trade  of  the  country  and  for  regulating  its 
railway  traffic.  In  the  same  year  in  which  Prince 
Bismarck  penned  the  sentence  "  Nothing  bitt  reprisals  l 
against  their  products  will  avail  against  those  States 
which  increase  their  duties  to  the  harm  of  German 
exports,"  and  took  steps  to  introduce  a  protective 
tariff  against  unfair  or  overpowerful  foreign  competi- 
tion, he  also  tried  to  protect  the  German  producer 
against  the  exactions  of  the  German  railway  companies 
by  proposing  to  transfer  the  railways  of  Germany 
from  the  hands  of  private  owners  and  of  the  indi- 
vidual States  to  the  hands  of  the  German  Empire. 
However,  in  1876  both  attempts  failed.  Germany  was 
not  yet  ripe  for  Protection,  and  several  of  the  minor 
States  of  Germany  were  naturally  enough  unwilling 
to  hand  over  their  railways  to  the  Empire.  When 
recommending  the  transfer  of  the  railways  of  Ger- 
many to  the  Imperial  Government,  Bismarck  said 
on  the  26th  of  April  1876  : — 

"...  Germany  is  divided  into  sixty-three  railway 
provinces,  or  rather  territories,  which  are  endowed 
with  all  territorial  and  feudal  rights  and  privileges, 
including  the  right  of  making  war ;  and  the  railway 
boards  avail  themselves  of  these  privileges,  and  even 
make  war  against  one  another,  which  cost  much 
money,  for  the  sake  of  power  and  as  a  kind  of  sport. 

1  The  italics  are  in  the  German  original 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF   GERMANY        569 

"  After  my  opinion,  the  railways  are  intended 
rather  to  serve  the  requirements  of  trade  than  to  earn 
a  profit  for  their  owners.  The  profits  which  the 
individual  States  derive  from  the  railways  owned  by 
them,  or  which  are  distributed  to  shareholders  in  the 
shape  of  dividends  in  the  case  of  private  companies, 
are  rightly  considered  a  national  taxation  which  the 
State  would  be  entitled  to  impose,  but  which  is  paid 
not  to  the  State  but  to  the  shareholders  in  private 
concerns.  It  should  be  our  aim  to  see  that  that 
taxation  is  not  oppressive,  but  that  it  stands  in  due 
relation  to  the  requirements  and  the  means  of  the 
railway  users,  that  it  is  financially  just.  .  .  ." 

On  the  ist  of  January  Bismarck  issued  the  follow- 
ing interesting  opinion  as  to  the  right  of  the  State 
to  withdraw  the  privileges  which  it  had  previously 
granted  to  the  private  railway  companies.  In  regard 
to  this  question,  Bismarck  wrote  : — 

"  Railways  were  meant  to  be,  and  are,  instruments 
for  conveying  the  national  traffic,  and  they  were 
given  their  far-reaching  privileges  and  they  were  con- 
structed in  order  to  serve  the  public  and  general 
interest.  Therefore  their  character  as  profit-earning 
instruments  may  be  taken  into  consideration  only 
in  so  far  as  that  character  is  compatible  with  the 
general  welfare,  which  has  to  be  considered  first  and 
foremost.  Hence  the  right  of  constructing  and  ex- 
ploiting railways  can  be  considered  only  as  temporary, 
and  their  eventual  purchase  by  the  Government  is  a 
matter  of  course." 

In  the  same  year  Bismarck  issued  an  interesting 
document  in  which  he  summed  up  the  evils  caused 
by  the  private  ownership  of  railways,  as  follows  : — 

i.  Unnecessarily  high  working  expenses  and  corre- 
spondingly high  charges  in  consequence  of  the  multi- 


570  MODERN    GERMANY 

plicity  of  railway  boards,  managers,  offices,  and  the 
unnecessary  duplication  of  lines,  stations,  material, 
rolling  stock,  &c. 

2.  Chaos    of    freight    charges,    there    being    1400 
different  tariffs  which  are  constantly  changing,  which 
are  unclear,  and  which  make  trade  an  uncertain  and 
speculative  venture. 

3.  Because  direct  travel  of  passengers  and  goods 
over  the  whole  railway  system  of  the  country  is  often 
impeded  with  the  object  of  harming  competing  rail- 
way systems,  and  consequently  much  damage  is  done 
to  trade  and  industry. 

The  steps  which  Bismarck  took  in  1876  in  order 
to  introduce  Protection  and  to  bring  the  German 
railways  under  the  direct  and  absolute  control  of  the 
Imperial  Government  were  somewhat  half-hearted,  and 
they  were  probably  meant  to  be  merely  preparatory ; 
but  in  1879  Bismarck  opened  his  campaign  in  favour 
of  Protection  and  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Prussian 
railways  by  the  Prussian  State  in  real  earnest  and 
with  his  usual  skill  and  energy.  But  his  was  not  an 
easy  fight.  It  was  a  very  difficult  matter  to  make 
these  two  enormous  measures  acceptable  to  the 
Governments  of  the  individual  States  and  to  a  majority 
in  the  German  Parliament,  but  his  powerful  arguments 
proved  convincing  both  to  the  high  officials  of  the 
allied  States  and  to  the  elected  representatives  of  the 
people.  Therefore  it  is  worth  while  to  take  note  of 
Bismarck's  principal  arguments  in  favour  of  his  anti- 
individualistic  policy ;  for  in  that  year  Germany  broke 
for  good  with  British  traditions,  refused  to  follow 
any  longer  the  example  of  England,  and  resolved  to 
seek  salvation  in  an  economic  policy  which  was 
diametrically  opposed  to  that  which  had  been  pursued 
by  this  country,  and  which  was  extolled  to  the  skies 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        571 

by  the  German  professors  and  the  German  Liberal 
Party. 

Bismarck  opened  his  railway  campaign  by  writing 
on  the  3rd  of  January  the  following  letter  to  Messrs. 
Hofmann,  Friedenthal,  and  Maybach,  who  were  the 
Prussian  Ministers  for  trade,  home  affairs,  and  rail- 
ways : — 

"  I  intend  to  raise  the  question  whether  it  be  not 
necessary  to  regulate  the  railway  tariffs  by  imperial 
law.  .  .  .  The  fact  that  such  far-reaching  public  in- 
terests as  the  transport  business  of  railways  is  left 
to  private  companies  and  to  individual  railway  boards 
which  are  free  from  any  supervision  by  the  State, 
and  the  fact  that  these  companies  are  entitled  to 
make  their  own  interest  their  sole  guide,  finds  no 
analogy  in  the  economic  history  of  modern  times 
except  in  the  way  in  which  formerly  a  country's 
finances  were  farmed  out  to  certain  individuals.  In 
view  of  this  fact,  I  intend,  after  due  investigation,  to 
bring  forward  the  question  whether  it  is  not  possible 
to  introduce,  by  means  of  imperial  legislation,  a 
uniform  tariff  on  all  the  railways  of  Germany." 

After  having  thus  prepared  his  colleagues,  he 
addressed  a  very  long  letter  to  the  German  States, 
represented  by  the  German  Federal  Council,  of  which 
the  following  abstract  gives  the  chief  points  of  interest 
to  the  English  reader  : — 

"  The  regulation  of  freights  on  railways,  which  are 
public  roads,  is  of  far-reaching  importance  for  the 
economic  interests  of  the  nation,  and  nobody  must 
be  damaged  or  be  artificially  limited  in  their  use.  The 
Government  will  no  longer  be  able  to  abstain  from 
promoting  the  public  interest  by  creating  those  con- 
ditions which  are  necessary  for  the  requirements  of 
our  national  industries.  The  railways  are  public  roads 


572  MODERN    GERMANY 

for  traffic,  but  can  be  used  only  by  one  corporation. 
By  granting  to  these  corporations  certain  privileges, 
such  as  that  of  expropriation,  of  police  and  of  raising 
capital,  the  State  has  ceded  to  the  railways  part  of 
its  power.  This  part  of  its  power  was  ceded  to  the 
railways  not  in  the  interest  of  the  proprietors  of  the 
railways,  but  in  that  of  the  general  public.  Therefore 
it  follows  that  the  management  of  a  railway  cannot 
be  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  railway  com- 
panies themselves.  Their  management  must  be  regu- 
lated in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  public 
and  with  an  eye  to  the  public  welfare. 

"  Therefore  it  follows  that  railway  charges  must 
not  be  fixed  solely  in  order  to  obtain  the  largest 
possible  profit.  The  State  must  not  only  consider 
the  interest  of  the  shareholders  in  determining  rail- 
way freights,  but  it  has  also  to  see  that  the  well- 
being  of  the  population  as  a  whole  is  fostered  and 
promoted,  and  that  thus  the  vitality  of  the  nation 
will  be  strengthened. 

"  At  any  rate  it  means  a  damage  to  the  interest 
of  the  community  if  a  railway  corporation  takes  no 
notice  of  these  larger  considerations.  Hence  the 
arguments  which  can  be  raised  against  the  system 
of  private  railways  as  such  are  strengthened.  Rail- 
ways must  not  be  allowed,  by  arbitrarily  fixed  tariffs, 
to  develop  industries  in  certain  parts  and  to  destroy 
other  industries  in  other  parts  of  the  country.  Even 
the  most  far-seeing  railway  directors  cannot  realise 
the  consequences  which  a  policy  of  discriminating 
tariffs  may  have  later  on,  although  such  a  policy  may 
prove  beneficial  in  the  immediate  future,  and  several 
railway  boards  have  already  begun  to  understand 
that  it  is  not  their  vocation  to  act  the  part  of  Provi- 
dence, to  alter  the  natural  conditions  of  demand  and 


THE   RAILWAYS    OF   GERMANY        573 

supply,  and  to  dominate  trade  and  industry,  but  that 
it  is  their  duty  to  serve  them. 

"  Starting  from  these  considerations,  it  is  clear  that 
railway  tariffs  should  correspond  with  the  requirements 
of  production  and  consumption,  and  should  not  be 
subject  to  violent  fluctuation.  They  should,  therefore — 

1.  Be  clear,  and  be  drawn  up  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  enable  everybody  to  easily  calculate  the  freight 
for  goods  sent. 

2.  They  should  secure  to  all  citizens  in  all  parts 
of  the  country  equality  of  railway  charges. 

3.  They  should  eliminate  the  disadvantages  which 
at  present  weigh  down  the  small  producers. 

4.  They   should   secure   the   abolishment   of   un- 
necessary, and  therefore  wasteful,  services,  and  insure 
the  honesty  of  railway  officials. 

"  These  requirements  are  not  fulfilled  by  the  present 
tariff  system." 

After  describing  in  detail  the  vast  number  of  dif- 
ferent tariffs  and  the  confusion  and  injustice  resulting 
from  them,  as  well  as  the  impossibility  for  traders  to 
make  a  clear  business  calculation  of  railway  charges, 
Prince  Bismarck  continues  : — 

"  Preferential  tariffs  are  an  injustice  by  the  damage 
they  do  to  those  who  are  not  preferentially  treated, 
and  the  tendency  of  railways  to  differentiate  not  only 
locally  but  also  to  give  cheaper  freight  to  senders  of 
large  quantities  may  damage  the  national  prosperity 
to  a  very  great  extent.  In  order  to  secure  large 
masses  of  goods,  railways  will  go  down  below  their 
normal  rates,  and  will  even  work  without  a  profit, 
and  will  thus  favour  the  foreign  producer  at  the  cost 
of  our  home  industries. 

"  The  railways  which  have  received  from  the  State 
the  monopoly  of  public  transportation  have  the  duty 


574  MODERN    GERMANY 

to  treat  all  railway  users  alike ;  but  differential  tariffs 
of  this  kind  destroy  the  equal  rights  which  all  citizens 
should  enjoy.  Through  the  changes  effected  by  the 
tariffs,  the  economic  interests  of  the  country  become 
dependent  upon  the  railway  companies,  and  our  home 
industries,  and  the  possibilities  which  they  have  for 
selling  their  products,  are  subjected  to  constant 
changes  which  cannot  take  place  without  inflicting 
great  damage  upon  individual  interests. 

"  Those  who  argue  that  competition  among  railways 
cheapens  freights  overlook  the  fact  that  railways 
recoup  themselves  for  their  loss  on  competitive  traffic 
by  charging  proportionately  higher  rates  on  non-com- 
petitive traffic;  and  as  railway  competition  brings 
cheap  freights  principally  to  the  largest  towns,  rail- 
way competition  leads  to  an  unhealthy  centralisation 
of  trade  and  industry  which  economically  and  politi- 
cally gives  cause  for  concern. 

"  In  order  to  avoid  mutually  ruinous  competition, 
railways  frequently  combine  and  agree  to  direct  the 
flow  of  traffic  in  certain  fixed  proportions  over  the 
various  lines  belonging  to  the  combine.  Hence  goods 
are  diverted  from  the  shortest  and  most  natural  route 
and  travel  over  artificially  arranged  roundabout  routes, 
a  proceeding  which  is  opposed  to  the  rational  and 
economical  despatch  of  goods,  and  which  increases 
the  costs  of  transport. 

"  These  unnatural  conditions  would  be  abolished  if 
the  railways  were  obliged  to  charge  standard  rates 
and  to  send  freight  on  normal  routes,  if  unnecessary 
competition  was  abolished,  and  if  the  artificially 
diverted  streams  of  traffic  would  again  be  brought 
back  to  their  natural  routes. 

"  The  foregoing  statement  shows  that  an  improve- 
ment can  only  be  effected  by  insisting  upon  the  prin- 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        575 

ciple  that  the  railways  are  meant  for  the  service 
of  the  nation.  In  railway  matters  changes  are  taking 
place  which  have  already  been  observed  in  the  general 
development  of  nations.  New  economic  factors  have 
arisen,  and  have  grown  up  without  State  interference, 
but  soon  the  interest  in  these  institutions  has  become 
so  great  and  so  general  that  their  further  direction 
can  no  longer  safely  be  left  to  the  egotism  and 
arbitrariness  of  irresponsible  individuals,  but  must  be 
brought  into  harmony  with  the  general  interests  of 
the  country." 

Addressing  Parliament,  Prince  Bismarck  said  : — 

"...  Did  formerly  anybody  trouble  whether  the 
introduction  of  railways  ruined  the  coaching  industry 
and  the  innkeeper  ?  The  railway  monopoly  is  to 
my  mind  far  more  unjust  than  was  that  of  the  coach- 
ing industry,  for  the  railway  monopoly  actually  means 
the  farming  out  of  a  province  to  a  railway  company. 
This  monopoly  arose  naturally  when  all  other  means 
of  transport  had  been  killed  by  the  railways.  Every 
one  who  had  goods  to  send  or  to  receive  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  railways,  and  these  acted  in  exactly 
the  same  manner  as  did  the  Fermiers  Generaux  who 
impoverished  France  before  the  Revolution,  for  they 
also  were  given  a  large  part  of  the  country,  and  were 
allowed  to  exploit  it  at  their  will.  The  object  of  the 
railways  is  to  squeeze  out  of  the  country  the  largest 
possible  dividends.  This  is  an  extraordinary  abuse  of 
the  tax-paying  and  traffic-requiring  community  which 
favours  those  capitalists  who  were  given  the  traffic 
monopoly  that  accrued  to  the  railways.  ..." 

Following  the  lead  given  by  his  great  chief,  the 
Minister  of  Railways,  Maybach,  declared  on  the  8th  of 
November  1879,  before  Parliament : — 

"...  As  regards  the  tariff  policy  of  railways,  I  am 


576  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  opinion  that  railway  charges  should  be  fixed  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  country  ;  and 
if  it  be  necessary  to  give  the  second  place  either  to 
the  national  interest  or  to  the  railway  interest,  I  am 
inclined  to  give  the  second  place  to  the  railway 
interest.  The  system  of  private  railways  has  been 
imported  from  England,  but  it  does  not  suit  Prussia. 
Prussia  requires  State  railways.  It  is  our  aim  to  take 
the  railways  out  of  the  hands  of  speculators,  and  to 
make  them  truly  national  for  the  defence  of  the 
country  and  for  the  development  of  its  prosperity." 

Privately  Bismarck  remarked,  in  1879,  that  it  would 
be  his  ideal  that  all  goods  imported  from  abroad 
should  be  transported  over  the  German  railways  at 
somewhat  higher  rates  than  those  of  home  production ; 
for  he  could  not  allow  that  the  moderate  fiscal  Pro- 
tection which  he  had  introduced  in  1879  should  be 
neutralised  by  preferential  freight  rates  given  to  the 
foreigner.  As  a  matter-of-fact,  he  expected  that  the 
preferential  tariffs  given  on  the  German  railways  for 
German  industrial  and  agricultural  products  would 
be  more  effective  in  protecting  the  home  industries, 
and  increasing  their  strength  and  prosperity,  than 
would  be  the  moderate  fiscal  Protection  which  he 
had  introduced. 

When  the  foregoing  weighty  arguments  had  pre- 
pared the  ground,  a  Bill  for  taking  over  the  railways 
possessed  by  private  companies  was  brought  out  on 
the  29th  of  October  1879,  and  the  Memoire  accom- 
panying it  laid  down  the  following  general  principles, 
which  may,  in  time,  be  adopted  by  the  whole 
world,  including  individualistic  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  unless  indeed  railways  should  be 
superseded  by  some  superior  means  of  transport  and 
locomotion : — 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY         577 

"  Among  the  various  forms  in  which  railways  have 
been  developed  in  civilised  countries,  the  system  of 
State  railways  pure  and  simple  is  the  only  one  which 
is  able  to  fulfil  in  the  most  satisfactory  manner  all 
the  tasks  of  a  national  railway  policy,  by  creating 
uniformity  throughout  the  country  and  equality  for 
all,  and  by  promoting  equally  the  welfare  of  all  inter- 
ested in  railways.  Only  in  the  case  of  State  railways 
is  it  possible  to  utilise  to  the  full  and  in  the  most 
thorough  manner  the  enormous  capital  invested  in 
railways  ;  only  in  the  case  of  State  railways  is  it 
possible  to  give  direct  and  effective  protection  to  the 
public  interest  which  is  the  Government's  duty  ;  lastly 
only  in  the  case  of  State  railways  is  it  possible  to 
establish  a  simple,  cheap,  and  rational  railway  tariff, 
to  effectually  suppress  harmful  differentiation,  and  to 
create  a  just,  diligent,  and  able  administration  which 
is  solely  guided  by  considerations  of  the  general  good. 
Therefore  the  State  railway  system  must  be  considered 
as  the  final  development  in  the  evolution  of  the  rail- 
way system." 

Most  people  think  that  Bismarck's  greatest  work 
was  political ;  but  although  the  elevation  of  Prussia 
and  the  unification  of  Germany  were  marvellous 
achievements,  they  were,  after  all,  only  of  a  circum- 
scribed importance,  and  were  devoid  of  originality  in 
their  essential  points.  But,  in  his  economic  policy, 
he  left  altogether  the  traditional  course  which  states- 
men had  followed  hitherto.  With  marvellous  bold- 
ness he  broke  with  the  doctrines  of  Free  Trade, 
non-interference,  and  Individualism,  which  were  almost 
universally  accepted  in  his  time ;  deliberately  returned 
to  the  economic  policy  of  Oliver  Cromwell  and  Colbert ; 
and  revived,  or  rather  re-created,  the  mercantile 
system,  to  the  horror  of  all  professors  of  political 

2  o 


578  MODERN    GERMANY 

economy.  It  may  sound  incredible,  but  it  is  never- 
theless true,  that  the  world  is  gradually  going  back 
to  the  Mercantile  system,  owing  to  Bismarck's  economic 
reform  of  1879,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
professors  of  political  economy  have  not  yet  dis- 
covered this  curious  but  most  important  phenomenon. 
Otherwise,  they  would  study  that  much  calumniated 
and  much  maligned  system,  under  which  the  poli- 
tical and  mercantile  greatness  of  England  was  built 
up,  instead  of  continuing  to  spin  out  unprofitable 
theories. 

According  to  the  economic  theories  which  still 
enjoy  the  greatest  prestige  in  this  country,  State 
interference  in  economics  is  sheer  heresy,  and  a  sure 
road  to  national  ruin,  and  the  text-books  prove  that 
a  State  or  municipal  corporation  is,  <per  se,  not  fit 
to  engage  in  industrial  pursuits.  However,  it  does 
not  necessarily  follow  that  all  governmental  and 
municipal  enterprise  in  matters  economic  is  found 
to  be  a  failure,  because  our  Government  departments 
and  municipalities  which  engage  in  industrial  pursuits 
are  usually  red-tape  bound,  amateurish,  ignorant  of 
business,  wasteful,  improvident,  and  incapable.  If  we 
look  carefully  into  the  record  of  the  German  State 
Railways,  and  see  what  they  have  done  for  Germany's 
trade,  industries,  and  finance,  and  for  the  people  at 
large,  and  then  look  into  the  records  of  our  own 
private  railways,  in  which  individual  initiative  has 
had  almost  unlimited  scope,  we  shall  see  an  aston- 
ishing difference,  which  appears  not  to  be  in  favour 
of  our  own  railways,  as  the  following  will  prove. 

Immediately  after  1879,  Prussia  rapidly  bought  up 
all  the  more  important  lines,  and  within  a  few  years 
the  State  more  than  trebled  its  railway  property,  as 
is  apparent  from  the  ensuing  table. 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF   GERMANY        579 
MILEAGE  OF  RAILWAYS  OF  PRUSSIA 


1 879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 


State  Railways 
6,323.6  kils. 


11,584.6 
14,825.6 
I5,30i.i 
19,766.9 
21,138.4 


Private  Railways        Total 

13,650.1  kils.  19,973.7  kils 
8,893.1 
9,159.2 
6,329.8 
6,604.2 
3,002.6 


2,496.6 


20,348.4 
20,743.8 
21,155.4 

21,905.3 
22,769.5 
23,635.0 


From  the  foregoing  figures  we  see  that  the  State 
turned  in  five  years  from  a  small  railway  manager 
and  owner  to  a  railway  monopolist.  As  a  rule,  the 
State  as  a  monopolist  is  unprogressive  and  unenter- 
prising— vide  our  own  Post-Ofnce.  But  the  Prussian 
Government  did  not  go  to  sleep  once  it  had  acquired 
the  railways.  On  the  contrary,  it  extended  them 
most  energetically,  as  the  following  figures  prove  : — 

MILEAGE  OF  PRUSSIAN  STATE  RAILWAYS 

1885 21,138  kils. 

1895-96 25,214    „ 

1900 27,513    „ 

1909 33.21?    „ 

If  we  now  compare  the  growth  of  all  the  German 
railways  since  1886,  when  the  State  possessed,  practi- 
cally, the  railway  monopoly,  with  the  growth  of  the 
British  railways  during  the  same  time,  we  arrive  at 
the  following  remarkable  results  ; — 


1880 
1908 


Increase 


German  Railways 

33,411  kilometres 
57.125 

23,714  kilometres 
70  per  cent. 


British  Railways 

17,933  miles 
23,205      „ 


Increase 


5272  miles 
29  per  cent. 


580  MODERN    GERMANY 

These  figures  show  that  the  German  railways  have, 
under  State  ownership,  grown  more  than  twice  as 
quickly  as  have  those  of  Great  Britain  under  private 
(ownership.  It  might,  of  course,  be  objected  that  in 
densely  populated  Great  Britain  there  was  no  more 
room  for  the  extension  of  railways.  But  that  argu- 
ment should  be  used  with  caution,  for  we  find  that 
Germany  has  now  about  six  thousand  miles  more 
railways  than  has  Great  Britain,  and,  according  to 
the  German  statistics,  there  are  now  9.9  kilometres  of 
railway  per  ten  thousand  inhabitants  in  Germany, 
whilst  there  are  only  9.0  kilometres  of  railway  per 
ten  thousand  inhabitants  in  this  country.  Measured 
in  proportion  to  the  population,  the  railway  net  of 
Germany  is  now  10  per  cent,  denser  than  that  of 
Great  Britain. 

This  country  possesses  also  no  longer  the  densest 
railway  net  in  proportion  to  its  size,  as  it  did  during 
the  time  when  Great  Britain  was  the  first  industrial 
country,  as  the  following  figures  prove.  They  are 
taken  from  the  Archil),  fur  Eiseribahnwesen,  a  publica- 
tion which  is  issued  by  the  Prussian  Ministry  for 
Public  Works  (Railways),  and  which  can  be  relied 
upon  for  accuracy.  According  to  this  periodical,  the 
railways  of  almost  purely  industrial  Great  Britain 
compared  x  as  follows  with  the  railways  of  Belgium 
and  of  the  industrial  States  of  Germany  in  1909  : — 

Belgium      .     .     .     28.1  kils.  of  railway  per  100  sq.  kils. 
Saxony        ...     21.0  „  ,,  „ 

Baden         .     .     .     14.7  „  „  „ 

Alsace-Lorraine    .14.1  „  „  „ 

Great  Britain       .11.9  „  „ 

1  A  comparison  of  Great  Britain  with  Belgium,  Saxony,  Baden,  and 
Alsace-Lorraine  may  appear  at  first  sight  unfair,  because  of  the  sterile  high- 
lands of  Scotland  and  the  bogs  of  Ireland.  But  the  proportion  of  waste  land 
in  Great  Britain  is  almost  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  forests  in  those  countries. 


1900-1 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        581 

The  activity  and  progressiveness  of  a  railway 
system  is  apparent  not  only  in  its  length  and  ex- 
tension, but  also  in  its  equipment.  The  magnificent 
palatial  railway  stations  of  Germany,  which  form  such 
a  strange  contrast  with  the  mean,  dirty,  and  cramped 
railway  stations  of  this  country,  are  well  known.  But 
it  is  not  so  well  known  how  rapidly  the  rolling-stock 
on  these  lines  has  increased  since  the  year  when 
almost  the  whole  of  them  were  brought  into  the 
possession  of  the  State.  Therefore  the  following 
Prussian  Railway  figures  may  be  of  interest  :  — 

Loconoti™         Passenger  Cars      %*£?£ 
1879      .  .      7,152  10,828  148,491 

1884-5  •     8.367  i3,°63  I74»I57 

1889-90  .     9,425  15^77  J94.7°5 

•  I0»99i  18,391  231,266 
.   13,267  24,225  303.364 

•  17.177  32,755  377.549 
1909     •              .    19,171              37.243              4".945 

During  the  thirty  years  following  the  creation  of 
the  State  railways,  the  rolling-stock  of  the  country 
has  practically  trebled.  Improved  material  has  been 
introduced  everywhere  ;  travelling  has  become  infi- 
nitely more  safe,  more  comfortable,  and  more  rapid 
on  the  State  railways  than  it  ever  was  on  the  old  private 
lines,  and  owing  to  the  introduction  of  more  powerful 
engines,  larger  freight  cars,  &c.,  haulage  has  become 
far  more  economical  and  efficient.  Goods  trains  in 
Gennany  convey,  as  a  rule,  more  than  twice  the 
weight  which  they  carry  in  this  country  ;  but  an  exact 
comparison  cannot  be  made,  because  our  railways  do 
not  publish  ton-mile  statistics,  which  would  glaringly 
show  up  their  inefficiency.  Whilst  the  most  common 
truck  in  Great  Britain  holds  about  eight  tons,  that 

In  Belgium  17.7  per  cent,  of  the  whole  territory  is  covered  with  forests,  in 
Saxony  25.8  per  cent.,  in  Baden  37.7  per  cent.,  and  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
30.3  per  cent.  Besides  Belgium,  Saxony,  Baden,  and  Alsace-Lorraine  are  on 
an  average  more  mountainous  than  is  Great  Britain. 


582  MODERN    GERMANY 

mostly  used  in  Germany  carries  fifteen  tons.  There- 
fore the  German  goods  trains  haul  a  smaller  dead- 
weight, and  are  therefore  much  more  economical  than 
are  English  toy  trains  pulled  by  toy  engines,  and 
composed  of  insufficiently  loaded  toy  trucks. 

How  marvellously  the  freight  and  passenger  busi- 
ness on  the  German  railways  has  expanded  since  they 
came  into  the  possession  of  the  State  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  statistics,  which  show  that,  whilst 
the  mileage  of  the  Prussian  State  railways  has  grown 
since  1879  by  70  per  cent.,  and  whilst  the  rolling-stock 
has  been  almost  trebled,  passenger  and  freight  traffics 
have  quadrupled  and  quintupled  : — 

Passenger,  Kilometres         Ton,  Kilometres 

1879     .  .  .  3,797,172,000                 8,644,625,000 

1884—5  .  .  5,083,700,000  12,414,712,000 

1889-90  .  .  6,903,526,000  16,142,648,000 

1894-5  •  •  8,763,723,000  18,162,727,000 

1900     .  .  .  14,310,204,000  27,434,536,000 

1908     .  .  .  21,331,413,729  38,187,612,343 

Although  the  wages  of  the  German  railway  servants 
have  considerably  risen  all  round,  and  although,  at 
the  same  time,  freight  and  passenger  charges  have 
been  lowered  all  round,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  course 
of  this  chapter,  the  financial  result  of  the  State  rail- 
ways has  become  more  satisfactory  from  year  to  year, 
largely  owing  to  good  management.  The  following 
have  been  the  profits  earned  on  the  total  capital  of 
all  the  railways  of  Prussia : — 

1869 6.5    per  cent. 

1874 4-4 


1879 -4*9 

1884-5 4-9 

1889-90 6.2 

I894-S 5-6 

1900 7'° 

1905 7-4 

1908 6.3 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY         583 

Under  private  management  the  railway  profits 
were  stagnant,  or  rather  retrogressive,  but  they  be- 
came rapidly  progressive  after  the  railways  had  in 
1879  been  taken  over  by  the  State.  A  profit  of 
6  to  7  per  cent,  on  the  whole  railway  capital  is  a  result 
of  which  an  English  railway  director  might  perhaps 
dream,  but  would  not  think,  for  the  net  receipts  of 
all  the  British  railways  have  fluctuated  for  so  many 
years  between  3  and  4  per  cent,  that  4  per  cent,  appears 
now  an  ideally  high  return  on  the  total  British  railway 
capital.  As  Prussia  borrowed  the  money  with  which 
she  bought  the  railways  by  means  of  loans,  returning 
about  3!  per  cent.,  the  State  makes  every  year  on 
its  railways  an  immense  profit,  which  flows  into  its 
exchequer.  Prussia  has  a  State  debt  of  £438,507,000, 
and  the  net  earnings  of  the  State  railways  for  1908 
not  only  sufficed  for  making  the  necessary  provisions 
for  the  interest  on  the  whole  of  the  National  Debt, 
and  for  its  redemption,  but  left  over  and  above  that 
sum  a  clear  balance  to  the  State  of  £13,500,000,  which 
went  to  the  relief  of  taxation. 

The  railway-using  public,  in  the  whole  world, 
desires  chiefly  that  the  conveyance  of  passengers  and 
goods  should  be  quick,  convenient,  punctual,  equitable, 
and  cheap.  These  five  requirements  are  well  fulfilled 
by  the  German  State  railways.  Although  a  few  show 
trains  on  British  lines  are  still  faster  than  are  the 
show  trains  on  German  lines,  the  average  speed  of 
passenger  trains  is,  according  to  a  high  German 
authority,  considerably  greater  in  Germany  than  it  is 
in  Great  Britain.  The  German  lines  are  no  doubt 
more  convenient  than  our  own  lines,  owing  to  the 
unity  and  uniformity  of  their  traffic  arrangements, 
trains,  time-tables,  &c.  Tickets  issued  from  one  town 
to  another  are,  as  a  rule,  available  on  the  different 


584  MODERN    GERMANY 

lines  connecting  the  two  towns,  and  if  a  traveller 
should  choose  another  way,  he  will  not  be  told  "  Your 
ticket  is  not  available  on  this  line,"  for  the  German 
railways  are,  for  all  practical  purposes,  one  line. 

In  Great  Britain  it  requires  years  of  travel  and 
of  careful  observation  to  learn  one's  way  across  the 
country,  and  its  numerous  lines,  and  to  avoid  the 
many  pitfalls  which  are  everywhere  placed  in  the  way 
of  the  inexperienced  traveller.  In  Germany,  such 
pitfalls  do  not  exist,  and  the  greatest  simpleton  will 
travel  as  cheaply,  as  comfortably,  and  as  rapidly  all 
over  the  country  as  will  the  most  cunning  commercial 
traveller.  On  many  British  lines,  and  especially  on 
those  south  of  London,  trains  appear  to  be  late  on 
principle.  In  Germany,  railway  trains  arrive,  in  nine- 
teen times  out  of  twenty,  to  the  minute,  because  the 
Government  punishes  severely  those  who  are  re- 
sponsible for  delay. 

On  British  railways  people  are  not  equitably  and 
not  equally  treated.  Those  individuals  who  can 
"  influence  freight,"  such  as  buyers  for  wholesale 
firms,  &c.,  are  often  able  to  extort  free  tickets  and 
even  free  passes  over  certain  railways,  and  the  amount 
of  freight  charged  is  largely  a  matter  of  negotiation 
and  of  influence.  The  British  merchant  cannot  tell 
beforehand  what  the  freight  will  come  to  unless  he 
inquires  previously  at  the  railway.  The  British  rail- 
ways charge  on  freight  "  what  the  traffic  will  bear  " — 
that  is  to  say,  they  put  on  the  screw  till  the  victim 
shrieks  or  goes  bankrupt.  Our  railways  are,  no  doubt, 
to  a  great  extent  guilty  of  the  ruin  of  our  agriculture 
and  the  decay  of  our  manufactures  and  industries, 
owing  to  the  freight  policy  which  they  pursue.  A 
reliable  guide  to  the  freight  charges  does  not  exist 
in  this  country,  and  it  could  not  be  compiled,  for  the 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        585 

freight  charges  per  mile,  for  the  identical  goods  and 
even  on  the  same  line,  vary  in  almost  every  town. 
Therefore  a  complete  freight  tariff  for  Great  Britain 
would  probably  be  bulkier  than  the  "  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica."  Besides,  freights  fluctuate  constantly. 
Consequently,  the  British  trader  who  has  to  send 
goods  by  railway  works  in  absolute  uncertainty,  and 
when  he  sends  his  goods,  carriage  forward,  the  chance 
is  that  the  railway  company  levies  an  extortionate 
toll  at  the  other  end,  and  the  trader  loses  his  customer. 
This  is  particularly  often  the  case  when  goods  are  sent 
abroad,  for  the  foreign  customer  believes  himself  to 
be  swindled  when  seeing  the  high  railway  charge, 
or  he  feels  at  least  aggrieved,  and  feels  inclined  to 
give  his  business  to  a  German  exporter,  whose  freight 
charge  is  moderate  and  not  a  matter  of  speculation. 

In  practice  the  British  railways  squeeze  out  their 
charges  on  a  system,  but  it  is  an  atrocious  system, 
which  nobody,  railway  managers  included,  knows  or 
can  understand.  The  nearest  analogy  to  the  "  system  " 
on  which  railway"  charges  are  made  in  Great  Britain 
may  be  found  in  the  system  of  Likin  charges  which 
are  imposed  in  China  by  the  local  mandarins  on  goods 
passing  through  territory  under  their  jurisdiction.  Likin 
also  is  levied  on  the  mediaeval  principle  "  Charge  what 
the  traffic  will  bear."  The  British  Government  has 
pressed  energetically  and  repeatedly  for  a  uniform 
Likin  charge  on  transit  throughout  .China.  It  has 
represented  to  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  ad- 
vantages of  such  an  enlightened  measure  would  be 
enormous  for  the  whole  country.  But  the  same 
British  Government  has  not  yet  tried  to  enforce  a 
uniform  railway  freight  tariff  in  Great  Britain.  As 
regards  China,  votes  need  not  be  considered,  whilst 
the  British  railway  interest,  unfortunately  for  the 


586  MODERN    GERMANY 

country,  sends  some  sixty  directors  into  Parliament. 
Therefore,  the  Railway  News  wrote,  after  a  General 
Election,  on  the  20th  October  1900,  of  the  sixty-six 
railway  directors  and  five  railway  contractors,  who 
were  returned,  that  "  these  might  be  expected  to 
support  proposals  beneficial  and  to  oppose  those 
detrimental  to  railway  enterprise."  This  result  is, 
no  doubt,  very  satisfactory  from  the  railway  point 
of  view ;  but  it  is,  unfortunately,  deplorable  from  the 
national  point  of  view.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons 
why,  in  this  country,  trade  and  industries  are  sub- 
servient and  in  vassalage  to  the  railways,  and  why 
agriculture  is  groaning  under  railway  tyranny,  whilst 
in  Germany  the  railways  have  to  be  subservient  to 
the  productive  interests  of  the  nation. 

The  German  State  railways  have  largely  contri- 
buted to  the  prosperity  of  the  German  industries,  the 
British  railways  have  largely  contributed  to  the  decay 
of  the  British  industries.  In  Germany  trade  policy 
is  made  by  the  trade ;  in  Great  Britain  it  is  made 
by  the  railways,  which,  without  consulting  the  trade, 
prescribes  its  course,  stimulating  it  here  and  stifling 
it  there.  But  the  greatest  injustice  under  which  the 
British  producer  suffers  is  that  the  British  railways 
are  allowed  to  convey  foreign  produce  more  cheaply 
than  they  carry  British  produce,  whereby  they 
directly  subsidise  the  foreigner  to  the  harm  of  the 
native  producer.  They  purposely  support  foreign 
industries  on  the  broad  principle,  "  On  British  pro- 
duce we  charge  what  we  can,  on  foreign  produce 
what  we  may ;  British  produce  has  to  come  to  us, 
foreign  produce  has  to  be  attracted."  Unfortunately, 
redress  for  those  who  are  injured  by  this  nefarious 
policy  is  very  difficult,  very  costly,  and  almost  im- 
possible, in  view  of  the  secrecy  of  railway  charges. 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF   GERMANY        587 

In  Germany  such  outrageous  conduct  would  be  im- 
possible, even  on  the  part  of  the  few  private  railways 
still  existing. 

The  German  freight  tariff  is  of  beautiful  simplicity. 
The  freight  charges  are  uniform  throughout  the 
country,  and  are  fixed  at  an  invariable  amount  per 
ton  per  mile.  There  are  only  a  few  classes  of  goods, 
and  every  trader  possesses  a  little  book  by  means  of 
which  the  office-boy  can  calculate  in  a  moment  the 
exact  amount  of  the  freight  charges  for  any  weight 
between  any  two  stations.  Freight  charges  in  Ger- 
many are  as  uniform,  as  generally  known,  and  as 
simple  as  are  our  own  postal  charges  on  letters, 
post-cards,  and  printed  matter.  Freight  charges  in 
Germany  are  not  determined  by  negotiation,  or  by  in- 
fluence, and  the  goods  of  the  foreigner  which  compete 
with  German  goods  are  not  carried  at  a  lower,  but  at 
a  higher,  rate  than  the  native  produce.  But  foreign 
raw  material  is  carried  cheaply,  and  thus  Bismarck's 
ideal,  which  was  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  is  ful- 
filled. 

Whilst  in  this  country  the  railways  raise  fares  and 
freights  at  every  opportunity,  the  fares  and  freight 
charges  of  the  German  State  railways  are  steadily 
going  down,  as  the  following  figures  show : — 

RECEIPTS  OF  THE  GERMAN  RAILWAYS  (per  ton,  kilometre) 

Goods  by  fast  train          Goods  by  ordinary  train 
pfennigs  pfennigs 

1893  •  •  24.47  3-79 

1896  .  .  24.09  3.79 

1899  .  .  21.75  3-57 

1902  .  .  17.01  3.52 

1909  .  .  16.52  3.51 

If  we  now  look  into  the  earnings  of  the  German 


588  MODERN    GERMANY 

railways  on  their  passenger  traffic,  we  find  the  follow- 
ing figures,  which  also  show  a  decrease  of  charges  : — 

RECEIPTS  OF  THE  GERMAN  RAILWAYS    (per   passenger, 
kilometre) 

ist  Class    2nd  Class    jrd  Class   4th  Class 
pfennigs     pfennigs     pfennigs     pfennigs 


1893  . 

.  7.87 

4.96 

2.94 

1.99 

1896  , 

.  7.94 

4.71 

2.76 

1.98 

1899  . 

.  7.75 

4.66 

2.69 

1.96 

1902  . 

•  7-33 

4.48 

2.67 

1.89 

1909  . 

.  7.48 

4.06 

2-54 

1.85 

In  Great  Britain  the  maximum  charge  for  third 
class  travelling  is  id.  per  mile,  and  a  glance  at  any 
railway  guide,  such  as  the  A,  B,  C  Guide,  will  show 
that  the  British  railways  charge,  in  nine  cases  out 
of  ten,  the  full  maximum  rate.  In  Germany,  the 
lowest  class  is  the  fourth  class,  where  the  average 
charge  is  fd.  per  mile,  whilst  the  charge  for  third 
class  is  about  £d.  per  mile.  It  is  also  worth  noting 
that  in  Germany,  travelling  first  class  is  comparatively 
very  much  dearer  than  it  is  in  England.  On  an 
average,  it  costs  in  that  country  about  three  times 
more  to  travel  first  class  than  third  class,  and  about 
four  times  more  than  it  costs  to  travel  fourth  class. 
But  in  Great  Britain,  travelling  first  class  usually  is 
only  about  twice  as  dear  as  it  is  to  travel  third  class, 
In  Germany,  the  poor  man  travels  cheaply,  whilst 
in  England  the  rich  man  travels  cheaply. 

Unfortunately,  the  German  statistics  of  passenger 
charges  and  freight  charges  per  mile  cannot  be  com- 
pared with  similar  British  statistics,  because  com- 
prehensive British  statistics  are  not  issued  by  the 
British  railway  companies,  for  reasons  best  known 
to  themselves.  The  British  railways  publish  neither 
these  statistics,  nor  their  freight  charges,  which  are 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        589 

of  the  greatest  interest  to  the  public,  exactly  as  the 
Chinese  mandarins  are  not  so  stupid  as  to  publish 
their  Likin  charges  in  the  seaports.  They  also  do 
not  care  to  frighten  customers  away  by  publishing 
their  extortionate  charges,  and  they  dread,  besides, 
exposure  and  impeachment  in  Pekin  by  the  Board 
of  Censors.  More  than  twenty  years  ago,  in  1884,  Sir 
Henry  Calcraft  and  Sir  Robert  Gifien,  who  were  then 
assistant  secretaries  for  the  Railway  and  Statistical 
Departments,  regretted  that  "  It  is  impossible  to 
show  what  is  the  receipt  per  ton  per  mile."  And  in 
1886  Mr.  J.  S.  Jeans  read  a  paper  on  Railway  Traffic 
before  the  Statistical  Society,  in  which  he  said  ; — 

"  The  average  transport  charges  may  be  ascertained  for 
every  European  country  except  our  own,  as  regards  both 
goods  and  passenger  traffic.  In  Great  Britain  the  railways, 
whether  by  accident  or  by  design,  have  hitherto  contrived 
to  make  it  impossible  for  the  public  to  discover  the  average 
charges  for  the  transport  of  either  the  one  or  the  other,  for 
any  one  railway  or  for  the  country  as  a  whole." 

Since  then  the  demand  has  frequently  been  raided 
by  the  public  that  the  railways  should  publish  their 
charges  and  their  earnings  per  mile  per  ton,  and 
per  mile  per  passenger,  &c.  But  although  our  rail- 
ways have,  through  their  various  advocates  in  the 
press,  written  and  argued  a  great  deal,  they  continue 
to  work  in  that  congenial  obscurity  which  they  find, 
apparently,  most  conducive  to  the  conduct  of  their 
business. 

The  German  States  pursue  a  truly  national  rail- 
way policy.  Railways  are  built  where  they  are 
wanted  by  the  population  or  by  the  State,  even  if 
they  do  not  pay  ;  for  the  German  State  monopolist 
considers  himself  as  the  servant  of  the  nation  and  as 
the  trustee  of  its  interests,  and  not  the  nation  as  the 


590  MODERN    GERMANY 

milch-cow  of  the  railway  department.  Hence,  the 
German  States  have  encouraged  the  building  of  canals 
in  every  way,  and  the  tolls  charged  for  their  use  are 
so  low  that  the  Government  loses  about  a  million 
pounds  per  annum  on  its  canals.  Again  the  German 
Government  has  in  no  way  interfered  with  the  build- 
ing of  electrical  trams,  whilst  the  railways  in  the 
classical  country  of  Freedom  and  Non-interference 
have  nefariously  closed  the  canals  and  obstructed 
the  building  of  electrical  tramways,  in  order  to  de- 
prive trade  which  wished  to  escape  strangulation  of 
an  alternative  outlet.  For  exactly  the  same  reasons 
the  Likin-imposing  mandarins  of  China  offer  the  most 
determined  opposition  to  the  building  of  railways, 
although  they  pretend  that  this  opposition  springs 
from  the  fear  that  the  ashes  of  their  ancestors  might 
be  disturbed. 

The  hostility  of  our  railways  to  the  canals  is 
largely  responsible  for  the  fact  that  Germany  has  an 
excellent  net  of  canals,  whilst  the  canals  of  this 
country  are  beneath  contempt,  and  that  Germany 
had,  in  1899,  more  than  2000  miles  of  electric  tram- 
ways, whilst  Great  Britain  had  only  about  500  miles. 
In  the  beginning  of  the  railway  era,  Germany  began 
to  experiment  in  railways  afler  they  had  been  estab- 
lished ten  years  in  this  country.  Now  the  position 
has  been  reversed.  Great  Britain  began  to  experi- 
ment with  electrical  traction  ten  years  after  it  had 
been  established  in  Germany,  to  the  great  amuse- 
ment of  German  engineers.  Incidentally,  it  might  be 
mentioned  that  the  first  electrical  locomotive  was 
exhibited  in  Berlin  as  early  as  1879,  and  that  on  the 
Government  subsidised  experimental  railway,  Berlin- 
Zossen,  an  electrical  railway  train  achieved  a  speed 
of  about  130  miles  per  hour. 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY 


591 


Although  the  British  railways  are  no  longer  leading 
in  enterprise,  they  are  in  another  respect  still  abso- 
lutely paramount.  With  the  same  energy  and  per- 
severance with  which  Germany  has  increased  and 
improved  her  railways,  the  British  railways  have 
piled  up  indebtedness  in  their  capital  account.  There- 
fore they  are,  as  regards  so-called  capital  cost,  the 
foremost  in  the  world,  as  the  following  figures  show, 
which  are  taken  from  the  Archiv  fur  Eisenbahnwesen. 


CAPITAL  COST  OF  RAILWAYS  (end  ot  1907) 


1.  Great  Britain 

2.  Belgium 

3.  France 

4.  Germany 

5.  Austria 

6.  Switzerland 

7.  Hungary 

8.  Norway 


Marks  696,100  per  kilometre 
456,400 


297,500 
264,000 
263,100 
258,700 
194,000 


If  we  compare  the  capital  of  the  German  and  the 
British  railways,  we  find  that  the  British  railway 
capital  per  mile  is  almost  two-and-a-half  times  as 
large  as  is  the  German  railway  capital.  Consequently, 
if  efficiency  and  expenses  be  equally  great  on  German 
and  on  British  railways,  our  railways  must  earn  two- 
and-a-half  times  more  on  their  traffic  than  do  the 
German  railways,  in  order  to  pay  the  same  dividend 
on  their  capital.  The  inflated  capital  of  the  British 
railways  hangs  like  a  millstone  round  their  necks,  and 
here  we  have  one  of  the  chief  reasons  why  fares  and 
freights  are  high  in  this  country  and  low  in  Germany, 
and  why  railway  profits  are  large  in  Germany  and 
small  in  Great  Britain. 

British   railway   capital   was   not   always   as   un- 


592  MODERN    GERMANY 

wieldy  as  it  is  now,  but  has  gradually  become  so,  as 
the  following  figures  prove  : — 

CAPITAL  OF  BRITISH  RAILWAYS 

Miles  of 
Railway  Open         Total  Capital        Capital  per  Mile 

1861  10,865  £362,327,000  ^33.335 

1871  IS»367  552,680,000  35.944 

1881  18,175  745,528,000  41,019 

1891  20,191  919,425,000  45,542 

1901  22,078  1,195,564,000  54.152 


1910 


23,387          1,318,500,000  56,377 


The  British  railways  have  been,  and  are  still,  piling 
up  capital  indebtedness  merrily  until  the  day  of 
reckoning,  which  assuredly  will  come,  and  then  lost 
capital  may  have  to  be  written  off  by  hundreds  of 
millions.  No  doubt  a  large  part  of  this  colossal  sum 
of  now  about  £60,000  per  mile  has  been  spent  pro- 
perly, but  perhaps  an  equally  large  part  represents 
promoter's  plunder,  water,  and,  before  all,  "  improve- 
ments." Our  railways  make  it  a  rule  when  effecting 
necessary  renewals,  repairs,  improvements,  &c.,  to 
charge  these  whenever  possible  to  capital  account, 
and  thus  increase  their  indebtedness,  instead  of  paying 
for  these  out  of  current  earnings.  In  other  words, 
they  declare  their  property  improved  in  value  by 
the  amounts  spent  on  necessary  repairs,  renewals,  and 
improvements.  On  the  same  principle,  a  man  might 
claim  that  his  boots  are  worth  sixty  shillings  because 
he  originally  paid  thirty  shillings  for  them,  and  paid 
since  then  another  thirty  shillings  on  repairs.  Un- 
fortunately, there  are  some  political  economists  and 
politicians  in  this  country  who  consider  it  a  matter 
of  congratulation  that  the  railways  owe  more  than 
£1,300,000,000  to  the  public,  although  they  are  worth, 
probably,  only  half  that  sum,  especially  as  nothing 
lasts  for  ever,  even  British  railways.  Mail  coaches 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY 


593 


have  been  superseded  by  railways,  and  railways  may 
be  superseded  by  some  other  form  of  locomotion  and 
transport. 

The  German  State  railways  have  pursued  a  more 
conservative  financial  policy  than  our  own  railways, 
especially  since  they  came  under  State  control,  as  the 
following  table  clearly  shows.  When  they  were  in 
private  hands,  they  also  increased  their  capital  year 
by  year,  though  their  financial  excesses  were  com- 
paratively small. 


CAPITAL  OF  GERMAN  RAILWAYS 


1871     . 

1873  • 
1875  . 
1877-8 


Marks  220,300  per  kilometre 
242,300 
249,200 
265,000 


1882-3  .  .  265,400 

1887-8  .  .  255,100 

1892-3  .  .  253,200 

1902     .  .  .  258,800 

1909     .  .  .  288,700 

Up  to  1878  the  German  railway  capital  per  kilo- 
metre increased  rapidly,  but  since  1877-78  it  has 
kept  almost  unchanged,  notwithstanding  the  enormous 
extensions  and  far-reaching  improvements  which  have 
been  effected  since  then.  During  the  same  period, 
when  the  capital  of  the  German  railways  per  kilo- 
metre has  scarcely  changed,  the  capital  of  the  British 
railways  has  been  increased  by  about  £15,000  per 
mile,  or  by  an  amount  approaching  the  total  cost  of 
the  German  railways.  Comment  on  these  figures 
seems  superfluous.  The  British  railways  claim  that 
their  capital  per  mile  has  so  enormously  been  in- 
creased during  the  last  twenty  years  on  account  of 
the  vast  improvements  and  extensions  which  they 
have  effected ;  but  similar  improvements  and 

2P 


594  MODERN    GERMANY 

extensions  have  been  made  by  the  German  State 
railways,  but  they  have  chiefly  been  paid  for  out  of 
earnings.  The  German  railways  were  anxious  to  keep 
their  capital  within  reasonable  bounds,  and  not  to 
put  on  their  railway  property  a  fictitious,  inflated 
value,  especially  in  view  of  the  possibility  that  rail- 
ways may  become  superseded  or  may  become  un- 
remunerative. 

The  British  railways  were  heavily  handicapped 
from  the  beginning  by  the  extortions  of  the  land- 
owner, the  promoter,  and  the  lawyer.  The  German 
railways  also  suffered  at  the  promoter's  hands,  but 
they  got  their  ground  cheaply.  Of  the  Prussian  rail- 
way capital  only  9.87  per  cent,  was  spent  on  account 
of  land.  Hence,  land  accounts  on  an  average  for  a 
capital  outlay  of  only  about  ^"2000  per  mile  on  the 
German  railways,  whilst  the  British  railways  bought 
land  at  fancy  prices.  The  law  expenses  also  were 
low  in  Germany,  whilst  they  were  extortionate  in  this 
country.  The  law  costs  in  respect  of  the  London, 
Brighton,  and  South  Coast  Railway  are  said  to  have 
come  to  £4806  per  mile,  and  those  of  the  Manchester- 
Birmingham  Railway  to  £5190  per  mile.  Apparently, 
it  has  often  cost  British  railways  much  more  money 
to  acquire  their  title  than  it  has  cost  German  railways 
to  acquire  their  land.  These  are  some  of  the  dis- 
advantages of  unrestrained  individualism,  which  is 
favoured  by  the  policy  of  laissez-faire.  Laissez- 
faire  means,  unfortunately,  only  too  often,  laissez- 
mefaire. 

The  foregoing  facts  and  figures  clearly  prove  the 
wisdom  of  Bismarck's  policy  and  the  immense 
superiority  of  the  German  State-owned  railways  over 
the  British  private  railways.  But  it  would  be  rash 
to  conclude  from  the  marvellous  success  of  Bismarck's 


THE   RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY         595 

gigantic  experiment  in  State  Socialism  that  State 
railways  would  prove  a  blessing  to  this  country  as 
well.  Germany  has  in  its  officials  a  splendid  instru- 
ment for  administration,  and  in  that  country  bureau- 
cracy works  on  business  lines,  especially  with  regard 
to  railways,  the  post-office,  telegraph,  and  telephones. 
A  similarly  efficient  instrument  of  administration,  un- 
happily, does  not  exist  in  this  country,  where  the  art 
of  administration  has  as  yet  hardly  been  discovered, 
and  where  administrative  organisation  is  rudimentary 
and  centuries  behind  the  times. 

A  British  Government  department  consists  of  a 
host  of  irresponsible  officials,  without  authority, 
directed  by  a  nominally  responsible  amateur,  without 
experience.  And  this  responsible  ignoramus  is  given 
the  highest  post  in  the  administration,  not  because 
of  his  proved  ability  or  latent  talent  as  an  adminis- 
trator, but  either  because  of  his  skill  as  a  debater 
or  because  of  his  social  influence  and  wealth.  That 
bureaucratic  irresponsibility  presided  over  by  well- 
meaning,  responsible  ignorance,  does  not  make  for 
administrative  efficiency,  can  hardly  be  wondered  at. 
For  these  reasons,  our  Government  departments  will 
continue  inefficient,  improvident,  unbusinesslike,  and 
wasteful  in  all  matters  of  administration,  until  the 
whole  administrative  machinery  of  the  country  is  put 
on  a  totally  different  basis.  For  these  reasons  State 
purchase  of  the  British  railways  is  out  of  the  question, 
for  they  would,  no  doubt,  be  worse  managed  by  the 
State  than  they  are  by  the  companies. 

What  the  State  can  do,  and  what  the  State  ought 
to  do,  is  far  simpler  and  far  easier  to  effect  than  taking 
over  and  managing  our  railways.  The  State  should, 
in  the  first  place,  restrict  further  capital  issues  for 
improvements,  renewals,  and  repairs  on  the  part  of 


596  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  railway  companies.  Then,  it  should  insist  on  a 
clear  tariff  for  the  conveyance  of  goods  and  passengers, 
based  on  uniform  charges  per  mile  throughout  the 
country,  and  should  make  discrimination  in  freight 
rates  by  any  means  whatsoever  an  offence  punishable 
with  so  enormous  a  fine  (say,  £1000  in  each  case),  of 
which  one  half  should  go  to  the  informant,  that 
preferential  treatment  meted  out  to  a  favoured  few 
or  to  the  foreigner  would  be  extinguished  for  all 
time.  Tickets  on  different  lines  should  be  made 
interchangeable.  The  publication  of  the  statistical 
and  other  information,  which  can  be  obtained  from 
the  railways  of  all  civilised  countries  excepting  Great 
Britain,  should  be  made  compulsory.  Lastly,  a 
Government  department  should  be  created  for  the 
supreme  control  of  all  traffic  by  rail,  canal,  and  sea, 
and  legal  arrangements  should  be  made  in  order  to 
facilitate  and  to  cheapen  the  prosecution  of  railway 
companies  by  aggrieved  railway  users.  At  present,  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  hold  a  railway  company  liable 
for  the  damage  which  they  do  in  forwarding  goods,  &c. 
Such  a  policy  should  be  immensely  popular  with 
the  whole  nation,  including  railway  stockholders,  for 
they  also  are  railway  users.  Besides,  with  fair  rates 
and  no  favour,  the  prosperity  of  our  declining  n- 
dustries  should  rapidly  return,  and  the  industrial  re- 
vival which  may  be  expected  should  more  than  recoup 
the  railway  companies  for  any  temporary  loss  which 
may  arise  to  them  when  they  are  compelled  to  abandon 
their  present  unfair  and  anti-national  policy.  Never- 
theless, they  will  raise  an  outcry,  protest  against 
coercion,  and  will  speak  of  their  rights;  but  then 
they  will  have  to  be  told  that  an  intolerable  wrong, 
which  has  gradually  grown  up,  and  which  has  been 
borne  for  a  long  time,  does  not  become  a  right,  that 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        597 

the  railways  exist  for  the  benefit  of  the  country,  and 
not  the  country  for  the  benefit  of  the  railways. 

However,  the  State  should  not  only  restrain  and 
punish,  but  also  encourage  and  assist,  the  railway 
companies,  and  it  can  do  so  at  small  expense.  If 
there  was  a  compact  permanent  commission,  com- 
posed of  practical  business  men  and  engineers,  pre- 
sided over  by  a  junior  statesman,  enormous  savings 
might  be  effected  on  our  wasteful  railways  by  the 
suggestions  and  mediation  of  such  a  body.  British 
railways  can,  in  view  of  their  bloated  capital,  find 
salvation  only  in  combination  and  economy.  If  a 
combined  effort  was  made  by  the  British  railways  and 
real,  not  apparent,  unity  of  purpose  was  secured  among 
them  by  means  of  a  connecting  and  impartial  central 
body,  a  huge  number  of  duplicate  stations,  receiving 
offices,  warehouses,  bureaus,  &c.,  might  be  abandoned, 
a  vast  number  of  competitive  trains  might  be  dropped, 
technical  improvements  could  be  introduced  more 
easily,  the  science  of  economic  transport  could  be 
better  developed,  and  purchases  could  more  cheaply 
be  effected  by  "  The  United  Railways  of  Great 
Britain  "  than  by  individual  companies.  Lastly,  im- 
provements and  inventions,  &c.,  made  by  one  road 
might  be  made  to  benefit  all  the  rest,  and  all  the 
railways  of  Great  Britain  might  be  made  to  assist 
one  another,  whereas,  now  they  only  hamper  one 
another  and  damage  one  another,  though  outwardly 
they  appear  to  be  on  good  terms. 

During  the  last  few  decades,  British  statesmen 
have  frequently  uttered  beautiful  sentiments  with 
regard  to  our  railways  and  our  industries,  but  they 
have  done  nothing  practical,  in  order  to  open  new 
outlets  to  our  trade  or  to  improve  the  old  ones. 

Three    hundred   years    ago,    Lord    Bacon    wrote : 


598  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  There  are  three  things  which  make  a  nation  great 
and  prosperous  :  a  fertile  soil,  busy  workshops,  and 
easy  conveyance  for  men  and  commodities  from  one 
place  to  another."  Great  Britain  possesses,  perhaps, 
the  most  fertile  soil  in  Northern  Europe,  yet  her 
agriculture  has  decayed  ;  she  has  the  most  industrious 
and  the  most  energetic  working  men,  yet  our  manu- 
facturing industries  are  visibly  declining.  Unless  the 
avenues  of  trade  are  again  opened  wide,  neither  our 
fertile  soil,  nor  our  willing  population,  nor  our  vast 
natural  resources,  nor  our  unique  geographical  position, 
nor  our  wealthy  colonies,  nor  our  accumulated  wealth, 
nor  our  great  industrial  past  will  save  us  from  poverty, 
misery,  and  decay.  Statesmen  must  act — gouverner 
c'est  prtvoir.  The  policy  of  Non-interference  is  the 
policy  of  incapacity ;  individual  but  isolated  effort  is 
inefficient ;  what  is  wanted  is  combination  and  a 
Government  which  leads  the  nation. 

Colbert,  the  father  of  the  Mercantile  System,  has 
left  a  beautiful  saying,  which  should  be  the  watch- 
word of  the  British  statesman  of  all  parties.  "  The 
most  precious  thing  which  a  State  possesses  is  the 
labour  of  its  people."  All  parties  should  combine  to 
protect  the  labour  of  the  British  people,  and  to  pro- 
mote actively  the  industrial  welfare  of  the  nation. 
The  policy  of  Non-interference  has  had  its  day.  Let 
us  frankly  recognise  it,  and  let  us  not  use  the  labour 
of  the  people  as  a  pawn  in  the  Party  game,  for  the 
people  live  by  their  labour.  Who  restricts  labour 
kills  life,  who  creates  labour  makes  -a  nation  great 
and  prosperous.  That  is  the  lesson  of  the  German 
railways  and  of  Bismarck's  railway  policy. 

When,  on  the  24th  of  February  1881,  Prince 
Bismarck  was  told  by  the  leader  of  the  Radical  party 
that  his  economic  policy  was  unsound,  unscientific, 


THE    RAILWAYS    OF    GERMANY        599 

opposed  to  economic  principles  and  traditions,  the 
Prince  did  not  quote  political  economists  to  support 
his  policy,  but  retorted  :  "  For  me  there  has  always 
been  one  single  aim  and  one  single  principle  by  which 
I  have  been  guided  :  Solus  public  a."  May  that  also 
be  the  guiding-star  of  all  those  politicians  who  have 
the  economic  regeneration  of  Great  Britain  honestly 
at  heart. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

THE   SHIPBUILDING   AND   SHIPPING   INDUSTRIES 
OF   GERMANY 

THE  fact  that  Germany  has  an  exceedingly  prosperous 
shipping  and  shipbuilding  industry  must  appear 
exceedingly  strange  and  almost  inexplicable  to  those 
who  are  convinced  that  a  prosperous  shipping  trade 
can  be  erected  only  on  the  broad  basis  of  Free  Trade, 
and  that  industrial  protection  necessarily  creates 
trusts,  brings  about  high  prices  of  the  various  materials 
used  in  shipbuilding,  and  thereby  causes  ships  to 
become  so  expensive  that  the  shipping  and  ship- 
building industries  decay  as  they  have  done  in  the 
case  of  the  United  States  and  France.  Therefore  it 
is  of  the  greatest  interest  and  of  considerable  import- 
ance to  investigate  why  Germany,  the  classical  land 
of  protected  industries,  of  trusts,  rings,  and  other 
industrial  combinations,  forms  an  exception  to  the 
general  rule,  and  why  she  possesses  a  very  powerful 
and  most  flourishing  mercantile  marine,  and  a  ship- 
building industry  which  need  not  fear  comparison  with 
the  enormous  shipbuilding  industry  of  this  country, 
although  German  shipbuilding  is  hampered  by  most 
unfavourable  natural  conditions,  conditions  which 
would  prove  absolutely  ruinous  to  our  own  ship- 
builders. 

Coal  and  iron,  which  are  the  principal  materials 
used  in  shipbuilding,  are  found  in  Germany  not  close 

to  the  sea  coast,  as  in  this  country,  but  far  away 

600 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING        601 

inland  in  the  middle  and  in  the  south  of  Germany. 
How  enormous  is  the  distance  between  the  principal 
coal  and  iron  centres  of  Germany  and  the  most  im- 
portant shipbuilding  towns  may  be  seen  at  a  glance 
from  the  following  comprehensive  figures  which  have 
been  furnished  by  Messrs,  von  Halle  and  Schwarz,  the 
well-known  authorities  on  German  shipbuilding: — 

Distances  between — 

Aix  la 

Essen.     Chapelle.     Saarbriicken.     Kattowitz. 

Miles. 
647 
S8l 
620 

534 
568 

SH 
380 
S68 

From  the  foregoing  table  it  appears  that  the 
average  distance  which  the  heavy  German  raw  material 
has  to  travel  overland  before  being  worked  into  ships 
is  approximately  400  miles,  a  distance  which  is  greater 
than  that  which  separates  London  and  Glasgow.  It 
should  be  added  that  by  far  the  largest  part  of  the 
German  iron  ore  comes  from  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
Luxemburg.  Consequently  the  column  giving  the 
distances  between  Saarbriicken  and  the  various  ship- 
building towns,  distances  which  range  from  400  to 
1000  miles,  is  the  most  important.  In  a  recent  report, 
Mr.  Warner,  the  United  States  Consul  at  Leipzig, 
correctly  said,  "  Germany,  of  all  World  Powers,  with 
the  exception  of  Russia  and  Austria,  is  the  one  with 
the  poorest  natural  means  of  communication  by  sea 
with  the  outside  world.  However,  in  spite  of  this 
fact  she  holds  to-day  an  enviable  position  in  the 


Wilhelmshaven 
Bremen  . 

Miles. 
.      .      198 
165 

Miles. 
258 
237 

Miles. 

417 
4O2 

Geestemiinde  . 
Hamburg  .  . 
Kiel  .... 

.      .      2O4 
.      .      243 
318 

\Jf 

277 
318 
3QO 

*TV^ 

437 
482 

cec 

Liibeck  .  .  . 
Danzig  .  .  . 
Memel  .  .  . 

.      .      283 
.      .      640 
.      .      872 

•jy 

357 
716 

950 

j  j  j 
523 
798 
1028 

602  MODERN    GERMANY 

world's  carrying  trade.  She  is  advancing  in  the 
science  of  traffic  upon  the  high  seas,  under  difficulties 
of  no  small  proportions,  faster  and  more  effectively 
than  any  other  Power." 

How  great  are  Germany's  difficulties  owing  to  her 
unfavourable  geographical  position  may  be  seen  from 
the  fact  that  when  in  the  year  1878  a  Government 
investigation  was  made  into  the  German  iron  industry, 
it  was  found  that  from  20  to  30  per  cent,  of  the  cost 
of  production  of  German  iron  was  accounted  for  by 
the  cost  of  transport  over  long  distances,  whilst  the 
cost  of  transport  in  respect  of  English  iron  was  said  to 
amount  only  to  from  8  to  10  per  cent,  of  the  cost. 
According  to  Schrodter  and  other  German  authorities 
who  have  given  their  views  when  the  new  Customs 
Tariff  was  prepared  and  when  the  state  of  the  ship- 
building industry  was  investigated,  these  high  per- 
centages prevailed  still  then  as  they  did  in  1879. 
These  official  figures  confirm  that  this  country  possesses 
an  enormous  natural  advantage  over  Germany  with 
regard  to  industrial  competition,  and  if  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  ever  should  work  under  identical  condi- 
tions Germany  could  not  possibly  industrially  com- 
pete with  this  country  owing  to  the  unfavourable 
geographical  condition  by  which  she  is  hampered. 

From  the  foregoing  table  of  the  distances  which 
separate  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  from  the 
centres  where  coal  and  iron  are  raised  we  can  form  an 
idea  of  the  difficulties  under  which  the  German  ship- 
builder has  to  work,  and  we  can  easiest  realise  these 
difficulties  by  imagining  that  our  shipbuilders  on  the 
Clyde  would  have  to  draw  their  raw  material  from 
Portsmouth,  Land's  End,  or  London,  overland  through 
the  whole  length  of  England  instead  of  either  drawing 
it  from  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  Clyde  or 


SHIPBUILDING   AND    SHIPPING        603 

obtaining  it  cheaply  oversea.  These  facts  and  figures 
show  that  Great  Britain  is  wonderfully  favoured  by 
Nature,  by  her  geographical  position  and  structure, 
and  by  the  fact  that  coal,  iron,  populous  towns  and 
harbours  lie  in  immediate  proximity  of  each  other, 
not  only  for  the  pursuit  of  shipbuilding  but  of  all 
other  manufacturing  industries  if  compared  with 
Germany,  or,  indeed,  any  other  country.  It  should 
be  added  that  most  of  the  material  used  in  German 
shipbuilding  is  of  German  origin,  that  the  German 
iron  travels  almost  .exclusively  by  rail  over  hundreds 
of  miles  to  the  shipbuilding  yards,  and  that  the  State 
railways  wisely  concede  very  low  freights  to  the  raw 
material  thus  despatched  in  order  to  foster  the  national 
shipbuilding  industry.  One  of  the  most  potent  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  the  construction  of  the  Dortmund- 
Ems  Canal,  which  cost  no  less  than  £4,000,000,  and 
which  was  opened  a  few  years  ago,  was  that  it  would 
cheapen  the  transportation  of  iron  and  steel  used  in 
shipbuilding  from  the  interior  of  Westphalia,  the  most 
important  centre  of  the  German  iron  industry,  to  the 
shipyards  on  the  North  Sea  and  on  the  Baltic. 

During  the  middle  of  the  last  century  German 
shipbuilding  was  rather  flourishing.  Numerous  ship- 
yards on  the  Elbe,  the  Weser,  and  along  the  North 
Sea  coast,  were  then  engaged  in  building  wooden 
sailing  ships  for  which  the  raw  material  was  cheap 
and  near  at  hand.  In  those  days  Germany  supplied 
this  country  with  much  of  the  shipbuilding  timber 
used  in  our  own  ships.  Prussia,  always  desirous  to 
foster  private  industry  by  judicious  official  encourage- 
ment, opened  in  1836  a  technical  high  school  of  ship- 
building near  Stettin,  and  the  numerous  fine  fast 
clippers,  which  between  1850  and  1860  carried  vast 
numbers  of  German  emigrants  to  the  United  States, 


604  MODERN    GERMANY 

owed  their  excellence  to  that  pioneer  institution,  which 
rather  benefited  Prussia's  neighbours  than  Prussia 
herself. 

When  in  the  'sixties  iron-built  steamships  began  to 
displace  wooden  sailing  ships,  the  German  shipyards 
on  the  sea  coast  declined,  Great  Britain,  who  was  then 
practically  the  only  industrial  country  in  the  world, 
easily  obtained  the  monopoly  in  iron  shipbuilding  and 
easily  maintained  her  position  with  the  German  buyers 
of  ships  for  a  long  time.  During  the  'sixties  and 
'seventies  practically  all  the  German  merchant  steam- 
ships were  built  in  this  country.  Competition  in  ship- 
building with  this  country  seemed  altogether  out  of 
the  question  on  account  of  Germany's  most  unfavour- 
able geographical  position.  Private  enterprise  in 
Germany  shrunk  from  undertaking  an  apparently 
hopeless  task,  and  Germany  would  have  remained  an 
inland  power  had  not  the  Government  again  shown 
the  way  to  private  enterprise  and  encouraged  the 
creation  of  a  shipbuilding  industry  by  a  deliberate 
fostering  policy  upon  which  no  British  Government 
of  modern  times  would  have  dared  to  embark,  and  for 
which  no  British  House  of  Commons  would  have 
voted  the  funds.  In  1870,  a  little  before  the  out- 
break of  the  Franco-German  war,  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment established  at  Kiel  and  Wilhelmshaven  repairing 
yards  for  the  few  British-built  warships  which  Prussia 
then  possessed.  The  victorious  war  and  the  unifica- 
tion of  Germany  encouraged  the  Prusso-German 
Government  to  go  a  step  further,  and  it  resolved 
experimentally  to  build  an  armoured  cruiser,  the 
Preussen,  without  looking  too  closely  into  the  ex- 
penditure. The  ship  was  a  success,  and  although  it 
was  far  more  expensive  than  it  would  have  been  if  it 
had  been  ordered  in  this  country,  which  then  was  the 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING        605 

cheapest  market  for  ships  of  war,  the  German  Govern- 
ment decided  to  continue  building  its  own  warships 
without  over  much  regard  to  economy,  firmly  expect- 
ing that  eventually  a  powerful  and  economically 
profitable  German  shipbuilding  industry  might  arise 
out  of  these  small,  very  costly,  and  apparently  hope- 
less beginnings. 

On  the  ist  of  January,  1872,  General  von  Stosch 
became  the  head  of  the  German  Admiralty.  Although 
he  was  not  a  naval  man  he  proved  a  most  capable  and 
far-seeing  organiser  and  administrator  of  the  German 
navy,  and  he  resolved  that  everything  that  could  be 
done  should  be  done  in  order  to  create  a  powerful 
shipbuilding  industry  in  Germany.  Although  no 
premiums  were  granted  for  encouraging  the  building 
of  iron  ships,  the  creation  of  the  German  navy  proved 
a  mighty  stimulus  to  the  German  shipyards  and  to 
the  German  iron  industry,  especially  as  Von  Stosch 
laid  down  the  principle  that  all  German  warships 
should  be  built  in  German  yards,  and  that  they  should 
be  constructed  exclusively  of  German  material  in 
order  to  make  Germany  independent  of  the  foreigner 
as  regards  the  building  of  men-of-war.  With  this 
object  in  view  he  made  it  his  motto,  "  Without 
German  shipbuilding  we  cannot  get  an  efficient 
German  fleet." 

When  in  1879  Bismarck  resolved  to  abandon  the 
policy  of  Free  Trade  and  introduced  Protection  into 
Germany,  he  found  that  the  German  shipyards  situated 
on  the  sea  coast  had  since  1853  been  able  to  import 
all  raw  material  used  in  shipbuilding  free  from  all 
duties,  whilst  the  shipyards  situated  on  the  great 
rivers  inland  were  not  similarly  favoured.  The  latter 
found  the  prices  of  foreign  raw  material  used  in  ship- 
building too  high  owing  to  the  duties  charged  on  the 


606  MODERN    GERMANY 

frontier,  and  they  could  also  not  furnish  river  steamers 
built  of  German  iron  at  a  sufficiently  low  price  because 
the  cheaper  English  iron  was  worked  up  into  river 
ships  in  England  and  Holland,  and  these  ships  pene- 
trated duty  free  into  Germany  vid  the  Rhine.  Thus 
the  important  shipbuilding  industry  on  the  rivers  of 
Germany  had  decayed,  and  the  very  large  river  traffic 
on  the  Rhine  was  not  in  German  but  in  Dutch  hands. 
In  introducing  his  comprehensive  system  of  general 
agricultural  and  industrial  protection  in  Germany, 
Bismarck  wisely  made  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule  in  favour  of  the  shipbuilding  industry  which, 
under  unmitigated  protection,  would  have  been 
crippled.  With  this  object  in  view  the  German  ship- 
yards were  exempted  from  all  duties  payable  on  the 
various  raw  and  manufactured  materials  used  in  ship- 
building. In  other  words,  Bismarck  gave  complete 
Free  Trade  to  the  German  shipbuilding  industry 
which,  from  a  fiscal  point  of  view,  is  carried  on  outside 
the  German  frontier.  Therefore  the  German  ship- 
building industry  is  treated  like  a  foreign  country  by 
the  German  iron  industry,  and  the  latter  relieves  itself 
of  unduly  large  stocks  by  dumping  iron  and  steel  not 
only  in  England  but  in  the  German  shipyards  as  well  in 
order  to  avoid  having  to  sell  its  produce  at  a  loss  in  the 
German  market,  and  thus  depressing  prices  in  its  most 
valuable  and  most  potent  market,  the  home  market. 

After  having  given  protection  to  all  the  German 
industries  with  the  exception  of  the  shipbuilding 
industry,  Bismarck  converted  the  private  railways  of 
Prussia  into  State  railways  and  arranged  that  the 
heavy  raw  material  used  in  German  shipbuilding,  such 
as  steel,  iron,  timber,  &c.,  should  be  hauled  over  the 
State  railways  at  rates  barely  covering  the  cost  of 
handling  and  transportation.  Thus  Bismarck  bridged 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING        607 

the  huge  distance  which  separated  the  German  seaports 
from  their  industrial  base,  and  he  created  conditions 
which  made  it  possible  for  the  German  shipbuilding 
industries  to  grow  and  to  expand.  Though  the  ship- 
building industry  was  not  protected  by  fiscal  measures 
it  was  no  less  fostered  by  these  preferential  traffic 
arrangements,  and  by  further  measures  taken  by  the 
Government  which  will  be  described  in  the  course  of 
this  chapter. 

Although  the  State  had  created  a  private  ship- 
building industry  by  ordering  warships  from  private 
German  builders  and  had  enabled  the  few  German 
shipbuilders  who  then  were  in  existence  to  work 
cheaply  by  giving  them  Free  Trade  in  foreign  materials 
used  in  shipbuilding,  and  by  granting  to  them  cheap 
transportation  over  Government  railways  for  material 
of  German  origin,  the  German  shipping  companies,  for 
some  considerable  time,  did  not  feel  inclined  to  desert 
the  British  shipbuilders,  who  had  hitherto  furnished 
them  with  excellent  ships.  The  German  shipowners 
did  not  trust  the  German  shipbuilders,  whose  ability 
at  building  merchant  ships  was  questioned  and 
doubted.  The  principle  of  General  Von  Stosch,  the 
Minister  of  the  Navy,  "  without  German  shipbuilding 
we  cannot  get  an  efficient  German  fleet,"  was  not 
applied  by  the  German  shipowners  to  the  shipping 
trade.  The  business  connections  which  the  German 
shipowners  had  formed  with  the  leading  English  ship- 
yards had,  by  a  long  and  a  satisfactory  intercourse, 
become  so  firmly  rooted  as  not  to  admit  of  new  build- 
ing orders  being  voluntarily  given  to  German  builders, 
especially  as  the  German  yards  had  so  far  not  achieved 
a  sufficient  success  in  the  building  of  merchant  vessels. 
Up  to  1879  the  German  yards  had  not  been  in  a 
position  to  compete  on  equal  terms  with  English 


6o8  MODERN    GERMANY 

shipbuilders  as  regards  both  price  and  rapidity  of 
delivery.  German  materials  were  far  more  costly  and 
the  working  plant  of  the  German  shipyards  was  quite 
inadequate  for  quick  and  efficient  shipbuilding.  Only 
when  in  1879  the  import  duties  on  shipbuilding 
materials  had  been  abolished,  and  when  at  the  same 
time  the  German  iron  and  steel  industries  had  been  so 
much  strengthened  as  to  allow  of  their  creating  branch 
industries  devoted  to  shipbuilding,  could  the  building 
of  merchant  vessels  on  an  adequate  scale  be  inaugu- 
rated in  Germany. 

At  a  time  when,  through  their  constantly  in- 
creasing output  of  cargo  steamers  and  fast  passenger 
boats,  British  shipbuilders  had  left  behind  them  the 
stage  of  infancy  in  steamship  building,  Germany 
hesitatingly  commenced  experimenting  with  high 
pressure  boilers,  and  replaced  the  boilers  of  the  old 
Lloyd  steamers  with  triple  expansion  engines  ol 
German  make.  As  these  new  boilers  proved  to  be 
unsatisfactory,  German  steamship  owners  not  un- 
naturally felt  disinclined  to  order  new  steamers  in 
Germany.  Only  gradually  were  the  difficulties  and 
obstacles  overcome  which  at  one  time  threatened  to 
overwhelm  the  German  shipbuilding  industry,  and 
only  in  1882  the  Hamburg- American  Line  began  to 
show  some  little  confidence  in  the  ability  of  German 
shipbuilders  by  ordering  the  Rugia  from  the  Vulcan 
Company  in  Stettin,  and  the  Rhaetia  from  the  Reiher- 
stieg  yard  in  Hamburg.  Thus  the  building  of  large 
vessels  in  Germany  made  a  very  modest  start  a  very 
short  time  ago. 

Only  fifteen  years  after  the  launch  of  the  Preussen 
and  five  years  after  Free  Trade  in  respect  of  foreign 
shipbuilding  material  and  preferential  railway  rates 
for  German  shipbuilding  material  had  been  granted  to 


SHIPBUILDING   AND    SHIPPING        609 

smooth  the  way  of  the  German  shipbuilders,  the 
German  shipowners  began  to  order  their  ships  more 
freely  from  German  builders,  and  they  did  so  not 
from  choice,  but  because  they  were  induced,  one 
might  almost  say  compelled,  to  order  their  ships  in 
Germany  by  an  Act  of  the  German  Parliament.  In 
1884  Bismarck  introduced  a  Bill  by  which  subsidies 
were  to  be  given  to  the  North  German  Lloyd  for  a 
line  of  mail  steamers,  but  these  subsidies  were  to  be 
accorded  under  the  express  stipulation  that  the  new 
ships  to  be  built  were  to  receive  the  subsidy  under 
the  Act  only  if  they  were  constructed  in  German 
shipyards  by  German  workmen  and,  as  far  as  was 
possible,  of  German  material.  That  action,  coupled 
with  the  subsidies  granted  to  the  German  liners, 
proved  at  the  same  time  the  salvation  and  the  founda- 
tion of  the  great  German  shipbuilding  industry,  and 
therefore  of  the  German  shipping  trade,  which,  rightly 
considered,  was  founded  only  in  1884.  Mr.  Mason, 
the  United  States  Consul  in  Berlin,  was  quite  right 
in  reporting  to  his  Government,  "  It  can  safely  be 
said  that  the  great  lines  which  now  connect  the  two 
principal  ports  of  Germany  with  Asia,  Australasia, 
and  the  German  colonies  in  East  Africa,  would  not, 
and  could  not,  have  been  established  and  maintained 
during  the  earlier  years  of  struggle  and  uncertainty 
had  they  not  received  the  direct,  liberal,  and  assured 
support  of  the  Government  through  fixed  annual 
subsidies."  Thus  events  have  fully  vindicated  Bis- 
marck's far-seeing  policy,  which  at  the  time  was 
loudly  condemned  hi  British  and  in  German  Free 
Trade  circles  as  well  as  unbusinesslike,  wasteful,  and 
unpractical. 

The  Government-subsidised  North  German  Lloyd 
gave  the  first  important  order  to  German  builders  of 

2Q 


6io  MODERN    GERMANY 

merchant  steamers  by  ordering,  under  the  Act  of 
1884,  six  liners  from  the  Vulcan  Shipbuilding  Com- 
pany. These  vessels,  when  completed,  were  found 
satisfactory  in  every  respect  by  the  North  German 
Lloyd,  but  the  Vulcan  Company  had  to  buy  dearly, 
though  not  too  dearly,  its  experience  in  building  large 
steamers,  for  it  lost  upon  this  pioneer  transaction 
between  one  and  one-and-a-half  million  marks.  This 
loss  was  largely  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  building 
plant  of  the  Vulcan  had  to  be  considerably  extended 
and  remodelled  at  the  very  time  when  these  ships 
were  building,  and  thus  work  was  interrupted  and 
impeded.  Still  in  the  long  run  the  Vulcan  Ship- 
building Company  was  greatly  benefited  by  the  great 
prestige  which  it  gained  by  having  secured  and  satis- 
factorily executed  this  very  important  order.  With 
praiseworthy  energy  and  perseverance  the  Vulcan 
Company  continued  to  compete  for  the  construction 
of  fast  steamers  without  over  much  regard  to  the 
financial  risks  which  it  had  to  run,  and  thus  the 
Vulcan  succeeded  in  1888  in  securing  the  contract  for 
the  first  fast  steamer  Augusta  Victoria  from  the  Ham- 
burg-American Line  notwithstanding  the  severe  com- 
petition from  British  yards.  With  the  construction 
of  that  steamer  the  great  German  shipbuilding  yard 
struck  out  a  line  of  its  own  by  introducing  twin-screw 
propulsion  for  transatlantic  liners.  Two  years  later  the 
Vulcan  built  the  twin-screw  steamer  Furst  Bismarck, 
and  the  success  achieved  by  these  two  twin-screw 
ocean  flyers,  which  at  the  time  were  the  fastest  liners 
afloat,  led  in  1895  to  the  building  of  the  celebrated 
fast  liner  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse.  That  enormous 
vessel  was  built  within  eighteen  months,  a  shorter 
time  than  that  required  by  any  English  yard,  and  its 
speed  exceeded  that  of  any  ship  afloat.  The  Kaiser 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING         611 

Wilhelm  der  Grosse  was  followed  by  the  three  great 
liners,  Deutschland,  Kronprinz  Wilhelm,  and  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  II.,  all  of  which  left  far  behind  them  the  fore- 
most British  liners.  Thus  the  Vulcan  had  brilliantly 
outstripped  English  competition  in  shipbuilding,  which, 
until  then,  had  been  considered  invincible,  and  since 
German  shipbuilding  has  proved  its  excellence  to  the 
whole  world  by  the  building  of  these  four  ships,  the 
reputation  of  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  has 
become  of  the  highest. 

The  following  figures  show  the  astonishing  develop- 
ment of  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  since  1879, 
the  year  when  Protection  was  introduced  into  Ger- 
many, and  when  the  German  shipbuilding  industry 
was  placed  in  a  favoured  position  by  being  granted 
free  imports  of  shipbuilding  material  and  very  low 
freight  rates  on  the  German  railway,  and  since  1884, 
the  year  in  which  the  Steamships'  Subsidies  Bill  was 
passed : — 

IRON  AND  STEEL  SHIPPING  BUILT  IN  GERMANY 

1880  23,986  register  tons 

1885  24,554       „ 

1890 100,597       „  „ 

1895  122,712       „          „ 

1900 235,171       „ 

1909 326,318       „  „ 

The  foregoing  figures  show  that  the  yearly  output 
of  the  German  shipbuilding  yards  has  grown  no  less 
than  tenfold  during  the  fifteen  years  between  1885 
and  1900.  Thirty  years  ago  German  shipbuilding 
was  practically  non-existent.  In  the  year  1906  Sir 
Charles  Maclaren,  M.P.,  presiding  at  the  yearly  meet- 
ing of  Palmer's  Shipbuilding  and  Iron  Company  held 
at  Newcastle,  said  that  Germany  was  now  building 


612  MODERN    GERMANY 

a  greater  tonnage  than  all  the  other  Continental 
countries  put  together,  and  that  her  output  during 
the  current  year  would  be  a  record.  The  foregoing 
facts  and  figures  show  that  Germany's  progress  in 
shipbuilding  is  truly  marvellous.  It  is  doubly 
marvellous  in  view  of  her  most  disadvantageous 
geographical  position,  her  comparatively  poor  natural 
resources,  and  her  lack  of  experience  in  ship- 
building. 

It  is  frequently  asserted  that  Germany  owes  her 
industrial  success  to  the  fact  that  German  business 
men  are  so  anxious  to  obtain  orders  that  they  are 
willing  to  work  for  nothing  or  almost  for  nothing, 
that  Germany  obtains  only  those  industrial  orders 
which  Englishmen  find  unprofitable  or  not  sufficiently 
profitable.  This  view,  which  is  very  widely  held  in 
this  country,  is  quite  unjustified.  In  fact,  as  money 
is  dearer  in  Germany  than  it  is  in  this  country,  in- 
dustrial profits,  generally  speaking,  have  to  be  much 
larger  in  Germany  than  here.  As  regards  the  German 
shipbuilding  industry  the  following  figures  will  tell  their 
own  tale : — 

CAPITAL  OF  IRON  SHIPBUILDING  YARDS 

Marks. 

1870          4,800,000 

1880    15,300,000 

1890    36,100,000 

IQOO    66,000,000 

1910    105,890,000 

From  the  foregoing  statement  it  appears  that 
the  capital  invested  in  the  German  shipbuilding 
yards  has  grown  at  an  almost  incredible  rate  of 
speed  during  the  thirty  years  under  review.  Now 
let  us  look  into  the  earnings  of  the  so  rapidly  in- 
creased capital. 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING         613 


TOTAL  AND  AVERAGE  DIVIDENDS  EARNED  BY  ALL 
SHIPBUILDING  YARDS  ON  ORDINARY  STOCK 

Marks. 
1880 
1882 
1884 
1886 
1888 
1890 
1892 
1894    • 
1896    . 
1898 
I9OO 


7.94  per  cent. 

9-93 
12.15 

I.I5 
6.57 
8.15 
6.08 
4.98 
5-55 
7.89 
10.05 


450,000 
.  1,035,056 
.  1,266,100 

145,800 

858,150 
.  1,757,500 
.  1,831,100 
.  1,514,900 
.  1,914,500 
.  2,958,080 
.  4.503,500 

The  foregoing  table  shows  that  the  profit  of  the 
German  shipbuilding  yards  is  very  large  and  rapidly 
growing,  notwithstanding  the  great  increase  of  the 
capital  invested  in  that  industry.  The  percentage 
earned  on  the  whole  capital  of  the  shipbuilding 
industry  is  particularly  satisfactory  if  we  remember 
that  some  over-capitalised,  badly  managed  or  unfor- 
tunate yards  have  naturally  severely  lowered  the 
average  rate  of  profit.  How  greatly  the  development 
of  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  has  benefited 
labour  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures  which 
give  the  number  of  hands  in  the  four  principal  ship- 
building yards : — 

HANDS  EMPLOYED  IN  PRINCIPAL  GERMAN 
SHIPBUILDING  YARDS 
1880. 

Schichau 1200 

Vulcan 2200 

Howaldt 400 

Blohm  and  Voss     .     .       450 


1890. 

1899. 

1910. 

3,000 

4.507 

5,820 

6,628 

7,100 
7,600 

1,304 
2,051 

2,370 
4,649 

2,350 
5,100 

Total 


4250       10,862       19,467      22,150 


These  figures  show  that  some  of  the  most  powerful 
German  shipbuilding  yards  of  the  present  time  were 


614  MODERN    GERMANY 

quite  insignificant  a  short  time  ago,  and  that  the 
number  of  men  employed  in  the  four  principal  yards 
increased  almost  fivefold  within  twenty  years. 

By  the  wise,  far-seeing,  determined,  and  appropriate 
action  of  the  State,  which  has  been  described  in  the 
foregoing,  has  the  German  shipbuilding  and  shipping 
industry  been  artificially  established,  fostered,  and 
developed  until  it  has  grown  from  a  weak  and  artificial 
industry — Adam  Smith  would  have  contemptuously 
called  it  a  hot-house  industry — into  a  powerful, 
healthy,  and  natural  industry  which  is  now  able  to 
maintain  itself  in  free  competition  without  State 
support  against  all  comers.  The  astonishing  success 
of  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  is  due  partly  to 
its  excellent  management  and  organisation,  partly  to 
the  application  of  science  and  experience  to  industry, 
partly  to  the  courage  and  perseverance  of  the  directors 
of  the  Vulcan  and  of  other  undertakings,  partly  to 
the  harmonious  co-ordination  and  co-operation  of  the 
various  economic  factors  which  in  more  individualistic 
countries,  such  as  Great  Britain,  are  not  co-ordinated, 
and  often  serve  rather  to  obstruct  and  to  retard  pro- 
gress by  unnecessary  friction  than  to  provide  it  by 
harmonious  action. 

In  the  Jahrbuch  fur  Deutschland's  See  Interessen 
fur  1905  we  read : — 

"  Our  shipbuilders  have  executed  large  orders  for 
foreign  countries  and  mean  to  compete  in  the  future 
still  more  energetically  with  British  builders  for  foreign 
orders.  Our  shipping  industry  means  to  compete  not 
only  in  the  protected  coastal  trade  of  Germany  and 
in  German  harbours,  but  on  foreign  routes  also  and 
with  all  nations.  But  that  can  be  done  only  if  our 
shipbuilders  are  able  to  build  cheaply.  If  Germany 
should  try  to  build  up  her  shipping  trade  by  means  of 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING         615 

State  bounties  and  subsidies  Germany  would  benefit 
little,  and  an  international  struggle  of  the  purse, 
ruinous  to  all  people  alike,  would  begin  between  the 
various  States  until  the  struggle  would  at  last  be 
ended  by  a  mutual  agreement  to  abolish  such  bounties 
and  subsidies  as  was  the  case  with  the  Sugar  Bounties." 

"  For  the  shipping  trade  and  for  shipbuilding  Great 
Britain  is  Germany's  chief  competitor,  but,  although 
Great  Britain  is  in  many  respects,  especially  by  the 
proximity  of  coal  and  iron  to  the  shipyards,  more 
favourably  situated  than  is  Germany,  we  neutralise 
these  natural  advantages  by  a  more  thorough  technical 
training,  by  a  better  organisation,  and  by  co-operation 
both  in  the  shipping  trade  and  in  shipbuilding." 

The  foregoing  extract  is  in  the  first  place  most 
instructive  and  most  valuable  because  it  shows  that 
the  German  shipping  and  shipbuilding  industries 
mean  to  stand  on  their  own  feet.  Secondly  and  prin- 
cipally, this  extract  should  be  most  interesting  to  all 
Englishmen  because  it  shows  that  the  Germans  feel 
confident  that  the  superior  organisation  of  their  in- 
dustries and  their  co-operation  will  prove  stronger  in 
the  struggle  for  success  than  the  unparalleled  advan- 
tages for  shipbuilding  and  shipping  which  this  country 
enjoys.  For  these  reasons  the  passage  which  affirms 
that  organisation  and  co-operation  are  more  valuable 
than  are  Great  Britain's  most  favourable  geographical 
position  and  structure  and  her  incomparable  latent 
resources  might  fitly  be  written  in  letters  of  gold  on 
the  walls  of  our  House  of  Parliament,  and  of  the 
offices  of  our  manufacturers  and  merchants. 

Let  us  now  see  what  industrial  organisation  and 
industrial  co-operation  has  done  for  the  German  ship- 
building industry,  for  such  an  investigation  will  convey 
an  invaluable  lesson  to  this  country. 


6i6  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  strong  man  can  stand  alone  ;  the  weak  must 
stand  together  to  protect  themselves  against  the 
strong.  The  industrial  weakness  of  Germany  has 
proved  the  cause  of  the  strength  of  present  Germany, 
for  the  weakness  of  the  individual  German  industries 
competing  hopelessly  and  helplessly  against  this 
country  twenty  and  thirty  years  ago  led  to  the  forma- 
tion first  of  combinations  for  mutual  support,  and 
eventually  to  the  formation  of  those  gigantic  German 
trusts  which  have  been  formed  not  so  much  in  order 
to  rob  the  German  consumer,  as  is  often  rashly  asserted, 
as  in  order  to  protect  the  German  producer  and  to 
kill  the  non-German  producer.  For  these  reasons  her 
trusts  have  on  the  whole  been  a  blessing  to  Germany. 

American  trusts  and  British  combinations,  such  as 
the  American  meat  ring,  the  British  railway  ring,  the 
British  shipping  ring,  and  certain  of  our  large  limited 
companies,  are  unfortunately  mostly  formed  with  the 
object  of  either  levying  extortionate  charges  from  the 
public  or  of  depriving  ignorant  investors  of  their 
money  by  means  of  a  financial  coup.  In  Germany 
the  leading  idea  in  the  formation  of  industrial  trusts 
and  combinations  is  not  to  secure  an  undue  advantage 
to  a  few  wirepullers  by  the  unscrupulous  use  of  force 
grown  out  of  monopoly,  but  to  secure  a  legitimate 
advantage  to  a  number  of  domestic  producers  by  a 
wise  combination  of  the  productive  forces. 

The  German  trusts  and  limited  companies  devote 
themselves  rather  to  promoting  industries  than  to 
exploiting  the  public,  not  because  German  business 
men  are  more  virtuous  than  are  British  or  American 
business  men,  but  because  the  State  keeps  a  very 
sharp  eye  on  company  promoters,  directors,  and 
managers,  and  unsparingly  applies  hard  labour  to 
those  who  contravene  the  very  strict  German  Com- 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING         617 

pany  Law  which  has  been  devised  to  shelter  the 
public  and  to  teach  the  promoter  that  honesty  is  the 
best  policy.  Our  company  laws  have,  unfortunately, 
the  opposite  effect.  They  shelter  the  swindling  pro- 
moters and  directors,  and  leave  the  ignorant  public 
an  easy  prey  to  unscrupulous  exploiters.  Hence 
many  people  with  brains  in  this  country  prefer  making 
money  by  swindling  to  honest  industry,  whilst  similar 
individuals  in  Germany  find  it  more  profitable  and 
less  risky  to  adopt  an  honest  and  useful  productive 
occupation. 

The  introduction  of  Protection  in  1879  immediately 
led  to  the  formation  of  numerous  large  combinations 
in  the  German  iron  industry.  The  various  works 
gradually  formed  co-operating  groups  in  order  to 
eliminate  unnecessary  and  mutually  destructive  com- 
petition, to  regulate  prices,  to  buy  and  sell  collectively, 
to  eliminate  unnecessary  middlemen,  &c.  According 
to  Dr.  Voelcker  there  were  in  1903  forty-four  con- 
ventions, trusts,  and  syndicates  in  the  German  iron 
industry.  However,  the  multitude  of  these  com- 
binations deprived  co-operation  in  the  German  iron 
industry  of  much  of  its  usefulness.  The  contrast 
between  these  numerous  combinations  in  the  iron 
industry  and  the  gigantic  German  coal  trust  which 
embraces  practically  the  whole  coal-mining  industry 
of  Germany  was  too  glaring  to  be  allowed  to  remain, 
and  in  the  beginning  of  1904  a  gigantic  steel  trust, 
embracing  all  Germany,  was  founded. 

At  the  time  when  the  huge  German  steel  trust  was 
formed,  the  German  shipbuilders  had  already  been  in 
the  habit  of  buying  their  material,  not  from  the  indi- 
vidual makers  in  retail  fashion,  but  through  the 
representatives  of  the  various  combinations.  There- 
fore the  central  management  of  these  combinations 


6i8  MODERN    GERMANY 

was  able  to  effect  very  great  economies  in  the  pro- 
duction of  metal  wares  used  in  shipbuilding  by  intro- 
ducing a  wisely  organised  specialisation  and  division 
of  labour  among  the  numerous  works  belonging  to 
the  combine.  For  instance,  the  different  plates  used 
in  German  shipbuilding,  about  150  in  number,  require 
special  rollers,  and  in  endeavouring  to  produce  every 
kind,  or  at  least  many  kinds,  of  steel  plates,  the  various 
rolling-mills  had  not  only  to  incur  an  enormous  capital 
expenditure  in  laying  down  a  huge  plant,  but  the 
working  expenses  of  the  rolling-mills  were  necessarily 
made  unduly  heavy  because  a  large  part  of  their 
plant  was  unoccupied  during  part  of  the  year.  This 
unnecessary  and  exceedingly  wasteful  multiplication 
of  plant  was  done  away  with  by  specialisation  based 
on  mutual  agreement  which  gave  to  every  work  a 
proportionate  number  of  specialities,  and  thus  indi- 
vidual mills  were  enabled  to  produce  with  a  smaller 
and  constantly  occupied  plant  larger  quantities  of 
uniform  ship  steel  at  a  cheaper  price  than  hitherto 
and  at  a  larger  profit  to  themselves.  In  this  way 
judicious  industrial  combination  may  benefit  both 
consumers  and  producers,  and  trusts  are  by  no  means 
an  unmixed  evil  as  so  many  believe. 

Not  only  the  German  steel  producers,  but  the 
German  shipbuilders  also  have  formed  a  large  com- 
bination. The  Society  of  German  Shipyards  at  Berlin 
comprises  no  less  than  forty-two  individual  yards,  and 
thus  the  whole  of  the  German  shipbuilding  industry 
is  in  a  position  to  meet  the  whole  of  the  German  steel 
industry  in  one  room,  and  the  two  combinations  can, 
through  their  representatives,  amicably  arrange 
matters  between  themselves  to  their  mutual  satis- 
faction. Both  combinations  wish  to  prosper  and  both 
are  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  the  other.  Thus, 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING        619 

instead  of  suicidal  petty  rivalry  and  endless  wrangling 
between  innumerable  small  concerns  and  a  host  of 
agents  and  other  useless  but  expensive  middlemen, 
we  find  in  Germany  the  curious  spectacle  that  two  of 
the  most  powerful  industries  are  united  and  meet  one 
another  in  a  spirit  not  of  commercial  rivalry,  of  envy, 
and  of  secret  or  open  hostility,  but  in  friendly  and 
loyal  co-operation. 

Owing  to  this  co-operation  and  this  systematic 
specialisation  and  division  of  labour,  the  saving  of 
unnecessary  labour  could  still  further  be  developed. 
The  shipyards  have  been  taught  by  the  steel-makers 
how  they  can  save  trouble  and  expense  to  the  steel 
industry  by  adapting  their  requirements  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  steel-works  and  making  work  easy  for 
them.  On  the  other  hand  the  steel-makers  have 
learned  from  the  shipbuilders  how  best  to  cater  for 
the  shipyards,  and  how  best  to  adapt  themselves  most 
effectively  to  the  requirements  of  the  German  ship- 
building industry.  Thus  the  two  great  industries 
work  hand  in  hand  like  a  single  concern,  and  friction, 
expense,  and  correspondence  between  buyer  and  seller 
have  been  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  a  wonderful 
simplification  of  business.  A  shipbuilder  who  requires 
steel  plates  or  columns  of  a  certain  kind  had  formerly 
to  make  inquiries  at  a  large  number  of  works  before 
being  able  to  place  his  order,  and  when  he  had  made 
the  most  careful  inquiry  and  studied  the  market,  he 
could  not  be  quite  sure  that  he  would  receive  exactly 
what  he  wanted  at  the  cheapest  price  and  in  the 
shortest  time  from  the  work  which  he  had  selected. 
Now  his  task  has  been  made  easier.  The  shipbuilder 
can  obtain  all  the  information  which  he  requires  at 
the  central  office  of  the  steel  combination,  which  dis- 
tributes all  orders  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  that 


620  MODERN    GERMANY 

they  are  most  economically  and  most  rapidly  executed 
according  to  the  standard  specification.  Through 
this  arrangement  the  "  science  of  buying "  is  no 
longer  a  science,  and  the  convenience  of  being  able 
to  place  orders  rapidly  on  the  most  favourable  terms 
and  without  much  inquiry,  and  of  being  absolutely 
certain  that  the  articles  ordered  will  be  exactly  in 
accordance  with  the  shipbuilder's  requirements,  and 
that  they  will  be  delivered  at  the  right  time,  has 
caused  German  shipbuilders  to  order  their  material 
in  Germany,  even  if  they  are  offered  the  identical 
goods  at  a  lower  price  by  a  well-known  British  maker. 
This  is  one  of  the  chief  reasons  why  during  the  last 
few  years  British  steel  has  almost  ceased  to  be  used 
in  German  shipbuilding,  as  appears  from  the  following 
table  :— 

STEEL  USED  IN  GERMAN  SHIPBUILDING 

SHIPS'  PLATES.  OTHER  SHIPS'  STEEL. 


Of  German 

Of  Foreign 

Of  German 

Of  Foreigi 

Origin. 

Origin. 

Origin. 

Origin. 

Tons. 

Tons. 

Tons. 

Tons. 

1899    . 

71,948 

26,928 

36,515 

12,766 

1900 

70,806 

21,734 

3I,4l8 

11,076 

1901 

94,478 

8,397 

49,325 

4,530 

1902 

98,776 

6,428 

48,381 

2,653 

1903    . 

92,521 

1,631 

43,492 

1,107 

The  foregoing  figures  show  that  the  German  ship- 
building industry  has  almost  completely  eliminated 
foreign  steel  largely  owing  to  the  highly  developed 
organisation  and  co-operation  of  the  German  steel- 
works described  in  the  foregoing.  This  elimination  of 
foreign  steel,  which  means  British  steel,  from  the 
German  shipbuilding  industry  is  all  the  more  remark- 
able as  the  German  shipbuilding  industries  work  for 
all  practical  purposes  under  Free  Trade  conditions. 


SHIPBUILDING   AND    SHIPPING         621 

At  the  same  time  it  must  not  be  thought  that  British 
steel  cannot  compete  with  German  steel  on  equal 
terms,  for  the  terms  of  competition  are  not  equal  in 
Germany.  Firstly,  much  of  the  steel  consumed  by 
the  German  shipbuilders  is  "  dumped  "  steel,  sold  at, 
or  under,  cost  price  by  German  makers  who  do  not 
wish  to  depress  prices  in  the  home  market ;  secondly, 
the  German  steel  which  is  sold  at  natural  prices  is 
carried  at  a  merely  nominal  charge,  possibly  at  a  loss, 
by  the  German  railway  companies  to  the  sea  coast. 
Thus  the  German  shipbuilding  industry  secures  the 
advantages  of  both  Protection  and  Free  Trade. 

Since  the  creation  of  the  German  Empire  the  fleet 
of  German  merchant  steamships  has  increased  nearly 
thirty-fold,  as  the  following  figures  show — 

1871 81,994  tons 

1881 215,758     „ 

1891 723,652     „ 

1901 1,347,875     „ 

1910 2,349,557     „ 

The  foregoing  figures  do  not  by  any  means  give 
the  whole  tale  of  the  progress  of  Germany's  mercantile 
marine.  In  former  times,  when  Germany  was  poor, 
she  possessed  chiefly  second-hand  and  second-rate 
ships,  but  at  present  Germany  boasts  of  some  of  the 
largest  and  swiftest  liners  afloat,  and  she  has  besides 
proportionately  by  far  the  largest  number  of  very 
large  and  new  ships  among  maritime  nations.  The 
German  mercantile  marine  is  at  present  more  up  to 
date  than  is  the  shipping  of  this  country.  The 
strength  of  the  shipping  of  Great  Britain  lies  in  its 
"  tramp  "  steamers,  which  one  might  describe  as  the 
costermongers  and  pedlars  of  the  sea ;  the  strength 
of  the  shipping  of  Germany  lies  in  its  huge  passenger 
and  cargo  boats.  In  this  country  small  shipping  com- 


622  MODERN   GERMANY 

panics  are  most  conspicuous ;  in  Germany  huge 
shipping  companies  are  most  noticeable.  The  gross 
tonnage  of  the  two  largest  German  shipping  companies 
is  rapidly  approaching  2,000,000  tons,  and  the  indi- 
vidual German  ships  possessed  by  the  Nord  Deutsche- 
Lloyd  and  the  Hamburg-Amerikanische  Packetfahrt 
Aktien  Gesellschaft  are  among  the  finest  in  the 
world.  Germany  can  be  proud  of  her  great  shipping 
companies. 

Bismarck's  policy  of  fostering  and  promoting  the 
German  shipping  trade  has  energetically  been  con- 
tinued by  the  present  Emperor,  who  unceasingly  aids 
the  shipbuilding  and  shipping  companies,  partly  by 
personal  encouragement,  partly  by  legislative  and 
administrative  action.  Not  only  has  the  German 
Government  done  all  in  its  power  to  assist  the  German 
shipping  and  shipbuilding  industries,  but  it  has,  at 
the  same  time,  done  all  that  could  be  done  hi  order 
to  damage  their  foreign  competitors.  An  example 
will  show  how  assiduously,  or  one  might  perhaps  say 
how  unscrupulously,  Germany  aids  her  shipping  in- 
dustry. The  German  shipping  companies  do  an 
enormous  business  in  shipping  emigrants.  The  two 
leading  German  companies,  for  instance,  carry  every 
year  between  200,000  and  300,000  passengers,  of 
whom  the  majority  are  emigrants.  Germany  herself 
has  practically  no  emigration,  as  only  about  20,000 
emigrants  leave  Germany  every  year.  Consequently 
the  German  shipping  companies  endeavour  to  attract 
emigrants  from  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  to  the 
German  ports.  In  order  to  "  induce  "  Austrian  and 
Russian  emigrants  to  patronise  the  German  steam- 
ship lines,  arrangements  devised  to  secure  that  end 
were  made  by  the  German  Government  at  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  frontiers.  So-called  control  stations  for 


SHIPBUILDING    AND    SHIPPING         623 

emigrants  were  erected  in  Germany  through  which  all 
foreign  emigrants  had  to  pass  ostensibly  in  order  to 
be  medically  examined,  but  if  these  emigrants  were 
not  in  the  possession  of  tickets  issued  by  one  of  the 
German  steamship  lines  they  were  told  that  they 
were  not  allowed  to  proceed  to  the  German  harbour 
of  embarkation.  Emigrants  who  were  in  the  possession 
of  a  railway  ticket  to  Bremen  and  of  a  ticket  issued 
by  the  Cunard  Company  or  some  other  British  line 
were  ruthlessly  turned  back  unless  they  bought  a 
ticket  for  passage  on  one  of  the  German  lines  from  an 
agent  at  the  control  station.  By  this  high-handed 
proceeding  the  German  companies  secured  practically 
the  whole  emigrant  traffic  from  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia,  because  it  became  known  in  those  countries 
among  intending  emigrants  that  they  could  not 
emigrate  vid  Germany  unless  they  went  by  a  German 
line  of  steamships.  This  arbitrary  treatment  of 
intending  emigrants  was  one  of  the  reasons,  and  I 
think  the  principal  reason,  why  during  1904  a  rate 
war  broke  out  between  the  Cunard  Company  and  the 
great  German  lines.  Evidently  the  German  Govern- 
ment uses  every  means  in  its  power  to  assist  its 
shipping  industry, 

If  we  now  sum  up  the  contents  of  the  foregoing 
pages  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  Germany  seems  to  be 
destined  by  nature  "  to  be,  and  always  to  remain,  a 
land  power,"  as  Mr.  Cobden  might  have  said,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  her  coal  and  iron  mines  and  her  manu- 
facturing industies  lie  hundreds  of  miles  inland  in 
the  centre  and  in  the  South  of  Germany  and  that  her 
coast  is  almost  harbourless.  However,  notwithstand- 
ing the  most  disadvantageous  natural  conditions  for 
shipbuilding  and  shipping  which  can  be  imagined,  and 
notwithstanding  the  former  disinclination  of  German 


624  MODERN    GERMANY 

business  men  to  embark  upon  shipbuilding  and 
shipping,  the  German  Government  has  succeeded,  at 
a  comparatively  trifling  cost  to  the  nation,  in  over- 
coming all  the  apparently  insurmountable  obstacles 
and  in  artificially  creating  a  powerful,  successful,  and 
wealth-creating  new  industry  which  is  now  the  pride 
of  Germany  and  the  envy  of  many  nations. 

Individualism  unaided  is  often  powerless  to  develop 
new  industries  against  a  mighty  and  experienced 
foreign  competitor,  and  Government  aid  is  wasted 
unless  Governmental  initiative  is  backed  by  strenuous 
individual  exertion.  Clearly  recognising  the  dis- 
advantages of  weak  and  unaided  individualism,  and 
of  unsupported  Governmental  initiative  and  indis- 
criminate Governmental  aid,  the  German  Government 
has  known  how  to  stimulate  private  enterprise  into 
action  without  making  it  effete  and  teaching  it  to 
rely  entirely  on  the  State  as  private  enterprise 
so  often  does  when  it  is  aided  by  the  State  in 
an  injudicious  manner.  The  German  Government 
has  known  how  to  combine  successfully  the  two 
most  powerful  factors,  Governmentalism  and  In- 
dividualism. 

The  foregoing  pages  also  show  that  the  German 
Government  shapes  its  economic  policy  not  in  accor- 
dance with  the  rigid  views  of  professors  of  political 
economy  and  of  other  more  or  less  scientific  doc- 
trinaires. It  follows  neither  a  rigid  policy  of  Pro- 
tection nor  an  uncompromising  doctrine  of  Free  Trade, 
but  applies  Protection  and  Free  Trade  in  varying 
doses  according  to  the  requirements  of  the  individual 
case.  It  does  not  condemn  trusts  as  being  bad  in 
themselves,  and  does  not  try  to  oppose  them  by  a 
Conspiracy  Bill  as  is  done  in  the  United  States,  nor 
does  it  unconditionally  support  them.  Its  economic 


SHIPBUILDING   AND    SHIPPING        625 

policy    is    not    "  scientific,"    but    is    deliberately   un- 
scientific and  empirical. 

German  statesmen  do  not  believe  that  bookish  pro- 
fessors in  their  study  have  the  capacity  to  guide  the 
practical  business  interests  of  the  nation.  Therefore 
German  statesmen  adapt  their  action  to  circum- 
stances, and  they  are  guided  in  their  action  not  by 
German  economic  scientists,  but  by  practical  business 
men  whom  they  consult.  These  are  the  reasons 
which  have  brought  it  about  that  Germany  has  suc- 
ceeded in  developing  a  great,  prosperous,  and  success- 
ful shipping  and  shipbuilding  industry,  notwithstanding 
the  greatest  obstacles.  Both  a  "  popular  "  policy  and 
a  "  thoroughly  scientific  "  policy  are,  as  a  rule,  inferior 
to  a  practical,  an  empiric  policy,  although  the  latter 
is  as  a  rule  condemned  by  its  professorial  opponents 
as  unscientific  and  although  it  has  often  the  misfortune 
of  being  unpopular. 


2  K 


CHAPTER   XXV 

THE   CHEMICAL   INDUSTRIES 

THE  chemical  industry  is  perhaps  the  youngest,  but 
certainly  the  most  vigorous  and  the  most  successful, 
industry  of  Germany.  Whilst  all  other  German 
industries  have  been  fostered  by  the  most  scientific 
and  the  most  skilfully-framed  protective  tariff  which 
the  world  has  known,  and  have  marvellously  de- 
veloped, largely  owing  to  that  protective  tariff,  the 
German  chemical  industry  has  achieved  its  com- 
manding and  world-wide  success  practically  without 
any  fiscal  aid.  Consequently  it  is  most  interesting  to 
follow  the  triumphant  progress  of  this  industry,  to 
investigate  the  causes  owing  to  which  it  has  so 
wonderfully  prospered,  and  to  consider  the  economic 
consequences  which  the  commanding  position  of  the 
German  chemical  industry  has  for  Germany  and  for 
other  countries. 

Every  one  knows  nowadays  that  the  German 
chemical  industry  has  been  extremely  successful,  but 
few  people  are  aware  that  Germany  has  obtained 
almost  the  world-monopoly  in  some  of  the  most  im- 
portant branches  of  chemical  production.  Many 
chemical  preparations  which  are  universally  used  are 
exclusively  of  German  manufacture,  and  about  four- 
fifths  of  the  dyes  consumed  in  the  world  are  made 
in  Germany. 

How  very  important  the  chemical  industry  is  to 
Germany  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  yearly 

output  of  that  industry  amounted  in  1897,  according 

626 


THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES 


627 


to  a  most  careful  official  investigation,  to  £47,895,000. 
At  present  the  production  of  the  German  chemical 
industry  should  represent  a  value  of  about  £60,000,000, 
whilst  the  export  of  all  chemical  products  amounts  to 
considerably  more  than  £20,000,000  per  annum.  The 
chemical  industry  is  therefore  one  of  Germany's  most 
important  industries.  It  takes  the  fifth  place  among 
the  great  exporting  industries  of  that  country,  and  it 
supplies  exactly  9  per  cent,  of  the  German  exports. 

The  meteoric  development  of  the  German  chemical 
industry  during  the  last  twenty-five  years  may  be 
seen  from  the  fact  that  the  production  of  soda  rose 
from  42,000  tons  in  1878  to  about  400,000  tons  at 
the  present  time,  whilst  the  production  of  sulphuric 
acid  increased  from  112,000  tons  in  1878  to  1,402,400 
tons  in  1907.  The  foregoing  figures  may  be  considered 
representative  of  the  progress  of  the  German  chemical 
industry.  This  enormous  progress  has  not  been 
effected  spasmodically,  but  by  a  gradual,  continuous, 
and  natural,  though  rapid,  growth  of  production  for 
the  home  market  and  for  export,  as  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  table  : — 

IMPORTS  INTO  AND  EXPORTS  FROM  GERMANY  OF 
MANUFACTURED  CHEMICAL  PRODUCTS 


Excess  of  Exports 

Imports 

Exports 

over  Imports 

1889 

^5,330,000 

^11,335,000 

^6,005,000 

1890 

5,595,000 

12,155,000 

6,560,000 

1891 

4,980,000 

12,285,000 

7,305,000 

1892 

5,485,000 

12,745,000 

7,260,000 

1893 

5,465,000 

13,260,000 

7,795,000 

1894 

5,345,000 

13,440,000 

8,095,000 

1895 

5,545,000 

15,850,000 

10,305,000 

1896 

5,760,000 

16,220,000 

10,460,000 

1897 

5,485,000 

16,750,000 

11,265,000 

1898 

5,230,000 

16,960,000 

11,730,000 

1899 

5,440,000 

18,270,000 

12,830,000 

1900 

5,650,000 

18,620,000 

1  2,970,000 

1901 

5,535,000 

18,115,000 

12,580,000 

1902 

5,560,000 

19,300-000 

13,840,000 

628  MODERN    GERMANY 

If  we  look  through  the  foregoing  table,  we  find 
that  during  the  last  fourteen  years  the  imports  of 
chemical  manufactures  into  Germany  have  remained 
stationary,  whilst  the  exports  of  chemical  manu- 
factures from  that  country  have  almost  doubled  during 
that  time.  The  excess  of  exports  over  imports  has 
considerably  more  than  doubled  during  the  period 
under  review.  The  manufactured  chemicals  imported 
consisted  largely  of  exotic  products,  such  as  natural 
indigo,  extract  of  meat,  camphor,  &c.  A  table  show- 
ing the  imports  and  exports  of  chemical  raw  products 
will  be  given  later  on. 

In  order  to  show  the  direction  in  which  the  German 
chemical  industry  has  developed,  so  as  to  give  a  view 
of  its  scope  and  character,  it  is  worth  while  to  look 
at  the  exports  of  some  of  the  more  important  chemical 
manufactures  in  detail. 

EXPORTS  OF  PRINCIPAL  CHEMICAL  MANUFACTURES 


Aniline  and  other 
Alizarine                   Dyes  made  from 

Coal  Tar 

1805 

,£580,000 

^3,l6o,OOO 

1896 

535,000 

3,245,000 

»w*pw 

1897 

620,000 

J»*"T  J,vv 
3.350,000 

*  v;7  / 

1898 

845,000 

*J'-U*J        * 

3,6OO,OOO 

*•  *-;?*•* 

1890 

3.745.OOO 

*  vyy 
I  OOO 

560,000 

*J>  /  T^> 
3,865,OOO 

•"  ^7*"*  v 

776,000 

Jl            V*J>            V 

5,O33,OOO 

1909 

5,884,OOO 

Cyanide  01              T    ,•  
Potassium             IndlS° 

»J*                         \* 

Chlorate  of 
Potash 

1895 

.      .      .      .   £180,000          £410,000 

£565,000 

1896 

.      .      .      .        8o,000             320,000 

615,000 

1897 

.      .      .      .      105,000             240,000 

570,000 

1898 

....      195,000             380,000 

675,000 

1899 

.      .      .      .      165,000             390,000 

730,000 

1900 

.      .      .      .      130,000             465,000 

8l6,OOO 

1905 

.      .      .      .      26o,OOO         1,286,000 

I,l6o,ooo 

1909 

.      .      .      .      408,000         1,974,000 

1,568,000 

THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES 


629 


In  passing,  it  might  be  mentioned  that  Germany 
produces  more  than  20,000  tons  of  alizarine,  and  more 
than  60,000  tons  of  other  dyes  per  annum,  and  that 
she  has  no  competitors  in  the  production  of  alizarine. 

The  chemical  industry  is  for  various  reasons  of 
national  importance  to  Germany.  Though  it  employs 
much  unskilled  labour,  the  industry  is  so  prosperous 
that  it  pays  very  good  wages  considering  the  char- 
acter of  the  work  done.  Hence  strikes  are  of  ex- 
tremely rare  occurrence  in  the  prosperous  chemical 
works.  At  present  about  220,000  workmen  and 
women  are  employed  in  that  industry,  and  they 
receive  in  wages  more  than  twelve  million  pounds 
sterling  per  annum.  The  following  table  conveys  a 
clear  idea  of  the  interest  of  German  labour  in  the 
chemical  industry ; — 

EMPLOYMENT  AND  WAGES  IN  CHEMICAL  INDUSTRIES 


Hands  employed 


1882 
1894 

1895 

1896 

1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1902 
1906 

1909 


Fotal  wages      Wa&es  P61"  head 

per  annum 

^4,981,000 

£44-5 

5,173,000 

44.14 

5,686,000 

45-8 

6,045,000 

46.2 

6,482,000 

47-8 

6,978,000 

48.15 

7,746,000 

50.12 

7,983,000 

48.12 

10,545,000 

52.20 

12,688,000 

57.80 

71.777 

110,348 

114.587 

124,219 
129,827 

135.350 
143.119 

I53.011 
165,889 
202,177 
219,601 

The  constant  growth  of  the  German  chemical  in- 
dustry has  allowed  not  only  of  a  yearly  and  consider- 
able increase  of  the  labour  employed,  but  also  of  a 
yearly  increase  of  the  average  wages.  Only  the  acute 
depression  of  1902  has  caused  a  temporary  set-back 
in  wages.  Thus  certain  and  satisfactory  employment 
at,  on  the  whole  constantly,  rising  wages  has  been 
provided  for  a  very  large  number  of  workers. 


630  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  national  importance  of  the  German  chemical 
industry  lies  not  only  in  the  employment  which  it 
gives  to  the  wage-earning  masses  engaged  in  it,  but 
also  in  the  great  direct  and  indirect  benefits  which 
other  industries  derive  from  it.  Chemical  research  is 
no  longer  confined  to  purely  chemical  ends  in  Germany, 
for  the  chemist  has  most  successfully  applied  his 
science  to  agriculture  and  to  the  manufacturing  in- 
dustries, and  many  German  industries  owe  their  great- 
ness to  the  assistance  which  they  have  received  from 
trained  chemists.  The  beneficial  effect  of  chemical 
research  applied  to  other  industries  is  most  clearly 
visible  in  German  agriculture,  and  the  result  of  the 
studies  and  experiments  which  the  chemist  has  carried 
on  in  his  laboratory  is  also  universally  applied  in 
practice  by  the  peasants  and  the  landed  proprietors. 
This  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  Germany  pro- 
duced only  9500  tons  of  manure  salts  in  1884,  and  in 
1901  she  produced  no  less  than  147,169  tons  of  manure 
salts,  and  nearly  the  whole  was  consumed  in  the 
country.  How  rapidly  and  enormously  the  use  of 
potash  salts  (KaO)  has  increased  in  German  agri- 
culture may  be  seen  from  the  following  table,  which 
will  also  show  the  use  which  other  nations  make  of 
these  salts  : — 

POTASH  SALTS  USED  IN  AGRICULTURE  PER  SQUARE 
KILOMETRE 


1895 

1897          1899 

1901 

1905 

Kilogrammes 

Germany 

171.0 

254.8           306.0 

391-9 

5M-2 

United  States 

24.1 

33-1            36.1 

54-o 

58.0 

Belgium 

136.0 

133-6          159-0 

297.7 

441.9 

Holland 

125.3 

201.7         296.8 

461.9 

762.0 

England 

— 

46.2            58.6 

61.5 

"3-9 

Scotland 

— 

100.9          175.4 

254.6 

340.8 

Sweden 

i45-o 

196.8          197.5 

266.6 

367-9 

Denmark 

32.7 

40.4           51.7 

98.0 

J35-7 

THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES 


631 


Germany  produces  on  an  average  about  2,000,000 
tons  of  beet  sugar  and  molasses  per  annum,  which 
represent  a  value  of  more  than  £20,000,000.  The 
success  of  Germany's  enormous  sugar  industry  is 
directly  due  to  the  German  chemist,  without  whom 
beet  sugar  would  be  unable  to  compete  with  cane 
sugar.  Formerly  the  percentage  of  sugar  which  was 
extracted  from  the  beet  was  so  small  that  it  could  be 
produced  only  at  a  loss  in  free  competition  with  cane 
sugar ;  but  the  German  chemists  have  succeeded  in 
increasing  the  percentage  of  sugar  extracted  from 
year  to  year  to  such  an  extent  that  beet  sugar  can  now 
be  obtained  in  formerly  unthought-of  proportions  and 
at  formerly  unthought-of  prices.  The  influence  of 
the  chemist  on  the  German  sugar  industry  is  clearly 
traceable  from  the  following  figures  : — 


QUANTITY  AND  PERCENTAGE  OF  SUGAR  EXTRACTED 
FROM  BEET 
8,822  tons 

35,709 
128,141 
210,915 
418,010 
.     1,110,703 
1,970,000 
.     2,400,771 
.     2,079,221 


1840-50 

1846-50 

1856-60 

1866-70 

1876-80 

1886-90 

1900-1 

1905-6 

1908-9 


5.72  per  cent. 
7.22 
8.17 
8.30 
8-93 
12-73 
14-93 
15-27 
17.60 

The  few  figures  given  in  the  foregoing  will  make 
it  clear  that  the  great  and  increasing  prosperity  of 
German  agriculture  is  not  only  due  to  the  protective 
tariff  and  the  protective  effect  of  the  freight  policy 
gursued  by  the  German  railways,  but  also  to  the  in- 
valuable assistance  which  German  chemists  have  given 
to  the  agriculturists. 

Other  industries  have  similarly  benefited  by  the 
application  of  chemical  science,  and  many  prominent 
manufacturers,  bankers,  and  landowners  send  their 


632 


MODERN    GERMANY 


sons  to  the  Universities  and  technical  High  Schools 
to  study  chemistry,  so  that  they  should  be  able  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  assistance  of  that  science  in 
practical  life. 

The  enormous  national  importance  of  a  prosperous 
chemical  industry  lies  not  only  in  the  invaluable 
assistance  which  that  industry  can  give  to  nearly  all 
other  industries,  but  also  in  the  unthought-of  resources 
which  it  will  create  almost  out  of  nothing.  A  century 
ago  Great  Britain's  wealthy  sugar  colonies  were  the 
envy  of  the  world,  and  sugar-planters  laughed  at  the 
idea  of  producing  sugar  from  beet.  To-day  the  West 
Indian  sugar-planters  are  ruined,  and  Germany  pro- 
duces the  "  tropical  product  "  on  a  scale  never  dreamt 
of.  Since  1890  Germany  produces  artificial  musk  at 
Mulhouse,  natural  vanilla  is  being  replaced  by  chemical 
vanilline,  Japanese  camphor  by  synthetic  camphor, 
and  chemically-produced  sugar  is  being  replaced  by 
saccharine.  The  extraction  of  dyes  from  madder  root 
and  from  various  other  plants  has  ceased,  and  vege- 
table dyes  have  given  place  to  dyes  made  from  tar. 
At  present  natural  indigo  is  being  crushed  out  of 
existence  by  the  synthetic  indigo  produced  by  German 
chemists.  How  the  rise  of  artificial  indigo  has  affected 
the  former  indigo  monopoly  of  India  may  be  clearly 
seen  from  the  following  figures  : — 


1894-5 
1895-6 

1896-7 

1897-8 

1898-9 

1899-1903 

1900-1 

1901—2 

1905-6 

1909-10 


Acreage  under 

Indigo 

in  India 

.705.977  acres 

,569,869 
,583,808 

,366,513 
,013,627 
,046,434 

977,349 
792,179 
400.552 
295,706 


Value  of  Exports 

of  Indigo 
Tens  of  Rupees 

4,745,915 
5,354,5" 
4,370,757 
3,057,402 

2,970,478 
£1,795,007 
£1,423,987 

£1,234,83? 
£390,918 

£234,544 


THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES  633 

INDIGO  IMPORTED  TO  GREAT  BRITAIN 

1895 £i,392,534 

1896 1,533,722 

1897 1,470,574 

1898 890,803 

1899 986,090 

1900 542,089 

1901 .          ....  788,820 

1902 498,043 

1907 151.297 

1909 139,335 

The  facts  and  figures  given  make  it  clear  that 
many  a  "  natural  monopoly "  which  is  at  present 
possessed  by  countries  which  control  the  tropics  is 
threatened,  and  may  be  taken  away  from  them  by 
the  discoveries  of  the  chemists.  There  is  no  bound 
to  the  possibilities  of  chemistry,  though  prejudice 
always  asserts  for  a  time  that  the  natural  product  is 
superior  to  the  chemical  one.  Formerly  it  was  said 
that  cane  sugar  was  superior  to  chemical  sugar.  Now 
it  appears  that  there  is  practically  no  difference  be- 
tween the  two.  Thirty  years  ago  dealers  in  madder 
root  declared  the  existence  of  a  method  for  making 
chemically  alizarine  dyes  a  fable.  When  the  prac- 
ticability of  the  method  was  proved  to  them  they 
asserted  that  chemical  alizarine  was  inferior  in  quality. 
Yet  artificial  alizarine  has  replaced  the  natural  pro- 
duct. At  present  we  are  told  by  producers  of  natural 
indigo  that  the  natural  dye  is  superior  to  the  artificial 
one,  whilst  chemists  maintain  that  both  are  equally 
good.  At  any  rate,  the  artificial  product  is  by  far 
the  cheaper,  and  the  fatal  effect  of  its  production  on 
the  natural  dye  is  visible  from  the  figures  given  in 
the  foregoing  table.  So  much  is  certain  that  the 
Badische  Anilin  und  Soda  Fabrik  has  the  utmost 
confidence  in  the  success  of  artificial  indigo,  as  may 
be  seen  from  the  fact  that"  this  company  has  spent 


634  MODERN    GERMANY 

no  less  than  £900,000  in  cash  on  a  gigantic  installation 
for  supplying  the  world's  requirements  of  indigo.  The 
effect  of  the  discovery  of  making  artificial  indigo  on 
Germany  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures  : — 

Imports  of  Indigo  Exports  of  Indigo 

into  Germany  from  Germany 

1895 £1,075,000  £410,000 

1896 I,O55,OOO  320,000 

1897 635,000  240,000 

1898 415,000  380,000 

1899 415,000  390,000 

1900 2O5,OOO  465,000 

1901 215,000  635,000 

1902 185,000  925,000 

1903 9O,OOO  1,035,000 

1904 67,000  1,083,000 

1907 54,000  2,129,000 

1909  ......  30,000  1,974,000 

A  few  years  ago  Germany  was  dependent  for  the 
indigo  she  used  on  India,  and  imported  on  balance 
indigo  of  the  value  of  £600,000  and  more  per  annum. 
Now  Germany  has  completely  reversed  the  balance, 
and  in  1907  she  exported  £2,075,000  more  indigo  than 
she  imported.  Thus  the  natural  resources  of  a 
naturally  wealthy  country  may  be  taken  away  from 
it  without  bloodshed  by  the  able  chemists  of  another 
country.  The  possession  of  a  strong  chemical  in- 
dustry is  therefore  of  the  utmost  economic  importance 
to  all  progressive  countries.  This  importance  was 
clearly  recognised  by  Prince  Bismarck,  who  remarked 
in  1894  :  "  Peace  is  being  maintained  less  owing  to 
the  peaceful  disposition  of  all  Governments  than  owing 
to  the  ability  of  chemists  in  inventing  new  kinds  of 
powder.  ...  It  sounds  almost  like  irony,  but  it  is 
the  truth  that  the  chemist  is  keeping  the  swords  in 
their  scabbards,  and  that  he  decides  by  his  inventions 
whether  there  will  be  peace  or  war." 

We  have  seen  the  economic  importance  of  the 
chemical  industry,  and  we  have  followed  its  marvellous 


THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES 


635 


developments  on  German  soil.  Now  let  us  inquire  as 
to  the  reasons  why  German  chemistry  has  been  so 
successful. 

The  commanding  position  of  Germany's  chemical 
industry  is  in  no  way  due  to  nature's  bounty,  for 
Germany  is  by  no  means  particularly  fitted  for  develop- 
ing a  great  chemical  industry  owing  to  the  possession 
of  the  raw  products  required.  On  the  contrary,  she 
is  largely  dependent  on  foreign  nations  for  the  supply 
of  chemical  raw  products,  which  she  works  up  into 
chemical  manufactures,  as  is  conclusively  proved  by 
the  following  table  : — 

IMPORTS  INTO  AND  EXPORTS  FROM  GERMANY  OF 
CHEMICAL  RAW  PRODUCTS 


1889  .  .  . 

1890  .  .  . 

1891  .  .  . 

1892  .  .  . 

1893  •  •  • 

1894  .  .  . 

1895  •  •  • 
.1896  .  .  . 

1897  .  .  . 

1898  .  .  . 

1899  .  .  . 

1900  .  .  . 

1901  .  .  . 

1902  .  .  . 

These  figures  establish  the  fact  that  Germany  im- 
ports five  times  more  chemical  raw  products  than  she 
exports,  and  that  the  dependence  of  her  chemical 
industry  on  foreign  raw  products  is  rapidly  increasing. 
Therefore  it  is  clear  that  Germany's  success  is  not 
due  to  the  fortuitous  possession  of  the  first  matter. 

The  great  success  of  Germany's  chemical  industry 


Excess  of  Imports 

Imports 

Exports 

over  Exports 

£8,040,000 

£l,620,OOO 

£6,420,000 

7,495,000 

1,625,000 

5,870,000 

8,250,000 

I,6O5,OOO 

6,645,000 

7,825,000 

1,555,000 

6,270,000 

8,190,000 

1.695,000 

6,495,000 

8,230,000 

1,790,000 

6,440,000 

8,445,000 

1,860,000 

6,585,000 

8,450,000 

1,815,000 

6,635,000 

8,770,000 

1,855,000 

6,915,000 

8,830,000 

1,930,000 

6,900,000 

10,375,000 

2,220,000 

8,155,000 

10,920,000 

2,260,000 

8,660,000 

11,045,000 

2,270,000 

8,775,000 

10,585,000 

2,220,000 

8,365,000 

636  MODERN    GERMANY 

may  be  traced  to  the  simultaneous  action  of  the  follow- 
ing causes  : — 

1.  The   natural   disposition   and   aptitude   of   the 
individual  German  for  close,  patient,  persevering,  and 
painstaking  work  and  study. 

2.  The  munificent  and  enlightened  assistance  and 
encouragement  given  by  the  German  Governments  to 
the  study  of  chemistry  in  all  its  branches  regardless  of 
expense  and  regardless  of  immediate  profitable  returns. 

3.  The  spirit  of  combination  and  the  absence  of 
jealousy  among  chemical  scientists  and  manufacturers, 
whereby  scientific  co-operation  on  the  largest  scale 
has  been  made  possible. 

How  these  three  factors  have  combined  in  making 
the  German  chemical  industry  great  is  known  to  all 
who  are  acquainted  with  that  industry,  for  chemical 
talent  of  the  highest  order  flourishes  rather  in  France 
and  Great  Britain  than  in  Germany.  The  German 
chemists  owe  their  successes  rather  to  methodical 
combination  and  united  plodding  than  to  the  in- 
ventive genius  of  individuals,  for  many  of  the  most 
important  chemical  inventions-  were  made  outside 
Germany,  though  they  were  most  successfully  ex- 
ploited by  the  German  industries. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  Great 
Britain  and  France  were  the  leading  nations  in  the 
chemical  industries  and  in  chemical  research.  The 
chemical  production  of  aniline  dyes  was  discovered 
in  1855  by  Mr.  W.  H.  Perkin.  Notwithstanding  the 
English  discovery,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  aniline  dyes 
used  are  made  in  Germany,  and  by  the  irony  of  fate 
they  are  largely  made  of  English  coal  tar.  A  small 
export  duty  on  coal  tar  would  probably  have  the 
effect  of  transferring  a  large  part  of  the  chemical 
industry  of  Germany  to  these  shores. 


THE   CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES          637 

Evidently  a  great  chemical  inventor  is  of  little 
practical  use  to  a  country  unless  his  inventions  can 
be  utilised  to  the  fullest  extent  by  a  large  body  of 
chemical  manufacturers  and  chemists.  Otherwise  his 
great  discoveries  will  only  benefit  that  country  where 
an  apparatus  exists  for  making  use  of  them.  At 
present  Great  Britain  and  France  possess  perhaps  the 
foremost  chemists.  Yet  the  discoveries  of  these  men 
will  chiefly,  and  perhaps  only,  benefit  the  powerful 
German  industries  with  which  neither  the  French 
nor  the  British  industries  can  compete  on  terms  of 
equality. 

The  individual  German  has  a  great  natural  aptitude 
for  patient  sedentary  work.  At  an  age  when  English 
boys  will  romp  or  pursue  various  outdoor  sports, 
German  boys  will  be  found  poring  over  books  and 
making  fretwork.  Owing  to  this  disposition  towards 
concentration  and  close  application,  Germans  may  be 
found  in  all  countries  as  watchmakers,  opticians,  &c. 

For  these  reasons  a  leaning  towards  chemistry  had 
been  prevalent  in  Germany  already  in  the  Dark  Ages. 
Albertus  Magnus,  of  Cologne,  was  the  greatest  chemist 
of  the  thirteenth  century,  and  Theophrastus  Bom- 
bastus  von  Hohenheim  (better  known  under  the  name 
of  Paracelsus)  the  greatest  chemist  of  the  sixteenth 
century.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  capitals  and  uni- 
versity towns  of  the  various  German  States  were  the 
favourite  haunts  of  the  alchemists,  who  spread  the 
desire  for  chemical  learning  far  and  wide.  Many  of 
them  were  swindlers,  but  many  were  guided  by  the 
spirit  of  research,  and  not  a  few  valuable  discoveries 
were  made  by  these  men.  Brandt,  for  instance,  dis- 
covered phosphorus ;  Kunkel,  ruby  glass,  &c. 

The  German  apothecaries  have  never  been,  and 
are  not  now,  more  Anglicano,  shopkeepers  who  sell 


638  MODERN    GERMANY 

pills  and  patent  medicines,  and  who  vend  the  pro- 
ductions of  "  manufacturing  chemists."  Patent  medi- 
cines hardly  exist  in  Germany,  and  are  on  the  whole 
forbidden  on  account  of  the  great  harm  that  is 
often  done  to  the  community  by  unscrupulous  manu- 
facturing quacks.  For  these  reasons  the  German 
apothecaries  had  to  be,  and  are  now,  manufacturing 
and  analytical  chemists  on  a  small  scale,  and  in  their 
daily  work  they  made  many  valuable  discoveries. 
Besides,  chemistry  is  with  many  German  apothecaries 
a  hobby  which  is  pursued  with  love,  and  many  boys 
become  apothecaries  merely  because  of  their  natural 
inclination  towards  patient  investigation  and  research. 
Thus  it  has  come  to  pass  that  many  important 
chemical  works  have  had  their  beginning  in  tiny 
apothecaries'  laboratories,  and  many  leading  chemists 
were  at  one  time  apothecaries'  assistants. 

When  Justus  von  Liebig,  the  greatest  German 
chemist,  was  at  school,  the  importance  of  chemistry 
was  not  yet  understood.  At  the  German  Universities 
there  existed  neither  adequate  facilities  for  the  study 
of  chemistry,  nor  were  there  any  public  laboratories 
in  existence.  Liebig's  greatest  service  to  his  country 
lay  not  so  much  in  his  fruitful  investigations  and 
numerous  discoveries — which,  by  the  way,  chiefly 
benefited  Great  Britain  and  France,  for  these  countries 
then  possessed  fully  developed  chemical  industries — 
as  in  the  organisation  of  chemical  study  and  research 
on  a  broad  national  basis.  Owing  to  his  exertions 
the  first  University  laboratory,  that  of  Giessen,  was 
created  in  1825  ;  and  he  strove  less  to  advance  chemical 
science  by  his  personal  research  than  to  train  a  large 
number  of  pupils,  in  order  to  spread  his  methods  far 
and  wide.  His  example  was  faithfully  copied  by  his 
numerous  assistants,  and  many  of  the  most  prominent 


THE   CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES          639 

German  chemists  living  have  been  initiated  into  that 
science  by  the  pupils  of  Liebig.  Thus  the  spirit  of 
Liebig  is  still  active  at  the  present  day,  and  the  seed 
which  Liebig  planted  has  brought  forth  the  magnificent 
harvest  that  is  now  yearly  garnered  by  the  German 
chemical  industry. 

The  German  Governments  were  won  over  to  the 
cause  of  chemistry  by  Liebig's  agitation  and  by  his 
numerous  popular  writings.  Therefore  assistance  came 
speedily  forward  from  all  quarters  of  Germany.  The 
laboratory  of  the  University  of  Marburg  was  opened 
in  1840,  that  of  the  University  of  Leipzig  in  1843, 
and  from  that  time  onward  laboratory  followed 
laboratory,  and  the  various  German  Governments 
spent  money  without  stint  for  the  advancement  of 
chemistry.  They  did  not  listen  to  the  doctrines  of 
laissez-faire,  which  were  much  in  vogue  in  Germany 
in  the  forties.  They  neither  waited  for  individual 
enterprise  and  private  munificence  to  come  forward, 
nor  did  they  inquire  too  closely  whether  an  immediate 
profit  could  be  secured  by  encouraging  chemistry  by 
substantial  grants.  They  simply  were  convinced  that 
the  encouragement  of  chemistry  might  be  beneficial 
to  the  nation,  and  considered  it  their  duty  to  spend 
a  little  of  the  money  of  the  nation  on  a  promising 
experiment,  and  refused  to  reject  the  legitimate  de- 
mands of  the  scientists  on  the  grounds  that  it  was 
not  the  business  to  the  State  to  exercise  foresight,  and 
that  the  initiative  for  all  progress  should  be  left  to 
private  enterprise. 

In  consequence  of  the  enlightened  policy  of  the 
German  Governments,  there  is  now  a  huge  army  of 
trained  chemists  in  existence,  and  that  army  grows 
in  number  and  importance  from  year  to  year.  In 
1900  there  were  more  than  7000  German  chemists 


640  MODERN    GERMANY 

counted  who  had  been  trained  at  the  Universities 
and  Technical  and  High  Schools.  They  were  distri- 
buted as  follows  : — 

German  analytical  chemists  in  Germany    .     .  4,300 

German  analytical  chemists  abroad  .     .     .     .  i  ,000 

University  professors,  lecturers,  and  assistants  400 

.     Chemists  in  State  employment    ...          .  100 

Private  chemists 400 

Apothecaries , 300 

Various     .     .          .          750 


Total     7,250 


Twenty-five  years  before  there  were  only  1700 
trained  chemists  employed  in  the  chemical  works  of 
Germany.  Their  increase  from  1700  to  4300  is  the  most 
eloquent  testimony  to  the  progress  of  the  industry  and 
to  the  progress  of  chemical  investigation  in  Germany. 

Unfortunately,  no  reliable  statistics  can  be  given 
with  regard  to  the  students  of  chemistry  enrolled  at 
the  Universities  and  technical  High  Schools.  How- 
ever, it  may  be  assumed  that  the  number  of  chemical 
students  has  grown  at  least  pan  passu  with  the 
number  of  students  in  which  we  find  the  following 
truly  remarkable  increase  : — 

STUDENTS  AT  THE  GERMAN  UNIVERSITIES,  THE  TECHNICAL, 
AGRICULTURAL,  AND  VETERINARY  HIGH  SCHOOLS,  AND 
THE  MINING  AND  FORESTRY  ACADEMIES 

Proportion  of 

Number  of      Students  to  10,000 
Students.          male  inhabitants 

1870 I7,76l  8.89 

1881 26,032  11.73 

1892 .  33,992  13.87 

1900 46,520  16.78 

1910 83,089  25-°3 

This  progress  is  most  remarkable,  and  shows  the  vigour 


THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES  641 

with  which  science  is  pursued  and  applied  to  industry 
in  every  direction. 

In  former  times  a  chemical  factory  was  frequently 
founded  on  some  excellent  receipts,  the  secret  of 
which  was  most  jealously  guarded  by  the  fortunate 
owner.  But  nowadays  it  is  impossible  to  maintain 
a  monopoly  either  by  keeping  a  process  secret  or  by 
the  protection  of  patents.  Chemical  science  has  so 
greatly  advanced  that  the  same  ultimate  end  may  be 
arrived  at  by  a  great  variety  of  processes.  Conse- 
quently neither  a  secret  process  nor  any  number  of 
patents  will  insure  the  continued  success  of  a  chemical 
factory  which  stands  still  scientifically.  A  chemical 
factory  can  maintain  its  position  only  if  it  remains, 
by  constant  research  and  constant  improvement,  in 
the  very  forefront  of  scientific  excellence.  Success 
can  only  be  won  and  maintained  by  the  strenuous 
and  constant  research  of  chemists  of  the  highest 
ability,  by  constant  progress  and  the  introduction  of 
improved  methods.  This  is  all  the  more  necessary 
as  the  prices  for  chemicals  have  been  falling  for  many 
years,  and  will  apparently  continue  to  fall. 

Formerly  it  was  possible  to  make  industrially 
valuable  discoveries  in  a  somewhat  haphazard  fashion 
by  individual  and  unconnected  experiments,  and  the 
results  arrived  at  could  be  utilised  through  several 
generations.  But  through  the  teaching  of  Liebig  and 
his  disciples  a  new  era  has  begun  in  chemical  research. 
Individual  planless  effort  has  made  way  for  systematic, 
strictly  logical,  and  exhaustive  research  of  many 
chemists  under  leaders  of  standing ;  and  the  problem 
to  be  solved  is  patiently  pursued  in  every  direction 
by  the  combined  forces  of  chemistry  until  the  final  aim 
is  arrived  at.  Every  success,  every  progress,  every 
discovery,  should  become  common  property,  and 

2  S 


642  MODERN    GERMANY 

should  become  the  starting  point  for  further  and 
greater  successes.  In  the  laboratories  of  the  German 
Universities  and  of  the  great  chemical  works  thousands 
of  highly-trained  chemists  co-operate  as  systemati- 
cally as  workmen  do  in  a  factory,  and  the  work  that 
is  dropped  by  one  chemist  who  falls  out  on  the  way 
is  carried  on  by  another.  Thus  the  army  of  German 
chemists  have  continued  their  advance,  and  the 
astonishing  success  of  the  German  chemical  industry 
has  been  brought  about. 

Combination  is  the  watchword  not  only  in  the 
laboratories,  but  also  in  the  counting-houses  of  the 
chemical  factories.  In  no  German  industry  is  there 
a  larger  proportion  of  mammoth  enterprises.  The 
Badische  Anilin  und  Sodafabrik,  in  Ludwigshafen,  has 
about  7000  workmen,  and  the  Farbenfabriken  vormals 
Friedr.  Bayer  &  Co.,  in  Elberfeld,  and  the  Farbwerke 
vormals  Meister,  Lucius  &  Briining,  in  Hochst,  each 
employ  more  than  4000  hands.  Besides,  each  of  these 
works  constantly  maintains  a  staff  of  about  150  trained 
chemists. 

The  great  individual  works  are  combined  in  groups 
for  the  regulation  of  prices  in  Germany  and  abroad. 
Germany  abounds  in  trusts  (Kartelle),  and  these  com- 
binations are  proportionately  particularly  numerous 
in  the  chemical  industry.  According  to  an  inquiry 
made  in  the  beginning  of  1905  there  were  then  in 
Germany  385  industrial  trusts,  46  of  which  belonged 
to  the  great  chemical  group.  These  trusts  have 
proved  a  blessing  to  the  chemical  industry  of  Germany, 
but  they  have,  by  dumping,  done  much  damage  to 
foreign  chemical  industries,  which  they  have  stifled, 
and  have  thus  assisted  in  creating  the  present  world- 
monopoly  of  the  German  chemical  industry. 

If  we  review  the  growth  and  the  achievements  of 


THE    CHEMICAL    INDUSTRIES  643 

the  German  chemical  industry,  we  cannot  wonder  that 
the  American  Consul,  in  Berlin,  reported  in  1900  to 
his  Government :  "  The  German  exhibit  at  the  Paris 
Exposition  is  conceded  on  all  hands  to  have  been — 
especially  in  the  departments  of  machinery,  chemicals, 
and  all  that  relates  to  the  application  of  science  to 
industry — a  triumphant  vindication  of  German 
methods  and  a  display  which  alone  would  establish 
the  right  of  the  Fatherland  to  a  place  in  the  front 
rank  of  industrial  and  commercial  nations." 

Of  late  much  has  been  said  and  written  in  Great 
Britain  as  to  the  advantages  of  education  and  on  the 
application  of  science  to  industry.  However,  many, 
perhaps  most,  people  who  uphold  education  and  the 
application  of  science  to  industry  have  only  a  dim 
idea  how  education  and  science  may  help  our  in- 
dustries. British  education  appears  to  suffer  from  two 
very  great  evils,  which  are  unfortunately  recognised 
by  only  very  few  people. 

In  the  first  place  our  higher  education  is  more 
ornamental  than  useful,  more  literary  than  practical, 
and  does  not  fit  men  for  the  battle  of  life — vide  Oxford 
and  Cambridge. 

In  the  second  place,  education  is  considered  and 
treated  almost  solely  as  a  means  to  pass  an  examina- 
tion, not  as  a  preparation  for  practical  life,  and  tends 
therefore  rather  to  exercise  the  retentive  power,  the 
memory,  in  the  individual,  than  to  strengthen  his 
intelligence,  his  judgment,  and  his  critical  faculties. 
In  other  words,  the  influence  of  the  crammer  upon 
education  is  more  noticeable  than  that  of  the  practical 
man.  Education  is  more  for  show  than  for  use. 

In  the  application  of  science  to  industry  the  crying 
necessity  of  combination  seems  hardly  to  be  recog- 
nised. Every  British  chemist  is  an  island.  The 


644  MODERN    GERMANY 

average  work  accomplished  by  the  average  British 
chemist  is  probably  greater  than  that  of  his  German 
competitor,  for  the  Englishman  puts  more  energy  into 
his  work,  and  works  more  quickly.  Yet,  though  some 
of  the  greatest  chemists  living  are  Englishmen,  our 
chemical  industries  are  languishing  owing  to  the  lack 
of  organised  and  co-ordinated  effort. 

Altogether  it  seems  that  the  use  of  education 
and  of  science  is  not  yet  fully  grasped  by  the  nation. 
The  various  Governments  appear  to  be  interested  only 
in  the  elementary  schools,  which  will  hardly  contribute 
much  to  the  scientific  and  industrial  advancement  of 
the  nation,  whilst  wealthy  individuals  give  and  be- 
queath much  money  for  charitable  purposes,  and  but 
little  for  the  advancement  of  true  science.  Thus 
science  is  starved  to  death.  Amateurs  and  leaders 
of  society,  who  frequently  do  not  grasp  the  ends 
towards  which  science  should  be  directed,  have  a 
commanding  influence  over  the  institutions  where 
science  should  be  taught.  Truly  the  scientific  and 
the  industrial  part  of  the  nation  can  learn  much  from 
the  rise  of  the  chemical  industry  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER   XXVI 

THE   FISCAL   POLICY   OF  GERMANY   AND   ITS   RESULT 

DURING  the  recent  discussion  of  our  fiscal  policy, 
Germany's  economic  success  under  a  protective  regime 
has  so  frequently  been  quoted,  and  has  so  often  been 
quoted  with  insufficient  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  the 
case,  that  it  would  seem  worth  while  to  look  some- 
what closely  into  the  economic  history  of  Germany, 
into  the  economic  policy  which  she  has  pursued  and 
is  still  pursuing,  and  into  the  economic  ideas  which 
prevail  in  that  country.  By  doing  so  we  shall  be 
able  to  understand  clearly  the  principles  on  which 
her  fiscal  policy  is  based,  we  shall  see  how  economic 
problems  similar  to  our  own  have  presented  them- 
selves to  another  nation,  and  how  they  have  been 
solved,  and  we  shall  thus  be  able  to  consider  our  own 
problem  in  the  light  of  German  experience. 

The  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  left  Germany 
devastated,  impoverished,  and  exhausted ;  her  com- 
merce and  her  industries  were  destroyed.  While  the 
whole  Continent  had  been  ravaged  and  ruined  by  in- 
cessant wars  and  hostile  invasions,  British  industries 
had  flourished  and  prospered  in  internal  peace.  The 
official  value  of  the  exports  of  British  and  Irish 
produce  had  risen  from  £18,556,891  in  1798  to  no 
less  than  £42,875,996  in  1815,  or  by  more  than  130 
per  cent.,  and  our  shipping  had  grown  from  1,632,112 
tons  in  1798  to  2,601,276  tons  in  1815,  or  by  60  per 
cent.  After  the  Napoleonic  wars  the  Continent  re- 


646  MODERN    GERMANY 

mained  utterly  exhausted  for  a  long  time ;  its  industries 
were  shattered,  its  wealth  had  disappeared,  and  during 
the  slow  progress  of  its  recuperation  Great  Britain 
conquered  the  commerce  and  industries  of  the  world, 
and  the  exports  of  her  produce  rapidly  rose  from 
£42,875,996  in  1815  to  no  less  than  £134,599,116  in 
1845,  according  to  official  value,  while  our  shipping 
increased  from  2,601,276  tons  in  1815  to  6,045,718  tons 
in  1845.  The  foregoing  figures  are  taken  from  the 
old  official  records. 

Thus,  towards  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  Great  Britain  was  the  merchant,  manu- 
facturer, carrier,  banker,  and  engineer  of  the  world, 
and  ruled  supreme  in  the  realm  of  business.  Two- 
thirds  of  the  world's  shipping  flew  the  British  flag, 
two-thirds  of  the  coal  produced  in  the  world  was 
British ;  Great  Britain  had  more  miles  of  railway 
than  the  whole  Continent,  and  produced  more  cotton 
goods  and  more  iron  than  all  the  countries  of  the 
world  together.  Her  coal  mines  were  considered 
inexhaustible,  and  the  coal  possessed  by  other  nations 
was  believed  to  be  of  such  inferior  quality  as  to  be 
almost  useless  for  manufacturing  purposes.  Great 
Britain  had  therefore  practically  the  manufacturing 
monopoly  of  the  world,  and  the  great  German 
economist  Friedrich  List  wrote  with  perfect  truth  in 
his  Zollvereinsblatt :  "  England  is  a  world  in  itself, 
a  world  which  is  superior  to  the  whole  rest  of  the 
world  in  power  and  wealth." 

Our  economists  and  many  of  our  merchants  then 
thought  that  our  economic  position  was  so  over- 
whelmingly strong  and  so  unassailable,  that  it  would 
be  impossible  for  other  nations  either  to  compete 
with  us  in  neutral  markets  or  to  protect  their  own 
manufactures  against  the  invasion  of  our  industries 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY     647 

by  protective  tariffs.  They  believed  that  Great 
Britain's  industrial  power  was  stronger  than  all  tariff 
walls.  During  the  reign  of  these  intoxicating  ideas 
of  Great  Britain's  irresistible  economic  power,  Cobden 
proclaimed  that  "  Great  Britain  is,  and  always  will 
be,  the  workshop  of  the  world  "  ;  Great  Britain  threw 
away  her  fiscal  weapons  of  defence,  opened  her  doors 
wide  to  all  nations,  and  introduced  Free  Trade. 

While  Great  Britain  was  the  undisputed  mistress 
of  the  world's  trade,  industry,  finance,  and  shipping, 
Germany  was  a  poor  agricultural  country.  She  had 
been  impoverished  by  her  constant  wars ;  she  had 
neither  colonies  nor  good  coal,  nor  shipping,  nor  even 
a  rich  soil  nor  a  climate  favourable  to  agriculture.  She 
was  divided  into  a  number  of  petty  States  which  were 
jealous  of  one  another,  and  which  hampered  one 
another's  progress.  Communications  in  the  interior 
were  bad,  and  her  internal  trade  was  obstructed  and 
undeveloped.  Besides  she  was  burdened  by  militarism, 
and  she  possessed  but  one  good  harbour.  According 
to  the  forecast  of  the  British  free  traders,  Germany 
was  predestined  always  to  remain  a  poor  agricultural 
country,  exactly  as  Great  Britain  was  predestined 
always  to  remain  a  rich  industrial  nation. 

At  that  time  arose  in  Germany  Friedrich  List,  a 
writer  on  political  economy  and  a  convinced  believer 
in  Protection.  He  had  travelled  and  seen  the  world, 
and  had  lived  a  long  time  in  England  and  the  United 
States.  Consequently  he  spoke  with  greater  practical 
knowledge  on  international  affairs  than  do  the  majority 
of  political  economists.  His  principal  work,  "  The 
National  System  of  Political  Economy,"  was  pub- 
lished in  1840,  and  created  some  stir  at  the  time 
of  its  appearance.  Like  Cobden's  doctrine  of  Free 
Trade,  List's  system  of  national  Protection  was  hailed 


648  MODERN    GERMANY 

with  enthusiasm  by  the  business  men  of  his  country, 
but  viewed  by  the  German  Governments  with  suspicion 
and  dislike.  Embittered  and  disappointed  by  the  lack 
of  official  appreciation  and  by  the  persecution  of  the 
German  Governments,  List  shot  himself  in  1846. 
After  his  death  his  system  rapidly  became  as  authori- 
tative for  German  economic  policy  as  was  the  system 
of  Adam  Smith  for  this  country,  and  it  became,  and 
is  still,  the  text-book  of  the  German  statesman. 
Consequently  it  will  be  interesting  to  consider  some 
of  List's  more  important  views. 

At  the  time  when  Friedrich  List  wrote,  Great 
Britain  was  wealthy  and  powerful,  while  Germany 
was  poor  and  weak.  Consequently  List  endeavoured 
to  show  how  Great  Britain  had  become  so  wealthy, 
and  how  Germany  might  also  acquire  wealth  by 
profiting  from  Great  Britain's  example.  After  in- 
vestigating the  economic  history  of  this  country  and 
the  causes  of  its  wealth,  he  summed  up  the  result 
of  his  inquiry  as  follows  : — 

"  The  English,  by  a  system  of  restrictions,  privileges,  and 
encouragements,  have  succeeded  in  transplanting  on  to  their 
native  soil  the  wealth,  the  talents,  and  the  spirit  of  enter- 
prise of  foreigners.  This  policy  was  pursued  with  greater 
or  lesser,  with  speedier  or  more  tardy,  success  just  in  propor- 
tion as  the  measures  adopted  were  more  or  less  judiciously 
adapted  to  the  object  in  view,  and  applied  and  pursued 
with  more  or  less  energy  and  perseverance. 

"  It  is  true  that  for  the  increase  in  her  power  and  in  her 
productive  capacity  England  is  indebted  not  solely  to  her 
commercial  restrictions,  to  her  protective  laws,  and  to  her 
commercial  treaties,  but  in  a  large  measure  also  to  her 
conquests  in  science  and  in  the  arts. 

",How  comes  it  that  in  these  days  one  million  of  English 
operatives  can  perform  the  work  of  hundreds  of  millions  ? 
It  comes  from  the  great  demand  for  manufactured  goods 
which  by  her  wise  and  energetic  policy  England  has  created 
in  foreign  lands,  and  especially  in  her  Colonies  ;  from  the 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF   GERMANY    649 

wise  and  powerful  protection  extended  to  her  home  industries  ; 
from  the  great  rewards  which  by  means  of  her  patent  laws 
she  has  offered  to  every  new  discovery ;  and  from  the  extra- 
ordinary facility  for  inland  transport  afforded  by  her  public 
roads,  canals,  and  railways. 

"  England  has  for  a  long  time  monopolised  the  inventive 
genius  of  every  nation.  It  is  no  more  than  fair  that  England, 
now  that  she  has  attained  the  culminating  point  of  her 
industrial  growth  and  progress,  should  restore  again  to  the 
nations  of  Continental  Europe  a  portion  of  those  productive 
forces  which  she  originally  derived  from  them." 

From  these  facts  List  draws  the  logical  conclusion 
and  applies  it  to  Germany.  He  says  : — 

"  Modern  Germany,  lacking  a  system  of  vigorous  and  united 
commercial  policy,  exposed  in  her  home  markets  to  com- 
petition with  a  foreign  manufacturing  power  in  every  way 
superior  to  her  own,  while  excluded  at  the  same  time  from 
foreign  markets  by  arbitrary  and  often  capricious  restrictions, 
is  very  far  indeed  from  making  that  progress  in  industry 
to  which  she  is  entitled  by  the  degrees  of  her  culture.  She 
cannot  even  maintain  her  previously  acquired  position,  and 
is  made  a  convenience  of  by  that  very  nation,  until  at  last 
the  German  States  have  resolved  to  secure  their  home  markets 
for  their  own  industries  by  the  adoption  of  a  united  vigorous 
system  of  commercial  policy. 

"  We  venture  to  assert  that  on  the  development  of  the 
German  protective  system  depend  the  existence,  the  inde- 
pendence, and  the  future  of  German  nationality.  Only  in 
the  soil  of  general  prosperity  does  the  national  spirit  strike 
its  roots  and  produce  fine  blossoms  and  rich  fruits.  Only 
from  the  unity  of  material  interests  does  unity  of  purpose 
arise,  and  from  both  of  these  national  power." 

The  position  of  disunited  Germany  in  1840  strangely 
resembled  the  position  of  the  scattered  British  Empire 
of  to-day,  and  if  we  insert  in  the  last  two  paragraphs 
quoted  the  world  "  British  Empire  "  for  "  Germany  " 
List's  words  might  easily  be  attributed  to  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain. 

By  a  curious  coincidence  List  wrote  at  the  same 


650  MODERN    GERMANY 

time  in  Germany  when  Cobden  and  his  disciples 
preached  their  gospel  in  Great  Britain,  and  the  British 
free  traders,  who  with  their  universal  theory  and 
their  cosmopolitan  views  simply  ignored  the  existence 
of  nations,  naturally  did  not  like  to  see  a  pronouncedly 
national  system  of  political  economy  arise  that  was 
absolutely  opposed  to  Free  Trade  cosmopolitanism. 
Consequently  List's  book  was  vigorously  attacked  by 
Free  Traders  throughout  Great  Britain.  The  Edin- 
burgh Review  devoted,  in  July  1842,  an  article  of  no 
less  than  forty-two  pages  to  that  book,  in  which  we 
find  expressions  of  contempt  such  as  "a  pretended 
system,"  "  his  poor  misconception  of  the  doctrines 
which  he  tries  to  brand  with  the  nickname  of  cosmo- 
politan economy,"  "  his  treatise  is  unworthy  of  notice," 
"  unworthy  of  grave  criticism,"  &c.  The  writer  of 
that  article  did,  however,  not  confine  himself  to  abuse, 
but  proved  to  his  own  satisfaction  that,  whereas 
England  was,  and  ever  would  remain,  the  workshop 
of  the  world,  Germany  was,  and  ever  would  remain, 
a  poor  agricultural  country,  and  that  all  attempts 
to  build  up  industries  in  Germany  under  the  shelter 
of  Protection  were  misdirected  and  would  prove  of 
no  avail.  The  writer  says  : — 

"The  manufactures  in  which  our  author  exults  are  an 
evil  to  Germany.  The  labour  and  capital  which  that  country 
has  expended  upon  them  have  been  forced  from  more 
profitable  employments." 

The  Edinburgh  Review  sapiently  concludes  : — 

"  In  Continental  countries  they  naturally  reason  thus  : 
'  England  has  protected  her  manufactures — England  is  rich  ; 
if  we  protect  our  manufactures  we  shall  be  as  rich  as  she 
is.'  They  forget  that  England  has  unrivalled  natural 
capacities  for  manufacturing  and  commercial  industry,  and 
that  no  country  with  capacities  distinctly  inferior  can  ascend 
to  an  equal  prosperity  by  any  policy  whatever." 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY     651 

The  tone  of  conscious  superiority  and  the  confident 
prediction  as  to  England's  everlasting  industrial 
supremacy,  and  as  to  the  hopeless  case  of  the  pro- 
tectionist countries,  which  were  characteristic  for  all 
our  Free  Traders,  seem  somewhat  out  of  place  in  the 
light  of  subsequent  events. 

We  have  now  heard  the  voice  of  the  English  and 
of  the  German  prophet  of  seventy  years  ago.  Since 
that  time  Germany  has  had  more  than  half  a  century 
of  almost  uninterrupted  Protection,  and  Great  Britain 
has  had  more  than  half  a  century  of  almost  uninter- 
rupted Free  Trade.  Germany,  which  was  then  a 
country  without  experience  in  industry,  finance,  com- 
merce, and  shipping,  without  capital,  without  colonies, 
without  good  coal,  with  only  one  good  harbour,  a 
country  weighed  down  by  militarism,  convulsed  by 
three  great  wars  and  a  revolution,  and,  according  to 
Free  Trade  doctrines,  kept  back  by  Protection,  has 
nevertheless  become  so  wealthy  and  powerful  that  she 
competes  with  us  in  all  foreign  markets  and  even  in 
our  home  market,  that  she  has  some  of  the  swiftest 
ships  on  the  ocean,  that  she  is  paramount  in  some  of 
the  most  important  industries,  and  that  she  can  even 
afford  to  emulate  Great  Britain's  fleet  after  having 
created  for  herself  the  strongest  army  in  the  world. 

She  has  been  able  to  introduce  an  immense  scheme 
of  workmen's  insurance  against  sickness,  accident 
and  old  age,  under  which  her  workmen  have  received 
£384,000,000  between  1885  and  1909,  a  scheme  which, 
we  are  told,  Great  Britain  cannot  afford ;  and  she 
is  calmly  contemplating  and  preparing  herself  for  a 
tariff  war  against  this  country  and  the  United  States, 
while  our  free  traders,  who  still  speak  of  the  economic 
paramountcy  of  this  country,  confess  that  they 
tremble  at  the  thought  that  a  change  in  our  fiscal 


652  MODERN    GERMANY 

policy  might  lead  to  friction  with  other  countries. 
Our  free  traders  who  formerly  so  loudly  spoke  of  the 
irresistible  commercial  and  industrial  power  of  Great 
Britain,  have  become  humble  indeed,  and  they  tell  us 
now  that  a  slight  tax  on  corn  would  create  wide- 
spread misery  and  starvation  in  this  country,  while 
the  German  masses  are  able  to  stand  a  high  duty 
not  only  on  bread  stuffs,  but  on  all  articles  of  food 
without  exception.  Truly  the  relative  position  of 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  has  changed  during  the 
last  half-century ! 

Germany's  progress  under  Protection  has  been 
steady,  continuous,  and  rapid.  Between  1850  and 
1900  Germany's  production  of  iron  has  risen  sixty- 
fold,  her  consumption  of  cotton  twenty-fold,  and  her 
savings  banks  deposits  sixty-fold.  Her  population 
has  about  four  times  the  amount  of  savings  in  the 
savings  banks  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  British 
savings  banks.  Sixty  years  ago  the  average  wages 
of  British  workmen  were,  according  to  List,  i8s.  a 
week,  or  four  times  as  high  as  the  average  wages 
of  the  German  workmen.  Now  German  wages  and 
British  wages  are  equally  high  in  many  instances, 
and  German  wages  have  risen  fourfold  in  many 
trades.  Considering  that  living  is  much  cheaper  in 
Germany  than  here,  the  German  workman  is  much 
better  off  than  the  British  workman.  From  a  poor 
debtor  country,  Germany  has  become  a  rich  creditor 
country.  Formerly  she  had  to  borrow  money  in 
foreign  countries  and  on  onerous  terms  ;  in  1897-8 
German  capital  invested  abroad  was  officially  esti- 
mated at  about  £1,000,000,000,  giving  an  average 
yearly  yield  of  about  £60,000,000.  Such  progress 
is  more  than  rapid,  it  is  marvellous  for  a  naturally 
poor  country ;  and  when  we  compare  that  rapid 


THE    FISCAL   POLICY    OF   GERMANY     653 

progress  with  Great  Britain's  vaunted  progress  under 
the  reign  of  Free  Trade  the  latter  would  perhaps 
be  more  correctly  described  as  stagnation,  if  not  as 
retrogression. 

In  view  of  Germany's  triumphant  economic  pro- 
gress, the  economic  policy  and  the  economic  views  of 
Germany  should  be  of  the  greatest  interest  to  the 
British  statesman  and  the  British  public. 

Free  Trade  has  never  had  much  influence  in  Ger- 
many, and  that  is  only  natural,  for  Free  Trade  has 
never  flourished  in  a  struggling  country.  Free  Trade 
is  an  excellent  policy  for  industries  of  irresistible 
strength.  When  the  producer  feels  assured  that  he 
can  always  easily  sell  his  produce,  he  can  afford  to 
devote  his  whole  attention  to  the  interests  of  the 
consumer.  Therefore  it  comes  that  those  parts 
which  are  so  greatly  favoured  by  nature  that  they 
feel  assured  of  a  free  market  for  their  produce  are 
always  in  favour  of  Free  Trade,  while  struggling  in- 
dustrial parts  are  always  in  favour  of  Protection. 
In  France  the  Gironde,  with  its  matchless  wines,  is  in 
favour  of  Free  Trade,  and  the  great  Free  Trader  Bastiat 
hailed  from  that  district.  In  the  United  States  the 
cotton  belt  and  the  wheat  districts  are  for  Free  Trade, 
while  the  industrial  parts  are  for  Protection.  In 
Germany,  where  neither  nature  nor  art  had  given 
to  any  industry  an  overwhelming  power,  the  idea  of 
Free  Trade  has  never  taken  hold  of  the  country  or 
of  any  part  of  it.  Jhering,  the  greatest  German 
jurist  of  his  time,  expressed  very  happily  the  ideas 
of  the  leading  circles  in  Germany  on  Free  Trade  when 
he  wittily  said  :  "  It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  the 
wolves  demand  freedom  of  action  for  themselves, 
but  if  the  sheep  raise  the  same  demand  it  only  proves 
that  they  are  sheep."  The  demand  for  Free  Trade 


654  MODERN    GERMANY 

arose  in  Great  Britain  from  the  cotton  industry,  and 
List  was  not  slow  in  pointing  out  the  real  cause  of 
that  demand.  In  his  weekly  paper,  the  Zollvereins- 
blatt,  he  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  England  was 
then  practically  the  only  cotton  manufacturer  in  the 
world,  that  the  British  cotton  industry  was  by  far 
the  most  powerful  exporting  industry  in  the  world, 
and  that  the  demand  of  the  British  cotton  manu- 
facturers for  Free  Trade  was  as  natural  as  it  was  for 
the  other  countries  to  resist  that  demand. 

A  certain  number  of  Free  Traders  existed  in  Ger- 
many, such  as  Prince-Smith,  Wiss,  Ascher,  Michaelis, 
Wirth,  Hiibner,  Soetbeer,  Braun,  Bamberger,  Bohmert, 
Emminghaus,  Lammers,  Meyer,  Eras,  Wolff,  and 
others.  These  men  were  mostly  professors,  journalists, 
and  authors,  and  were  therefore  never  considered  in 
their  country  as  the  spokesmen  of  the  productive 
industries.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  chief 
representative  of  Free  Trade  and  the  man  who  intro- 
duced Free  Trade  into  Germany  was  Prince-Smith,  an 
Englishman,  and  by  profession  an  author.  In  mer- 
chant and  banking  circles,  especially  in  Hamburg, 
Free  Trade  found  naturally  more  support,  for  the 
purely  distributive  business  of  the  merchant  and  the 
banker  is  greatly  hampered  by  irksome  and  often 
vexatious  customs  regulations.  Besides  it  is  im- 
material to  merchants  and  bankers  whether  they 
trade  in  foreign  goods  and  bills  or  in  domestic  ones, 
and  unless  patriotism  is  stronger  than  business  instinct 
these  two  classes  always  incline  to  Free  Trade.  In 
consideration  of  these  circumstances  their  pleadings 
were  ignored,  and  the  German  Government  made  up 
its  mind  to  look  chiefly  after  the  interests  of  the 
productive  industries,  which  were  considered  to  be 
the  only  basis  of  a  nation's  wealth. 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY     655 

Bismarck,  when  referring  in  the  Reichstag  to 
the  German  Free  Traders,  significantly  said :  "  They 
do  not  sow,  neither  do  they  spin — nevertheless  they 
are  clothed  and  fed  "  ;  and  he  delighted  in  describing 
them  as  people  who  pore  all  day  long  in  their  study 
over  books  and  papers,  and  who  are  perfectly  un- 
acquainted with  practical  life.  His  practical  mind 
observed  that  the  men  who  in  later  years  directed 
the  commercial  policy  of  Great  Britain  were  clergy- 
men, like  Adam  Smith,  Malthus,  and  the  elder  Mill, 
that  Ricardo  was  a  stockbroker,  that  Cobden  went 
bankrupt,  that  Bright  was  a  cotton  manufacturer, 
and  therefore  personally  interested  in  the  establish- 
ment of  Free  Trade,  and  that  Villiers  was  a  lawyer. 
In  private  conversation  his  derision  of  these  men 
knew  no  bounds.  Nevertheless  his  standing  instruc- 
tions were  that  his  unflattering  remarks  on  these 
men  and  on  "  Professor  "  Gladstone  should  not  get 
into  the  papers. 

According  to  Bismarck's  opinion  Free  Trade  in 
England  was  a  most  excellent  thing — for  Germany— 
and  he  did  not  like  to  see  that  happy  state  of  affairs 
altered.  Therefore  he  wished  neither  to  see  the  Free 
Traders  of  Great  Britain,  whose  rule  was  such  a  bless- 
ing to  his  country,  attacked  by  the  German  press  nor 
Great  Britain's  belief  in  the  panacea  of  Free  Trade 
shaken.  Nevertheless  when  the  German  Free  Traders 
became  too  loud  in  their  praise  of  British  Free  Trade, 
of  which  they  had  no  practical  knowledge,  he  had  a 
pamphlet  written  on  the  Cobden  Club  by  Lothar 
Bucher,  his  confidential  assistant,  in  which  he  de- 
clared, "  The  Manchester  Free  Trade  agitation  is  the 
most  colossal  and  the  most  audacious  campaign  of 
political  and  economic  deception  which  the  world 
has  ever  seen." 


656  MODERN    GERMANY 

While  some  of  the  minor  political  economists  of 
Germany  were  Free  Traders,  Wilhelm  Roscher,  Ger- 
many's greatest  political  economist,  considered  Free 
Trade  as  an  impracticable  and  unattainable  ideal.  He 
said  with  regard  to  Free  Trade  : — 

"  When  the  feeling  that  all  mankind  constitutes  one  family 
has  abolished  all  political  boundaries,  and  when  universal 
righteousness  and  love  have  killed  all  national  ambitions 
and  jealousies,  differences  between  nations  will  become  of 
rare  occurrence.  However,  arguments  presupposing  such  a 
state  of  affairs  are  not  admissible  before  it  has  been  clearly 
proved  that  such  ideal  conditions  exist.  It  is  so  improbable 
that  such  an  ideal  state  will  ever  be  created,  and  universal 
'  philanthropy '  is  something  so  suspicious,  the  people  are 
so  unable  to  develop  except  when  they  constitute  a  nation, 
that  I  should  look  at  the  disappearance  of  national  jealousies 
with  concern.  Nothing  contributed  more  to  the  subjection 
of  Greece  by  Macedon  and  Rome  than  the  cosmopolitanism 
of  Greek  philosophers." 

Professor  von  Treitschke,  the  eminent  historian, 
condemned  Free  Trade  from  the  historian's  point  of 
view.  He  wrote  in  his  "  Politik  "  : — 

"  We  have  found  it  to  be  an  erroneous  idea  that  Protection 
is  only  necessary  for  young  industries.  Old  industries,  too, 
require  protection  against  foreign  competition.  In  this 
respect  ancient  Italy  teaches  us  a  terrible  lesson.  If  pro- 
tective tariffs  against  Asiatic  and  African  bread  stuffs  had 
been  introduced  in  time,  the  old  Italian  peasantry  would  have 
been  preserved  and  the  social  conditions  of  Italy  would  have 
remained  healthy.  But  Roman  traders  could  import  cheap 
grain  from  Africa  without  hindrance,  the  rural  industries 
decayed,  the  rural  population  disappeared,  and  the  Campagna, 
which  surrounds  the  capital,  became  a  vast  desert." 

Professor  Mommsen  expresses  the  same  view  in 
his  "  Romische  Geschichte." 

One  of  the  younger  political  economists,  Mr. 
Victor  Leo,  a  rising  man  who  has  represented  the 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY    657 

German  Government  on  more  than  one  occasion,  says 
in  "  The  Tendencies  of  the  World's  Commerce  "  : — 

"  Protective  tariffs  must  continue,  and  a  moderate  increase 
of  them  cannot  be  considered  as  a  misfortune.  In  practice  it 
is  not  possible  simply  to  drop  entire  industries  because  similar 
industries  can  produce  more  cheaply  somewhere  else.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  the  world  economist  it  is  correct  to  insist 
on  a  division  of  labour  which  gives  to  every  nation  those 
industries  for  which  it  is  most  adapted  ;  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  national  economist  the  disadvantages  resulting 
from  such  a  policy  would  be  greater  than  the  advantage  to 
the  consumer  of  being  able  to  buy  the  article  in  question 
at  a  cheaper  price." 

The  belief  that  Free  Trade  presupposes  a  univer- 
sal brotherhood  among  the  nations,  and  is  therefore 
impracticable,  is  general  in  Germany.  Therefore  it 
comes  that  we  read  in  the  article  "  Free  Trade  "  in 
"  Brockhaus's  Encyclopedia,"  which  faithfully  reflects 
the  mind  of  the  nation  : — 

"  As  long  as  mankind  is  divided  into  autonomous  States 
possessing  individual  institutions,  no  State  must  expose  itself 
to  the  danger,  which  is  not  only  an  economic  but  also  a 
political  and  social  danger,  that  home  production  should  lose 
its  independence  by  over-powerful  foreign  competition.  .  .  . 
A  weaker  State,  if  it  wishes  to  preserve  an  independent 
existence,  is  absolutely  justified  in  safeguarding  its  imperfect 
means  of  production  against  foreign  competition  by  Pro- 
tection." 

In  spite  of  the  almost  universal  opposition  to  Free 
Trade  we  find  that  Protection  has  not  been  elevated 
to  a  dogma  in  Germany,  as  Free  Trade  has  been  in  this 
country.  Protection  is  considered  merely  as  a  policy 
in  Germany,  which  is  well  adapted  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  present  time,  but  which,  like  every 
policy,  is  subject  to  revision  and  reconsideration 
in  altered  circumstances.  Professor  Schmoller,  the 

2  T 


658  MODERN    GERMANY 

distinguished    lecturer    at     the     Berlin    University, 
says  : — 

"  Protection  and  Free  Trade  are  for  me  not  principles,  but 
remedies  for  the  political  and  economic  organism  which  are 
prescribed  according  to  the  state  of  the  nation.  A  doctor 
who  would  say  that  he  prescribed  on  principle  to  every  patient 
restrinqentia  or  laxantia  would  be  considered  insane.  How- 
ever, that  is  the  idea  both  of  the  extreme  Free  Trader  and  of 
the  extreme  Protectionist." 

Professor  Biermer  wrote,  using  a  similar  meta- 
phor : — 

"  Protection  and  Free  Trade,  rightly  considered,  are  not 
questions  of  principle,  but  only  remedies  of  political  and 
economic  therapeutics  which,  according  to  the  state  of  the 
patient,  have  to  be  prescribed  sometimes  in  big  and  some- 
times in  small  doses." 

Professor  Roscher  believed  strongly  in  Protection 
and  in  customs  unions.  He  wrote  : — 

"  The  greater  the  extent  of  a  territory  protected  by  tariffs, 
the  sooner  will  active  competition  spring  up  within  its  frontiers. 
Foreign  markets  are  always  uncertain.  Hence  all  customs 
unions  between  related  States  are  to  be  recommended,  not 
only  as  financially,  but  also  as  economically  advantageous." 

The  uncertainty  of  foreign  markets  and  the  danger 
to  a  nation  which  has  become  dependent  for  its  very 
existence  on  foreign  markets  and  on  foreign  good- 
will have  become  a  matter  of  the  greatest  concern  to 
the  statesmen  and  political  economists  of  Germany. 
Therefore  we  find  in  that  country  a  feverish  anxiety 
in  political  circles  to  acquire  colonial  possessions  and 
to  found  a  Central  European  Customs  Union,  while 
the  political  economists  loudly  warn  the  country 
against  a  state  of  affairs  in  which  Germany  may 
become  economically  dependent  on  foreign  nations 
and  in  which  the  prosperity  and  the  very  life  of  the 


THE   FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY    659 

country  may  be  made  the  sport  of  its  enemies.  Pro- 
fessor Oldenberg,  comparing  economic  Germany  to  a 
huge  building,  said  : — 

"  When  our  home  industries  work  for  exportation  and  live 
on  foreign  countries  by  exchanging  their  produce  for  foreign 
food,  the  huge  industrial  structure  of  Germany  branches 
sideways  into  the  air  and  is  made  to  rest  on  pillars  of  trade 
which  are  erected  on  foreign  ground.  But  those  pillars, 
which  support  our  very  existence,  will  remain  standing 
only  for  so  long  as  it  pleases  the  owner  of  the  ground.  Some 
day,  when  he  wishes  to  use  his  own  land,  he  cuts  off  the 
pillars  of  our  existence  from  under  us  and  thus  breaks  down 
the  building  which  we  have  reared  on  them." 

Another    economist,    Mr.    Paul    Voigt,    shares    the 
misgivings  of  Professor  Oldenberg.     He  writes  : — 

"  The  loss  of  our  export  trade  would  bring  starvation  to 
the  masses  of  German  workers,  and  compel  them  to  emigrate 
and  to  beg  before  the  doors  of  foreign  nations  for  work  and 
for  food.  The  collapse  of  our  export  trade  would  be  the 
most  terrible  catastrophe  in  German  history  and  would  rank 
with  the  Thirty  Years'  War  as  a  calamity,  It  would  wipe 
out  the  German  nation  from  the  great  nations  of  the  world 
and  might  end  its  political  existence." 

The  latter  views  have  been  expressed  but  a  few 
years  ago. 

The  cotton  famine  in  Lancashire,  the  constantly 
growing  dependence  of  Great  Britain  on  foreign  food 
and  raw  material,  the  numerous  "  corners  "  in  grain 
and  cotton  under  which  our  country  has  suffered  so 
much  owing  to  the  conspiracies  of  foreign  monopolists, 
and  the  certainty  that  the  other  nations  would  corner 
our  supplies  at  the  outbreak  of  a  great  war  in  which 
we  might  be  engaged,  and  that  the  British  masses 
would  then  be  starving,  have  made  a  deep  and  lasting 
impression  in  Germany.  Therefore  Germany  wishes 
to  act  with  foresight,  and  tries  to  take  her  precautions 
in  time. 


66o  MODERN    GERMANY 

Before  1879  there  was  a  period  of  moderate  Free 
Trade  in  Germany,  and  German  industries  were  acutely 
suffering  for  years.  At  last  Bismarck  intervened,  and 
inaugurated  in  that  year  a  strongly  protective  policy, 
and  since  then  Germany's  prosperity  has  grown  by 
leaps  and  bounds.  Up  to  the  early  eighties  Germany 
was  only  known  as  the  provider  of  inferior  goods, 
which  were  usually  clumsy  imitations  of  English  goods. 
The  "  Made  in  Germany  "  stamp  was  enforced  largely, 
in  order  to  check  that  abuse.  But  since  that  time 
Germany  has  conquered  the  markets  of  the  world 
with  products  of  the  highest  excellence,  and  every 
English  newspaper-reader  has  become  familiarised  with 
German  liners,  Krupp  armour,  Siemens  steel,  Mauser 
rifles,  Zeiss  field-glasses,  and  German  electrical  and 
chemical  products  of  the  highest  class,  which  have 
supplanted  British  products. 

There  have  always  been  many  Free  Traders  in  the 
German  Reichstag,  as  that  assembly  is  largely  com- 
posed of  professional  men  and  of  men  belonging  to 
the  leisured  class  who  are  consumers,  not  producers, 
who  can  easily  understand  the  "  consumers'  argu- 
ment," but  who  are  out  of  touch  with  the  producers 
of  their  country.  Consequently,  Bismarck's  proposal 
for  Protection  met  with  considerable  opposition  from 
the  parliamentarians  and  from  the  bankers  and  mer- 
chants. Agriculture  and  the  manufacturing  industries 
enthusiastically  supported  him.  It  must  be  interest- 
ing for  Englishmen  of  all  classes  to  follow  Bismarck's 
arguments  in  favour  of  Protection.  In  his  speech  of 
the  2nd  of  May  1879,  in  which  he  introduced  his 
protective  policy,  he  said  : — 

"  I  do  not  mean  to  discuss  Protection  and  Free  Trade  in 
the  abstract.  .  .  .  We  have  opened  wide  the  doors  of  our 
State  to  the  imports  of  foreign  countries,  and  we  have  become 


THE   FISCAL    POLICY    OF   GERMANY    661 

the  dumping-ground  for  the  over-production  of  all  those 
countries.  Germany  being  swamped  by  the  surplus  pro- 
duction of  foreign  nations,  prices  have  been  depressed,  and 
the  development  of  all  our  industries  and  our  entire  economic 
position  has  suffered  in  consequence.  If  the  danger  of 
Protection  were  as  great  as  we  are  told  by  enthusiastic  free 
traders,  France  would  have  been  impoverished  long  ago, 
for  she  has  had  Protection  since  the  time  of  Colbert,  and  she 
should  have  been  ruined  long  ago,  owing  to  the  theories  which 
have  guided  her  economic  policy. 

"  After  my  opinion,  we  are  slowly  bleeding  to  death  owing 
to  insufficient  Protection.  This  process  has  been  arrested 
for  a  time  by  the  five  milliards  which  we  have  received  from 
France  after  the  war  ;  otherwise  we  should  have  been  com- 
pelled already  five  years  ago  to  take  those  steps  which  we 
are  taking  to-day. 

"  We  demand  a  moderate  Protection  for  German  labour. 
Let  us  close  our  doors  and  erect  some  barriers  in  order  to 
reserve  to  German  industries  at  least  the  home  market,  in 
which  German  good  nature  is  at  present  being  exploited 
by  the  foreigner.  The  problem  of  a  large  export  trade  is 
always  an  extremely  delicate  one.  No  more  new  countries 
will  be  discovered  ;  the  world  has  been  circumnavigated, 
and  we  can  no  longer  find  abroad  new  purchasers  of  im- 
portance to  whom  we  can  send  our  goods. 

"  In  questions  such  as  these  I  view  scientific  theories  with 
the  same  doubt  with  which  I  regard  the  theories  applied 
to  other  organic  formations.  Medical  science,  as  contrasted 
with  anatomy,  has  made  little  progress  with  regard  to  those 
parts  which  the  eye  cannot  reach,  and  to-day  the  riddle 
of  organic  changes  in  the  human  body  is  as  great  as  it  was 
formerly.  With  regard  to  the  organism  of  the  State,  it 
is  the  same  thing.  The  dicta  of  abstract  science  do  not 
influence  me  in  the  slightest.  I  base  my  opinion  on  the 
practical  experience  of  the  time  in  which  we  are  living.  I 
see  that  those  countries  which  possess  Protection  are  prosper- 
ing, and  that  those  countries  which  possess  Free  Trade  are 
decaying.  Mighty  England,  that  powerful  athlete,  stepped 
out  into  the  open  market  after  she  had  strengthened  her 
sinews,  and  said,  Who  will  fight  me  ?  I  am  prepared  to 
meet  everybody.  But  England  herself  is  slowly  returning 
to  Protection,  and  in  some  years  she  will  take  it  up  in  order 
to  save  for  herself  at  least  the  home  market." 


662  MODERN    GERMANY 

On  the  I4th  of  June  1882,  Bismarck  made  again 
an  important  speech  on  Protection  and  Free  Trade  and 
said  : — 

"  I  believe  the  whole  theory  of  Free  Trade  to  be  wrong.  .  .  . 
England  has  abolished  Protection  after  she  had  benefited 
by  it  to  the  fullest  extent.  That  country  used  to  have  the 
strongest  protective  tariffs  until  it  had  become  so  powerful 
under  their  protection  that  it  could  step  out  of  those  barriers 
like  a  gigantic  athlete  and  challenge  the  world.  Free  Trade 
is  the  weapon  of  the  strongest  nation,  and  England  has  become 
the  strongest  nation  owing  to  her  capital,  her  iron,  her  coal, 
and  her  harbours,  and  owing  to  her  favourable  geographical 
position.  Nevertheless  she  protected  herself  against  foreign 
competition  with  exorbitant  protective  tariffs  until  her  indus- 
tries have  become  so  powerful." 

It  is  very  interesting  to  observe  that  Prince  Bis- 
marck predicted  already  in  1882  that  Great  Britain 
would  have  to  go  back  to  Protection,  "  in  order  to 
secure  for  herself  at  least  the  home  market,"  and  that 
the  demands  for  Protection  which  were  advanced 
by  List  in  1840,  and  by  Bismarck  in  1879,  were  based 
on  the  same  arguments  as  those  on  which  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain based  his  demand  for  the  reconsideration  of 
our  fiscal  policy.  German  good  nature  was  shut 
out  of  foreign  markets  by  the  arbitrary  tariffs  of 
foreign  nations,  which  besides  exploited,  swamped, 
and  spoiled  her  home  market  with  their  surplus 
production.  It  was  necessary  that  she  at  least 
should  reserve  the  home  market  for  herself  and 
create  for  herself  a  weapon  which  would  make  it 
possible  for  her  to  conclude  advantageous  commercial 
treaties. 

The  usual  objections  to  Protection  were  naturally 
raised  by  German  Free  Traders  when  Bismarck  re- 
introduced  Protection,  and  it  was  predicted  in  non- 
industrial  circles  that  Protection  would  mean  disaster 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY    663 

to  German  industries  and  especially  to  the  German 
export  trade.  The  industrial  classes,  which  clamoured 
for  Protection,  were  loftily  declared  to  be  so  short- 
sighted as  to  favour  a  suicidal  policy.  Protection 
would  benefit  only  a  few  capitalists  at  the  cost  of 
the  whole  people,  and  it  would  ruin  Germany  by 
customs  wars  with  other  nations.  These  objections 
were  very  effectively  dealt  with  by  the  German  poli- 
tical economists  who  favoured  Protection.  Professor 
Schmoller,  for  instance,  said  in  1879,  in  reply  to  the 
objection  that  commerce  and  exportation  would  suffer 
by  a  protective  tariff  :— 

"  Exports  will  certainly  suffer  in  one  or  the  other  branch, 
but  that  is  a  point  of  minor  consideration.  At  present  the 
conditions  of  our  export  business  are  so  bad  that  they  can 
hardly  become  worse.  Our  export  trade  can  only  become 
better  if  we  have  commercial  treaties  and  an  autonomous 
tariff." 

Arguments  like  that  of  Professor  Schmoller  caused 
the  Society  for  Social  Policy  in  Berlin  to  adopt  the 
following  resolution  in  favour  of  Protection  : — 

"  Considering  that  our  endeavours  to  conclude  commercial 
treaties,  which  will  open  new  markets  to  German  industries, 
must  prove  unsuccessful  in  view  of  the  present  position  of 
the  world,  and 

"  Considering  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  increase  some 
important  duties  in  order  to  place  the  finances  of  the  Empire 
on  a  firm  basis, 

"The  Society  for  Social  Policy  declares  itself  in  favour 
of  a  moderate  fiscal  reform  in  a  commercio-political  and 
protectionist  direction  by  a  tariff  which  is  especially  directed 
against  those  countries  which  are  particularly  harmful  to 
German  production." 

This  resolution  might  have  come  from  the  mouth  of 
Mr.  Chamberlain. 

The    protective    duties    which,    according    to    the 


664  MODERN    GERMANY 

German  Free  Traders,  were  to  prove  so  ruinous  to 
Germany  have,  as  yet,  not  crushed  the  German  in- 
dustries. Though  the  receipts  from  customs  duties 
have  more  than  sextupled  since  1879,  having  risen  from 
114,716,000  marks  in  1879  to  no  less  than  715,696,000 
marks  in  1910,  the  German  industries  have  not  only 
not  been  crushed  by  the  tariff,  but  are  most  pros- 
perous. This  is  particularly  noticeable  in  Saxony,  the 
Lancashire  of  Germany,  the  income  of  that  country 
having  risen  from  959,222,000  marks  in  1879  to 
1,666,521,000  marks  in  1894,  and  to  2,797,643,500 
marks  in  1908.  Therefore  it  appears  that  the  in- 
come of  the  German  Lancashire  has  considerably 
more  than  trebled  since  Protection  was  reintro- 
duced  into  Germany.  It  is  also  significant  that 
Saxony,  with  4,500,000  inhabitants,  has  more  than 
£85,000,000  deposited  in  its  savings  bank — as  much 
as  have  18,000,000  Englishmen.  Evidently  Free 
Trade  has  not  brought  ruin  to  the  Lancashire  of 
Germany. 

The  beneficial  effect  of  the  protective  tariff  on 
German  industries  was  immediate.  On  the  i6th  of 
March  1881,  Mr.  von  Kardorff  stated  hi  the  German 
Diet  that  85,901  men  were  occupied  in  the  German 
iron  and  steel  industries  in  January  1879,  and  98,224 
men  in  January  1881.  They  received  in  wages 
5,288,539  marks  in  1879,  against  6,459,694  marks  in 
January  1881,  which  is  equal  to  an  increase  of  50.28 
marks  per  annum  for  every  worker.  Mr.  Loewe, 
another  member  of  the  Diet,  reported  on  the  same 
date  that  in  the  important  districts  of  Bochum  and 
Dortmund  wages  had  risen  from  five  to  fifteen  per 
cent.,  but  not  only  had  wages  risen  but  the  men 
who  some  years  ago  had  been  only  partly  occupied 
were  now  fully  occupied.  Some  had  formerly  been 


THE    FISCAL   POLICY    OF   GERMANY     665 

working  only  three  or  four  days  a  week.  Other  deputies 
gave  similar  reports.  This  rising  tendency  of  wages 
has  almost  uninterruptedly  continued  from  1879,  when 
Bismarck's  protective  tariff  was  inaugurated,  down  to 
the  present  time.  The  average  daily  wages  at  Krupp's, 
for  instance,  have  risen  from  33.  in  1879  to  53.  4|d. 
in  1907. 

Lately  the  German  Government  has  again  in- 
creased its  protective  duties.  Again  we  heard  the 
non-industrial  croakers  predicting  the  ruin  of  the 
German  industries,  and  again  we  saw  the  manufac- 
turers supporting  Protection.  The  German  Govern- 
ment has  been  putting  up  its  duties  not  because  the 
present  Protection  has  proved  disappointing.  On  the 
contrary,  it  has  explicitly  enumerated  the  great 
benefits  which  Protection  has  conferred  upon  Germany. 
In  the  preamble  to  the  last  Tariff  Bill,  Government 
summed  up  the  results  of  the  protective  policy  hitherto 
pursued.  It  said  ; — 

"  Strengthened  by  Protection  our  industries  have  been 
able  to  increase  considerably  their  production,  and  have 
thereby  afforded  fuller  employment  and  rising  wages  to 
the  working  classes.  With  the  larger  turnover  the  traffic 
on  our  railways,  rivers,  and  canals  has  grown,  and  our  mer- 
chant marine  has  experienced  a  considerable  and  constantly 
increasing  expansion,  and  its  freight  services  for  foreign 
countries  have  been  a  source  of  great  profit  to  Germany.  At 
the  same  time  the  participation  of  German  capital  in  foreign 
enterprises  has  increased.  Emigration  has  very  substantially 
diminished.  The  effect  of  the  growing  wealth  of  the  nation 
may  be  seen  by  the  visible  progress  in  the  conditions  and  in 
the  life  of  the  broad  masses  of  the  people,  especially  of  the 
working  men.  The  improvement  in  the  standard  of  life 
may  be  seen  in  the  larger  proportion  of  taxpayers  who  pay 
taxes  on  intermediate  incomes  ;  from  the  improved  yield 
of  the  income  tax  ;  from  the  growth  of  savings  banks  deposits  ; 
from  the  expansion  of  life  insurances,  and  from  the  rising 
consumption  of  the  more  expensive  articles  of  food.  This 


666  MODERN    GERMANY 

improvement  is  especially  striking,  as  a  considerably  increased 
population  has  had  to  be  provided  for,  the  inhabitants  having 
increased  from  45,000,000  in  1880  to  56,000,000  in  1900." 

The  vast  increase  in  the  wealth  of  Germany  has 
chiefly  been  derived  from  the  home  market,  which  is 
no  longer  swamped  and  depressed  by  foreign  surplus 
products,  and  which  has  become  extremely  stable  and 
profitable.  The  semi-official  year-book  "  Nauticus  " 
says  in  1900,  in  an  article  on  the  foundations  of  the 
industrial  prosperity  in  Germany  ; — 

"  To  sum  up :  during  the  last  two  decades  the  industrial 
production  of  Germany  has  experienced  an  extraordinary 
increase.  That  increase  has  been  caused  less  by  the  greater 
amount  of  our  exports  than  by  the  growing  importance  of 
the  home  markets — that  is  to  say,  by  the  growing  wealth 
of  the  German  people." 

How  rapidly  the  wealth  of  Germany  has  grown  and 
how  wealthy  Germany  has  become  is  so  well  known 
that  it  requires  no  further  proof. 

People  in  this  country  who  are  insufficiently 
acquainted  with  German  affairs  may  often  be  heard 
speaking  somewhat  vaguely  of  the  great  evils  of  Pro- 
tection in  Germany,  and  they  will  repeat,  what  they 
have  so  often  read  in  text-books  on  political  economy, 
that  those  iniquitous  trusts  only  flourish  under  the 
shelter  of  Protection.  Now  it  is  quite  true  that  a  large 
number  of  very  powerful  trusts  exist  in  Germany, 
which  are  called  "  Kartelle "  in  that  country,  but 
nobody  intimately  acquainted  with  Germany  will  be 
prepared  to  condemn  indiscriminately  those  200  large 
combinations,  the  majority  of  which  are  distinctly 
beneficial  and  are  kept  under  proper  control,  because 
some  of  them  may  have  abused  their  power.  The 
doctrine  that  trusts  flourish  only  under  Protection, 


THE    FISCAL    POLICY    OF    GERMANY    667 

which  doctrine  has  been  invented  by  Free  Traders,  is 
considered  a  fallacy  in  Germany,  and  it  is  pointed 
out  that  the  most  powerful  and  the  most  harmful 
trusts  in  the  world  exist  and  flourish  in  the  paradise 
of  Free  Trade  and  of  free  competition,  in  Great  Britain. 
The  traffic  arrangements  between  British  railways  and 
the  "  Shipping  Conferences,"  which  have  abolished 
nearly  all  competition,  are  considered  in  Germany  as 
gigantic  trusts,  which  are  trusts  in  everything  but  in 
name,  which  exercise  not  only  a  tyranny  over  the 
people  of  this  country,  but  which  directly  favour 
foreign  nations  at  the  expense  of  Great  Britain  by 
carrying  their  goods  more  cheaply  than  British  goods, 
and  which  have  therefore  been  the  cause  of  ruin  for 
many  British  industries  and  especially  for  British 
agriculture. 

The  German  Government  observes  the  develop- 
ment of  huge  trusts  in  Germany  not  only  with  a 
benevolent  interest,  but  lends  them  its  active  assist- 
ance and  encourages  their  formation,  from  which  it 
may  be  seen  that  their  activity  is  not  considered  an 
evil  by  the  German  Government.  The  German 
Government  adopts  this  attitude  chiefly  because  the 
activity  of  the  German  trusts  outside  Germany  largely 
consists  in  undermining  and  ruining  foreign  industries 
by  swamping  them  with  surplus  products  which  are 
sold  below  cost  price  and  in  thus  ridding  German 
industries  of  dangerous  competitors.  The  way  in 
which  the  German  Sugar  Trust  has  created  a  huge 
industry  in  Germany,  and  has  ruined  and  killed  the 
formerly  so  prosperous  West  Indian  sugar  industry 
by  flooding  England  with  cheap  sugar,  is  the  best 
known  example  of  that  policy.  Many  similar  but 
less  well  known  instances  of  the  activity  of  these 
trusts  might  be  quoted.  Their  oppression  of  the 


668  MODERN    GERMANY 

consumer,  of  which  we  hear  so  often,  seems  chiefly 
to  exist  in  the  imagination  of  British  Free  Trade 
doctrinaires,  for  in  Germany  few  complaints  are  heard 
with  regard  to  these  combinations. 

We  have  now  followed  Germany's  economic  history 
for  the  last  sixty  years,  and  we  have  seen  how  Germany 
has  prospered  and  developed,  how  correct  have  been 
the  economic  views  of  German  political  economists, 
and  how  eminently  successful  her  statesmen  have  been 
in  their  fiscal  policy.  Consequently,  it  would  seem 
interesting  to  hear  what  those  men  think  of  the 
economic  position  of  Great  Britain.  Mr.  Victor  Leo 
wrote  in  "  The  Tendencies  of  the  World's  Commerce  " 
with  regard  to  Great  Britain  : — 

"  The  constantly  growing  excess  of  imports  over  exports* 
which  has  now  risen  to  ^150,000,000  per  annum,  is  difficult 
to  provide  for  even  for  a  creditor  country  like  Great  Britain 
without  entrenching  on  her  capital." 

Mr.  Paul  Voigt  said  in  "  Germany  and  the  World 
Market "  :— 

"  British  exports  have  developed  far  less,  Savourably  than 
German  exports.  British  exportation  has  become  completely 
stagnant  since  the  seventies,  fluctuating  between  ^2 10,000,000 
and  ^250,000,000,  and  being  therefore  now  very  little  larger 
than  German  exports.  In  Great  Britain  the  export  industry 
par  excellence,  the  textile  industry,  is  in  a  particularly  un- 
favourable condition.  The  adverse  balance  of  British  trade 
has  grown  continually  from  less  than  ^50,000,000  in  the  sixties 
to  more  than  £i  50,000,000  at  the  present  time." 

These  two  statements  are  characteristic  for  the 
very  serious  view  which  is  generally  taken  in  Germany 
with  regard  to  our  economic  position,  and  in  the 
best-informed  German  circles  it  is  often  asserted  that 
Great  Britain  has  for  a  long  time  been  living  on 
her  capital.  German  statesmen  and  financiers  find  a 


confirmation  of  this  view  in  the  low  price  of  British  Con- 
sols and  of  all  British  investment  stocks  ;  in  the  fact 
that  Great  Britain  used  to  possess  huge  quantities  of 
Continental  Government  loans  and  other  Continental 
investments,  and  of  American  railway  stocks  and 
bonds,  and  that  she  now  holds  hardly  any  of  them  ; 
that  American  and  Continental  trade  used  to  be 
financed,  and  American  and  Continental  property  be 
mortgaged,  in  London,  and  that  the  trade  of  the 
world  is  no  longer  financed  by  this  country.  From 
these,  and  many  other  symptoms  of  similar  portent, 
German  observers  conclude  that  Great  Britain  has 
paid  for  the  huge  excess  of  her  imports  over  her 
exports  by  realising  a  large  part  of  her  foreign  in- 
vestments in  real  estate,  stock  exchange  securities,  &c., 
that  the  capital  of  Great  Britain  is  constantly  being 
drained  away  by  foreign  countries,  and  that  this 
process  cannot  go  on  indefinitely. 

Bismarck  said  in  1882  :  "  Free  Trade  is  the  weapon 
of  the  strongest."  This  argument  appears  to  be  irre- 
futable by  logic  and  in  the  light  of  history.  Great 
Britain  is  economically  no  longer  the  strongest  among 
the  nations  of  the  world,  but  is,  in  proportion  to  other 
nations,  rapidly  getting  poorer,  and  this  fact  alone 
should  be  of  sufficient  importance  to  make  us  consider 
our  position  and  reconsider  our  fiscal  policy. 


CHAPTER    XXVII 

WHY  AND    HOW   BISMARCK   INTRODUCED   PROTECTION 

THE  following  mostly  confidential  State  Papers  were 
written  or  dictated  by  Prince  Bismarck,  and  illustrate 
clearly  the  genesis  of  the  movement  for  Protection  in 
Germany,  which  has  many  points  of  resemblance  with 
the  present  movement  for  a  reform  of  British  fiscal 
policy.  They  show  why  and  how  Germany  intro- 
duced Protection.  Therefore  they  ought  to  be  of  the 
greatest  interest  and  value  to  British  Tariff  Reformers. 

Memorandum  pro  Memoria,  the  i$th  of  October  1875. 

His  Excellency  Prince  Bismarck  is  of  opinion — 
which  opinion  he  is  inclined  to  express  publicly,  and 
the  criticism  of  which  he  leaves  to  experts — that 
nothing  but  reprisals  against  their  products  will  avail 
against  those  States  which  increase  their  duties  to  the 
harm  of  German  exports .  The  ob j  ections  raised  against 
such  steps  in  the  name  of  political  economy  seem 
untenable  for  reasons  of  policy. 

Extract  from  Despatch  to  Prince  Hohenlohe,  German 
Ambassador  in  Paris,  March  1876. 

We  cannot  disguise  to  ourselves  that,  if  the  exist- 
ing system  of  export  bounties  in  France  (by  means  of 
acquits-d-caution)  should  continue  we  would  be  com- 
pelled to  levy  countervailing  duties  on  French  iron 

670 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED  671 

similar  in  amount  to  the  bounties  given  by  the  French 
Government. 


Letter  to  Minister  of  State  Hoffmann,  the 
2jth  of  October  1876. 

...  I  request  your  Excellency  to  make  proposals 
to  me  how  and  in  which  way  the  Imperial  authorities 
might  be  empowered  to  take  measures  in  order  to 
combat  the  abuse  of  secret  bounties  which  are  given 
by  the  French  Government  to  the  French  industries. 

With  regard  to  this  matter,  we  cannot  remain 
dependent  upon  the  good-will  of  foreign  Governments, 
but  require  absolute  guarantees  which  we  can  only 
find  in  our  own  institutions  and  in  our  own  mea- 
sures ;  for  even  if  we  should  succeed  in  obtaining  by 
diplomatic  negotiations  and  by  the  threat  of  reprisals 
from  the  French  Government  assurances  which  would 
appear  satisfactory  on  paper,  the  French  customs 
authorities  would  nevertheless  in  practice  always  be 
able  to  favour  the  interest  of  French  subjects  at  the 
cost  of  German  trade.  The  administrative  arbitrari- 
ness of  the  customs  officials  in  France,  which  is  con- 
nived at  by  the  highest  authorities  in  Paris,  is  too 
great  to  allow  us  to  rely  upon  the  French  authorities 
for  the  protection  of  German  interests. 

The  honesty  and  the  greater  clumsiness  of  our 
officials,  together  with  the  greater  publicity  under 
which  our  own  administration  has  to  work,  puts  us 
easily  at  a  disadvantage  in  dealing  with  the  astute 
and  disciplined  officials  of  foreign  Governments.  By 
"  disciplined  "  I  mean  the  greater  obedience  of  foreign 
officials  even  to  such  instructions  as  are  not  publicly 
admitted,  and  their  greater  skill  in  twisting  the  sense 
of  commercial  stipulations  in  such  a  way  that  the 


672  MODERN    GERMANY 

advantages  are  all  on  one  side,  tactics  which  we  find 
in  France  not  only  among  the  customs  authorities  but 
also  among  the  transporting  and  forwarding  inter- 
mediaries. 

I  believe,  therefore,  that  we  must  not  conclude  a 
new  commercial  treaty  which  in  any  way  fetters  our 
freedom  of  action  in  the  sphere  of  tariffs. 

Letter  to  Minister  of  State  Hoffmann,  the 
ijth  of  November  1876. 

In  the  draft  bill 1  received  with  your  letter  of  the 
i5th  of  this  month,  Paragraph  I.,  and  especially  Para- 
graph II.,  leave  to  us  the  burden  of  proof  as  to  the 
actual  export  bounties  which  are  granted  by  foreign 
Governments.  It  is  within  our  power  neither  to  de- 
termine the  existence  of  such  bounties  nor  to  adduce 
legally  valid  proof  as  to  their  amount  and  extent. 
The  determination  of  these  bounties  depends  partly 
on  scientific  and  partly  on  technical  arguments,  and 
on  their  applicability  opinions  may  be  divided. 

In  view  of  the  lesser  scrupulousness  with  which 
foreign  Governments  observe  their  treaty  obligations, 
and  in  view  of  the  greater  facility  with  which  the 
customs  apparatus  of  foreign  countries  is  made  sub- 
servient to  the  Government  for  secret  purposes  which 
are  not  avowed,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  we  shall  be 

1  The  chief  provisions  of  this  draft  bill  were  : 

Paragraph  I.  Goods  which  are  imported  into  Germany,  and  which 
receive  an  export  bounty  from  another  country,  are,  when  introduced  into 
Germany,  liable  to  a  countervailing  duty  which  may  be  imposed  by 
Imperial  proclamation. 

Paragraph  II.  The  countervailing  duty  must  not  exceed  the  amount 
of  the  export  bounty. 

Paragraph  III.  Countervailing  duties  can  be  levied  either  upon  the 
products  of  a  certain  country  or  upon  all  goods  arriving  from  that  country, 
without  regard  to  their  country  of  origin. 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED     673 

outwitted  in  all  treaties  which  presuppose  that  the 
bona  fides  of  foreign  officials  is  equal  to  that  of  our  own. 
I  do,  therefore,  not  think  it  advisable  for  us  to 
conclude  commercial  treaties  which  limit  our  freedom 
of  action  with  regard  to  tariffs  for  the  whole  time  for 
which  such  treaties  are  concluded.  Only  in  freedom 
of  action  and  in  our  determination  to  make  use  of 
that  freedom  of  action  to  the  fullest  extent,  shall  we 
find  protection  against  injuries  inflicted  upon  us  which 
we  may  recognise,  but  for  which  we  cannot  adduce 
legally  valid  proof. 

Letter  to  Minister  of  Finance  Camphausen, 
the  i^th  of  February  1877. 

.  .  .  We  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  German 
industries  ought  to  be  effectively  protected  against  the 
injuries  that  are  at  present  being  inflicted  upon  them 
by  the  fiscal  policy  of  foreign  States.  Therefore  it 
should  be  our  aim  to  secure  for  the  exports  of  our 
home  industries  into  foreign  countries  conditions  at 
least  as  favourable  as  are  the  conditions  which  foreign 
countries  enjoy  in  the  German  market.  We  have 
consequently  not  only  to  consider  the  duties  which 
are  levied  on  foreign  frontiers  and  on  our  own,  but 
also  the  export  bounties  which  are  granted  in  various 
countries,  and  which,  I  fear,  are  insufficient  in  the 
case  of  Germany  and  lower  than  those  which  are  given 
by  foreign  countries. 

Confidential  Letter  to  all  the  German  Governments, 
the  2nd  of  July  1878. 

In  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  German  Diet  during 
its  last  session  towards  the  taxation  proposals  recently 

2U 


674  MODERN    GERMANY 

made  by  the  allied  Governments,  I  think  it  desirable 
that  the  allied  Governments  should  in  time  arrive  at 
an  agreement  as  to  the  financial  policy  of  the  future, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  submit  proposals  for  a  compre- 
hensive programme  of  economic  reform  to  the  Diet 
during  its  next  session. 

The  chief  object  of  that  reform  should  be  the 
expansion  of  the  Imperial  revenues,  which  expansion 
has  on  all  sides  been  considered  necessary. 

Consultation  and  agreement  among  the  various 
Governments  is  required  with  regard  to  the  following 
points  : 

(1)  As  to  the  degree  to  which  the  revenues  must 
be  increased. 

(2)  As  to  the  objects  on  which  taxation  should  be 
increased. 

(3)  As  to  the  manner  in  which  that  higher  taxation 
should  be  levied. 

(4)  As  to  the  effect  which  the  settlement  of  these 
three  points  will  have  upon  our  fiscal  policy. 

It  appears  recommendable  that  these  questions 
should  be  discussed  by  way  of  confidential  conversa- 
tion between  the  allied  Governments  before  formal 
legislation  be  entered  upon.  Consequently  I  take  the 
liberty  of  submitting  to  the  allied  Governments  the 
proposal  that,  as  soon  as  possible,  a  conference  of  the 
competent  ministers  should  take  place. 

For  such  a  conference  some  days  in  the  first  half 
of  August  would  appear  to  be  a  suitable  time,  and  a 
town  should  be  selected  for  it  which  is  geographically 
most  convenient  to  all  the  representatives  of  the 
various  States.  Heidelberg  would  perhaps  be  best 
situated  and  would  be  more  suitable  than  Berlin. 

In  order  to  give  the  chief  points  which  will  be 
of  interest  for  the  conference  I  have  the  honour  to 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED      675 

enclose  for  your  confidential  information  several  copies 
of  a  memorial l  in  which  the  questions  mentioned  are 
treated. 

I  take  the  liberty  of  asking  your  Government  to 
let  me  know  as  soon  as  possible  whether  it  would  take 
part  in  such  a  conference,  and  whether  my  proposals 
as  to  time  and  place  are  convenient.  In  case  your 
Government  should  assent  to  my  proposal  I  should 
be  glad  to  be  furnished  with  the  names  of  its  repre- 
sentatives as  soon  as  possible. 

(The  conference  in  Heidelberg  took  place  between 
the  5th  and  8th  of  August  1878,  and  led  to  an  agree- 
ment in  nearly  all  points  with  the  proposals  made  by 
Prussia.) 

Confidential  Circular  to  all  the  Prussian  Ambassadors 
accredited  to  the  various  German  Courts,  the  28th  of 
October  1878. 

I  have  the  honour  to  send  enclosed  a  copy  of  a 
proposal  for  a  revision  of  our  fiscal  policy,  which  pro- 
posal has  been  advanced  by  the  Prussian  Ministry  of 
State.  I  think  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  have 
thereon  the  views  of  the  allied  Governments. 

You  will  therefore  communicate  in  confidence  the 
contents  of  the  enclosure  to  the  Government  to  which 
you  are  accredited,  and  ask  in  my  name  for  an  ex- 
pression of  its  views  on  that  question. 

At  the  same  time  you  will  direct  the  attention  of 
the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited  to  the 
following  :  The  policy  of  fostering  individual  indus- 
tries by  protective  tariff  (for  reasons  apart  from  financial 
considerations)  is  a  policy  which  is  permanently  or 

1  The  text  of  the  memorial  alluded  to  is  not  obtainable,  but  it  was 
probably  identical  with  the  next  document. 


676  MODERN    GERMANY 

temporarily  pursued  by  all  Governments.  The  opposi- 
tion which  that  policy  usually  finds  amongst  those 
producers  who  are  not  protected  is  directed  princi- 
pally against  the  privileges  which  individual  protected 
industries  are  supposed  to  obtain  at  the  cost  of  all 
other  industries. 

To  such  opposition  a  protective  system  will  not  be 
exposed  which  levies  duties  on  all  merchandise  *  which 
passes  our  frontiers  from  abroad  and  which  treats  all 
produce  alike,  subjecting  all  without  exception  to  ad 
valorem  duties. 

Prompted  by  the  justified  pursuit  of  German 
national  interest,  the  whole  of  the  German  production 
would  receive  a  more  favourable  treatment  in  the 
home  market  than  would  be  granted  to  foreign  pro- 
duction. 

According  to  my  opinion,  such  a  system  has  the 
following  advantages  : 

(1)  The  financial  results  of  an   ad  valorem  duty 
would  be  very  considerable. 

(2)  Such  duties  would  not  be  oppressive  in  any 
direction,  as  they  would  affect  all  classes  equally.     As 
every  producer  in  the  Empire  is  at  the  same  time  a 
consumer  of  the  products  of  other  industries,  the  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  caused  by  such  a  tariff 
would  be  balanced  and  would  be  more  equally  distri- 
buted than  if  duties  were  imposed  upon  a  limited 
number  of  particular  products. 

Only  a  small  minority  of  the  population  is  non- 
producing  and  lives  on  a  settled  income,  on  fixed 
salaries,  professional  fees,  &c.  This  fact  increases  to 

1  Prince  Bismarck  amended  this  statement  later  on  by  declaring  that 
foreign  raw  products  which  are  required  for  manufacturing  purposes,  and 
which  cannot  be  produced  in  Germany,  would  either  not  be  taxed  at  all 
or  would  be  taxed  according  to  requirement. 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED    677 

a  considerable  degree  the  difficulties  which  are  in  the 
way  of  the  introduction  of  such  a  tariff.  These  diffi- 
culties are  especially  great/  as  the  majority  of  our 
legislators  in  Parliament,  and  of  our  permanent  offi- 
cials, belong  to  that  minority.  However,  the  justified 
claims  of  our  officials  can  always  be  satisfied  by  in- 
creasing their  salaries  if  prices  should  really  advance 
after  an  increase  in  the  customs  duties  has  taken  place. 
At  all  events  it  does  not  seem  likely  that  a  consider- 
able rise  in  prices  will  occur. 

(3)  The  duties  raised  on  foreign  imports  will  either 
not  be  borne  by  the  home  consumer  at  all  or  such 
duties  will  be  borne  by  him  to  a  small  extent  only. 
These  duties  will  diminish  the  profit  which  the  foreign 
producer  has  hitherto  made  from  us,  and  will  per- 
haps also  affect  the  profit  of  the  middleman. 

By  the  fact  that  foreign  countries  always  show  the 
greatest  concern  if  another  country  desires  to  increase 
its  duties,  it  can  be  seen  that  such  customs  duties  are 
to  a  very  large  extent  borne  by  the  foreign  producer 
and  not  by  the  consumer.  If  the  home  consumer 
should  really  have  to  bear  the  weight  of  increased 
duties,  such  an  increase  would  leave  the  foreign  pro- 
ducer indifferent.  However,  that  is  not  the  case,  for 
the  gain  of  the  foreign  importer  is  diminished  either 
by  the  whole  amount  of  the  duty  or  by  part  of  it. 
Under  a  system  of  protective  tariffs  the  Empire  will, 
therefore,  derive  part  of  its  income  from  foreign 
countries. 

(4)  The  cost  of  the  customs  apparatus  will  not  be 
much  increased,  as  the  customs  arrangements  already 
existing  have  to  be  maintained  in  any  case,  and  they 
will  probably  prove  sufficient  for  dealing  with  the 
additional  goods  subject  to  duties. 

So  far  I  have  not  made  proposals  in  any  direction 


678  MODERN    GERMANY 

with  regard  to  the  considerations  enumerated  above. 
The  purpose  of  this  letter  is  to  ascertain  how  far  it 
is  advisable  for  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to  proceed 
officially,  in  which  way  he  should  proceed,  and  how 
far  such  proposals  would  be  favourably  received. 

You  will,  therefore,  bring  about  a  confidential  ex- 
pression of  views  on  the  part  of  the  Government  to 
which  you  are  accredited  and  notify  to  me  the  result 
of  your  conversation. 

Enclosure  referred  to  in  the  previous  Letter. 

The  financial,  economic,  and  political  conditions 
which  have  determined  the  direction  of  our  fiscal 
policy  have  materially  altered  in  the  course  of  the 
last  years. 

The  financial  position  of  the  Empire  and  of  the 
single  States  requires  an  increase  of  the  revenues. 
During  the  confidential  conversations  which  took  place 
last  summer  in  Heidelberg  with  regard  to  fiscal  reform 
the  conviction  was  unanimously  expressed  that  the 
system  of  indirect  taxation  should  be  further  de- 
veloped. 

Besides  the  present  state  of  the  German  industries 
and  the  tendency  to  increase  the  protection  of  home 
production  against  foreign  competition,  which  has 
become  apparent  in  our  great  neighbour  States  and  in 
America,  have  made  it  necessary  to  inquire  carefully 
whether  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  reserve  the 
German  home  market  also,  to  a  greater  extent  than 
heretofore,  to  the  national  industries.  By  taking 
these  steps,  the  growth  of  our  home  production  would 
be  encouraged,  and  at  the  same  time  material  for 
future  negotiations  would  be  created,  provided  with 
which  we  might  try  later  on  in  which  way  and  how 


far  the  customs  barriers  of  foreign  countries,  which 
at  present  damage  our  exporting  industries,  might 
be  removed  for  the  benefit  of  our  industries  by  new 
commercial  treaties. 

The  results  of  an  inquiry  into  the  position  of  the 
iron,  cotton,  and  woollen  industries  which  is  being 
conducted  will  supply  us  with  useful  material  for 
answering  the  question  whether  an  increase  of  our 
import  duties  or  their  reintroduction  will  be  con- 
ducive to  the  welfare  of  those  industries. 

Preliminary  investigations  have  already  been  made, 
and  papers  will  be  placed  before  a  committee  of  the 
council  which  will  be  appointed  for  the  object  of 
changing  the  customs  tariff  in  such  a  way  that  in  the 
first  place  the  present  disproportion  between  import 
duties  on  manufactured  goods  and  on  raw  produce 
will  disappear,  and  that  in  the  second  place  the  pro- 
tection of  our  various  industries  against  foreign  com- 
petition will  be  increased.  However,  the  introduction 
of  higher  duties  than  those  contemplated  is  in  no  way 
excluded.  .  .  . 

In  order  to  solve  the  questions  alluded  to  as  quickly 
as  possible  and  to  end  the  present  oppressive  un- 
certainty with  regard  to  the  future  course  of  our  fiscal 
policy,  which  weighs  on  all  our  industries,  it  seems 
necessary  to  nominate  a  special  commission  for  utilising 
the  material  which  already  exists  and  which  has  been 
collected  by  the  inquiries  already  made  in  order  to 
prepare  the  revision  of  our  customs  tariff. 

The  duty  of  the  commission  would  be  to  examine 
the  whole  of  the  tariff,  and  it  should  be  composed 
partly  of  officials  of  the  Empire  and  partly  of  officials  of 
the  most  important  individual  States.  The  number  of 
its  members  should  not  be  too  small  in  view  of  the 
scope  of  the  task.  The  working  out  of  questions  of 


680  MODERN    GERMANY 

detail  should  be  left  to  smaller  sub-commissions  which 
could  be  formed  from  the  larger  commission.  It  is 
also  recommendable  to  empower  the  commission  and 
the  sub-commission  to  call  and  examine  experts  or  to 
call  for  written  opinions  and  statements  through  the 
various  authorities. 

(On  the  I2th  of  November  1878,  a  copy  of  this 
document  was  sent  to  the  Federal  Council,  and  on 
the  1 2th  of  December  a  commission  was  appointed 
which  received  Bismarck's  views  and  instructions  by 
his  letter  of  the  i5th  of  December,  which  is  printed 
below.) 

Reply  to  Objections  made  by  German  Governments  with 
regard  to  the  proposed  Alterations  in  the  Tariff, 
end  of  November  1878. 

.  .  .  The  proposal  to  impose  duties  on  our  imports 
may  be  viewed  with  suspicion  by  consumers,  and 
chiefly  by  those  consumers  who  live  on  their  assured 
income  free  from  care.  But  the  means  of  those  people 
also  will  give  out  if  they  do  not  make  up  their  mind 
to  consider  the  position  of  the  producing  part  of  the 
population.  If  the  producing  part  of  the  population 
is  impoverished  the  whole  State  is  impoverished.  .  .  , 
Who  after  all  is  to  carry  the  whole  burden  of  the 
State  ?  The  producer  alone  ?  Consumers  are  all. 

Memorandum  to  Federal  Council,  the  itfh  of 
December  1878. 

...  It  is  not  a  matter  of  chance  that  other  States, 
especially  those  which  politically  and  economically 
have  made  the  greatest  progress,  rely  chiefly  on  cus- 
toms duties  for  their  revenue. 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED    681 

Direct  taxation  which  is  demanded  from  the  indi- 
vidual, and  which,  in  case  of  need,  is  obtained  by 
force,  is  by  its  very  nature  more  oppressive  than  in- 
direct taxation,  which  is  almost  unperceived  by  the 
consumer.  .  .  .  Direct  taxation  weighs  especially 
heavily  upon  the  middle  classes. 

It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  is  not  intended  that  the 
increase  of  indirect  taxation  should  mean  an  increase  in 
the  whole  burden  of  taxation,  which  is  not  determined 
by  the  national  income,  but  by  its  necessary  budgetary 
expenditure.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  produce  larger  revenues  than  are  absolutely 
necessary,  but  it  is  its  intention  to  produce  them  in 
the  least  oppressive  manner.  The  reform  of  our  fiscal 
policy  consists  not  in  increasing  taxation  but  in  re- 
moving the  burden  from  the  more  oppressive  direct  to  the 
less  oppressive  indirect  contributions  by  a  revised  tariff. 

To  attain  that  end  it  would  appear  recommendable 
that  all  merchandise  passing  our  frontiers  should  be 
subjected  to  customs  duties.  From  those  duties  the 
raw  materials  which  are  necessary  to  our  industries 
and  which  are  not  produced  in  Germany  (such  as 
cotton),  or  which  are  produced  in  insufficient  quantity 
or  quality,  should  be  excepted.  The  duties  should  be 
graduated  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  our 
home  industries.  .  .  . 

The  increased  yield  of  indirect  taxation  would  not 
necessitate  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  expenses 
for  collecting  the  duties,  as  the  existing  customs 
apparatus  will  probably  prove  sufficient  to  cope  with 
the  additional  work  with  which  it  will  have  to  deal. 

Though  I  am  laying  the  greatest  stress  on  the 
financial  aspect  of  a  change  in  our  fiscal  policy,  I  am  of 
opinion  that  the.  reintroduction  of  protection  cannot  be 
attacked  by  political  economists  on  economic  grounds. 


682  MODERN   GERMANY 

It  is  an  open  question  whether  a  state  of  complete 
and  reciprocal  international  Free  Trade  would  be  to 
the  interest  of  Germany.  As  long  as  most  other 
nations  with  which  Germany  has  to  keep  up  business 
relations  are  surrounded  with  tariff  walls  which  are 
continually  rising  higher,  it  seems  both  justifiable  and 
necessary  to  introduce  protection.  .  .  . 

Protective  duties  in  favour  of  individual  industries 
are  like  privileges,  and  meet  with  hostility  on  the  part 
of  those  industries  which  are  unprotected.  In  order 
not  to  give  undue  privileges  to  individual  industries 
it  would,  therefore,  be  advisable  to  give  a  preference 
to  all  home  production  over  foreign  production  in  the 
home  market. 

Such  a  system  would  not  be  oppressive  and  would 
be  just  to  all,  as  the  duties  would  be  more  equally 
distributed  over  all  the  productive  forces  of  the  nation 
than  in  the  case  of  protective  duties  in  favour  of 
individual  industries. 

The  small  minority  of  the  population  which  does 
not  produce  at  all,  the  consumers  pure  and  simple, 
would  apparently  suffer  by  Protection  ;  but  if  the 
prosperity  of  the  country  should  be  increased  by  Pro- 
tection the  non-productive  section  of  the  community 
and  the  recipients  of  fixed  salaries,  imperial  and  local 
officials,  &c.,  would  certainly  also  be  benefited.  The 
community  would  be  enabled  to  give  compensation 
to  those  classes  for  a  possible  rise  in  the  price  of 
commodities  ;  but  if  such  a  rise  should  take  place 
it  would  be  but  infinitesimal  and  nothing  like  the 
rise  that  is  usually  imagined  and  feared  by  the 
consumers. 

Duties  which  are  imposed  merely  for  revenue  pur- 
poses on  products  which  cannot  be  raised  in  the 
country,  and  which  must  be  imported  from  abroad, 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED    683 

will  always  to  a  large  extent  be  borne  by  the  home 
consumer.  However,  on  those  products  which  can  in 
sufficient  quantity  and  quality  be  raised  in  the  country, 
the  foreign  producer  will  have  to  bear  the  whole  of 
the  duty  in  order  to  be  able  to  compete  in  our  market. 
Lastly,  in  such  cases  where  a  part  of  the  home  de- 
mand must  be  supplied  by  imports  from  abroad,  the 
foreign  competitor  will  be  forced  to  pay  at  least  a 
part  and  sometimes  the  whole  of  the  duties,  and  to 
be  satisfied  with  a  smaller  profit  than  heretofore.  The 
customs  duties  on  those  products  which  are  in  part 
raised  in  this  country  would  to  a  large  extent  be 
paid  by  foreign  countries,  which  may  be  seen  by  the 
interested  clamour  which  is  always  raised  abroad 
whenever  new  duties  are  introduced  or  when  the  old 
ones  are  increased.  If  the  home  consumer  would  in 
practice  be  burdened  with  the  weight  of  import 
duties,  the  introduction  of  such  duties  would  leave  the 
foreign  producer  more  indifferent. 

Whenever  a  portion  of  the  import  duties  is  borne 
by  the  home  consumer,  it  is  small  in  proportion  to 
the  fluctuations  in  price  which  are  caused  by  the 
changes  in  supply  and  demand.  Compared  with  the 
great  and  rapid  fluctuations  arising  from  these  causes 
a  duty  of  5  or  10  per  cent,  ad  valorem  can  only  exercise 
a  proportionately  small  influence  upon  prices.  .  .  . 

The  return  to  the  principle  of  Protection  all  round 
has  become  necessary  owing  to  the  altered  economic 
position  of  the  world.  In  the  revision  of  our  fiscal 
policy  we  can  be  solely  guided  by  the  interests  of 
Germany. 

Commercial  negotiations  with  foreign  countries 
may  soon  be  expected,  and  we  can  initiate  such 
negotiations  in  the  hope  of  securing  favourable  treat- 
ment of  our  claims  and  favourable  conditions  to 


684  MODERN    GERMANY 

German  trade  only  if  the  whole  of  our  industries  can, 
by  an  autonomous  tariff,  be  brought  into  a  favoured 
position  with  regard  to  foreign  countries. 

Speech  from  the  Throne  to  the  newly  elected  Reichstag, 
the  I2th  of  February  1879. 

.  .  .  The  new  fiscal  proposals  are  firstly  intended 
to  increase  our  resources  by  broadening  the  basis  of 
taxation  and  by  abolishing  that  taxation  which  is 
felt  to  be  most  oppressive.  At  the  same  time  I  am 
of  opinion  that  our  home  industries  in  their  entirety 
have  a  claim  for  as  much  assistance  as  can  be  granted 
to  them  by  duties  and  taxes,  an  assistance  which  in 
other  countries  is  given  to  similar  industries  perhaps 
in  excess  of  the  industrial  requirements. 

I  think  it  my  duty  to  try  to  reserve  at  least  the 
German  home  market  to  national  production  so  far  as 
that  policy  is  compatible  with  our  other  interests.  We 
shall,  therefore,  return  to  those  principles  which  have 
been  proved  by  experience,  which  have  guided  the 
Zollverein  during  almost  half  a  century  of  prosperity, 
and  which  we  have,  to  a  large  extent,  deserted  since 
1865.  I  fail  to  see  that  that  departure  from  Pro- 
tection has  brought  to  us  any  real  advantages. 

Statement  placed  before  the  German  Diet  in  support  of 
the  Tariff  Proposals  and  explaining  their  Aim,  the 
of  April  1879. 


.  .  .  German  fiscal  policy,  in  taking  up  Free  Trade, 
had  entered  upon  a  phase  during  which  the  well- 
being  of  our  national  industries  and  the  retention  of 
the  home  market  for  the  benefit  of  our  own  industries 
were  almost  completely  left  out  of  consideration. 


HOW   PROTECTION   WAS    INTRODUCED    685 

That  economic  policy  would  have  been  advantageous 
and  justified  only  under  two  conditions. 

Firstly,  it  was  necessary  that  other  countries  should 
follow  our  example  and  also  adopt  Free  Trade,  and 
the  hope  that  they  would  do  so  was  widely  enter- 
tained in  economic  circles  until  a  few  years  ago,  and 
was  also  very  prevalent  in  the  Diet.  But  to-day  no 
doubt  exists  that  the  first  condition  which  can  justify 
Free  Trade  has  not  come  into  existence,  for  no  nation 
has  followed  our  example. 

The  second  condition  which  could  justify  the  in- 
troduction of  Free  Trade  was  that  no  changes  in  the 
international  economic  conditions  unfavourable  to 
Germany  should  take  place  since  the  time  when  Free 
Trade  was  inaugurated,  and  that  Germany  should 
preserve  her  relative  economic  position  amongst 
nations.  This  condition  also  has  not  been  fulfilled. 

The  marvellous  development  of  transport  has, 
during  the  last  ten  or  twenty  years,  completely  changed 
the  economic  aspect  of  the  world  and  the  distribution 
of  economic  power.  The  most  important  German 
industries  are  at  present  endangered  by  huge  foreign 
industries  whose  production,  owing  to  the  greatly 
increased  transport  facilities,  threatens  the  German 
market  in  a  way  that,  but  a  short  time  ago,  could  not 
have  been  anticipated.  Furthermore  foreign  nations 
have  learned — and  the  United  States  are  an  example — 
to  dispense  with  German  goods  by  surrounding  them- 
selves with  hostile  tariffs  and  by  creating  industries 
of  their  own  in  their  country. 

Our  present  tariffs,  therefore,  correspond  no  longer 
with  the  economic  conditions  of  the  world  and  with 
the  requirements  of  the  time. 

To  the  allied  Governments  the  considerations 
enumerated  appeared  so  weighty  as  to  make  a  recon- 


686  MODERN    GERMANY 

sideration  of  our  fiscal  policy  necessary,  and  from  the 
disadvantages  mentioned  the  direction  which  the 
necessary  fiscal  reforms  should  have  to  take  became 
clearly  apparent. 

In  view  of  the  position  described  above,  it  evi- 
dently became  necessary  to  come  to  the  assistance 
not  of  certain  individual  industries  which  had  suffered, 
but  of  all  the  national  industries,  by  giving  them, 
wherever  such  treatment  appeared  desirable,  a  pre- 
ference in  the  home  market. 

With  this  end  in  view  a  special  commission  was 
nominated  which  has  examined  every  single  item  of 
the  proposed  tariff. 

The  changes  which  have  occurred  in  the  relative 
economic  position  of  various  nations  must  make  it 
apparent  that  it  is  risky  for  Germany  to  keep  our 
market  any  longer  open  to  foreign  nations,  especially 
if  we  bear  in  mind  that  other  nations,  whose  system 
is  more  strongly  protective  than  our  own,  have  re- 
served their  home  market  to  their  own  industries  by 
increased  customs  duties. 

As  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  the  German  in- 
dustries is  not  of  recent  growth,  material  to  support 
the  justified  claims  of  our  industries  is  not  lacking. 
Two  inquiries  into  the  decay  of  two  industries,  which 
have  particularly  acutely  suffered,  were  made  last 
summer,  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at  are  at  the 
disposal  of  the  various  Governments. 

The  finding  of  the  commission  which  has  examined 
the  requirements  of  the  various  industries  is  apparent 
from  the  individual  provisions  of  the  new  tariff,  in 
which  the  reasons  which  have  been  instrumental  for 
determining  each  individual  provision  have  also  been 
stated.  The  general  conclusion  at  which  the  com- 
mission has  arrived  may  be  summed  up  as  follows  : 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED    687 

Whenever  a  pressing  necessity  can  be  proved  to  exist, 
home  industries  should  receive  a  somewhat  higher 
protection  than  that  hitherto  received.  As  a  rule  our 
industries  should  be  granted  only  a  moderate  advan- 
tage over  foreign  competition.  In  drawing  up  the 
provisions  of  the  tariff  it  has  been  borne  in  mind  that 
the  ability  of  German  industries  to  export  should  be 
fully  maintained  and  that  that  ability  should  be 
strengthened  by  reserving  to  them  the  home  market. 

Letter  to  Minister  of  Finance  Bitter,  the 
13th  of  May  1880. 

With  reference  to  your  letter  of  the  4th  of  May 
regarding  the  decrease  in  the  yield  of  the  income  tax 
on  small  incomes  (Klassensteuer),  I  agree  with  you 
that  it  is  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  utmost 
economy,  and  to  recommend  to  the  local  authorities 
the  greatest  possible  indulgence  in  levying  taxes  in 
view  of  the  diminished  prosperity  of  the  country.  In 
reply  to  your  letter  I  should  like  to  make  the  follow- 
ing observations  : — 

The  shrinkage  in  the  income  tax  on  small  incomes 
is  a  proof  of  the  shrinkage  in  the  prosperity  of  the 
population.  That  shrinkage  has  made  itself  felt  for 
several  years  past,  and  according  to  my  conviction  it 
would  have  taken  place  several  years  earlier  had  it 
not  been  for  the  war  contribution  of  5,000,000,000 
francs  which  we  received  from  France  between  1871 
and  1874.  Only  that  circumstance  has,  for  a  time, 
arrested  the  deterioration  in  our  economic  position 
which  has  been  caused  by  the  Free  Trade  legislation 
that  was  initiated  after  the  Zollverein  period.  If  these 
statements  should  require  further  proof,  the  fact  that 
the  masses  of  our  population  are  impoverishing  should 


688  MODERN    GERMANY 

be  sufficient.  That  decline  in  our  prosperity  began 
when  our  fiscal  policy  was  altered  in  the  direction  of 
Free  Trade.  .  .  .  Only  the  French  War  contributions 
stopped  for  a  time  the  decay  of  our  prosperity  that 
began  when  we  deserted  the  traditional  policy  of  the 
Zollverein,  which  had  been  followed  ever  since  1823. 
We  may,  therefore,  hope  to  see  this  decay  disappear 
if  our  legislation  continues  to  advance  in  the  direction 
which  it  took  in  the  session  of  1879,  without  regard  to 
the  wishes  of  an  opposition  whose  action  was  due 
rather  to  the  consideration  of  the  requirements  of  the 
political  parties  in  the  Diet  than  to  considerations  of 
public  welfare. 

.  .  .  That  the  income  tax  on  large  incomes  has 
risen  whilst  that  on  small  incomes  has  fallen  off  seems 
to  me  to  be  due  to  nothing  else  than  to  the  greater 
pressure  which  has  been  exercised  by  the  tax-gather- 
ing apparatus  whose  principle  it  is  to  increase  the 
assessment  until  the  public  makes  formal  complaints. 
However,  merchants  and  other  business  men  who  re- 
quire credit  do  not  easily  make  such  formal  complaints, 
because  of  their  credit  requirements.  But  even  those 
income-tax  payers  who  need  not  think  of  their  credit 
will  rather  bear  an  undue  increase  in  their  assessment 
for  a  time,  as  long  as  that  increase  is  not  out  of  all 
proportion,  than  take  the  trouble  of  sending  in  formal 
complaints.  Only  incomes  which  emanate  from  regu- 
larly flowing  sources  and  which  are  paid  in  cash  can 
be  measured  with  absolute  accuracy.  I  can,  there- 
fore, only  view  with  suspicion  the  way  in  which  the 
income-tax  gathering  authorities  have  proceeded,  if 
the  income  tax  received  between  1874  and  1880  has 
increased  by  nearly  12  per  cent,  when  all  incomes,  as 
is  well  known,  have  decreased.  In  consideration  of 
the  depressing  circumstances  of  the  present  time  and 


HOW    PROTECTION    WAS    INTRODUCED    689 

of  the  shrinkage  in  our  income,  I  cannot  believe  that 
such  an  increase  could  have  been  effected  except  by 
causing  perfectly  justified  dissatisfaction  amongst  the 
taxpayers. 

If  I  therefore  agree  with  the  wishes  of  the  Minister 
of  Finance  for  economy,  I  cannot  help  seeing  in  the 
arguments  which  your  Excellency  has  advanced  in 
your  memorandum  a  proof  how  greatly  the  Free 
Trade  disturbance,  which  has  affected  the  fiscal  tradi- 
tions of  the  Zollverein,  has  damaged  the  prosperity  of 
the  German  nation,  and  how  necessary  it  is  to  con- 
tinue to  oppose  Free  Trade.  The  history  of  the 
Zollverein  up  to  the  end  of  the  sixties  was  a  history 
of  uninterrupted  prosperity  for  Prussia,  notwithstand- 
ing the  narrow  limits  of  the  country  and  notwith- 
standing the  greater  impediments  to  our  home  trade 
owing  to  our  inferior  means  of  transport.  During  the 
short  space  of  but  half  a  year  since  we  have  deliber- 
ately turned  away  from  that  mistaken  system  of 
Free  Trade  we  have  already  witnessed  a  slight  im- 
provement in  our  economic  position,  and  we  may 
count  on  an  increasing  improvement  if  we  continue  to 
proceed  on  the  road  upon  which  we  have  entered. 


2  X 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 
GERMANY'S  WEALTH  AND  FINANCES  l 

THE  principal  wealth  of  a  country  lies  in  the  produc- 
tive power  of  the  people.  Germany  has  66,000,000 
inhabitants ;  Great  Britain  has  only  45,000,000  in- 
habitants. In  man-power,  which,  rightly  considered, 
is  more  important  than  machine-power,  Germany  is 
50  per  cent,  stronger  than  Great  Britain. 

At  the  time  of  her  great  prosperity  the  population 
of  Great  Britain  increased  more  rapidly  than  that 
of  any  other  country.  Now,  every  report  of  the 
Registrar-General  establishes  a  new  low  record  of  the 
birth-rate,  which  is  rapidly  sinking  to  the  level  of  that 
of  France.  Additional  men  would  not  increase  the 
national  wealth,  but  only  accentuate  existing  unem- 
ployment and  poverty  in  Great  Britain.  Already  we 
have  to  maintain  more  than  a  million  paupers.  While 
the  population  of  Great  Britain  increases  by  about 
400,000  a  year,  the  population  of  Germany  increases 
by  more  than  900,000  a  year. 

It  is  obvious  that  66,000,000  fully  employed 
Germans  produce  more  than  45,000,000  ill-employed 
Englishmen,  especially  as  the  former  are  better 
organised  than  the  latter,  and  as  they  employ  the 
most  scientific  processes  and  the  most  perfect 
machinery.  It  is  true  that  the  three  British  show- 
industries — cotton,  shipbuilding,  and  shipping — are 
much  larger  than  the  corresponding  German  ones,  but 

1  Part  of  this  chapter  has  appeared  in  the  Daily  Mail. 
690 


GERMANY'S    WEALTH    AND    FINANCES    691 

Germany  has  proportionately  a  far  greater  predomi- 
nance in  other  industries.  Her  chemical  and  electrical 
industries,  for  instance,  are  foremost  in  the  world, 
and  in  the  production  of  steel  she  has  rapidly  over- 
taken Great  Britain,  as  the  following  figures  prove  : — 

German  Steel  Production.          British  Steel  Production. 
1880    .     .    .         624,000  tons  1,342,000  tons 

1908    .    .    .    1 1,000,000  tons  5,300,000  tons 

Since  1879,  the  year  when  she  introduced  Protec- 
tion, Germany's  supremacy  in  steel  over  this  country 
has  become  overwhelming. 

We  are  only  too  familiar  with  the  stagnation  and 
the  decay  which  prevail  in  nearly  all  our  industries. 
The  abounding  prosperity  of  the  German  industries 
may  be  seen  at  a  glance  from  the  following  figures  : — 

Horse-power  of  Industrial  Steam- 
engines  in  Prussia. 

1 879 984,000  horse-power 

1900 4,046,036  „ 

1909 6,754,468  „ 

Corresponding  official  figures  for  England  do  not  exist. 

It  is  ominous  that  between  1900  and  1909,  in  the 
short  space  of  nine  years,  German  industrial  horse- 
power should  have  increased  by  2,750,000,  or  by 
almost  70  per  cent. 

The  abounding  wealth  of  Germany  may  be  seen 
from  the  expenditure  of  the  State  and  of  individuals. 
Germany  has  spent  about  £50,000,000  on  worthless 
Colonies ;  she  is  spending  £35,000,000  on  the  re- 
settlement of  her  Polish  provinces  ;  she  is  spending 
more  than  £50,000,000  on  her  canals  ;  she  is  spending 
more  than  £20,000,000  per  annum  on  her  fleet,  and 
£50,000,000  per  annum  on  workmen's  insurance. 


692  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  assertion  that  Germany  is  poor  is  ridiculous. 
Money  is  dear  in  Germany  chiefly  because  the  rapidly 
expanding  industries  absorb  all  the  liquid  funds. 
Moneyed  Germans  invest  their  cash  in  the  national 
industries  and  make  6  per  cent.  Moneyed  English- 
men invest  their  cash  in  Stock  Exchange  securities, 
and  especially  foreign  stocks,  because  our  shrunken 
and  decaying  industries  are  no  longer  safe  and  de- 
sirable investments.  The  cheapness  of  money  in 
England  is  not  a  sign  of  our  wealth,  but  of  indus- 
trial stagnation  and  decay.  Our  vast  foreign  trade 
represents  turnover,  not  profits  and  wealth.  Even 
Germany's  foreign  investments  seem  to  be  almost 
as  large  as  those  of  this  country.  About  1897  she 
drew  £60,000,000  a  year  from  that  source  alone, 
and  now  her  income  from  foreign  investments  is  offi- 
cially estimated  to  amount  to  from  £75,000,000  to 
£100,000,000  per  annum. 

A  comparison  of  German  and  British  finances  will 
prove  that  Germany  is  financially  in  a  very  strong 
position,  that  she  is  in  a  position  which  should  arouse 
not  our  scorn  but  our  envy. 

The  National  Debt  of  Great  Britain  amounted  in 
1908  to  £760,000,000,  or  £17,  6s.  per  inhabitant.  The 
Debts  of  the  German  Empire  and  of  all  the  States 
composing  it  amounted  in  1908  in  the  aggregate  to 
£772,000,000,  or  to  only  £12,  55.  per  inhabitant.  Great 
Britain  possesses  practically  no  realisable  assets  against 
her  National  Debt  except  the  Suez  Canal  shares  and 
some  small  items  valued  together  at  £40,000,000. 
Deducting  this  sum,  England's  net  debt  stands  at 
£720,000,000.  This  amount  has  been  spent  on  powder 
and  shot,  and  represents  nothing  but  powder  and 
shot. 

The  German  National  Debt  has  a  different  origin. 


GERMANY'S    WEALTH    AND    FINANCES    693 

It  has  been  spent  not  on  war,  but  mainly  on  the 
purchase  of  commercial  undertakings,  and  is  a  debt 
in  name  rather  than  in  fact  Against  the  German 
National  Debt  of  £772,000,000  there  are  vast  in- 
dustrial assets,  the  value  of  which  is  far  greater  than 
her  indebtedness.  While  Great  Britain  possesses  no 
purely  commercial  State  enterprises,  the  German 
States  possess  many  commercial  undertakings  of  very 
great  value.  Nearly  all  the  railways,  nearly  all  the 
canals,  extensive  agricultural  domains,  vast  forests 
and  numerous  mines,  salt  works,  factories,  and  banks 
are  Government  property  in  Germany. 

During  1909  the  net  profits  of  the  State  enter- 
prises of  Prussia  alone  were  as  follows  : — - 

Net  profit  of  State  railways ,£26,135,000 

Net  profit  of  State  forests 2,880,000 

Net  profit  of  State  mines  and  salt  works  .    .  900,000 

Net  profit  of  State  agricultural  domains  .     .  800,000 

Net  profit  of  various  undertakings  ....  800,000 

Total    ....    £3 1,5 1 5,000 

How  carefully  the  German  Empire  and  the  indi- 
vidual States  manage  their  commercial  and  industrial 
enterprises  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that,  according 
to  a  statement  made  on  behalf  of  the  Prussian  Ministry 
of  Public  Works  in  the  Prussian  Diet  on  March  7, 
1907,  the  price  for  which  the  Prussian  State  railways 
were  acquired  was  £475,000,000.  Of  this  amount 
£150,000,000  has  been  written  off,  so  that  the  book 
debt  on  account  of  the  railways  amounts  now  only  to 
£325,000,000,  although  the  intrinsic  value  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  State  Department,  at  least  £1,000,000,000. 
This  is  conservative  finance. 

Other  State  enterprises  are  managed  on  the  same 
principle.  The  progressive  value  of  the  Prussian  State 


694  MODERN    GERMANY 

railways  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  their  net 
earnings  have  doubled  during  the  last  ten  years,  and 
these  are  likely  to  increase  considerably  in  the  near 
future.  The  profits  of  the  mines,  domains,  and  forests 
of  the  State  show  a  similar  increase.  Bavaria,  Saxony, 
Wiirtemberg,  and  the  other  States  have  railways, 
forests,  mines,  and  other  industrial  undertakings  of 
their  own.  The  combined  net  profits  of  the  com- 
mercial undertakings  of  the  Empire  and  of  the  States 
composing  it  exceed  at  present  £60,000,000  per  annum. 
Capitalised  at  4  per  cent.,  the  State  enterprises  of 
Germany  represent,  therefore,  at  present  a  value  of 
£1,500,000,000. 

Against  the  British  National  Debt  there  are  prac- 
tically no  realisable  assets.  Against  the  German 
National  Debt  there  are  enormous  assets.  If  Germany 
should  sell  her  public  undertakings  to  limited  com- 
panies, she  could  pay  off  all  her  debts  and  receive 
besides  a  cash  bonus  of  £800,000,000.  She  could 
cancel  her  entire  debt  by  selling  one-half  of  the  State 
enterprises. 

In  Great  Britain  the  State  is  merely  an  adminis- 
trative institution.  It  is  propertyless,  and,  being  pro- 
pertyless,  it  ought  not  to  borrow  and  ought  not  to 
have  a  purely  unproductive  National  Debt  which  is 
merely  a  drag  on  production.  In  Germany  the 
National  Debt  is  an  excellent  and  highly  produc- 
tive investment  which  represents  a  large  part  of  the 
national  working  capital.  In  Germany  the  State  is 
not  only  an  administrative  machine,  but  is  also  a 
business  enterprise,  and,  being  exceedingly  prosperous, 
it  constantly  requires  fresh  capital,  as  does  every 
prosperous  and  expanding  private  business  or  limited 
company. 

The  bulk  of  the  loans  recently  issued  by  Germany 


GERMANY'S    WEALTH    AND    FINANCES    695 

was  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  vast  network 
of  light  railways  and  canals  which,  like  most  of  her 
Government  undertakings,  will  greatly  assist  her  manu- 
facturers and  traders,  and  will  in  due  course  return 
about  8  per  cent,  in  net  profit,  as  do  her  other  under- 
takings. Hence,  Germany  need  not  mind  borrowing 
the  money  required  at  4  per  cent.  Besides,  while  she 
borrows  certain  sums  chiefly  for  building  railways  and 
canals,  she  writes  off  much  larger  sums  from  her 
industrial  undertakings,  as  may  be  seen  from  the 
example  of  her  railways.  Thus  the  excess  of  State 
assets  over  State  liabilities  is  constantly  growing,  and 
Great  Britain  has  little  cause  to  pity  Germany  for 
her  indebtedness  and  her  borrowings. 

Germany  is  in  a  far  more  favourable  position  than 
Great  Britain,  not  only  as  regards  indebtedness  but 
also  as  regards  taxation,  as  the  following  figures 
show  : — 

Income-tax  in  Prussia.  Income-tax  in  Great  Britain. 

(Allowing  for  Abatements. )  (Allowing  for  Abatements. ) 

On  ^150  .  .  4jd.  in  the  pound.  " 
„   300  ..  5jd.     „ 


500  .  .  7id. 

1000  .  .  7jd. 

2000  .  .  yfd. 

3000  .  .  8Jd. 


9d.  to    is.   8d.    in    the 
pound. 


Estate  duty  to  direct  descendants  : — 
None  in  Germany    .    .    .     1-15  per  cent,  in  Great  Britain. 

Import  Duties  in  Germany.                  Import  Duties  in  Great  Britain, 
i os.  7d.  per  head 153.  per  head. 

All  Indirect  Taxes  in  Germany.        All  Indirect  Taxes  in  Great  Britain. 
1 8s.  per  head 303.  per  head. 

For  every  pound  paid  by  the  average  German  in 
local  taxation  the  average  Englishman  pays  £2,  IDS, 


6g6  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  foregoing  figures  prove  that,  compared  with 
Englishmen,  Germans  are  very  lightly  taxed,  that 
they  are  able  to  stand  a  much  heavier  taxation,  and 
that  they  should  easily  be  able  to  raise  by  taxation 
the  money  which  they  require. 

Those  who  wish  to  prove  that  the  financial  position 
of  Great  Britain  is  better  than  that  of  Germany  are 
reduced  to  the  argument  that  England's  credit  is 
better  than  Germany's  because  England  borrows  at 
3  per  cent,  while  Germany  borrows  at  4  per  cent. 
This  argument  is  fallacious.  The  wealth  of  a  country 
cannot  be  measured  by  the  quantity  of  unemployed 
money  requiring  investment  which  determines  inte- 
rest. Cheapness  of  money  and  consequent  low  interest 
is  often  not  a  sign  of  national  wealth  but  of  unemploy- 
ment for  money  in  industry,  of  industrial  stagnation 
and  decay.  I  have  shown  in  my  book  on  the  "  Rise 
and  Decline  of  the  Netherlands  "  that,  alter  the  decay 
of  her  industries,  money  was  cheaper  in  Holland  than 
anywhere  else.  The  Government  could  borrow  at 
2  per  cent.  Dutch  2,\  per  cent.  Consols  stood  high 
above  par.  In  those  countries  where  industries  are 
most  flourishing  and  expansive,  such  as  the  United 
States  and  Germany,  unemployed  money  is  scarce  and 
dear,  and  interest  is  high  as  a  rule. 

Besides,  as  every  financier  knows,  British  Consols 
stand  higher  than  German  Consols  largely  because  they 
have  artificially  been  driven  up  by  forced  purchases 
under  the  Trustee  Acts,  and  by  the  fact  that  all  Govern- 
ment funds  and  the  entire  savings  banks  deposits 
must  be  invested  in  British  Government  securities. 
Germany  has  never  made  a  similar  attempt  to  drive 
up  the  price  of  her  loans.  Her  Government  offices 
hold  hardly  any  Government  stock,  and  trust  funds 
and  savings  banks  deposits  are  invested  chiefly  in 


GERMANY'S    WEALTH    AND    FINANCES    697 

mortgages.      The  wealth  of  the  classes  in  Germany 
has  increased  as  follows  : — 

Income  subjected  to  Income  subjected  to 

Income-tax  in  Prussia.          Income-tax  in  Great  Britain. 
(Allowing  for  Abatements. )        (Allowing  for  Abatements, ) 

1892  .   .  .  £298,069,881          £537,151,200 
1909  .   .   .   660,981,000  652,886,576 

As  figures  relating  to  the  income  subjected  to 
income-tax  and  applying  to  the  whole  of  Germany 
are  not  in  my  possession,  I  can  give  only  those  for 
Prussia.  The  income  of  the  classes  of  the  whole  of 
Germany  should  be  about  50  per  cent,  larger  than 
that  of  Prussia,  and  should  amount  for  1909,  roughly 
speaking,  to  £1,000,000,000,  as  against  £653,000,000 
for  Great  Britain.  Income-tax  is  levied,  and  income  is 
estimated,  on  different  principles  in  the  two  countries. 
Therefore  the  two  total  sums  given  are  not  strictly 
comparable.  However,  the  foregoing  statement  is  of 
the  greatest  interest,  inasmuch  as  it  shows  that  the 
income  of  the  classes  in  Germany  has  increased  by 
about  125  per  cent,  during  a  period  when  it  has  in- 
creased by  only  25  per  cent,  in  Great  Britain.  The 
trifling  increase  of  about  25  per  cent,  of  the  income 
subjected  to  income-tax  in  this  country  is  merely 
equal  to  the  increase  of  the  population  during  the 
same  period.  Therefore,  individual  wealth  has  appa- 
rently remained  almost  stationary  in  Great  Britain. 
However,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  British  income- 
tax  collectors  have  of  late  years  "  put  the  screw  on  " 
in  an  unprecedented  manner,  it  seems  likely  that  the 
income  of  Great  Britain  has  in  reality  remained 
stationary,  or  has  more  probably  decreased,  during  a 
time  when  it  has  almost  doubled  in  Germany. 

Germany  is  no  doubt  at  present  by  far  the 
wealthiest  State  in  Europe. 


CHAPTER   XXIX 

GERMAN   LABOUR  CONDITIONS 

SUFFICIENCY  of  employment  is  the  greatest  interest 
of  the  workers.  Let  us  investigate  the  state  of  em- 
ployment in  Germany  by  comparing  it  with  the  state 
of  employment  in  Great  Britain. 

Employment  is  constantly  in  a  state  of  flux.  The 
ebb  and  flow  of  the  national  labour  market  may  be 
gauged  to  some  extent  from  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the 
people  across  its  frontiers,  and  from  the  ebb  and  flow 
of  the  money  in  its  savings  banks.  Broadly  speaking, 
it  may  be  said  that  workers  emigrate  from  countries 
where  employment  is  bad  to  countries  where  it  is 
good.  Unemployment  and  ill-paid  employment  are 
no  doubt  the  principal  causes  of  emigration,  whilst 
good  employment  and  well-paid  employment  are  the 
chief  causes  of  immigration.  Therefore  the  emigra- 
tion and  immigration  statistics  give  a  most  valuable 
indication  of  the  state  of  the  national  labour  market 
in  its  entirety,  as  compared  with  the  purely  sectional 
trade  union  labour  market.  Besides,  workers  who  are 
well  employed  and  well  paid  are  able  to  save  much, 
whilst  workers  who  are  ill-employed  and  ill-paid  can 
save  but  little.  Consequently  in  countries  where 
workers  are  well  employed  and  well  paid,  savings 
banks  deposits  should  increase  rapidly,  whilst  in 
countries  where  workers  are  badly  employed,  and 
consequently  badly  paid,  savings  banks  deposits  should 

be  stationary  or  even  retrogressive.     Hence,  the  state 

698 


GERMAN    LABOUR   CONDITIONS        699 

of  employment  among  the  workers  of  a  nation  may 
further  be  gauged  by  observing  the  business  trans- 
acted by  the  savings  banks. 

The  foregoing  shows  that  unemployment  may  be 
measured  by  three  different  tests  :  the  trade  union 
unemployment  test  which  is  generally  used  ;  the  immi- 
gration and  emigration  test ;  and  the  savings  banks 
test.  Normally,  all  three  should  agree — that  is,  the 
indications  as  to  the  state  of  employment  furnished 
by  one  of  these  tests  should  be  confirmed  by  the  two 
remaining  tests.  Now  let  us,  at  the  hand  of  these 
three  tests,  compare  unemployment  in  Great  Britain 
and  in  Germany. 

PERCENTAGE  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT  AMONG  TRADE  UNIONISTS. 

In  Great  Britain. 

5-0 
6.4 
5-3 
3-7 
3-9 
8.7 
7-7 

It  will  be  observed  that  during  the  period  1903- 
1909 — the  official  German  unemployment  statistics 
were  first  issued  in  1903 — unemployment  among  trade 
unionists  was,  as  a  rule,  from  three  to  four  times  as 
large  in  Great  Britain  as  it  was  in  Germany.  How- 
ever, there  is  an  irreducible  minimum  of  unemploy- 
ment in  every  country,  a  minimum  which  arises  from 
the  fact  that  workers  leave  one  situation  on  a 
Wednesday  and  enter  another  one  on  the  following 
Monday,  or  on  Monday  week,  without  being  in  the 
meantime  unemployed  in  the  usual  sense  of  the 
term,  although  they  may  be  reported  as  being  un- 
employed by  their  trade  unions.  Besides,  voluntary 


Years. 
IOO3 

In  Germany. 
2.7 

IQO4. 

1005     . 

.    .         1.6 

1006 

.    .         i.i 

IQO7 

i.l 

1008    , 

i.i 

IQOQ 

2.8 

700  MODERN    GERMANY 

holidays,  illnesses,  &c.,  cause  absence  from  work,  but 
not  unemployment  strictly  so-called.  If  we  allow,  let 
us  say,  i  per  cent,  for  this  irreducible  minimum  of 
purely  technical  unemployment,  it  would  appear  that 
between  1903  and  1909  unemployment  among  trade 
unionists  was  about  four  times  as  great  in  Great 
Britain  as  it  was  in  Germany ;  that  for  every  unem- 
ployed trade  unionist  in  Germany,  there  were  no 
less  than  four  unemployed  trade  unionists  in  Great 
Britain. 

The  state  of  employment  in  Germany  may  be 
measured  not  only  by  the  trade  union  statistics  but 
also  by  the  Sick  Fund  figures,  which  are  published 
every  month,  and  which  show  how  many  workers  are 
ensured  against  disease  with  the  State  Insurance 
Societies.  By  comparing  the  number  of  insured 
workers  during  1908  and  the  previous  year,  and  by 
allowing  for  the  natural  increase  of  workers,  Richard 
Calwer,  a  prominent  German  statistician,  has  calcu- 
lated in  the  Wirtschaftliche  Korrespondenz  that  towards 
the  end  of  1908,  380,000  workers,  out  of  a  total  of 
about  14,000,000  wage-earners,  were  unemployed  in 
Germany.  If  this  calculation  and  his  carefully  drawn- 
up  tables,  which  have  been  endorsed  by  the  German 
press  and  the  German  Parliament,  are  correct,  it  would 
follow  that  2.7  per  cent,  of  all  the  German  workers 
were  unemployed  at  a  time  when  9.4  per  cent,  of  the 
British  trade  unionists  were  unemployed.  These 
figures  are  particularly  remarkable,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  it  is  usually  assumed  that  the  percentage  of 
unemployed  among  British  unorganised  workers  is 
considerably  higher  than  it  is  among  British  trade 
unionists.  Therefore  we  may  safely  assume  that  for 
every  unemploved  worker  in  Germany  there  are  at 
least  four  unemployed  workers  in  Great  Britain. 


GERMAN    LABOUR    CONDITIONS        701 

Now  let  us  see  whether  the  emigration  and  immi- 
gration figures  and  the  savings  banks  statistics  con- 
firm or  contradict  the  foregoing  statement. 


Gross  Emigration 
from 

Net  Emigration 
from 

Gross  Emigration 
from 

Net  Emigration 
from 

Germany. 

Germany. 

Great  Britain. 

Great  Britain. 

1900  . 

22,309 

none 

168,825 

7I,l88 

1901   . 

22,073 

none 

171,715 

72,Ol6 

1902  . 

32,098 

none 

205,662 

101,547 

1903   . 

36,310 

none 

259,956 

147,036 

1904  . 

27,984 

none 

271,435 

126,854 

1905   . 

28,075 

none 

262,077 

139,365 

1906  . 

31,074 

none 

325,137 

194,671 

1907  . 

30,431 

none 

395,680 

235,092 

1908  . 

1  7,95  1 

none 

263,199 

91,156 

1909  . 

19,930 

none 

474.378 

139,774 

I9IO  . 

22,773 

none 

618,859 

233.940 

IQII  . 



none 

623,292 

261,858 

The  foregoing  figures  show  that  between  1900  and 
1909  gross  emigration — that  is,  emigration  which  does 
not  allow  for  immigration — was  absolutely  from  seven 
to  fifteen  times  as  large  from  Great  Britain  as  it  was 
from  Germany.  However,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  population  of  Germany  is,  roughly,  50  per  cent, 
larger  than  the  population  of  Great  Britain.  If  we 
allow  for  that  difference  in  population,  it  follows  that 
emigration  was  relatively  from  ten  to  twenty-two  times 
as  large  from  Great  Britain  as  from  Germany  ;  that  for 
every  German  emigrant  there  were  from  ten  to  twenty- 
two  British  emigrants.  Consequently,  we  may  say 
that  the  pressure  which  causes  emigration  was  from  ten 
to  fifteen  times  as  great  in  Great  Britain  as  it  was 
in  Germany. 

The  foregoing  figures  show  a  constant,  rapid,  and 
very  disquieting  increase  in  the  outflow  of  population 
from  Great  Britain,  an  increase  which,  proportionately, 
becomes  still  greater  when  we  look  into  the  figures 


702  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  British  net  emigration.  These  figures  show  how 
many  British  people  have  left  these  shores  when  the 
number  of  all  British  immigrants  is  deducted.  In 
comparing  gross  and  net  emigration  from  this  country, 
we  find  that  gross  emigration  from  Great  Britain 
increased  between  1900  and  1907  by,  roughly,  230  per 
cent.,  whilst  net  emigration  from  Great  Britain  in- 
creased during  the  same  time  by  330  per  cent.  The 
inclination  of  our  emigrants  to  return  to  their  old 
home  is  apparently  growing  smaller  from  year  to  year, 
presumably  because  they  find  British  conditions  of 
employment  more  and  more  unsatisfactory. 

Whilst  Great  Britain  loses  every  year  an  enormous 
number  of  her  people  by  emigration,  a  loss  compared 
with  which  the  loss  of  20,000  lives  in  the  South  African 
War  seems  but  a  trifle,  Germany  gains  every  year  on 
balance  a  considerable  number  of  citizens  through 
immigration.  Unfortunately,  I  have  no  figures  re- 
lating to  the  immigrations  of  Germans  into  Germany. 
If  these  figures  could  be  given,  it  would  probably 
appear  that  the  German  population  of  Germany  is 
rapidly  increasing  in  numbers  through  the  inflow  of 
German- Americans,  of  whom  many  return  to  their  old 
country.  At  all  events,  it  is  clear  that  Germany  is 
gaining  on  balance  in  population  through  the  immi- 
gration of  foreigners.  At  the  census  of  1900,  757,151 
foreigners  were  counted  in  Germany.  At  the  census 
of  1905,  1,007,179  foreigners  were  counted  in  that 
country.  Hence,  Germany  has  gained  in  foreigners 
alone  250,849  people  between  1900  and  1905,  whilst 
she  has  lost  during  the  same  time  only  168,849  of  her 
own  people  through  emigration. 

A  comparison  of  the  British  and  German  emigra- 
tion and  immigration  figures  seems  to  indicate  that 
employment  is  considerably  better  in  Germany  than 


GERMAN   LABOUR    CONDITIONS        703 

in  Great  Britain,  and  that  consequently  unemploy- 
ment is  considerably  smaller  in  the  former  than  in  the 
latter  country.  The  objection  that  it  is  natural  that 
British  emigration  is  greater  than  German  emigration 
because  Great  Britain  is  more  densely  populated  than 
Germany,  is  irrelevant  as  regards  this  investigation, 
which  inquires  merely  into  actual  conditions,  but  not 
into  causes.  Besides,  the  fact  that  the  population  is 
denser  in  Great  Britain  than  in  Germany  is  not  by 
any  means  a  sufficient  explanation  for  the  great  and 
constantly  increasing  outflow  of  our  people.  Great 
Britain  is  densely  populated  only  in  parts.  The 
country  contains  large,  very  thinly,  and  very  inade- 
quately populated  districts,  which  might  be  filled  up 
if  our  industries  were  flourishing.  Ireland,  for  in- 
stance, which  in  the  year  1845  had  about  9,000,000 
inhabitants,  had  at  the  census  of  1900  only  4,458,775 
inhabitants.  Besides,  the  population  per  square  mile 
is  70  per  cent,  larger  in  Belgium  than  it  is  in  the  whole 
of  Great  Britain,  and  it  is  even  6  per  cent,  larger  in 
that  country  than  it  is  in  densely  populated  England 
and  Wales.  Lastly,  people  emigrate  from  this  country 
by  the  hundred  thousand,  not  because  there  is  not 
enough  room,  but  because  there  is  not  enough  work ; 
and  I  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  maintained  for  a 
moment  that  there  is  not  enough  work  in  Great 
Britain  because  there  is  not  enough  room.  Great 
Britain  would  have  room  enough  for  factories,  work- 
shops, and  dwelling-houses  to  maintain  more  than  a 
hundred  million  people  if  there  were  a  sufficiency  of 
markets  for  the  wares  which  these  additional  factories 
and  workshops  might  produce. 

Now  let  us  apply  the  savings  banks  test  to  Great 
Britain  and  to  Germany. 


704  MODERN    GERMANY 

SAVINGS  BANKS  DEPOSITS 

In  Germany.  In  Great  Britain. 

1900     .     .     £441,929,000  ^181,574,000 

1907     .     .         696,030,000*  209,654,000! 


Difference  .    .    ^254,101,000  £  28,080,000 

*  Besides  ^"50,000,000  Reserve  Funds.         t  No  Reserve  Funds  kept. 

The  foregoing  table  shows  that  in  1907  the  deposits 
in  the  German  savings  banks  were  three  and  a  half 
times  as  large  as  the  deposits  in  the  British  savings 
banks,  without  allowing  for  the  important  fact  that 
in  1907  the  German  savings  banks  had  accumulated 
a  reserve  fund  of  £50,000,000,  which  might  properly  be 
added  to  the  deposits,  whilst  the  British  savings  banks 
have  no  reserve  fund.  A  comparison  of  the  growth 
of  the  savings  banks  deposits  gives  evidently  a  better 
indication  of  the  state  of  employment  in  the  two 
countries  than  a  comparison  of  the  sums  total  de- 
posited. The  foregoing  table  shows  that  between 
1900  and  1907  the  German  savings  banks  deposits 
have  grown  exactly  nine  times  as  fast  as  the  British 
savings  banks  deposit ;  and  if  we  allow  for  the  fact 
that  the  population  of  Germany  is  about  50  per  cent, 
larger  than  the  population  of  Great  Britain,  it  appears 
that  the  deposits  in  the  German  savings  banks  have 
grown  six  times  as  fast  as  the  deposits  in  the  British 
savings  banks,  that  for  every  £i  deposited  by  the 
British  working  classes  between  1900  and  1907  the 
German  working  classes  have  deposited  £6. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  British  savings  banks 
deposits  have  not  grown,  but  they  have  remained 
stationary  between  1900  and  1905,  for  there  the  appa- 
rent increase  during  these  years  is  entirely  due  to  the 
interest  added,  withdrawals  having  been  equal  to 


GERMAN    LABOUR   CONDITIONS        705 

deposits.  This  state  of  stagnation  has  lately  changed 
for  one  of  ominous  retrogression.  During  the  three 
years,  1905-1908,  the  British  savings  banks  deposits 
have  grown  by  only  £6,000,000,  or  by  £2,000,000  a 
year.  As  the  interest  paid  on  our  savings  banks 
deposits  exceeds  £5,000,000  per  annum,  it  follows  that 
during  those  three  years  withdrawals  have  exceeded 
deposits  by  more  than  £3,000,000  a  year.  Rightly 
considered,  our  savings  banks  deposits  have  not  in- 
creased, but  have  decreased  by  more  than  £3,000,000 
during  every  one  of  those  three  years.  During  the 
very  same  years,  the  German  savings  banks  deposits 
have  grown  more  than  twenty-five  times  as  fast  as 
the  British  savings  banks  deposits — that  is,  for  every 
£i  deposited  during  the  years  1905-1908  in  Great 
Britain,  £25  have  been  deposited  in  Germany. 

The  growth  of  the  German  savings  banks  deposits 
is  all  the  more  remarkable  when  we  remember  that 
the  working  masses  in  Germany  have  the  greatest 
facilities  for  acquiring  freehold  cottages,  houses,  and 
agricultural  land  ;  that  millions  of  German  peasants 
are  owners  of  freehold  land  and  houses ;  and  that  by 
far  the  largest  part  of  the  savings  of  the  German 
masses  is  invested  in  fields,  and  in  bricks  and  mortar. 
Apart  from  the  enormous  savings  banks  deposits,  which 
now  amount  to  more  than  £900,000,000,  the  German 
workers  have  about  £100,000,000  in  the  Imperial 
assurance  societies,  to  which  they  contribute  at  pre- 
sent about  £20,000,000  per  year,  and  they  are  largely 
interested  in  prosperous  and  wealthy  co-operative 
societies,  building  societies,  &c.,  in  which  another 
£200,000,000  of  their  savings  are  invested.  In  cash 
savings  alone  the  German  working  masses  possess 
more  than  £1,000,000,000,  whilst  the  entire  capital  of 
the  British  working  masses  is  usually  estimated  to 

2Y 


706  MODERN    GERMANY 

amount  to  only  from  £600,000,000  to  £1,000,000,000. 
Hence  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  German  working 
masses  are  considerably  better  off  than  are  the  British 
working  masses. 

In  comparing  German  and  British  savings  banks 
deposits,  some  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  fact 
that  many  German  savings  banks  accept  considerably 
larger  deposits  than  £200,  which  is  the  maximum 
deposit  allowed  by  the  British  savings  banks.  How- 
ever, of  these  larger  sums  a  considerable  proportion 
consists  of  the  collective  holdings  of  workers  in  various 
forms,  and  it  may  be  estimated  that  about  80  per 
cent,  of  the  German  savings  banks  deposits,  or  about 
£700,000,000,  come  within  the  British  limit  of  £200. 

The  interest  paid  by  the  German  savings  banks, 
which  is  usually  3  per  cent,  to  3^  per  cent.,  is  cer- 
tainly considerably  higher  than  the  fixed  interest  of 
2\  per  cent,  paid  by  the  British  savings  banks,  but 
relatively  both  rates  of  interest  are  practically  equal. 
German  Government  stocks  yield  about  4  per  cent., 
whilst  British  Government  stocks  yield  only  about 
3  per  cent,  to  the  investor.  Hence,  the  savings  banks 
pay  in  both  countries  about  \  per  cent,  less  than  the 
rate  which  is  obtainable  on  Government  stocks.  Con- 
sequently, it  cannot  be  said  that  the  German  savings 
banks  deposits  are  three  and  a  half  times  as  large  and 
increase  from  eight  to  twenty-five  times  as  fast  as  the 
British  savings  banks  deposits,  because  the  interest 
paid  is  higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain. 

I  am  also  not  of  opinion  that  the  huge  amount  and 
the  rapid  accumulation  of  deposits  in  the  German 
savings  banks,  as  compared  with  the  small  amount 
and  the  slow  growth  of  deposits  in  the  British  savings 
banks  deposits,  is  chiefly  due  to  the  fact  that  Germans 
are  more  thrifty  than  Englishmen.  The  greater  thrift 


GERMAN    LABOUR   CONDITIONS        707 

of  the  Germans  is  largely  off-set  by  other  influences 
which  diminish  German,  but  not  British,  savings. 
The  German  workers  have  on  an  average  a  larger 
number  of  children,  and  therefore  larger  expenses, 
than  have  Englishmen  of  the  same  ckss,  and  educa- 
tion is  not  gratuitous  in  Germany,  as  it  is  in  this 
country.  Besides,  the  German  children  are  longer  at 
school  than  British  children ;  they  go  to  work  later  in 
life,  and  they  have  therefore  to  be  maintained  during 
a  longer  period  by  their  parents  than  English  children. 
Lastly,  military  service  is  compulsory  and  universal 
in  Germany,  and  the  pay  of  the  soldier  is  so  low  that 
it  is  usually  supplemented  by  small  stuns  which  the 
parents  send  regularly  to  their  sons  who  are  serving. 
All  these  circumstances,  and  various  others  which  I 
might  enumerate,  tend  to  entrench  upon  German 
savings. 

The  comparative  tables  given  in  the  foregoing 
pages  as  to  unemployment  among  German  and  British 
trade  unionists,  as  to  emigration  from  Germany 
and  Great  Britain,  and  as  to  British  and  German 
savings  banks  deposits,  corroborate  and  confirm  each 
other.  All  these  tables  point  unmistakably  to  the 
fact  that  employment  is  as  a  rule  very  considerably 
better  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain,  and  that 
consequently  unemployment  is  less  prevalent  in  the 
former  than  in  the  latter  country.  They  point  to  the 
fact  that,  in  consequence  of  better  employment,  the 
great  mass  of  the  working  population  is  considerably 
better  off  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain.  The 
greater  prosperity  of  the  German  working  masses  is 
eloquently  proclaimed  by  the  German  savings  banks 
statistics. 

Now  let  us  examine  German  wages. 

The  fact  that  the  members  of  certain  British  trade 


708  MODERN    GERMANY 

unions  receive  higher  nominal  wages  than  the  members 
in  corresponding  German  trade  unions,  does  not  contra- 
dict the  foregoing  conclusions.  In  Great  Britain,  the 
trade  unions  are  almost  as  old  as  are  the  manufac- 
turing industries  themselves.  In  Germany,  the  trade 
unions  are  of  yesterday.  The  German  trade  unions 
have  not  yet  succeeded  in  conquering  for  themselves 
a  privileged  position,  and  "  standard  union  wages  " 
are  practically  unknown  in  Germany.  Although 
nominal  trade  union  wages  in  Great  Britain  are  in 
many  instances  higher  than  are  the  corresponding 
trade  union  wages  in  Germany,  it  cannot  be  con- 
cluded that  general  wages  are  higher  in  Great  Britain 
than  in  Germany.  On  the  contrary,  the  general  level 
of  wages  is  certainly  as  high  in  Germany  as  in  Great 
Britain,  and  is  very  likely  higher,  largely  because 
Germany  suffers  habitually  from  a  scarcity  of  workers. 
The  election  manifesto  of  the  German  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party,  published  in  the  Vorwarts  on  January  15, 
1907,  stated  : — 

"  We  have  in  Germany  not  too  large  but  too  small  a 
number  of  workers.  This  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
every  year  foreign  workers  are  imported  into  Germany  by 
the  hundred  thousand." 

That  statement  was  literally  correct.  According 
to  the  German  Government  statistics,  and  the  re- 
searches of  Dr.  Bodenstein,  no  less  than  600,000 
foreign  workers  were  imported  and  temporarily  em- 
ployed in  Germany  in  1906.  Of  these  about  240,000 
were  set  to  work  in  agriculture,  and  360,000  in  the 
manufacturing  industries.  In  1907  about  700,000 
foreign  workers  were  imported.  In  1908  800,000 
foreign  workers  were  imported.  These  foreign  workers 
are  not  imported  for  the  sake  of  cheapness.  In  order 


GERMAN   LABOUR   CONDITIONS        709 

to  prevent  these  men  settling  in  Germany,  the  German 
Government  makes  various  restrictions  and  does  not 
allow  the  employment  of  Russian  and  Austrian  Polish 
workers  between  December  20  and  February  I.  Hence 
the  employers  have  to  pay  for  two  long  and  expensive 
journeys  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  wages,  and  the 
consequence  is  that  imported  foreign  workers  are  as 
a  rule  not  cheaper  but  are  actually  dearer  than 
German  workers.  Nearly  every  German  Chamber 
of  Commerce  Report — I  would  particularly  mention 
the  reports  from  Berlin,  Barmen,  Chemnitz,  and 
Mannheim — contains  complaints  about  a  great  scarcity 
of  workers,  complaints  which  have  been  confirmed  in 
the  reports  from  the  British  Consuls  in  Germany,  and 
petitions  have  been  sent  to  the  German  Government 
praying  for  permission  to  import  foreign  workers  more 
freely  to  relieve  the  dearth  of  workers. 

The  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the  enormous  in- 
crease of  the  German  population,  workers  are  as  a 
rule  scarce  in  Germany  is  also  attested  by  the  British 
Consuls  in  that  country.  For  instance,  Consul-General 
Schwabach  reported  from  Berlin  in  May  1907  : — 

"Workpeople  of  all  classes  were  in  strong  demand,  and 
received  employment  without  regard  to  nationality.  As  the 
dearth  of  workmen  became  accentuated  in  the  course  of  the 
year,  working  hours  were  lengthened,  night  shifts  put  on, 
and  overtime  became  the  rule  almost  everywhere.  The 
abundance  of  urgent  orders  received  in  almost  all  branches 
of  industry  rendered  it  imperative  for  manufacturers  con- 
stantly to  increase  the  number  of  hands,  but  although  large 
drafts  of  men  were  obtained  from  the  agricultural  districts 
(where  there  is  a  permanent  dearth  of  labourers)  and  foreign 
countries,  the  demand  was  very  frequently  greatly  in  excess 
of  the  supply." 

Consul  Brookfield  reported  from  Dantzig  in  June 
1907  :— 


710  MODERN    GERMANY 

"  The  chief  complaint  coming  from  employers  of  labour 
was  not  that  they  had  no  work  to  give,  but  that  they  could 
not  obtain  the  men  to  execute  their  orders." 

Consul-General  Sir  William  Ward  reported  from 
Hamburg  in  August  1907  : — 

"  The  chief  difficulty  with  which  many  manufacturers  in 
Germany  had  to  contend  in  1906  was  the  scarcity  of  work- 
men which  prevailed  in  many  districts,  notwithstanding  the 
advance  in  the  rate  of  wages.  Several  large  coal-mines,  for 
instance,  in  north-western  Germany  were,  it  is  stated,  unable 
last  year  to  produce  more  than  one-third  of  their  usual  annual 
output,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  finding  sufficient  hands 
for  the  work." 

Consul-General  Oppenheimer  reported  from  Frank- 
fort in  July  1907  : — 

"  With  the  state  of  the  labour  market  there  was  no  chance 
of  obtaining  even  a  percentage  of  the  additional  hands  needed. 
If  there  was  a  decided  scarcity  of  labour  in  a  number  of 
industries,  constant  complaints  proved  that  the  textile  in- 
dustry suffered  intensely  from  this  calamity,  though  the 
average  wages  in  this  industry  have  improved  considerably, 
and,  more  especially  in  the  Rhenish  Westphalian  districts, 
would  have  been  considered  tempting  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances. It  is,  then,  not  surprising  that  a  number  of  in- 
dustries should  have  to  rely  upon  foreign  workers  to  fill  the 
vacancies." 

Continuing,  the  Consul-General  tells  that  in  1905 
the  influx  of  foreign  workers  was  151,557  in  Rhenish 
Prussia,  78,252  in  Silesia,  57,358  in  Westphalia,  with- 
out giving  figures  for  the  agricultural  districts. 

The  great  scarcity  of  workers  to  which  our  Consuls 
testified  prevailed  not  only  during  1906  and  the  first 
nine  months  of  1907,  but  also  during  several  preceding 
years.  Therefore  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Mann- 
heim sent  in  autumn  1907  a  petition  to  the  Govern- 
ment, in  which  it  prayed  : — 


GERMAN    LABOUR   CONDITIONS        711 

"  A  scarcity  of  male  and  female  workers  has  prevailed  in 
our  districts  during  some  considerable  time,  as  reference  to 
the  yearly  reports  of  the  Chamber  for  1904,  1905,  and  1906 
shows.  During  several  years  this  scarcity  of  workers  has 
been  constantly  increasing.  This  scarcity  has,  in  the  course 
of  this  year,  grown  to  such  an  extent  that  various  industries 
have  been  very  seriously  hampered  in  their  operations,  and 
have  suffered  considerable  loss  and  damage.  Experience  has 
shown  that  that  scarcity  of  workers  cannot  be  remedied  by 
offering  higher  wages.  The  workers  know  that  labour  is 
scarce.  An  increase  in  wages  does  not  increase  the  output. 
On  the  contrary,  employers  are  seriously  complaining  that 
their  workers  produce  less  and  less,  knowing  that  they  are  the 
masters  of  the  situation." 

The  petition  from  which  the  foregoing  extract  is 
taken  is  dated  the  I3th  November  1907,  a  time  when 
employment  was  bad  in  Great  Britain  and  when  our 
trade  unions  reported  that  5  per  cent,  of  their  members 
were  unemployed.  Commenting  on  this  position, 
the  Mannheim  Chamber  of  Commerce  stated  in  its 
report : — 

"  The  causes  of  the  permanent  scarcity  of  workers  in 
Germany  are  sufficiently  known.  The  continuous  growth  of 
our  industries  and  trade  requires  a  large  additional  supply 
of  workers,  which  is  not  forthcoming  through  the  natural 
increase  of  our  population." 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  natural  increase  of 
the  German  population  exceeds  the  enormous  figure 
of  900,000  a  year,  whilst  the  British  population,  with 
a  natural  increase  of  only  400,000  a  year,  is  suffer- 
ing constantly  from  widespread  unemployment  and 
consequent  emigration,  the  foregoing  statement  is 
certainly  very  remarkable. 

Work  being  usually  very  plentiful  and  workers 
scarce,  unemployment  is  as  a  rule  practically  un- 
known in  Germany.  Wages  are  high  and  have  been 
rapidly  rising,  and  they  are  in  many,  if  not  in  most, 


712  MODERN    GERMANY 

instances  higher  than  British  wages  except  in  certain 
selected  trade  unions.  The  yearly  report  of  1908  of 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Elberfeld,  for  instance, 
states :  "  Wages  in  Germany  are  in  numerous  in- 
stances higher  than  wages  in  England  and  France." 
The  report  of  the  British  Consul  in  Frankfort  of  1908 
says :  "  When  recently  some  important  chemical 
works  were  meditating  the  establishment  of  a  fac- 
tory in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Directorate  of  the 
German  company  decided,  after  minute  inquiries,  so 
to  prepare  the  plans  of  the  new  factory  that  various 
branches  of  their  •  German  manufacture  could  later 
be  transferred  to  the  United  Kingdom  because  'the 
workman's  wages  are,  at  the  present  moment,  con- 
siderably lower  in  England  than  in  Germany.' '  The 
1908  report  of  the  Berlin  Chamber  of  Commerce  com- 
plained that  the  ready-made  clothes  trade  is  leaving 
Berlin  for  London  because  wages  in  London  are  lower 
than  they  are  in  Berlin. 

It  may  be  objected  that  the  rapid  rise  in  wages  in 
Germany  to,  and  even  above,  the  English  level  of 
wages  has  been  offset,  or  more  than  offset,  by  the  rise 
in  the  cost  of  living.  That  objection  is  refuted  by 
the  painstaking  and  thorough  statistical  investigations 
published  in  the  Arbeitsmarkt  Correspondenz,  by  Mr. 
Calwer,  a  leading  German  statistician,  who,  being  a 
Socialist,  might  be  expected  to  take  rather  too  pessi- 
mistic than  too  roseate  a  view  of  the  condition  of  the 
workers  in  Germany.  The  1908  report  of  the  Chamber 
of  Commerce  at  Hanover  states  : — 

"  The  industries  of  Germany  have,  during  the  last  decade, 
prospered  more  than  the  industries  in  any  other  country,  and 
the  working  men  have  participated  in  the  rising  prosperity 
to  a  substantial  extent.  During  the  last  twelve  years,  1895- 
1906,  the  wages  of  industrial  workers  have  on  an  average  risen 


GERMAN   LABOUR   CONDITIONS        713 

by  from  37  to  38  per  cent.  Although  this  improvement  in 
wages  has  to  some  extent  been  counterbalanced  by  the  rise 
in  prices,  prices  have  risen  during  the  same  time  only  by 
22  per  cent.  Hence  the  real  yearly  income  of  working  men 
has  considerably  improved,  a  fact  which  is  borne  out  by  daily 
observation." 

The  foregoing  statement  was  confirmed  in  the 
report  of  the  British  Consul  in  Berlin,  who  supplied 
similar  figures. 

The  frequently  heard  assertion  that  the  cost  of 
living  is  higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain  is 
absurd.  If  it  were  true  thrifty  German  rentiers  with 
moderate  incomes  would  settle  in  England.  Instead 
of  this  we  find  everywhere  in  Germany  English  people 
of  reduced  means  who  have  settled  in  that  country 
because  living  is  cheaper  over  there.  It  is  true  that 
the  British  Board  of  Trade  has  issued  a  bulky  report 
in  1908  which  tried  to  prove  that  cost  of  living  was 
higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain,  but  the 
conclusions  of  that  report  were  unanimously  repudiated 
by  all  the  German  statistical  offices  with  which  I 
communicated,  and  I  have  proved,  at  the  hand  of 
the  official  information  supplied  to  me,  the  misleading 
character  of  the  Board  of  Trade  Report  in  a  penny 
pamphlet,  "  Economic  Problems  and  Board  of  Trade 
Methods — An  Exposure,"  published  by  Spottis- 
woode  &  Co.,  London. 

The  great  prosperity  of  the  German  workers  may 
be  seen  not  only  by  the  small  number  of  unemployed 
workers  and  of  emigrants,  and  by  the  huge  amounts 
deposited  in  the  German  savings  banks  and  similar 
institutions,  but  also  by  a  comparison  of  German  and 
British  pauperism.  The  Second  Fiscal  Blue  Book 
(Cd.  2337)  gives  statistics  of  pauperism  relating  to 
about  one-seventh  of  the  German  population.  Ac- 
cording to  these  statistics,  pauperism  in  Germany 


714  MODERN    GERMANY 

fluctuated  in  the  period  1884-1901  between  294  and 
314  per  10,000,  and  amounted,  therefore,  on  an  average 
to  304  per  10,000.  According  to  the  statistical 
abstract  for  the  United  Kingdom,  there  are  at  any 
time  on  an  average  about  1,200,000  paupers  in  receipt 
of  relief  in  Great  Britain,  whilst  the  total  number  of 
individuals  relieved  per  year  comes  to  about  3,000,000, 
as  a  recently  published  White-paper  shows.  As  Great 
Britain  has  44,000,000  inhabitants,  it  follows  that  we 
have  about  700  paupers  per  10,000  inhabitants  in 
receipt  of  relief,  as  compared  with  304  per  10,000  in 
Germany.  In  other  words,  for  every  three  German 
paupers  there  are,  according  to  Blue  Book  2337,  no 
less  than  seven  British  paupers.  The  German  pauper 
figures  given  in  the  Blue  Book  relate  chiefly  to  Bavaria 
and  Berlin,  where  pauperism  is  much  greater  than  in 
other  parts  of  Germany,  and  therefore  they  greatly 
overstate  the  case.  Besides,  Great  Britain,  the  most 
charitable  nation  in  the  world,  spends  yearly  about 
£20,000,000  on  private  charity,  and  the  armies  of  poor 
maintained  by  private  British  charity,  though  being 
paupers,  are  not  classed  as  paupers  unless  they  receive 
parish  relief  at  the  same  time.  If  due  allowance  be 
made  for  these  two  factors,  it  would  probably  appear 
that  for  every  three  paupers  in  Germany  there  are 
from  nine  to  ten  paupers  in  Great  Britain. 

As  workmen  are  probably  the  best  judges  of  labour 
conditions,  I  extract  from  the  report  of  the  Gains- 
borough Commission  of  working-men  who  in  mid- 
winter, 1906,  travelled  all  over  Germany,  the  following 
passages,  which  throw  a  vivid  light  upon  labour 
conditions  in  the  various  parts  of  that  country  : — 

P.  10.  "  The  general  conditions  of  the  working  classes  in  the 
industrial  town  of  Crefeld  impressed  us.  Wherever  we  came 
into  contact  with  them  we  were  struck  by  their  genial 


GERMAN    LABOUR    CONDITIONS        715 

character,  general  physical  health,  cheerfulness  of  demeanour, 
and  freshness  about  their  work.  No  sign  of  extreme  poverty 
meets  the  eye  ;  the  problem  of  the  unemployed  obviously 
does  not  weigh  upon  the  municipal  authorities  at  the  present 
juncture." 

P.  29.  "  The  question  of  the  unemployed  does  not  exist 
here  (Dortmund).  We  found  that  an  immense  number  of 
Polish  and  Italian  workmen  flock  hither." 

P.  31.  "  We  could,  however,  see  no  trace  of  want  (Dort- 
mund)." 

P.  44.  "  .  .  .  We  have  been  forced  to  face  the  fact  that  it 
has  been  during  the  period  following  upon  the  introduction 
of  Protection  duties  by  Prince  Bismarck  in  1 879,  that  Germany 
has  ceased  to  be  poor  and  has  become  well-to-do ;  that  her 
workpeople  have  received  a  large  increase  in  wages ;  that 
the  general  social  condition  of  the  latter  has  improved  ;  that 
Germany's  industry  has  developed ;  that  she  has  succeeded 
in  extending  her  foreign  trade  and  in  acquiring  ready  markets 
for  her  continuously  developing  industry." 

P.  50.  "  In  Solingen  one  of  the  party  went  into  a  horse- 
meat  restaurant,  where  all  kinds  of  people  were  dining  off 
horse-meat.  It  was  the  restaurant  we  spoke  of  in  our  Elber- 
feld  report.  The  proprietor  does  a  good  business,  but  his 
clients  are  not  exclusively  working  men,  who  indeed  form  the 
minority.  There  is  evidently  a  taste  for  this  meat  in  Solingen, 
where  the  meat  is  declared  to  be  very  palatable.  We  heard 
of  a  servant-maid  here  who  exclaimed  one  day  to  her  mistress, 
'  Can't  we  have  some  horse-meat  one  day  for  dinner  ? ' ' 

P.  84.  "  In  the  busy  districts  of  Rhineland  and  Westphalia 
we  came  into  contact  with  thousands  of  our  German  com- 
rades engaged  in  the  heavy  industry,  and  looked  in  vain  for 
the  signs  of  poverty  which  certain  persons  in  Gainsborough 
and  elsewhere  told  us  would  confront  us  on  all  sides.  .  .  . 
Nothing  indicative  in  the  remotest  degree  of  widespread 
distress  has  come  within  the  limit  of  our  vision  ;  on  the 
contrary  there  is  every  sign  of  increasing  prosperity.  Occu- 
pation is  to  be  had  everywhere  for  the  asking  of  it  in  all 
factories  and  at  all  works  in  the  towns  we  have  passed 
through.  Instead  of  there  being  a  superabundance  of  workers 
and  consequently  a  crowd  of  '  unemployed,'  employers  are 
clamouring  on  all  sides  for  skilled  labour." 


716  MODERN    GERMANY 

P.  1 08.  "  One  of  the  leading  Socialists  (Frankfort-on-Maine) 
assured  us  that  the  consumption  of  horse-flesh  could  not  be 
attributed  to  the  high  tariffs,  seeing  that  its  consumption  was 
confined  generally  to  those  who  had  a  particular  liking  for  this 
sort  of  meat,  and  did  not  affect  workmen  as  such.'* 

P.  1 1 6.  "The  unskilled  working  man  in  Germany  is  un- 
doubtedly as  well,  and  in  many  cases  relatively  better  paid 
than  unskilled  working  men  in  England.  During  our  stay  in 
Germany  we  have  nowhere  seen  clusters  of  workmen  hanging 
about  idle  and  unemployed  in  the  streets." 

P.  1 1 8.  "  Wherever  we  have  been  in  Prussia  we  have  seen 
no  lack  of  employment  amongst  industrial  workpeople  ;  on 
the  contrary  there  has  been  everywhere  a  demand  for  skilled 
workmen  which  could  not  be  supplied.  No  German  muni- 
cipality is  being  harassed  by  an  '  unemployed '  problem ; 
whilst  in  Great  Britain,  which  boasts  of  the  advantage  of 
Free  Trade  and  of  untaxed  wheat,  the  streets  are  thronged 
with  strong  men  who  have  no  work  to  do,  and  charity  is  being 
generously  lavished  upon  them  without  much  avail.  We 
have  everywhere  been  told  by  the  German  working  man  that 
he  prefers  rye  bread  to  wheaten  bread,  and  that  he  would  not 
at  any  price  give  up  his  rye  bread  for  the  best  of  wheaten 
bread  that  we  eat  in  England." 

P.  204.  "  In  going  through  the  workmen's  quarters  in 
German  large  towns  we  were  struck  by  the  fact  that  nowhere 
have  we  seen  the  same  abject  dirt  and  misery  that  one  meets 
with,  e.g.,  in  London  and  Liverpool  or  Glasgow." 

P.  227.  "  He  pays  no  more  in  a  Protectionist  country  for 
his  bread,  his  coffee,  his  sugar,  his  clothing,  or  his  boots  than 
we  do  in  England.  It  would  be  of  no  use  to  offer  him  white 
wheaten  bread  and  jam,  which  we  consider  in  England  to 
be  necessaries.  He  prefers  his  brown  rye  bread  and  other 
delicacies  at  which  our  people  would  turn  up  their  noses. 
His  meat  is  just  now  dearer  than  it  is  with  us  ;  but  in  normal 
times  we  do  not  consider  that  he  is  worse  off  relatively  in  this 
respect  than  we  are  when  we  make  due  allowances  for  national 
differences  of  taste." 


CHAPTER   XXX 

GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS 

A  CONSIDERABLE  number  of  British  working  men's 
deputations  have  travelled  through  Germany  with  a 
view  to  discovering  whether  the  working  man  fares 
better  under  Protection  or  under  Free  Trade.  Their 
Reports  teem  with  interesting  and  valuable  facts  and 
shrewd  observations,  but  they  fail  to  give  a  com- 
prehensive picture  of  German  industrial  conditions 
as  a  whole.  Therefore  the  following  pages  should 
prove  of  interest  to  those  who  wish  to  focus  the  in- 
dustrial conditions  of  modern  Germany  in  their 
entirety,  and  to  compare  them  with  the  conditions 
prevailing  in  this  country. 

Whether  the  workers  of  a  nation  are  prosperous  or 
not  depends,  in  the  first  place,  on  the  productivity  of 
the  national  industries,  for  it  is  obvious  that  only  a 
people  which  produces  much  will  be  able  to  consume 
much.  In  the  second  place,  the  prosperity  of  the 
workers  depends  upon  the  adequate  expansion  of  the 
national  industries,  for  every  year  adds  to  the  existing 
population  fresh  numbers  who  have  to  be  housed, 
clothed,  and  fed,  whilst  the  progress  of  civilisation 
and  of  luxury  creates  constantly  new  wants  among 
the  citizens.  As  great,  but  stagnant,  industries 
cannot  provide  for  a  rapidly  increasing  population 
with  rapidly  increasing  wants,  the  masses  of  the 

people  can  be  prosperous  only  if  the  national  industries 

717 


7i8  MODERN   GERMANY 

are  so  vigorously  expanding  that  they  are  able  to 
provide  the  additional  employment  and  commodities 
which  are  constantly  called  for. 

Germany  introduced  Protection  in  1879.  Let  us 
compare  German  and  British  industrial  conditions, 
taking  as  starting-point  1880,  wherever  the  figures  for 
that  year  are  available. 

The  great  productive  industries  are  four  in  number  : 
mining,  manufacturing,  agriculture,  trade.  Germany, 
like  Great  Britain,  mines  principally  coal  and  iron  ore. 
The  production  of  these  has  progressed  as  follows  in 
the  two  countries,  according  to  the  Statistical  Abstract 
for  Foreign  Countries  (Cd.  5446),  published  late  in 
autumn  1911  :  — 

PRODUCTION  OF  COAL  AND  LIGNITE 

In  Germany  In,  G™at 

Britain 

Tons.  Tons. 

1880  .......  59,Tl8,000  146,969,000 

1890  .......  89,291,000  181,614,000 

1900  .......  149,788,000  225,181,000 

1909  .......  217,433,000  263,774,000 

PRODUCTION  OF  IRON  ORE 


Tons.  Tons. 

1880  .......    7,239,000  18,026,000 

1890  .......   11,406,000  13,781,000 

1900  .......   18,964,000  14,028,000 

1909  .......   25,505,000  14,980,000 

In  1880  Great  Britain  produced  150  per  cent,  more 
coal  and  160  per  cent,  more  iron  ore  than  Germany. 
Things  have  changed  since  then.  In  1909  Great 


GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    719 

Britain  produced  60  per  cent,  less  iron  ore  than 
Germany,  and  her  superiority  in  the  production  of  coal 
has  shrunk  to  a  paltry  20  per  cent.,  and  threatens  to 
be  a  thing  of  the  past  in  a  few  years.  On  balance, 
Great  Britain  exports  60,000,000  tons  of  coal  a  year, 
whilst  Germany  exports  only  10,000,000  tons.  Hence 
it  appears  that  Germany  has  already  overtaken  Great 
Britain  in  the  consumption  of  coal.  In  value  Ger- 
many's mining  production  has,  according  to  the 
Statistical  Abstract  for  Foreign  Countries,  increased 
in  value  as  follows  :  — 

I 
1880     ........    18,775,000 

1890     .    .    ......    36,282,000 

1900     ........    63,162,000 

1909      ........     97.393.ooo 

In  value  Germany's  mining  production  has  grown 
fivefold  during  the  twenty-nine  years  under  review. 

As  the  manufacturing  industries  are  based  on  the 
use  of  coal,  iron  and  steam,  the  manufacturing 
eminence  and  progress  of  a  country  can  best  be 
measured  by  the  national  consumption  of  coal  and 
iron,  and  by  the  power  of  its  steam  engines.  As 
regards  the  consumption  of  coal  and  iron,  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  compare  as  follows  :— 

CONSUMPTION  OF  COAL  AND  LIGNITE 


Tons.  Tons. 

l88o  .......    57,008,000  129,078,000 

1890  .......    90,798,000  152,876,000 

1900  .......   149,804,000  179,083,000 

1907  .......   208,195,000  195,466,000 

1909  .......   206,321,000  198,080,000 


720 


MODERN  GERMANY 


PRODUCTION  OF  PIG  IRON 


In  Germany 


In  Great 
Britain 


Tons.  Tons. 

1880 2,713,000  7.749,233 

1890 4,651,000  7,904,214 

1900 8,507,000  8,959,691 

1907 12,875,000  10,114,000 

1909 12,645,000  9,532,000 

CONSUMPTION  OF  PIG  IRON 

In  Germany        ln,  G*eat 
Britain 

Tons.  Tons. 

1880 2,713,000  6,176,673 

1890 4,940,000  6,824,925 

1900 9,106,000  7,705,201 

1907 13,016,000  8,273,000 

1909 12,308,000  8,501,000 

In  1880  Great  Britain  consumed  72,000,000  tons 
of  coal  more  than  Germany.  In  1909  she  consumed 
8,000,000  tons  of  coal  less  than  Germany.  In  1880 
Great  Britain  produced  5,000,000  tons  of  pig  iron 
more  than  Germany.  In  1909  she  produced  3,100,000 
tons  less  than  Germany.  In  1880  Great  Britain  con- 
sumed 3,500,000  tons  of  iron  more  than  Germany. 
In  1909  she  consumed  3,800,000  tons  less  than  Ger- 
many. As  the  German  people  use  much  wood  for 
fuel,  and  require  besides  less  coal  for  their  closed 
stoves  than  Englishmen  do  for  their  open  fires,  the 
difference  in  Germany's  favour  is  far  greater  than 
appears  from  the  foregoing  figures. 

Whilst,  since  the  introduction  of  Protection, 
Germany's  coal  consumption  has  quadrupled,  and  her 
iron  consumption  has  quintupled,  the  power  of|her 


GERMAN   INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    721 

engines    has    increased    even    more    rapidly,    as    the 
figures  for  Prussia  and  Bavaria  show  : — 

HORSE  POWER  OF  STATIONARY  STEAM  ENGINES 

In  Prussia  In  Bavaria 

1879  ....  887,780  1879  ....  70,678 

1895  ....  2,358,175  1889  ....  124,680 

1909  ....  5,768,010  1908  ....  428,253 

1910  ....  5,837,782  1910  ....        

Since  the  introduction  of  Protection  the  engine- 
power  of  Germany  has  grown  no  less  than  sevenfold. 
Unfortunately,  economic  science,  as  distinguished 
from  barren  economic  theory,  has  been  very  greatly 
neglected  in  this  country.  Hence  no  statistics  of 
steam  engines  similar  to  those  published  in  Germany 
are  available  for  Great  Britain,  and  we  are  spared 
a  comparison  which  probably  would  be  exceedingly 
humiliating  to  this  country.  The  figures  given  show 
that  the  engine-power  of  Germany  has  increased 
enormously  since  the  introduction  of  Protection,  and 
as  her  new  machines  are  better,  and  therefore  more 
productive,  than  her  old  ones,  and  do  not  stand  idle, 
we  are  justified  in  assuming  that  the  industrial  pro- 
duction of  Germany  has  grown  at  least  sixfold  during 
thirty  years  of  Protection. 

If  we  now  turn  to  agriculture,  we  find  that  the 
German  harvest  has  increased  as  follows  : — 

THE  GERMAN  HARVEST 

Tons 
Rye  Wheat  Oats 

1880 4,952,525    2,345,278    4,228,128 

1890 5,868,078    2,830,921    4,913,544 

IQOO 8,550,659    3,841,165    7,091,930 

1908 10,736,874    3.?67>767    7>694.833 

1910  .....  10,511,160    3,861,479    7,900,376 

2Z 


722  MODERN    GERMANY 

THE  GERMAN  HARVEST 

Tons 

Potatoes  Sugar                       Hay 

1880 19,466,242  415,000  19,563,388 

1890 23,320,983  1,261,000  18,859,888 

1900 40,585,317  1,795,000  23,116,276 

1908 46,342,726  2,139,000  27,076,097 

1910 43,468,397  2.037.397  28,250,115 

During  the  thirty  years  under  review,  when  the 
productivity  of  her  mines  and  the  output  of  her 
manufacturing  industries  have  grown  about  seven- 
fold, the  rural  industries  of  Germany  have  not  decayed 
as  have  our  own.  On  the  contrary,  her  soil  produces 
now  twice  the  quantity  of  bread  corn,  oats,  and  potatoes, 
and  five  times  the  quantity  of  sugar,  which  it  produced 
before  the  introduction  of  Protection.  During  the 
same  period  British  agriculture  has  rapidly  decayed, 
"  owing  to  our  industrial  prosperity,"  as  the  Free 
Traders  tell  us,  and  all  our  crops,  from  wheat  to  hops, 
have  shrunk  most  lamentably,  and  have  caused 
millions  of  British  acres  to  be  deserted  by  the  plough 
and  to  revert  to  grass. 

The  increase  of  Germany's  meat  production  during 
the  last  three  decades  is  no  less  surprising  than  the 
increase  of  her  crops.  Her  meat  production  has  more 
than  kept  pace  with  the  increase  of  her  population,  as 
the  following  table  indicates  : — 

Population  of  Cattle  in  Pigs  in 

1873  .  .  . 

1883  .  .  . 

1892  .  .  . 

1897  .  .  . 

1900  . 

1904  .  .  . 

1907  .  .  .   62,083,000     20,630,544     22,146,532 


Germany 

Germany 

Germany 

41,564,000 

15.776,702 

7,124,088 

46,016,000 

15,786,764 

9,206,195 

50,266,000 

17.555.834 

12,174,442 

53.509,000 

18,490,772 

14,274,557 

56,046,000 

18,939,692 

16,807,014 

57,475,000 

19.331.568 

18,920,666 

GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    723 

It  will  be  noticed  that  between  1873  and  1907  the 
population  of  Germany  has  increased  by  50  per  cent. 
During  the  same  period  the  number  of  her  cattle  has 
increased  by  33  per  cent.,  and  that  of  her  pigs  by  no 
less  than  200  per  cent.  Pork  is  the  favourite  meat 
of  the  German  workers,  whilst  mutton  is  little  esteemed 
by  them.  In  beef  and  pork  combined  Germany  now 
produces,  per  head  of  population,  twice  as  much  meat 
as  she  did  thirty  years  ago.  Her  meat  production 
has  so  greatly  increased  that  Germany,  notwithstand- 
ing the  greatly  increased  meat  consumption  of  her 
people,  has  become  practically  entirely  independent 
of  foreign  meat  supplies  during  the  very  time  when  our 
meat  production  has  remained  stationary,  and  we 
have  become  dangerously  dependent  on  foreign  supplies 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  meat  we  eat.  A  comparison 
of  British  and  German  live  stock  is  humiliating.  In 
1907  Great  Britain  possessed  only  11,630,142  cattle 
and  3,967,163  pigs. 

It  is  worth  noting  that,  according  to  the  inter- 
national statistics  published  in  the  Year-Book  of  the 
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  for  1908, 
Germany  produces  one-third  of  the  world's  potato 
crop.  It  is  estimated  that  this  enormous  crop  is  used 
as  follows  : — 

12,000,000  tons  for  human  food. 
17,600,000          for  fodder. 


2,500,000 
1,400,000 
5,200,000 
5,000,000 


for  making  spirit, 
for  making  starch, 
for  seed, 
for  loss  and  waste. 


Total     43,700,000 

The  British  potato  crop  amounted  in  1907  to 
5,223,973  tons.  The  whole  of  the  United  Kingdom 
produces,  therefore,  merely  as  much  potatoes  as 


724  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany  uses  every  year  for  seed  alone.  According 
to  the  American  statistics,  Germany  produces  one- 
sixth  of  the  world's  sugar.  She  raises  yearly  from 
12,000,000  tons  to  15,000,000  tons  of  sugar  beet, 
which  furnish  2,000,000  tons  of  sugar  and  10,000,000 
tons  of  fodder,  which,  like  the  bulk  of  the  potato 
harvest,  is  converted  into  pig  meat.  Germany's 
22,000,000  pigs  are  merely  a  by-product  of  her  in- 
tensive agriculture. 

As  all  trade  is  exchange,  the  greatness  of  a  nation's 
trade  cannot  fairly  be  measured  by  its  foreign  trade 
alone,  as  our  Free  Traders  do,  especially  as  the  home 
trade  is  far  more  important  than  is  the  foreign  trade, 
both  in  Great  Britain  and  in  Germany.  The  German 
home  trade  is  carried  largely  by  water,  and  its  increase 
during  the  last  three  decades  may  be  gauged  from  the 
following  figures,  which  are  taken  from  the  Royal 
Commission  Report  on  Waterways  (Cd.  4841)  and 
the  German  Statistical  Year-Book  : — 

Ton-miles  on  Ton-miles  on 

German  railways  German  waterways 

1875  .  .  .  6,758,000,000  1,798,000,000 

1885  .  .  .  10,292,000,000  2,976,000,000 

1895  .  .  .  16,430,000,000  4,650,000,000 

1905  .  .  .  27,652,000,000  9,300,000,000 

Carrying  capacity  of 
German  inland  shipping 

1877 1,379,222  tons 

1887 2,100,705  „ 

l897 3,370.447  „ 

1907 5,914,020  ,, 

During  the  last  thirty  years  Germany's  railway 
freight  traffic  has  increased  by  more  than  300  per  cent., 
Germany's  inland  waterways  traffic  has  increased  by 
more  than  400  per  cent.,  and  the  tonnage  of  her  inland 


GERMAN   INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    725 

shipping  has  increased  by  more  than  300  per  cent. 
Unfortunately,  a  comparison  of  Germany's  home 
trade,  as  given  in  these  figures,  with  that  of  Great 
Britain,  is  impossible,  owing  to  the  deplorable  de- 
fectiveness  of  our  statistics.  Still,  the  rudimentary 
British  figures  existing  suffice  to  show  that,  during 
the  last  thirty  years,  the  railway  freight  traffic  of 
Great  Britain  has  grown  little  compared  with  that 
of  Germany,  whilst  our  canal  traffic  has  remained 
stationary.  How  enormous  is  the  German  home  trade 
may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that,  in  1907,  the  German 
merchant  marine  measured  2,629,093  tons  net.  Hence 
Germany's  inland  fleet  vastly  exceeds  in  carrying 
capacity  her  great  ocean  fleet.  Our  inland  shipping, 
with  its  toy  barges,  is  quite  insignificant,  and  here, 
again,  the  absence  of  exact  statistical  information 
must  be  deplored. 

Free  Traders  never  tire  of  assuring  us  that  Protec- 
tion makes  production  dear,  that  it  thus  hampers  the 
sale  of  domestic  manufactures  in  foreign  markets, 
and  "  destroys  "  the  export  trade.  Since  1879  the 
exportation  of  German  manufactures  has  increased  as 
follows — 

£ 

1880 83,500,000 

1890 107,440,000 

1900 149,100,000 

1910 239,800,000 

The  foregoing  figures  prove  that  Germany's  foreign 
trade  also  is  exceedingly  prosperous  and  rapidly  ex- 
panding. During  the  period  1880-1910,  when  Ger- 
many's manufactured  exports  have  increased  by  no 
less  than  200  per  cent.,  the  manufactured  exports  of 
Great  Britain  have  increased  by  only  70  per  cent. 

The  statistics  given  prove  that  in  all  the  productive 


726  MODERN   GERMANY 

industries,  in  mining,  manufacture,  agriculture,  and 
commerce,  Germany's  progress  is  stupendous,  that 
Germany  has  overtaken  Great  Britain  in  industrial 
production,  although  we  are  still  supreme  in  cotton 
and  shipping  ;  and  it  stands  to  reason  that  the  German 
people  must  have  fully  participated  in  this  enormous 
expansion  of  national  wealth  production  and  conse- 
quent prosperity. 

Whether  the  masses  of  the  people,  of  whom  the 
majority  are  wage-earners,  are  prosperous  or  not 
depends  on  three  factors  :  employment,  wages,  cost 
of  living.  Each  of  these  three  factors  will  be  separately 
considered. 

Unemployment  appears  to  be  many  times  larger 
in  Great  Britain  than  in  Germany.  According  to  the 
statistics  of  unemployment  among  Trade  Unionists, 
published  by  the  British  Board  of  Trade,  there  are, 
as  a  rule,  from  three  to  four  unemployed  workers  in 
Great  Britain  to  every  single  unemployed  worker  in 
Germany.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  working  men 
leave  their  country  chiefly  through  lack  of  employ- 
ment. A  comparison  of  the  emigration  statistics  of 
the  two  countries  shows  that  there  are,  as  a  rule,  from 
ten  to  twelve  British  emigrants  to  every  single  German 
emigrant.  The  harrowing  tale  of  the  British  emigra- 
tion statistics,  and  of  the  British  statistics  of  unem- 
ployment among  Trade  Unionists,  is  amply  confirmed 
by  a  comparison  of  the  British  decennial  censuses 
with  the  German  industrial  censuses  of  1892,  1895, 
and  1907.  Unfortunately,  the  British  censuses  and 
the  German  industrial  censuses  are  not  strictly  com- 
parable. They  have  been  taken  in  different  years, 
and  different  classifications  have  been  adopted  in 
the  two  countries.  Still,  the  existing  figures  suffice  to 
show  how  employment  has  changed  in  certain  im- 


GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    727 

portant  and  comparable  industries  of  the  two  countries 
during  a  considerable  space  of  time. 

EMPLOYMENT  IN  CERTAIN  TRADES  IN  GERMANY 


Metal  and 
Machinery  Trades 

Textile 
Trades 

Building 
Trades 

Agriculture 

1882  . 

815,802 

910,089 

533,5  IJC 

8,236,496 

1895  . 

.      1,247,258 

945.  191 

1,353,637 

8,292,692 

1907  . 

.      2,093,147 

1.057,243 

1,905,987 

9,883,257 

EMPLOYMENT  IN  CERTAIN  TRADES  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 

Metals  and  T,     ...  Building  .     •     ,A 

Machinery  Textl!e  Construction  Agriculture 

1881  .  .  978,102  1,430,985  926,135  2,574,031 
1891  .  .  1,145,386  1,519,861  955,573  2,420,926 
1901  .  .  1,475,410  1,462,001  1,335,820  2,262,454 

A  comparison  of  the  two  tables  is  most  interesting. 
It  shows  that  during  the  period  covered  by  the  last 
three  censuses,  the  German  metal  and  machinery 
trades  have  provided  employment  for  1,280,000 
additional  workers,  whilst  the  British  metal  and 
machinery  trades  have  provided  work  for  only  497,000 
additional  workers  ;  that  the  workers  in  the  building 
trade  have  increased  by  1,370,000  in  Germany,  and 
by  only  410,000  in  the  United  Kingdom ;  that  the 
workers  in  the  textile  trades  have  increased  by  150,000 
in  Germany,  by  only  31,000  in  the  United  Kingdom ; 
that  agriculture  provides  work  for  1,600,000  additional 
workers  in  Germany,  and  for  312,000  fewer  workers 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  Further  figures,  which  I 
refrain  from  giving  through  lack  of  space,  confirm 
the  tale  of  vastly  increased  employment  in  Germany, 
and  of  slowly  and  inadequately  increasing,  stagnant, 
or  shrinking  employment  in  Great  Britain. 

The  British  population  increases  by  only  400,000  a 
year,  whilst  the  German  population  increases  by  no 
less  than  900,000  a  year.  Notwithstanding  our  re- 


728  MODERN    GERMANY 

latively  small  increase  in  population,  between  200,000 
and  300,000  people  emigrate  on  balance  every  year 
from  this  country,  whilst  Germany,  with  her  immense 
increase  in  population,  has  an  emigration  of  from 
20,000  to  30,000  only.  On  balance  she  has  no  emi- 
gration, but  receives  instead  from  50,000  to  100,000 
people  a  year  from  abroad,  immigration  exceeding 
emigration  by  these  numbers.  The  census  figures 
given  in  these  pages  supply  an  explanation  of  this 
strange  phenomenon  which  must  be  alarming  to  every 
British  patriot.  People  flee  from  this  country  by 
the  hundred  thousand,  as  from  a  stricken  land,  through 
lack  of  work,  whilst  they  migrate  into  Germany  by 
the  hundred  thousand,  being  attracted  thereto  by 
regular  employment  and  good  wages.  In  some  dis- 
tricts of  Germany  the  amount  spent  in  wages  has 
trebled  and  quadrupled  within  twenty  years.  Accord- 
ing to  the  report  of  the  Dortmund  Mining  Society  for 
1906,  the  wages  paid  to  the  Dortmund  coal-miners  have 
increased  from  £3,859,423  in  1886  to  £18,942,579  in 
1906.  In  1910  they  amounted  to  £23,114,778  accord- 
ing to  the  Statistisches  Jahrbuch.  Those  paid  to  the 
coal-miners  of  Upper  Silesia  have  increased  from 
£981,995  in  1886  to  £4,110,626  in  1906,  and  to  £5,603,633 
in  1910.  Those  paid  to  the  coal-miners  in  the  Saar 
district  have  increased  from  £999,840  in  1886  to 
£2,745,099  in  1906,  and  to  £2,939,405  in  1910.  We 
cannot  wonder  that  a  very  large  percentage  of  the 
coal-miners  in  Germany  are  foreigners — Russians, 
Poles,  Austrians,  Italians,  &c. 

The  price  of  labour,  like  the  price  of  all  commodities, 
is  regulated  by  the  law  of  demand  and  supply.  Hence 
it  is  only  natural  that  the  great  demand  for  labour 
of  every  kind  which  prevails  in  Germany  has  raised 
general  wages  very  greatly  in  that  country,  whilst 


GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    729 

the  insufficient  demand  for  labour  in  Great  Britain 
not  only  drives  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Englishmen 
every  year  out  of  the  country,  but  has  depressed 
general  British  wages  considerably  below  the  German 
level.  In  1908  the  British  Board  of  Trade  issued  a 
report  on  German  industrial  conditions  (Cd.  4032),  in 
which  we  were  informed  that  wages  are  considerably 
higher  and  the  food  prices  considerably  lower  in 
Great  Britain  than  in  Germany.  That  report  has 
been  widely  quoted  by  the  Free  Trade  Press.  It 
contained  summary  comparisons  of  German  and 
British  wages  in  general,  but  the  calculations  supplied 
by  the  Board  of  Trade  were  utterly  fallacious  and 
misleading,  because  the  wage-figures  given  are  re- 
stricted to  the  skilled  workers  in  a  few  selected  in- 
dustries. The  summary  comparisons  supplied  are  not 
by  any  means  representative  of  the  prevailing  general 
wages.  For  every  skilled  worker  in  Germany  and  in 
Great  Britain  there  are  six  or  seven  unskilled  workers. 
Consequently  it  was  unscientific,  unfair,  and  inad- 
missible to  compare  merely  the  wages  of  a  small,  but 
in  Great  Britain  highly  favoured  minority,  and  treat 
these  wages  as  wages  representative  of  generally  pre- 
vailing wages. 

Whilst  it  is  true  that  in  a  few  trades,  such  as  those 
selected  by  the  Board  of  Trade  for  comparison  in 
the  report  mentioned,  the  nominal  wages  of  the 
skilled  workers,  that  is,  wages  which  leave  out  of 
account  loss  through  unemployment  and  short  time, 
may  be  higher  in  Great  Britain  than  in  Germany,  the 
general  level  of  wages,  and  especially  of  real  wages,  is 
certainly  lower,  because  the  wages  of  the  numerically 
far  more  important  unskilled  workers  are  considerably 
higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain.  In  Great 
Britain  skilled  workers  receive  approximately  twice 


730  MODERN   GERMANY 

the  wages  of  the  unskilled  workers  owing  to  the 
strength  of  the  firmly  established  Trade  Unions, 
which  artificially  restrict  the  supply  of  labour.  In 
Germany  the  Trade  Unions  are  of  very  recent  date, 
and  as  they  have  not  yet  succeeded  in  securing  ab- 
normally high  wages  for  their  members,  as  the  British 
Trade  Unions  have  done,  the  difference  in  the  wages  of 
skilled  and  unskilled  workers  is  very  slight.  How 
small  this  difference  is  may  be  seen  from  a  report, 
Household  Budgets  in  Families  of  Small  Means,  which 
was  published  by  the  German  Statistical  Office  in 
1909.  From  that  publication  we  learn  that  the 
following  average  wages — not  nominal  wages,  but  real 
wages  actually  earned  in  the  course  of  a  whole  year, 
which  allow  for  short  time  and  unemployment — were 
received  in  the  cases  investigated  : — 

£    s.    d.  s.     d. 

Skilled  workers  .  .  78  9  5  per  year  or  30  2  per  week. 
Unskilled  workers  .  .  65  3  o  „  or  25  i  „ 

Dockers 79  12  n        „        or  30     7        ,, 

Road  workers     ...     60  14  n        „        or  23     4        ,, 
General  labourers   .     .     67     5     8        ,,        or  25   n        „ 

Whilst  on  an  average  British  skilled  workers  in  full 
employ  earn  from  303.  to  353.  per  week,  British  un- 
skilled workers  earn  only  from  i8s.  to  223.  per  week. 
Possibly  the  average  level  of  wages  among  skilled 
Unionist  workers  is  slightly  higher  in  Great  Britain 
than  in  Germany,  owing  to  the  strength  of  the  British 
Trade  Unions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  average  level 
of  wages  among  unskilled  workers  is  certainly  con- 
siderably higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain, 
owing  to  the  greater  demand  for,  and  the  consequent 
scarcity  of,  labour. 

That  the  wages  of  many  German  workers,  especially 
of  non-Unionists,   who  form  the  vast  majority,   are 


GERMAN   INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    731 

higher  than  the  corresponding  British  wages,  has  been 
stated  by  many  competent  authorities.  The  report 
of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Elberfeld  of  1908 
stated :  "  Wages  in  Germany  are,  in  numerous  in- 
stances, higher  than  wages  in  England."  The  report 
of  the  Berlin  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  1908  com- 
plained that  the  ready-made  clothes  trade  was  leaving 
Berlin  for  London  "  because  wages  are  lower  in 
London  than  in  Berlin."  The  report  of  the  British 
Consul  in  Frankfurt  of  1908  said  :  "  When  recently 
some  important  chemical  works  were  meditating  the 
establishment  of  a  factory  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  directorate  of  the  German  company  decided,  after 
minute  inquiries,  so  to  prepare  the  plans  of  the  new 
factory  that  various  branches  of  their  German  manu- 
facture could  later  be  transferred  to  the  United 
Kingdom,  because  the  workman's  wages  are,  at  the 
present  moment,  considerably  lower  in  England  than 
in  Germany."  The  report  of  1909  of  the  British 
Consul  in  Frankfurt,  who,  by  the  by,  is  a  Free  Trader, 
stated :  "A  report  from  a  prominent  firm  in  the 
colour-printing  trade  runs  as  follows  :  '  While  years 
back  the  wages  paid  to  printers  in  Germany  were 
considerably  less  than  those  paid  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  we  should  say  that  to-day  little,  if  any, 
difference  exists  between  the  earnings  of  the  average 
printer  in  the  two  countries  ;  while,  with  regard  to  the 
specially  skilled  colour  printer,  we  should  say  that, 
if  anything,  the  German  to-day  is  in  receipt  of  a 
higher  wage  than  the  same  calibre  man  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  net  result  is,  that  whereas  years  ago 
fairly  good  colour  printed  work  might  be  procured 
from  Germany  at  a  saving  when  compared  with 
British  work  of  the  same  quality,  this  difference  has 
entirely  vanished  to-day,  with  the  very  natural  result 


732 


MODERN   GERMANY 


that  a  considerable  amount  of  the  work  which  used 
to  go  to  Germany  is  now  placed  with  British  firms.' 
A  report  from  a  prominent  brewing  concern  in  the 
North,  one  of  the  partners  of  which  has  given  special 
attention  to  the  question  of  comparative  wages, 
assures  me  that  he  has  no  doubt  whatsoever  that,  on 
the  whole,  the  German  workmen  in  the  brewing 
business  are  decidedly  better  paid  than  the  British. 
In  the  paper  industry  a  similar  impression  prevails." 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that,  if  we  take  into  account 
the  many  millions  of  unskilled  workers  who  receive  a 
higher  wage  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain,  the 
general  level  of  wages — the  national  real  wages  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  nominal  Trade  Union  wages — are 
considerably  higher  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain. 
How  greatly  German  wages  in  certain  trades  have 
risen  since  1879  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
interesting  figures,  furnished  by  an  official  German 
statistician,  Mr.  Kuczynski,  in  1909  : — 

DAILY  AVERAGE  WAGES  IN  MARKS 


1879 
1884 
1889 
1894 
1899 
1904 
1907 


Dortmund 
Miners 

•  2-55 
.     3.08 

•  3-42 

•  3-73 
.     4.84 

•  4.78 

•  5.98 


1879 
1884 
1889 
1894 
1899 
1904 
1907 


Hamburg 
Bricklayers 


Rostock 

Bricklayers 

3-20 

3-20 

4.00 
4.20 

4.40 
4.70 
5.30 

Elberfeld 

Bricklayers 

3.00 


Berlin 
Bricklayers 


5.00 
6.00 
6.00 
6.00 
6.30 
7.20 


3.00 
3-50 
3.80 

4-51 
4.60 

5-41 


Berlin 

Carpenters 

2.50 

3-75 

5.50  3-87 

5-25  4-83 

5-40  4.83 

6.30  6.28 

6-75 

Workers  at 
Krupp's 
3.02 
3-55 
3-83 
4.06 
4.72 
4.88 
5-35 


GERMAN   INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    733 

Those  who  believe  that  the  German  workers  are 
poor  may  argue  :  "It  may  be  true  that  employment 
is  very  good  and  that  wages  have  risen  very  sub- 
stantially in  Germany,  but,  owing  to  Protection,  the 
cost  of  food  has  risen  more  than  have  wages,  so  that 
the  German  workers  are  worse  off  than  they  were, 
notwithstanding  the  great  rise  in  money  wages." 
Some  support  for  this  argument  is  furnished  by  the 
Board  of  Trade  report  on  German  labour  conditions 
(Cd.  4032),  which  gives  the  following  surprisingly 
high  percentages  of  income  spent  on  food  among  the 
German  workers  : — 

Income  of  German  workers  Percentage  of  income 

per  week  spent  on  food 

5.         S. 

25  to  30  62  per  cent. 

30  „  35  59 

35  »  40  58 

The  Board  of  Trade  report  is  unreliable  and  mis- 
leading, not  only  as  regards  German  wages  but  also 
as  regards  cost  of  food.  Therefore  the  report  of  the 
German  Statistical  Office,  Household  Budgets  in  Families 
of  Small  Means,  published  in  1909,  makes  the  damning 
statement,  "  The  summary  of  the  Yellow  Book  on 
German  labour  conditions,  published  by  the  British 
Board  of  Trade,  cannot  be  considered  as  a  correct 
representation  of  the  conditions  prevailing  in  '  average  ' 
or  '  typical '  German  working-men's  households,"  and, 
after  a  searching  investigation  of  German  working- 
class  expenditure  covering  a  whole  year,  it  summarised 
the  percentages  of  working-men's  expenditure,  as 
found  by  twelve  months'  actual  book-keeping,  as 
follows  : — 


734  MODERN    GERMANY 

Skilled  Unskilled 
Industrial  Industrial 
Workers  Workers 

Per  Cent.  Per  Cent. 

Percentage  of  Income  spent  on  food  .     .     .  51.5  52.8 

„               „               „         clothing   .     .  ii. 2  TO. 6 

„               „               „         rent     .     .     .  16.8  18.4 

„               „               „         fire  and  light       4.2  4.1 
„               ,,               ,,         health.educa- 

tion,  newspapers,  fares,  taxes,  amusements  16.3  14.1 

100.0         100.0 

The  British  Board  of  Trade  has  not  only  greatly 
understated  German  wages,  but  has  evidently  equally 
grossly  overstated  the  German  working-man's  expendi- 
ture on  food. 

Whilst  the  British  Board  of  Trade  estimated  that 
the  British  workers  spend  from  61  per  cent,  to  66  per 
cent,  of  their  income  on  food,  the  German  Statistical 
Office  calculated,  from  hundreds  of  budgets  kept 
during  a  whole  year,  that  the  German  workers  spend 
only  from  51.5  per  cent,  to  52.8  per  cent,  on  food.  It  is 
a  well-known  fact  that  the  percentage  of  income  spent 
on  food  is  greatest  among  the  poorest  workers.  The 
official  figures  given  by  the  German  and  British  Govern- 
ment Departments  indicate  clearly,  firstly,  that  the 
German  working-men  are  better  off  than  the  British 
working  men,  and,  secondly,  that  food  is,  on  the  whole, 
considerably  cheaper  in  Germany  than  in  Great 
Britain. 

If  the  cost  of  food  had  risen  more  than  wages,  the 
consumption  of  food,  and  especially  of  the  more  ex- 
pensive kinds  of  food,  should  have  declined  in  Germany. 
That  this  is  not  the  case  appears  from  the  White  Books 
published  by  the  German  Ministry  of  Finance  in  1908, 
from  which  I  extract  the  following  : — 


Rye 

Wheat 

Barley 

Potatoes 

125.1 

50.6 

40.6 

281.2 

106.4 

56.2 

50.6 

423-I 

144.6 

89.8 

69-5 

58l.I 

143-5 

94-4 

82.5 

592.6 

GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    735 

AVERAGE  CONSUMPTION  PER  HEAD  OF  POPULATION 
In  Kilogrammes 

Rye 

1879  .  . 
1889  .  . 
1899  .  . 
1906  .  . 

It  will  be  observed  that  between  1879  and  1906 
the  consumption  per  head  of  population  of  all  the 
staple  vegetable  foods  has  greatly  increased.  The 
increase  is  smallest  in  rye,  which  furnishes  the  so- 
called  black  bread,  and  greatest  in  wheat,  which  is 
principally  consumed  in  the  forms  of  rolls,  fancy  bread, 
and  cake.  The  consumption  of  beer  per  head  has 
increased  from  85  litres  per  head  in  1879-83  to  118 
litres  per  head  in  1904-7.  As  regards  meat,  there  are 
available  only  statistics  regarding  the  consumption 
of  beef  and  pork  in  Saxony,  which  show  the  following  : — 

CONSUMPTION  OF  MEAT,  EXCLUSIVE  OF  VEAL,  MUTTON, 
POULTRY,  AND  GAME,  IN  SAXONY 

In  Kilogrammes 

1880  .  .  . 

1890  . 

IQOO  .  .  . 

1907  .  .  . 

During  the  period  of  Protection  the  consumption  of 
beef  and  pork  has  grown  by  50  per  cent.,  not  only  in 
Saxony  but  throughout  Germany,  and  the  German 
Ministry  of  Finance  published  in  its  White  Books  of 
1908  an  estimate  showing  that  the  German  population 
consumes  55  kilogrammes  of  meat  of  all  kinds  per  head 
per  year,  as  compared  with  only  52.2  kilogrammes  per 
head  per  year  for  the  British  population. 


Beef 

Pork 

Total 

II.  I 

I8.I 

29.2 

14.0 

20.6 

34-6 

15-2 

27.9 

43.1 

14.4 

27.9 

42.3 

736  MODERN    GERMANY 

It  is  true  that  the  cost  of  living  has  lately  con- 
siderably increased  both  in  Germany  and  in  Great 
Britain.  However,  whilst  during  this  period  of  rising 
prices  wages  have  remained  stationary,  or  have  de- 
clined, in  this  country,  they  have  in  Germany  ad- 
vanced much  more  rapidly  than  has  the  cost  of  living. 
On  this  point  the  Hanover  Chamber  of  Commerce 
reported  in  1908  that  between  1895  and  1906  German 
wages  had  risen  by  from  37-38  per  cent.,  whilst  the 
cost  of  living  had  risen  by  only  22  per  cent.  The 
British  Consul  at  Berlin  reported  in  the  same  year  : 
"  The  average  annual  wage  of  a  workman  in  Germany 
has  risen  between  37  and  38  per  cent.,  whilst  the  ratio 
of  the  price  of  commodities  has  risen,  at  the  utmost, 
25  per  cent."  The  British  Consul  in  Berlin  wrote  in 
his  report  of  1909  :  "  The  ample  rise  in  wages  has 
more  than  kept  pace  with  the  rise  in  price."  Un- 
fortunately, in  this  country  we  have  a  higher  cost  of 
living,  but  not  higher  wages.  Whilst  the  German 
workers  have  grown  richer,  the  British  workers  have 
grown  poorer. 

The  foregoing  pages  show*  that  employment  is  con- 
siderably better  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain ;  that 
general  wages  are  considerably  higher  in  the  former 
country  than  in  the  latter ;  that  the  cost  of  living  is 
considerably  lower  to  the  workers  in  Germany  than 
to  the  workers  in  this  country.  From  these  three 
facts  we  must  conclude  that  the  German  working-man 
is  considerably  better  off  than  the  British  working-man, 
and  much  corroborative  evidence  can  be  adduced  in 
support  of  this  conclusion. 

An  eminent  Free  Trader,  Lord  Brassey,  wrote  in 
his  book,  The  New  Fiscal  Policy,  "  For  the  masses  of 
our  population  no  test  of  progress  can  be  more  con- 
clusive than  the  deposits  in  the  Post  Office  and  Trustee 


GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL    CONDITIONS    737 

Savings  Banks."  Let  us  apply  Lord  Brassey's  test 
to  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  and  compare  their 
progress  since  the  introduction  of  Protection  : — 

Savings  Banks  Deposits  Savings  Banks  Deposits 

in  Germany  in  Great  Britain 

£  £ 

1880 ....    130,690,000  77,721,084 

1890 ....    256,865,000  111,285,359 

1900 ....    441,929,000  187,005,562 

1911 ....    900,000,000  227,902,840 

The  foregoing  table  shows  that  during  the  period 
of  Protection,  1880-1911,  the  German  people  have 
placed  £770,000,000,  and  the  British  people  have 
placed  only  £139,000,000,  into  the  Savings  Banks, 
whilst  between  1900  and  1911  the  German  people  have 
placed  £459,000,000,  and  the  British  people  only 
£41,000,000,  into  the  Savings  Banks.  During  these 
eleven  years  the  German  Savings  Banks  Deposits 
have  grown  more  than  eleven  times  as  quickly  as  the 
British  Savings  Banks  Deposits.  It  is  worth  noting 
that  more  than  £700,000,000  of  the  German  Savings 
Banks  Deposits  consists  of  small  sums  which  have 
been  put  into  these  banks  by  people  belonging  to  the 
working  class. 

British  workers  put  their  savings,  not  only  into 
the  Savings  Banks,  but  into  Building,  Friendly,  Co- 
operative Societies,  and  Trade  Unions  as  well.  Ac- 
cording to  the  second  Fiscal  Blue  Book  (Cd.  2337) 
these  savings  are  as  follows  : — 

I 

Building  Societies 62,000,000 

Friendly  Societies       ......     43,000,000 

Co-operative  Societies 40,000,000 

Trade  Unions        5,000,000 

Total  150,000,000. 
According  to  the  White  Books  published  by  the 


738 


MODERN    GERMANY 


German  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  savings  in  the  German 
Co-operative  Societies  alone  were,  in  1906-7,  as 
follows  : — 

£ 

Deposits  in  Allgemeiner  Verband      ....  45,800,000 

Verband  Darmstadt        ....  68,650,000 

Neuwied 18,170,000 

Bavaria 9,730,000 

Baden 2,765,000 

Wurtemberg     ....  4,150,000 

Trier        1,715,000 

Hanover 4,895,000 

Posen 6,150,000 

Berlin 3,490,000 

Total     165,515,000 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  savings  in  the  German 
Co-operative  Societies  alone  exceed  those  of  all  the 
British  popular  societies  combined.  According  to 
Heiligenstadt  (Jahrbuch  fur  Gesetzgebung  1901),  the 
savings  placed  into  the  Prussian  Co-operative  Societies 
should  be  £7,500,000,  and  into  all  the  German  Co- 
operative Societies,  £11,250,000  per  year.  In  the 
State  Insurance  Societies  there  are  more  than 
£100,000,000  to  the  credit  of  the  workers,  and  many 
hundreds  of  millions  of  pounds  are  invested  by  the 
workers  in  freehold  land  and  houses. 

Workers  who  are  poor  cannot  afford  to  join  a  trade 
union.  The  German  Social-Democratic  Trade  Unions 
alone  show  the  following  record  : — 


Average 

Number 

Yearly 

Accumulated 

contribution 

of  members 

Income 

Funds 

per  member 

per  year 

£ 

£ 

s.    d. 

1891  . 

277.659 

55,829 

21,292 

4     2 

1893  . 

223,530 

111,218 

30,352 

9  ii 

1898  . 

493.742 

275.434 

218,665 

II       2 

1903  . 

887,698 

820,999 

648,686 

18     8 

1908  . 

1,831,731 

2,427,220 

2,041,989 

26     6 

1910  . 

2,I28,O2I 

3,216,110 

2,628,700 

24  10 

GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    739 

The  Social-Democratic  and  the  Non-Socialist  Trade 
Unions  combined  have  more  than  4,000,000  members. 

In  nineteen  years  the  number  of  German  trade 
unionists  has  grown  eightfold,  and  their  contributions 
nearly  sixtyfold.  The  average  contribution  per 
member  has  risen  from  43.  2d.  per  year  to  245.  zod. 
per  year,  or  to  6d.  a  week.  Could  ill-employed  and 
badly-paid  workers  who,  as  we  are  told,  suffer  severely 
from  the  dearness  of  food,  spare  6d.  a  week  for  unions 
which  in  Germany  serve  mainly,  not  for  purposes  of 
insurance  —  that  is  done  by  the  State  Insurance 
Societies  —  but  for  purposes  of  agitation  ?  In  some  of 
the  German  unions  the  contributions  are  considerably 
higher  than  243.  lod.  a  year  or  6d.  a  week.  In  1908 
55,482  compositors  contributed  to  their  unions  8os. 
per  head  per  year  ;  16,648  lithographers  contributed 
6os.  per  head  per  year  ;  146,337  wood-workers  con- 
tributed 355.  per  head  per  year  ;  360,099  metal- 
workers contributed  335.  per  head  per  year. 

How  greatly  the  prosperity  of  the  German  workers 
has  grown  during  recent  years  can  be  seen  at  a  glance 
from  the  Prussian  Income  Tax  statistics.  From  these 
we  learn  that  the  number  of  people  who  earn  from 
£45  to  £150  per  year,  and  their  income,  have  increased 
as  follows  :  — 

PEOPLE  WITH  INCOMES  OF  ^45  TO  £150  PER  YEAR 
IN  PRUSSIA 

Number  of  People  Income  per  Year 

£ 

1892  .  .  .  2,118,969      145,599,000 

1909  .  .  .  5,477,856      382,081,000 

1910  .  .  .  5,537'74*         383,780,000 


Increase     .     3,358,887  236,482,000 

During  the  years  1892-1909  both  the  number  of 
the  Prussian  people  in  receipt  of  a  substantial  working- 


740  MODERN   GERMANY 

class  income  and  their  aggregate  income  have  in- 
creased by  1 60  per  cent.,  whilst  at  the  same  time  the 
number  of  people  earning  less  than  £45  per  annum 
has  very  greatly  shrunk.  In  other  words,  millions  of 
working  men  who  used  to  earn  less  than  £45  a  year 
earn  now  an  income  of  from  £45  to  £150  a  year. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  proclaimed  that  the  German 
working  masses  subsist  on  offal  and  carrion.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  was  wise  to  advance  that  argument,  for 
those  who  desire  to  prove  that  the  German  masses 
are  poor  have  no  argument  left  except  the  horse 
meat  and  dog  meat  argument.  A  number  of  Germans 
and  Frenchmen  eat  horse  meat  not  from  poverty 
but  because  they  like  it,  or  believe  it  more  strengthen- 
ing than  other  meat.  The  Board  of  Trade  Report 
on  labour  conditions  in  Germany  reported  on  page  125, 
with  regard  to  Breslau  :  "  Few  workpeople  appear 
to  have  any  personal  knowledge  of  the  use  of  horse- 
flesh," and  on  page  438  with  regard  to  Solingen, 
"  Horse-flesh  has  long  been  in  favour  with  the  working 
classes,  owing  more,  it  is  asserted,  to  a  local  preference 
for  this  meat  than  to  inability  to  buy  other  meat." 
With  regard  to  dog  meat,  the  Board  of  Trade  Report 
stated  on  page  379,  with  regard  to  Munich  :  "  The 
public  abattoir  has  a  special  department  for  the  killing 
of  dogs,  but  it  is  maintained  that  only  a  small  portion 
of  the  flesh  is  used  as  human  food,  and  even  then  only 
because  of  the  belief  that  a  dog's  flesh  is  an  antidote 
against  tuberculosis,  a  belief  in  many  parts  of  Ger- 
many." My  inquiries  in  Germany  have  confirmed  the 
foregoing  statements.  The  superstition  that  the  meat 
of  a  fat  dog  is  good  in  wasting  diseases  is  chiefly  found 
among  German  Roman  Catholics.  In  Prussia,  which 
has  as  many  inhabitants  as  Great  Britain,  1596  dogs 
were  killed  at  the  slaughter-houses  in  1908,  or  four 


GERMAN    INDUSTRIAL   CONDITIONS    741 

dogs  per  day.  Possibly  more  than  four  dogs  per  day 
are  eaten  in  Great  Britain,  though  they  need  not  be 
killed  in  public  slaughter-houses.  But  then  it  is  not 
compulsory  in  Great  Britain,  as  it  is  in  Germany,  to 
kill  in  public  slaughter-houses  all  animals  offered  for 
sale.  As  regards  horse  meat,  we  must  remember  that 
different  nations  have  different  tastes.  The  Turk 
abhors  pork,  the  Englishman  horse,  and  the  German 
rabbit,  porridge,  periwinkles,  half-baked,  but  white, 
bread,  and  tea  which  has  been  allowed  to  stew. 

The  members  of  all  the  working-men  deputations 
who  have  visited  Germany,  both  Protectionists  and 
Free  Traders,  have  expressed  their  surprise  at  not 
seeing  any  ragged  people  in  the  streets.  This  absence 
of  visible  poverty  is  all  the  more  surprising  as,  accord- 
ing to  the  German  census  of  1907,  only  27,399  people 
were  maintained  in  institutions  for  the  poor,  com- 
parable with  our  workhouses.  In  the  British  work- 
houses between  300,000  and  400,000  paupers  are 
permanently  maintained  out  of  sight  of  the  com- 
munity. If  this  whole  army  of  paupers,  except 
27,399,  were  turned  into  the  streets,  how  then  would 
British  and  German  visible  poverty  compare  ? 

The  British  workmen  delegates  have  searched  for 
poverty  in  Germany  but  have  not  found  it.  The  tale 
of  the  poverty  of  the  German  working  masses  is  a 
fable.  By  unexampled  mendacity  the  Free  Trade 
party  is  trying  to  maintain  the  fiction  that  the  British 
workers  are  the  best  employed,  best  paid,  best  fed, 
and  happiest  workers  in  the  world,  the  envy  of  the 
workers  of  the  universe,  thanks  to  Free  Trade,  and 
that  the  workers  of  Germany  are  ill-employed,  over- 
worked, under-paid,  under-fed,  and  miserable  owing 
to  Protection. 


CHAPTER   XXXI 

THE   FUTURE   OF  ANGLO-GERMAN   RELATIONS 
AND   BRITISH  TARIFF   REFORM 

WHAT  is  the  German  navy  for  ? 

The  advocates  of  an  overwhelmingly  strong  British 
fleet  habitually  assert  that  Germany  is  building  a 
huge  Navy  because  she  intends  to  attack  Great  Britain. 
The  champions  of  naval  economy,  on  the  other  hand, 
assure  us  with  equal  confidence  and  emphasis  that  Ger- 
many is  a  peaceful  country,  that  William  the  Second, 
as  he  has  lately  so  often  declared,  is  a  friend  of  peace 
and  of  Great  Britain,  that  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
his  sincerity,  that  he  has  no  warlike  designs,  and  that 
therefore  we  need  not  fear  a  German  attack. 

Both  explanations  betray  great  crudity  of  thought. 
Both  spring  from  insufficient  acquaintance  with  the 
realities  of  statesmanship.  Both  arise  from  a  mistaken 
attempt  of  applying  to  matters  of  national  policy  and 
to  international  relations  the  motives  of  private  inter- 
course and  the  standards  of  private  morality. 

The  policy  of  States  is  not  directed  by  the  personal 
sentiments  and  publicly  expressed  intentions  of  their 
rulers,  but  by  considerations  of  national  interests, 
by  political  and  economic  necessity.  In  considering 
Germany's  naval  policy,  we  had  therefore  better  leave 
out  of  our  calculations  the  problematical  intentions, 
warlike  or  peaceful,  of  Germany  and  her  ruler,  and 
study  the  factors  which  shape  Germany's  naval  policy 
by  investigating  those  interests  which  her  naval  policy 
is  evidently  meant  to  promote. 

742 


GERMANY    AND   TARIFF    REFORM    743 

The  naval  policy  of  all  great  nations  is  directed 
rather  by  economic  necessity  than  by  ambition.  Great 
Britain  became  a  great  sea  Power  and  a  colonial  and 
maritime  empire  by  sheer  force  of  circumstances. 
The  British  world-empire  was  built  up  during  the  time 
when  England  had  practically  the  world's  monopoly 
in  trade  and  manufactures,  in  shipping  and  in  bank- 
ing. Great  Britain,  like  all  the  great  colonial  and 
maritime  empires  of  the  past,  from  Phoenicia  to 
Holland,  was  forced  into  a  career  of  conquest  and 
expansion  over  sea  by  economic  pressure.  Our  power- 
ful industries,  which  made  Great  Britain  the  work- 
shop of  the  world,  and  the  necessities  of  our  trade 
imperatively  demanded  markets  outside  these  islands, 
and  led  to  the  conquest  of  India  and  of  various  other 
colonies.  The  rapid  increase  of  our  population  beyond 
the  national  means  of  subsistence  equally  urgently 
demanded  settlements  in  a  temperate  zone  and  led  to 
the  colonisation  of  America  and  Australia. 

At  the  time  when  Great  Britain  was  conquering 
and  colonising  the  world,  Germany  was  divided  into 
numerous  badly  governed  independent  States,  which 
quarrelled  among  themselves.  The  country  was 
wretchedly  poor.  It  subsisted  on  agriculture.  German 
wheat,  timber,  hides,  &c.,  were  exchanged  for  British 
manufactures.  In  1844  Lord  Palmerston  visited 
Berlin,  and  from  his  correspondence  we  learn  that  he 
was  struck  by  the  poverty  and  backwardness  of  the 
country,  and  that  he  thought  that  Germany  was  in 
the  mechanical  arts  a  century  behind  Great  Britain. 
The  overwhelming  industrial  superiority  which  Eng- 
land then  possessed  over  Germany  may  be  seen  from 
the  fact  that  in  1846  Great  Britain  produced  64.2  per 
cent,  of  the  world's  coal,  whilst  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  States  combined,  with  double  the  number  of 


744  MODERN    GERMANY 

inhabitants,  produced  but  8.4  per  cent,  of  the  world's 
coal,  and  that  Great  Britain  produced  eleven  times 
more  iron  than  all  the  German  States.  At  that  time, 
steam  engines  were  hardly  known  in  Germany.  The 
industrial  machines  used  in  Prussia  possessed  but 
21,716  horse-power  in  1846.  Since  then  they  have 
increased  three  hundred-fold,  and  amount  now  to 
more  than  six  millions. 

The  political  and  economic  unification  of  the  in- 
dependent German  States,  which  took  place  in  1871, 
their  transformation  into  a  homogeneous  empire,  and 
the  wise  organisation  and  direction  and  the  vigorous 
and  deliberate  development  of  all  the  national  re- 
sources immediately  after  the  Franco-German  war, 
gave  to  the  industries  of  the  young  empire  an  excellent 
start,  and  the  introduction  of  Protection  in  1879  con- 
verted a  backward  agricultural  country  into  a  wealthy 
industrial,  commercial,  and  maritime  State.  Bismarck 
introduced  his  protective  tariff  in  1879,  with  the  de- 
liberate and  avowed  object  of  transferring  part  of  the 
industries  and  the  wealth  of  Great  Britain  to  Germany, 
and  his  policy  has  succeeded  only  too  well.  In  the 
present  age  of  steel,  the  production  of  steel  is  perhaps 
the  best  index  to  a  nation's  manufacturing  eminence. 
In  1880,  the  year  following  the  introduction  of  Pro- 
tection into  Germany,  Germany  produced  but  624,418 
tons  of  steel,  whilst  Great  Britain  produced  1,341,690 
tons  of  steel.  In  1908  Germany  produced  11,000,000 
tons  of  steel,  whilst  Great  Britain  produced  only 
5,300,000  tons  of  steel.  In  other  words,  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  have  changed  places.  Only  a  short 
time  ago,  Great  Britain  produced  twice  as  much  steel 
as  did  Germany.  Now  Germany  produces  twice  as 
much  steel  as  does  Great  Britain.  Other  German 
industries  have  followed  the  lead  of  the  steel  industry, 


GERMANY    AND    TARIFF    REFORM     745 

but  space  precludes  the  showing  of  their  progress  in 
detail.  The  fact  that  the  industrial  steam  engines  of 
Prussia  have  increased  from  984,000  horse-power  in 
1879,  the  year  in  which  Protection  was  introduced, 
to  6,754,468  in  1909  shows  better  than  a  lengthy 
account  the  marvellous  progress  of  the  German  manu- 
facturing industries  as  a  whole. 

Largely  owing  to  Germany's  surprising  develop- 
ment as  an  industrial  nation,  Great  Britain  is  ceasing 
to  be  the  workshop  of  the  world,  and  Germany  is 
rapidly  attaining  her  place.  It  is  true  that  if  we  look 
uncritically,  as  most  Free  Traders  do,  at  the  combined 
export  and  import  figures  which  are  swelled  by  our 
huge  imports  of  food  and  our  constantly  growing 
exports  of  coal  and  of  other  raw  materials,  Great 
Britain  is  still  the  first  trading  nation  in  the  world. 
But  a  closer  examination  will  show  that  the  character 
of  our  trade  has  curiously  altered  during  the  last  three 
decades,  that  Great  Britain  is  becoming,  to  an  increas- 
ing extent,  a  purveyor  of  raw  materials  to  other 
nations,  whilst  Germany  is  becoming  the  workshop  of 
the  world  ;  that  Germany  is  industrially  rising,  whilst 
Great  Britain  is  industrially  declining.  I  would 
therefore  draw  attention  to  the  following  most  in- 
structive and  significant  figures,  which  sum  up  the 
most  recent  industrial  development  of  Germany  in 
two  lines. 

Imports  of  Raw  Material  Exports  of  Manufactured 

into  Germany.  Goods  from  Germany. 

1894    .     •     •      ,£83,295,000  ,£93,970,000 

1910    .     .     .       254,165,000  239,775,000 

During  the  short  period  of  1894-1910,  whilst  Great 
Britain  has  but  haltingly  increased  her  exports  of 
manufactured  goods,  Germany  has  exactly  trebled 


746  MODERN    GERMANY 

her  imports  of  raw  materials  and  nearly  trebled  her 
exports  of  manufactures. 

The  change  in  the  industrial  character  of  Germany 
and  in  the  character  of  her  foreign  trade  is  particu- 
larly striking  if  we  study  the  change  which  has  taken 
place  in  the  nature  of  the  Anglo-German  trade. 
Formerly,  Germany  sold  to  Great  Britain  raw  materials 
and  food,  and  bought  from  us  our  manufactured  goods. 
Germany  was  Great  Britain's  farm,  and  Great  Britain 
was  Germany's  factory.  Now  Germany  exports  to 
Great  Britain  chiefly  manufactures  of  every  kind,  and 
receives  in  return  principally  raw  materials  and  food. 
Yarn  apart,  which  is  a  raw  material  to  the  German 
industries  and  is  therefore  subject  to  only  a  slight 
duty,  Great  Britain  exports  to  Germany  chiefly  coal, 
gold,  silver,  leather,  furs,  fish,  caoutchouc,  wool, 
copper,  &c.  According  to  the  very  reliable  German 
Customs  statistics,  almost  exactly  nine-tenths  of  the 
British  exports  to  Germany  consist  of  raw  materials 
and  food,  whilst  only  one-tenth  of  the  British  exports 
to  Germany  are  fully  manufactured  articles,  such  as 
machinery,  woollen  and  cotton  cloths,  &c.  Great 
Britain  has  become  a  hewer  of  wood  and  a  drawer 
of  water  to  Germany. 

The  industrial  development  of  Germany  is  still 
progressing  with  an  incredible  speed.  The  fact  that 
the  horse-power  of  industrial  steam  engines  in  Prussia 
has  increased  from  4,046,036  in  1900  to  6,754,468  in 
1909  shows  that  Germany's  manufacturing  industries 
continue  even  at  the  present  moment  to  increase  their 
productive  power  by  leaps  and  bounds,  and  that  they 
must  in  the  immediate  future  rely  to  an  increasing 
extent  upon  expansive  foreign  markets  for  the  sale 
of  their  productions.  Unless  the  expansion  of  the 
German  industries  be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding 


GERMANY   AND   TARIFF   REFORM     747 

increase  of  opportunities  for  sale  abroad,  the  German 
industries,  and  with  the  German  industries  the  German 
Empire,  will  decline  and  decay.  Germany  experi- 
ences now  the  same  imperative  necessity  for  expansion 
over  sea  which  Great  Britain  has  experienced  in  times 
gone  by,  and  she  knows  that  upon  her  ability  to 
secure  that  needed  expansion  depends  her  future  as 
a  great  nation.  Her  leading  statesmen,  economists, 
and  merchants  have  told  her  so,  and  when  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  said,  "  Germany's  future  lies  upon  the 
water,"  he  simply  gave  a  convenient  formula,  easy 
to  remember,  to  the  general  thought  that  the  econo- 
mical requirements  of  Germany  and  of  her  industries 
make  maritime  expansion  absolutely  necessary. 

To  a  great  industrial  and  trading  nation,  a  great 
merchant  marine  is  a  necessity,  and  a  great  merchant 
marine  requires  adequate  harbours. 

Germany  has  become  an  industrial  State  whose 
population  relies  principally  on  the  manufacturing 
industries  for  its  support.  Her  manufacturing  indus- 
tries are  forced  to  rely  to  an  ever-increasing  extent 
upon  foreign  markets,  and  especially  upon  markets 
over  sea,  for  the  sale  of  their  wares.  About  three- 
quarters  of  Germany's  foreign  trade  is  over-sea  trade, 
and  the  proportion  of  Germany's  over-sea  trade  to 
her  land  trade  is  constantly  growing,  in  consequence 
of  the  protective  tariffs  with  which  her  neighbours 
in  Europe  try  to  shut  out  Germany's  manufactures. 
Therefore  Germany's  most  important  market  for  the 
sale  of  her  manufactures  is  not  that  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  or  of  Russia,  or  of  France,  her  immediate 
neighbours.  Her  best  customer  is  the  British  Empire, 
which  absorbs  about  25  per  cent,  of  Germany's 
exports,  more  than  is  taken  by  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia,  and  France  combined. 


748 


MODERN    GERMANY 


The  chief  characteristic  of  Germany's  foreign  trade 
is  its  precariousness.  The  precariousness  of  the  ho]d 
of  Germany  on  her  most  important  market,  the 
British  market,  is  well  known  to  the  German  states- 
men and  to  most  German  business-men,  who  dread 
the  possibility  of  Great  Britain  introducing  Protection 
and  arranging  with  her  Colonies  for  the  preferential 
treatment  of  her  manufactures.  How  rapidly  Ger- 
many's exports  to  Great  Britain,  and  especially  to 
her  principal  Colonies,  have  grown  is  apparent  from 
the  following  figures,  which  are  taken  from  the  German 
official  statistics  : — 


German  Exports  to 

1896. 

1902. 

1909. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

Great  Britain 

35,755,000 

48,275,000 

50,750,000 

India  and  Ceylon  . 

2,460,000 

3,310,000 

4,475,000 

Australia 

1,465,000 

2,275,000 

3,320,000 

Canada  . 

756,500 

1,935,000 

1,240,000 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  figures  relating  to 
Canada  show  between  1902  and  1909  a  very  heavy 
decline  in  the  German  exports.  A  comparison  of  this 
decline  with  the  other  figures,  which  indicate  a  constant 
and  vigorous  growth  of  the  German  exports  to  Great 
Britain  and  her  Colonies,  shows  how  much  damage  a 
preferential  tariff  may  inflict  upon  Germany's  indus- 
trial exports.  Germany  stands  in  danger  of  seeing  by 
far  her  most  valuable  markets,  the  markets  of  the 
British  Empire,  closed  to  many  of  her  wares.  However, 
this  is  by  no  means  the  only  danger  which  threatens 
Germany.  If  Great  Britain  should  introduce  Pro- 
tection, she  will,  following  Germany's  example,  con- 
clude preferential  treaties  of  commerce  with  her  best 


GERMANY    AND    TARIFF    REFORM     749 

foreign  customers  (the  Colonies  would,  of  course,  be 
placed  upon  the  most  favoured  footing),  and  thus 
Germany  will  lose  many  of  the  advantages  which  she 
now  enjoys  in  neutral  markets  owing  to  the  advan- 
tageous commercial  treaties  which  she  has  con- 
cluded, but  which  she  will  hardly  be  able  to  renew  in 
competition  with  the  British  Empire.  A  study  of  the 
Japanese  Customs  returns,  for  instance,  reveals  the 
fact  that  Germany  is  ousting  Great  Britain  in  the 
Japanese  market.  An  Anglo- Japanese  commercial 
treaty,  giving  Great  Britain  and  her  Colonies  pre- 
ference over  Germany  in  Japan,  which  undoubtedly 
can  be  concluded  in  view  of  Japan's  great  interest  in 
the  India  trade,  would  practically  exclude  certain 
German  manufactures  from  that  country. 

The  German  tariff  policy  which  Bismarck  in- 
augurated in  1879  led  to  the  transference  of  much 
English  trade  to  Germany.  The  tables  may  be 
turned  upon  Germany.  The  introduction  of  Pro- 
tection into  Great  Britain  and  of  preferential 
arrangements  throughout  the  Empire  would  lead 
to  the  transference  of  much  valuable  German  trade 
to  Great  Britain. 

Germany  is  threatened  not  only  with  the  narrowing 
of  the  outlets  for  her  manufactured  products,  but  also 
with  the  danger  of  seeing  her  supply  of  raw  products 
for  industrial  purposes  diminish. 

Owing  to  her  Colonies  and  dependencies,  the  value 
of  which  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently  realised  by 
most  Englishmen,  Great  Britain  controls  the  supply  of 
many  industrial  raw  products.  Inter-imperial  prefer- 
ence for  sale  would,  no  doubt,  be  followed  by  inter- 
imperial  preference  for  purchase,  especially  in  the  case 
of  articles  of  relative  scarcity.  Great  Britain  would, 
for  instance,  probably  receive  the  preference  for  the 


750  MODERN    GERMANY 

purchase  of  Empire-grown  cotton  and  wool.  Hence 
some  of  the  most  important  German  industries  would 
find  themselves  hampered  by  the  British  Empire,  both 
in  buying  their  raw  products  and  in  disposing  of  their 
manufactured  articles,  and  the  result  would,  no  doubt, 
be  the  wholesale  transference  of  many  industries  and 
of  much  industrial  capital  from  Germany  to  Great 
Britain  and  to  the  British  Dominions  over  sea,  a 
transference  which  at  the  same  time  would  greatly 
benefit  the  British  nations  and  greatly  weaken  Ger- 
many. 

Germany,  whose  natural  resources,  such  as  coal, 
coast-line,  harbours,  easy  access  to  the  sea,  &c.,  compare 
most  unfavourably  with  those  possessed  by  Great 
Britain,  owes  her  marvellous  success  chiefly  to  the 
fact  that  she  was  the  first  nation  to  exchange  the 
policy  of  laisser-faire,  the  policy  of  Governmental 
indifference  and  neglect,  for  a  far-seeing  and  business- 
like policy  of  national  industrial  organisation  and 
development.  Owing  to  the  inferiority  of  her  natural 
resources,  and  especially  to  her  lack  of  harbours  and 
to  the  vast  distances  (from  200  miles  to  400  miles) 
which  separate  her  industrial  centres  from  the  sea, 
Germany's  industrial  position  is  exceedingly  unsafe. 
Germany's  industrial  prosperity  has  been  built  up  on 
the  basis  of  British  laisser-faire,  her  wealth  has  been 
drawn  out  of  British  purses,  and  as  soon  as  that  basis 
is  withdrawn  there  will  be  a  collapse  in  the  German 
industries.  Every  German  economist  knows  that, 
given  equal  conditions,  Germany  could  not  industrially 
compete  with  Great  Britain. 

Recognising  the  dangers  which  threaten  her  by  the 
conclusion  of  a  Pan-Britannic  Customs  Union,  Ger- 
many has  naturally  done  her  utmost  to  prevent  the 
unification  of  the  British  Empire  upon  an  economic 


GERMANY    AND    TARIFF    REFORM      751 

basis — an  event  which,  for  her,  would  be  a  calamity 
of  the  very  greatest  magnitude.  Therefore  no  English- 
man was  more  dreaded  and  hated  by  Germany  than 
was  Mr.  Chamberlain.  Therefore  Germany  penalised 
Canada  when  she  took  the  first  practical  step  towards 
the  unification  of  the  empire  and  the  conclusion  of 
a  Pan-Britannic  Zollverein  by  giving  Great  Britain  a 
preference  in  her  market. 

The  foregoing  should  suffice  to  show  that  Germany's 
abounding  prosperity  is  largely  due  to  certain  tempo- 
rary conditions  which  the  short-sightedness  of  English 
administrations  and  the  far-sightedness  of  Bismarck 
and  his  successors  have  created.  It  should  also  show 
that  the  conclusion  of  a  Pan-Britannic  Customs 
Union  would  lead  to  a  rapid  decline  of  German  pros- 
perity, and  to  a  rapid  exodus  of  a  large  part  of  her 
capital  and  of  her  industrial  population,  an  exodus 
similar  to  that  to  which,  unfortunately,  we  have 
become  accustomed  in  this  country.  Germany,  if  she 
cannot  defeat  the  conclusion  of  a  Pan-Britannic 
Customs  Union  by  diplomacy  or  force,  can  counteract 
its  harmful  effect  upon  her  industries  and  prosperity 
only  by  expansion  over  sea.  She  can  improve  her 
unfavourable  position  as  to  commercial  harbours  only 
by  securing  the  control  of  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam, 
which  are  the  natural  ports  to  her  chief  manufacturing 
districts  in  Rhenish  Prussia  and  Westphalia.  She  can 
obtain  secure  markets  only  by  acquiring  extensive 
Colonies,  both  in  temperate  and  tropical  zones,  which 
make  her  independent  of  other  countries  as  regards 
the  supply  of  raw  materials,  which  give  her  an  ade- 
quate outlet  for  her  surplus  population,  and  which 
at  the  same  time  afford  expansive  markets  for  her 
manufactures  similar  to  those  furnished  by  her 
Colonies  to  Great  Britain. 


752  MODERN    GERMANY 

Maritime  expansion  is  not  merely  a  hobby  of  the 
Emperor's,  as  so  often  is  believed,  but  it  is  a  question 
of  life  or  death  for  Germany.  Germany,  from  her 
point  of  view,  is  perfectly  justified  in  endeavouring 
to  strengthen  her  industrial  position  by  the  acquisition 
of  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp,  which  at  one  time  formed 
part  of  the  German  Empire.  Great  Britain,  on  her 
part,  is  equally  justified  in  preventing  Germany  from 
acquiring  harbours  from  which  a  descent  upon  the 
English  coasts  would  be  comparatively  easy.  Ger- 
many is  perfectly  justified  in  trying  to  acquire  Colonies 
for  her  abounding  population  ;  but  Great  Britain  is 
equally  justified  in  defending  her  Colonies,  and  in 
preventing  their  receiving  so  dangerous  a  neighbour 
as  Germany  might  prove.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  is  clear  that  the  question  of  the  expansion  of  Germany 
depends  in  the  first  place  on  Germany's  power  to  over- 
come the  opposition  which  Great  Britain,  for  the  sake 
of  self-preservation,  is  compelled  to  offer.  There  was 
much  sense  in  the  German  Emperor's  winged  word, 
"  Germany  stands  in  bitter  need  of  a  strong  navy." 

Great  Britain's  opposition  need  not  necessarily  be 
overcome  by  war.  A  demonstration  of  sufficient  naval 
force  might  suffice,  as  German  writers  have  frequently 
pointed  out,  to  overcome  Great  Britain's  opposition  to 
Germany's  maritime  expansion. 

Those  who  doubt  that  the  German  Navy  is  primarily 
destined  either  to  defeat  the  British  fleet  or  to  overawe 
Great  Britain  without  war,  in  order  to  obtain  a  free 
field  for  Germany's  maritime  expansion,  and  those  who 
find  the  leading  principle  of  Germany's  naval  policy 
which  was  laid  down  in  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  not 
sufficiently  explicit,  should  ask  themselves:  "Against 
which  State,  apart  from  Great  Britain,  can  the  German 
naval  armaments  possibly  be  directed  ?  "  Germany 


GERMANY    AND    TARIFF    REFORM     753 

requires  no  fleet  in  case  of  a  war  with  France,  as  a 
Franco-German  war  will  be  decided  on  land,  as  Moltke 
has  pointed  out.  Russia  has  practically  no  fleet. 
Outside  Europe,  there  are  only  two  great  naval  Powers 
—the  United  States  and  Japan.  Both  countries  are 
too  far  removed  from  Germany  to  make  a  war  with 
Germany  likely.  Besides,  the  German  fleet,  pro- 
ceeding to  attack  the  United  States  or  Japan,  would 
find  no  coaling-stations  open  to  her,  and  would  have 
to  pass  within  reach  of  the  guns  of  the  French  and 
English  coasts.  In  view  of  the  intimate  relations 
existing  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
and  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  Germany 
cannot  think  of  a  war  against  either  country.  Ger- 
many can  strike  westward  only  if  Great  Britain  is  on 
her  side.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  that  Germany 
would  run  the  risk  of  having  her  fleet  cut  off  from 
her  harbours  by  Great  Britain  or  France  or  by  both 
Powers  combined.  Not  only  economically,  but  geo- 
graphically as  well,  Great  Britain  bars  Germany's 
way ;  if  Germany  wishes  to  take  New  York  or  Tokio 
she  must  first  take  London.  The  way  to  New  York 
or  to  Tokio  goes  vid  London. 

Lately  the  British  Government  has  shown  a  desire 
to  withdraw  from  the  race  for  naval  supremacy  by 
making  puerile  proposals  of  naval  disarmament  to 
Germany,  which  serve  only  to  strengthen  Germany's 
determination  to  outbuild  this  country.  The  British 
disarmament  proposals  were  declared  impractical  and 
absurd  by  the  leading  organs  of  the  Conservative, 
Liberal,  and  Clerical  parties  of  Germany,  and  even  the 
German  Socialists,  who  favour  disarmament  in  the 
abstract,  exposed  the  childish  proposals  of  the  Liberal 
Government  to  well-deserved  ridicule.  The  Vorwdrts, 
for  instance,  wrote  : — 


754  MODERN    GERMANY 

"With  the  greatest  number  of  the  Liberal  advocates  of 
disarmament,  their  point  of  view  originates  simply  in  the  con- 
sideration that  strong  naval  and  military  armaments  demand 
more  and  more  from  England's  purse  and  her  human  material, 
whilst  England  possesses  all  that  she  can  wish  for,  and  has 
therefore  nothing  to  gain  from  fresh  conquests.  All  over  the 
world  she  has  the  most  valuable  colonies.  She  is  in  that 
satisfied  frame  of  mind  which  makes  the  fortunate  winner 
at  cards  say,  '  Let  us  leave  off,  I  am  tired  of  playing  any 
longer,'  and  the  thing  is,  therefore,  to  secure  what  she  has 
got,  and  to  diminish  her  heavy  financial  burdens.  This  desire 
is  comprehensible,  but  the  other  Powers  will  hardly  respect 
it.  Social-Democracy  is  very  much  in  sympathy  with  the 
disarmament  idea,  but  no  amount  of  sympathy  can  get  over 
the  fact  that  in  the  world  as  at  present  constituted  there  is 
little  chance  of  a  general  disarmament.  The  conception  that 
war  is  only  a  product  of  human  unreason  is  on  the  same  level 
as  the  idea  that  revolutions  are  only  mental  aberrations  of 
the  masses.  War  is  rooted  in  the  opposing  interests  of  the 
nations,  as  are  revolutions  in  the  opposing  interests  of  the 
classes." 

There  is  no  hope  for  England  to  secure  her  posses- 
sions and  her  peace  cheaply  by  a  piece  of  paper.  She 
can  secure  them  only  by  her  armed  strength. 

It  is  not  sufficient  that  Great  Britain  possesses 
merely  a  supremacy  over  Germany  in  first-class  battle- 
ships. She  must  possess  an  overwhelming  supremacy. 
Accident,  floating  mines,  a  surprise  attack  by  torpedo 
boats,  a  mistake  of  a  captain  or  an  error  of  judgment 
on  the  part  of  an  admiral — for  we  cannot  count  upon 
always  having  a  Nelson  upon  our  side — may  destroy 
or  temporarily  cripple  a  few  of  our  best  ships,  and 
might  convert  our  theoretical  superiority  into  a  very 
real  inferiority.  Besides,  some  of  our  own  Dread- 
noughts and  Invincibles  may  in  case  of  an  Anglo- 
German  war  have  to  be  detached  in  order  to  protect 
British  interests  in  other  directions.  For  these  reasons 
it  is  necessary  that  the  doctrine  should  be  laid  down 


GERMANY    AND    TARIFF    REFORM      755 

that  for  every  German  battleship  Great  Britain  will 
build  two. 

In  view  of  the  growing  disproportion  in  the  increase 
of  British  and  of  German  wealth,  and  the  evident 
economic  decay  of  Great  Britain,  it  is  clear  that  the 
question  whether  Germany  will  outbuild  Great  Britain, 
or  whether  Great  Britain  will  outbuild  Germany,  is  a 
purely  financial  one.  Great  Britain  has  no  monopoly 
of  naval  ability.  The  longest  purse  can  build  the 
strongest  fleet.  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  amendment  of  the 
Patent  Laws,  which  no  longer  allow  foreign  manu- 
facturers who  hold  British  patents  to  manufacture 
abroad,  has  caused  some  important  patent-protected 
German  industries  to  migrate  to  this  country,  and 
these  German  industries  are  giving  occupation  to 
thousands  of  British  working  men.  The  capital  so 
transferred  from  Germany  to  Great  Britain  is  said  to 
amount  already  to  £25,000,000.  An  amendment  of  the 
Fiscal  Policy  of  Great  Britain,  sufficiently  high  pro- 
tective duties  for  our  industries,  will  compel  German 
industries  which  now  import  their  productions  into 
Great  Britain  to  migrate  wholesale  to  this  country. 
With  them  a  large  part  of  Germany's  wealth  will  be 
transferred  to  this  country,  the  flight  of  British  capital 
towards  Protectionist  countries  will  cease,  English 
industries  will  flourish  again,  and  Germany  will  no 
longer  financially  be  able  to  dispute  Great  Britain's 
naval  supremacy.  A  strong  tariff  will  pay  for  a  strong 
fleet,  and  enable  us  to  preserve  our  independence, 
wealth,  and  empire.  The  latent  resources  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  Colonies  are  ample.  All  that  Great 
Britain  desires  is  to  preserve  and  develop  her  country 
and  possessions.  All  that  she  may  desire  from  Ger- 
many she  can  obtain  by  means  of  a  tariff.  Therefore, 
a  strong  tariff  will  make  an  Anglo-German  War  sense- 


756  MODERN    GERMANY 

less  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  and  impossible  on  the 
part  of  Germany,  whose  resources  will  be  crippled  when 
Great  Britain  introduces  Protection.  Hence  a  strong 
Protective  tariff  may  prove  a  stronger  safeguard  of 
Great  Britain's  peace  and  independence  than  her 
Navy,  the  most  satisfactory  alliances  and  treaties  of 
arbitration,  and  the  most  cordial  assurances  of  friend- 
ship and  goodwill  towards  Great  Britain  on  the  part 
of  the  German  Emperor. 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

THE   ULTIMATE   RUIN   OF  GERMANY  1 

DURING  the  first  half  of  1914  peace  in  Europe  seemed 
firmly  and  permanently  established.  Although  the 
situation  in  Ireland  was  causing  much  anxiety,  the 
people  thought  of  their  holidays,  and  as  foreign  affairs 
were  quite  uneventful  and  uninteresting  the  news- 
papers and  periodicals  filled  the  space  usually  devoted 
to  foreign  politics  with  the  discussion  of  various 
schemes  for  abolishing  war  and  restricting  national 
armaments.  To-day  five  of  the  six  European  Great 
Powers,  with  more  than  400,000,000  people,  are  at 
war,  and  more  than  20,000,000  soldiers  have  been 
mobilised  and  are  dealing  out  death  and  destruction. 
Compared  with  these  gigantic  armies,  the  mythical 
hosts  of  the  Persians  and  Scythians  shrink  into  insig- 
nificance. The  greatest  war  the  world  has  seen, 
and  perhaps  the  greatest  the  world  will  ever  see,  has 
begun.  We  live  in  a  great  and  terrible  tune.  People 
are  asking :  Why  did  the  German  Emperor  make 
war  ?  What  was  its  real  cause  ?  What  will  be  its 
issue  and  its  consequences  ?  In  the  following  pages 
an  attempt  will  be  made  to  answer  these  questions. 

Many  people  in  this  country  are  surprised  and 
amazed  that  the  German  Emperor,  who  was  con- 
sidered to  be  the  strongest  defender  of  the  world's 
peace,  should  recklessly  have  plunged  all  Europe  into 
war ;  that  he  should  rashly  have  jeopardised  the 
existence  of  his  country  and  of  his  dynasty  on  account 

1  From  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  Sept.  1914. 
757 


758  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  Austria's  quarrel  with  Serbia ;  that  the  Triple 
Alliance,  which  only  recently  had  been  renewed,  and 
which  was  proclaimed  to  be  an  absolutely  reliable 
partnership,  should  have  broken  down  before  the 
first  shot  was  fired  ;  that  Germany,  which  is  supposed 
to  be  the  best  governed  and  administered  country  in 
the  world,  and  which  under  Bismarck  had  always 
known  how  to  isolate  her  enemies  and  secure  for 
herself  the  support  of  the  leading  Powers,  should,  in 
company  with  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey,  be  at 
war  with  six  powerful  nations — France,  Russia,  Great 
Britain,  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan — whose  ranks 
may  be  increased  to  eight  if,  as  appears  probable, 
Italy  and  Roumania  should  range  themselves  on  the 
side  of  Germany's  opponents ;  that  the  German  navy 
should  have  remained  absolutely  inactive  during  the 
first  critical  weeks  of  the  war,  when  its  value  and  in- 
fluence would  have  been  greatest,  and  that  the  cele- 
brated German  army  should  have  begun  the  cam- 
paign by  a  series  of  palpable  mistakes.  However,  the 
readers  of  the  earlier  editions  of  this  book  and  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After  will  scarcely  be  surprised 
at  the  terrible  events  of  the  last  few  weeks,  for  I  have 
frequently  and  emphatically  foretold  these  during 
more  than  a  decade.  Year  after  year  I  have  warned 
the  British  and  the  German  peoples  with  all  my 
strength  of  the  coming  catastrophe.  Year  by  year  I 
have  watched  with  increasing  concern  the  mistakes 
of  Germany's  foreign  and  domestic  policy,  which  were 
bound  to  lead  to  disaster.  In  the  preface  to  the 
fourth  edition  of  this  book,  published  in  the  autumn 
of  1912, 1  wrote  : — 

"During  the  last  few  years  Germany's  failures,  to  which  I 
had  drawn  attention  in  previous  editions,  have  become  more 
salient  and  more  frequent.  During  twenty  years  the  German 


THE    ULTIMATE   RUIN    OF   GERMANY    759 

Foreign  Office  has  serenely  marched  from  failure  to  failure. 
The  Morocco  fiasco  is  merely  the  last  of  a  large  number  of 
mistaken  and  unsuccessful  enterprises. 

"  By  her  policy  towards  Great  Britain,  Germany  has  brought 
into  being  the  Triple  Entente  and  that  isolation  about  which 
she  has  so  frequently  complained,  and  she  is  accelerating  the 
unification  of  the  British  Empire,  which  she  wishes  to  pre- 
vent and  has  tried  to  prevent.  The  failure  of  her  domestic 
policy  is  proclaimed  by  the  constant  increase  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  which  polled  more  than  4,250,000  votes 
at  the  Election  of  1912.  Germany's  prosperity  is  admittedly 
phenomenal.  Still,  a  careful  observer  cannot  help  noticing 
that  her  economic  progress  is  slackening.  Germany's  future 
seems  no  longer  as  bright  as  it  used  to  appear." 

Although  intimate  friends  of  the  Emperor  often 
assured  me  that  he  was  a  prince  of  peace,  I  never 
ceased  to  describe  him  as  immoderately  ambitious, 
reckless  and  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the  world,  and 
I  indicated  almost  the  exact  moment  when  he  would 
strike.  In  an  article  "  England,  Germany  and  the 
Baltic,"  which  was  given  first  place  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  in  July  1907,  and  reprinted  in  Chapter  VIII 
of  this  book,  I  pointed  out  the  enormous  strategical 
importance  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal,  which 
was  being  greatly  enlarged  so  as  to  make  it  available 
to  the  largest  German  Dreadnoughts  and  which  would 
practically  double  the  striking  power  of  the  German 
fleet.  In  one  of  the  concluding  paragraphs  I  said  with 
all  the  emphasis  which  I  could  bring  to  bear  : — 

"It  is  expected  that  eight  years  will  be  required  to  finish  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal.  Therefore  during  the  next  eight 
years  Germany  will  be  unable  to  avail  herself  of  the  great 
advantages  furnished  by  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal, 
except  for  her  smaller  and  older  ships.  Her  magnificent  new 
ships  will  for  about  eight  years  be  restricted  to  one  of  the 
German  seas.  Consequently  Germany  will,  during  the  next 
eight  years,  do  all  in  her  power  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  a  first- 
class  naval  Power.  During  the  next  eight  years  Germany 


760  MODERN    GERMANY 

has  every  reason  to  keep  the  peace.  Only  when  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  has  been  accomplished 
will  she  be  ready  for  a  great  naval  war." 

The  article,  and  especially  its  conclusion,  attracted 
a  great  deal  of  attention,  both  in  England  and  abroad. 
By  accelerating  the  work,  the  Kiel  Canal  was  finished 
not  in  eight  years,  but  in  seven.  Its  completion  was 
celebrated  on  the  24th  of  June  1914,  five  weeks  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  and  by  the  irony  of 
fate  English  warships  took  a  prominent  part  in  the 
festivities. 

To  those  who  have  given  the  matter  some  considera- 
tion it  was  clear  that  if  Germany  should  embark  upon 
a  world  war  the  Netherlands  might  become  its  principal 
theatre.  In  an  article,  "  The  Absorption  of  Holland 
by  Germany,"  I  wrote  in  the  Nineteenth  Century — see 
Chapter  IV  of  this  book — in  July  1906  : — 

"  During  four  centuries  the  Netherlands  have  been  the  centre 
of  gravity  to  the  European  Great  Powers.  The  sceptre  of 
Europe  lies  buried  not  on  the  banks  of  the  Bosphorus  but  at 
the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  and  the  Scheldt.  Therefore  the 
Netherlands  have  during  four  centuries  been  the  battlefield 
on  which  the  struggle  for  the  mastery  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world  has  been  decided.  In  the  Netherlands  the  mighty 
armies  with  which  Philip  the  Second,  Louis  the  Fourteenth, 
Louis  the  Fifteenth,  and  Napoleon  the  First  strove  to  subdue 
Europe  and  to  conquer  the  world  were  broken  to  pieces,  and 
in  the  Netherlands  Germany  may  find  either  her  Gemblours, 
her  Breda,  or  her  Waterloo." 

When  William  the  Second  came  to  the  throne 
Germany  dominated  Europe.  Her  position  was  im- 
pregnable and  unassailable.  The  Triple  Alliance  was 
absolutely  reliable  and  Germany's  possible  antagonists 
were  isolated,  for  Bismarck  had  with  marvellous  skill 
created  a  strong  antagonism  between  France  and  Italy, 
by  giving  Tunis,  which  was  claimed  by  Italy,  to 


THE   ULTIMATE   RUIN    OF   GERMANY    761 

France.  Besides,  he  had  estranged  France  and  Eng- 
land by  inciting  France  to  encroach  upon  England's 
Colonial  domain  and  to  pursue  an  anti-British  policy, 
and  he  had  increased  the  differences  between  England 
and  Russia  by  encouraging  Russia  to  press  upon 
England  in  Asia.  As  both  France  and  Russia  were 
antagonistic  to  England,  Germany  could  always  count 
upon  Great  Britain's  support,  or  at  least  upon  her 
benevolent  neutrality,  in  case  of  that  war  on  two 
fronts  which  Bismarck  dreaded  so  much. 

The  great  value  which  the  Iron  Chancellor  attached 
to  good  and  cordial  relations  with  England  is  apparent 
from  many  of  his  public  utterances.  On  the  loth  of 
July  1885,  for  instance,  on  the  occasion  of  some 
colonial  dispute  between  England  and  Germany,  he 
stated  in  the  Reichstag  : — 

"  I  would  ask  the  last  speaker  not  to  make  any  attempt 
to  disturb  the  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany, 
or  to  diminish  the  confidence  that  peace  between  these  two 
Powers  will  be  maintained  by  hinting  that  some  day  we  may 
find  ourselves  in  an  armed  conflict  with  England.  I  absolutely 
deny  that  possibility.  It  does  not  exist,  and  all  the  questions 
which  are  at  present  being  discussed  between  England  and 
Germany  are  not  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify  a  breach 
of  the  peace  on  either  side  of  the  North  Sea.  Besides,  I  really 
do  not  know  what  dispute  could  arise  between  England  and 
Germany." 

Four  years  later,  on  the  26th  of  January  1889, 
Bismarck  stated  in  the  Reichstag  with  reference  to 
Anglo-German  differences  regarding  Zanzibar  : — 

"  The  preservation  of  Anglo-German  goodwill  is,  after  all, 
the  most  important  thing  for  us.  I  see  in  England  an  old  and 
traditional  ally.  No  differences  exist  between  England  and 
Germany.  If  I  speak  of  England  as  our  ally,  I  am  not  using 
a  diplomatic  term.  We  have  no  alliance  with  England. 
However,  I  wish  to  remain  in  close  contact  with  England  also 


762  MODERN   GERMANY 

in  colonial  questions.  The  two  nations  have  marched  side  by 
side  during  at  least  a  hundred  and  fifty  years,  and  if  I  should 
discover  that  we  might  lose  touch  with  England,  I  should  act 
with  caution  and  endeavour  to  avoid  losing  England's  good- 
will." 

Bismarck  desired  that  Germany's  relations  with 
Great  Britain  should  be  most  cordial,  because  he 
counted  upon  British  support  in  case  of  a  war  with 
France  and  Russia  combined.  He  dreaded  England's 
hostility  not  only  because  Germany  was  vulnerable  at 
sea,  but  also  because  he  knew  that  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  could  reckon  upon  the  loyal  support 
of  allied  Italy  only  as  long  as  Great  Britain  was  either 
friendly  or  observed  a  benevolent  neutrality.  As 
Italy  has  very  extensive  coasts,  as  most  of  her  large 
towns  can  be  shelled  from  the  sea,  as  her  most  im- 
portant strategic  and  commercial  railways  run  close 
to  the  seashore,  and  can  easily  be  destroyed  by  the 
warships  of  a  superior  naval  Power,  and  as  she  is  econo- 
mically as  dependent  upon  her  sea  trade  as  is  Great 
Britain,  it  was  clear  that  England's  hostility  to 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  would  automatically 
lead  to  Italy  deserting  her  allies  in  case  of  war. 
Italy's  desertion  was  foretold  by  those  acquainted 
with  the  true  position,  as,  for  instance,  in  Chapter  XII 
of  this  book,  written  many  years  ago. 

Under  Bismarck's  guidance  Germany  had  grown 
great  by  three  victorious  wars.  Having  created 
Germany's  unity  and  firmly  established  the  State, 
Bismarck  desired  to  establish  its  permanence  and 
security  by  pursuing  a  peaceful,  prudent,  moderate 
and  conciliatory  foreign  policy,  rightly  fearing  that  a 
policy  of  dash  and  adventure,  of  interference,  provo- 
cation and  bluster,  would  raise  dangerous  enemies  to 
the  new  State.  In  one  of  the  concluding  chapters  of 


THE   ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    763 

his  Memoirs,  his  political  testament,  that  great  states- 
man laid  down  on  large  lines  the  policy  which  Germany 
ought  to  pursue  in  the  future,  in  the  following  phrases  : 

"  In  the  future  not  only  sufficient  military  equpiment,  but 
also  a  correct  political  eye,  will  be  required  to  guide  the 
German  ship  of  State  through  the  currents  of  coalition  to 
which,  in  consequence  of  our  geographical  position  and  our 
previous  history,  we  are  exposed. 

"We  ought  to  do  all  we  can  to  weaken  the  bad  feeling  among 
the  nations,  which  has  been  called  forth  through  our  growth 
to  the  position  of  a  real  Great  Power,  by  honourable  and 
peaceful  use  of  our  influence,  and  so  convince  the  world  that 
a  German  hegemony  in  Europe  is  more  useful  and  less  partisan, 
and  also  less  harmful  for  the  freedom  of  other  nations,  than 
would  be  the  hegemony  of  France,  Russia,  or  England. 

"  In  order  to  produce  this  confidence,  it  is  above  everything 
necessary  that  we  should  act  honourably  and  openly,  and  be 
easily  reconciled  in  case  of  friction  or  untoward  events." 

In  1888  William  the  Second  came  to  the  throne. 
Believing  that  he  possessed  the  genius  and  the  univer- 
sality of  Frederick  the  Great,  and  being  confirmed  in 
that  opinion  by  the  flatterers  surrounding  him,  the 
young  Emperor  declared  in  his  overweening  self- 
confidence  that  he  was  divinely  inspired,  that  he  had 
received  his  crown  from  God,  and  that  he  was  re- 
sponsible only  to  God.  He  said,  for  instance  :  "  Only 
one  is  master  in  this  country.  That  is  I.  Who 
opposes  me  I  shall  crush  to  pieces."  "Sic  volo,  sic 
jubeo."  "We  Hohenzollerns  take  our  crown  from 
God  alone,  and  to  God  alone  we  are  responsible  in  the 
fulfilment  of  our  duty."  "  Suprema  lex  regis  volun- 
tas."  "  All  of  you  have  only  one  will,  and  that  is  my 
will ;  there  is  only  one  law,  and  that  is  my  law,"  &c. 

"  Intoxicated  by  the  exuberance  of  his  own  ver- 
bosity "  and  by  the  adulation  of  his  entourage,  and 
animated  by  a  boundless  confidence  in  himself,  William 


764  MODERN   GERMANY 

the  Second,  like  another  Frederick  the  Great,  took  the 
control  of  all  the  great  departments  of  State  out  of 
the  hands  of  his  responsible  Ministers,  and  assumed 
their  direction.  Soon  after  his  accession  he  dismissed 
Prince  Bismarck,  who  refused  to  carry  out  the  hasty, 
crude  and  ill-considered  views  of  the  new  Emperor. 
After  Bismarck's  dismissal  the  young  Emperor  de- 
clared, with  the  admiring  applause  of  his  flattering 
courtiers,  that  he  would  steer  the  ship  of  State  over  a 
new  course,  his  own  course,  that  he  would  lead  the 
nation  to  a  great  and  glorious  future,  that  henceforth 
he  would  be  his  own  Chancellor.  Pursuing  a  purely 
personal  policy,  and  allowing  himself  to  be  swayed  by 
the  impulses  of  the  moment,  he  threw  caution  to  the 
wind,  and  irritated  and  exasperated,  by  his  restless 
and  interfering  policy,  not  only  the  continental  Powers, 
both  large  and  small,  but  also  Great  Britain,  Ger- 
many's "  old  and  traditional  ally,"  and  the  United 
States. 

From  his  retirement  Bismarck  looked  upon  the 
Emperor's  activity  with  anxiety  and  dismay.  He 
feared  that  William  the  Second  would  endanger 
Germany's  future.  Obviously  referring  to  William  the 
Second  and  to  the  flattering  courtiers  surrounding 
him,  and  comparing  him  with  his  grandfather,  the 
Emperor  William  the  First,  the  founder  of  the  German 
Empire,  Bismarck  wrote  in  his  Memoirs  : — 

"The  Emperor  William  I.  was  completely  free  from  vanity 
of  this  kind  ;  on  the  other  hand  he  had  in  a  high  degree  a 
peculiar  fear  of  the  legitimate  criticism  of  his  contemporaries 
and  of  posterity. 

"  No  one  would  have  dared  to  flatter  him  openly  to  his  face. 
In  his  feeling  of  royal  dignity  he  would  have  thought  '  If  any- 
one has  the  right  of  praising  me  to  my  face,  he  has  also  the 
right  of  blaming  me  to  my  face.'  He  would  not  admit  either. 

"  What  I  fear  is,  that  by  following  the  road  in  which  we  are 


THE   ULTIMATE   RUIN    OF   GERMANY    765 

walking  our  future  will  be  sacrificed  to  the  impulses  of  the 
moment.  Former  rulers  looked  more  to  the  capacity  than  the 
obedience  of  their  advisers  ;  if  obedience  alone  is  the  quali- 
fication, then  demands  will  be  made  on  the  general  ability  of 
the  monarch,  which  even  a  Frederick  the  Great  could  not 
satisfy,  although  in  his  time  politics,  both  in  war  and  peace, 
were  less  difficult  than  they  are  to-day." 

William  the  Second  disregarded  Bismarck's  wise 
advice  that  Germany  should  follow  a  frank  and  con- 
ciliatory policy,  and  that  she  should  endeavour  to 
avoid  friction  with  other  nations  ;  and,  in  addition,  he 
made  the  fatal  mistake  of  challenging  Great  Britain's 
naval  supremacy.  Thus  he  converted  Germany's  "  old 
and  traditional  ally  "  into  a  dangerous  opponent. 

Clearly  recognising  that  Germany's  naval  policy 
would,  in  case  of  a  great  European  conflict,  compel 
this  country  to  support  Germany's  opponents,  the 
writer  of  this  book  repeatedly  urged  the  danger  of 
Germany's  naval  and  anti-British  policy  upon  Prince 
Biilow,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  and  other  leading  Ger- 
mans, but  he  preached  to  deaf  ears. 

In  the  summer  of  1911  the  second  Morocco  crisis 
broke  out  in  consequence  of  the  despatch  of  the 
Panther  to  Agadir.  It  nearly  led  to  war  between 
France  and  Germany.  Both  in  England  and  in 
Germany  hostilities  were  expected  between  the  two 
countries,  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  plainly  announced  in 
his  Mansion  House  speech  that  if  Germany  should 
attack  France,  Great  Britain  would  aid  France  in  her 
defence.  The  tension  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  reached  the  breaking  point.  In  December 
1911,  when  the  Morocco  question  had  been  settled,  I 
happened  to  see  one  of  the  leading  German  diplomats 
at  the  German  Foreign  Office.  In  the  course  of  a  long 
conversation  I  pointed  out  once  more  that  Germany's 


766  MODERN   GERMANY 

trans-maritime  policy  not  only  endangered  her  security 
but  was  bound  to  lead  to  the  break-up  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  ;  that  she  rashly  risked  her  very  existence  ; 
that  Germany's  safety  on  the  Continent  depended  on 
good  relations  with  Great  Britain  ;  that  she  would  act 
wisely  in  ceasing  to  antagonise  France  ;  that  she  should 
not  increase  her  fleet  beyond  the  provisions  of  her 
gigantic  naval  programme  ;  that  she  should  stop  the 
anti-British  agitation  of  the  German  navy  party  ;  that 
if  Germany  continued  on  the  course  on  which  she  had 
embarked  a  collision  between  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many was  inevitable.  I  added  that  an  Anglo-German 
war  might  lead  not  merely  to  Germany's  defeat,  but 
to  her  downfall ;  and  that  my  action  was  undertaken 
rather  in  the  interest  of  Germany  than  in  that  of 
Great  Britain,  for  if  the  two  countries  should  unhappily 
go  to  war  Germany  would  risk  very  much,  while  Great 
Britain  would  risk  but  little.  The  eminent  personage 
before  whom  I  put  these  considerations  treated  me 
with  studied  discourtesy.  The  leaders  of  Germany's 
foreign  policy  seemed  struck  with  blindness. 

A  few  weeks  after  this  conversation  the  German 
navy  programme  received  another  enormous  expan- 
sion. The  whole  German  fleet  was  to  be  put  on  a 
permanent  war  footing  in  time  of  peace.  More  ships 
were  to  be  laid  down,  and  once  more  a  virulent  and 
malicious  anti-British  agitation  was  engineered  in  the 
German  Press  by  the  Press  Bureau  of  the  German 
Admiralty.  Shortly  after  my  return  I  wrote  an  article 
on  "  Anglo-German  Differences  and  Sir  Edward  Grey," 
which  appeared  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  and  which 
was  addressed  to  the  German  Foreign  Office.  In  that 
article  I  gave  the  following  warning  : — 

"  Great  Britain  has  little  cause  to  plead  for  Germany's  good- 
will, for  she  suffers  little  through  the  existing  Anglo-German 


THE   ULTIMATE   RUIN    OF   GERMANY    767 

tension,  while  isolated  Germany  suffers  much  and  risks  more. 
While  Great  Britain's  position  throughout  the  world  is  secure* 
that  of  Germany  is  very  precarious  because  of  her  exposed 
frontiers.  As  matters  stand  at  present  Germany  has  far  more 
need  of  Great  Britain's  support  than  Great  Britain  has  of 
Germany's.  It  is  true  that  Germany  possesses  still  the  strongest 
army  in  Europe,  but  it  is  not  strong  enough  to  face  a  great 
European  combination.  She  is  no  longer  a  danger  to  the 
peace  of  the  world,  owing  to  her  isolation  and  to  the  estrange- 
ment of  Great  Britain.  The  minds  of  her  statesmen  must 
rather  be  preoccupied  with  the  problem  of  defending  Germany 
than  with  ambitious  wars  of  aggression.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  is  madness  for  Germany's  rulers  to  continue 
proclaiming  that  Germany  requires  more  Dreadnoughts,  and 
still  more  Dreadnoughts,  and  ever  more  Dreadnoughts  against 
Great  Britain. 

"  Germany's  prospects  are  dark  and  threatening.  She  is  not 
rich  enough  and  not  strong  enough  to  maintain  at  the  same 
time  the  strongest  army  and  a  navy  able  to  challenge  the 
strongest  navy.  Evei'y  nation  which  has  tried  to  become 
supreme  on  land  and  sea  has  failed." 

When  it  became  clear  that  Germany  was  determined 
to  continue  her  dangerous  anti-British  policy,  I  stated 
in  an  article  published  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  in 
June  1912,  and  entitled  "  The  Failure  of  Post-Bis- 
marckian  Germany  "  : — 

"A  nation  can  safely  embark  upon  a  bold  and  costly  trans- 
maritime  policy  only  if  it  is  secure  on  land,  if  it  either  occupies 
an  island,  like  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  or  if  it  occupies  an 
isolated  position  and  cannot  be  invaded  by  its  neighbours, 
like  the  United  States.  Germany  has  three  great  land  Powers 
for  neighbours.  Two  of  them,  France  and  Russia,  are  not 
friendly  to  Germany,  and  she  cannot  rely  with  absolute 
certainty  upon  the  support  of  her  third  neighbour,  Austria- 
Hungary,  a  fact  of  which  Bismarck  warned  her  in  his  Memoirs. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  obvious  that  Germany's 
greatest  need  is  not  expansion  oversea,  but  defence  on  land  ; 
that  her  greatest  interests  lie  not  on  the  sea,  but  on  terra 
firma," 

It  was  obvious  to  many  that,  owing  to  the  unwise 


768  MODERN    GERMANY 

policy  of  William  the  Second,  the  Triple  Alliance  had 
become  a  sham,  that  Germany  could  no  longer  rely 
on  Italy's  support  in  the  hour  of  need.  I  wrote  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  in  June  1912  : — 

"  In  matters  of  foreign  policy  praise  or  blame  must  be  meted 
out  according  to  results.  At  the  time  of  Bismarck's  dismissal 
the  Triple  Alliance  was  a  solid  and  reliable  partnership,  and 
as  France  on  one  side  of  Germany,  Russia  on  another,  and 
Great  Britain  on  a  third  were  isolated,  Germany's  position  in 
the  world  was  absolutely  secure.  She  dominated  the  Continent. 

"  By  pursuing  an  anti- British  policy,  Germany  has  not  only 
driven  Great  Britain  from  Germany's  side  and  has  driven  her 
into  the  arms  of  France  and  Russia,  but  she  has  at  the  same 
time  greatly  weakened  the  formerly  reliable  Triple  Alliance. 
Few  Germans  believe  that  Germany  can  count  on  Italy's  sup- 
port in  the  hour  of  need.  Thus  Germany  has  simultaneously 
created  the  Triple  Entente  and  weakened,  if  not  destroyed, 
the  Triple  Alliance.  It  is  true  the  Triple  Alliance  exists  still — 
on  paper.  However,  Italy  would  not  think  of  supporting 
Germany  in  a  war  against  France,  and  still  less  in  a  war  against 
Great  Britain  or  against  Great  Britain  and  France  combined. 

"Few  intelligent  Germans  reckon  upon  Italy's  support. 
Most  think  that  in  a  great  European  war  Italy  will  either 
remain  neutral  or  will  be  found  on  the  side  of  Germany's 
enemies." 

In  Bismarck's  time,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the 
reign  of  William  the  Second,  Germany's  position  was, 
I  repeat,  absolutely  secure.  Not  only  were  Germany's 
enemies  isolated,  but  the  Triple  Alliance  was  in  reality 
a  Quintuple  Alliance  in  disguise.  The  loyalty  of  Italy 
was  then  undoubted,  and  Germany  could  firmly  reckon 
upon  the  support  of  Turkey  and  of  Roumania  in  case 
of  need.  Turkey  and  Roumania  could  have  afforded 
invaluable  assistance  to  the  Triple  Alliance  in  case  of 
a  war  with  Russia.  By  allowing  Turkey  to  be  attacked 
and  despoiled  in  quick  succession,  first  by  Italy  and 
then  by  the  Balkan  States,  Germany  seriously  changed 


THE   ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    769 

the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  to  her  disadvantage ; 
and  Roumania,  recognising  that  the  central  European 
group  of  Powers  was  no  longer  the  stronger  one  of  the 
two,  not  unnaturally  turned  towards  the  Powers  of 
the  Triple  Entente  for  support,  especially  as  she  de- 
sired to  acquire  those  vast  territories  of  Austria- 
Hungary  which  border  upon  Roumania,  and  which  are 
inhabited  by  three  million  Roumanians.  Through  the 
wretched  policy  of  her  Emperor,  Turkey  has  been 
crippled  and  Roumania  has  been  estranged.  Com- 
menting on  Germany's  impolicy  in  allowing  Turkey  to 
be  struck  down,  and  in  estranging  Roumania,  I  wrote 
in  an  article  "  The  Changing  of  the  Balance  of  Power," 
published  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  Review  in  June 
1913  :— 

"  In  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  had  driven  Great  Britain 
into  the  arms  of  France  and  Russia,  and  had  exposed  herself 
to  the  possibility  of  being  simultaneously  involved  in  a  great 
war  by  land  and  sea,  it  was  of  course  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  her  that  her  position  on  land  should  be  absolutely  impreg- 
nable. In  these  circumstances  it  was  clearly  the  first  and 
most  urgent  duty  of  German  statesmanship  to  take  care  that 
Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  should  be  as  strong  as  possible, 
and  that  Roumania  and  Turkey — and  especially  Turkey,  the 
support  of  which,  should  be  invaluable  in  case  of  complications 
with  Great  Britain — should  be  firmly  attached  to  Germany 
or  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  But  with  the  same  incredible 
short-sightedness  and  levity  with  which  Germany  had  em- 
barked upon  an  anti-British  course,  she  allowed  Turkey  to  be 
attacked  first  by  Italy  and  then  by  the  Balkan  States,  and  to 
be  utterly  defeated.  If  Germany  had  possessed  a  policy,  if 
her  diplomacy  had  been  guided  by  a  statesman,  or  merely  by 
a  man  possessed  of  common  sense,  she  would  have  known  that 
the  support  of  Turkey  would  be  more  valuable  to  her  in  the  hour 
of  need  than  that  of  Italy.  She  would,  therefore,  either  have 
attached  Turkey  to  the  Triple  Alliance  by  treaty,  as  General  von 
Bernhardi  had  suggested,  or  she  would  have  replied  to  Italy's 
ultimatum  to  Turkey  by  an  ultimatum  of  her  own  addressed 
to  Italy,  which  very  likely  would  have  prevented  the  war." 

3C 


770  MODERN    GERMANY 

Year  by  year  it  became  clearer  that  the  German 
Emperor's  unceasing,  unnecessary  and  exasperating 
activity  in  all  quarters  of  the  globe  had  made  Germany's 
policy  universally  disliked  and  suspected,  that  Ger- 
many had  come  to  take  that  place  among  the  nations 
which  France  occupied  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  the 
Third,  that  Germany  had  become  the  disturber  of  the 
world's  peace,  and  was  in  danger  of  being  treated  as 
such  by  the  generality  of  nations.  In  an  article  en- 
titled "  German  Designs  in  Africa,"  published  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After  in  August  1911,  I  had 
written  : — 

"  War  has  been  brought  within  the  limits  of  vision.  It  is  to 
be  hoped  that  Germany  will  turn  away  from  the  very  dangerous 
course  upon  which  she  has  embarked,  a  course  which  in  a  very 
short  time  may  bring  her  into  a  collision  not  only  with  France, 
but  with  several  Great  Powers  ;  and  as  the  Triple  Alliance  is 
believed  to  be  a  purely  defensive  alliance  relating  only  to 
Europe,  Germany  may  find  herself  deserted  by  her  allies  in 
the  hour  of  trouble.  Let  us  hope  that  the  Morocco  crisis  can 
be  explained  away  as  the  mistake  of  a  single  man.  Let  us 
hope  that  Herr  von  Kiderlen-Waechter  will  be  replaced  with- 
out delay.  That  will  solve  and  explain  the  crisis,  and  the 
Morocco  incident  will  soon  be  forgotten.  Persistence  on  the 
dangerous  and  unprecedented  course  which  Germany  is 
steering  at  the  present  moment  may  imperil  Germany's  future, 
and  may  cost  the  Emperor  his  throne.  The  German  nation 
is  intensely  loyal  and  patriotic,  but  it  would  never  forgive  a 
monarch  who  had  driven  the  nation  into  a  disastrous  war 
without  adequate  reason." 

Germany  had  become  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  the 
world.  Time  after  time  she  had  dragged  the  nations 
to  the  very  brink  of  a  world-war.  By  his  ceaseless, 
neurotic  activity,  William  the  Second  was  likely  to 
raise  a  great  coalition  against  Germany.  He  was 
likely  to  be  confronted  in  the  hour  of  trial  by  a  Europe 
in  arms,  as  was  Napoleon  the  First  a  century  ago.  In 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    771 

my  article  "  The  Failure  of  Post-Bismarckian  Ger- 
many," published  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  and 
After  in  June  1912,  I  wrote  : — 

"  Bismarck  was  constantly  haunted  by  the  thought  of  the 
formation  of  a  great  European  coalition  against  Germany. 
This  will  be  seen  from  his  Memoirs,  and  from  many  of  his 
letters  and  conversations.  Bismarck's  worst  fear  may  be 
realised  before  long.  Germany's  post-Bismarckian  diplomacy 
is  doing  its  best  to  destroy  the  work  of  the  great  Chancellor. 
It  has  already  destroyed  Germany's  security  on  the  Continent. 
Yet  there  is  no  sign  that  the  '  new  course  '  will  be  abandoned." 

The  forecasts  made  have  come  true  in  every  par- 
ticular. Germany,  which  was  the  undisputed  leader 
of  the  strongest  group  of  Powers  in  Europe,  which 
dominated  a  Quintuple  Alliance,  and  which  kept  the 
other  Powers  in  a  state  of  isolation  and  mutual  dis- 
trust, has  at  present  scarcely  a  single  friend,  and  she 
is  at  war  with  nearly  all  Europe.  Before  long  Germany 
may  have  the  fate  of  Imperial  France  and  William  the 
Second  that  of  Napoleon  the  First. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  Germany  has  gone  to  war 
in  order  to  acquire  the  hegemony  of  Europe.  That 
assertion  is  not  correct.  Germany  possessed  the  hege- 
mony of  Europe  in  the  time  of  Bismarck.  She  lost 
it  through  the  mistaken  policy  of  William  the  Second, 
and  she  is  now  trying  to  regain  by  force  what  she  has 
lost  through  her  own  folly. 

Hitherto  the  German  army  has  been  considered  to 
be  by  far  the  best  army  in  the  world.  However, 
those  who  have  studied  military  matters  closely  and 
without  prejudice  were  aware  that  the  influence  of 
William  the  Second  had  been  as  fatal  to  the  German 
army  as  it  has  been  to  Germany's  diplomacy.  In  the 
first  place,  since  the  time  when  the  German  Emperor 
embarked  upon  naval  competition  with  Great  Britain, 


772  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  army  was  relatively  neglected.  It  was  starved  of 
money  and  men  for  the  sake  of  the  navy.  In  the 
second  place,  William  the  Second  insisted  upon  being 
not  only  his  own  Chancellor  and  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  but  also  his  own  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  and  his  own  Chief  of  the 
Staff  of  both  services.  At  the  time  when  the  Emperor 
made  the  nephew  of  the  Great  Moltke  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  appointing  him  to  the  same  position  which  his 
uncle  had  filled  with  such  wonderful  success,  the 
rumour  was  current  in  well-informed  circles  in  Berlin 
that  von  Moltke  asked  not  to  be  given  that  most  re- 
sponsible position,  because  he  thought  that  he  did 
not  possess  the  necessary  high  qualifications,  but  that 
the  Emperor  had  replied,  "  Never  mind,  Moltke.  You 
can  safely  take  the  post.  What  you  don't  know  I  do, 
and  I  can  do  the  work  for  you."  Two  years  ago,  when 
nobody  dared  to  question  the  pre-eminence  and  ex- 
cellence of  the  German  army,  I  wrote  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  Review,  in  an  article  entitled  "  The  Failure  of 
Post-Bismarckian  Germany,"  published  in  June  1912  : — 

"  Guided  by  the  maxim  '  Germany's  future  lies  upon  the 
water,'  the  leaders  of  the  '  new  course  '  have  been  so  anxious 
to  strengthen  the  navy  that  the  German  Army  has  been 
neglected  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively.  Germany's 
expenditure  on  the  navy  has  been  comparatively  extravagant, 
and  that  on  her  army  scarcely  sufficient.  Not  only  quantita- 
tively but  qualitatively  as  well  has  the  German  Army  suffered 
during  the  '  new  course.'  German  generals  complain  that 
promotions  are  made  less  by  merit  and  more  by  favour  than 
in  former  times.  Similar  complaints  are  heard  in  most 
Government  offices.  They  complain  that  the  officers  are  no 
longer  as  good  as  they  used  to  be.  Owing  to  the  rise  in  wages 
the  German  Army  can  no  longer  obtain  a  sufficient  number  of 
good  non-commissioned  officers.  The  German  war  material 
also  is  scarcely  up  to  date.  The  military  outfit  of  France  is 
superior  to  that  of  Germany.  According  to  Lieutenant- 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF    GERMANY    773 

Colonel  Beyel,  of  the  French  artillery,  and  many  other  experts, 
the  German  artillery  is  inferior  to  the  French.  The  tactics 
of  the  German  Army  have  become  antiquated.  According  to 
various  German  writers  Germany  has  failed  to  learn  the  lessons 
of  the  Boer  war  and  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  Major 
Hoppenstedt  published  in  1910  a  book,  Sind  wir  Kriegsfertig  ? 
in  which  he  showed  that  the  German  Army  is  too  much  occupied 
with  barracks-square  drill  and  too  little  with  warlike  training. 
Many  officers  attribute  the  neglect  of  the  army  to  the  influence 
of  the  Emperor,  who  is  severely  criticised.  William  the  First 
was  a  soldier  by  nature.  The  army  was  his  principal  interest. 
He  did  not  understand  the  navy.  He  tolerated  no  flatterers, 
and  knew  no  favouritism.  He  worked  incessantly  on  the 
improvement  of  the  army.  William  the  Second  has  made 
the  navy  his  hobby  and  attends  to  the  army  perfunctorily, 
and  many  say  that  it  is  little  better  managed  than  his  Foreign 
Office." 

After  the  Morocco  crisis  of  1911  Germany  hastily 
tried  to  improve  her  neglected  army  by  greatly  in- 
creasing the  establishment,  improving  arms  and  ap- 
pliances, strengthening  fortresses,  &c.  Her  military 
expenditure  rose  from  £47,200,000  in  1912  to£50,400,ooo 
in  1913,  and  to  no  less  than  £83,500,000  in  1914,  and  a 
special  "  war  levy  "  of  £50,000,000  was  voted  by  the 
Reichstag  for  bringing  her  army  up  to  date.  However, 
armies  and  navies  are  largely  spiritual  things  of  slow 
organic  growth.  They  cannot  be  improvised,  nor  can 
they  be  rapidly  improved  if  they  have  been  neglected 
for  a  long  time,  even  if  money  is  poured  out  like  water. 
Besides,  monetary  expenditure,  however  lavish,  cannot 
alter  the  spirit  of  an  army  and  its  supreme  direction. 
Money  neither  gives  foresight  nor  does  it  destroy 
conceit  in  the  leaders.  It  neither  replaces  officers  ap- 
pointed by  favour  by  men  of  merit,  nor  does  it  improve 
a  defective  organisation  and  faulty  tactics. 

Modesty,  concentration,  thoroughness  and  hard 
work  command  success  in  diplomacy  and  war.  While 


774  MODERN    GERMANY 

modesty  and  thoroughness  were  the  great  character- 
istics of  William  the  First  and  of  his  time,  the  reign 
of  William  the  Second  has  become  notorious  for 
luxury,  ostentation,  arrogance,  favouritism,  amateur- 
ishness, self-praise  and  conceit.  During  the  reign  of 
William  the  Second  the  old  Prussian  virtues  of 
frugality,  modesty  and  thoroughness  disappeared. 
German  idealism  died,  and  Berlin  became  a  centre  of 
coarse  materialism,  of  luxury,  and  of  immorality. 
Encouraged  by  the  most  exalted  circles,  all  Germany 
gave  itself  over  to  self-admiration  and  self-praise.  In 
the  Emperor's  speeches  and  in  innumerable  articles, 
lectures,  pamphlets  and  books,  the  Germans  were  told 
that  they  were,  to  quote  the  Emperor,  "  the  salt  of 
the  earth,"  the  wisest,  ablest,  strongest  and  most 
valiant  nation  in  the  world,  and  that  they  were, 
therefore,  entitled  to  rule  the  universe.  Foreign 
nations,  especially  the  English,  were  looked  upon  with 
undisguised  contempt.  Being  convinced  of  their  irre- 
sistible might  and  their  great  destiny,  many  Germans 
thought  that  Germany  should  become  supreme  in  the 
world  by  the  free  and  unscrupulous  use  of  her  irre- 
sistible strength.  Although  Bismarck  had  eloquently 
warned  the  nation  against  Machtpolitik,  against  pursu- 
ing a  policy  based  on  force,  against  the  policy  which 
had  caused  the  downfall  of  Napoleonic  France,  the 
idea  of  Machtpolitik  became  the  guiding  principle  of 
the  German  nation,  and  the  word  Machtpolitik  was  in 
everyone's  mouth.  Unfortunately  Bismarck  had  not 
practised  in  the  earlier  years  of  his  career  what  he 
preached  in  the  later.  In  three  great  wars  he  had 
given  to  little  Prussia  the  hegemony  of  Europe.  Young 
Germany  hoped,  by  another  series  of  successful  wars, 
to  conquer  the  hegemony  of  the  world.  By  sheer  force 
and  audacity  the  world  was  to  be  made  German. 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    775 

The  Government,  following  the  fatal  precedents  set 
by  Bismarck,  continued  to  rely  on  force  in  its  foreign 
and  domestic  policy.  By  force  Germany  was  to  con- 
quer for  herself  "  a  place  in  the  sun."  By  force  were 
the  Poles,  Danes  and  Frenchmen  in  the  conquered 
provinces  to  be  denationalised.  By  force  were  Social- 
ism and  popular  dissatisfaction  to  be  crushed.  By 
force  was  the  German  people  to  be  governed  against 
its  will,  and  by  force  were  the  rudimentary  parlia- 
mentary institutions  of  Germany  to  be  abolished  if 
parliament  should  cease  to  obey  the  will  of  the  ruling 
class.  Patriotic  Germans  in  their  thousands  had  been 
converted  to  the  gospel  of  force,  and  they  endeavoured 
to  aid  the  policy  of  the  Government  by  creating 
enormous  organisations  which  advocated  solving  all 
German  problems  by  that  means.  The  Navy  League, 
with  more  than  a  million  members,  demanded  that 
Germany  should  have  the  strongest  fleet,  the  Army 
League  that  she  should  have  the  strongest  army,  the 
Air  League  that  she  should  rule  the  air.  The  Ost- 
markenverein  and  Nordmarkenverein  agitated  in 
favour  of  denationalising  the  Poles  and  Danes  dwelling 
in  the  conquered  provinces  by  force.  A  Government- 
aided  league  made  war  on  Socialism,  and  the  Pan- 
Germanic  League,  founded  three  years  after  the 
Emperor's  accession,  advocated  Germany's  conquest 
of  Belgium,  Holland,  Denmark,  the  Baltic  provinces 
of  Russia,  &c.  It  advocated  the  Germanisation  of 
Europe  and  of  the  world.  An  enormous  literature 
arose  in  which  "  the  war  of  the  future  "  was  vividly 
and  patriotically  described.  In  hundreds  of  romances 
the  German  people,  and  especially  the  younger  genera- 
tion, were  told  how  Germany  would  conquer  France 
and  Russia,  defeat  the  English  fleet,  raise  India  in 
rebellion,  invade  England,  deprive  her  of  her  colonies, 


776  MODERN    GERMANY 

punish  the  United  States  for  their  arrogance,  and  tear 
up  the  Monroe  doctrine.  Scarcely  in  any  of  these 
romances,  or  in  any  serious  books,  was  the  possibility 
of  a  German  defeat  contemplated.  Countless  admirals, 
generals,  university  professors,  lecturers,  authors  and 
journalists  unceasingly  preached  the  need  of  power, 
but  none  the  need  of  wisdom,  of  caution  and  of  fair- 
ness. To  discuss  even  the  possibility  of  disaster  or  to 
advocate  moderation  was  considered  unpatriotic. 

The  Germans  are  a  most  docile  nation.  They  are 
what  their  rulers  make  them.  They  may  be  arrogant 
to  foreigners,  but  they  are  always  most  obedient  and 
respectful  to  their  rulers.  That  lies  in  their  training. 
They  take  from  their  rulers  their  policy  and  their 
opinions.  Since  the  advent  of  William  the  Second  an 
evil  spirit  has  taken  possession  of  Germany.  A  quarter 
of  a  century  of  stirring  Imperial  oratory,  of  jingoist 
self-admiration,  self-praise,  and  brag,  has  totally  cor- 
rupted both  the  sterling  character  and  the  mind  of  the 
German  nation. 

During  the  early  part  of  the  Emperor's  reign  the 
advocates  of  Germany's  expansion  believed  in  him. 
They  trusted  that  he,  like  his  ancestors,  would  be  a 
"Mehrer  des  Reiches."  William  the  Second  had  no 
doubt  the  ambition  to  increase  the  territory  and  the 
glory  of  his  country,  but  he  had  not  the  ability. 
When,  time  after  time,  the  Emperor  failed  in  his 
attempts  to  acquire  new  territories,  when  one  diplo- 
matic failure  followed  the  other  in  quick  succession, 
when  at  last  it  became  generally  recognised  that  he 
habitually  threatened  but  did  not  act,  Germany's 
leading  men  sarcastically  referred  to  him  as  the 
Friedenskaiser,  and  began  openly  to  call  him  a  coward. 
After  his  second  failure  to  overawe  France  by  raising 
the  Morocco  question,  the  ultra-patriotic  Post  of  Berlin 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    777 

referred  to  him  as  a  "  poltron  miserable  "  in  leaded 
print.  His  friends  and  his  own  family,  especially  the 
Crown  Prince,  openly  showed  their  disgust  that  the 
Emperor's  bold  words  were  never  followed  by  suitable 
action.  Many  leading  Germans  began  to  despair  of 
the  Emperor  and  of  the  future  of  their  country. 
William  the  Second  felt  the  ground  on  which  he  stood 
crumbling  under  his  feet,  that  deeds,  not  words,  were 
expected  of  him. 

The  Emperor's  unceasing  activity  had  alarmed  the 
nations  around,  and  they  had  made  arrangements 
for  their  mutual  protection.  Germany  felt  constantly 
hampered  and  circumscribed  by  the  Triple  Entente. 
The  balance  of  power  was  felt  to  be  a  most  powerful 
check  to  Germany's  desire  for  expansion.  Many  of  the 
most  eminent  military  men  demanded  that  Germany 
should  endeavour  to  break  up  the  Triple  Entente  and 
destroy  the  balance  of  power.  General  von  Bernhardi, 
for  instance,  wrote  in  his  book  Unsere  Zukunft :  "  We 
can  render  secure  our  position  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe  only  if  we  succeed  in  bursting  the  Triple 
Entente  and  forcing  France,  which  is  never  likely  to 
co-operate  with  Germany,  to  accept  that  position  of 
inferiority  which  is  her  due."  Numerous  statements 
of  similar  import  made  by  leading  Germans  might 
easily  be  given.  Germany  repeatedly  tried  to  destroy 
the  Triple  Entente,  but  as  her  policy  was  no  longer 
directed  by  a  master-hand,  every  attempt  at  weakening 
the  bonds  connecting  France,  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
resulted  in  the  strengthening  of  their  determination  to 
support  each  other.  So  Germany  bided  her  time  and 
waited  for  a  favourable  opportunity. 

Many  patriotic  Germans,  and  especially  the  leaders 
of  the  Pan-Germanic  League,  advocated  the  creation 
of  a  Greater  Germany,  the  territories  of  which  should 


778  MODERN    GERMANY 

reach  not  only  from  Hamburg  to  Trieste,  but  from 
Hamburg  to  Constantinople,  and  to  the  lands  beyond 
the  Straits.  Asia  Minor  was  to  become  a  German 
colony,  the  Bagdad  railway  a  German  railway,  and  thus 
Egypt  and  India  would  fall  into  Germany's  hands. 
Austria-Hungary  desired  to  make  herself  supreme  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  to  acquire  the  harbour  of 
Salonica.  She  allowed  the  Balkan  war  to  break  out, 
hoping  that  it  would  result  in  the  defeat  of  the  Slavonic 
Balkan  States,  or  in  the  weakening  of  both  sides,  for 
either  result  would  have  facilitated  Austria's  progress 
in  the  direction  of  Salonica.  However,  Servia  blocked 
the  way.  The  valley  of  the  Vardar  is  the  great 
natural  highroad  from  Vienna  and  Budapest  on  the 
one  hand  to  Salonica  and  Constantinople  on  the  other. 
The  Vardar  runs  through  the  centre  of  Servia.  To 
Austria's  dismay  the  Balkan  States  were  victorious. 
A  stronger  Servia,  holding  the  gateway  to  Constanti- 
nople, was  likely  to  block  Austria's  and  Germany's 
path  to  the  ^Egean  Sea  and  the  Bosphorus.  Desiring 
to  ruin  Servia,  Austria  brought  about  the  second 
Balkan  war.  In  the  course  of  the  Balkan  war  and 
during  the  peace  negotiations  she  repeatedly  threatened 
little  Servia  with  war  by  inventing  outrages  done  to 
Austrians — the  most  notorious  case  was  the  infamous 
invention  spread  and  maintained  by  the  Austrian 
Government  press  for  weeks  that  the  Servians  had 
perpetrated  an  unnameable  mutilation  upon  the 
Austrian  Consul  Prochaska — and  by  forbidding  Servia 
to  acquire  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic.  However,  while 
Austria  was  threatening  and  blustering  in  public,  she 
was  very  kindly  but  very  firmly  informed  by  Mr. 
Sazonoff  in  private  that  an  Austrian  attack  upon 
Servia  would  be  equivalent  to  an  Austrian  attack  upon 
Russia,  that  Russia  was  as  strongly  interested  in 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    779 

Servia's  independence  as  was  Great  Britain  in  the 
independence  of  Belgium.  Austria  clearly  knew  what 
the  consequences  of  an  attack  on  Servia  would  be. 

When  William  the  Second  had  dismissed  Bismarck 
he  proclaimed  that  he  would  henceforth  be  his  own 
Chancellor.  He  no  longer  required  an  able  Chancellor 
but  only  an  obedient  one.  In  Bismarck's  words  quoted 
above,  obedience  alone  was  made  the  qualification  of 
the  monarch's  principal  adviser.  Bismarck  had  four 
successors  :  General  von  Caprivi,  who  was  accustomed 
to  discipline  and  did  what  he  was  told  ;  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe,  an  outworn  diplomat,  who  was  made  Chancellor 
at  the  age  of  seventy-five,  and  who,  according  to  his 
Memoirs,  was  very  badly  treated  by  the  Emperor  ; 
Prince  Biilow,  a  sprightly  diplomat  and  an  entertain- 
ing companion  full  of  good  jokes  and  stories  ;  and 
Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  a  dull  but  industrious 
bureaucrat,  who  had  no  experience  whatever  of 
diplomacy  and  of  practical  statesmanship.  When,  in 
the  spring  of  1892,  Bismarck  learnt  that  General  von 
Caprivi  intended  resigning,  he  said,  according  to 
Harden  : — 

"  I  am  not  pleased  with  the  news.  At  least  he  was  a  general. 
Who  will  come  next  ?  That  is  the  question.  If  you  get  for 
Chancellor  a  Prussian  bureaucrat  who  has  learned  his  trade 
solely  at  his  desk,  then  you  will  see  strange  happenings  which 
at  present  seem  unbelievable." 

This  prediction  of  Bismarck's,  as  so  many  others,  has 
come  true.  The  unbelievable  has  happened. 

From  evidence  which  it  would  lead  too  far  to  give 
in  detail  in  these  pages  it  appears  that  the  German 
Emperor  and  the  late  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
agreed  on  common  action  against  Servia.  Austria- 
Hungary  was  to  pick  a  plausible  quarrel  with  that 
country,  and  Germany  was  to  support  the  action 


780  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  her  ally  with  her  entire  strength.  Russia  would 
either  intervene  or  abstain  from  action.  If  she  only 
threatened  but  did  not  act,  Russia  would  lose  all 
credit  among  the  Balkan  Slavs,  and  Austria-Hungary, 
backed  by  Germany,  would,  through  Servia  and  the 
Vardar  valley,  dominate  the  Balkan  Peninsula  with 
Salonica  and  Constantinople.  An  enormous  step  in 
advance  would  have  been  taken.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  Russia  should  attack  Austria-Hungary,  war  be- 
tween the  two  great  groups  of  Powers  would  ensue. 
As  Great  Britain  had  no  direct  interests  in  Servia  it 
was  expected  that  she  would  keep  neutral,  especially 
if  she  should  at  the  time  have  her  hands  full  with 
problems  of  her  own.  If  Great  Britain  should  not 
take  part  in  such  a  war,  Italy  would  no  doubt  support 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in  the  hope  of  receiving 
valuable  territorial  compensation  for  her  assistance. 
By  raising  the  Servian  question  there  seemed  to  be  a 
possibility  of  ranging  the  three  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  against  France  and  Russia.  A  war  of  three 
Great  Powers  against  two  seemed  very  promising.  A 
few  weeks  before  the  Archduke's  murder  he  was  visited 
by  the  German  Emperor  at  his  castle  of  Konopischt. 
It  has  been  asserted  that  a  secret  treaty  was  then 
concluded  between  Germany  and  Austria,  and  very 
likely  it  dealt  with  the  Servian  question  in  the  manner 
described  above. 

After  the  Archduke's  murder  Austria-Hungary  kept 
quiet  for  weeks.  Apparently  the  outrage  was  to  be 
treated  as  an  ordinary  crime,  and  there  was  much 
reason  to  treat  it  as  such,  for  the  murderers,  though 
Serbs  by  race,  were  Austrian  citizens.  On  the  2Oth  of 
July  Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote  to  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Berlin  that  Count  Berchtold,  in  speaking  to  the 
Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  had  "  deprecated  the 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    781 

suggestion  that  the  situation  [between  Austria-Hungary 
and  Servia]  was  grave."  Three  days  later,  on  the 
23rd  of  July,  Austria-Hungary  despatched  to  Servia, 
without  any  previous  warning,  a  totally  unacceptable 
ultimatum,  accusing  Servia  of  being  responsible  for 
the  Archduke's  death.  She  gave  no  proof  of  her 
assertion,  yet  she  demanded  from  Servia  that  she 
should,  within  forty-eight  hours,  divest  herself  of  her 
sovereign  rights  and  place  herself  under  Austria's  pro- 
tection and  dependence.  What  had  happened  in  the 
meantime  ? 

The  Irish  crisis  had  been  watched  by  all  the  Conti- 
nental Powers  with  the  greatest  interest.  Civil  war  in 
Great  Britain  seemed  unavoidable.  At  the  eleventh 
hour  the  King  called  a  conference  of  the  leaders  of 
all  parties  at  Buckingham  Palace.  A  settlement  by 
consent  seemed  possible.  That  hope  quickly  disap- 
peared. On  the  22nd  of  July  it  became  generally 
known  in  London  that  the  Conference  would  be  a 
failure,  and  on  the  24th  the  leaders  held  their  last 
and  purely  formal  meeting,  when  the  impossibility  of 
reaching  an  agreement  was  announced.  Great  Britain 
not  only  had  no  direct  interest  in  the  Austro-Servian 
quarrel,  but  seemed  likely  to  be  lamed  by  the  immi- 
nence of  civil  war.  Besides,  Russia  was  expected  to 
suffer  from  famine  in  consequence  of  a  bad  harvest, 
and  both  the  French  President  and  the  French  Prime 
Minister  were  abroad.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  Russian 
and  French  armies  were  not  ready  for  war.  Russia 
was  about  to  reorganise  and  greatly  increase  her  army 
and  to  construct  most  important  strategical  railways, 
while,  according  to  Senator  Humbert's  report^con- 
firmed  by  the  Minister  of  War,  France  lacked  heavy 
artillery,  ammunition,  and  boots,  and  the  French 
fortresses  required  strengthening  against  the  heavy 


782  MODERN    GERMANY 

artillery  introduced  in  Germany.  The  whole  situation 
seemed  most  favourable  to  the  Germanic  Powers. 
The  longed-for  moment  had  arrived  at  last.  Now  or 
never  was  the  time  to  strike.  The  moment  seemed  all 
the  more  propitious  as  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
had  recently  greatly  strengthened  their  armies  ;  as 
Russia  had  not  yet  followed  suit  and  was  believed  to 
be  unprepared  ;  as,  according  to  Senator  Humbert's 
report,  grave  deficiencies  existed  in  the  French  army  ; 
and  as,  last  but  not  least,  the  strategically  most  im- 
portant Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  had  just  been 
completed. 

It  has  been  asserted  in  Berlin  that  the  initiative 
for  Austria's  Servian  policy  came  from  Vienna.  That 
assertion  is  quite  inadmissible.  Germany  has  un- 
mistakably shown  to  Austria-Hungary  in  the  past  that 
she,  as  the  stronger  Power,  is  not  willing  to  allow 
herself  to  be  dragged  into  adventures  at  the  heels  of 
her  weaker  partner.  Besides,  Austria-Hungary  has, 
ever  since  1848,  when  Francis  Joseph  came  to  the 
throne,  followed  a  policy  of  drift  and  surrender.  Hence 
it  seems  most  improbable  that  her  aged  monarch 
would,  at  the  end  of  his  days,  and  upon  his  own 
initiative,  act  with  such  unexampled  and  ferocious 
energy.  It  is  true  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis 
the  German  Foreign  Office  declared  that  they  had  no 
knowledge  of  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Servia.  How- 
ever, according  to  a  despatch  sent  by  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  "  the 
German  Ambassador  [in  Vienna]  knew  the  text  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  before  it  was  despatched 
and  telegraphed  it  to  the  German  Emperor."  Accord- 
ing to  the  British  Ambassador's  report  the  Emperor 
"  endorsed  every  line  of  it."  Apparently  the  German 
Emperor  either  inspired  the  fatal  ultimatum  himself 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF    GERMANY    783 

or  at  least  agreed  upon  it  with  Austria-Hungary, 
leaving  the  German  Foreign  Office  in  complete  ignor- 
ance of  his  action.  Similar  things  have  happened 
before.  William  the  Second  is  his  own  Chancellor 
and  his  own  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  he  has  no  use  for  any  but  obedient  Chancellors 
and  Ministers. 

From  the  hundred  and  fifty-nine  documents  con- 
tained in  the  "Correspondence  respecting  the  Euro- 
pean Crisis  (Cd.  7467),"  published  with  praiseworthy 
promptitude  by  the  British  Foreign  Office,  it  appears 
that  all  the  Great  Powers  except  Germany  urged 
Austria-Hungary  to  settle  her  quarrel  with  Servia  by 
agreement  in  some  form  or  other.  Only  Germany 
raised  difficulties  by  ominously  declaring  that  the 
matter  did  not  concern  any  Power  except  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia,  that  arbitration,  conference,  or 
international  discussion  was  out  of  the  question,  al- 
though she  knew  that  every  Balkan  question  had  so 
far  been  treated  as  one  of  European  concern  by  the 
Concert  of  Powers.  Assured  of  Germany's  uncon- 
ditional support,  Austria-Hungary  absolutely  declined 
all  proposals  towards  an  amicable  settlement  made  by 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  on  the  28th  of  July  Count 
Berchtold  informed  Russia  with  haughty  abruptness 
that  he  could  not  even  discuss  Austria's  Note  to  Servia. 

But  suddenly  the  aspect  of  affairs  altered  very 
seriously  to  the  disadvantage  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  On  the  30th  of  July  the  British  parties 
agreed  to  bury  all  their  differences  in  view  of  the 
critical  foreign  situation.  The  second  reading  of  the 
Home  Rule  Amending  Bill  was  indefinitely  postponed. 
Great  Britain  was  united  and  stood  ready  for  action. 
Immediately  Austria's  tone  changed.  She  now  de- 
clared in  courteous  tones  her  readiness  to  discuss  the 


784  MODERN    GERMANY 

unacceptable  ultimatum,  and  plainly  displayed  her 
anxiety  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia. 
Peace  seemed  secure.  Unfortunately  Austria-Hungary 
had  reckoned  without  Germany.  Although  Austria 
was  ready  to  negotiate,  and  although  Russia  declared 
on  the  soth  of  July  that  she  would  "  stop  all  military 
preparations,"  the  German  Emperor  sent  in  hot  haste 
an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  demanding  that  she  should 
unconditionally  demobilise  within  twelve  hours.  War 
would  be  the  consequence  of  refusal.  Thus  war  was 
brought  about,  not  owing  to  the  differences  between 
Austria  and  Servia  or  to  Russia's  intervention,  for 
Russia  and  Austria  were  both  willing  to  adjust  matters 
peacefully.  War  was  precipitated  by  the  Emperor's 
action,  taken  apparently  against  the  advice  of  his 
Chancellor  and  his  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Why  did  William  the  Second  plunge  his  country 
and  all  Europe  into  war  at  a  moment  when  peace 
was  in  his  grasp  ?  Possibly  he  was  urged  into  war 
by  the  war  party.  Possibly  because  he  dreaded  the 
supreme  disgrace  of  another  diplomatic  failure,  of 
another  surrender.  The  governing  class  and  his  own 
family  were  exasperated  at  the  Emperor's  surrenders 
on  the  occasions  of  the  first  and  second  Morocco 
crises.  They  would  never  have  forgiven  him  a  third 
surrender,  which  would  have  been  deadly  to  the 
prestige  of  Germany  and  to  that  of  the  crown.  In 
rushing  into  this  war  the  Emperor  probably  knew 
that  he  was  endangering  the  very  existence  of 
the  Empire,  that  Germany  was  not  unlikely  to 
be  defeated,  for  his  speech  from  the  balcony  of  his 
Berlin  castle  to  the  citizens  below  on  the  3ist  of  July 
was  that  of  a  beaten  man.  Addressing  the  people  he 
said : — 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    785 

"A  fateful  hour  has  fallen  for  Germany.  Envious  people 
everywhere  are  compelling  us  to  our  just  defence.  The  sword 
has  been  forced  into  our  hands.  I  hope  that  if  my  efforts  at 
the  last  hour  do  not  succeed  in  bringing  our  opponents  to  see 
eye  to  eye  with  us,  and  in  maintaining  peace,  we  shall  with 
God's  help  so  wield  the  sword  that  we  shall  restore  it  to  its 
sheath  again  with  honour.  War  would  demand  of  us  enormous 
sacrifices  in  property  and  life,  but  we  should  show  our  enemies 
what  it  means  to  provoke  Germany.  And  now  I  commend 
you  to  God.  Go  to  church  and  kneel  before  God  and  pray 
for  His  help  and  for  our  gallant  army." 

While  the  Emperor  asserted  in  his  speech  that 
Germany  was  wantonly  attacked,  the  White  Book  re- 
garding the  outbreak  of  war,  published  by  his  own 
Government,  states  that  Germany  unconditionally 
backed  up  Austria-Hungary  in  her  Servian  policy, 
with  a  view  to  foiling  the  policy  of  Russia,  who  aimed 
at  disintegrating  and  destroying  the  Dual  Monarchy  ; 
in  other  words,  that  she  deliberately  challenged  that 
country.  And,  while  protesting  in  an  introductory 
memorandum  that  Germany  urged  Austria  to  preserve 
the  peace,  the  German  Government  has  hitherto  failed 
to  publish  a  single  one  of  its  despatches  sent  to  Vienna 
at  that  critical  period.  No  official  document  has  been 
published  to  show  that  Germany  recommended  moder- 
ation in  Vienna.  That  omission  is  noteworthy.  Ger- 
many was  well  aware  that  she  would  appear  to  be  the 
aggressor,  and  herein  lies  perhaps  the  reason  why  the 
German  Ambassador,  shortly  before  leaving  Paris, 
drove  repeatedly  up  and  down  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
through  the  seething  mass  of  the  people.  Perhaps  he 
had  orders  if  possible  to  produce  an  incident  which 
would  put  France  into  the  wrong.  Strangely  enough 
the  Paris  populace  kept  its  temper  and  offered  no 
insult  to  the  Ambassador. 

Germany  has  protested  to  the  world  that  she  was 


786  MODERN    GERMANY 

attacked.  Those  whcTwish  to  find  out  whether  Germany 
or  her  opponents  were  in  the  wrong  need  not  study 
the  numerous  official  publications  of  the  governments 
concerned.  The  fact  that  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia  promptly  published  all  their  despatches  shows 
that  they  have  little  to  conceal.  The  fact  that  Ger- 
many has  published  only  a  few  picked  communica- 
tions and  none  of  the  vitally  important  ones  nominally 
addressed  to  Austria  in  the  interest  of  peace  gravely 
prejudices  Germany  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  More- 
over, it  is  improbable  that  the  militarily  unready 
Powers  took  the  initiative  in  attacking  fully  pre- 
pared Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  As  a  rule  the 
prepared,  not  the  unprepared,  army  is  the  aggressor. 

At  the  moment  when  Germany  sent  her  ultimatum 
to  Russia  it  was  evident  that  her  position  would  be  an 
extremely  dangerous  one  in  case  of  war.  Although 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  could  conceivably  hope 
to  defeat  France,  Russia,  and  Servia  on  land,  they 
could  hardly  hope  to  defeat  Great  Britain  on  the  sea. 
Hence,  even  if  the  war  on  land  should  end  in  Germany's 
favour  and  if  France,  Russia,  and  Servia  should  have  to 
withdraw  from  the  stricken  field,  Great  Britain  was 
not  likely  to  cease  fighting,  and  exhausted  and  im- 
poverished Germany  could  not  hope  to  vanquish  her. 
Besides  Italy,  dreading  Great  Britain's  hostility,  was 
now  likely  to  desert  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in 
the  hour  of  need.  She  would  therefore  have  to  fear 
the  vengeance  of  her  former  partners,  should  they 
prove  victorious.  Consequently  Italy  was  vitally  in- 
terested in  the  defeat  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  it  was  clear  that  in  case  of  need  she 
would  draw  the  sword  and  help  in  the  downfall  of  her 
former  allies  so  as  to  establish  her  own  security.  If 
things  should  go  badly  for  Germany  and  Austria 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    787 

Italy  would  in  all  probability  attack  Austria-Hungary 
in  order  to  recover  the  Italian  Tyrol,  the  Trentino,  and 
Trieste.  These  considerations  must  have  been  in  the 
Emperor's  mind  and  in  that  of  his  diplomatic  advisers 
on  the  fatal  3ist  of  July.  Unfortunately  military  and 
naval  men  were  closeted  with  the  Emperor  and  his 
diplomats,  and  probably  none  of  the  Emperor's  ad- 
visers possessed  Bismarck's  authority  and  determina- 
tion and  was  ready  to  risk  his  position  for  the  sake  of 
his  country.  Bismarck  would  never  have  consented 
to  such  a  suicidal  war.  He  would  rather  have  raised 
the  country  against  his  Emperor.  However,  it  was 
observed  that  when,  after  the  fatal  and  final  de- 
cision, the  Emperor  and  his  Chancellor  drove  into 
Berlin,  the  Chancellor's  face  was  so  distorted  that 
the  people  in  the  streets  did  not  recognise  him. 
He  probably  considered  that  the  Emperor  had 
signed  the  death  warrant  of  Germany  and  of  his 
own  dynasty. 

When  the  Emperor  resolved  upon  war  with  France 
and  Russia  it  was  perhaps  still  somewhat  doubtful 
whether  Great  Britain  would  come  to  the  aid  of  France, 
but  soon  the  Emperor  made  Great  Britain's  hostility 
certain  by  invading  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  That 
attack  was  not  unexpected.  The  strategical  intentions 
of  a  military  nation  in  case  of  war  can  clearly  be 
gauged  by  its  strategical  railways  and  especially  by 
their  military  platforms.  To  detrain  rapidly  the 
gigantic  armies  used  in  modern  war,  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  horses  and  tens  of  thousands  of  guns  and 
vehicles,  enormous  military  platforms  and  sidings  are 
required.  By  comparing  the  detraining  capacity  of  the 
military  platforms  on  the  Belgo-German  frontier  with 
that  on  the  Franco-German  frontier,  it  was  clear  that 
Germany  intended  to  strike  at  France  by  way  of 


788  MODERN    GERMANY 

Belgium.  As  France  had  powerfully  fortified  her 
eastern  frontier,  it  had  been  an  open  secret  for  more 
than  thirty  years  that  Germany  would  try  to  enter 
France  by  breaking  through  Belgium.  In  a  confi- 
dential and  authoritative  monograph  Sketch  of  the 
Defences  of  France  against  Invasion  from  Germany, 
marked  "Secret,"  and  published  by  Harrison  and 
Sons  in  1887,  we  read  : — 

"It  is  from  the  recognition  of  the  extraordinary  strength  of 
the  north-eastern  barrier  that  it  is  argued  that  Germany  will 
in  a  future  war  be  forced  to  direct  her  attack  by  way  of 
Belgium.  The  best,  shortest,  and  safest  line  of  invasion  from 
North  or  Central  Germany,  having  Paris  for  its  objective,  lies 
unquestionably  by  the  Meuse,  Sambre,  and  Oise,  and  follows 
the  latter  river  up  to  the  gates  of  the  capital.  The  roads  and 
railways  connecting  Cologne  and  Diisseldorf  with  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  lead  thence  on  Lie"ge,  the  northern  key  to  the  valley 
of  the  Meuse  and  distant  only  about  nineteen  miles  (a  two 
days'  march)  from  the  German  frontier.  From  Lidge,  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse,  prolonged  by  the  valley  of  the  Sambre, 
opens  up  a  broad  road  into  France,  which  carries  an  invader 
without  sensible  interruption  from  the  plains  of  the  Meuse 
basin  into  those  of  the  Seine  basin." 

The  general  staffs  of  all  nations  were  prepared  for 
Germany's  breach  of  Belgium's  neutrality.  However, 
with  regrettable  insincerity  the  German  Government 
pretended  that  France  and  Belgium  were  to  be  blamed 
for  the  universally  expected  invasion.  On  the  31  st  of 
July  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
complained  to  the  British  Ambassador  that  Belgium 
had  "  already  committed  hostile  acts  by  placing  an 
embargo  on  a  consignment  of  corn  to  Germany." 
General  von  Emmich,  the  Commander  of  the  invading 
army,  put  forth  the  still  more  ridiculous  claim  that 
invasion  was  justified  because  "  some  French  officers 
had  crossed  the  Belgian  frontier  in  disguise  in  motor- 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    789 

cars."     His  Proclamation  to  the  Belgian  people  was 
as  follows  : — 

"  To  my  great  regret  German  troops  are  compelled  to  cross 
the  frontier  by  inevitable  necessity,  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
having  been  already  violated  by  French  officers  who  crossed 
the  frontier  in  disguise  in  motor-cars.  Our  greatest  desire  is 
to  avoid  a  conflict  between  our  peoples,  who  have  hitherto 
been  friendly  and  were  formerly  allies.  Remember  Waterloo, 
where  the  German  armies  contributed  to  found  the  indepen- 
dence of  your  country  !  But  we  must  have  a  clear  road. 
The  destruction  of  bridges,  tunnels,  and  railways  will  have  to 
be  considered  hostile  actions.  I  hope  that  the  German  Army 
on  the  Meuse  will  not  be  called  upon  to  fight  you.  We  want 
a  clear  road  to  attack  those  who  wish  to  attack  us.  I  guarantee 
that  the  Belgian  population  will  not  have  to  suffer  the  horrors 
of  war.  We  will  pay  for  provisions,  and  our  soldiers  will  show 
themselves  to  be  the  best  friends  of  a  people  for  whom  we  have 
the  highest  esteem  and  the  greatest  sympathy.  It  depends 
upon  your  prudence  and  patriotism  to  avoid  the  horrors  of 
war  for  your  country." 

Lastly  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  with  greater  candour 
than  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  invading 
General,  pleaded  simply  necessity  in  the  following 
speech  delivered  in  the  Reichstag  :— 

"  Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity,  and  necessity 
knows  no  law  !  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg,  and 
perhaps  are  already  on  Belgian  soil.  That,  gentlemen,  is 
contrary  to  the  dictates  of  international  law.  It  is  true  that 
the  French  Government  has  declared  at  Brussels  that  France 
is  wiring  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  as  long  as  her 
opponents  respect  it.  We  knew,  however,  that  France  stood 
ready  for  the  invasion.  France  could  wait,  but  we  could  not 
wait.  A  French  movement  upon  our  flank  upon  the  lower 
Rhine  might  have  been  disastrous.  So  we  were  compelled 
to  override  the  justified  protests  of  the  Luxemburg  and 
Belgian  Governments.  The  wrong — I  speak  openly — that 
we  are  committing  we  will  endeavour  to  make  good  as  soon  as 
our  military  goal  has  been  reached .  Anybody  who  is  threatened, 


790  MODERN    GERMANY 

as  we  are  threatened,  and  is  fighting  for  his  highest  possessions, 
can  have  only  one  thought — how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through." 

JH  These  mutually  contradictory  and  insincere  ex- 
planations are  highly  suggestive,  as  also  were  the 
equally  clumsy  attempts  of  the  German  Government 
to  induce  Belgium  not  to  resist  the  German  armies  by 
promising  to  restore  her  independence  "  after  a  German 
victory  "  ;  and  the  incredibly  foolish  attempt  of  the 
Chancellor  to  induce  Great  Britain  to  forsake  France, 
by  promising  on  the  2gth  of  July  that  in  case  of  victory 
Germany  would  take  no  French  territory,  but  only  the 
French  colonies — two  days  later,  on  the  ist  of  August, 
he  improved  this  offer  by  stating  that  Germany  might 
guarantee  "the  integrity  of  France  and  her  colonies  " 
—and  to  tolerate  the  invasion  of  Belgium  against  a 
promise  that  Germany  would  evacuate  the  country  at 
the  end  of  the  war.  They  show  that  the  German 
Foreign  Office,  which,  under  Bismarck's  control,  was 
the  best  organised  and  best  informed  Foreign  Office  in 
the  world,  has,  under  the  personal  government  of 
William  the  Second  and  under  the  nominal  control 
of  a  bureaucrat  unacquainted  with  diplomacy,  become 
a  byword  for  incapacity,  confusion,  and  ignorance 
among  the  world's  diplomats.  The  three  contradic- 
tory explanations  of  Germany's  reasons  for  invading 
Belgium  are  due  either  to  the  fact  that  the  Foreign 
Office  gave  one  explanation,  while  the  Emperor  gave 
totally  different  instructions  without  informing  the 
Foreign  Office,  or  to  the  fact  that  the  Emperor  himself, 
within  a  few  hours,  three  times  changed  his  mind  as  to 
the  explanation  which  should  be  given.  The  German 
Ambassadors  are  appointed  by  the  Emperor.  They 
owe  their  position  rather  to  favour  than  to  merit,  and 
they  have  learned  that  they  will  fare  best  if  they 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    791 

report  not  what  is  true,  but  what  exalted  circles  desire 
to  hear.  Of  course  there  are  exceptions  to  the  rule. 
It  is  believed  that  Prince  Lichnowsky  did  his  best  to 
enlighten  Berlin  as  to  Great  Britain's  attitude  ;  but 
in  the  misinformation  supplied  by  her  diplomatic  re- 
presentatives lies  probably  the  reason  of  Germany's 
endeavour  to  induce  Great  Britain  and  Belgium  to 
abandon  their  most  vital  interests  without  a  stroke, 
by  ridiculous  and  palpably  insincere  promises. 

Although  Germany  no  longer  actually  feeds  herself, 
although,  after  the  United  Kingdom,  she  is  the  largest 
importer  of  food,  she  can  resist  almost  indefinitely  as 
far  as  food  is  concerned.  She  produces  about  nine 
tenths  of  her  bread  corn,  and  the  remaining  tenth  can 
be  replaced  by  potatoes  and  sugar,  of  which  she  has  a 
huge  surplus.  By  reducing  the  production  of  potato- 
spirit  and  of  beer,  she  can  accumulate  a  huge  reserve 
store  of  potatoes  and  barley.  As  she  imports  scarcely 
any  meat,  her  meat  supply  is  ample,  but  she  may  ex- 
perience a  shortage  of  fodder.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  should  be  a  serious  deficiency  in  butter,  eggs, 
cheese,  fish,  coffee,  tea,  cocoa,  and  tobacco,  of  which 
she  imports  large  quantities. 

While,  even  if  the  war  lasts  a  year  and  longer, 
Germany  will  scarcely  suffer  from  a  shortage  of  the 
most  necessary  foods,  her  industries  will  suffer  very 
severely  through  the  cessation  of  her  foreign  trade  and 
through  shortage  of  coal  and  lack  of  imported  raw 
materials,  such  as  wool,  cotton,  silk,  ore.  Her  people 
may  also  suffer  from  lack  of  coal,  as  the  vast  majority 
of  the  miners  have  been  called  into  the  army.  So 
far  the  entire  able-bodied  population  up  to  forty-five 
has  been  mobilised.  If  Germany  should  be  invaded 
in  force,  she  may  call  out  all  the  able-bodied  from 
sixteen  to  sixty.  Only  about  one  tenth  of  Germany's 


foreign  trade  is  carried  on  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
her  neutral  neighbours,  while  approximately  nine 
tenths  are  carried  on  with  her  antagonists  and  with  the 
countries  oversea.  The  war  may  well  result  in  the 
destruction  of  Germany's  manufacturing  industries, 
shipping  and  foreign  trade,  and  in  the  general  im- 
poverishment of  the  people. 

If  Germany  should  be  defeated,  her  political  and 
economic  position  will  become  a  very  serious  one. 
She  will  probably  be  deprived  of  large  territories  in 
the  East,  West,  and  North.  She  will  certainly  lose  to 
France  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  iron-ore  beds  of  which  are 
indispensable  to  her  magnificent  iron  and  steel  trade, 
which  is  by  far  the  largest  German  industry.  Possibly 
the  French  and  Belgians  will  claim  all  German  territory 
up  to  the  Rhine.  Germany  may  lose  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein  with  Kiel  and  the  Kiel  Canal  to  Denmark,  who 
owned  these  provinces  until  1864,  while  Heligoland 
and  Borkum  and  her  colonies  may  fall  to  Great  Britain. 
Lastly,  the  Czar  has  announced  his  intention  to  re- 
constitute the  ancient  kingdom  of  Poland,  placing  it 
under  Russian  protection.  That  measure  would  de- 
prive Germany  of  a  vast  district  in  the  East.  It 
would  deprive  her  of  the  southern  part  of  Silesia 
which  contains  a  very  important  industrial  district 
and  the  largest  coalfield  on  the  continent  of  Europe, 
and  of  the  important  harbours  of  Dantzig  and  Konigs- 
berg,  the  most  Prussian  of  all  Prussian  towns,  in  which 
the  princes  of  the  house  of  Hohenzollern  have  been 
crowned.  That  loss  of  territory  would  reduce  the 
distance  separating  Berlin  from  the  nearest  point  on 
the  Russian  frontier  from  180  miles  to  about  90  miles. 
Berlin  would  be  within  a  few  days'  march  of  the 
Russian  army. 

Germany's    manufacturing    industries,    Germany's 


THE    ULTIMATE   RUIN    OF   GERMANY    793 

shipping  and  Germany's  foreign  trade  may  never  re- 
cover from  the  war.  When  the  war  is  over,  and 
especially  if  it  is  very  protracted,  much  of  the  German 
business  will  have  fallen  into  foreign  hands.  In  ad- 
dition impoverished  Germany  may  have  to  pay  to  the 
victors  an  indemnity  compared  with  which  that  paid 
by  France  would  appear  a  trifle.  Before  the  war  the 
German  Press  threatened  that  if  France  should  support 
Russia  she  would,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  have  to  pay, 
as  an  indemnity,  not  £200,000,000  as  in  1871,  but 
£2,000,000,000.  Such  a  sum  may  be  exacted  from 
Germany  by  her  opponents  should  they  be  victorious. 
Poverty  combined  with  high  taxation  does  not  afford 
a  congenial  soil  to  the  manufacturing  industries.  In 
the  countries  of  her  antagonists,  France,  Belgium, 
Great  Britain,  and  Russia,  German  business  men  have 
acquired  huge  interests,  and  these  also  will  in  part  be 
lost.  The  war  may  totally  destroy  the  great  industrial 
position  which  Germany  has  acquired  during  the  past 
three  or  four  decades.  It  may  convert  Germany  from 
a  wealthy  into  a  poverty-stricken  land,  and  the 
Germans  may  be  compelled  to  emigrate  by  the  million 
to  the  United  States  and  the  British  Colonies  in  the 
same  way  in  which  the  Irish  emigrated  after  the 
Potato  Famine  of  1846.  The  outlook  for  Germany 
would  be  terrible. 

The  war  may  jeopardise,  and  perhaps  destroy,  not 
only  the  entire  life  work  of  Bismarck  and  part  of  that 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  it  may  not  only  impoverish 
Germany  very  greatly,  but  it  may  also  damage  Ger- 
many's good  name  for  generations.  With  the  same 
ruthlessness  with  which  her  diplomats,  following  the 
principles  of  Machtpolitik,  have  disregarded  the  sacred- 
ness  of  treaties,  making  Germany's  advantage  their 
only  law,  her  soldiers  have  disregarded  the  written 


794  MODERN    GERMANY 

laws  of  war,  and,  what  is  worse,  the  unwritten  law 
of  humanity.  According  to  numerous  accounts,  the 
German  soldiers  have  bombarded  open  and  unde- 
fended towns,  wantonly  burned  down  villages,  killed 
wounded  soldiers  and  peaceful  inhabitants  of  both 
sexes,  and  executed  all  Belgian  civilians  caught  with 
arms  in  their  hands,  although,  according  to  Article  2 
of  the  Regulations  respecting  the  Laws  and  Customs 
of  War,  signed  at  The  Hague  on  the  i8th  of  October 
1907  by  Germany  herself  : — 

"The  inhabitants  of  a  territory  not  under  occupation  who, 
on  the  approach  of  an  enemy,  spontaneously  take  up  arms  to 
resist  the  invading  troops  without  having  had  time  to  organise 
themselves  in  accordance  with  Article  i,  shall  be  regarded  as 
belligerents  if  they  carry  arms  openly,  and  if  they  respect  the 
laws  and  customs  of  war." 

Though  many  of  the  accounts  published  may  be  un- 
true, there  is  bound  to  be  a  considerable  substratum 
of  truth.  By  these  actions  and  by  the  infliction  of 
crushing  fines  upon  the  conquered  towns  and  territories, 
the  German  Government  is  not  weakening  resistance, 
but  increasing  the  bitterness  and  determination  of  its 
opponents,  and  it  is  doing  irremediable  harm  to  the 
reputation  of  the  race  throughout  the  world.  Besides, 
the  German  people  may  reap  a  hundredfold  the  harvest 
of  hatred  which  its  government  is  sowing.  Its  action 
in  Belgium,  France,  and  Poland  may  lead  to  fearful 
reprisals  in  Germany,  and  the  war  may  in  the  end 
assume  the  character  of  a  Balkan  butchery. 

The  question  now  arises  whether  the  docile  Germans 
will  bear  their  misfortunes  patiently,  or  whether  they 
will  rebel  against  those  who  have  brought  about  their 
misery.  A  revolt  is  possible,  and  it  may  take  a  two- 
fold shape.  Conceivably  the  Southern  States  might, 
after  a  serious  defeat  of  the  German  army,  detach 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    795 

themselves  from  Prussia,  refusing  to  fight  any  longer 
for  the  German  Emperor.  The  Empire  may  be  dis- 
solved. The  secession  of  the  Southern  States  would 
no  doubt  be  encouraged  by  a  victorious  French  army. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  that  there  would  be  a 
general  rising  of  the  people  against  their  rulers.  The 
great  majority  of  Germans  are  dissatisfied  with  their 
form  of  government.  A  well-educated  people  does 
not  like  to  be  governed  like  children.  An  absolutism 
thinly  disguised  by  parliamentary  forms  is  tolerable 
only  as  long  as  it  is  successful,  and  as  the  people  are 
prosperous.  The  vast  majority  of  the  Germans  are 
Liberals,  Radicals,  and  Socialists.  This  majority  has 
at  present  no  influence  whatever  upon  the  government 
and  policy  of  the  country.  Failure  of  the  Government 
in  the  present  war  would  make  absolute  government 
impossible  in  Germany.  If  Germany  should  experience 
a  serious  defeat,  she  may  either  become  a  strictly 
limited  monarchy  on  the  English  model,  or  a  republic. 
As  both  the  Emperor  and  the  Crown  Prince  are  equally 
responsible  for  the  present  war,  it  may  well  happen 
that  the  German  people  will  refuse  to  be  ruled  any 
longer  by  the  Hohenzollerns.  The  rise  of  a  German 
republic  is  certainly  within  the  limits  of  possibility. 

Germany  may  be  greatly  reduced  in  size,  and  may 
become  much  impoverished,  but  the  German  race  will 
not  die.  Greatness  will  return  to  it,  and  adversity 
may  prove  its  salvation.  The  character  of  the  German 
nation  has  been  warped  and  distorted  by  the  military- 
bureaucratic  regime,  which  has  educated  the  people 
to  the  worship  of  militarism  and  of  brute  force.  A 
free,  self-governing  German  people  would  probably 
again  take  a  leading  place  among  the  nations  of  the 
world.  Feudal  and  militarist  Germany  may  be  re- 
placed by  a  German  democracy,  which  will  take  its 


796  MODERN    GERMANY 

place  side  by  side  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  The  dream  of  an  alliance  of  the  three  great 
Germanic  States  may  still  come  true. 

The  present  war  will  be  enormously  costly  in  lives 
and  property.  Directly  and  indirectly  it  costs  per 
month  about  £600,000,000,  an  amount  almost  as  large 
as  our  gigantic  national  debt.  But  this  enormous  ex- 
penditure of  blood  and  money  will  not,  it  is  to  be 
hoped,  be  all  lost.  This  war,  should  Great  Britain  and 
her  allies  be  successful,  would  have  the  most  far- 
reaching  results.  It  has  solved  the  Irish  question,  and 
it  should  bring  about  the  unification  of  the  British 
Empire.  It  should  give  an  enormous  impetus  to 
British  industry  and  trade,  and  stimulate  the  growth 
of  the  Dominions.  Other  nations  also  would  greatly 
benefit.  France  would  once  more  become  la  grande 
nation,  and  Russia,  by  freeing  Poland,  seems  to  be 
starting  on  a  path  which  may  gradually  lead  her 
through  constitutionalism  to  federalism.  Lastly,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  war  is  not  merely  a 
war  between  two  groups  of  nations,  but  between  two 
political  systems  and  two  political  philosophies.  It 
is  a  war  between  democracy  and  feudalism,  between 
human  freedom  and  military  absolutism,  between 
liberty  and  force,  between  right  and  might.  It  will 
decide  whether  the  world  will  become  Prussian  or 
Anglo-Saxon,  militarist  or  free,  whether  it  will  be 
ruled  by  the  gospel  of  force  or  by  the  gospel  of  right. 
If  the  forces  of  militarism  and  of  feudalism  should  be 
defeated,  it  will  mean  the  dawn  of  a  new  era.  A 
victory  of  the  Entente  Powers  would  free  the  world 
of  the  incubus  of  militarism,  it  would  secure  the  pre- 
eminence of  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  for  centuries,  it 
might  lead  to  a  general  disarmament  among  nations, 
and  it  would  certainly  lead  to  a  reduction  of  the  armies 


THE    ULTIMATE    RUIN    OF   GERMANY    797 

and  navies.  Probably  not  for  many  decades  should 
we  see  another  great  war.  A  victory  of  the  Entente 
Powers  would  set  free  many  European  nations  which 
were  arbitrarily  cut  up  and  despotically  ruled.  After 
the  war  the  world  would  be  freer  and  happier  than  it 
has  ever  been  before. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII 

HOW  THE   MILITARY   RULES   GERMANY1 

THE  outbreak  of  the  present  war  has  been  brought 
about  by  the  German  war  party.  It  has  apparently 
been  brought  about  by  the  military  against  the  wish 
and  will  of  the  civil  power.  Since  the  earliest  times 
Prussia  has  been  a  military  State,  and  modern  Germany 
is  a  military  State,  Reichstag  and  democratic  franchise 
notwithstanding.  The  true  character  of  the  German 
government,  the  fact  that  the  military  is  absolutely 
supreme  over  the  civil  power,  was  startlingly  revealed 
to  the  world  six  months  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
great  war.  The  escapades  of  a  very  young  lieutenant 
in  the  little  German  garrison  of  Zabern  late  in  1913, 
and  the  consequent  differences  between  the  military 
and  the  civil  population  of  the  town,  filled  the  papers 
of  the  world  during  a  couple  of  months  and  very 
nearly  led  to  a  most  serious  constitutional  crisis  in 
Germany  in  the  beginning  of  1914.  The  Zabern  affair 
is  most  characteristic  of  modern  Germany,  and  the 
little  lieutenant  may  some  day  occupy  a  considerable 
space  in  the  constitutional  histories  of  Germany. 

The  whole  world  was  greatly  interested  in  the 
conflict — the  Italian  papers  in  the  South  of  Sicily, 
where  I  was  staying  at  the  time,  published  every  day 
two  columns  of  news  regarding  it — because  it  was 
generally  recognised  that  the  Zabern.  conflict  was  not 
an  event  but  a  symptom.  It  was  not  only  a  conflict 

1  From  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  February  1914. 
798 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    799 

between  the  officers  and  citizens  of  an  unimportant 
town  but  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  military  and 
the  civil  authorities  of  Germany,  between  reaction  and 
progress,  between  might  and  right,  between  absolutism 
and  democracy,  and  herein  lies  its  importance.  There 
are  two  powerful  currents  in  Germany,  an  autocratic 
and  a  democratic  one,  and  no  one  can  understand 
Germany's  foreign  and  domestic  policy  who  is  not 
acquainted  with  the  elements  which  have  clashed  at 
Zabern.  Therefore  it  is  worth  while  to  consider  the 
foreign  and  domestic  policy  of  Germany  in  the  light  of 
the  Zabern  events. 

Zabern  is  a  little  town  of  about  nine  thousand  in- 
habitants in  German  Alsace.  The  vast  majority  of  the 
people  are  Germans.  They  are  thoroughly  loyal  to 
Germany,  and  there  had  been  no  conflicts  between 
the  civil  population  and  the  military  until  Lieutenant 
von  Forstner,  a  youth  of  twenty,  joined  the  garrison. 
He  was  tactless  enough  to  make  before  his  men,  some 
of  whom  were  French  Alsatians,  highly  offensive  re- 
marks about  France  ;  to  call  the  native  Alsatian 
recruits  "Wackes,"  which  means  rowdies,  larrikins; 
to  tell  his  soldiers  that  they  should  use  their  weapons 
with  energy  should  they  come  into  collision  with  the 
local  civilians  ;  and  to  offer  a  prize  of  ten  marks  to 
those  who  should  succeed  in  "  running  a  man  through  " 
with  their  side-arms.  His  remarks  became  the  talk 
of  the  town,  they  found  their  way  into  one  of  the 
local  papers,  and  as  the  rumour  got  about  that  an 
infantile  and  somewhat  ludicrous  physical  mishap  had 
occurred  to  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  while  in  a 
state  of  intoxication,  he  was  laughed  at  and  teased  by 
the  people,  and  especially  by  children  and  youths. 
His  fellow-officers  took  his  part,  soldiers  with  fixed 
bayonets  began  to  accompany  the  officers  on  their 


8oo  MODERN    GERMANY 

walks  through  the  town,  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  was 
seen  buying  chocolates  escorted  by  soldiers  with  fixed 
bayonets,  and  dining  at  a  public  restaurant  with  a 
revolver  lying  on  the  table.  The  merriment  of  the 
town  increased  through  this  ludicrous  exhibition,  and 
small  crowds  began  to  follow  the  officers  and  to  collect 
before  the  barracks  awaiting  developments.  Then 
Colonel  von  Reuter,  the  commander  of  the  regiment, 
instead  of  sending  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  away, 
after  complaining  about  insufficient  police  protection 
to  the  civil  authorities,  resolved  to  take  the  law  into 
his  own  hands.  He  called  his  soldiers  out,  apparently 
had  ball  cartridge  served  out  and  machine  guns  got  in 
readiness,  and  threatened  to  fire  upon  the  crowd  in 
front  of  the  barracks  which,  according  to  his  own 
statement  before  the  military  court,  numbered  only 
from  forty  to  one  hundred  people.  The  people  ran 
away.  Orders  were  then  given  to  the  soldiers  to  arrest 
every  civilian  who  lingered  near  the  barracks  or  who 
insulted  the  soldiers  or  laughed  at  them,  and  thirty 
people  were  arrested,  among  them  some  of  the  local 
judges  who  came  from  the  law  courts.  Soldiers,  eager 
to  arrest  people  who  were  supposed  to  have  laughed 
or  jeered,  pursued  the  fugitives  into  their  houses,  and 
a  front  door  was  broken  in  during  the  man-hunt. 
The  prisoners  secured  were  locked  up  in  a  coal-cellar 
all  night ;  they  were  brought  next  morning  before  the 
civil  magistrates,  who  immediately  set  them  at  liberty. 
However,  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  remained  a  butt  to 
the  populace.  One  day,  when  marching  along  with 
his  soldiers,  he  was  jeered  at  by  some  youths.  They 
were  pursued  by  the  soldiers  but  escaped.  A  lame 
shoemaker  was  left  behind.  He  was  attacked  by 
Lieutenant  von  Forstner  with  his  sword  and  received 
a  cut  over  the  head. 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    801 

The  high-handed  action  of  the  military  was  loudly 
condemned  by  all  the  Liberal,  Radical,  Clerical,  and 
Socialistic  people  of  Germany  and  their  press,  but  was 
praised  by  the  small  but  powerful  Conservative  party 
and  its  papers.  When  the  matter  was  brought  up 
before  the  Reichstag,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  instead 
of  promising  immediate  redress  for  the  injustice  done, 
expressed  abstract  views  on  the  conflict  of  right  and 
wrong  in  an  impersonal,  detached,  and  non-committal 
way,  while  the  Minister  of  War,  who  followed  him, 
instead  of  expressing  regret  for  the  occurrences,  used 
the  opportunity  of  making  a  glowing  speech  in  praise 
of  the  virtues  of  the  Prussian  officers  and  of  the  army 
who  were  the  defenders  of  the  Throne  and  of  the 
Fatherland.  In  consequence  of  the  attitude  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  and  the  Minister  of  War,  who 
seemed  to  flout  the  German  Parliament  and  people,  a 
vote  of  censure  on  the  Chancellor  was  moved  and  was 
passed  by  the  enormous  majority  of  two  hundred  and 
ninety-three  to  fifty-four.  The  Conservatives  alone 
supported  the  Government.  To  allay  the  anger  of 
people  and  Parliament,  a  judicial  inquiry  was  an- 
nounced, and  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  was  promptly 
sentenced  to  forty-five  days'  imprisonment  by  a 
military  court  for  wounding  the  shoemaker.  Pro- 
ceedings against  Colonel  von  Reuter  were  delayed. 
Lieutenant  von  Forstner  appealed  against  the  sentence, 
and  his  appeal  and  the  case  of  Colonel  von  Reuter 
came  simultaneously  before  the  higher  military  court 
at  Strassburg. 

Before  the  appeal  of  the  young  lieutenant  and  the 
case  of  Colonel  von  Reuter  came  on  for  hearing,  one 
of  the  most  powerful  officials  in  Germany,  Herr  von 
Jagow,  the  Police  President  of  Berlin,  who  is  con- 
sidered a  possible  successor  to  Herr  von  Bethmann- 

3E 


802  MODERN    GERMANY 

Hollweg,  published  over  his  name  in  the  Conservative 
Kreuzzeitung  a  manifesto  in  form  of  a  letter  in  which 
he  stated : — 

"  Military  exercises  are  acts  of  the  State.  Those  who  try 
to  impede  acts  of  the  State  are  liable  to  be  prosecuted  and 
punished.  Consequently  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  could  not 
be  placed  on  trial,  and  could  still  less  be  punished.  The 
military  court  which  condemned  him  has  apparently  failed 
to  be  guided  by  these  considerations.  If  the  law  stood  dif- 
ferently, its  prompt  amendment  would  be  needed.  For  if 
German  officers,  who  are  garrisoned  in  what  is  nearly  the 
enemy's  country,  are  in  danger  of  being  prosecuted  for  illegal 
detention  because  they  endeavour  to  make  room  for  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  the  State,  the  highest  profession  in 
the  land  is  disgraced." 

The  legal  arguments  of  the  President  of  the  Berlin 
Police  were  scarcely  taken  seriously,  but  his  attempt 
to  influence  the  decision  of  the  military  court  in  favour 
of  the  accused  officers  at  a  time  when  the  matter  was 
still  sub  judice,  the  fact  that  Herr  von  Jagow  tried  to 
use  his  great  position  and  influence  in  order  to  secure 
for  the  officers  a  judicial  verdict  in  their  favour,  out- 
raged once  more  the  Liberals,  Radicals,  Clericals,  and 
Socialists  of  Germany,  but  was  applauded  by  the 
entire  Conservative  Press. 

The  military  court  at  Strassburg  declared  both 
Colonel  von  Reuter  and  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  not 
guilty — the  colonel  because,  in  detaining  people,  he 
had  acted  in  ignorance  of  the  law,  and  the  lieutenant 
because  he  had  wounded  the  shoemaker  in  putative 
self-defence. 

In  the  struggle  between  the  military  and  civil  power, 
between  the  military  and  the  people,  the  military  had 
proved  victorious.  Military  absolutism  and  contempt 
of  law  had  been  declared  legal  by  a  high  military  court. 
The  German  nation  is  a  well-drilled  nation.  From  the 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    803 

tenderest  age  the  children  are  taught  in  the  schools 
that  obedience  to  authority  is  the  foremost  duty  of 
the  citizen,  that  military  officers  belong  to  an  exalted 
and  highly  privileged  class,  that  the  military  uniform 
is  sacred,  that  even  the  youngest  lieutenant  is  the 
representative  of  the  Emperor-King.  In  how  high 
estimation  officers  are  held  in  Germany  may  be  seen 
from  this,  that  many  of  the  leading  business  men  and 
estate  owners  whose  names  are  generally  known  in 
Germany  have  printed  on  their  visiting  cards  the  fact 
that  they  are  Lieutenants  of  the  Reserve. 

The  German  people  apparently  acquiesced  in  the 
Strassburg  verdict  and  were  seemingly  ready  to  pocket 
their  defeat  by  the  military.  The  enormous  excitement 
caused  at  the  time  by  the  high-handed  behaviour  of  the 
Zabern  officers  died  down.  Militarism  in  Germany 
became  as  all-powerful  as  ever.  The  well-known  poli- 
tician and  publicist,  Herr  Eduard  Bernstein,  wrote  in 
the  English  Nation  of  January  17  : 

"  It  is  no  use  concealing  the  truth.  The  hold  of  militarism 
on  the  German  nation  is  certainly  stronger  than  ever.  Were 
it  otherwise,  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  timely  remarks  upon  the 
necessity  of  stopping  the  growth  of  armaments  would  not  have 
been  passed  over  with  a  few  embarrassed  remarks  by  the  great 
Liberal  Press  of  the  Empire." 

The  significance  of  the  Zabern  verdict  was  recog- 
nised throughout  Germany.  Democratic  Germany 
was  profoundly  depressed  and  humiliated,  while 
Colonel  von  Reuter  received  more  than  fifteen  thousand 
letters  and  telegrams  of  congratulation  from  the  sup- 
porters of  absolutist  government.  Herr  von  Jahn, 
who  had  presided  at  the  trial  at  Strassburg,  immedi- 
ately after  having  read  the  verdict  in  court,  sent 
telegrams  of  congratulation  to  Herr  von  Jagow,  the 
Berlin  President  of  Police,  and  to  the  famous  Herr  von 


804  MODERN    GERMANY 

Oldenburg- Januschau,  who,  as  a  deputy,  had  declared 
a  few  years  ago  in  the  Reichstag,  "  The  King  of 
Prussia  and  Emperor  of  Germany  must  be  able  to  tell 
a  lieutenant  at  any  moment :  '  Take  ten  men  with  you 
and  close  the  Reichstag.'  ' 

The  Zabern  affair  offers  some  most  valuable  and 
important  lessons  to  all  who  are  interested  in  Germany. 
Even  the  most  casual  observer  must  be  struck  with 
several  curious  phenomena  which  require  explanation. 
He  will  ask :  How  is  it  that  the  phlegmatic,  patient  and 
law-abiding  German  population,  which  is  very  slow  to 
anger,  has  during  the  last  few  years  twice  been  roused 
into  such  a  passion  by  the  action  of  its  rulers — once 
over  the  Emperor's  Daily  Telegraph  interview  and  now 
over  the  Zabern  affair — that  the  vast  majority  of  the 
newspapers  and  people  have  demanded  an  alteration 
of  the  Constitution  by  which  the  people  should  be 
given  greater  power  over  the  national  executive  and 
administration  ?  How  is  it  that  in  both  cases  the 
German  Reichstag  has  failed  to  take  action  whereby 
to  secure  some  control  over  the  national  executive  and 
administration  ?  And  how  is  it  that  the  angry  passions 
died  down  as  quickly  as  they  arose  ?  How  is  it  that 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
instead  of  promising  to  make  similar  military  excesses 
impossible  in  the  future,  adopted  a  weak  and  apologetic 
attitude  ?  How  is  it  that  he  remained  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, although  the  recent  vote  of  censure  is  the  third 
which  the  Reichstag  has  passed  upon  him  ? — The  in- 
efficient and  somewhat  childish  petulance  of  the 
German  people,  when  provoked  by  its  rulers,  the  fact 
that  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  did  not  promise 
that  he  would  make  recurrence  of  events  like  those  at 
Zabern  impossible,  and  the  fact  that  the  German 
Parliament  has  not  even  tried  to  provide  a  permanent 


HOW  THE   MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    805 

remedy  for  the  grievances  of  the  people  by  bringing 
pressure  to  bear  upon  the  German  Government  and 
Administration,  spring  all  from  the  same  source.  They 
spring  from  this  :  that  Germany,  which  has  the  most 
democratic  franchise  in  the  world,  possesses  a  Parlia- 
ment but  no  Parliamentary  Government ;  that  Ger- 
many is  an  almost  autocratically  governed  military 
State  which  possesses  merely  the  semblance  of  repre- 
sentative Government ;  that  the  German  Parliament, 
unlike  the  British  Parliament,  has  not  been  created  by 
the  people  but  has  been  bestowed  upon  the  German 
people  as  a  free  gift  by  its  rulers  ;  that,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  Reichstag  exists  not  by  the  will  of  the 
people  but  by  the  permission  of  the  Monarch,  the 
Monarch  may  take  away  his  gift  as  soon  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people  are  no  longer  absolutely  loyal 
to  him  and  to  the  officials  he  has  appointed,  but  try  to 
enter  upon  a  serious  conflict  with  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment with  a  view  to  limiting  its  practically  absolute 
powers. 

Germany,  as  William  the  First  said,  is  merely  an 
enlarged  Prussia.  The  Imperial  Chancellor,  like  all 
German  officials,  is  nominated  and  dismissed  by  the 
Emperor,  for,  according  to  Art.  18  of  the  Constitution, 
"  The  Emperor  appoints  the  Imperial  officials,  has  their 
oaths  taken,  and  effects  their  dismissal  if  required." 
The  Reichstag  and  the  Party  Leaders  can  neither 
bring  about  the  appointment  of  a  Government  official, 
nor  can  they  bring  about  his  dismissal  or  his  resigna- 
tion by  a  vote  of  censure.  Moreover,  a  vote  of  censure 
upon  the  Imperial  Chancellor  is  an  interference  with 
the  Imperial  prerogative.  It  is  an  attempt  to  in- 
fluence the  Imperial  will.  Therefore  it  only  causes  the 
censured  Chancellor  to  be  retained,  for  dismissal  after 
a  vote  of  censure  would  make  it  appear  that  the 


806  MODERN    GERMANY 

Emperor  had  obeyed  Parliament  or  given  way  to 
popular  pressure.  No  German  Emperor  is  likely  to 
do  that.  As  the  Reichstag  knows  that  its  votes  of 
censure  have  no  practical  effect  whatever,  it  does  not 
take  its  own  votes  of  censure  very  seriously,  nor  does 
anyone  in  Germany.  Hence  the  relations  between 
the  Reichstag  and  the  censured  Chancellor  have  re- 
mained practically  unchanged. 

The  arrogant  attitude  of  the  Zabern  officers  and 
the  great  reserve  maintained  by  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor in  the  Reichstag  when  dealing  with  the  Zabern 
events  are  due  to  the  fact  that  Germany  is  an  almost 
autocratically  governed  military  State.  Neither  the 
Reichstag  nor  the  Imperial  Chancellor  has  any  influence 
over  the  army.  Bismarck  himself  was  quite  powerless 
where  the  army  was  concerned.  Article  63  of  the 
German  Constitution  states :  "  The  whole  of  the 
military  forces  of  the  Empire  will  form  a  homogeneous 
army  which  is  commanded  by  the  Emperor  in  war 
and  in  peace."  As  the  Emperor  keeps  the  command 
of  the  army  in  war  and  in  peace  absolutely  in  his 
own  hands  and  allows  no  interference  from  any  quarter, 
least  of  all  from  any  civilian,  and  as  the  Chancellor's 
authority  extends  only  to  civil  affairs,  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  was  of  course  powerless  to  promise  the 
Reichstag  that  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  should  be 
punished  or  Colonel  von  Reuter  reprimanded.  Where 
the  army  is  concerned  the  Imperial  Chancellor  has  no 
greater  power  than  has  any  ordinary  citizen. 

Article  64  of  the  German  Constitution  states  :  "All 
German  troops  are  obliged  unconditionally  to  obey 
the  Emperor.  That  obligation  is  to  form  part  of  the 
military  oath  of  fidelity."  According  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  Emperor's  power  over  the  army  is  unlimited. 
A  conflict  between  the  Imperial  Army  and  the  army 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    807 

of  one  of  the  smaller  German  States  is  unthinkable. 
The  commanders  of  the  troops  and  of  the  fortresses  in 
the  non-Prussian  States  have,  according  to  their  oath, 
to  obey  the  Emperor.  The  independent  armies  of  the 
individual  States  exist  rather  in  theory  than  in  fact. 
Moreover,  while  in  all  civil  matters  the  orders  of  the 
Emperor  require  for  their  validity  the  counter-signa- 
ture of  the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  assumes  responsi- 
bility for  them,  the  Emperor's  orders  regarding  the 
army  need  not  be  countersigned  even  if  they  indirectly 
touch  the  budget.  In  military  matters  the  authority 
of  the  Emperor  is  absolute.  Interference  with  the 
army  by  the  civil  government  or  by  Parliament  is  out 
of  the  question. 

The  German  Army  is  a  national  army  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  the  word,  and  being,  so  to  say,  the  Emperor's 
bodyguard,  has  been  given  a  highly  privileged  position. 
Officers  are  treated  as  the  highest  class  of  Society,  not 
only  at  Court,  but  throughout  Germany.  According 
to  the  instructions  they  receive,  officers  must  not 
draw  their  weapons  when  insulted,  but  "  immediate 
use  of  their  arms  is  required  should  they  be  assaulted." 
According  to  Dilthey's  widely  read  textbook  "  every 
officer,  non-commissioned  officer,  and  soldier  is  en- 
titled to  use  his  arms  if  assaulted.  He  may  use  the 
arms  which  the  Emperor  has  given  him  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  person  and  of  his  honour.  Therefore 
arms  must  be  used  on  suitable  occasions,  and  they 
must  be  used  with  an  energy  commensurate  to  the 
danger ousness  of  the  opponent."  A  civilian  who  lifts 
his  hand  against  a  German  officer,  even  if  the  officer 
be  the  aggressor,  risks  being  sabred  or  shot.  Their 
highly  privileged  position  and  the  right  to  use  their 
weapons  are  apt  to  make  the  German  officers  over- 
bearing, create  men  of  the  von  Forstner  type,  and 


8o8  MODERN    GERMANY 

arouse  much  dissatisfaction  among  the  body  of  the 
citizens. 

At  the  time  of  the  excitement  caused  by  the 
publication  of  the  German  Emperor's  interview  in  the 
Daily  Telegraph  the  Socialist  members  of  the  Reichstag 
proposed  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  should  be  made 
responsible  to  the  Reichstag  by  an  amendment  of  the 
Constitution.  The  Reichstag  did  not  accept  that 
proposal.  After  the  Zabern  scandal  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  and  other  influential  Liberal  and  Radical 
journals  proposed  that  supplies  should  be  withheld 
when  the  next  budget  came  up  for  discussion,  unless 
the  outraged  citizens  received  full  satisfaction.  How- 
ever, once  more  it  was  unlikely  that  the  Reichstag 
would  quarrel  with  the  Imperial  Government,  which 
means  with  the  Emperor  himself,  for  the  Emperor 
is  the  Government. 

The  greatest  power  of  Parliament  consists  in  the 
power  of  the  purse.  The  Reichstag  could  hope  to  limit 
the  powers  of  absolutism  only  by  withholding  supplies 
and  bringing  the  Government  to  a  standstill.  Demo- 
cratic Parliaments  can  use  that  power  with  great 
effect,  but  the  German  Reichstag  cannot  do  so.  In 
parliamentarily  governed  countries  the  refusal  of  sup- 
plies by  the  people  brings  government  to  a  standstill, 
and  automatically  brings  about  the  fall  of  the  govern- 
ing statesmen.  In  Germany  such  a  refusal  would  have 
no  similar  effect.  In  Great  Britain  and  other  demo- 
cratic monarchies  the  people  rule  through  their  elected 
representatives,  who  appoint  the  officials,  and  the 
King  carries  out  the  will  of  the  people.  In  Germany 
the  Emperor  rules  through  his  officials  with  the 
assistance  of  the  Reichstag,  and  if  the  Reichstag,  as  the 
less  important  part  of  the  Government,  refuses  to  assist 
in  governing  the  country,  the  Government  is  simply 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    809 

carried  on  without  its  assistance.  According  to  Laband 
and  other  leading  writers  on  German  Constitutional  Law 
the  co-operation  of  the  Reichstag  for  providing  supplies 
is  only  theoretically  necessary.  If  supplies  are  not 
voted,  the  last  year's  taxes  and  imposts  are  automati- 
cally renewed,  and  are  collected  by  the  officials,  for  the 
Reichstag  has  no  authority  to  abrogate  existing  taxa- 
tion. The  Handbuch  fur  Sozialdemokratische  Wdhler 
states  quite  correctly  :  "  Opinions  differ  as  to  the 
Reichstag's  power  of  withholding  supplies.  However, 
so  much  is  certain,  that  taxes  and  other  sources  of  the 
national  income,  which  have  once  been  voted,  cannot 
be  discontinued  in  consequence  of  the  Reichstag's 
veto."  The  question  whether  Prusso-Germany  can 
be  governed  if  the  deputies  refuse  to  vote  supplies  is  in 
the  last  resort  rather  a  question  of  practical  politics 
than  of  constitutional  theory.  In  1863  the  Prussian 
Parliament  refused  to  allow  the  doubling  of  the  army 
and  also  refused  supplies.  Nevertheless  the  army 
was  doubled.  Bismarck  did  not  shrink  from  a  con- 
flict with  Parliament,  and  the  necessary  taxes  were 
collected  against  Parliament's  will.  The  German 
citizens  are  very  law-abiding  and  they  possess  a 
strong  sense  of  caution.  It  would  be  dangerous  for 
them  to  quarrel  with  a  ruler  who  disposes  of  1,350,000 
officials  and  of  an  army  of  800,000  men  in  time  of 
peace. 

Both  at  the  time  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  interview 
and  of  the  Zabern  incident  the  Reichstag  refused  to 
act  with  vigour  against  the  Government  because  it 
recognised  its  powerlessness.  Had  it  entered  upon  a 
conflict  with  the  Government,  which  means  with  the 
Emperor,  it  would  probably  have  been  defeated  by 
the  Emperor,  who  not  only  absolutely  controls  the 
bureaucracy  and  the  army,  but  who  has  power  over 


8io  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  national  purse  as  well.  In  every  conflict  between 
the  people  and  the  Government  the  passionate  out- 
bursts of  the  Reichstag  have  been  only  of  momentary 
duration,  because  its  members  were  aware  that  a 
serious  conflict  with  the  Emperor's  Government  would 
not  lead  to  the  resignation  of  the  Chancellor  or  to  the 
diminution  of  the  Emperor's  prerogative,  but  that  it 
would  lead  either  to  the  dissolution  of  the  Reichstag — 
according  to  Article  12  of  the  Constitution  the  Emperor 
has  the  right  to  dissolve  it — or  to  a  coup  d'etat  and  an 
alteration  of  the  Constitution,  which  would  make  the 
Reichstag  powerless  for  the  future. 

Prussia  is  a  strong  Conservative,  one  might  almost 
say  an  anti-democratic,  State.  Yet  Bismarck  created 
in  the  German  Reichstag  a  Parliament  based  on  the 
most  democratic  franchise  in  the  world.  He  did  so, 
not  actuated  by  a  sense  of  justice  and  fitness,  but 
compelled  by  necessity.  When,  in  1866,  Prussia  risked 
her  existence  in  a  struggle  with  Austria,  Bismarck 
offered  to  the  people,  who  had  been  vainly  clamouring 
for  parliamentary  institutions  for  decades,  a  demo- 
cratic Parliament  so  as  to  obtain  the  necessary  support 
of  the  very  influential  German  Liberals  and  Democrats 
for  that  most  dangerous  war.  However,  Bismarck 
was  not  in  love  with  the  democratic  franchise.  He 
did  not  endeavour  to  democratise  the  Prussian  Parlia- 
ment (the  Landtag),  which  is  elected  under  the 
most  anti-democratic  franchise  in  the  world,  and  he 
quarrelled  incessantly  with  the  Reichstag  and  contem- 
plated its  destruction  by  a  coup  d'etat. 

The  historian  Professor  Hans  Delbriick,  a  well- 
informed  man,  who  at  one  time  was  the  present 
Emperor's  tutor,  has  told  us  in  volumes  147  and  153 
of  the  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  and  in  his  Regierung  und 
Volkswille,  that  Bismarck  intended  to  destroy  the 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    811 

power  of  the  Reichstag  by  a  coup  d'&tat.  In  1884  the 
Federal  Council,  which  represents  the  rulers  and  the 
Governments  of  the  individual  German  States,  had,  at 
Bismarck's  desire,  solemnly  declared  that  the  German 
Empire  was  a  free  and  voluntary  federation  of  the 
German  sovereigns,  and  that  this  federation,  in  case 
of  need,  could  again  be  dissolved.  When  William  the 
Second  came  to  the  throne  Bismarck  thought  that  the 
time  was  ripe  for  action.  Having  found  himself  con- 
fronted by  a  hostile  majority  in  the  Reichstag  he 
mapped  out  the  following  plan.  He  wished  to  dissolve 
the  Reichstag  by  the  Emperor's  authority — expecting 
that  the  sudden  dissolution  would  lead  to  Socialist 
demonstrations  in  the  streets.  These  would  be  re- 
pressed with  the  greatest  energy.  Blood  would  flow  in 
the  principal  towns.  Riots  and  revolts  would  take 
place.  A  state  approaching  civil  war  would  be  created. 
Then  the  German  Emperor  was  to  declare  that  he 
could  no  longer  govern  Germany  under  the  existing 
conditions.  He  would  renounce  the  Imperial  Crown. 
All  the  German  sovereigns  would  be  called  to  a  con- 
ference. The  suggestion  would  be  made  that  the 
German  Empire  should  be  reconstituted  under  the 
Presidency  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  but  the  King  of 
Prussia  would  declare  that  he  would  be  willing  to 
reassume  the  Imperial  Crown  only  if  the  Imperial 
Constitution  was  altered,  if  all  those  Germans  who 
pursued  a  policy  hostile  to  the  State,  and  especially 
all  Socialists,  were  disfranchised,  and  if  the  secrecy  of 
the  ballot  was  abolished.  The  sanguinary  riots  and 
the  dramatic  renunciation  of  the  Crown  by  the  German 
Emperor  would  have  created  an  enormous  sensation 
throughout  Germany.  In  their  patriotic  excitement 
the  German  people  would  probably  have  enthusiasti- 
cally supported  the  projected  reform  of  the  franchise, 


812  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  crisis  would  have  been  over  in  a  few  days,  and  the 
electors  would  have  discovered  when  it  was  too  late 
that  they  had  assisted  in  destroying  the  only  demo- 
cratic institution  of  Germany. 

Herr  Delbruck's  information  as  to  Bismarck's  in- 
tentions is  amply  corroborated  by  conversations  be- 
tween Prince  Bismarck  and  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Wiirtemberg,  von  Mittnacht,  and  between  the  German 
Emperor  and  Prince  Hohenlohe  reported  in  their 
memoirs,  by  a  conversation  between  Bismarck  and 
Herr  Kaemmel,  published  by  the  Grenzboten  in  1907, 
and  by  Bismarck's  letter  to  Herr  von  Helldorf,  the 
leader  of  the  Conservative  party,  written  in  1887,  m 
which  Bismarck  stated  :  "I  will  devote  the  last  years 
of  my  life  to  correcting  my  greatest  mistake,  the 
universal  vote  and  the  secrecy  of  the  poll."  Numerous 
allusions  to  the  necessity  of  abolishing  the  secrecy  of 
the  vote  and  of  disfranchising  the  Socialists  and  other 
enemies  of  the  Empire  may  be  found  in  Bismarck's 
public  speeches  and  in  his  reported  conversations.  In 
his  Memoirs  we  read :  "I  have  hinted  in  public 
speeches  that  the  King  of  Prussia  might  find  himself 
compelled  to  lean  for  support  on  the  foundations 
afforded  to  him  by  the  Prussian  Constitution,  if  the 
Reichstag  should  carry  its  hindrance  to  the  monarchical 
establishment  beyond  the  limits  of  the  endurable." 
In  other  places  also  Bismarck  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  German  people  would  have  the  courage  and 
strength  to  rid  themselves  of  the  Reichstag  if  it  should 
prove  itself  a  hindrance  to  Germany's  development. 
According  to  the  Memoirs  of  Prince  Hohenlohe,  William 
the  Second  told  the  Prince  that  he  was  unwilling  to 
act  upon  Bismarck's  suggestion  and  to  begin  his  reign 
by  shooting  his  subjects  and  effecting  a  coup  d'etat. 
The  Emperor's  refusal  to  act  his  part  was  apparently 


HOW  THE  MILITARY   RULES  GERMANY    813 

the  principal  reason  for  his  rupture  with  Prince  Bis- 
marck and  for  Bismarck's  subsequent  dismissal. 

Since  Bismarck's  dismissal  the  idea  of  weakening 
the  Reichstag  and  of  abolishing  Germany's  democratic 
franchise  by  a  coup  d'etat  has  frequently  been  contem- 
plated by  German  statesmen  and  politicians.  Espe- 
cially the  small  but  mighty  party  of  the  feudal  Con- 
servatives, who  hate  democracy,  have  been  anxious 
that  the  Government  should  destroy  the  Reichstag's 
power  by  violence.  Count  Mirbach  stated  at  the 
meeting  of  the  Conservative  party  on  the  ist  of 
January  1895  that  universal  suffrage  was  a  derision 
of  all  authority,  and  recommended  the  abolition  of 
the  secret  ballot.  The  same  gentleman  stated  in  the 
Prussian  Upper  House  on  the  a8th  of  March  1895  : 
"  The  country  would  greet  with  jubilation  a  decision 
of  the  German  Princes  to  create  a  new  Reichstag  on 
the  basis  of  a  new  Election  Law."  In  the  same  place 
Count  Frankenberg  stated  two  days  later :  "  We  hope 
tb  obtain  a  new  Election  Law  for  the  German  Empire, 
for  with  the  present  Election  Law  it  is  impossible  to 
exist."  Freiherr  von  Zedlitz,  Freiherr  von  Stumm, 
and  von  Kardorff  uttered  similar  sentiments.  At  the 
meeting  of  the  Conservative  party  on  the  8th  of 
March  1897  Freiherr  von  Stumm  said  "  The  right 
to  vote  should  be  taken  away  from  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, and  no  Social  Democrat  should  be  permitted 
to  sit  in  the  Diet,"  and  Count  Limburg-Stirum  likewise 
advocated  their  exclusion.  Hundreds  of  similar  views 
expressed  by  Conservative  and  Conservative-Liberal 
politicians  and  papers  might  be  given.  In  1906-1907, 
when  there  was  a  great  agitation  for  the  increase  of 
the  German  Navy,  and  when  the  Reichstag  seemed 
disinclined  to  vote  the  funds  required,  many  leading 
German  politicians  and  newspapers  recommended  that 


8i4  MODERN    GERMANY 

the  Government  should  provide  the  necessary  funds 
by  a  coup  d'etat  should  the  Reichstag  prove  obdurate ; 
that  the  Government  should  levy  the  necessary  taxes 
with  or  without  the  Reichstag,  and  should,  in  case  of 
need,  govern  against  the  will  of  Parliament  or  without 
Parliament.  At  the  time  of  the  General  Election  of 
1907  the  possibility  of  a  coup  d'etat  was  again  univer- 
sally discussed.  Many  Conservative  politicians  and 
many  prominent  Conservative  journals,  such  as  the 
Kreuz-Zeitung,  the  Post,  the  Deutsche  Tageszeitung, 
the  Hamburger  Nachrichten,  demanded  an  Imperial 
coup  d'etat  disguised  in  the  phrase  "  Reform  of  the 
Franchise  "  ;  and  Prince  Billow  seemed  to  contem- 
plate the  possibility  of  abolishing,  or  at  least  modify- 
ing, parliamentary  government  in  Germany  by  force 
of  arms  if  an  anti-expansionist  Reichstag  should  be 
elected,  for  in  his  election  manifesto  he  threatened 
the  anti-expansionist  part  of  the  German  community 
in  no  uncertain  tone  with  "  the  sword  of  Buonaparte." 
On  the  igth  of  February  1910  Prince  Hatzfeldt  said 
in  the  Reichstag  : — 

"The  universal  and  secret  vote  has  a  history.  The  present 
franchise  is  indissolubly  connected  with  the  German  Empire. 
It  has  welded  together  North  and  South  Germany.  However, 
an  alteration  of  the  franchise  may  come  in  question  if  the 
Reichstag  should  have  a  majority  which  threatens  the  con- 
ditions essential  to  the  life  of  the  Empire." 

The  German  Emperor  has  strong  autocratic  in- 
clinations— that  is  evident  from  many  of  his  pro- 
nouncements. A  conflict  between  German  absolutism 
and  German  democracy  seems  unavoidable.  Formerly 
Germany  was  an  agricultural  country.  The  towns 
were  small  and  poor.  The  aristocracy  was  the 
wealthiest  and  the  most  intelligent  class  in  the  com- 
munity. They  ruled  the  country  and  their  supremacy 
was  taken  as  a  matter  of  course.  Since  her  unification, 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    815 

and  especially  since  the  introduction  of  Protection  in 
1879,  Germany  has  become  very  wealthy.  Germany's 
wealth  is  no  longer  represented  by  her  agriculture  and 
her  landed  proprietors,  but  by  industry,  commerce, 
and  finance,  by  business  men  and  their  workers,  and 
these  desire  to  be  no  longer  merely  tax-paying  subjects 
but  to  take  a  part  in  the  government  of  the  country. 

Hitherto  the  Conservatives  have  maintained  a 
predominant  position  in  the  Reichstag,  partly  because 
the  Conservative  deputies  belong  to  the  ruling  caste 
and  because  the  Conservative  party  was  considered 
to  be  the  Government  party,  partly  because  they 
knew  how  to  increase  their  weight  in  that  assembly 
by  a  skilful  policy  and  by  a  judicious  co-operation 
with  other  parties,  partly  because  they  were  much 
over-represented.  More  than  forty  years  ago  Germany 
was  divided  into  parliamentary  districts.  Since  that 
time  the  population  in  the  rural  districts,  which  are 
dominated  by  the  Conservatives,  has  remained  station- 
ary and  has  declined  in  many  instances  while  the 
population  in  the  industrial  towns  has  enormously 
increased.  The  Government  and  the  Conservative 
party  have  hitherto  strenuously  opposed  the  redis- 
tribution of  seats,  and  the  result  is  that  the  democratic 
towns  are  greatly  under-represented  while  the  Con- 
servative rural  districts  are  greatly  over-represented  in 
the  Reichstag.  In  1907  the  electoral  district  of  Teltow 
near  Berlin  had  248,000  electors,  while  that  of  Lauen- 
burg  had  only  13,000  ;  the  district  of  Bochum-Gelsen- 
kirchen  had  144,000  voters,  while  Schaumburg-Lippe 
had  only  10,000  voters,  &c.  The  parliamentary 
strength  of  the  Conservative  party  is  largely  due  to  the 
prevalence  of  rotten  boroughs  and  to  the  intimidation 
of  the  rural  voters  by  the  Conservative  landowners. 

The  under-representation  of  the  democratic  parties 


816  MODERN    GERMANY 

in  the  Lower  House  of  Prussia  is  still  more  startling, 
owing  to  the  three-classes  system  by  which  the  Prussian 
masses  are  disfranchised.  By  far  the  largest  party 
in  Germany  is  the  Social-Democratic  party.  Yet, 
until  1908,  not  a  single  Social-Democrat  had  been  able 
to  obtain  a  seat  in  the  "  Representative  "  Assembly 
of  Prussia,  while  the  Conservative  contingent  always 
exceeded  two  hundred.  At  present  there  are  in  the 
Prussian  Landtag  only  six  Social-Democrats,  as  com- 
pared with  212  Conservatives,  although  there  are 
three  times  as  many  Social-Democratic  voters  in 
Prussia  as  there  are  Conservative  voters. 

Dissatisfaction  with  Governmental  absolutism  in 
all  its  manifestations — the  Zabern  incident  is  only  one 
out  of  thousands — has  greatly  strengthened  the 
Democratic  parties  of  Germany,  and  the  overbearing 
attitude  of  the  German  bureaucracy  and  the  sense 
of  injustice  done  to  the  people  has  particularly  in- 
creased the  number  of  the  Democratic  extremists,  the 
Socialists.  Since  the  foundation  of  the  Empire  the 
number  of  Socialist  votes  polled  at  the  Reichstag 
elections  has  increased  as  follows  : — 

1871 101,927  votes 

1881 311,969     „ 

1890       ...         .        .        .     1,427,098     ,, 

1903     .       .       .       .       .       .    3,010,771     „ 

1912       ......     4,250,400      ,, 

In  1912  considerably  more  than  one  third  of  the  men 
who  voted  for  the  Reichstag  voted  for  Socialist  candi- 
dates. That  fact  alone  shows  that  there  is  something 
radically  wrong  in  German  domestic  politics,  that  there 
is  widespread  dissatisfaction  among  the  German  people. 
While  in  1912  the  Socialists  polled  4,250,400,  the  two 
Conservative  parties  polled  together  only  1,493,500 
votes.  Yet  the  influence  of  the  fifty-eight  Conserva- 


HOW  THE  MILITARY   RULES  GERMANY    817 

tive  members  in  the  Reichstag  is  far  greater  than  that 
of  the  no  Socialists.  Bismarck  skilfully  split  up  the 
German  Liberal  party,  setting  one  fraction  against  the 
other.  If  the  Democratic  parties  should  unite,  if  the 
German  Liberals  and  Socialists  should  co-operate  in 
the  Reichstag  against  the  Conservative  parties,  they 
would  have  the  majority.  Although  the  Democratic 
majority  could  not  control  the  German  administration, 
over  which  the  Reichstag  has  no  influence,  it  could  at 
least  control  German  legislation,  and  absolutist  legis- 
lation would  become  impossible. 

The  Government  is  so  strongly  entrenched  in  its 
position  by  the  Emperor's  control  over  the  services 
and  over  the  national  purse,  and  by  Germany's 
feudal  constitution,  that  a  Democratic  Parliament 
cannot  hope  to  obtain  the  control  over  the  Govern- 
ment by  gradual  pressure,  by  orderly  parliamentary 
means.  A  Democratic  Reichstag  can  obtain  such 
control  only  by  a  revolution,  and  a  revolution  is  im- 
possible in  Germany  as  long  as  the  army  remains 
loyal  to  the  Emperor.  Only  a  great  defeat  might 
democratise  the  country. 

From  year  to  year  the  German  people  is  becoming 
more  democratically  inclined.  From  year  to  year  the 
dissatisfaction  of  the  population  with  the  present  form 
of  Government  is  increasing.  With  nearly  every 
election  the  strength  of  the  Democratic  elements  in 
the  Reichstag  is  growing,  while  that  of  the  Conservative 
elements  is  dwindling.  Every  year  the  Conservative 
elements  are  more  hardly  pressed  by  the  advance  of 
Democracy.  Every  year  absolutist  legislation  becomes 
more  impossible.  German  absolutism  feels  that  its 
influence  is  waning.  Hence  its  most  daring  sup- 
porters call  from  year  to  year  more  loudly  for  violent 
measures  with  which  to  stem  the  Democratic  tide. 

3F 


8i8  MODERN    GERMANY 

Germany  is  rich,  but  Germany  is  very  dissatisfied. 
Those  who  are  powerful  are  discontented  because  they 
are  not  wealthy,  and  those  who  are  wealthy  because 
they  are  not  powerful.  The  Conservatives  are  dis- 
satisfied because  Liberalism  and  Socialism  are  rapidly 
increasing,  and  the  Liberals  and  Socialists  because  they 
have  no  power  and  no  influence,  although  they  are 
the  large  majority  of  the  citizens,  possess  the  bulk  of 
the  country's  wealth,  and  pay  by  far  the  largest  part 
of  the  taxes. 

The  aims  of  the  German  Democrats  are  obvious. 
They  work  for  representative  government,  they  wish 
to  limit  the  powers  of  absolutism,  they  strive  to  secure 
greater  liberty  to  the  individual,  and  desire  that  in 
domestic  and  foreign  affairs  Germany  should  be 
allowed  to  develop  gradually  and  naturally.  To  them 
force  is  no  remedy.  The  Conservatives,  on  the  other 
hand,  believe  in  force  as  a  policy.  They  would  like 
to  Prussianise  Germany  by  force,  and  to  establish  by 
force  the  supremacy  of  absolutism  in  Germany,  and 
the  supremacy  of  Germany  in  Europe  and  in  the 
world.  As  the  Democratic  majority  has  scarcely  any 
influence  in  political,  and  especially  in  foreign-political, 
affairs,  the  views  of  the  champions  of  absolutism 
should  be  interesting  to  all  who  desire  to  understand 
Germany's  foreign  and  domestic  policy. 

The  views  of  many  German  Conservatives  as  to 
Germany's  domestic  policy  are  unreservedly  given  in 
Frymann's  Wenn  Ich  der  Kaiser  War'  (Leipzig,  1912). 
The  book  costs  35.,  and  has  had  a  large  circulation. 
The  copy  in  my  possession  is  marked  i2th  to  i5th 
thousand.  "  Frymann "  is  a  pseudonym.  As  the 
author  intimates  that  he  was  grown  up  at  the  time 
of  the  Franco-German  War,  he  must  be  about  sixty 
years  old.  The  views  of  German  Conservatives  as  to 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    819 

Germany's  foreign  policy  are  well  stated  in  the  book 
Unsere  Zukunft  by  General  von  Bernhardi  (Berlin, 
1912).  An  English  translation  of  this  book  has  been 
published  under  the  title  Britain  as  Germany's  Vassal, 
by  Messrs.  Wm.  Dawson  &  Sons,  Ltd.,  London.  That 
book,  the  latest  political  book  of  Bernhardi's,  has  the 
advantage  over  its  predecessor  of  being  far  more  out- 
spoken and  therefore  far  more  interesting  than  his 
first  book,  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Both  books 
are  representative  of  a  large  literature. 

"  Frymann,"  like  most  German  Conservatives,  is 
very  dissatisfied  with  the  German  franchise.  He 
urges  a  reform  of  the  election  law  and  advocates  the 
formation  of  five  classes  of  electors.  Votes  should  not 
merely  be  counted  but  be  weighed.  Agricultural 
estate-owners  and  other  large  employers  of  labour 
should  be  given  a  number  of  votes  corresponding  to 
the  number  of  hands  employed.  On  principle  the 
weight  of  votes  should  be  proportionate  to  the  amount 
of  taxation  paid,  but  men  of  high  culture  and  of  great 
administrative  ability  should  receive  a  considerable 
number  of  votes.  Those  who  pay  no  taxes  should 
have  no  vote.  The  result  of  the  policy  advocated 
would  be  that  the  property-owning  and  educated 
classes  would  at  all  times  command  a  majority  in 
Parliament.  Continuing,  the  author  proposes  that 
the  Government  should  alter  the  present  franchise  by 
a  coup  d'etat.  He  writes  : — 

"We  must  alter  the  electoral  law  at  any  price,  and  even 
at  the  price  of  a  conflict  between  the  Government  and  people, 
at  the  price  of  a  coup  d'6tat.  That  sounds  frivolous  and 
brutal.  However,  it  is  the  same  thing  as  if  a  father  resolves 
that  a  serious  operation  must  be  performed  upon  his  child  in 
order  to  save  its  life.  Politically  the  German  nation  is  ill 
unto  death.  It  can  be  saved  only  by  an  alteration  of  the 
Constitution,  and  if  the  Constitution  cannot  be  altered  owing 


820  MODERN    GERMANY 

to  the  opposition  of  Parliament,  then  it  must  be  altered  not- 
withstanding the  will  of  Parliament,  exactly  as  a  father  orders 
the  surgeon  to  operate  on  a  child  against  the  child's  will. 

"We  must  consider  in  this  connexion  the  possible  occur- 
rence of  foreign  difficulties.  England's  envy,  France's  thirst  for 
revenge,  and  Germany's  need  of  expansion  create  antagonisms 
which  cannot  be  abolished  unless  Germany  is  willing  to 
abandon  her  position  as  a  Great  Power.  Therefore  all  who 
love  the  German  people,  and  wish  to  accelerate  the  advent  of 
a  crisis,  will  long  for  the  outbreak  of  a  war  which  will  wake 
all  the  wholesome  and  strong  forces  of  the  nation. 

"  If  Germany  should  be  victorious  there  will  occur  a  great 
moral  revival  similar  to  that  resulting  from  the  Franco- 
German  war,  and  it  will  have  similar  political  results.  A 
Reichstag  with  a  large  patriotic  majority  will  be  elected.  As 
that  sentiment  may  be  only  transient,  it  should  immediately 
be  utilised.  Immediately  the  Constitution  should  be  altered 
by  the  abolition  of  the  present  franchise. 

"  If  we  should  be  defeated — that,  after  all,  is  possible — the 
present  internal  disunion  would  increase.  It  would  become 
a  curse.  It  could  be  converted  into  order  only  by  the  absolute 
will  of  a  Dictator.  A  Dictatorship,  supported  by  the  Army 
and  all  patriots,  could  then  effect  the  necessary  revision  of  the 
Constitution." 

"  Frymann  "  is  anxious  to  combat  Socialism  by 
a  drastic  anti-Socialist  Law  drafted  after  the  Bis- 
marckian  model.  He  writes  : — 

"  In  accordance  with  its  provisions  every  action  should  be 
prohibited  which  might  serve  to  undermine,  or  threaten  to 
undermine,  the  existing  order  of  State  and  Society.  Meetings, 
societies,  journals  and  periodicals  of  subversive  tendency 
should  not  be  tolerated .  The  masses  should  be  freed  from  the 
present  leaders  of  the  Party  of  Subversion.  All  Socialist 
members  of  the  Imperial  Diet  and  the  various  State  Parlia- 
ments, all  leaders  and  officers  of  the  Socialist  party,  all  editors, 
publishers,  and  journalists  connected  with  Socialist  papers 
and  publications,  and  all  Socialist  officers  of  Trades  Unions, 
in  short,  all  who  stand  in  the  service  of  the  Socialist  propaganda, 
should  be  expelled  from  the  German  Empire.  All  Anarchists 
shouidjreceive  the  same  treatment." 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    821 

The  author  is,  of  course,  an  uncompromising  anti- 
Semite  : — 

"  It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  the  frontiers  should  be  com- 
pletely closed  against  the  immigration  of  Jews.  It  is  equally 
indispensable  that  foreign  Jews  who  have  not  yet  acquired 
citizen  rights  should  be  expelled  without  delay  and  without 
consideration. 

"  However  hard  it  may  seem  to  the  German  sense  of  justice, 
we  must  restrict  the  rights  of  resident  Jews.  The  good  may 
suffer  together  with  the  bad,  but  necessity  must  steel  our 
hearts  to  pity.  We  must  demand  that  all  Jews  in  Germany  be 
placed  under  alien  law. 

"  The  question  at  once  arises  :  Who  is  a  Jew  ?  We  must 
differentiate  between  race  and  faith.  Jews  are  a  race,  and 
those  who  have  changed  their  faith  are  Jews  still.  We  must 
further  re-establish  the  old  Germanic  principle  that  in  case 
of  marriages  between  Jews  and  Christians  the  descendants 
belong  to  the  inferior  race.  Therefore  it  should  be  laid  down 
that  all  those  are  Jews  who  belonged  to  the  Jewish  faith  on  the 
1 8th  of  January  1871  or  who  are  descendants  of  those  who 
were  Jews  at  that  date,  even  if  only  one  of  the  parents  was  a 
Jew." 

The  following  measures  should  be  taken : — 

"  Jews  should  be  excluded  from  all  public  employments  in 
the  gift  of  the  Empire,  the  single  States  and  the  local  author- 
ities, whether  such  employment  be  in  consideration  of  a 
remuneration  or  purely  honorary  and  gratuitous.  Jews 
should  not  be  admitted  to  the  service  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 
Jews  should  neither  vote  nor  be  elected.  They  should  be 
excluded  from  the  profession  of  the  law,  and  they  should  not 
teach  in  schools.  They  should  not  manage  theatres.  News- 
papers which  have  Jews  for  contributors  should  clearly  state 
that  fact.  The  other  newspapers,  which  one  may  call  German 
newspapers,  should  neither  be  owned  by  Jews  nor  have 
Jewish  managers,  editors,  or  journalists.  Banks  should  not 
be  conducted  by  Jews  unless  they  are  private  banks.  Landed 
property  should  neither  be  owned  by  Jews  nor  be  hypothecated 
to  them.  In  consideration  for  the  protection  which  Jews 
enjoy  as  aliens  they  should  have  to  pay  double  taxes." 


822  MODERN    GERMANY 

The  millions  of  Poles,  Frenchmen,  and  Danes 
resident  in  Germany  should,  according  to  "  Frymann," 
be  Germanised  by  force  : — 

"We  must  demand  that  the  members  elected  by  the  Polish 
nation  into  the  German  Parliament  should  have  only  the  right 
to  speak,  but  not  to  vote,  and  that  they  could  demand  to  be 
heard  only  on  questions  which  touch  the  Poles  or  the  district 
inhabited  by  them.  If  it  should  be  found  that  this  provision 
is  evaded  by  their  co-operating  with  one  of  the  Parliamentary 
parties,  the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  be  elected  should  be 
definitely  taken  away  from  the  Poles.  Polish  newspapers  and 
periodicals  should  under  all  circumstances  give  a  German 
translation  of  the  Polish  text,  and  the  only  language  permis- 
sible at  public  meetings  of  Poles  should  be  German.  .  .  . 

"...  We  have  acquired  Alsace-Lorraine  because  the  terri- 
tory is  militarily  necessary  to  us.  The  inhabitants  were  thrown 
in.  We  have  given  them  the  option  either  to  become  German 
subjects  or  to  emigrate  into  France  after  the  acquisition  of 
their  country.  Now  we  must  give  them  a  second  option,  but 
a  more  thorough  one.  Every  inhabitant  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
who  is  of  age  should  publicly  declare  that  he  is  an  uncon- 
ditional supporter  of  the  German  Empire  and  he  should  enter 
into  the  obligation  not  to  use  the  French  language  in  public 
or  within  his  own  house,  nor  should  he  obtain  newspapers, 
periodicals,  or  books  from  France.  Those  who  refuse  to  enter 
into  this  obligation  should  have  to  leave  the  country  without 
delay.  Those  who  contravene  the  foregoing  should  be  expelled. 
All  private  schools  should  be  closed,  and  French  should  be 
taught  only  as  a  foreign  language,  and  no  more  time  should  be 
devoted  to  it  than  is  devoted  to  French  in  the  other  parts  of 
Germany.  Newspapers  printed  in  French  should  be  compelled 
to  issue  at  the  same  time  a  German  translation  of  the  French 
text.  The  Constitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be  abolished 
and  its  administration  be  placed  under  a  Minister  with  dicta- 
torial powers.  The  Danes  in  Schleswig-Holstein  should 
receive  the  same  treatment." 

While  "Frymann"  recommends  establishing  the 
supremacy  of  absolutism  in  Germany  by  force,  General 
von  Bernhardi  proposes  in  his  book,  Unsere  Zukunft, 
to  establish  by  force  the  supremacy  of  Germany  in 


HOW  THE    MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    823 

Europe  and  throughout  the  world.  He  recognises 
that  Germany's  expansion  is  restrained  by  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe,  that  Germany  cannot  expand 
because  the  forces  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
Triple  Entente  are  about  equally  strong  : — 

"  We  can  render  secure  our  position  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe  only  if  we  succeed  in  bursting  the  Triple  Entente  and 
forcing  France,  which  is  never  likely  to  co-operate  with 
Germany,  to  accept  that  position  of  inferiority  which  is  her 
due." 

General  von  Bernhardi  hates  Great  Britain  with  a 
passionate  hatred,  partly  because  her  adhesion  to  the 
Franco- Russian  Alliance  has  established  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe,  partly  because  he  envies  Great 
Britain  her  enormous  possessions,  partly  because  he 
despises  her  for  not  possessing  a  national  army. 
According  to  him  "  armed  strength  in  its  moral, 
intellectual,  and  physical  aspects  is  the  truest  measure 
of  civilisation."  He  believes  that  Great  Britain 
wishes  to  destroy  Germany  : — 

"  Only  England  has  an  interest  in  bringing  about  a  general 
European  war  which  would  necessarily  involve  Germany.  In 
the  first  place  England  finds  it  from  day  to  day  more  difficult 
to  man  her  rapidly  increasing  fleet.  She  seems  to  be  approach- 
ing the  limits  of  her  naval  capacity.  In  the  second  place  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal  will  soon  be  finished,  and  its 
completion  will  yield  considerable  military  advantages  to 
Germany.  Lastly,  the  German  Navy  grows  from  year  to 
year,  so  that  the  conclusion  lies  near  that  the  comparative 
strength  of  the  two  countries  will  gradually  be  altered  to 
England's  disadvantage.  In  the  Mediterranean  the  Austrian 
and  the  Italian  navies  are  about  to  be  strengthened.  All  these 
circumstances  make  it  clearly  desirable  for  England  to  bring 
about  a  war  as  soon  as  possible  and  to  obtain  the  assistance  of 
France  and  Russia  for  such  an  undertaking.  .  .  . 

"  German  competition,  German  enterprise,  and  German 
industry  hamper  Englishmen  throughout  the  world,  and  often 


824  MODERN    GERMANY 

prove  superior.  It  is  England's  interest  to  destroy  Germany's 
competition,  especially  as  the  German  nation  has  the  greatest 
ability  among  the  nations  of  Europe  and  the  greatest  hope  of 
expansion,  for  it  is  a  maritime  State  of  the  first  rank.  It 
threatens  to  obtain  a  predominant  position  on  the  Continent, 
to  disturb  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  which  is  so  profit- 
able to  England,  and  to  develop  a  navy  which  may  become 
dangerous  to  Great  Britain.  Great  Britain  has  allied  herself 
with  Russia  and  France  in  order  to  keep  Germany  down,  to 
prevent  her  political  development  and  to  destroy  her  fleet. 
We  cannot  be  deceived  on  that  point.  The  German  Fleet  must 
be  destroyed.  That  is  the  Alpha  and  the  Omega  of  British 
policy.  It  is  the  necessary  and  logical  consequence  of  the 
Triple  Entente." 

General  von  Bernhardi  has  not  a  very  high  opinion 
of  the  British  Fleet : — 

"The  British  Fleet  is  an  extremely  powerful  opponent. 
However,  it  suffers  from  a  national  weakness.  It  is  already 
difficult  to  secure  a  sufficient  supply  of  men,  and  especially  of 
the  higher  ratings.  Therefore,  unless  universal  compulsory 
service  be  introduced,  a  distinct  limit  is  put  to  the  increase  of 
the  British  Fleet.  Besides,  the  German  artillery  is  at  least 
as  good  as  the  English ;  perhaps  it  is  better.  The  same 
applies  to  the  torpedo  boats.  Lastly,  the  newest  English 
ships  correspond  in  no  way  to  expectations." 

The  General  thinks  that  a  war  with  Great  Britain 
is  inevitable  because  Great  Britain  will  never  allow 
Germany  to  acquire  great  colonial  possessions.  He 
writes  :— 

"  We  must  enlarge  Germany's  colonial  possessions  and 
acquire  adequate  territories  suitable  for  the  settlement  of 
white  men.  However,  we  cannot  disguise  from  ourselves  the 
fact  that  England  will  undoubtedly  oppose  Germany's 
acquisition  of  valuable  Colonies,  of  coaling  stations  and  naval 
bases.  Colonies  situated  in  the  Temperate  Zone  can  scarcely 
be  acquired  without  a  war  with  other  States. 

"  Exactly  as  Bismarck  clearly  recognised  in  his  time,  that 
a  healthy  development  of  Prussia  and  Germany  would  be 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    825 

possible  only  when  the  differences  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  had  finally  been  settled,  so  every  German  who  looks 
at  the  matter  without  prejudice  is  convinced  that  Germany's 
further  development  as  a  world-Power  is  possible  only  when 
the  existing  Anglo-German  competition  has  come  to  an  end. 
Exactly  as  a  cordial  alliance  was  possible  between  Germany 
and  Austria  only  after  the  Austro-German  war  of  1866,  so  we 
shall  obtain  an  understanding  with  England,  which  from 
many  points  of  view  is  desirable,  only  after  an  Anglo-German 
war." 

General  von  Bernhardi  recommends  that  Germany 
should  secure  the  co-operation  of  the  United  States 
against  Great  Britain  and  that  Germany  should 
weaken  Great  Britain's  power  of  resistance  by  foment- 
ing risings  of  the  natives  throughout  the  British 
Empire : — 

"  There  is  a  distinct  conflict  of  interests  between  the  United 
States  and  England,  firstly,  because  the  United  States  are 
England's  most  dangerous  competitor  in  the  trade  of  the 
world  and  especially  with  Eastern  Asia  ;  secondly,  because 
the  United  States  are  determined  not  in  any  case  to  submit  to 
England's  naval  predominance.  The  Dominion  of  Canada 
forms  another  point  of  friction  between  the  two  States,  whilst 
there  are  no  material  differences  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany.  It  is  true  that  peaceful  division  of  the  world 
between  England  and  the  United  States  is  conceivable.  How- 
ever, no  indications  can  at  present  be  found  of  such  an  under- 
standing. As  matters  are  at  present,  the  enormous  increase 
in  England's  power  which  would  flow  from  the  defeat 
of  Germany  would  be  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  United 
States.  It  follows  that  the  co-operation  of  the  United  States 
and  of  Germany  would  be  in  the  interests  of  both  countries. 

"  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that. in  the  English  Colonies,  in 
India,  South  Africa,  and  Egypt,  there  is  explosive  material  in 
large  quantities,  so  that  it  seems  by  no  means  unthinkable  that 
revolts  and  national  risings  would  occur  in  the  event  that 
England  should  be  engaged  in  an  unfortunate  or  dangerous 
war.  These  are  circumstances  with  which  we  have  to  count, 
and  it  is  our  duty  to  make  the  best  use  of  them.  .  .  .  England 
would  probably  feel  inclined  to  conclude  peace  if,  in  the  course 


826  MODERN    GERMANY 

of  a  European  war  in  which  she  was  engaged,  risings  and 
revolts  took  place  in  her  Colonies  which  threatened  her  pre- 
eminent position.  It  may  be  considered  as  a  matter  which 
does  not  admit  of  dispute  that  in  India,  in  Egypt,  and  in 
South  Africa  there  is  sufficient  inflammable  material." 

General  von  Bernhardi  thinks  that  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  can  come  to  an  understanding  only  if 
Great  Britain  is  willing  to  abandon  her  allies  on  the 
Continent  and  allow  Germany  to  deal  with  them  as 
she  pleases.  He  thinks  that  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many can  conclude  an  alliance  only  if  Great  Britain 
agrees  not  to  oppose  in  any  way  Germany's  oversea 
expansion,  and  if  she  agrees  to  redistribute  her  fleet 
so  as  to  allow  Germany  to  rule  the  North  Sea.  The 
General  writes  : — 

"  There  are  two  possibilities  of  arriving  at  an  understanding 
with  England.  An  agreement  with  her  can  be  either  lasting 
or  transient.  If  a  lasting  agreement  is  desired,  the  important 
interests  of  Germany  must  be  safeguarded.  Nothing  must 
remain  that  could  impede  their  necessary  development.  This 
demand  makes  it  necessary  for  England  to  abandon  its  claim 
to  a  predominant  position  in  the  world.  It  involves  England's 
recognition  that  England  and  Germany  have  equal  rights. 
England  would  have  to  give  an  absolutely  free  hand  to  Ger- 
many in  Europe,  and  would  have  to  agree  beforehand  to  any 
increase  of  power  of  Germany  on  the  Continent  which  might 
arise  out  of  a  Central-European  federation  of  States  or  out  of 
a  Franco-German  war.  England  would  have  to  abandon  its 
diplomatic  opposition  to  Germany's  colonial  policy  as  long  as 
Germany  does  not  strive  to  acquire  Colonies  at  England's 
cost.  England  would  have  to  agree  not  to  oppose  Austria's 
expansion  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  nor  to  oppose  Germany's 
economic  policy  in  Asia  Minor,  nor  the  development  of  the 
German  Navy  and  the  acquisition  of  coaling  stations. 

"  Whether  such  an  understanding  would  take  the  form  of  an 
alliance  is  an  open  question.  In  reality  it  would  for  most 
purposes  be  equal  to  an  Anglo-German  alliance,  and  on  the 
basis  of  such  an  understanding  England  and  Germany  could 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    827 

peacefully  settle  their  economic  interests.  Such  an  agree- 
ment of  the  two  great  Germanic  States  would  create  an 
irresistible  political  force  which  would  promote  the  develop- 
ment of  both  nations  in  every  way.  It  would  create  a  factor 
for  civilisation  which  would  more  than  any  other  promote 
human  progress.  Thus  a  practical  way  would  be  found  to 
banish  war  and  the  danger  of  war  for  ever,  or  at  least  to 
restrict  its  danger.  Peace  in  Europe  would  be  secured  by  Eng- 
land's approaching  the  Triple  Alliance.  At  the  same  time  a 
powerful  counterpoise  would  be  created  to  the  growing  in- 
fluence of  the  United  States.  The  pressure  of  East  European 
Slavism  would  be  diminished  and  a  powerful  wall  would  be 
raised  against  the  millions  of  yellow  men  in  the  Far  East. 

"  It  would  be  seen  that  such  an  understanding  between 
England  and  Germany  would  have  the  most  far-reaching 
advantages  not  only  to  the  two  countries  but  to  all  mankind. 
However,  it  is  clear  that  England  would  have  to  alter  her 
entire  policy.  The  basis  of  all  negotiations  should  be  the 
demand  that  England  would  abandon  the  Triple  Entente  and 
redistribute  her  fleet.  After  all,  it  is  clear  to  every  thinking 
man  that  England  and  Germany  can  never  enter  into  friendly 
and  cordial  relations  as  long  as  Great  Britain  is  allied  with 
Germany's  enemies.  Besides,  Germany  could  never  have  any 
confidence  as  to  the  honesty  of  England's  peaceful  intentions 
as  long  as  the  entire  British  Navy  is  concentrated  in  the  North 
Sea  and  kept  ready  for  an  attack  upon  Germany." 

General  von  Bernhardi  evidently  strives  to  secure 
for  Germany  not  only  supremacy  in  Europe  but  supre- 
macy throughout  the  world.  He  wishes  to  conclude 
an  Anglo-German  alliance,  but  Germany  is  to  be  the 
predominant  partner.  Great  Britain  is  to  help  Ger- 
many to  become  a  world-Power,  but  in  order  to  be 
on  good  terms  with  Germany  she  must  disarm.  She 
must  redistribute  her  fleet  and  apparently  leave  the 
protection  of  her  shores  to  Germany.  According  to 
General  von  Bernhardi  a  durable  understanding  be- 
tween the  two  Powers  can  be  concluded  only  if  Great 
Britain  consents  to  become  Germany's  vassal. 

The  Germans  are  frequently  described  as  a  peace- 


828  MODERN    GERMANY 

ful  nation.  They  would  more  correctly  be  described 
as  a  well-drilled  and  well-disciplined  nation.  They 
are  firmly  ruled  by  a  small  class  through  an  all- 
powerful  bureaucracy,  army,  and  police.  Absolute 
obedience  to  official  orders  is  the  first  duty  of  the 
citizen  and  the  first  law  of  the  State.  The  well-drilled 
Germans  are  a  law-abiding  people  and  their  obedience 
is  absolute.  Orderly  grumbling,  if  done  in  moderation, 
is  permitted.  Hence,  if  the  people  are  dissatisfied 
with  their  rulers  or  disapprove  of  their  policy,  they 
may  protest  but  they  will  obey.  That  was  seen  in 
1866.  Then  the  Prussians  passionately  protested 
against  the  "  Bruderkrieg,"  the  fratricidal  war,  against 
Austria.  Yet  they  obeyed  and  fought.  The  Govern- 
ment has  crushed  the  spirit  of  the  people.  This  lack 
of  spirit  constitutes  Germany's  strength  but  also  her 
weakness.  German  enthusiasts  have  always  greatly 
admired  democratic  government,  but,  unlike  French- 
men, Englishmen,  Americans,  Italians,  Swiss,  and 
Dutch,  they  have  never  seriously  fought  for  it.  They 
were  at  best  half-hearted  supporters  of  revolution. 
The  nation  rose  only,  as  in  1813  against  Napoleon, 
when  ordered  by  the  Government.  In  Germany  the 
Government  does  not  carry  out  the  will  of  the  people 
but  the  people  execute  the  will  of  the  Government, 
and  those  who  try  to  prove  that  Germany  is  peaceful 
because  the  German  merchants,  clergymen,  and  work- 
ing-men do  not  wish  for  war,  only  show  that  they  are 
unacquainted  with  Germany's  political  character  and 
organisation  and  with  the  elementary  facts  of  German 
history.  The  majority  of  Germans  are  undoubtedly 
peaceful,  but  that  peaceful  majority  will  go  to  war 
with  alacrity  as  soon  as  the  ruling  minority  gives  the 
signal.  There  is  a  great  difference  between  demo- 
cratic and  autocratic  Germany,  a  difference  which  is 


HOW  THE  MILITARY  RULES  GERMANY    829 

not  sufficiently  appreciated  in  other  countries.  Demo- 
cratic Germany  talks  much  but  does  not  act ;  auto- 
cratic Germany  acts  but  does  not  talk.  Democratic 
Germany  has  filled  the  newspapers  with  loud  com- 
plaints about  the  Zabern  incident ;  autocratic  Germany 
has  not  talked  at  Zabern  but  has  acted,  and  the 
incident  has  closed  with  the  victory  of  autocratic 
Germany.  Herein  lies  the  lesson  of  Zabern. 


CHAPTER   XXXIV 

THE  GERMAN  CUSTOMS  OF  WAR 

Extracts  from  Kriegsbrauch — The  Customs  of  War,  the  official 
handbook  for  the  information  of  officers  (published  by  the  German 
General  Staff,  Berlin,  1902). 

INTRODUCTION. — To  conduct  war  with  energy  it  must 
be  made  not  only  on  the  combatant  forces  of  a  hostile 
State  and  its  fortresses.  Equally  strong  endeavour 
must  be  made  to  destroy  its  entire  intellectual  and 
material  resources.  The  claims  of  humanity,  the 
sparing  of  human  lives  and  of  property,  may  be  con- 
sidered only  in  so  far  as  the  nature  of  war  permits. 
Although  the  purpose  of  war  allows  a  State  which  is 
at  war  to  employ  all  means  suitable  for  attaining  its 
purpose,  experience  has  taught  us  that  it  is  in  our 
own  interest  to  limit  the  use  of  certain  warlike  measures 
and  entirely  to  omit  others.  The  spirit  of  chivalry  and 
of  Christian  morality,  the  advance  of  Culture,  and  last 
but  not  least  the  recognition  of  one's  own  advantage, 
have  led  to  a  voluntary  limitation  in  the  means  em- 
ployed in  time  of  war.  .  .  . 

In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  various 
attempts  have  been  made  to  formulate  and  modify 
the  existing  customs  of  war,  to  lay  down  laws  of  war 
binding  upon  all  nations  and  armies,  in  other  words, 
to  create  an  International  Law  of  War — a  codex  belli. 
However,  hitherto,  a  few  points  excepted,  all  these 
attempts  have  failed.  If,  nevertheless,  the  words 
"  Rights  of  War  "  are  used  in  the  following  pages,  it 

must  be  remembered  that  we  are  not  referring  to  a 

830 


THE  GERMAN   CUSTOMS   OF  WAR        831 

lex  scripta  which  is  based  upon  international  treaties, 
but  only  to  a  mutual,  though  not  expressly  covenanted, 
agreement  of  nations  regulating  warfare  which  is  in- 
tended to  set  limits  to  arbitrary  action,  limits  which 
have  been  established  by  custom,  tradition,  humanity, 
and  calculating  egoism,  limits  which  are  respected  not 
because  of  the  existence  of  some  superior  force  con- 
trolling the  action  of  States,  but  because  of  the  "  fear 
of  reprisals."  .  .  . 

The  modern  customs  of  war  are  not  merely  founded 
upon  the  tradition  of  former  ages  and  upon  ancient 
military  customs  and  views.  They  are  the  precipitate 
of  the  currents  of  modern  thought.  .  .  . 

The  study  of  the  history  of  war  will  prevent 
officers  forming  views  of  exaggerated  humanity.  It 
will  teach  them  that  wars  cannot  be  conducted  with- 
out certain  severities ;  that  rightly  considered  true 
humanity  lies  often  in  their  unsparing  use.  .  .  .  To 
understand  the  Right  of  War  we  must  study  it  not 
only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  military  historian, 
but  we  must  acquaint  ourselves  with  the  fundamental 
views  of  modern  International  Law.  This  is  the  object 
of  the  present  work. 

IRREGULAR  TROOPS — LEVEE  EN  MASSE. — The  pre- 
judice against  the  use  of  irregular  troops  is  founded  on 
this,  that  the  lack  of  a  thorough  military  training  and 
the  absence  of  a  severe  discipline,  easily  induces  them 
to  perpetrate  crimes  and  to  disregard  the  customs  of 
war.  .  .  .  According  to  International  Law,  no  State 
is  compelled  to  limit  its  military  forces  in  case  of  war 
to  its  standing  army.  On  the  contrary,  a  State  is 
perfectly  justified  to  arm  all  the  inhabitants  able  to 
bear  arms,  and  to  authorise  them  to  take  part  in  the 
war.  Therefore,  up  to  the  most  recent  times,  autho- 
risation by  the  State  has  been  the  absolutely  necessary 


832  MODERN    GERMANY 

condition  of  recognising  irregular  troops  as  com- 
batants. 

The  organisation  of  irregular  troops  in  military 
formations,  and  their  control  by  responsible  officers, 
does  not  suffice  to  entitle  them  to  be  treated  as  com- 
batants. More  important  than  the  foregoing  con- 
dition is  that  by  their  outward  appearance  they  can 
easily  be  recognised  as  soldiers,  and  that  they  carry 
their  arms  openly. 

Guided  by  the  view  that  one  can  never  deny  to  the 
people  their  natural  right  of  defending  their  country, 
and  that  smaller  States,  possessed  of  inferior  power, 
can  only  protect  themselves  by  arming  the  people — 
by  a  levee  en  masse — the  majority  of  authorities  on 
International  Law  have  demanded,  in  making  pro- 
posals for  codifying  the  Laws  of  War,  that  they  should, 
on  principle,  be  recognised  as  combatants. 

THE  MEANS  OF  WARFARE. — All  means  of  warfare 
may  be  used  without  which  the  purpose  of  war  cannot  be 
achieved.  On  the  other  hand,  every  act  of  violence  and 
destruction  which  is  not  demanded  by  the  purpose  of  war 
must  be  condemned. 

Among  the  means  of  warfare  which  are  not  per- 
missible are  :  The  use  of  poison  against  individuals  and 
against  masses  of  the  enemy,  the  poisoning  of  wells  or 
of  food  and  the  spreading  of  infectious  diseases ; 
murder  in  every  form ;  the  use  of  arms  or  missiles 
which  cause  unnecessary  suffering;  the  killing  of  in- 
capacitated wounded  men  and  of  prisoners ;  the 
killing  of  soldiers  who  have  laid  down  their  arms  and 
have  surrendered  themselves. 

Closely  connected  with  means  of  warfare  which  are 
not  permissible  is  the  employment  of  uncivilised  and 
barbarian  peoples  in  European  war.  Considered  from 
the  point  of  view  of  right,  it  is  evident  that  no  State 


THE  GERMAN   CUSTOMS   OF  WAR      833 

can  be  prohibited  to  employ  troops  taken  from  its  non- 
European  colonies.  However,  with  the  modern  tend- 
ency to  humanise  warfare  and  to  diminish  the  sufferings 
caused  by  war,  the  employment  of  soldiers  who  lack 
the  knowledge  of  civilised  warfare,  and  who  conse- 
quently perpetrate  cruelties  and  inhumanities  pro- 
hibited by  the  customs  of  war,  cannot  be  reconciled. 
The  employment  of  such  troops  is  as  inadmissible  as  is 
the  use  of  poison,  murder,  &c.  The  employment  of 
African  and  Mohammedan  Turcos  by  France  in  1870 
was  undoubtedly  a  lapse  from  civilised  into  barbarous 
warfare,  because  these  troops  could  have  no  under- 
standing for  European  and  Christian  civilisation,  for 
the  necessity  of  protecting  property,  and  of  safe- 
guarding the  honour  of  men  and  women. 

TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS  OF  WAR. — No  measures 
should  be  taken  against  prisoners  of  war  beyond 
keeping  them  under  guard.  They  should  especially 
not  be  incarcerated  as  if  they  were  to  be  punished. 
They  should  not  be  fettered,  and  their  liberty  should 
not  be  unnecessarily  restricted  unless  special  reasons 
justify  such  measures  or  compel  their  adoption.  The 
housing  of  prisoners  of  war  should  take  place  in  edifices 
which  are  as  healthy,  clean,  and  decent  as  possible. 
Prisoners  of  war  should  not  be  placed  into  prisons 
and  other  houses  of  punishment.  ...  It  is  opposed  to 
the  Right  of  War  that  prisoners  should  be  kept  under 
conditions  where  they  lack  sufficient  air  and  food,  or 
be  brutally  treated,  as  has  happened  in  the  American 
Civil  War  in  a  prison  of  the  South  with  regard  to 
soldiers  belonging  to  the  North  American  States. 

The  food  of  prisoners  of  war  must  be  sufficient 
and  in  accordance  with  their  condition  in  life.  .  .  . 
Prisoners  of  war  retain  their  private  property,  arms, 
horses,  and  documents  of  military  importance  excepted. 


834  MODERN    GERMANY 

Prisoners  of  war  must  be  treated  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  the  land  in  which  they  are  kept,  and  in 
accordance  with  the  prevailing  regulations  governing  the 
treatment  of  the  troops  of  the  country.  They  must  be 
treated  like  the  soldiers  of  the  State  which  retains  them, 
neither  worse  nor  better. 

As  regards  the  right  of  killing  prisoners  of  war,  the 
following  opinions  prevail.  They  may  be  killed — 

(1)  In  case  they  commit  crimes  which,  according 

to  civil  or  military  law,  are  punishable  with 
death ; 

(2)  In  case  of  resistance  or  flight ; 

(3)  As    reprisals,    either    against    the    killing    of 

prisoners    by    a    hostile    Power,    or    against 
other  transgressions  of  a  hostile  army  ; 

(4)  In  case  of  pressing  necessity. 

Many  teachers  of  International  Law  maintain  that 
the  killing  of  prisoners,  as  a  form  of  reprisal,  is  inad- 
missible for  reasons  of  humanity.  To  assert  that  such 
action  is  not  permissible  under  all  circumstances  would, 
according  to  Professor  Lueder  in  his  book  War  Rights 
on  Land,  be  an  erroneous  conception  of  the  importance, 
the  seriousness  and  the  right  of  war,  flowing  from  an 
understandable  but  exaggerated  and  unjustified  feeling 
of  humanity.  It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  also, 
as  regards  the  killing  of  prisoners,  the  necessity  of  the 
war  and  the  security  of  the  State  must  be  considered 
in  the  first  place,  but  not  the  idea  that  prisoners  have 
to  be  spared  at  any  price. 

In  transporting  prisoners,  commanders  and  soldiers 
guarding  them  must  do  everything  in  their  power  to 
ease  their  lot  as  much  as  possible,  especially  if  they  are 
ill  or  wounded.  In  particular,  they  must  be  protected 
against  insults  and  ill-treatment  on  the  part  of  an 
excited  populace, 


THE  GERMAN  CUSTOMS   OF  WAR       835 

SIEGES  AND  BOMBARDMENTS. — War  is  conducted 
not  only  against  hostile  combatants,  but  also  against 
the  inanimate  means  of  war  possessed  by  the  enemy. 
Among  the  latter,  hostile  fortresses  take  the  first 
place,  but  war  may  also  be  made  upon  every  town  and 
village  which  hampers  military  action.  All  inhabited 
places  may  be  besieged,  shelled,  stormed  and  destroyed 
if  they  are  defended  by  the  enemy  and  under  certain 
circumstances  also  when  they  are  only  occupied  by 
him. 

The  prohibition  to  shell  open  towns  and  villages 
which  are  neither  occupied  nor  defended  by  the  enemy, 
has  been  formulated  by  the  Hague  Conference.  How- 
ever, that  prohibition  appears  superfluous,  as  the 
modern  history  of  war  scarcely  knows  a  case  in  which 
such  shelling  has  taken  place. 

RUSES  OF  WAR. — The  employment  of  ruses  of  war 
has  been  considered  lawful  since  the  most  remote 
times.  .  .  .  However,  certain  ruses  are  not  reconcil- 
able with  honest  warfare,  namely  those  which  de- 
generate into  perfidy,  fraud,  and  the  breach  of  the 
given  word.  .  .  .  Among  these  are  to  be  mentioned 
pretended  surrender  with  the  object  of  killing  an 
unsuspecting  opponent  on  his  approach,  the  abuse  of 
the  white  flag  or  of  the  Red  Cross.  .  .  .  These  crimes 
violate  the  most  ancient  principles  of  war.  The 
natural  sense  of  right  possessed  by  all  men,  and  the 
spirit  of  chivalry  which  lives  in  the  armies  of  all 
civilised  States,  have  branded  such  proceedings  as 
crimes  against  humanity  and  against  Right,  and, 
guided  by  these  sentiments,  one  refuses  to  recognise 
any  longer  as  equals  opponents  which  thus  openly 
violate  the  laws  of  honour  and  justice.  The  views  of 
military  authorities  with  regard  to  these  means  of 
warfare  differ  in  many  points  from  those  expressed  by 


836  MODERN    GERMANY 

reputed  teachers  of  International  Law.  Thus,  the  use 
of  the  enemy's  uniform,  the  use  of  the  enemy's  flags  or 
of  neutral  flags  in  order  to  deceive,  is  declared  ad- 
missible by  the  majority  of  those  who  expound  the 
theory  of  legitimate  warfare.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
military  writers  (see  Boguslawski,  Der  Kleine  Krieg) 
have  expressed  themselves  unanimously  against  their 
use,  and  the  Hague  Conference  has  supported  their 
opinion  by  prohibiting  the  use  of  the  enemy's  uniform 
and  flags,  and  placing  their  use  into  the  same  category 
as  the  abuse  of  the  white  flag  and  of  the  Red  Cross. 

Professor  Lueder,  in  his  Handbuch  der  Volker- 
rechts,  writes  :  "  The  ugliness  and  immorality  of  such 
ruses  cannot  alter  the  fact  that  their  recognition  is 
admissible.  The  purpose  and  necessity  of  war  entitle 
those  who  conduct  it,  and  under  certain  circumstances 
make  it  even  their  duty,  not  to  allow  decisive  advan- 
tages to  escape  them  which  can  be  obtained  by  the 
use  of  these  ruses." 

CUSTOMS  OF  WAR  RELATING  TO  THE  ENEMY'S 
COUNTRY  :  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  INHABITANTS. — 
While  in  past  ages  the  laying  waste  of  the  enemy's 
country,  the  destruction  of  his  property  and  even  the 
enslaving  of  the  inhabitants  was  considered  a  natural 
consequence  flowing  from  a  state  of  war,  more  recent 
tunes  have  introduced  more  lenient  views.  While 
formerly  the  opinion  prevailed  that  the  destruction  of 
private  property  was  "  the  principal  means  of  war- 
fare," and  that  the  right  to  plunder  private  property 
was  unlimited,  to-day  the  opinion  prevails  universally 
that  the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country  are  no  longer 
to  be  considered  as  enemies.  ...  It  follows  that  the 
citizens  of  an  occupied  country  possess  the  right,  that 
neither  their  life  may  be  taken  nor  that  their  honour 
and  liberty  be  diminished,  that  every  case  of  unlawful 


THE   GERMAN   CUSTOMS    OF   WAR     837 

killing  of  the  civil  population,  that  every  malicious  or 
careless  wounding,  that  every  insult,  every  disturbance 
of  the  domestic  peace,  every  attack  upon  the  family, 
upon  honour,  and  upon  morality,  in  short,  every  un- 
lawful or  criminal  attack  and  insult,  is  exactly  as 
punishable  as  if  it  had  been  perpetrated  against  the 
inhabitants  of  one's  own  country.  .  .  .  On  the  other 
hand,  the  inhabitants  of  an  enemy-country  have 
naturally  the  duty  to  behave  peacefully,  not  to  take 
part  in  the  war  in  any  way,  and  not  to  harm  in  any 
manner  the  troops  occupying  their  country. 

The  majority  of  writers  are  unanimous  in  con- 
demning the  forcing  of  the  people  to  give  information 
about  their  own  army,  the  conduct  of  war,  and  about 
military  secrets  concerning  their  own  country.  Never- 
theless, it  is  not  always  possible  to  do  without  such 
information.  Force  to  obtain  it  will  no  doubt  be  used 
with  regret,  but  the  purpose  of  war  will  frequently 
make  that  step  necessary. 

PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  TIME  OF  WAR. — As,  in 
accordance  with  the  views  of  International  Law  as  to 
the  right  of  war  prevailing  to-day,  war  is  made  not 
between  private  people  but  between  States,  it  follows 
that  all  arbitrary  devastation  of  the  country,  and 
every  wilful  destruction  of  private  property,  unless  it 
is  called  for  by  the  necessity  of  war,  is  opposed  to 
International  Law.  ...  It  follows  : — 

(1)  All  unnecessary  devastation,  destruction,  arson, 

&c.,  in  the  enemy's  country  is  prohibited, 
and  soldiers  guilty  of  such  action  will  be 
punished  as  criminals  according  to  law, 

(2)  All  destruction  and  damage  brought  about  for 

military  reasons  is  permissible. 
The  following  double  rule  prevails :    No  damage, 
not  even  the  smallest,  must  be  done  unless  it  is  done  for 


838  MODERN    GERMANY 

military  reasons.     On  the  other  hand,  the  greatest  damage 
may  be  inflicted  if  it  is  demanded  by  the  conduct  of  war. 

PLUNDERING  AND  LOOT. — According  to  modern 
views,  the  victor  may  appropriate,  without  any  for- 
malities, all  movable  property  belonging  to  a  hostile 
State.  He  may  confiscate  the  monies  deposited  in 
national  offices,  but  discrimination  must  be  used,  for 
the  monies  in  communal  offices  are  considered  to  be 
private  property. 

Some  consider  the  taking  of  private  property  from 
a  defeated  combatant  to  be  permissible.  The  conflict 
of  opinions  has,  however,  led  to  the  rule  that  the 
taking  of  valuables,  money,  &c.,  from  a  defeated 
combatant  is  inadmissible,  and  that  only  the  taking  of 
his  military  outfit  is  permitted. 

Plunder  is  the  worst  form  of  taking  other  people's 
property.  It  consists  in  robbing  the  citizens  of  the 
country  by  making  use  of  the  terror  of  war,  in  abusing 
the  superior  force  possessed  by  the  military.  The 
worst  feature  of  the  crime  of  plunder  lies  in  this,  that 
the  plunderer  appropriates  objects  of  value  in  the 
presence  of  the  frightened  owner,  who  cannot  offer  any 
resistance,  and  that  he  takes  objects  which  are  not 
required  by  his  necessity,  such  as  food  and  clothing. 
If  objects  are  taken  from  uninhabited  houses,  or  from 
houses  from  which  the  owner  is  absent,  the  crime  is 
theft,  but  not  plunder. 

FORCED  REQUISITIONS  AND  CONTRIBUTIONS. — 
Contributions  of  war  are  sums  of  money  which  are 
levied  by  force  from  the  people  of  an  occupied  country. 
They  differ  in  character  from  requisitions  in  kind 
because  they  do  not  serve  an  immediate  requirement 
of  the  army.  Hence,  requisitions  in  cash  are  only  in 
the  rarest  cases  justified  by  the  necessities  of  war. 
Monetary  requisitions  have  generated  from  the  old 


THE  GERMAN   CUSTOMS   OF  WAR      839 

custom  of  ransom.  In  former  times,  the  burning  of 
towns  was  not  undertaken  against  an  agreed-upon 
payment  in  cash.  Thus,  ransom  arose  from  the  right 
to  destroy  and  plunder  private  property.  As  modern 
International  Law  no  longer  recognises  the  right  to 
destroy  and  plunder,  and  as  the  maxim  that  wars  are 
made  upon  States  and  not  upon  private  individuals 
is  no  longer  in  doubt,  it  follows  logically  that  forced 
contributions  in  money  are  not  permissible  according 
to  present-day  views,  because  such  contributions  re- 
present only  an  arbitrary  enrichment  of  the  victor. 
The  victor  is,  in  particular,  not  entitled  to  recover  the 
.cost  of  war  by  a  tax  upon  private  people,  even  in  the 
event  that  he  was  forced  into  war  by  the  action  of  the 
enemy.  Therefore,  the  demand  of  contributions  in 
cash  is  permissible  only  in  lieu  of  taxation,  in  lieu  of 
contributions  in  kind,  or  as  a  form  of  punishment. 

THE  CUSTOM  OF  WAR  RELATING  TO  NEUTRAL 
STATES. — The  fundamental  demand  which  neutral 
States  should  satisfy  is  the  equal  treatment  of  the 
belligerents.  It  follows  that  a  neutral  State  may  assist 
both  belligerents  provided  it  gives  equal  assistance  to 
either.  However,  as  this  is  absolutely  impossible,  and 
as  probably  both  parties  would  complain  about  greater 
favour  shown  to  the  other,  experience  has  led  to  the 
establishment  of  the  following  principle  :  the  basic 
condition  of  neutrality  is  that  a  neutral  State  gives  no 
aid  to  either  combatant. 

The  principal  duties  of  neutral  States  are  the 
following  : — 

i.  The  territory  of  a  neutral  State  must  not  be 
used  for  the  conduct  of  war  by  any  of  the  belligerents. 
In  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870-71,  the  Prussian 
Government  complained  about  Luxemburg's  attitude, 
because  that  country  did  not  prevent  the  flight  of  large 


840  MODERN    GERMANY 

masses  of  French  soldiers  across  Luxemburg  territory 
after  the  fall  of  the  fortress  of  Metz.  The  government 
of  a  neutral  State  must  therefore,  after  a  declaration 
of  war,  prohibit,  the  troops  of  both  belligerents  to 
march  through  the  country,  and  it  must  prevent  the 
establishment  of  factories  and  workshops  in  its  terri- 
tory for  providing  either  belligerent  with  warlike  re- 
quirements. According  to  International  Law,  the 
organising  of  troops  and  the  collecting  of  volunteers 
within  the  territory  of  neutral  States  is  also  prohibited. 

2.  If  a  neutral  State  borders  upon  territory  upon 
which  the  war  is  fought,  its  government  must  place 
sufficiently  strong  military  forces  on  the  frontiers  in 
order  to  prevent  the  crossing  of  the  frontier  on  the 
part  of  the  armies  at  war  which  may  desire  to  march 
through,  to  rest  after  a  battle,  or  to  avoid  capture. 
Every  individual  belonging  to  the  fighting  armies  who 
crosses  the  border  of  a  neutral  State  must  be  disarmed 
and  restrained  from  rejoining  the  armies  during  the 
war.  Organised  bodies  of  soldiers  which  cross  the 
frontier  must  be  treated  in  the  same  manner.  They 
are  not  prisoners  of  war,  but  must  be  prevented  from 
re-entering  the  theatre  of  war.  .  .  . 

Neutral  States  have  the  following  rights  : — 

1.  A  neutral  State  is  entitled  to  remain  at  peace 
while  its  neighbours  are  at  war. 

2.  The  belligerent  States  must  respect  the  integrity 
of   the   neutral   territory.     They   must   not   interfere 
with  the  exercise  of  its  governing  power  even  if  the 
necessity  of  war  should  demand  violation  of  these 
rights.     Consequently,  neutral  States  possess  the  right 
of  asylum  for  members  of  the  armies  at  war  as  long 
as  no  favour  is  shown  to  either  side.     Even  the  re- 
ception of  a  large  or  small  body  of  troops  pursued  by 
the  hostile  army,  does  not  entitle  the  pursuer  to  con- 


THE   GERMAN    CUSTOMS    OF   WAR      841 

tinue  the  pursuit  across  the  frontier  of  a  neutral  State. 
It  is  the  duty  of  a  neutral  State  to  prevent  troops 
which  have  crossed  its  border  to  reorganise  themselves 
and  to  embark  upon  an  attack  across  the  neutral 
frontier. 

3.  If  the  territory  of  a  neutral  State  is  entered 
upon  by  one  of  the  nations  at  war  for  the  purpose 
of  military  action,  the  neutral  State  is  entitled  to 
oppose  the  violation  of  its  territory  by  all  means  in  its 
power,  and  to  disarm  the  troops  which  have  entered  it. 
If  entry  upon  neutral  territory  has  been  effected  by 
order  of  the  army  commander,  the  State  violating  the 
neutrality  is  obliged  to  give  full  satisfaction  and  to 
pay  for  all  the  damage  done.  If  such  violation  has 
been  done  without  authorisation,  the  guilty  parties  are 
liable  to  prosecution  at  law.  If  the  violation  has 
taken  place  in  consequence  of  ignorance  as  to  the 
position  of  the  frontier,  and  not  intentionally,  the 
neutral  State  can  demand  the  immediate  cessation  of 
the  wrong,  and  the  taking  of  measures  which  will 
ensure  that  no  repetition  will  occur. 


CHAPTER   XXXV 

RULES  OF  THE  HAGUE  CONVENTION 

EXTRACTS  from  the  Regulations  adopted  at  the  Hague 
Conference  of  1907,  and  subscribed  to  by  Germany  : — 

Article  2. — "  The  inhabitants  of  a  territory  not 
under  occupation,  who,  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
spontaneously  take  up  arms  to  resist  the  invading 
troops  without  having  had  time  to  organise  them- 
selves .  .  .  shall  be  regarded  as  belligerents  if  they 
carry  arms  openly,  and  if  they  respect  the  laws  and 
customs  of  war." 

Article  3. — "  The  armed  forces  of  the  belligerents 
may  consist  of  combatants  and  non-combatants.  In 
the  case  of  capture  by  the  enemy,  both  have  the  right 
to  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war." 

Article  4. — "  Prisoners  of  war  are  in  the  power  of 
the  hostile  Government,  but  not  of  the  individuals  or 
corps  who  capture  them.  They  must  be  humanely 
treated.  All  their  personal  belongings,  except  arms, 
horses,  and  military  papers,  remain  their  property." 

Article  22. — "  Belligerents  have  not  got  an  un- 
limited right  as  to  the  choice  of  means  of  injuring  the 
enemy." 

Article  23. — "  It  is  particularly  forbidden  to  employ 
poison  or  poisoned  weapons  ;  to  kill  or  wound  by 
treachery  individuals  belonging  to  the  hostile  nation 
or  army  ;  to  kill  or  wound  an  enemy  who,  having  laid 
down  his  arms,  or  no  longer  having  means  of  defence, 
has  surrendered  at  discretion ;  to  declare  that  no 

84a 


RULES    OF   THE   HAGUE    CONVENTION    843 

quarter  will  be  given  ;  to  employ  arms,  projectiles,  or 
materials  calculated  to  cause  unnecessary  sufferings  ; 
to  make  an  improper  use  of  the  flag  of  truce,  of  the 
national  flag,  or  of  the  military  insignia  and  uniform 
of  the  enemy,  as  well  as  of  the  distinctive  sign  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  ;  to  destroy  or  seize  enemy  pro- 
perty, unless  such  destruction  or  seizure  be  impera- 
tively demanded  by  the  necessities  of  war.  ...  A 
belligerent  is  likewise  forbidden  to  compel  the  subjects 
of  the  hostile  party  to  take  part  in  the  operations  of 
war  directed  against  their  own  country,  even  if  they 
were  in  the  service  of  the  belligerent  before  the  com- 
mencement of  war." 

Article  25. — "  The  attack  or  bombardment,  by 
any  means  whatever,  of  undefended  towns,  villages, 
dwellings,  or  buildings  is  forbidden." 

Article  27. — "  In  sieges  and  bombardments  all 
necessary  steps  must  be  taken  to  spare,  as  far  as 
possible,  buildings  dedicated  to  public  worship,  art, 
science,  or  charitable  purposes,  historic  monuments, 
hospitals,  and  places  where  the  sick  and  wounded  are 
collected,  provided  they  are  not  being  used  at  the 
time  for  military  purposes.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
besieged  to  indicate  such  buildings  or  places  by  dis- 
tinctive or  visible  signs,  which  shall  be  notified  to  the 
enemy  beforehand." 

Article  28. — "  The  giving  over  to  pillage  of  a  town 
or  place,  even  when  taken  by  assault,  is  forbidden." 

Article  46. — "  Family  honour  and  rights,  individual 
life,  and  private  property,  as  well  as  religious  con- 
victions and  worship,  must  be  respected.  Private 
property  may  not  be  confiscated." 

Article  47. — "  Pillage  is  expressly  forbidden." 

Article  50. — "  No  collective  penalty,  pecuniary  or 
otherwise,  shall  be  inflicted  upon  the  population  on 


844  MODERN    GERMANY 

account  of  the  acts  of  individuals  for  which  it  cannot 
be  regarded  as  collectively  responsible." 

Extracts  from  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  con- 
cerning the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral  Powers  : — 

Article  i. — "The  territory  of  neutral  Powers  is 
inviolable." 

Article  2. — "  Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move 
troops  or  convoys,  whether  of  munitions  of  war  or  of 
supplies,  across  the  territory  of  a  neutral  Power." 

Article  10. — "The  fact  of  a  neutral  Power  re- 
sisting, even  by  force,  attempts  to  violate  its  neutrality 
cannot  be  regarded  as  a  hostile  act." 


ANALYTICAL    INDEX 


The  abbreviation  "  f."  signifies  "and  following  page";   "  ff. 
"  and  following  pages." 

AGADIR,  223  ff.,  229,  235,  239,  765 
AGRICULTURAL  Labourers,  506  ff. 
AGRICULTURE,  GERMAN,  485  ff.,  791 

Increase  in  Crops  and  Live  Stock,  487  ff.,  721  ff. 
Potash  Salts  used  in,  630 
Scientific,  511  ff. 
and  Co-operation,  5 1 8  ff . 
and  Railways,  524  ff. 

ALLIANCES  and  Treaties,  Binding  force  of,  271  ff. 
Bismarck  on,  19 
Frederick  the  Great  on,  1 8 
Treitschke  on,  28 
ALSACE-LORRAINE,  203,  206  ff. 

ANGLO-GERMAN  differences,  German  evidence  on,  241  ff. 
Relations,  32  ff.,  120  ff.,  241  ff.,  742  ff. 
Trade,  748 
ANTWERP,  70  ff.,  85 
ARBITRATION,  International,  319  ff. 
Bismarck  on,  320  f. 
German  Views  on,  29 
Treitschke  on,  321 
ARMAMENTS,  Limitation  of,  754 
ARMY,  GERMAN,  growth  of,  under  William  II.,  377 
How  it  rules  Germany,  798  ff. 
Insufficient  strength  of,  264,  773 
Preparedness  of,  308  ff . 
Rise  of,  297  ff. 

and  operations  over  sea,  345  ff. 
AUSTRALIA,  Germans  in,  58 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  and  Germany,  21,  38  ff.,  112  f.,  779  ff. 
AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  War  of  1866,  201  f. 

BALANCE  of  Power,  243  f.,  823 

BALTIC  AND  NORTH  SEA  CANAL,  83  f.,  179  ff.,  190,  759  f. 

BALTIC  PROVINCES  OF  RUSSIA,  101  ff. 

Sea,  Germany  and  the,  1 74  ff . 
BEET-SUGAR  Production,  515,  631 
BELGIUM  and  Germany,  20,  55,  80  f.,  787  ff. 
BENEDETTI,  20 

845 


846  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

BERNHARDI,  General  von,  777,  819,  822  flf. 
BERNSTEIN,  EDUARD,  247  i. 
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG,  779,  789,  801,  804 
BISMARCK,  119 

Fiscal  policy  of,  655,  660  ff.,  670  ff. 

Foreign  policy  of,  19  f.,  21  ff.,  30,  763  ff. 

Shipbuilding  policy  of,  605  ff. 

and  France,  211  f.,  213,  215 

and  Great  Britain,  253  ff.,  761  ff. 

and  Italy,  275  ff. 

and  Social  Democratic  Party,  387  ff.,  810  ff. 

on  binding  force  of  Treaties,  19 

on  International  Arbitration,  320  ff. 

on  Railways  and  Railway  policy,  568  ff. 

on  War,  323,  346,  763  ff. 
BOARD  OF   TRADE,  British,  and    German    Industrial   Conditions, 

7295. 

BOERS,  Germany  and  the,  27  f. 
BRAZIL,  Germans  in,  57 
BRITISH  EMPIRE  and  German  Exports,  748 
BiiLow,  PRINCE,  126 

CANADA  and  Germany,  35,  57,  150  ff. 
CANALS  AND  WATERWAYS,  74  ff.,  530  ff. 

Growth  of  Traffic  on,  545,  724  f. 

Neglect  of  British,  535  ff.,  542  ff.,  559  ff. 
CAPRI vi,  von,  214  f.,  318 
CARTELS  and  Trusts,  616  ff.,  642 
CHEMICAL  INDUSTRIES,  626  ff. 

History  of,  626  ff. 

Work  and  Wages  in,  629 

SCIENCE  applied  to  Agriculture,  514 

Education  in,  638  ff. 
CHINA,  134 
COAL  Production  and  Consumption,  Increase  of,  718  f. 

Fields,  German,  remoteness  of  from  sea,  530  ff.,  600  ff. 
COLONIES,  British  and  German,  148  ff.,  750  ff. 
COMPANY  LAWS,  German,  616  f. 
CONSTITUTION,  German,  368  ff.,  433  ff. 
CO-OPERATION  of  Agriculture  and  of  Labour,  5 1 8  ff . 

of  Capital,  616  ff.,  642 

CO-OPERATIVE  Societies,  Savings  deposited  in,  738 
COPENHAGEN,  177  f. 

Coup  d'etat  proposed  by  Bismarck,  810  ff. 
CROPS  and  Live  stock,  increase  in,  487  ff.,  721  ff. 

DELCASSE,  Monsieur,  199,  215  ff.,  291 

DENMARK  and  Germany,  61,  83  f.,  99,  174  ff. 

DISARMAMENT,  754 

DOG-FLESH  and  Horse-flesh,  740  f. 

DOMINIONS,  BRITISH,  and  Germany,  35,  57,  150  ff. 

DORTMUND-EMS  CANAL,  74  ff,  82,  88 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX  847 

EDUCATION,  453  ff. 

Agricultural,  516  ff. 

Chemical,  638  ff. 

Frederick  the  Great  on,  473 

Technical,  478  f. 

University,  476  f.,  640 

William  II.  on,  474  f. 
EDWARD  VII.,  249 

ELECTION   Arrangements   in  Germany,   401    f.,  408    ff.,  441    ff., 
448  ff. 

German  of  1907  and  its  Lessons,  412  ff. 

1912  and  its  Lessons,  426  ff. 
EMDEN,  82 

Canal,  74  ff.,  82,  88,  555  ff. 
EMIGRATION,  German,  701  ff.,  728  f. 
EMPEROR,  German,  powers  of,  368  ff.,  808  ff. 
EMPIRE,  British,  and  Germany,  148  ff.,  750  ff.,  823  ff. 
EMPLOYMENT  and  Unemployment,  698  ff.,  707  ff.,  727 
EXPENDITURE,  Imperial,  growth  of,  377  f. 
EXPORTS,  German,  to  British  Empire,  748 
EXPORTS  and  Imports,  German,  growth  of,  725,  745  f. 

FARES  for  Passengers  on  German  Railways,  588 
FINANCES,  German,  690  ff. 
FINLAND,  Strategical  Importance  of,  108  ff. 
FISCAL  POLICY,  German,  645  ff. 
FOREIGN  POLICY — see  Policy,  Foreign 
FRANCE  and  Germany,  55  f.,  198  ff. 
Population,  increase  of,  205 

FRANCHISE,  German  and  Prussian,  401  f.,  408  ff.,  441  ff.,  448  ff. 
FRANCO-GERMAN  Alliance,  216  ff. 

War,  1870-1871,  203  f.,  302,  310  ff. 

Cost  of,  212 

FRANCO-RUSSIAN  Alliance,  213  f. 
FRANKFURTER  ZEITUNG,  256  ff. 
FREDERICK  THE  GREAT,  Foreign  Policy  of,  1 5  ff. 

Germanising  policy  of,  62 

on  Education,  473 
FREEHOLDS  and  Agriculture,  495  ff. 
FREE  TRADE  and  Protection,  605  ff.,  617  ff.,  645  ff.,  660  ff. 

Bismarck  on,  655,  670  ff. 
FREIGHT  by  Waterway  and  Rail  compared,  552 

Cost  of,  by  Railway,  587 

and  Waterway  compared,  539  f.,  542  ff.,  547  ff. 

GENERALSTAB,  312  ff.,  830  ff. 
GERMANY,  Colonial  Policy  of,  115  ff. 
Early  History  of,  12  ff. 
Foreign  Policy  of,  12  ff. 

Navy  and  Naval  Policy  of,  92  ff.,  174  ff.,  752  ff.,  771  ff. 
Policy  of,  towards  British  Dominions,  35,  148  ff. 
British  Empire,  115  ff.,  750  ff.,  823  ff. 
Canada,  1 50  ff . 


848  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

GERMANY,  Population,  Increase  of,  38  ff.,  116  f.,  205 

Rise  of  Modern,  12  ff. 

Unfavourable  Geographical  Situation  of,  530  ff.,  600  ff. 

Wealth  and  Finances  of,  690  ff . 

World  Policy  of,  115  ff . 

and  the  Baltic,  174  ff. 

and  Denmark,  1 74  ff . 

and  France,  198  ff. 

and  Great  Britain,  32  ff.,  120  ff.,  241  ff.,  742  ff.,  823  ff. 

and  the  United  States,  30,  56  f.,  135,  359  ff.,  825  ff. 
GOLTZ,  Von  der,  142  ff. 
GREAT  BRITAIN,  Bismarck  on,  253  ff.,  761  f. 

German  Policy  towards,  32  ff.,  120  ff.,  241  ff.,  742  ff.,  823  ff. 
Population  in,  56 

Treitschke,  views  on,  27 

and  Germany,  relations  between,  32  ff.,  120  ff.,  241  ff.,  742  ff. 

823  ff. 
GREY,  Sir  Edward,  and  Germany,  241  ff.,  782  ff. 

HAGUE  CONVENTION,  Rules  of  the,  842  ff. 

HAMBURG,  70  ff . 

HELIGOLAND,  182  f.,  214 

HOLLAND  and  Germany,  26,  55,  61,  66  ff.,  144  ff.,  760 

HORSE-FLESH  and  Dog-flesh,  740  f . 

HORSE  Powers,  Increase  of  since  1879,  691,  721 

ILLEGITIMACY  in  Austria,  52 

in  Germany,  463 

IMPORTS  and  Exports  from  Germany,  725,  745  f. 
INCOME  and  Income  Tax,  695  ff.,  739 
INDEBTEDNESS,  Agricultural,  492,  499  f. 
INDIGO,  Chemical,  632  ff. 
INDUSTRIAL  Centres,  German,  remoteness  of  from  sea,  530  ff.,  600  ff. 

Conditions  in  Germany,  690,  717  ff. 
INDUSTRIES,  Growth  of  since  1880,  690,  717  ff.,  721 
INLAND  FLEET,  Growth  of  German,  545  ff.  724  f. 
INLAND  NAVIGATION,  530  ff. 

IRON,  Production  and  Consumption  of,  in  Germany,  720 
ITALY  and  Austria-Hungary,  270  ff. 

Bismarck,  275  ff. 

Triple  Alliance,  270  ff.,  768  f. 

Tripoli,  270  f. 

JAMESON  RAID,  136  ff. 
JENA,  Battle  of,  304 

KARTELS  and  Trusts,  616  ff.,  642 
KIDERLEN  Wachter,  and  Morocco,  231,  268 
KIEL,  83,  179  ff. 
KRUGER  telegram,  1 36  f . 

LABOUR  Conditions,  German,  698  ft.,  726  ff. 
LABOURERS,  Agricultural,  506  ff. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX  849 

LANDOWNERS,  German,  492,  494  ff. 
LAND  REGISTRATION,  German,  505 
LANSDOWNE,  Lord,  and  Germany,  162  ff. 
LASCELLES,  Sir  Frank,  149  ff. 
LIBERAL  PARTY,  GERMAN,  437  ff. 
LIEBIG,  Justus  von,  514  f.,  638  ff. 

LIST,  Friedrich,  Economic  Teachings  of,  565,  646,  647  ff. 
LIVE  STOCK,  German,  487  ff.,  496  ff.,  721  ff. 
and  Crops,  Increase  in,  487  ff.,  721  ff. 

MACHINERY  used  in  German  Agriculture,  498 
MARSCHALL  VON  BIEBERSTEIN,  137,  150 
MEAT,  Consumption  of,  in  Germany,  735  f. 
MERCHANT  MARINE,  German,  600  ff. 

Increase  of,  621  ff. 
METZ,  208  f. 

MOLTKE,  Military  Principle  of,  308 
MONTENEGRO,  282  ff.,  285  f. 
MOROCCO,  199,  218,  223  ff.,  765 
German  Trade  with,  225  ff. 

NAPOLEON  I.  and  Prussia,  304  ff. 
NAPOLEON  III.,  311 
NATIONAL  DEBT,  German,  692  ff. 
NAVY  BILL  of  1898,  140,  248,  325 

1900   and    Amendments,    127,    140,    248    f.,   337  ff.,   415  ff., 

427  ff.,  766 

NAVY  and  Naval  Policy,  German,  92  ff.,  174  ff.,  752  ff.,  771  ff. 
French  and  German  compared,  220  f.,  342  f. 
German,  Growth  of ,  under  William  II.,  377,  771  ff. 
Rise  of,  317  ff. 

and  Invasion  of  England  and  America,  345  ff. 
NAVY  LEAGUE,  German,  324  ff.,  41 5  f. 
NEWSPAPERS,  German,  482 

PAN-GERMANISM,  39  ff. 
PASSENGER  Fares  on  German  Railways,  588 
PAUPERISM  and  Poverty,  713  f.,  741 
PEASANT  Proprietors,  492,  494  ff. 
PHYSIQUE,  National,  526  ff. 
POLAND,  Partition  of,  21 
Germanisation  of,  64 
Russian,  1 10 
POLICY,  Foreign,  of  Bismarck,  19  f.,  21  ff. 

Frederick  the  Great,  1 5  ff . 

Germany,  12  ff. 

Treitschke,  25  ff. 
POPULATION,  Increase  of,  in  Germany,  38  ff.,  1 16  f.,  205 

various  countries,  39 
POSADOWSKY,  Count  von,  161 
PRESS,  German,  482 
PROFESSORS,  Political  influence  of,  25  ff. 

3H 


850  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

PROTECTION  AND  FREE  TRADE,  605  fit.,  617  ff.,  645  ff. 

Bismarck  on,  655,  660  ff,  670  ff. 
PRUSSIA,  Characteristics  of,  118  ff. 

Defeat  of,  by  Napoleon  I.,  304  ff. 

Early  History  of,  12  ff.,  118 

RAILWAYS,  German,  Capital  cost  of,  591  ff. 

Freight  charges  on,  587 

Growth  of  Mileage,  Equipment  and  Traffic,  579  ff.,  724  f. 

Passenger  Fares  on,  588 

Profit  of,  to  the  State,  583 

Rise  of,  563  ff. 

and  Agriculture,  524  ff. 
RAILWAYS  and  Railway  Policy,  Bismarck  on,  568  ff. 

British  and  German  compared,  579,  580,  583  ff. 

and  Germany,  563  ff. 

RHINE,  Economic  Importance  of,  68  ff.,  534,  539  ff. 
Mouths  of,  claimed  by  Germany,  26,  73,  83 
Strategical  Importance  of,  206  ff. 
RHINE-EMS  Canal,  55  ff.,  74  ff.,  82,  88. 
RICHTHOFEN,  Baron  von,  160  ff. 
RINGS  and  Trusts,  616  ff.,  642 
ROON,  Count  von,  310 
ROTTERDAM,  70  ff. 
ROUMANIA  and  Germany,  769 
RURAL  INDUSTRIES,  485  ff. 
RUSSIA  and  Germany,  17  ff.,  31  ff.,  55,  92  ff.,  371  f. 

SALES,  Forced,  of  Agricultural  Land,  492 

SALISBURY,  Marquis  of,  1 50  ff . 

SALONICA,  284 

SAVINGS  BANKS  DEPOSITS,  German,  664,  704  ff .,  737 

SAVINGS  Deposited  in  Co-operative  Societies,  738 

SCHARNHORST,  305  ff. 

SCHOOLS,  German,  453  ff. 
SCIENCE  applied  to  Agriculture,  5 1 1  ff . 
SERBIA,  285,  779  ff. 

SHIPBUILDING    INDUSTRY,   GERMAN,    Capital   and    Dividends    of, 
612  f. 

Expansion  of,  611  ff. 

Hands  employed  by,  613 

Rise  of,  603  ff. 

and  Shipping  Industries,  600  ff. 
SMALL  HOLDINGS,  German,  492  ff. 

SOCIAL  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY,  Disfranchisement  proposed,  399  ff.,  41 7  f 
810  ff.,  819  f. 

Mommsen  on,  394,  407 

Programme  of,  404  ff. 

Rise  and  growth  of,  375,  384  ff.,  431  ff.,  439  f. 

Under-representation  of,  408  ff. 

and  Bismarck,  387  ff.,  810  ff. 

and  the  Navy,  140  f. 

and  William  II.,  367,  384  f.,  395  ff.,  443. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX  851 

SOUTH  AFRICA  and  Germany,  27,  1 36  fif. 

SOUTH  AMERICA,  Germans  in,  57 

SOUTH-WEST  AFRICA,  German,  413  f. 

SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR,  135 

STATE,  Functions  of  in  England  and  in  Germany,  i  fi.,  4  ff. 

STATE  ENTERPRISES,  Income  from  German,  693 

STATE  INSURANCE,  651 

STATE  RAILWAYS — see  Railways 

STEAM  ENGINES,  Increase  in  Horse-power  of,  691,  721 

SUGAR  Production  from  Beet,  515,  631 

SWITZERLAND,  54,  61 

TARIFF  REFORM,  British  and  Anglo-Saxon  Relations,  742  fi. 

TECHNICAL  Education,  German,  478  f. 

TIRPITZ,  Admiral,  126 

TRADE  UNIONS,  German,  738  f. 

TRANSPORT,  Cost  of  by  Waterway  and  Rail,  compared,  539  f.,  542  ff., 

547  ff. 
of  Goods  by  Rail,  cost  of,  587 

and  Waterways  compared,  552,  724  f. 
TRANSPORT  QUESTION,  530  ff. 
TRANSVAAL  and  Germany,  27,  136  ff. 
TREATIES  and  Alliances,  Bismarck  on  Binding  Force  of,  19 

Frederick  the  Great  on  Binding  Force  of,  19 

Treitschke  on  Binding  Force  of,  28 
TREITSCHKE,  Political  Views  of,  25  ff.,  73,  321 
TRIESTE,  279  f. 
TRIPLE  ALLIANCE,  270  ff.,  370  ff.,  768  ff. 

How  concluded,  275  ff. 
TRIPOLI  and  Italy,  270  f. 
TRUSTS  and  Cartels,  616  ff.,  642 
TURKEY  and  Germany,  31,  768  f. 

UNEMPLOYMENT  and  Employment  in  Germany,  698  ff.,  707  ff.,  727 
UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY,  30,  56  f.,  135,  359  ff.,  825  ff. 
UNIVERSITY  Education,  German,  476  f.,  640 

VENEZUELA  AND  GERMANY,  34 

WAGES,  German,  707  ff.,  728  ff. 
WAR  of  1914,  757  ff. 
WAR,  German  customs  of,  830  ff. 
WATERWAYS  AND  CANALS,  530  ff. 

Growth  of  Traffic  on  German,  545,  724  ff. 

Neglect  of  British,  535  ff.,  542,  559  ff. 

WlLHELMSHAVEN,   144  f. 

WILLIAM  II.  as  a  Political  Factor,  363  ff. 
varied  activity  of,  363  ff.,  763  ff. 
and  the  Army,  377,  798  ff. 
and  his  Ministers,  372  f.,  764  ff. 
and  Imperial  Expenditure,  377  f. 
and  Navy  League,  328  f. 
and  Navy,  377  f.,  771  ff. 


852  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

WILLIAM  II.  and  the  Election  of  1907,  419  f. 

and  the  War  of  1914,  763  ff.,  784  ff. 

and  Social  Democracy,  367,  384  f.,  395  ff.,  443 

and  World  Policy,  124  ff.,  763  ff. 

on  Education,  473  f. 

WORKING  CLASSES,  Conditions  of  the  German,  698  ff.,  714  ff. 
WORKMEN'S  INSURANCE,  651 
WORKMEN,  Scarcity  of,  in  Germany,  708  f. 
WORLD  POLICY,  German,  1 1 5  ff . 

YELLOW  PERIL,  32 

ZABERN,  the  lesson  of,  798  ff. 
ZANZIBAR,  214 


Printed  by  BALLANTYNE,  HANSON  &*  Co. 
Edinburgh  &1  London 


UCSB  II 3 RAM 


THE  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Santa  Barbara 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW. 


NOV  28  1988 


IOOM  11/86  Series  9482 


A     000  650  227     2 


